Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations

Author(s): MARTIN STUART-FOX

Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia , April 2004, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April 2004), pp. 116-
139
Published by: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798674

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 Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 1 (2004): 116-139 ISSN 0219-797X

Southeast Asia and China: The

Role of History and Culture in
Shaping Future Relations
MARTIN STUART-FOX

Despite the position of the United States as de facto global

hegemon, China is a rising power in the world. As Chinese
power grows, the projection of Chinese influence will be felt
most acutely in Southeast Asia. Whether to accommodate,
contain or resist China will depend on future developments
that none can foresee, including Chinese ambitions, the policies
of other international players (the U.S., Japan), and the
cohesion or fragility of the Association of Southeast Asia
Nations (ASEAN). This paper argues that in deciding how
best to deal with China, two factors that will influence the
countries of Southeast Asia are their own long histories of
bilateral relations with China and their own differing
conceptions of how foreign relations should be conducted.
This is to argue that history and culture are central to any
understanding of the likely future shape of China-Southeast
Asia relations. Only by taking history and culture into account
will analysts be in a position to predict how the mainland and
maritime states of Southeast Asia are likely to respond to a
more powerful, confident and assertive China.

Introduction: China's Regional Ambitions

China has strategic interests and goals that it is determined to pursue,
even in the face of U.S. opposition.1 These are summed up in the two
phrases that recur again and again in discussions with Chinese officials:
to overcome the "century of humiliation" that China suffered at the
hands of the West and Japan from the First Opium War to the
116

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 117

proclamation of the People's Republic (PRC) in 1949; and in the process

to regain China's "rightful place in the world".2 But what is that "rightful
place"? Chinese leaders are not so unrealistic as to hope to recreate a
new sinocentric world order with China as global hegemon in place of
the United States. They do, however, want China to be recognized as
one of a small and select group of great powers responsible for shaping
the international world order.3
For China to regain its "rightful place", it must remain united (one
lesson of Chinese history is that the Middle Kingdom was weak when
divided) and avoid any loss of territory (in Tibet, Xinjiang or elsewhere).
It is determined, therefore, to regain Taiwan. A primary goal for China
is to remain economically and militarily strong. But to be a world
power, China must exercise influence beyond its frontiers, and that
means particularly in the ring of neighbouring states that China has
historically sought to dominate (at least to the extent that these states
take primary account of China's security and strategic interests). In the
view of China's leaders, only America stands in the way of these
strategic goals. It does this in two ways: by preventing the return of
Taiwan to China (the last galling reminder of the century of humiliation);
and by limiting the influence of China internationally, particularly
through its military presence in East and Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia is important for China for several reasons. Perhaps
the most strategically significant is that Southeast Asia, especially the
mainland as opposed to the maritime states, provides potentially the
most fruitful and receptive region for the projection of Chinese influence.
For as long as Korea remains divided and the U.S.-Japan alliance is in
place, the American military presence is too strong in Northeast Asia.4
In Central Asia, Xinjiang offers a weak base for the projection of Chinese
power, for there China is in competition with Russia, political Islam
and a growing American presence. Despite China's long friendship
with Pakistan, South Asia will always be dominated by India. So this
leaves Southeast Asia, a region where historically, Chinese influence
has been considerable, and to which many Chinese have migrated over
the centuries. Moreover, it is an economically vibrant region in close
communication with China's coastal provinces, the powerhouse of
China's own rapid economic development. It is obviously tempting for
Beijing, therefore, to attempt to draw Southeast Asia into a recognizably
Chinese sphere of influence.5
China consistently denies any ambition to act as a "regional
hegemon"; but such denials ring somewhat hollow in the light of
history. Any historical atlas of East Asia graphically shows the extent
to which Chinese territory has expanded over the centuries. Claims by
Chinese officials and historians that China has been expansionist only

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118 Martin Stuart-Fox

when ruled by non-Chinese dynasties (Mongols, Manchus), in

contradistinction to the peaceable Han, are ingenuous at best. Tang
and Ming armies marched into Central Asia and Southeast Asia. The
Vietnamese in particular have been on the receiving end of a succession
of Chinese invasions. Han Chinese have never shown much
compunction about ruling non-Han Chinese peoples, which they
justified by a conception of China's mission civilisatrice that long pre
dates any European equivalent.6 To this day, China remains an "empire
state", with a policy towards subject peoples that is, despite its
proclaimed minorities policy, essentially assimilationist, as it always
has been historically. This tough-minded realist characterization of
China today needs to be tempered, however, by reference to another
side of its relations with neighbouring peoples and powers, and that
is the genuinely moral dimension that historically has infused China's
view of the world and its relations with other polities. To this I shall
return below.
Just how the rising power of a more nationalistic and confident
China will be accommodated by the countries of Southeast Asia will
depend, of course, on how the great powers respond, especially the
United States and Japan. It will also depend on whether the countries
of Southeast Asia are able to present a common front in dealing with
Beijing. ASEAN now groups ten members. For thirty years after ASEAN
was first formed in 1967 (by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand), Indonesia was its centre of political gravity
and de facto leader; but the combination of economic crisis and the
collapse of the Soeharto regime has seriously undermined Indonesia's
leadership in ASEAN. ASEAN-5 solidarity was forged through support
for Thailand as the frontline state opposing Vietnam's occupation of
Cambodia after 1979. ASEAN-10 would be less likely to agree on a
common response to a threat from China directed against, say, Vietnam,
in the event that dialogue and diplomacy broke down.
The success of ASEAN has been to bring Beijing to deal with
Southeast Asia on a multilateral basis. But although ASEAN has been
remarkably successful in its diplomacy and has gone some way towards
developing a regional security community, it still lacks the internal
cohesion required to resist China. Like that other great power, the
United States, China prefers to pursue its regional ambitions through
bilateral means, and Beijing continues to be assiduous in developing
bilateral relations with Southeast Asian states.7 The question is, therefore:
how are the states of Southeast Asia, severally and together, likely to
respond to Chinese ambitions to become more influential in the region,
even in the face of American opposition? The answer must take account

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 119

of how both sides perceive the world and how best to ensure their
respective strategic and security interests.
My contention is that the relationship between China and Southeast
Asia will inevitably be deeply influenced by both history and culture,
difficult though these are to factor into international relations theory.
Only thus will it be possible to predict the likely responses of the
nations of Southeast Asia confronted by the growing might of China.

Extending Theory
If the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington
taught us anything, it is surely that people see the world in very
different ways. What is less obvious, except in the case of irrational
tyrants, is that states do too. Insofar as the strategic goals of states
embody the aspirations of political leaders and elites, they also embody
their different views of the world. The compromises and agreements
that are regularly worked out between states tend to obscure these
differences, however, for it is an easy assumption to make that the other
side sees the world in a similarly "rational" and "realistic" way. This is
particularly the case where there are great disparities of power, for
there is little incentive for the powerful to make much effort to
understand the weak. Moreover, the practice of international relations
tends to take little account of cultural differences, which are notoriously
difficult to pin down as causes of misunderstanding and conflict between
states. Yet agreements in international relations are often little more
than temporary accommodations to be honoured only until relations of
power change. This is because in many cases they fail to reflect a
genuine meeting of minds, due not so much to unstated reservations on
one or both sides (the Machiavellian explanation), but to an inability to
understand how situations or events could be differently construed.
States sometimes act in irrational ways; "irrational", that is, in
terms of the rational decision-making and game theory models beloved
by the realists in assessing likely outcomes. This could be due to the
pursuit of purely selfish or corrupt interests by a powerful elite (for
example, the purchase of expensive defence equipment by an
impoverished state, either for a ruling elite to remain in power, or
obtain monetary reward); or be driven by ideology (as when Hitler
invaded the Soviet Union, thereby committing Germany to a war on
two fronts). But there are other cases the explanation of which require
more searching investigation into the influence of culture and history
(as, for example, the decisions leading up to the outbreak of the Third
Indochina War between Vietnam and Cambodia and China and Vietnam,

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120 Martin Stuart-Fox

where Cambodian paranoia with regard to Vietnam and a history of

poisonous relations between the communist parties of both countries
led the Khmer Rouge regime to provoke and attack its much larger and
stronger neighbour).8 Too often such cases are dismissed as exceptional,
rather than recognized as paradigmatic.
Theoretical attempts to understand relations between states have
become far more sophisticated than unreconstructed realism, however.
Neorealists now compete with neoliberals to take account of the
complexities of foreign policy decision-making and the multiple factors
affecting international relations.9 But we need to go further in recognizing
the role that cultural and historical factors play in influencing the ways
in which states interact. Recent theoretical approaches point to the way
ahead, notably those collected under the banner of what has been
called "conventional constructivism", which attempts to understand
the world, as opposed to the "critical" variety, which attempts to
change it.10 Two useful constructivist concepts that take seriously the
role played by ideas, norms and expectations in international relations
are "regimes" and "strategic culture". Neither is theoretically
comprehensive, but together they suggest how we might conceptualize
and interpret the influence of history and culture on relations between
states, the better to predict likely future responses to changes in the
international environment.
Regime theory attempts to explain why in the potentially anarchic
realm of interstate relations, where no supra-state coercive force or
"global policing" exists to punish states that refuse to abide by
international conventions and law, states by and large nevertheless do
act in reasonable and law-abiding ways, particularly with respect to
specific issues such as international trade, or the treatment of refugees.11
Regimes are institutional arrangements based upon agreed principles,
norms, rules and procedures (practices more generally), which then
form the model for expected and acceptable state behaviour. States
cooperate in regimes not just because it is in their interest that other
states should accept the same principles and obligations enshrined in
the international agreements they underwrite,12 but also because foreign
policy elites justify acting on behalf of states by claiming to adhere to
certain moral principles. Regime theory thus attempts to take account
of the assumptions and expectations of reciprocity that are shared even
by foreign policy elites representing very different cultural traditions.
Strategic culture takes more specific account than neorealists do
of the ways in which cultural factors influence decisions, but only
insofar as these relate to national security. In particular, it refers to the
beliefs, values and goals that influence the use or threat of force in
relations between states. In the words of one recent study of strategic

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 121

culture in the Asia-Pacific region, the concept assumes that states or

nations hold to

a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the
threat and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental
influences as geopolitical setting, history and political culture.13

Strategic culture recognizes that states do not threaten or use force on

the basis just of realist assessments of likely success based on the
calculus of respective available force levels. Other, cultural factors
enter into strategic thinking and decision-making, which must be taken
into account if we are to understand why states act in the way they do
in response to circumstances.14 These factors include the socialization
and education of leaders and the broader decision-making elite; the
worldview, moral principles, and historical experience they are taught
and believe; the political culture within which they operate; the
geopolitical situation as they perceive it; and how they understand the
interrelationship between internal and external security considerations.
Regime theory, strategic culture and other constructivist approaches
help us to conceptualize and explain aspects of interstate relations that
go beyond the simple calculus of material power. Together they offer
richer, more nuanced, approaches to international relations and point
to ways in which we might include culture and history in our
understanding of bilateral relations between China and the countries
of Southeast Asia.
The core underlying influence on the way states and nations relate
to one another is how their leaders understand the world. "Worldview"
comprises both how the world is constituted (believed to be in a
descriptive sense) and should be constituted (in an ideal and prescriptive
sense). It includes, in other words, notions of cultural identity and
worth as well as national interests and goals. Worldview shapes cultural
beliefs, while its temporal dimension defines our conceptions of time
and history. Both culture and history contribute significantly to how
we think about ourselves as communities or nations, and how we think
about others, using what metaphors and analogies, drawing upon what
prejudices and stereotypes, and in this way exert significant influences
on foreign affairs decision-making. Culture also influences international
relations through the politics of personal ambition and competition for
power (the importance of hierarchy, status and "face"), and the
functioning of national institutions (parties, parliaments, ministries of
foreign affairs, etc.)
Strategic culture rightly takes note of the influence of cognitive
and historical factors, as well as geopolitical relationships, on decision
making, but only in relation to the use of force. But since military

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 122 Martin Stuart-Fox

options only come into play when peaceful relations between states
have broken down, what we need is a conceptual framework that
includes both peace and war. We need to understand how each state
and nation has historically developed its own foreign relations culture,
including not just strategic and military considerations (under what
circumstances force is deemed a legitimate or necessary response), but
also how peaceful intercourse with other states should normally and
properly be conducted (including diplomacy, cultural exchange, trade,
and the treatment of foreign nationals).15
Analysis of such influences on the behaviour of states and nations
towards each other reveals many of the presuppositions underlying
decision and action. Unless we have clear contrary evidence, we should
assume that the world views, and hence the foreign relations cultures,
of two polities differ in important ways. This was certainly the case for
China and the classical kingdoms of Southeast Asia (with the exception
of Vietnam), just as it was for the European powers and China in the
19th century. Yet in the case of the former, it proved possible to reconcile
respective worldviews through what we may term implicit bilateral
relations regimes. These were more informal than issue-focused regimes,
but they too rested on shared principles, norms and expectations, and
required rules to be followed. In large part these rules were determined
by China, but they came to be accepted by ruling elites throughout
Southeast Asian as defining expected behaviour on both sides in relation
to issues of diplomacy, security and trade. We can understand how
bilateral relations regimes came about by comparing the cognitive
assumptions embedded in worldviews, systems of values, perceptions
of strategic interests, and interpretations of historical relationships of
the states that are party to each regime. Where these coincide, the
conduct of relations between two states will often not require shared
commitments to be spelled out, for they will be taken for granted ?
which may cause some astonishment to those who do not share them.
An example would be the willingness of certain Southeast Asian states
(Thailand, Burma) to make use of "family" metaphors in referring to
their relations with China,16 while other states (Indonesia, the
Philippines) would eschew such language.
These two conceptual tools ? foreign relations culture to refer to
the assumptions embodied in worldview in relation to which polities
(today nation-states) understand and conduct their relations with other
polities, and bilateral relations regime to refer to the compromise set of
(often implicit) norms, understandings and procedures which two
polities come to accept in conducting relations with each other ?
enable us to understand why historically relations between China and
Southeast Asia took the form they did.

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 123

Until the 19th century, China, by virtue of its size and power, both
economically and militarily, was able to impose its uncompromising
worldview to construct what amounted to a hegemonic international
order covering all aspects of its relations with other polities. The
question is: why did Southeast Asian kingdoms go along with this? Did
they do so for purely pragmatic reasons in order to promote profitable
trade? Were there other reasons that had to do with security, both
internal and external, or status? Or were Chinese demands not resented
because they could be accommodated within Southeast Asian views of
the world, and so were not considered outrageous in the way they
seemed to be to 19th century European envoys? As we shall see, to such
questions history and the cultural presuppositions embedded in
worldview provide answers that also shed light on contemporary
relations.
Towards the end of the 19th century, China was forced to come to
terms with an entirely different international order, based on a very
different view of the world and how relations between states should be
conducted. This was a world of competing empires, in which the
Chinese empire attempted to claim some standing, until humiliated by
the West and Japan. Yet, thanks largely to the mutual antagonism of its
opponents, the Chinese empire remained essentially intact. Even after
the fall of the Qing dynasty, though it lost its hegemonic influence in
Southeast Asia, China continued to rule over non-Chinese peoples
beyond its core cultural area (Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs). It was in
this sense that China constituted an "empire-state".
This was a difficult transitional period, even after China became
a republic, for the world system of nation-states was itself evolving.
Only after the Second World War, when countries in Southeast Asia
became independent, did the United Nations as a forum of nominally
equal sovereign states come to embody what we take for granted as the
contemporary world order. It was in this context, in which the Peoples'
Republic of China after 1949 was initially a pariah state excluded
from the UN, that relations between the new China and the newly
independent states of Southeast Asia had to be fashioned. The first
stages of this process were complicated by the continued presence of
former colonial powers, by the U.S. military presence in the region, by
China's revolutionary ambitions, and by the internal politics of
Southeast Asian nations. The later stages are still in the process of
being worked out. What their form will be into the 21st century is
unclear, though it is possible, in the light of history and political
culture, to discern some key trends.
It is impossible in this brief article to do more than sketch the
changing relations between China and Southeast Asia. Over the course

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 124 Martin Stuart-Fox

of more than a millennium, China as unified empire (for most of the

time) and Southeast Asia comprising a collection of principalities,
kingdoms and eventually nation-states, evolved their own individual
foreign relations cultures ? covering diplomatic, economic, cultural,
political, and strategic contacts.17 Over this same period both sides
developed bilateral relations regimes that rested not just on a coincidence
of interests and a degree of compatibility between worldviews, but
increasingly on shared historical experience. It is my contention that
these cultural and historical factors continue to impact upon
contemporary relations between China and Southeast Asia. If we wish
to predict the likely ways in which the nation-states of Southeast Asia
are likely to respond to a more powerful and assertive China in the
future, we must take such factors into consideration.

Culture and History

We must begin with worldview. While the worldviews of dominant
political elites change over time, some elements remain remarkably
stable. The reason for this is partly that they tend not to be subjected to
critical scrutiny. The English philosopher R.G. Collingwood called
these "absolute presuppositions", the bedrock assumptions (axioms)
upon which entire structures of cognition rest. Upon these depend the
"relative presuppositions" that constitute basic beliefs about divinity,
self, society, and the natural world, and how these interrelate.18
Relations between China and Southeast Asia go back over two
thousand years. For most of that time, relations between successive
Chinese dynasties and the various kingdoms and principalities of
Southeast Asia were conducted according to Chinese-imposed rules,
constituting what has been called the Chinese, or sinocentric, world
order.19 This world order, often referred to as the "tributary system",
rested on a set of assumptions about the ideal structure of social
relationships, which was itself grounded in Chinese cosmology; that
is, on the relationship believed to exist between Heaven, Earth and
humankind. This Chinese worldview took time to evolve. Its roots go
back to the Shang and Zhou dynasties, while its elaboration owes
much to Confucius, Mencius and the eclectic philosophers of the later
Han dynasty.
Key aspects of the Chinese worldview are essential for any
understanding of China's historical relations with Southeast Asia. A
first point to note is that all humankind was believed to partake in a
single hierarchical social order, presided over by the emperor of China,
the Son of Heaven. A second point is that it was the will of Heaven, as
a moral force, that this social order should reflect the divine cosmic

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 125

harmony; that is, that human society should function as harmoniously

as the natural world (in accordance with the Dao). A third point is that
it was taken for granted that Chinese civilization was superior to all
others. Let me expand briefly on each of these as they affected China's
view of, and relations with, the non-Chinese world.
The emperor did not simply stand at the apex of Chinese society,
he was the point of contact between the heavenly macrocosm and the
earthly microcosm.20 The sacrifices he performed at the temples of
Heaven and Earth were essential to ensure Heaven's blessing. Any
moral shortcomings on his behalf would provoke Heaven's displeasure,
as revealed by signs and portents (floods, earthquakes, etc.). Social
chaos and rebellion might either be a severe warning, or even indicate
that the dynasty had lost the mandate of Heaven to rule ? not just the
Middle Kingdom, but "all under Heaven" [tian-xia). Given this cosmic
role, the Son of Heaven was the unique and only universal ruler, whom
all other subsidiary rulers had perforce to recognize. The hierarchical
social order over which the emperor presided thus extended beyond
the Middle Kingdom to encompass all barbarian realms.
In a cosmic sense, harmony {ho) depended on maintaining a
proper balance between the universal principles of yin and yang. In a
social sense, as Confucius taught, it required everyone to fulfil the
social role allotted to them.21 The link between the two was ensured
by the moral power, "virtue" (de), of the emperor. Universal recognition
of this power was essential to extend the ideal social harmony of the
Middle Kingdom to include neighbouring kingdoms. Barbarian kings
were appointed "pacification superintendents" with mandarin rank.22
Their task was to ensure that peace prevailed along ill-defined frontiers.
Should war break out between them, they could expect a visit from a
Chinese envoy who would admonish them to mend their ways, for
any breakdown in social harmony was always believed to be due to
moral failure.
There was thus a moral dimension to China's traditional foreign
relations. It was the moral duty of the emperor to extend his benevolence
to "all under Heaven", and that meant to extend the benefits of Chinese
civilization. That this civilization was superior to all barbarian ways
went without saying. Any refusal to acknowledge this was therefore
perverse, just as was any defiance of the emperor's will. Chinese policy
towards internal or frontier minorities was thus strongly assimilationist
and inherently expansionist. Opposition to Chinese expansion and
assimilation was punished, but the punishment was justified in moral
terms. While such justification could be cynically self-serving, the fact
that it had to be framed in terms of Confucian morality could not help
but influence how policy decisions were decided upon and endorsed.

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 126 Martin Stuart-Fox

Punishment applied above all to frontier barbarians. Those from

further afield were inscribed within the Chinese world order by being
instructed in the finer points of ritual submission. Whenever Chinese
dynasties were strong all contact with foreign powers, even for purposes
of trade, were required to take the form of official "tributary" missions,
led by envoys who duly performed obeisance and offered gifts to the
Son of Heaven, which in Chinese eyes constituted recognition of his
superior status.
The early kings and kingdoms of Southeast Asia went along with
this Chinese-imposed world order not because they shared its underlying
assumptions, but for the practical purpose of trade.23 Their view of the
world was very different, shaped as it was by Indian (Hindu or Buddhist)
beliefs about the workings of karma and the transitory nature of human
existence and human institutions. Differentials of power, in their view,
were contingent and shifting, to be accommodated until things changed
? as they inevitably would. Chinese pretensions and power were
politely recognized as current reality, not as the immutable expression
of Heaven's will.
Tribute provides an important case study of differing Chinese and
Southeast Asian perceptions. In Southeast Asian kingdoms, tribute was
designed, like taxation, to transfer wealth, in the form of valuable local
products (gathered, grown, mined or manufactured), to the capital and
centre of power. All that regional rulers received in return were status
and protection. In "tributary" relations with China, however, the emperor
regularly returned gifts of greater value, as proof of his benevolence and
largesse. Such "equal" exchanges were interpreted by Southeast Asian
rulers in quite a different light from the tributary relations they imposed
on their subordinates. What for the Chinese was ritual submission to
the Son of Heaven was for Southeast Asian rulers a ritual of polite
diplomacy required as a condition of trade. In this way incompatible
worldviews could be reconciled within a mutually acceptable bilateral
relations regime.
The tributary relationship with China did carry with it moral
obligations on both sides. In return for the acceptance by tributary
kingdoms of the Chinese world order, China was obligated to conduct
fair trade and provide formal protection. The emperor's benevolence in
allowing trade flowed from the power of his virtue, which had been
symbolically recognized by the act of submission. Moreover, all
tributaries were treated equally, as "children" of the emperor. Family
metaphors were often used to describe the relationship. But family
relations for the Chinese and for Southeast Asians were always
hierarchical ? father to son, husband to wife, older brother to younger

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 127

brother (there is no word for "brother", tout court, in Chinese or most

Southeast Asian languages).24 Each knew where the other stood.
Over the centuries, China and the kingdoms of Southeast Asia
learned to deal with each other. They developed, in other words, a set
of procedures and expectations that were never jointly endorsed in the
form of a written treaty, but which nevertheless provided the basis for
mutual accommodation and intercourse. The envoys of powerful
Southeast Asian rulers kowtowed before the Chinese emperor, while
the rulers themselves politely refused invitations to make the pilgrimage
to the Chinese capital. With the exception of certain emperors of Vietnam
(see below), only minor potentates from trading ports like Brunei
and the Malacca Sultanate, ever presented themselves in person to
acknowledge Chinese suzerainty.
As the only state in Southeast Asia that had been for over a
thousand years a province of the Chinese empire, Vietnam was always
acutely aware of the threat China posed to its national independence.
This was because several new Chinese dynasties sought to demonstrate
their power by reconstructing the empire at its greatest extent. For this
reason, Chinese armies invaded Vietnam far more often than any other
Southeast Asian kingdom. On each occasion the Vietnamese fought
doggedly to defeat them, on Vietnamese soil ? only to be faced with
the prospect of another invasion to exact revenge for the defeat of the
first. The only way to prevent this was to re-inscribe as a tributary in
the Chinese world order, by sending a delegation to acknowledge the
new emperor. Gracious reception of the delegation placed Vietnam once
again under the nominal protection of China, and so reduced the risk of
invasion ? until a new dynasty took power. So a pattern developed in
Sino-Vietnamese relations ? a bilateral relations regime ? which both
sides well understood. It was a regime with mutual obligations: Vietnam
sent tributary missions to China, while China extended nominal protection
to Vietnam. As late as 1879, the Vietnamese emperor Tu Due called upon
China as Vietnam's suzerain power for assistance in suppressing bandits
along their common frontier, at a time when France was rapidly putting
an end to Vietnamese independence.25

The Changing World Order

The first European traders in East Asian waters had no alternative, if
they wanted to trade, but to accept the Chinese world order. Portuguese,
Spanish and Dutch envoys performed the triple kowtow before Qing
emperors. Not until Lord Macartney's mission of 1793 did a European
ambassador refuse to kowtow.26 This did not prevent the Chinese from

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 128 Martin Stuart-Fox

implying that he had, in order to preserve China's established foreign

relations culture ? a pretence that was kept up almost to the end of the
Qing dynasty.
There was no escaping the fact, however, that power relations
were rapidly changing. The European world order was replacing that
of China in Southeast Asia, a shift clearly recognized by King
Chulalongkorn of Siam, the last independent Southeast Asian state,
when he abrogated his tributary recognition of Chinese suzerainty in
1882.27 Chinese influence in Southeast Asia had reached its nadir,
though the late Qing did try to compensate by turning to the overseas
Chinese.
Republican China under the Guomindang (GMD) was too
preoccupied with internal conflict and then the war with Japan to do
much to recover lost Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. The entire
region remained under European domination, except for Thailand, and
Bangkok refused to establish diplomatic relations, despite Chinese
urging. All that the GMD could do was to target overseas Chinese in
competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a strategy that
alarmed both colonial authorities in Southeast Asia and indigenous
elites. Republican Chinese relations with the region were complicated
still further by a nationality law that claimed all descendants of a
Chinese father as Chinese. It would take the PRC three decades to solve
the problem of the overseas Chinese, by eliminating any possibility of
dual nationality through declaring all overseas Chinese to be citizens
of their countries of residence.28
The victory of the CCP was supposed to inaugurate a whole new
age in China's relations with the rest of the world. In fact, several key
components of the worldview implicit in China's traditional foreign
relations culture carried over into the Chinese Marxist-Leninist
worldview. One was a preoccupation with status based on the hierarchy
of power. China has always had difficulty seeing itself as just one of a
number of nominally equal nation-states. China might treat visiting
heads of mini-states with scrupulous attention, just as it did the envoys
of minor tributaries (for all barbarians were equal before the Son of
Heaven), but this did not in any way lessen the superior status of China
itself. The PRC, in its chaotic swings of foreign policy under Mao
Zedong, never deviated in two matters: in attempting always to play
above its league as a major power alongside the United States and the
Soviet Union; and in portraying itself always as the natural leader (of
revolutionary movements, the Third World, etc.).29
The desire to lead was related to a second component of traditional
Chinese foreign relations culture that carried through to the PRC: a
conviction of the superiority of Chinese example. The Chinese revolution

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 129

was the model for all others to follow. The patronizing superiority with
which Chinese mandarins lectured visiting envoys found its parallel in
the insufferable way senior communist officials lectured visiting foreign
communist delegations, not least those from Southeast Asia.30 In turn
this related to a third carry-over component: the moralistic dimension
in Chinese foreign policy. Policies as diverse as coexistence, anti
hegemonism, or "equal benefit" trade policy have tended to be
proclaimed as moral principles, with moral fervour.31
Underlying these parallels has been the structural similarity between
the authoritarian and hierarchical dictatorship exercised by the CCP
and the equally authoritarian and hierarchical Confucian mandarinate.
The role of history and economics may be radically different in the
Confucian and Marxist-Leninist worldviews, but not beliefs about how
power should be concentrated and exercised, and by whom.
The CCP came to power just as Western imperialism was
withdrawing from Southeast Asia. This provided Beijing with an
opportunity the Republic of China had never had, to develop new
bilateral relations regimes with independent states throughout the region.
But the process of decolonization, though brief and amicable in the
case of Burma, was accompanied by more or less protracted violence
everywhere else. China's support for anti-colonial revolutionary
movements, particularly in Malaya and Indochina, made it difficult to
establish satisfactory relations with newly independent governments
still beholden to the West for their security under the aegis of the new
regional hegemon, the United States. The distinction developed by
Beijing between government-to-government and party-to-party relations,
while it allowed China some flexibility in juggling revolutionary rhetoric
and diplomacy, engendered understandable suspicion. Not until well
into the era of Deng Xiaoping was this dichotomy finally dispensed
with as an element complicating bilateral relations regimes.
New bilateral relations regimes did, however, gradually develop.
Burma, the first Southeast Asian nation to establish diplomatic relations
with the PRC, was a good example. In effect, Burma resuscitated elements
of its traditional paukpauw (sibling) relationship that accorded China
seniority, and thus status, within a presumed common family of states
in which each took account of the interests of the other.32 Strict Burmese
neutralism reinforced Chinese security along its long and porous
southwestern border, in return for Chinese non-intervention in Burma's
chaotic internal affairs, in particular minimal material (as opposed to
rhetorical) support for the Burmese Communist Party.
New bilateral relations regimes were also established with Sukarno's
Indonesia and Sihanouk's Cambodia, neither of which, because of their
narrow leader-to-leader basis, survived changes in regime. In Indochina,

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 130 Martin Stuart-Fox

Beijing was first to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

(DRV). But Sino-Vietnamese relations were soured by Beijing's great
power play at the Geneva Conference of 1954, which left the Vietnamese
Communists with only half the country, thus setting the stage for the
Second Indochina War.33 Throughout the period from 1950 to 1975,
moreover, China's own disastrous policies (the Great Leap Forward, the
Cultural Revolution and its aftermath) ensured that relations with
Southeast Asia remained fraught with tension.
The period from the ceasefire agreement between the United States
and Vietnam early in 1973 to the death of Mao in 1976 marked a major
shift in China's relations with Southeast Asia. American military
disengagement from Vietnam signalled, in effect, American military
withdrawal from all of mainland Southeast Asia. The subsequent
American closure of bases in the Philippines merely confirmed what
everyone in the region knew: never again would American ground
forces be committed to the defence of mainland Southeast Asian states,
not even to Thailand, with which the United States maintained a
formal security pact. In quick succession in 1974 and , 1975, three
members of the staunchly anti-communist Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand,
established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Indonesia was more
hesitant, while Singapore waited for Jakarta.
At the same time three Southeast Asian states ? Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos ? became communist. The opportunities for expanded Chinese
influence in Southeast Asia were thus obvious. The only thing that
circumscribed these opportunities to some extent was the continuing
context of the Cold War. By the end of 1978, however, when Vietnam
invaded Cambodia, China was ready to take advantage of the situation.
It was China, far more than either ASEAN or the United States, which
orchestrated both Cambodian resistance to the Vietnamese occupation
and the timing of the solution to the "Cambodian problem".34
The impact for China-Southeast Asia relations of the collapse of
the Soviet Union was two-fold: it removed yet another outside power,
and it enabled China to re-establish relations with Vietnam on Beijing's
terms. The sequence of events, from China's brief border incursion to
"punish" Vietnam for invading Cambodia (use of the term itself evokes
China's traditional foreign relations culture) to normalization of relations
a decade later, awoke powerful historical memories for both countries.
When Vietnamese forces blunted the Chinese offensive, Hanoi declared
victory. But this had happened before. Only Soviet support allowed
Vietnam to avoid what it eventually was forced to do after that support
was withdrawn: ensure its own security by apologetically re
acknowledging China's superior status, symbolically demonstrated by

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 131

the visit of Vietnam's top leaders to China to conclude the normalization

process. The historical precedents may not have been obvious to Western
observers, but they certainly were to both participants.35
The reforms of Deng Xiaoping and his 'four modernizations' placed
China in a strong position to weather the collapse of communism in
Europe and the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Economic
growth and trade had taken precedence over political brinkmanship
and ideological posturing in China's relations with the world. Beijing
had at last realized that increased national wealth provided the best
basis for military modernization, a development whose implications
were not lost on Southeast Asian elites. Add to this the CCP's increasing
appeal to Chinese nationalism and China's steadfast claim to all the
islands in the South China Sea, and the "threat" of increased Chinese
influence in the region becomes evident.
What stands in the way of de facto Chinese hegemony in Southeast
Asia is, of course, the United States ? not as a committed regional
player as it was dining the Second Indochina War, but as the sole global
superpower determined to remain as such. This is at present enough to
thwart Chinese ambitions, much to the annoyance of Beijing, but will
it suffice in the longer term if a China growing stronger pursues its
national interests more aggressively? How will the nation-states of
Southeast Asia respond, both to China and to the United States? The
answer to such questions must, I maintain, take account of both culture
and history, as these influence the foreign relations cultures of the
various states and their bilateral relations regimes with China.

The Future Shape of China-Southeast Asia Relations

At present China is pursuing what has been aptly called a "calculative
strategy"36 to attain its longer-term strategic goals of reunification
(inclusion of Taiwan) and corresponding prevention of disintegration
of the empire-state (as happened to the Soviet Union), national security
in the face of hostile powers (notably the United States), and return to
its "rightful" place in the world (recognition of great power status). The
key elements of this strategy are rapid economic growth through
promotion of a market economy; preservation of an amicable
international environment; avoidance of conflict while modernizing
military capability; and expansion of China's international influence
through both bilateral and multilateral means.
To this end China has shown itself prepared to act as a good
international team player. Beijing has cooperated in the "war on terror",
been constructive in the United Nations and other international forums,
has been fair in resolving minor differences over land borders (for

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 132 Martin Stuart-Fox

example, with Vietnam ? at least in the sense that the agreement did
not transfer large areas to China) while reserving its claim to all the
islands of the South China Sea, and has promoted freer trade (by
joining the WTO, and by signing a free trade agreement with ASEAN).
But how long will this last? What might derail Beijing's current strategy?
One thing, of course, would be a collapse of control by the CCP, to
which the "calculative strategy" itself might even contribute. Regional
leaders, the military, or a growing wealthy middle and professional
class may demand more political say; or growing disparities in wealth
may create massive social unrest. If the CCP did lose power, this would
only be in the context of political and social turmoil, which would be
likely to provoke an unprecedented movement of population,
particularly into Southeast Asia. This would be highly destabilizing,
and very likely result in regional conflict.
Another possibility is that China's very economic success could
provoke regional tensions. Increasingly, direct foreign investment that
previously went to Southeast Asia is being diverted to China, while the
flow of cheap Chinese goods into Southeast Asia undercuts local
manufactures. Both of these are adding to already high levels of
unemployment in the region.
The two most likely reasons why the "calculative strategy" might
be discarded, however, are because China itself for nationalistic reasons
decides to embark on some strategic adventure (such as invading Taiwan,
or seizing the Spratly Islands), or conversely because the United States
again decides that China, rather than terrorism, poses the greatest threat
to Washington's global hegemony and adopts a more aggressive attitude
towards her (as the present Bush administration appeared ready to do
upon taking office). The first of these possibilities would directly
challenge the United States in the case of Taiwan, and probably lead to
war; or in the case of the Spratlys threaten international sea lanes
(though Beijing could issue assurances in that regard). In the case of a
Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Southeast Asian states would attempt to
remain neutral; in the case of the Spratlys they would be more likely to
recoil into the arms of America.
But could the ASEAN states remain neutral in a conflict between
America and China? They would certainly try. And would they present
a common front in opposing any unilateral Chinese seizure of islands
in the South China Sea? This is rather less likely, given the international
tensions such a move would provoke. A third question is more
immediate, in the light of current American strategic thinking: how
would the countries of Southeast Asia be likely to respond to American
attempts to limit Chinese power, to constrain or contain longer-term
Chinese great power ambitions?

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 133

Historically Southeast Asian states have shown themselves reluctant

to join balance-of-power coalitions. The South-East Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) only ever had two Southeast Asian members
(Thailand and the Philippines) at a time when American power
dominated the region. Indonesia feared foreign entanglement, while
Burma did not want to antagonize China. ASEAN, its members have
been keen to reiterate, is not such an organization. Balance of power is
a Western conception, useful in a politically divided region like Europe
where a coalition of smaller powers could counter a larger one. But
historically it was never part of strategic thinking in Southeast Asia,
which has always had to face the overwhelmingly preponderant power
of China. Southeast Asian kingdoms, with the fleeting exception of
three Tai principalities in the late 13th century, never made common
cause against China. Rather they preferred to ensure their security by
enrolling as good tributaries in the Chinese world order, and relying on
the obligations that entailed on the part of China.
Even if faced with a militarily aggressive China, it is unlikely that
any mainland Southeast Asian state would join a U.S.-led coalition ?
if only because they would know that there is very little likelihood that
American troops would ever be committed to their defence. Far more
likely is that each would draw upon its own historical relationship
with China (for each a significant dimension of its bilateral relations
regime with Beijing) in the light of its own foreign relations culture to
assure its own security.
Burma and Vietnam have historically defeated invading Chinese
armies, only to ensure their security by re-inscribing in the Chinese
world order. This was in no way humiliating: it was a sensible course
of action. The modern Sino-Burmese bilateral relations regime has
worked well for both countries. Burma obtained non-interference, and
China a peaceful frontier. More recendy Burma has been able to disregard
Western threats of sanctions, while China has expanded trade and
gained access to the Bay of Bengal.37 For Vietnam, the failure of its
Soviet policy provides a telling historical lesson: China is always next
door and must be dealt with on its own terms. The Vietnamese
understand the Chinese better than anyone else in Southeast Asia, for
they share much of the Chinese worldview. Tough self-reliance has
proved their best course of action.
As for Thailand, it shares no common border with China, but a
central component of Thai foreign relations culture has always been to
"go with the strength" as the best means of preserving Thai security and
independence. Bangkok was a close ally of Britain in colonial times, of
Japan during the Second World War, and of America immediately after
it. These days, Thai diplomats and academics claim that Thailand

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 134 Martin Stuart-Fox

enjoys the best relations with China of any country in Southeast Asia,
despite its security arrangement with the United States. Thailand will
not join a coalition opposed to China, and the Chinese know it. As for
weak and vulnerable Laos and Cambodia, they have always looked to
China more as a protector against powerful neighbours (Thailand and
Vietnam) than as a threatening great power.
The situation for the maritime states (in which I include Malaysia
and Singapore, as well as the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei) is not
so clear-cut. Singapore, as a wealthy Chinese island in a Malay sea, has
always been careful not to get out of step with its neighbours, and is
unlikely to serve either as an advanced garrison for China or a lone
bastion for America, despite providing facilities for U.S. warships.
Brunei, despite its historic trading links with China, will also take its
lead from its neighbours. Malaysia too has a long history of trading ties
with China (mainly via Malacca). The Malay elite has pursued closer
economic ties with East Asia in preference to the West. Indeed now
Malaysia vies with Thailand in claiming to have the friendliest relations
with Beijing.38 Kuala Lumpur would thus be unlikely to side with the
United States in a confrontation with China (especially if the former
was perceived to be anti-Islamic).
The Philippines bilateral relations regime with China is relatively
weak, lacking as it does both historical depth and the cultural
components of the mainland states. The trading regime with Manila
was conducted under Spanish auspices and involved overseas Chinese,
not Filipinos. Only the Sulu Archipelago had historical trading links
comparable to Brunei or Malacca, but Sulu did not then fall under any
Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippines after independence developed
much closer relations with Taiwan than with the PRC. Moreover the
Philippine ruling elite is Catholic with cultural ties to Europe and to
Latin America, and no historical memories of being part of a sinocentric
world order. If history constitutes a dimension of Philippine foreign
policy culture, it favours links with the United States, as a former
colony, in common resistance to Japan, and in joint security
arrangements. Of all the ASEAN states, the Philippines is the most
likely to support America in a confrontation with China. Manila's
primary concern in such a situation would be that doing so would
break ASEAN solidarity.
That leaves Indonesia, the largest and most populous state in
Southeast Asia, formerly the centre of political gravity of ASEAN, but
now weakened by internal conflict and division. Indonesia, more
particularly the trading ports of Java and Sumatra, has a long history of
relations with China. The conversion of most of what is now Indonesia
to Islam did not weaken these trading links so much as strengthen

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 135

equally important links to India and the Persian Gulf. The Muslim
worldview sat uneasily beside the pretensions of the Son of Heaven,
but from the 17th century relations with China were brokered by the
Dutch, not the sultans of Central Java. Moreover, independent Indonesia
saw itself as inheriting the historical and cultural legacy of the Java
centred kingdom of Majapahit, rather than the divisive competition of
the trading ports.
Briefly under Sukarno independent Indonesia entered into close
relations with the PRC, each in the belief that it was the leader of
"newly emerging forces" in the world.39 It was a relationship that could
not last. Under Soeharto, Indonesia established itself as de facto leader
of ASEAN: the "ASEAN way" was in large measure the Javanese way.
This placed Indonesia in direct competition with China for influence in
the region. Jakarta was highly suspicious of Chinese intentions, and it
was not until 1990 that diplomatic relations were finally re-established.
With the fall of Soeharto, ASEAN lost the cohesion that a strong
Indonesia had provided, but the Indonesian elite did not lose the belief
that Indonesia should rightfully be primus inter pares among the ASEAN
states. Given its deep-rooted suspicions of China, its large population
and its Islamic heritage, Indonesia still stands as probably the principal
opponent to increased Chinese influence in Southeast Asia ? provided
it does not break apart. Any break-up of Indonesia could, of course,
only benefit the extension of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
Indonesia's opposition to China does not, however, make it a
natural ally of America. After independence, Indonesia never joined
any U.S.-led coalition: it always saw itself as a neutral regional leader,
not a Cold War follower. Despite being a secular state, Indonesia
retains strong ties with the Muslim world, and shares with it a lurking
distaste for American policies and culture. For these reasons, Indonesia
would not easily join an American-led confrontation with China.
Moreover, it would be more reluctant than the Philippines to
undermine ASEAN solidarity.

Conclusion: Southeast Asia's Responses to a Rising China

So how are the states of Southeast Asia likely to respond to the rising
power of China in the face of U.S. determination to maintain its
unchallenged position of the world? Will they side with the world
superpower? Certainly not in the case of the mainland states, and
probably not in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia. Possibly the U.S.
could construct an offshore coalition of states to contain China, running
from Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines ? excluding Indonesia ?
to Australia, perhaps even with visiting rights in nominally neutral

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 136 Martin Stuart-Fox

Singapore. But Washington cannot hope to sign up ASEAN as a bloc,

no matter how great suspicions are of China.
If the United States sought to contain a more bellicose China
through constructing a de facto balance-of-power alliance, ASEAN
would break apart. Even if China unilaterally resorted to force in
seizing some or all of the islands of the South China Sea, ASEAN would
be unlikely to hold together, particularly if the Taiwan issue had
already been resolved by political means, through some variant of the
"one country, two systems" formula. This would leave each country to
work out its own salvation ? with either Beijing or Washington. In
both scenarios, therefore, the ensuing crisis would more likely divide
rather than unite ASEAN, for the mainland states, including Thailand
and, with extreme reluctance, Vietnam, would side with China. This
would not just be because of geography, but also because history and
culture predispose the countries of Southeast Asia to draw on their
own experience of the benefits of due deference to status in working
out their relations with China.
This preference of the countries of Southeast Asia to deal with
China in their own way can be labelled accommodation, and denounced
as weakness, but as a response it needs to be understood. Though the
ASEAN states may prefer to deal with China as a group, it is upon their
bilateral relations regimes that they will ultimately have to rely ? and
these are deeply influenced by history and culture. Southeast Asian
leaders are thus likely to give China what they believe the Chinese want
? due deference, status as a great power, recognition of China's interests
even while pursuing their own ? in return for non-interference in their
internal affairs and fair trading relations. These are what China
traditionally provided. This would be to trade on the moral dimension
of Chinese foreign relations culture, which realists would consider
something of a weak reed. But Southeast Asian states taking this course
would do so on a stronger basis than realists might realize. For to accept
de facto Chinese hegemony would not imply neglecting military
preparedness. As in the past, any Chinese invasion would be vigorously
resisted ? after which due acceptance of Chinese hegemony would
again need to be symbolically re-established.

NOTES
1 It is easily forgotten, amidst the clamour of the "war on terrorism", that before
11 September 2001, the Bush administration viewed China as the principal threat
to continuing American global hegemony in the 21st century. A temporary
commonality of interest ? China is eager to suppress Islamic-driven Uighur
nationalism in Xinjiang ? has reduced overt antagonism, but only in the short

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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 137

term; the American radical nationalist strategy of preemptive elimination of whatever

might be considered a threat to U.S. global domination has implications for China
that Beijing can hardly have missed.
2 I am particularly grateful to the many officials and scholars, too numerous to name,
in both Beijing and ASEAN capitals who have kindly given me their time over the
years to discuss China's relations with Southeast Asia.
3 The list mentioned several times in discussions in Beijing comprised the U.S., the
EU, Russia, India, Japan, and of course China.
4 Even if the United States were to withdraw completely from Northeast Asia, Japan
would resist being drawn into China's orbit, as it always did historically; while a
reunified Korea, though it would want to cultivate good relations with Tokyo,
would probably accept de facto Chinese hegemony.
5 Thammy Evans, "The PRC's Relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum:
Realpolitik, Regime Theory or a Continuation of the Sinitic Zone of Influence
System", Modern Asian Studies 37 (2003): 737-63, in which she argues that
Chinese reasons for joining are best understood in neither neorealist nor neoliberal
terms, but rather as a continuation of the hierarchical way China has always viewed
and conducted international relations.
6 See Geoff Wade, "Chinese Imperial Expansion during the Early Ming: Two
Examples", paper presented at the International Convention of Asian Scholars,
Noordwijkerhout, 1998, p. 3.
7 Beijing's New Security Concept does, however, operate on both bilateral and
multilateral levels, always, as in China's membership of the ASEAN Regional
Forum, in China's national interests (see Evans, "The PRC's Relationship with the
ASEAN Regional Forum").
8 This is the subject of an excellent study by Stephen J. Morris, Why Vietnam
Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1999).
9 See David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993).
10 Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory",
International Security 23 (1998): 171-88. Other approaches include the notion of
"securitization" developed by the so-called Copenhagen School, which focuses on
the way elites identify and politicize security issues, and "human security", which
focuses on the welfare of individuals. For a discussion of these in the Southeast
Asian context, see William T. Tow, "Alternative Security Models: Implications for
ASEAN", in Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asiat edited by Andrew
T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (Singapore, Select Publishing, 2001), pp. 257-85.
11 It is arguable that the United States's overthrow of the Taliban and subsequent
preemptive strike strategy does introduce a new coercive element to police the
behaviour of at least smaller and weaker states.
12 See Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983); Volker Ritter, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993); Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zurn, "The
Study of International Regimes", European Journal of International Relations
1 (1995): 267-330.
13 Ken Booth and Russel Trood, eds., Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region
(London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 8 (italics in original).
14 See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", International Security
19 (1995): 32-64; and Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First
Generation of Theory Strikes Back", Review of International Studies 25 (1999):
49-69.

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 138 Martin Stuart-Fox

15 See Haacke's more limited conception of "diplomatic culture". Jiirgen Haacke,

ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects
(London: Routledge/Curzon, 2003).
16 See, for example, the response of Thai prime minister, Kukrit Pramoj, when asked
why the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and China had
proceeded so smoothly. (Quoted in Michael Vatikiotis, "Ties That Bind", Far
Eastern Economic Review, 11 January 1996.)
17 1 have sketched this history in more detail in Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of
China and Southeast Asia (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003).
18 R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940),
pp. 31-47.
19 Still the best study is John King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional
China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) upon
which much of the following account is based.
20 See Aihe Wang, Cosmology and Political Culture in Early China (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
21 Analects 12.11. A good translation is Simon Leys, The Analects of Confucius (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
22 Appointments were noted in the Ming Shi. (I am most grateful to Geoff Wade for
making his translations of the Ming Shi available to me.)
23 Tribute and trade were not sharply differentiated for Southeast Asian rulers, and
their conception of tribute as not just submission, but also the transfer of resources
to the centre, was very different from the Chinese conception of tribute as symbolic
recognition of superior status. I have tried to sort out these differences in A Short
History of China and Southeast Asia, pp. 32-35.
24 Even friend to friend, the only one of the five Confucian relationships that is not
obviously hierarchical, entailed recognition of status and obligation.
25 Yoshiharu Tsuboi', L'empire vietnamienne face a la France et a la Chine (Paris:
L'Harmattan, 1987), pp. 263-64.
26 See James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney
Embassy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), and John E. Wills, Jr., Embassies
and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K'and-his (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1984).
27 Sarasin Viraphon, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 236-37.
28 The 1909 Qing Nationality Law, based on the principle of jus sanguinis, descent
through the male line, was endorsed by the Republic of China under the Guomintang.
Not until the Nationality Law of 1980 did the People's Republic of China finally put
an end to dual nationality.
29 There is a vast literature on the foreign policy and foreign relations of the PRC, but
see, for example, John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of
China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993).
30 See, for example, O.A. Westad, et al., eds., 77 Conversations Between Chinese and
Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977, Working Paper no. 22, Cold
War International History Project (Woodrow Wilson International Center,
Washington, D.C., 1998).
31 See Chih-yu Shih, China's fust World: The Morality of China's Foreign Policy
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Rienner, 1993).
32 See Daw Than Han, Common Vision: Burma's Regional Outlook (Washington D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1988).
33 Chinese policy during the First and Second Indochina Wars has been much studied.

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 Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 139

Two important recent publications are Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists'
Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland, 1997), and Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars: 1950-1975
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
34 Robert S. Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process", Asian Survey 31 (1991):
1169-85.
35 As the author discovered in several interviews and discussions in Beijing and
Hanoi.
36 The term is used and the concept developed in Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J.
Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica,
Calif.: Rand Corporation, 2000).
37 Bertil Lintner, "Arms for Eyes: Military Sales Raise China's Profile in Bay of
Bengal", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 December 1993, p. 26; Donald M.
Seekins, "Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire", Asian Survey 37 (1997): 525
39.
38 Claims to enjoy the best relations with China were made in interviews with
academics and officials conducted by the author in both Bangkok and Kuala
Lumpur.
39 See the introductory background chapter of Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China:
The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 1999).

Martin Stuart-Fox is currently Professor of History at the University of

Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

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