Mid-America American Studies Association

Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal

Author(s): Rais A. Khan
Source: American Studies International, Vol. 23, No. 1 (April 1985), pp. 83-102
Published by: Mid-America American Studies Association
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 83

Pakistan-United States

Relations: An
Appraisal

by Rais A. Khan

eminentAmerican Scholar on South Asia has describedthe

UnitedStates relationswith Pakistanas a "torturedrelationship/'1
An Pakistanison theirpart,bothpolicymakers and foreign policyintellec-
tuals, have invariablynoted the lack of "durabilityand credibility" in the
Washington connection.
Pakistan-U.S.relationshavebeenbothcooperative and conflictive,ranging
fromindifference to intimacy In recentyearsrelationshavebecome
to hostility.
warmagain;butthecheckeredhistory is in partdue to theinherent limitations
and contradictions involved in a relationshipbetween a small state and
superpower.ForPakistan,thealliancewiththeU.S. has been thefundamental
factorin itsforeignpolicy,whilefortheU.S. thetieswithPakistanhave been
one of many otherperipheralties. The geopoliticalrealitiesand strategic
compulsions tendtobringthemtogether butdifferences overa variety ofglobal,
regionaland bilateralissues tend to pull themapart.Moreover,the different
socio-economic and politicalstructuresof the two societiesas well as the
differentvaluesystemsand nationalpsychesofthetwopeopleshaveprevented
an enduringrelationship to develop betweenthe two countries.Pakistanis
feudal,authoritarian and ideological;the U.S. is capitalistic,
democraticand
secular.Popularimagesof each otherare rathernegative.Pakistanhas a very
limitedconstituency in theU.S., but theAmericanconstituency in Pakistanis
fairlylargewith the resultthatAmericanpoliciesevoke widerand sharper
reactions.Pakistan-U.S.bilateralrelationshave further been subjectedto two
seriousconstraints,theIndiafactor, and thepredilections ofthepoliticalpartyin
powerin theU.S. AmericanpoliciestowardPakistanhavealwaysbeenframed
withan eye on India and have seldombeen bipartisanor nonpartisan.
The surprisingthingis not, therefore, thatthe historyof Pakistan-U.S.
relationsis a checkeredone. The surprising thingis thatthe relationship has

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84

survivedall thestressesand strainsthatithas beensubjectedtoand evenduring

theworstoftimesthetwohavemanagedtohaveatleasta working relationship.

AMERICAN INTEREST IN SOUTH ASIA

SouthAsia has generally remainedan area ofperipheral interestfortheforeign
policymakersoftheU.S. UnliketheSovietUnionand China,theU.S. is notan
Asianpower;itdoes notsharecommonborderswithanyoftheregionalstates
and has no territorial Thereare feweconomicresourcescritical
interests. to the
U.S. economy.The regionis not a major tradingpartner,and American
investments hereare negligible.SouthWestAsia, SouthEastAsia and thesea
lanesoftheIndianOcean, becauseoftheireconomicand strategic importance,
havebeenthemainconcernsofAmericanpolicyin Asia,as is thefactthatSouth
Asia constitutesthe southernflankof the two Communistgiants - the Soviet
Unionand China.
Thus theprincipaldeterminant of theU.S. policytowardsSouthAsia has
been theU.S. perceptionof the region'srelevanceto thepursuitof its global
economic,geopoliticaland strategicgoals. The regionhas been raised or
loweredon the scale of Americanpriorities accordingto its perceivedimpor-
tanceto America'sconcernsin the East-Westconflict. Americanpolicyin the
regionhas been shaped notso much with referencetothecountries oftheregion
but withreference to America'srelationswiththe SovietUnion and China.
These relationshave fluctuated and so has theAmericanpolicyin theregion.
Understandably, the U.S. has been accusedoffollowing an inconsistentpolicy
in SouthAsia.

ASIAN INDEPENDENCE AND U.S. ALLIANCES

The postwarera thatwitnessedthe cold war also saw the upsurgeof Asian
nationalism and thecrumbling ofthecolonialempiresin Asia. The Americans
supported the principle of nationalself-determination but theywanted its
in a
application way,perhaps in imitationof theirown Revolution, thatwould
secureindependenceforthe colonieswithoutradicallydisturbing theirsocio-
economicstatusquo. The AmericansdesiredAsia to followan evolutionary
processofchangeremaining committed to "democracy and freeenterprise." To
help thisprocess,the U.S. launched thePoint Four Program which,according to
historianHarryMagdoff, was to "maintain a positionof influence and control
aroundthe worldand sustaina good manycountriesthatwould definitely
collapseor pass intotheCommunist bloc."2
It was assumed that economicdevelopmentcould be acceleratedby
American technicalassistanceand thiswouldcontribute and
topoliticalstability
resistanceto penetration by the Communist ideology and Sovietinfluence.

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Two eventsin 1949-50shattered theAmericanassumptions and hopes,and

forceda reappraisal oftheirpolicyin Asia: Communist victory in China,and the
Korean War. The Communistvictoryin China was a great shock to the
Americansas China,morethanEasternEurope,had come to symbolizetheir
"Open Door" policywhichlay at theheartof thecold war. The debatein the
U.S. over"who lostChina?"degeneratedintoanti-Communist hysteria which
made a rationalanalysisof thesituationimpossible.Americansfailedto grasp
theindigenousand autonomouscharacterof ChineseCommunism.Theyfell
victimto theidea ofa monolithic Communist powercontrolled byMoscow,and
whenNorthKoreainvadedSouthKorea,theywereconvincedthattheCommu-
nistgiantwas on themarchin Asia. The loss of China also triggered fearsin
Americanmindsthatthe rulingelitesin Asia mightnot have the will, the
experience and theresourcestocontainCommunism. ThecoldwarinAsia,they
feared,mightbe lost.
Thustheconcernsthathavegivenbirthto theMarshallPlanand NATO in
Europe were, in Americanthinking,now operativein Asia. The policyof
containment withitsingredients of economicassistance,military aid and U.S.
securityumbrella, so successful in Europe, was thereforeto be extended toAsia.
A fenceofallianceswas to be builtall alongtheSouthernbordersofChinaand
theSovietUnion.
Americanpolicymakers,in theirsearchforalliesin SouthAsia, did notat
showmuchinterest
first in Pakistan.Onlya smallgroupofprofessionals bothin
theStateDepartment and thePentagonwereconsciousof Pakistan'sstrategic
location.3Pakistanthenhad a windowon bothSouthEastand SouthWestAsia,
was a partof SouthAsia as well as CentralAsia, and enjoyeda unique geo-
positionwhichconstituted
strategic bothitsvalueand itsvulnerability. Howev-
er, the American public had little awareness of Pakistan, and could not
understand therationaleofpartitioning theSub-Continent and creatinga state
on the basis of "religiousnationalism."The Americanview of partition, as
ina Brookings
reflected Institution study,was, "It was an artificial
splittingofan
areathathad formed a rationaleconomicwholewithorganizedcommunications
and defense."4
The TrumanAdministration ignoredPakistanat first.It tooktheU.S. six
monthstoappointitsfirst ambassadortoPakistanand thepostremainedvacant
fortwoyearswhenthisincumbent returnedhomedue to illhealth.The landof
Gandhiand Nehru,by contrast, was betterknownto Americans.India's size,
populationand potentialas a "democratic"counterforce to Chinaattracted the
Americanforeignpolicymakers.It was not,therefore, surprising thatIndian
PrimeMinister Jawaharlal Nehruwas thefirstSouthAsianleaderto be invited
toWashington. However,Nehru'sworldviewand regionalperceptions wereat
variancewiththoseof the Americans.The Indian foreignpolicyintellectuals
havegivenvariousexplanations forIndia'salienationfromtheU.S.5Two factors
largelydetermined India's initial
responseto Americanovertures. Nehruhad a

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dreamof India's greatnessin her own right.(It may be recalledthatin a

somewhatsimilarsituation in 1823whentheBritish proposeda jointAnglo-U.S.
oppositionto a non-existentthreatofHoly Alliance in theAmerican
interference
the
hemisphere, Secretary of StateJohn Quincy Adams remarked, "Whybe a
cockboatin thewake ofBritish manofwar.") The secondfactorwas thatIndia
did nothavea security problem.Russiawas at a safedistance,Afghanistan and
Pakistanconstituted usefulbuffers. None of her immediateneighborsexcept
Chinawas largeand strongenoughto pose a threat.Chinawas busyin post-
Revolutionreconstruction Bhai-Bhai
and itwas an eraofHindi-Chini (Indiansand
Chinese are brothers).The Indians, therefore, while welcomingAmerican
economicand military assistance,refusedto enterintoany anti-Communist
withtheU.S. In facttheyrejectedtheveryidea ofan American
coalition security
umbrellaovertheregionas itdid notsuittheirperception ofIndia'sfuturerole
in SouthAsia. It was thenthattheU.S. turnedto Pakistan.

PAKISTAN AS A SOVEREIGN NATION

Pakistan,atitsbirth,founditselfina veryadversesecurity environment. Itfaced
Indian hostilityon its easternborderand Afghanhostilityon the western
border.While the Afghanhostility, thoughunexpectedand annoying,was
manageable, theIndian hostilitywas a moreseriousmatter.
India and Pakistanstartedtheirlivesas sovereignstatesburdenedby the
weightofhistory. In Jinnah'sschemeofpartition,thetwonationsweretolivein
peace and not
harmony, perpetual In a speechat Delhion May
confrontation.
21, 1947,just twelve days before the announcement of thepartitionplan, he
said,"I have been urging thatwe in a
separate friendly way and remain friends
thereafter."He evenenvisaged"an alliance,pactortreaty betweenPakistanand
Hindustanin themutualinterest ofbothand againstanyaggressiveoutsider."6
Yet forthe Indian leaders partitionshatteredtheirdreamof a unitedSub-
continent,and theirreactionto Pakistanwas one of hostility.Top Indian
leaders,bothoftheCongressand theHinduMahasbha,talkedofreuniting the
Sub-Continent. Men likeNehruthoughtofreunity in constitutional
terms,yet
otherslikeSardarVillabhbhai Pateland B. N. Khareadvocatedtheuse offorce.
A numberofIndianactionsgavesubstanceto Pakistan'salarm:thewithholding
ofPakistan'sshareofassetsincludingcash and military supplies;thestoppage
of canal watersand the occupationof a largepartof the stateofJammuand
Kashmirconvincedthe Pakistanisthatthe undoingof Pakistanwas a settled
policyforIndia.The Kashmirdisputeled toan undeclaredwarbetweenthetwo
statesfromMay, 1948to September,1949.Twice- in the springof 1950and
summerof 1951- an all out war nearlybrokeout betweenthetwonations.
Thoughthecrisesof1950and 1951passed withouttheoutbreakofwar,the
traumatic experiencethroughwhichPakistanhad livedin thoseanxiousdays

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lefta deep impression on themindsofthepeopleofPakistanand theirleaders.

According to a of thePakistanarmy,"In thewake of the1951India-
historian
Pakistanwar scareGeneralAyubKhan startedthinking in termsof Pakistan's
alliancewiththe U.S."7 It can be said thatit was India's belligerentattitude
towardPakistanthatpushedthelatterintothearmsoftheU.S., yetthisis only
partofthetruth.
Pakistan,likeIndia,had startedoffwitha policyof neutrality in theEast-
Westconflict.Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan'sfirstPrimeMinister,declared,"I
wishittobe clearlyknownabroadthatPakistanstartson itscareerwithoutany
specialcommitments and withoutanyprejudicesin theinternational sphere."8
In a speechon March8, 1951,LiaquatexplainedPakistan'sforeign policythus:

The cornerstoneofPakistan'sforeignpolicyis theestablishment offriendly

relationswithall thecountriesoftheworld.Pakistanis neithertiedto the
apronstringsof theAnglo-American Block,noris a camp followerof the
Communistbloc. It has steeredclearof the inter-bloc rivalryand has an
absolutelyindependentforeignpolicy. . . . Pakistancan pursuean inde-
pendentcourse because it is not under the obligationof any foreign
country.We have notbeen givenassistanceby any countryof theworld
and whateverwe have achievedhas been throughour resources.9

In thisearlyphase of Pakistan'sforeignpolicyone does not come across

anti-Communist statements byPakistanileaders.In factinreplytoa questionby
an Americancorrespondent LiaquatAli Khan said thathe did notfearRussian
aggression. "Pakistan is too small forRussia to botherabout," he added.10
Liaquat reportedly declined to send a tokenforceto Korea in returnforan
Americanofferto equip an entiredivisionforthe Pakistanarmy.Though
Pakistan,as comparedtoIndia,couldill-afford toantagonisetheWest,itplayed
a leadingrole in the strugglefordecolonization, bothinsideand outsidethe
UnitedNations.
One thusfindsan interesting paradox.Between1947-51whentheIndian
to
hostility Pakistan was most pronounced,Pakistanpursueda neutralpolicy
and when,after1951,the Indianthreatsomewhatbegan to recede,Pakistan
beganto movetowardalignment withtheU.S. The explanation probablyliesin
Pakistan'sfrustrationin creatinga Pan-Islamicframework ofitssecurity
and in
thedeteriorating and
political economic situationin Pakistan.
At firstPakistansought to overcomeits adverse securityenvironment
throughthe creationof an Islamicbloc. Liaquat Ali Khan declared,"If the
westerndemocraciescan enterintopactsto protecttheirway oflifeand ifthe
Communist countriescan forma blockon thebasis thattheyhave an ideology
why cannot theMuslimpeoplesgettogether to protectthemselvesand showto
theworldthattheyhavean ideologyand a wayoflifewhichensurespeace and
harmonyin theworld."11

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88

ofa village
Portrait boyfrom
thePotwar ofPakistan.
region PhotobyJaved
A. Kahn

Thisstrategy was naive,premature and over-optimistic.In termsofpower

and influence theMuslimworldat thattimedidnotamounttomuch.Moreover,
Pakistan'soft-repeatedclaimofbeingthelargestMuslimstatewas seenbyother
Muslimstatesas suggestiveof a leadershiproleand was notwell receivedby
them,proudas theywereoftheirown history and heritage.
Pakistanlostthe"FatheroftheNation"toillnessin September, 1948and its
PrimeMinister,
first by an assassin's in
bullet, October, 1951. Deprivedofitstwo
mostdedicatedleadersand withno deep rootsin theareas thatcameto form
Pakistan,theMuslimLeague (thePartythathad createdPakistan)fragmented
intofactionsand fellpreytoinfightingforpower.Thecountry witnessedtherise
and fallin quicksuccessionofa numberofgovernments bothat theCenterand
in theProvinces.The absenceofa constitution and theineptitude and selfish-
nessofthepoliticians led thebureaucrats, bothciviland in uniform, to develop
politicalambitions.Men like Ghulam Mohammad, Iskandar Mirza,Chaudhry
MohammadAli and GeneralAyubKhanpromotedthemselves intoministerial

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slotswhichnormally shouldhave been filledby theelectedrepresentatives of

thepeople.Thebureaucrats- rejectedtheprinciples
turned-politicians ofdemoc-
racyand majority rule.The disillusionmentand frustrationofthepeoplefound
expressionin centrifugal and sectariantendencies.In a momentof candor
GeneralMohammadAyubKhan wrote,"The politicalturmoilwhichappeared
in thewakeofthePrimeMinister's(LiaquatAliKhan)deathconvincedme that
we mustnotlose anytimein buildingup thearmywhichalone couldhold the
country together and defenditagainstpossibleattack."12
Thepoliticalinstabilityin Pakistanwas compoundedbyitseconomiccrises.
Like all developingcountriesPakistanbadly needed foreigneconomicand
technicalassistance.Agriculture, themainstayofthePakistaneconomy,sharply
declineddue to lack of attentionand investments, and severefloodsin 1951
brought about a near famine situation.
By 1952, the rulingelitesin Pakistan
foundthemselvesin a ratheruntenablesituation.The euphoriaand national
consensusof the earlyyearshad been destroyed;the securityenvironment
remainedadverseand theeconomicsituationhad becomecritical. The tempta-
tionto giveup thepolicyofneutrality and nonalignment in orderto securethe
patronageof the most powerfuland richestnation on earth was almost
In 1953when AmericanSecretary
irresistible. of StateJohnFosterDulles and
lateron Vice-President RichardM. Nixon visitedPakistanin theirsearchfor
Asianallies,theyfoundtheclimatein Pakistanveryhospitable.

PAKISTAN-U.S. ALLIANCE
Pakistanand theUnitedStatesenteredintoan alliancerelationship throughfour
pacts:1) MutualDefense AssistanceAgreement, May,1954;2) SEATO, Septem-
ber, 1954;3) BaghdadPact,September,1955;13and 4) Agreementof Cooper-
ation,March,1959.
Pakistanwas theonlyAsian stateto be a memberofbothSEATO and the
BaghdadPact.Theintimacy ofthePakistan-U.S.relationscouldbe judgedfrom
thefactthatPakistancameto be knownas the"most-allied ally"oftheU.S. in
Asia.
TheU.S. and Pakistanenteredthealliancewithbasicallydivergent motives,
theU.S. to containCommunismand Pakistanto containIndia and to ensure
domesticstability
and economicprogress.The Pakistanirulingelites,becauseof
theireducation,training,social background,religiousbeliefsand historical
associations
wereideologicallypro-West, and feltno threatfromeitherRussiaor
China. The U.S., though allergicto India's nonalignment, did not share
Pakistan'sperceivedthreatof India. At the timeof the signingof theSEATO
Treaty,Pakistanmade franticefforts to defineaggressionin widerterms,to
covertheIndiancontingency, but theU.S. appendeda noteto thetextof the
treatystatingthatitscommitment wouldapplyonlyto Communist aggression.

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Againaftersigningthe bilateralAgreementof Cooperationof 1959,the U.S.

assuredtheIndianforeign thattheAgreement
office was limitedto Communist
aggressionby Communist countries. Both Pakistan and theU.S. wereawareof
each other'sperceptionsand motivesand therebyof the limitations of the
alliance.Both chose to overlookthe divergencesand decided to enterthe
allianceand thento lettheintangibles ofthealliancetaketheircourse.
The allianceprovedsatisfactory to bothPakistanand theU.S. in theshort
run.Pakistanreceivedlarge-scale military aid and economicassistancefromthe
U.S.14and enjoyeda periodofpoliticalstability and economicgrowth.In return,
the U.S. was allowed to set up a surveillance base near Peshawarto spy on
Russia and China- a significant privilege in the days beforespy satellites.
Pakistanalso generally supported the U.S. on cold war issues. 1954-60marked
the heydayof the U.S.-Pakistanalliance.Yet, in the long run, the alliance
provedcounter-productive bothforthe U.S. and Pakistan.Americanmilitary
aid to Pakistan,whichhelped to rectify the Indo-Pakistan imbalance,pushed
Indiaintothearmsoftheirrivalsuperpower, theSovietUnion.In ordertodraw
IndiaawayfromtheSovietUnionand to rectify theSino-Indianimbalance,the
U.S. gave military aid to India,but lost the trustand friendship of Pakistan,
pushing them into the arms of the other big communist power, China. Thusthe
U.S. got caughtin the competitive politics of India and Pakistan. Far from
containing the Soviets and the Chinese, the U.S. policyhelped these powers,
thoughunwittingly, in extending theirinfluence in theSub-Continent. Pakistan
on its partbecameisolatedin its immediateenvironment and in the Muslim
world.Itturnedtheothersuperpower, theSovietUnion,whoalso happenedto
be a neighbor,againstit. The Indianhostility, recededsince1951,revived.So
the securityenvironment forPakistan,insteadof improving, worsened.The
Indo-Soviet collaboration becamean important factorin thedismemberment of
Pakistanin 1971.Pakistanalso founditselfno nearertoa solutiontotheKashmir
dispute.Moreover,thestrengthening ofthemilitary establishment in Pakistan
enableditto takeoverthecountry in 1959.Thishappenedwhenthecountry at
long last had a constitution and the firstgeneral elections were about to take
place. The impositionof Ayub's martiallaw sealed the fateof democracyin
Pakistanand thereby also sealed thefateoftheFederation.Thus thePak-U.S.
alliance,formed to safeguardthesecurity and integrity ofPakistan,inadvertent-
lyjeopardized both.
Pakistan-U.S.relationsbegan to cool with the advent of the Kennedy
Administration inJanuary, 1961.President JohnF. KennedyregardedChinaas a
greater threat to the "free world" than Russia. He tooka sympathetic view
towardIndia's nonalignedpolicy,and pleaded to buildIndia as a democratic
counterforce toCommunist China.No wonder,as HenryKissinger has notedin
his White HouseYears , "afterthechangeofadministration in 1961,Washington's
interest in Pakistancoolednoticeably, verbalassurancesofAmericanprotection
cameincreasingly to be substituted formilitary hardware."15 In contrast, when

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Sino-Indian borderclasheseruptedin 1962,theKennedyAdministration rushed

large-scale
military aid toIndia without its
consulting ally Pakistan.After theU-2
incidentin 1960 the Soviet Union had threateneddire consequencesfor
Pakistan.In viewofthechangedAmericanpolicy,Pakistanwonderedwhether
theriskoftheU.S. alliancewas worthit.It beganto menditsfenceswithboth
theSovietUnionand China. By 1965relationswithChinabecameparticularly
warm.The spectacleofa memberofSEATO and theBaghdadPacthobnobbing
withChinaand theSovietUnionduringtheperiodoftheVietnamwarwas as
gallingto the U.S. as the spectacleof the U.S. helpingIndia was gallingto
Pakistan.Bothseemed to have failedthe loyaltytest.The U.S. tookpunitive
actionsagainstPakistan.Fundsweretransferred fromtheStateBankofPakistan
to foreigncommerical banks; pledge $4,300,000fortheimprovement
a of ofthe
Dacca airportwas withdrawn; PresidentAyub'svisitto theU.S., at President
LyndonJohnson'sinvitation, was postponed;and in July,1965,themeetingof
theWorldBankConsortium to pledgeaid of $500millionforPakistan'sThird
FiveYear Plan was cancelled.
In additionto Americanmilitaryaid to India, anotherfrustration for
Pakistan was the Kashmir dispute. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 gave
Pakistantheopportunity to settletheKashmirdispute,butunderpressurefrom
Washington Pakistanlettheopportunity go. TherushingofarmstoIndiabythe
KennedyAdministration, and itssubsequentfailureto putenoughpressureon
Indiatohonorhercommitments in Kashmir,hastenedPakistan'sdecisiontoact
in Kashmir,whichled to theIndo-Pakistan war of 1965whichin itsturnled to
thetermination ofAmerican military aid to both Pakistanand India. Seemingly
an evenhandedpolicy, this hurt Pakistan most because it was dependent
entirelyon Americanarms, whereas India had various sourcesof supplyin
additionto a significant indigenouscapacity. The U.S. followedthe ban on
militaryaid duringthewarwithtotalstoppageofeconomicaid to Pakistanafter
thewarin 1966.PakistanclosedtheAmericansurveillance base nearPeshawar
in 1968.The alliancerelationship for practicalpurposeswas dead. Pakistan
all
was not even mentionedin the 1969-70comprehensive Senate hearingson
Americansecurity commitments abroad.
Exasperated bythepersistent Indo-Pakistan antagonism, encouragedbythe
Sino-Soviet riftand forcedby the growing involvement in theVietnamwar,the
U.S. decidedon an almosttotal withdrawal from South Asia,leavingtheSoviet
Unionand Chinatomanagetheregion long so as neitherpowertriedtoobtaina
positionof dominance.Symptomatic of the waning American interestin the
regionwas itsacquiescence in the Soviet mediation of theIndo-Pakistan dispute.
The Pakistan-China relationswhichhad broughtthewrathof theU.S. on
Pakistanduringthe Kennedyand JohnsonAdministrations were foundto be
veryopportuneby President Richard Nixon and his National SecurityAdviser
HenryKissinger. The offices of President General Yahya Khan were used to
makesecretcontactwithChina.Kissinger'ssecretflight toBeijingvia Islamabad

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notonlyopenedChinatotheU.S. butalso restored thewarmth ofearlyyearsin

thePakistan-U.S.relations.The Sino-Americandetentewould have removed
themajorcause ofAmericanhostility to Pakistan.Yet,beforethisnew situation
couldhave an impact,theBangladeshcrisisintervened.
During1965-69the Americans,piqued by Pakistan'sChina policy,had
shownsympathy to Bengalinationalism in East Pakistan.(Duringthisperiod
writersfortheNewYorkTimesdiscussedtheexistingsocial,political,linguistic,
culturaland economiccleavagesbetweenthetwowingsofPakistanand openly
questionedtheviability ofPakistanas a nation.16)Bythetimethecrisiserupted,
Americanpolicy toward China, and consequentlytoward Pakistan,had
changed.It was now to supportPakistan.However,the ineptitudeof the
military junta at Islamabadand the popular natureof the uprisingin East
Pakistanand its brutalsuppressionhad so incensedCongressand public
opinionin the U.S. thatPresidentNixon foundhimselfhelpless.The White
House,theStateDepartment and Congresswereall convincedoftheinevitabil-
ityofBangladesh.Whattheydid notwant,however,was Indianintervention
and anotherIndo-Pakistanwar. The emergenceof Bangladeshunder pro-
Western, liberalAwamiLeague,wouldnotalterthebalanceofpowerinfavorof
Russia; nor would the increasein Indian politicalclout,as a resultof the
partition ofPakistan,be a negativefactorforAmericanpolicyin theregion.So
whenIndiapreemptedtheAmericanefforts fora peacefulbirthofBangladesh
and invadedEast Pakistan,the U.S. did nothing.Pakistaninvokedthe 1959
Agreement ofCooperationbutto no avail. To quoteHenryKissinger:
The imageofa greatnationconducting itselflikea shysterlookingforthe
legislativeloopholeswas notlikelyto inspiretheallies. . . . The factwas
thatoverthedecades ofour relationship withPakistantherehad growna
complexbodyofCommunications by theKennedyand JohnsonAdminis-
trations goingbeyondthe1959pact,someverbal,somein writing, whose
plainimportwas thattheU.S. would cometo Pakistan'sassistanceifshe
was attackedby India.17
The oft-quoted Nixon tiltto Pakistanwas symboliconly.The Anderson
papers clearly show that the Americanpolicywas not actuallyto support
PakistanagainstIndiabut onlyseem to be supportiveof Pakistanso as notto
lose credibility with the Chinese. However Nixon's symbolictilthelped to
preserve West Pakistan.The U.S. policyduringtheBangladeshcrisisearnedfor
itneitherthegood willnorgratitude ofIndiaor Pakistan.
During the1970's,American detente withboththeSovietUnionand China,
as well as the Sino-Sovietrift,reducedU.S. securityconcernsin SouthAsia.
President Nixon,in hisfourth AnnualForeignPolicyReportto theCongresson
May 3, 1973 announced, "The UnitedStates has no economicor strategic
interestin a privilegedposition,norin forming tiesdirectedagainstanycountry
insidetheregionor outside,norin altering thebasicpoliticalframework on the
Sub-Continent."

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Pakistanon its part saw no reason, afterthe loss of East Pakistan,to

continueits membership of SEATO. It continuedits membership of CENTO,
more in deferenceto its ties with Iran and Turkeythan its ties with the
U.S. Pakistan-U.S.relationsshowedsome improvement as theU.S. resumed
itseconomicaid and partially liftedthearmsembargo.However,soon thetwo
countrieswerelockedin a bittercontroversy overthenuclearissue.
India's explosionof a nucleardevice in 1974 made Pakistan'ssecurity
pictureverybleak. To the overwhelming imbalancein conventionalarms,
Pakistannow facedthepossiblenuclearthreatfromIndia. Disillusionedwith
theAmerican,Chineseand Sovietrolesin 1971,ZulfikarAli Bhuttodeviseda
two-pronged strategy:acquisitionofnuclearcapability, and closelinkswiththe
Muslimcountrieswithina ThirdWorldframework. This broughtBhuttoin
directconflictwiththenonproliferation policyoftheU.S. Washington exerted
enoughpressure on Canada to terminate all assistance
to Pakistanin thenuclear
field,and on Franceto renegeon its deal to sell Pakistana fullysafeguarded
reprocessing plant.
To thenuclearissue was added theissue of humanrights.WhenGeneral
Ziaul Haq, Chiefof the ArmyStaff,overthrew Bhuttohe placed the country
under martiallaw. The suppressionof the politicalprocess, the repeated
postponements ofthepromisedgeneralelections,theexecutionofZulfikar Ali
Bhutto, and the introduction of Islamic like
punishments flogging evoked a
negative reaction in the U.S. Zia also continued Bhutto's nuclearpolicy.The
Pakistan-U.S.relationsreachedtheirnadir.In January, 1978,PresidentCarter,
on hisway fromIndiato Iran,refusedto makeevena briefstopin Pakistan.In
April, 1979, the U.S. stopped all economicaid. In November,1979, the
AmericanEmbassyat Islamabadwas put to the torchby an angrymob. They
believedrumorsthattheU.S. protege,Israel,had occupiedtheHolyKaaba. The
"mostalliedally"becamea veritablepariahin Americaneyes. But the Soviet
militaryinvasionof Afghanistan in December,1979,forcedboththeU.S. and
Pakistanto reassesstheirpositionand policies.

PAKISTAN-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE 1980s

WiththeousteroftheShah ofIran,theAmerican"twinpillarpolicy"in South-
west Asia collapsed. The anti-Americanorientationin Iran, of the Islamic
fundamentalists,and thethreatthattheymightovertakethepro-West moderate
kingdoms and sheikhdoms of the Gulfwere disturbingprospects theU.S.
for
TheSovietmilitary interventionin Afghanistan,
coming itdid on theheelsof
as
theRevolutionin Iran,was lookeduponbytheAmericananalystsas partofthe
Sovietgeo-political
momentum ofthe1970's.Theyregardeditas a springboard
not only forSoviet regionalhegemony,but world domination.They drew
attention
to theSovietUnion's"historicand traditional" quest forinfluencein
theGulfand forwarmwaterportsin SouthAsia. The Sovietintervention in

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Afghanistan was regardedas a new, significant and alarmingstep in that

direction.PresidentCartercalledit "a steppingstoneto possiblecontrolover
muchoftheworld'soil supplies"and warnedagainstpossibleRussiandesigns
on Iran,Pakistanand theGulf.18
PresidentCarter'sresponseto theSovietintervention in Afghanistanwas
the CarterDoctrine(January,1980). It offereda two year,$400 millionaid
packagetoPakistantogether witha reaffirmation oftheU.S. commitment tothe
1959Agreement ofCooperation(February, 1980).The CarterDoctrineimplicitly
acceptedthe Sovietpresencein Afghanistan and excludedPakistanfromits
security perimeter. The aid amount,as GeneralZiaul Haq undiplomatically put
it,was just "peanuts."The reaffirmation ofthe1959Agreement was notat all
reassuring as ithad lostcredibility after1971.IslamabadviewedCarter'soffer as
meetingtheshorttermAmericanobjectivesratherthansafeguarding thelong-
termsecurityinterestsof Pakistan.America'scredibility gap and Pakistan's
interestsin theOrganization ofIslamicConference (OIC) and theNon-Aligned
Movement(NAM) demandeda more pragmaticand practicalarrangement
based on a properappreciationof Pakistan'ssecurityand economicneeds.
PakistanrejectedtheCarteroffer, a startlingrevelation to theU.S. ofthedegree
towhichWashington's perceivedreliability, effectivenessand steadfastnesshad
deteriorated.
The Reagan Administration exhibiteda betterappreciationof Pakistan's
situation,susceptibilities and needs. As a resultof negotiations fromAprilto
June,1981,a $3.2 billionsix yeareconomicaid and military sales packagewas
workedout, and thishas becomethe basis of whatis now called "the new
relationship."There are of course other fringebenefitsfor Pakistan:the
rescheduling of debts,lifting of countervailing dutieson textiles, prospectsof
increasedprivateU.S. investments in Pakistan,etc. The new Pakistan-U.S.
relationship is limitedin scope and objectives.It is also moreinformal and
flexibleand does notrequirePakistanto givebases to theU.S.
ThoughPakistanconstitutes theeasternflankof theGulfand has sizeable
militarypresencein manyof theGulfStates,itsrolein thesecurity of theGulf
thoughimportant is ratherlimited.Theconceptofthe"policeman oftheGulf"died
withtheShahofIran.Pakistandoesnotaspireandis notequippedforthisrole.In
fact,theGulfstateswouldobjectto thisrolebeingassignedtoanyone state,and
insteadare workingout a collective security arrangement oftheirown. Pakistan
wouldprobablycooperatewiththemto meettheirown objectives(i.e., to gain
trainingfortheirown armedforcesand to controlinternal subversion).Whenit
comesto containing one superpower it can be done onlyby thecountervailing
forceoftheothersuperpower. HenceAmerican aid and salespackageshouldnot
be viewedtoomuchin thecontext ofthesecurity oftheGulf.
The basic objectivesof the Americaneconomicaid and militarysales
packageseemto be to buildtheconfidence ofPakistanvia itssecurity situation
and to restorethelostAmericanleveragewithIslamabad.

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Americawishesto obtainleveragewithIslamabadforseveralpurposes:1)
to hold Pakistanin lineovertheAfghanistan issue so thatit does notaccepta
settlement whichis not in America'sglobalinterests; 2) to dissuade Pakistan
frompursuingits nuclearoption;3) to persuadePakistanto shareAmerican
perceptions of regionalcooperationand India's leadershiprolein SouthAsia;
and possiblyin thelongrun4) to makePakistanifacilities availablefortherapid
deployment of the newly created Central Command forces in timeofa crisis.
The new relationship is not an "exclusiverelationship/' The Washington
connectionis not the anchorof Pakistan'ssecurityas it was in the 1950's.
Pakistan'smembership and statusin theNon-AlignedMovement(NAM) and in
theOrganization ofIslamicConference (OIC), and itsveryclose relationswith
China, as wellas itsMuslim neighbors theWest,areimportant
to components of
its securityarchitecture. The quantumof Americanmilitary sales to Pakistan
cannotguaranteethe securityof Pakistan,as it is facedwiththe mightof a
superpower(Russia) on the westernborder,and the vast and sophisticated
arsenalofIndiaon theeasternborder.Allitcan hope toachieveis to discourage
thepotential aggressor byraisingthecostofaggression.Thenewrelationship is
morelikelyto be durableand crediblebecause it is moreinformal and flexible
and is based on greatercommonality ofperceptions and interests.
From separatelyderivednationalviewpoints,Pakistanand the United
Stateshavesignificant sharedinterests (i.e., economic,strategic and political)in
SouthWestAsia. Bothneed oil; yetanydisruption ofGulfoil suppliesis more
likelyto adverselyaffect Pakistan,whichhas limitedalternate sourcesofenergy
athomeand sourcesofsupplyabroad.TheGulfcountries areimportant markets
forgoods and servicesforbothPakistanand the UnitedStates.Additionally,
Pakistanearnsaboutthreebilliondollarsannuallythroughitsmigrant workers
in the Gulf,an amountwhich is crucialto Pakistan'sbalance of payment
situation. Thegovernments ofthesecountries arelargelypro-West, and theU.S.
would like them to stay that way, to maintain the global statusquoofinfluence
and power.Pakistanhas commonreligious,culturaland historical tieswiththe
peoples of these countries and any trend likely to weaken these ties will be
adversely looked upon by Pakistan. In fact the concept of the Ummah (World
Muslim Community)and its solidarityhas been a great drivingforcein
Pakistan'sforeignpolicy.It has led Pakistanto supportMuslimcauses even
when theyare of no immediateconcernto Pakistanitself.WhileSouthWest
Asia is significantto theU.S. in maintaining globalstrategic balance,Pakistan's
strategic interestin the area arises from the fact that it dependson itsMuslim
neighbors to the west to providedepth for its defense. It also has military links
ofvaryingsize and significance withmostcountriesoftheGulf.
Many in Pakistanrejectthe "steppingstone" thesis of the American
analysts.TheyconsiderAmericanconcernsin SouthWestAsia as overrated and
overstated. They think that world domination is not a feasible proposition for
eitherof thesuperpowers.Warmwaterports,theypointout,are no longera

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critical
need ofthetechnologically advancedSovietstate.The variousoil denial
scenariosare also not convincingas the Sovietsare self-sufficient in theiroil
needs.
Evenifthe"steppingstone"thesisis rejecteditcannotbe deniedthatthe
massiveSovietmilitary presencein Afghanistan has upsetthebalanceofpower
ina regionthatcomprisesvitalpolitical,strategic and economicinterests ofboth
Pakistanand theUnitedStates.Additionally forPakistan,apartfromthelegal
and moralaspectsofintervention, theprospectthatAfghanistan mightlose its
bufferstatusorthattheSovietsmightsupportAfghanistan's irridentist claimsis
alarming. has
Afghanistan unilaterally repudiated the Durand Line and beinga
landlockedcountryshe mightseek an outletto theArabianSea.
Pakistanhas no bilateraldisputeswith the Soviet Union. The present
tensionsin Pakistan-Soviet relationsover Afghanistan are not of Pakistan's
seeking. It its
cherishes nonaligned statusand does not wish tobecomeinvolved
in any way in the East-Westconflict.Its responseto the Americanquest for
"strategicconsensus"has beennegative.Itdoes notenvisage,eitherforitselfor
theUnitedStates,theroleofa policemanin theGulf.It doubtsthewisdomand
efficacyoftheRapidDeployment Force(nowcalledtheCentralCommand)and
believesthatthedefenseoftheGulfshouldprimarily be theresponsibility ofthe
Gulfstates.Despitethesedivergences, themutuality of threatfromtheSoviet
militarypresencein Afghanistan has againmadePakistana "strategic state"for
the UnitedStates,and has made the Washingtonconnectionimportant for
Pakistan.Given the natureof the UnitedStatescommitment, including the
vagariesofAmerican partypoliticsand publicopinion,Pakistanhas tobe careful
and watchful in formulating itsresponsesto developments in theregion.
In an importantspeech at Karachi in April,1982, the then U.S. Ambassador
to Pakistan,Mr. RonaldSpiers,pinpointed"fourvulnerabilities" in Pakistan-
the"Indiafactor";
U.S. relations: thenuclearissue;humanrights; and narcotics.
Ofthefourvulnerabilities, narcotics has becomea non-issueas thegovernment
of Pakistanhas extendedthe fullestpossiblecooperationto the U.S. Human
rightswillhopefully whenelectionsareheldin Pakistan,
cease to be an irritant
and the countrywill hopefullyreturnto some formof civilianhome rule.
However,the India factorand the nuclearissue are matterswhich,if not
handledwisely,could becomeproblematic forPakistan-U.S.relations.Differ-
encesofperceptions and policiesmightruinthenew relationship.
American attitudetowarda regionalframework ofsecurity and cooperation
has beenratherambivalent. Conceptually, there can be two possibleapproaches
ormodelsforestablishing peace,security and cooperation in SouthAsia. One is
the traditional"balance of power" approach,which regardspeace to be a
functionof equilibriumof power in a systemas it is weaknessthattempts
aggression.The otheris theOrganiskimodel,19 whichemphasizestheprepon-
deranceof powerin one stateas creatingthe dynamicsof peace. The weaker
stateshave eitherto acceptthe diktatof the preponderant poweror facethe

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 97

schoolgirls.PhotobyPervezA. Kahn
Pakistani

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possibilityofwarwhichtheycannothope towinordraw.Thusan environment

conduciveto peace is automatically created.
ConsciousofIndia's size, populationand potential,theIndianpolicymak-
ershad all alonga self-perception ofIndia as a majorpowerin herown right.
Fromthebeginning they had embraced theconceptof"peacebypreponderance
ofpower"(i.e., Indianhegemonyin SouthAsia). India'srolein thedismember-
mentofPakistanin 1971was a partoftheirstrategy. TodayIndiais withinthe
top twelve industrialproducers of the world, has the fourth largestarmedforce,
has crashedintothe"nuclearclub,"and has launchedsatellites. Indianaturally
expects the superpowers to accord her the status of a majorpowerand her
neighbors, particularly to her
Pakistan, acknowledge preeminence in theregion
(Indians carefully avoid the words "dominance and hegemony").India's
imperious tone toward Sri Lanka during the recent Sinhali-Tamil Conflict and
theassertionofherown "MonroeDoctrine"in theregionshowwhichwaythe
windis blowing.One maynotean interesting dualityinIndia'spolicy;whileshe
follows a "balance of power" approach vis-a-visChina, she is not willingto
allow her weaker neighbors to follow the same approachvis-a-visherself.
In the 1950's and early 60's the U.S. followeda "balance of power"
approachin SouthAsia, firstbalancingPakistanagainstIndia (thoughthereal
purposewas to containCommunism), and thenbalancingIndiaagainstChina.
In theprocesstheU.S. firstearnedtheenmityofIndiaand thenlostthetrust
and friendship ofPakistan.
In the 1970's,afterdetenteand thedismemberment of Pakistan,theU.S.
acceptedthe"dominanceofpower"model. May,1973, In President Nixoninhis
foreign policyaddressto theCongresssaid thattheU.S. was "preparedto treat
India in accordancewith its new statusand responsibility on the basis of
reciprocity."20Secretary of StateHenryKissinger,duringhis visitto Delhi in
October,1974,was morespecificwhenhe said, "thesize and positionofIndia
gave ita specialroleofleadershipin SouthAsia and worldaffairs."21 The 1976
DemocraticPartyPlatform wentso faras to state,"India has now achieveda
considerablehegemonyover the Sub-Continent . . . (and) futureAmerican
policy should accept this fact."22
Thiswas as mucha recognition ofa growingrealityas a strategem to draw
Indiaaway fromtheSovietUnion.Americanshave cometo believethatonce
Indiabecomesa dominantstatein SouthAsia, even withSovietarms,and is
recognizedas a majorpower,she would move away fromthe SovietUnion.
After1971, Pakistanceased to be a complicating factorin Indo-American
relations,yet other factors such as Sino-American detente,India's nuclear
in
explosion 1974, and Diego Garcia kept these relations ruffled.The U.S. could
notloosenthebonds oftheIndo-SovietTreatyofFriendship and Cooperation
(1971).
The Reagan Administration's approachto South Asia seems to be more
complex, and a curious mix of the "balance of power" and "dominanceof

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power"approaches.It has strengthened Pakistaneconomically and militarilyto

resistthe threat(real or perceived)of the SovietUnion,yetany increment in
Pakistan'sstrength also enablesittoresistthethreat(realorperceived)ofIndia.
Whenitcomestomilitary aid forPakistan,itis difficulttobalancewhatPakistan
as
perceives necessary and India as tolerable. The Indians, therefore, arebound
tolookuponanyincrement in Pakistan'smilitary strength as a roadblock totheir
aspirations in the A
region. congressionalstudy mission which visited both
Indiaand Pakistanin October,1981,notedthat"India'sreactiontotheproposed
U.S. package is drivenby its determination to maintainits positionas the
dominantpowerin theregion."23
Atthesametime,theReaganAdministration deniesthatIndiais a proxyof
Russia, and that the Indo-Soviet of
Treaty Friendship and Cooperationof1971is
a military alliance.Its spokesmenhave madeitveryclearthattheU.S. is notin
thebusinessoftakingsidesin themutualproblemsofPakistanand India.Such
problemsmustbe settledbilaterally. The Reagan Administration has helped
India in securinghuge financialassistancefromthe World Bank and the
International MonetaryFund. It has also seen thatIndia'snuclearplansdo not
lackenricheduraniumand sparepartsfortheTarapurnuclearplant.It has also
offeredto sell India sophisticatedweapons worthapproximately a billion
dollars.A high-powered IndiandefenseteamvisitedtheU.S. in October,1984.
It is also reportedthattheU.S. mighttransfer advancedcomputerand missiles
technology to India. The Reagan Administration's policyin SouthAsia thusmay
be called an "integratedapproach."One may see moreof it as the second
Reagantermproceeds.
The reality ofIndianpowerand positionis toolargenow foreithertheU.S.
or Pakistanto ignore.Thus ithas notbeen difficult fortheReaganAdministra-
tionto persuadeZia's government to enterintoa dialoguewithIndia and to
acceleratethe efforts to establisha regionalframework of cooperation.These
efforts have made a slow but encouraging progressand lastyeartheSouthAsian
RegionalCooperation(SARC) met, for the first
time, at the foreignminister's
level.A SARC heads-of-state summit is scheduled to take placetowardtheend
ofthisyear.These are welcome developments.However,a sizeableportionof
PakistanipublicopinionmakersstillregardIndia as the principalthreatto
Pakistan.The Indo-SovietTreatyof 1971continuesto presentthepossibility of
concerted actionbythetwopartiesin anysituationtheychooseto interpret as a
threatto peace in SouthAsia. Whiletheywould welcomeU.S. efforts to bring
about Indo-U.S. and Indo-Pakistanunderstanding and friendship, any pro-
nouncedU.S. supportforIndia's hegemonyin theregionis bound to arouse
theirlatentfears.
Americannonproliferation policyin generallacks credibility because it is
selectivein application.South Asia providesa glaringexample.Pakistanhas
done all it could withinthelimitsofitsenergyneeds and security concernsto
establisha nonproliferation regime in South Asia. Pakistan's quest fornuclear

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power makes both economicand strategicsense. The energysituationin

Pakistanis fastreachingcrisisproportions and cheapnuclearenergyis theirbest
answer.It is also Pakistan'sbest guaranteeof securityas it raisesthecostof
aggressionto an unacceptablelevel. The U.S. and Pakistanseem to have
reachedsome sortofworkingcompromise. Reaganhas soft-pedalled theissue
and Zia has publiclypromisednottodetonatea nucleardeviceevenforpeaceful
purposes.The issue thusis dormant,notdead.
In additiontothefourvulnerabilities examinedabovethereis a wholerange
of issues on whichPakistanand U.S. perceptionsand policiesdiffer. These
includetheNorth-South dialogue, the Arab-Israel the
relations, Iranian Revolu-
tion,theIndianocean as a zone of peace, etc. However,bothcountrieshave
shownmaturity and understanding tocontainthesedivergences so thattheydo
notbecomestumbling blocksin the evolutionof a cooperativePakistan-U.S.
relationship.
To sum up, theU.S. interest in Pakistanhas been transient. Pakistanhas
beentreatedmoreas a strategic statethanas a nation.Therefore, Pakistan-U.S.
relationshave fluctuated withtheebb and flowofthecold war. Talkingofthe
new Pakistan-U.S.relationship at Lahorein May,1984,Vice-President George
Bushsaid thatit transcended Sovietaggressionin Afghanistan, and thatthere
was no questionofWashington losinginterest in Pakistanin theeventofany
settlement of the Afghanissue.24Hearteningas the assuranceis, it cannot
completely overcomethePakistanifeelingthata relationship basedon mutuality
ofthreatperceptions alonemaynotpossiblyendure.PakistanexpectstheUnited
Statesto treatitas a nationand to shareU.S. economicaspirations and security
concernson a long-term basis.Theydo notwishthepasttobe a preludeto the
future. A moreenduringrelationship canbe builton thebasisofthelargeareaof
policycongruence that has emerged between thetwocountries.Oppositionto
Sovietintervention and theircontinuedpresencein Afghanistan; cooperative
tieswithChina,Japan,theGulfStatesand WestEuropeancountries; desirefor
peace, stability and cooperation in a South Asia freeof nuclear weapons
constitute themajorareas ofcongruence.Americaneconomicpoliciestowards
theThirdWorldand uncritical supportto Israelon one hand and Pakistan's
quest for nucleartechnology on the othercouldcreateproblemsforan enduring
relationship ifthese divergences turnedintoquidproquos.
are

NOTES

1. Norman D. Palmer, A Tortured

'The UnitedStatesand Pakistan: "
Relationship/
PaperreadattheFirstBilateral
Conference
on Pakistan-U.S. held
Relations atArlington,
Va.,June7-10,1981.

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 101

2. Harry Magdoff, TheAgeofImperialism (NewYork:Monthly ReviewPress,1969),p. 117.

3. Someoftheseprofessionals were:Gen.HaytVandenberg, ChiefofU.S.Airforce Staff;
Adm.Arthur W. Radford, Chiefof U.S. NavalStaff; HenryA. Byroade, Assistant
Secretary ofStateforNearEastern, SouthAsianandAfrican Maj.Gen.George
Affairs;
Olmwald, DeputytotheMutualSecurity Administrator.
4. TheBrookings Institution,MajorProblems ofUnitedStates Foreign
Policy(Washington,
D.C.: TheBrookings Institute,1952),p. 291.
5. Fora briefdiscussion of theseinterpretations see Raju G. C. Thomas,"Security
Relationships in Southern Asia:Differences in theIndianandAmerican Perspectives,"
AsianSurvey 21(July 1981),pp. 689-709.
6. GolamWahedChoudhury, Pakistan'sRelations withIndia, 1947-1966(London:PallMall
Press,1968),p. 211.
7. Fazal MuqeemKhan,TheStoryof thePakistan Army(Karachi,Pakistan: Oxford
University Press,1963),p. 154.
8. Ziauddin Ahmad, ed.,Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat AliKhan, LeaderAndStatesman. (Karachi,
Pakistan: Oriental Academy, 1970), p. 177.
9. M. Rafique Afzal, ed.,Speeches AndStatements ofQuaid-i-Millat
LiaquatAliKhan (Lahore:
Research Society ofPakistan, 1967),p. 538.
10. Dawn(Karachi), October 21,1951.
11. S. M. Burke, Mainsprings ofIndian andPakistani Foreign Policies
(Karachi,Pakistan:
Oxford University Press,1975),p. 116.
12. Mohammad AyubKhan,Friends, NotMasters (Karachi, Pakistan:Oxford University
Press,1967),p. 42.
13. It was redesignated as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)whenIran,after the
Revolution of1958,leftit.Itmaybe notedthattheU.S. wasnota formal member ofthis
pactbutinpractice participated inallitsactivities.
14. Between 1954-65 Pakistan received about$1.5billion worth ofmilitaryaid.About40
per cent of Pakistan's development budget outlays were also metby the U.S. during the
sameperiod.
15. Henry Kissinger, TheWhite HouseYears(London: Weidenfold, 1979),p. 846.
16. GhulamMustafaChaudhry, TheAmerican ImagesofPakistan (Unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis,Department of Government and InternationalStudies, University of South
Carolina, 1981)Chapter Seven,pp. 114-139.
17. Henry Kissinger, White HouseYears, p. 895.
18. Newsweek, January 14,1980,p. 6.
19. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics(NewYork:Alfred Knopf, 1968).
20. William J.Barnds, "U.S. Policy TowardSouthAsia,Shifting PerceptionsAndPolicy
Choices," PacificCommunity, 8 (July,1977),p. 47.
21. Ibid.
22. Norman D. Palmer, "TheCarter Administration AndSouthAsia"inLawrence Ziring,
ed.,TheSub-Continent inWorld Politics:
India,ItsNeighborsAndTheGreat Powers(NewYork:
Praeger, 1978),p. 199.
23. Dawn(Karachi), December 14,1981.
24. TheMuslim (Islamabad), May19,1984.

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102

RaisA. Kahnis currentlytheDirector oftheCentrefor

American andAfricanStudiesatQuaid-i-AzamUniversity,
Islamabad,Pakistan. hewasProfessor
Previously ofHistory
attheUniversity
ofKarachi, anda Director
Karachi, General
in theMinistryof Foreign Islamabad.
Affairs, He holds
Mastersdegreesin History and DefenseStudies,and a
DoctorateinAmerican History theUniversity
from ofCali-
fornia,
Berkeley.He is theauthorof twobooks,several
articles
andbookreviews.

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