"Bamboo Swirling in the Wind": Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and

the United States

Author(s): PONGPHISOOT BUSBARAT
Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia , August 2016, Vol. 38, No. 2 (August 2016), pp.
233-257
Published by: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24916631

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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 38, No. 2 (2016), pp. 233-57 DOI: 10.1355/cs38-2c
© 2016 ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

"Bamboo Swirling in the Wind":

Thailand's Foreign Policy
Imbalance between China and
the United States

PONGPHISOOT BUSBARAT

This article examines Thailand's foreign policy posture towards China

and the United States since the early 2000s. It argues that Thailand
increasingly faces difficulties in maintaining its time-honoured
diplomatic tradition of flexibility and pragmatism. The "China factor"
together with domestic developments since the late 1990s, including
the rise of nationalistic sentiment among the public and politica
polarization, have become important determinants in the decisio
making process vis-à-vis Thailand's relations with Washington an
Beijing. As a result, compared to other US allies in Asia, Thailan
does not always accommodate American policies but, in many
circumstances, acts in favour of China instead. This policy posture i
not a product of a well-planned strategy, but rather a reaction to the
China factor and domestic sensitivities surrounding decision-making.
This current stage of Thai foreign policy can be labelled "bambo
swirling in the wind" instead of the conventional "bending with th
wind" diplomacy that tends to reflect a better-calculated strategy t
balance Great Power influence.

Pongphisoot Busbarat is Dorothy Borg Scholar in Southeast A

Studies at the Weatherhead Institute of Asian Studies, Colum
University, and Research Affiliate at the Sydney Southeas
Centre, University of Sydney Postal address: 420 West 118th S
9th Floor, International Affairs Building, New York, NY10027, Un
States; email: p.busharat@columbia.edu.

233

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234 Pongphisoot Busbarat

Keywords: Thai foreign policy, policy orientation, geopolitics, US-Thai security

alliance, China's rise, domestic influence.

The rise of China has transformed the political and economic

landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. China is undeniably the new
Asian powerhouse of the twenty-first century that has propelled
the region's economies amid difficulties in other parts of the globe.
However, despite the opportunities that China's growth offers, there
are concerns over China's increasing influence and behaviour in
Northeast and Southeast Asia. Economic dependence on China may
constrain autonomous policymaking in smaller countries, especially
on policies that impinge on Beijing's national interests. Countries
across the region are concerned that China is transforming its
economic strength into military might, and that its armed forces
have become more assertive in the maritime domain. In the face of
a rising China, many Asian countries believe that the United States
remains the best guarantor of regional stability. As a result, they
have facilitated an increased US military presence as part of the
Obama administration's Asian pivot or rebalance.1 However, regional
states cannot be assured about the future, as historical experience is
a reminder that given the vagaries of international politics, relying
on the protection of an external power is not a long-term solution.2
The United States may reduce its presence in Asia, as it did after
the Vietnam War. Therefore, a general policy practice — especially
in Southeast Asia — is to "hedge" against such an outcome.3 In
other words, regional states prefer the flexibility and pragmatism in
their interactions with Washington and Beijing by continuing their
engagement with China in regional affairs while keeping the United
States involved as a counterweight.
Despite the common stance of maintaining a balance between
the United States and China, an effective hedging strategy is
increasingly delicate and difficult to sustain. Recently, various
factors have pushed some countries towards one power and pulled
them away from the other. Maritime disputes between China and a
number of Asian countries, including Japan in the East China Sea
and Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei in the South
China Sea, are good examples. Rising tensions in the South China
Sea has resulted in Vietnam and the Philippines moving closer to
the United States in an effort to deter further Chinese assertiveness.4
For Thailand, pursuing a flexible policy towards the Great
Powers is not a new diplomatic strategy. The historical legacy
of Thailand's interaction with outsiders has shaped a diplomatic

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 235

culture that values flexibility and pragmatism in its foreign policy.

It has been dubbed "bamboo bending with the wind", suggesting a
policy that is "always solidly rooted, but flexible enough to bend
whichever way the wind blows in order to survive".5 Guided by
the principles of flexibility and pragmatism throughout its modern
history, Thailand has managed to mitigate major security threats,
including European colonialism in the nineteenth century, the
Japanese occupation during the Second World War and the communist
expansion in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. However, as with
other mainland Southeast Asian states, since the end of the Cold
War Thailand has faced difficulties resisting China's influence, and
thus on a number of policy issues, Bangkok has gradually tilted
towards Beijing. Recent developments in Thai politics and the
country's foreign policy cast doubt on whether Thailand is skillful
enough to maintain its traditional balancing diplomacy. Most
significantly, the military coup in May 2014 has widened the rift
between Thailand and the United States, and the junta has moved
closer to China.6
This article assesses Thai foreign policy and argues that the
rise of China has tested the effectiveness of Thailand's flexible
diplomacy. Although Thailand generally manages to maintain clos
ties with both Washington and Beijing, its balancing act is more ad
hoc than a well-crafted strategy. Bangkok's inability to keep a fin
balance is also exacerbated by two interrelated domestic factor
the upsurge of nationalism and political polarization. Rather than
"bending with the wind", as conventional wisdom would have it, th
author believes Thailand's current diplomacy can best be describe
as "swirling in the wind". This metaphor suggests a foreign polic
decision-making process that is highly sensitive to the surroundin
external environment and tends to change abruptly in response t
immediate pressures. In this context, this article examines four cas
studies of Thailand's policy responses to China and the Unite
States, in addition to domestic political factors.

Thailand's Diplomatic Culture: "Bamboo Bending with the Wind"

The flexible nature of Thai foreign policy can be viewed through
the legacy of the Hindu-Buddhist cosmological concept of mandal
which underpins the ancient state system in mainland Southea
Asia.7 Under this system, the weaker, often smaller, politie
acknowledged the superiority of the most powerful kingdoms an
submitted themselves as tributaries. The strong kingdoms wer

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236 Pongphisoot Busbarat

perceived simultaneously as potential threats to the survival of

the weaker polities and as effective counter-balancers to guarantee
the autonomy of the less powerful kingdoms. Notably, the loyalty
of the weaker was not exclusive to one of the stronger, but was
shared among multiple power nodes. This resulted in a system in
which there were intersecting spheres of influence over smaller
kingdoms. For example, the Khmer kings recognized both Siam
(Thailand) and Annam (Vietnam) as their patrons during the
fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries by sending tribute as a symbol
of acceptance of their suzerainty over the Cambodian kingdom. The
mandala concept of state interaction informed Siam in its responses
to security challenges following the arrival of European colonialists
in the mid-nineteenth century. The ability to be flexible in switching
support from one power to balance another "is always in the interest
of Thailand" in order to protect its vital interests, i.e. sovereignty
and territorial integrity.8 Therefore, the ability to evaluate the external
environment and maintain flexibility became a core value in the
conduct of Thai foreign policy.
The principle of flexibility enables Thailand to achieve two
goals: first, avoid conflict with a major power; and second, maintain
the status quo with regard to the country's sovereignty and security.
In essence, Thailand understands its relative insignificance in Great
Power politics and that it could be abandoned by a Great Power
ally at any time. Thus, Thailand needs to manoeuvre its relations
with external powers so that it will not be negatively affected
by their rivalry. This dimension reflects the realist paradigm of
thought within the Thai foreign policy elite that conceives of
Thailand as a small state that lacks power in quantitative terms,
especially military might, and is ultimately concerned about its
survival in the international system.9 A small power generally
"considers that it can never, acting alone or in a small group,
make a significant impact on the system".10 It thus often "feel[s]
threatened, to some significant and immediate sense, by the play of
Great Power politics".11 A small state ultimately prefers neutrality
and non-alignment,12 but realizes the difficulty in achieving that
position and is therefore left with more realistic choices between
balancing and bandwagoning with the Great Powers and diversifying
its relationship with multiple powers.13 Therefore, the flexibility
to select an appropriate foreign policy to reflect accurately the
surrounding environment at a particular time is deemed necessary
by its leaders. Moreover, Thai foreign policy aims, as part of the
state apparatus, to achieve a condition that stabilizes its core pillars

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 23 7

— nation, religion (Buddhism) and king14 — by "defending] the

nation's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and status
in the international arena".15
Thailand regards the ability to be flexible and pragmatic in
changing its alignment as important in defending the country's
national interest in response to shifts in the international distribution
of power. This was clearly evident during the Cold War, when
Thailand shifted its foreign policy posture from maintaining
contacts with both non-communist and communist countries
immediately after the end of the Second World War, to adop
an anti-communist posture in the early 1950s, and then swing
back to rapprochement with China during Vietnam's occup
of Cambodia in the 1980s. In the post-Cold War environment,
absence of traditional security threats declined, and this enab
Thailand to pursue a more omnidirectional diplomacy. Th
captured well in the remarks by former Foreign Minister Th
Khoman in 1999:

When we know that great powers always compete for power,

we must fall into nobody's arms, but maintain the policy of
equidistance — not leaning too much towards anyone who will
tie us so tightly that we cannot breathe comfortably. This is the
principle that always guided me when I was responsible for Thai
foreign affairs.16

In a nutshell, "bending with the wind" diplomacy can be observed

from Thailand's ability to justify its close ties with multiple powers
without being overly concerned about losing trust with, or benefits
from, any of those powers. Apart from its ability to maintain
independence throughout the period of European colonial expansion
in Southeast Asia in the late nineteenth century, Thailand's ability to
form a de facto military alliance with China during the Cambodian
crisis in the 1980s, while at the same time preserving a formal treaty
alliance with the United States, is a classic example of the flexibility
and pragmatism practised by Thailand's foreign policy elite. In the
post-Cold War era, although Thailand's security alliance with the
United States remains a significant component of its national security
strategy, Thailand has attempted to diversify its security partnerships
with other external powers, as well as within ASEAN-led multilateral
frameworks. Thailand has also expanded its economic and cultural
ties with various partners, particularly China. With the exception
of its alliance with the United States during the height of the Cold
War, Thailand has been relatively consistent with its omnidirectional

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238 Pongphisoot Busbarat

diplomacy. This corresponds to the overarching strategy of enmeshment

that Southeast Asian states have pursued in response to changes in
the regional security environment, underpinned by the US strategic
drift away from Southeast Asia alongside the growing influence of
China.17 This foreign policy posture has allowed Thailand to bend
in whichever direction the wind may offer benefits to advance its
national interests. In the main, this flexibility attempts to create a
win-win situation whereby Thailand does not have to choose sides
and consequently lose any external support, trust or economic
benefits.

Thailand's Policy Imbalance

Thailand's general posture between America and China is simply
to keep a balance between the two so long as neither becomes an
immediate security threat. While Thailand's alliance with the United
States has remained an indispensable element in the country's
security calculations since the Cold War, Bangkok has not hesitated
to cultivate new partnerships with other powers so long as its
national integrity is not compromised. In the immediate post-Cold
War era, while the United States reprioritized its foreign policy
away from Southeast Asia to other regions, especially the Middle
East, China moved to promote bilateral ties with its neighbouring
countries. Despite the fact that strategic competition in the region
between Washington and Beijing may increase exponentially, the
view from Bangkok is that a critical breaking point where the two
contending powers engage in direct military confrontation is unlikely
to happen in the foreseeable future. Thailand's general position
between Washington and Beijing is that it maintains security ties
with America while deepening economic and political engagement
with China. However, since the late 1990s the "China factor" has
increasingly influenced the direction of Thailand's foreign policy
orientation. Coupled with domestic developments around the same
time, these two factors have constrained Thailand's balancing strategy,
resulting in closer relations with Beijing.

The China Factor

Thailand-China relations moved into a new phase in the post-Cold

War period in which mutual economic interests formed the primary
basis of the relationship. Thailand views China as an important
economic partner, and this has become an important pull factor for

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 239

the country. With a huge population, China represents a potentially

massive market for Thai exports, which in turn can help promote
Thailand's economic growth. China's "Go West" strategy has led it to
boost its relations with Thailand by creating a regional environment
where China's economic expansion can be accommodated. Beijing's
"Go West" strategy is designed to develop the country's western
inland regions of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou and Tibet by shortening
transport routes from these regions to sea ports in Southeast Asia,
thereby stimulating trade, investment and tourism in Western China.18
These overlapping economic interests between China and Thailand
have, in essence, been a very important driver of nurturing closer
bilateral relations.
Economic relations between China and Thailand have expanded
considerably since the end of the Cold War. The volume of trade
between the two countries has dramatically increased. In 2013
China surpassed Japan as Thailand's number one trading partner. In
2015, trade with China stood at US$56 billion or 15.6 per cent of
Thailand's foreign trade.19 Thailand also leapfrogged other ASEAN
countries by signing an early harvest free trade agreement with China
on agricultural items in 2003, seven years before the China-ASEAN
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) was signed. In the multilateral arena,
both countries have promoted the economic development of mainland
Southeast Asia, and have actively supported regional arrangements
such as the Quadrangle Economic Cooperation (QEC),20 the Greater
Mekong Subregion (GMS), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and
other ASEAN frameworks. This bilateral economic relationship has
also been facilitated by frequent contacts between the two countries
at every level, including the Thai royal family, political leaders,
officials, businesses and tourists. Coupled with the absence of
territorial disputes, Thailand is arguably China's closest partner in
Southeast Asia,21 and is often praised by Chinese leaders as a good
model for China-Southeast Asia cooperation.22 This warm relationship
between the two countries has been described by senior Chinese
leaders akin to family members (zhong tai yi jia qin).23
Notwithstanding the country's close ties with Beijing, Thai
policymakers have concerns regarding China's rising power. This
concern stems mainly from Beijing's growing political and economic
influence in mainland Southeast Asia that may limit Thailand's
subregional leadership and autonomous decision making. This concern
can be traced back to a confidential policy document circulated within
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1992 which concluded that
China was intent on expanding its sphere of influence in mainland

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240 Pongphisoot Busbarat

Southeast Asia.24 MFA officials assessed that China's growing

economic and political profile would reduce Thailand's influence in
mainland Southeast Asia. The document concluded that although
Sino-Thai relations were in excellent condition, in the long run
economic competition could lead to friction and undermine the
relationship. The document further expressed concern that China
was likely to be a security threat to Thailand in the sense that it
could manipulate Thai policymakers and businessmen in favour of its
national interests. This is especially due to the fact that the overseas
Chinese population in Thailand is well integrated into mainstream
society. Chinese diplomats and officials have also established close
contacts with high-ranking Thai officials and overseas Chinese
associations. Such a propinquity creates a sympathetic attitude
towards China among major stakeholders and the public in Thailand.
This assessment in the early post-Cold War period appears to be
increasingly relevant when we look at developments in Sino-Thai
relations since the late 1990s.

Domestic Imperatives
The Thai public has previously been portrayed as not having much
interest in the country's foreign affairs.25 However, public interest in
Thai foreign affairs began to rise after the end of the Cold War, and
especially during the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Public
resentment over the responses of the United States and international
lending agencies — especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
— to Thailand's economic woes reignited a new wave of nationalist
sentiment against Western countries, particularly America. Compared
to Washington's quick response to the economic crisis in South Korea,
many Thais felt that America did not take its friendship with the
country seriously and that it had merely exploited it during the Cold
War.26 In contrast, China's more proactive role, including financial
contributions to affected countries and its decision not to devalue
its currency, was applauded by Thai policymakers.27 Washington's
lacklustre response to Thailand's economic crisis created negative
perceptions of the United States in Thailand.28 This domestic
environment was partly responsible for Thailand's refocus towards
Asia more broadly, and China in particular, during the premiership
of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-6).
In addition, a decade of political polarization in Thailand
following Thaksin's removal from power in a 2006 military coup,
also become a push factor because the United States was perceived

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 241

by anti-Thaksin groups as having backed forces loyal to Thaksin

thereby interfering in Thailand's domestic politics.29 The aftermath
of the military coup in May 2014 has aggravated this resentment.
While China and many other Asian countries regarded the coup
as Thailand's internal affairs, Western countries, and especially the
United States, have repeatedly criticized the military's seizure of
power.30 Following the coup, Washington downgraded its bilateral
ties with Thailand and enacted tough measures to pressure the
junta into restoring democracy, including the suspension of military
assistance and arms sales, and scaling down the annual Cobra Gold
military exercise.31 The junta and its local supporters have criticized
Washington for not understanding the complexity of Thai politics.32
As a result of deteriorating relations with America, the military junta
has turned to its Asian neighbours, especially China for international
support.33 Under the current military regime, Thailand is trying to
play the "China card" against the United States.34
Domestic developments in Thailand since the AFC have
resulted in an increasingly negative perception of the United States.
Conversely, perceptions of China have become more positive. Although
tangible threats to state sovereignty such as a military invasion are
unlikely, a more abstract understanding of the threats such as neo
imperialism or foreign interference in Thailand's domestic affairs
has been popularized. Against this backdrop, domestic pressure has
become a strong determinant in deciding the course of Thailand's
foreign policy, especially when the presence of two major powers
has divided public opinion. As such, Thai policymakers can swiftly
abandon its balanced position to one that may satisfy the public
under the rubric of protecting national pride and sovereignty, with
this change most likely in favour of Beijing.

Vacillation in Foreign Policy Responses

In general, Thailand's optimal foreign policy option is not to
take sides, but rather pursue foreign relations that best promote
its national interests. Maintaining close ties with all the major
powers serves Thailand's interests best as evidenced earlier by
the "bending with the wind" diplomacy. However, since the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Bangkok
has found it increasingly difficult to manage this balance, especially
when the interests of Washington and Beijing conflict. Due to
Thailand's security ties with America and strong economic ties with
China, the Thai policy elite's decision-making has sometimes been

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242 Pongphisoot Busbarat

indecisive and vacillating because it did not want to offend either.

Policy responses to international events began to resemble a bamboo
tree being blown by the wind from different directions and swirling
around without a clear direction. While both "bending with the
wind" and "swirling in the wind" notions connote flexibility, there
are some subtle differences between the two. The former suggests
the ability to maintain an optimal policy that preserves Thailand's
national interests. The latter signifies a swift change in decision
making that partly sacrifices or compromises its national interests.
Therefore, Thai foreign policy has been criticized for lacking a clear
strategy for dealing with Sino-US competition in Southeast Asia;
its foreign policy is viewed as being more reactive than planned.35
Thailand's foreign policy responses to major events allow us
to make a number of observations concerning a lack of well-crafted
strategies. First, as a US security ally in the region, Thailand
generally holds the view that America's military presence is vital
to regional stability. Therefore, it is almost a default position that
Thailand's preference is to accommodate the United States in the
security arena as it has done in the past while diversifying its ties
with other partners without disrupting its security cooperation with
its key ally. Second, and paradoxically, Thailand's accommodation
vis-à-vis America is watered down, delayed, or abandoned if it is
likely to negatively affect relations with other powers or pose a
threat to political stability. In such a situation, the China factor can
influence the final decision-making of Thai policymakers. Third, in
terms of economic relations, although both China and the United
States are important trading partners for Thailand, Bangkok tends
to cooperate more with the former than the latter.

Empirical Cases
In this section, four important foreign policy cases since the early
2000s are examined to demonstrate the aforementioned policy
postures: Thailand's fluctuating position towards the "Global War
on Terror" (GWOT); Thailand's pan-Asian policy; the US request to
use U-Tapao airbase for a scientific project; and Thailand's position
on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). These cases reveal Bangkok's
responses to different circumstances where the United States and
China factors are intertwined within the broader framework of elite
decision-making in Thailand. In so doing, these cases provide for
a better understanding of how the United States and China affect
Thailand's attempt to maintain a balanced position between them.

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 243

In some circumstances, the China factor is relatively subtle and

initially may not even be central to the policy debate. However,
it can turn out to be either part of the final determinant, or
manipulated by domestic actors such as opposition parties and anti
government groups; both of which reflect how Thai policymaking
is perceptible to China's influence.

Thailand's Responses to the "Global War on Terror" (GWOT)

After the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, Thailand's position
vis-à-vis the US-led international campaign against terrorism — dubbed
the GWOT by the Bush administration — underlined the country's
default security posture. Thai security planners accommodated
America in the security area despite concerns about getting too
close to Washington. However, Thailand's decision to support the
GWOT shifted over time: from reluctance, to discreet support and
finally to accommodation. The shifting positions during the first
few weeks following 9/11 ostensibly reflected conflict avoidance in
Thailand's foreign policy.
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Thaksin
government declared that Thailand was strictly neutral but later
changed its position to support GWOT.36 However, the Thai
government quickly toned down its position by qualifying its
support for GWOT in accordance with UN-led measures, after
coming under strong domestic criticism, including from members of
the public, academics, media, and the Senate.37 The main concern
was over Thailand's Muslim population in the far south — which
constitutes the second biggest religious group in the country — as
well as its relations with Muslim countries. At the same time,
Thailand was also wary about the strategic implications of its
overt support of US policy. While Thailand-China relations were
extraordinarily amicable during the Thaksin administration, Thaksin
was concerned that support for US counter-terrorism efforts might
be perceived in Beijing as Thai support for a US-led containment
strategy aimed at China.38 Thai policymakers assessed that while
the vacillation of Thailand's position may have confused or perhaps
even upset Washington, its cooperation with the United States in
general was not seriously affected in practice.39
Thailand adjusted its position again after US President George
W. Bush criticized countries that his administration perceived were
not providing full support for the GWOT — a position captured in
the phrase "you're either with us or against us in the fight against

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244 Pongphisoot Busbarat

terror".40 Thailand reacted immediately by offering its support for

Washington's anti-terrorism policy and providing logistic support
to US-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. US military
aircraft were refuelled at U-Tapao airbase and Thailand dispatched
non-combat troops to Afghanistan following an official request by
the United States.41 In addition, Thailand increased intelligence
sharing with the United States and this led to the arrest of Hambali,
a leading figure in the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network in
Southeast Asia.42 Credible reports also suggested that Thailand had
allowed the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to use a secret
prison to interrogate suspected members of al-Qaeda.43 As a result
of its cooperation with America, Thailand was granted Major Non
NATO Ally (MNNA) status which allowed the Kingdom to receive
surplus US military equipment. Washington also promised to start
negotiations with Thailand on a free trade agreement. Due to
Thaksin's endorsement of the GWOT, the Bush administration was
willing to tolerate Thaksin's outspoken criticism of America as well
as his hawkish approach to domestic problems and serious human
rights violations against drug traffickers and separatists in Southern
Thailand.44
It can be argued that Thailand continues to prefer close ties
with the United States in the security area while attempting to
balance countervailing forces — such as public opinion and criticism
from other foreign countries — by seeking support and justification
through international arrangements. Thailand's commitment to the
United States may have negatively impacted its relations with other
Muslim countries and domestic groups, which could be potentially
harmful to the government's legitimacy and stability. Notwithstanding
the ambiguity of Thailand's verbal commitment, its support for
US policy remained unchanged in practice. The ambiguity in the
beginning was intended to alleviate pressure on the government and
hedge against any negative consequences, and thus leave space for
the government to manage the situation. The Thaksin government's
support for the GWOT at a later stage reflects Thailand's conflict
avoidance with America and desire to maintain its default position
of accommodating Washington in security matters. Concerning China,
Bangkok pursued economic diplomacy to further deepen its ties with
Beijing, and in so doing, tried to reassure Beijing of its commitment
to the bilateral relationship. Thailand's economic engagement with
China is discussed further in the next section.

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 245

Thailand's Pan-Asian Policy

Thailand's foreign economic policy in the post-Cold War period,
especially since the Thaksin administration, demonstrates a shift of
focus towards Asia, and particularly China. In the aftermath of the
AFC, the main objective of Thai foreign policy was to revive the
Thai economy. In contrast to the preceding government of Chuan
Leekpai — which deferred to the West, especially the United States,
for economic recovery — the Thaksin administration redirected
its foreign policy towards Asian countries under the label Forward
Engagement Strategy.45 Thaksin believed that this strategy would
bind the subregions of Asia together. The strategy comprised
several major subregional initiatives, including the Asia Cooperation
Dialogue (ACD), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Ayeyawady
Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), and
a web of bilateral free trade agreements.
Thailand's focus on Asia can be seen as a rebuke to Western
countries, especially the United States, for their slow and seemingly
indifferent response to the AFC. Within the US$17.2 billion bailout
package offered under the IMF programme, most of the funding was
provided by the IMF, ADB, and Asian countries led by Japan.46 Not
only did Washington fail to offer any additional help to Thailand,
but it also backed the IMF's austerity measures which ultimately
exacerbated the country's economic problems.47 In contrast to the
minimalist response towards Thailand, the United States seemed
more concerned with the economic crisis in South Korea, home
to substantial US military and economic interests.48 As Kishore
Mahbubani opined, "all the Western institutions that had made loans
to South Korea received phone calls from the US Treasury 'advising'
them not to pull out. These phone calls saved South Korea."49
However, this did not happen with Thailand. At this juncture,
public resentment against the West was provoked by nationalist
public intellectuals who saw the conditions imposed by international
financial institutions as a neo-imperialist tool supported by
America.50 As US companies bought Thai assets at low prices, the
perception emerged that America had taken advantage of Thailand's
economic problems. Considering the fact that Thailand is America's
oldest ally in Asia, its lack of enthusiasm and support during
the crisis not only upset Thais but also raised doubts concerning
Washington's real intentions towards the Kingdom.51 Anti-American
sentiment contributed to Thaksin's popularity. In contrast to America's

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246
Pongphisoot Busbarat

lackadaisical response, other Asian countries were more generous

in offering their assistance, notably China which gained public
admiration for its leadership in helping affected countries maintain
their trade competitiveness. China's decision to contribute US$1 billion
to the IMF rescue fund, and not to devalue its own currency, was
applauded by Thailand.52 In addition, China joined ASEAN member
countries along with Japan and South Korea (ASEAN Plus Three) to
establish the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000, a form of currency swap
mechanism. China's role reinforced the close ties between Bangkok
and Beijing. Crucially, China began to be seen as a "true friend"
that did not abandon Thailand during times of crisis.53
Promoting Asian cooperation was a core tenet of Thaksin's
foreign policy. It led Thaksin to establish the ACD, a forum for
Asian countries to increase economic cooperation. Thaksin viewed
the ACD as complimenting existing dialogues and initiatives in
Asia, and he predicted it would create synergy among bilateral,
multilateral, subregional and regional strategic partnerships and
promote mutual interests. According to this perspective, increasing
interdependence in Asia would counterbalance regional economic
and political uncertainty. Realizing that China's participation would
attract other countries to the ACD, Thaksin actively courted Beijing.
Thaksin visited China frequently to promote both bilateral and
regional initiatives and he successfully convinced China to host the
third ACD Summit in June 2004. Thailand and China also agreed
to an early harvest free trade agreement in June 2003. During
Thaksin's visit to China in July 2005, a strategic partnership plan was
discussed.54 Close bilateral ties with Beijing also served to legitimize
Thaksin's domestic policy, especially in regard to the violation of
human rights in the war on drugs and his hardline response to
separatist violence in Southern Thailand. China's near-silence on
these issues helped deflect international criticism from Western
nations and human rights groups. Some observers took the view
that the Thaksin administration had drifted away from its balanced
position between Washington and Beijing in favour of the latter.55

NASA's Request to Use U-Tapao Airport for Scientific Study

In some circumstances, domestic determinants, together with the

China factor, play an important role in shifting Thailand's decision
making away from the default position of accommodating the United
States. Unlike the first case where Thailand complied with its default
position in support of US security policy, Thailand's response to

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 247

a request by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) to use the U-Tapao airbase for scientific study entails more
complexities, and resulted in a shift away from its default position
of accommodating the United States.
In March 2012, NASA proposed a plan to Thailand to base an
airborne scientific project on Southeast Asia at U-Tapao airbase on
Thailand's eastern seaboard. The project, entitled Southeast Asia
Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study (SEAC4RS),
proposed a study of the meteorological system designed to
examine the atmosphere.56 Under the proposal, NASA aircraft based
at U-Tapao would collect samples of the region's atmospheric
circulation: the summertime monsoon circulation to the west and
marine convection to the east and south that can loft emissions
into the stratosphere.57
Proponents expressed the view that this was a regular an
legitimate request from a strategic ally.58 Post-Cold War, Thaila
had continued to provide the United States with access to it
military facilities, with U-Tapao occupying an important positio
in America's forward-deployed military strategy. US forces not on
transit through U-Tapao on a regular basis, but also pre-position
equipment at the airbase. Therefore, from the military perspecti
this was a routine request, and it also presented an importa
research opportunity for Thailand's scientific community. On th
whole, Thailand, as well as the wider region, would be able
embrace a new advanced technology and receive more accurate d
that would improve weather and climate forecasting.59
However, in June 2012 the issue became a matter of controversy.
Domestic opposition groups argued that NASA's request was a ru
by Washington to increase its military presence in Southeast Asia
contain China.60 Faced with budget cuts due to economic problem
while at the same time planning to expand its military presence
Asia, the Pentagon hoped to resolve this dilemma by seeking acces
to military bases in the region, including in Singapore, Thailand
Vietnam and the Philippines.61 Some went further in claiming th
U-Tapao would be used for US espionage activities against China.6
Critics warned that if Thailand allowed the United States to use
U-Tapao for the NASA mission, it would compromise Thailand's
sovereignty and affect the country's balanced position between
Washington and Beijing. In turn, this could adversely affect Beijing's
trust in Thailand and therefore limit future economic and political
cooperation. The suspicion about the real intention behind NASA's
request also increased as there was also parallel progress on the

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248 Pongphisoot Busbarat

discussion to use U-Tapao for a future humanitarian and disaster

relief centre. Thai Defence Minister Sukampol Suwannathat met
briefly with US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta during the
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in early June 2012 to discuss
the issue.63 This was followed by a meeting between General
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and Thai senior security
officials.64 In late June, US Assistant Secretary of State for Political
Military Affairs, Andrew Shapiro also held meetings on Thai-US
political-military relations to discuss cooperation in peacekeeping,
humanitarian aid and disaster relief, combined military exercises
and exchanges, counterterrorism and security cooperation.65
Considering the fact that the US military's use of U-Tapao
has been long-standing, and not just limited to emergencies and
combined military exercises, NASA's request should not have been
as controversial as it became. America's use of U-Tapao has been
sanctioned by successive Thai governments over the past decades
without any effect on Sino-Thai relations. A RAND report on the
issue also concluded that the Thai military and government had
agreed with the plan and there was no objection from ASEAN
states to the US presence at U-Tapao.66 However, NASA's request
became embroiled in domestic politics when the opposition Democrat
Party used it to discredit the government by claiming that it would
negatively affect Thailand's relations with China, even though the
initial request had been approved by the Democrat-led government
in 2010.67 The Democrats pressed for parliamentary approval of the
project.68 The NASA request also provided a good opportunity for
China to test the Yingluck government. Although Beijing did not
express overt concern about the NASA project, Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi reminded his Thai counterpart, Surapong Tovichakchaikul,
that initiatives for humanitarian and disaster relief that had regional
implications should proceed in a multilateral manner.69
To avoid conflict with Washington, the Thai government
resorted to public opinion and scrutiny in an open parliamentary
debate. The Thai Cabinet discussed NASA's request on 26 June
2012 and agreed to allow NASA to use U-Tapao on the proviso
that parliament sanctioned it following an open debate in August.
The cabinet decision thereby delayed the NASA plan that had been
scheduled to start in August or September 2012. In fact, according
to a 1983 US-Thai agreement, a US request to use U-Tapao did
not require parliamentary approval; the United States is only
required to notify the Royal Thai Armed Forces about its flight

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 249

plans, and the Thai side is required to provide logistical support

as requested.70 Before the parliamentary debate could take place
however, NASA withdrew its request. The cabinet decision to push
the request through parliament reflected the fact that Thailand could
not maintain its default position as a US security ally. Bangkok
used domestic opposition to NASA's plan as a pretext to justify its
inability to accommodate the US request. Despite NASA's cancellation
of the project, Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra reiterated
Thailand's commitment to the alliance and stated that she believed
this would not affect bilateral relations.71 Humanitarian activities,
such as disaster relief, had been suggested by both sides as a means
to reinvigorate the alliance which had experienced drift in the
post-Cold War era, except for a brief period after 9/11.72 Ultimately,
this episode can be seen as a missed opportunity for Thailand to
revitalize its ties with the United States.

Thailand's Position on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

In 2004, Thailand and the United States began discussions for a
bilateral free trade agreement. However, the negotiation process was
sluggish and opposed by many interest groups, and subsequently
halted when the Thai military overthrew Prime Minister Thaksin
in 2006. At the same time, Washington's approach to free trade
agreements became more multilateral. In 2008, the Bush administration
agreed to enter into negotiations with the original members of the
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP)
— Brunei, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand — which eventually
became the TPP and for which the Obama administration became
a strong advocate as part of its Asian pivot.73 The TPP includes
some of Thailand's key trading partners including Japan, America,
Malaysia, Singapore and Australia.74
Initially, Thailand refused to participate in the TPP for a
number of reasons. Firstly, there was no agreement among domestic
stakeholders on whether the TPP would benefit Thailand. In
principle, Thailand and other small economies are likely to gain
from access to wider markets. However, local activist groups and
some industries criticized the TPP as designed primarily to benefit
advanced economies and their multinational corporations at the
expense of developing economies.75 Under the new rules and
measures for export, the impact of the restrictions on access and
non-tariff barriers to market access in higher-income countries would
be felt more by developing economies.76 Thailand might also be

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250 Pongphisoot Busbarat

disadvantaged were it to join the TPP on a number of sensitive

issues such as patient access rights to generic medicines, higher
labour costs and environmental standards, government procurement,
etc.77
Secondly, Thailand had already signed bilateral and multilateral
free trade arrangements with a number of its trading partners.
Therefore, the costs of joining the TPP may have outweighed the
benefits. Moreover, Thailand was concerned that the TPP may
undermine ASEAN "Centrality" as it pertains to the regional
integration process.78 Thailand's official position regarding regional
trading regimes prioritizes negotiation under the ASEAN frameworks,
especially within the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC].79
Thailand's preference for regional economic arrangements with
ASEAN as a core group, in turn, offers a geostrategic advantage for
China and its influence on the region. The deepening role of China
in the world economy has not only helped maintain the economic
robustness in East Asia over the past three decades but also shifted
the global economic centre of gravity towards the region, centred
on China. The plethora of ideas of regional economic cooperation
in the past decade has shown a gradual development of regional
arrangements independent of American involvement, as evidenced
by CAFTA, the ASEAN-Japan FTA, the ASEAN-Korea FTA, the
East Asia FTA (or ASEAN+3 FTA), RCEP, the Chiang Mai Initiative
etc. Therefore, US enthusiasm for the TPP can be explained as
an attempt to regain its leadership of Asia-Pacific trade regimes.80
In response to the TPP — which excludes China — Beijing has
pledged its support to RCEP, which includes China but not the
United States.81 In this connection, Thailand shares an interest with
China in supporting regional arrangements that centre on ASEAN.
Although TPP supporters warned that if Thailand did not join, it
would lose out in this FTA game,82 Thailand has been reluctant
to join the TPP, despite having been approached by US officials
numerous times.83
In an attempt to reduce pressure from the United States,
however, in November 2012 the Thai government expressed interest
in joining the TPP during the state visit of President Barack Obama.84
This decision can be interpreted as Thailand trying to accommodate
the United States. The Thai Ministry of Commerce began a detailed
study and commenced discussions with relevant agencies such as
parliamentary committees, USTR representatives and other TPP
members' representatives. The government also initiated a public
hearing process that involved other government agencies, chambers

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 251

of commerce, industry associations, academics and civil society. By

supporting the TPP, Thailand showed Washington that it was not
just taking the side of Beijing in the construction of new regional
economic architectures.
Concurrently, Thailand tried to reassure China in a number
of subtle ways. Immediately after Obama's visit, Thailand joined
other ASEAN members and their trading partners at the ASEAN
Summit in Phnom Penh to officially launch negotiations for RCEP.
To Thailand, this serves the core policy objective of maintaining
ASEAN Centrality while Beijing is still able to engage closely
with regional economic integration. Moreover, Thailand has not
progressed substantially towards joining the TPP. Thai officials
have even denied participating in TPP talks.85 Thai politics reached
a stalemate after November 2013 when anti-government protests
occupied government offices and major streets in Bangkok for
almost six months. The May 2014 military coup prevented further
progress as Washington suspended high-level contacts with the Thai
junta. This domestic disturbance caused a significant delay in decision
making within the Thai government. Although the government of
Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-o-cha expressed its willingness
to join the TPP on several occasions — such as at the US-ASEAN
Special Leaders' Summit in February 2016 — a final decision has
yet to be made.86

Conclusion

This article has sought to demonstrate that since the turn of the new
century, Thailand has faced difficulties in maintaining a balanced
position between China and the United States. Thailand's strategic
culture prescribes a policy that aims to keep cordial relations with
both powers while also being pragmatic and flexible in the face of
changing circumstances. However, China's rising power has created
a dilemma for Thailand. On the one hand, deepening ties with
Beijing offer undeniable benefits to the Thai economy, while on
the other hand, this economic (inter)dependence has political and
strategic implications. Thailand's room for manoeuvre has become
constrained, especially when decision-making may not be in line with
Beijing's national interests. Despite the US-Thai alliance, strengthening
security ties with Washington is increasingly viewed in Thailand
as participation in a containment policy against China, which Thai
policymakers feel will hurt relations with Beijing. As shown from
the four case studies presented in this article, Thailand's foreign

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252 Pongphisoot Busbarat

policy decision-making process has been influenced by pressure

from both Beijing and Washington.
Since the early 2000s, developments in Thai foreign policy
suggests that maintaining a stable balance between China and the
United States has become more complex. For Thailand, as well
as other Southeast Asian states, the economic gains derived from
maintaining close relations with China has become a source of
regime legitimacy, especially those states ruled by autocratic regimes.
Domestic politics in each country is also a facilitating factor for
China's rising influence, with the possible exception of Vietnam
and the Philippines which are locked into contentious maritime
disputes with China. Despite this development, Thailand's
diplomatic culture is a reminder to its foreign policy elite that
reliance on a single power is unwise. An attempt to rebalance
Beijing's influence can be seen, for instance, in Bangkok's invitation
to Japan to invest in joint development of the East-West railway
that will ultimately connect Myanmar's Dawei port city to Thailand,
Cambodia and Vietnam.87 Thailand's recent cancellation of a joint
venture with China on the northeast railway project can also be
seen as a rejection of the unfavourable strings Beijing attached to
the project.88 That Bangkok is now seeking alternative sources of
balancing China is another important aspect of its hedging strategy,
but is beyond the scope of this article. As Thailand's experience with
China and the United States shows, the country lacks a coherent
strategy to deal with post-Cold War complexities. Despite Thailand's
attempt to balance both powers, decisions are made haphazardly
rather than flexibly, resulting in indecisiveness and thus confusion
in the conduct of Thai foreign policy.

NOTES

Bonnie S. Glaser, "Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences", in

2012 Global Forecast, edited by Craig Cohen and Josiane Gabel (Washington,
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), pp. 22-27.
Rizal Sukma, "Can the US Sustain the 'Asia Pivot'?", Jakarta Post, 8 October
2013.

Alice D. Ba, "Southeast Asia and China", in Betwixt and Between: Southeast
Asian Strategic Relations with the United States and China, edited by Evelyn
Goh (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005), pp. 93-108.
Kristine Kwok and Julian Ryall, "Vietnam Edges Closer to Old US Foe as
Maritime Dispute with China Heats Up", South China Morning Post, 29 May
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Arne Kislenko, "Bending with the Wind: The Continuity and Flexibility of Thai
Foreign Policy", International Journal 57 (Autumn 2002): 3.
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Martin Stuart-Fox, "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture
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2004): 116-39.
8 Ibid.

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New Yo

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12 Ibid., p. 30.
Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, "Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver's
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of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia, edited by David Würfel and Brace Burton
(London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 201.
Panithan Wattanayakorn, "Thailand: The Elite's Shifting Conceptions of Security",
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Jörn Dosch, "Who's Leading Who in ASEAN-China Relations?: Community
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20 Pongphisoot Busbarat, "A Review of Thailand's Foreign Policy in Mainland
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Michael R. Chambers, '"The Chinese and the Thais are Brothers': The Evolution
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254 Pongphisoot Busbarat

"Li Praises Strong Sino-Thai Relat

"Premier Li Ke Qian meets with P
Thailand are of the Same Family' h
The Chinese Central Government N
big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/
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toward China [in Thai], No. 0304/1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thai Foreig
Profit?", Contemporary Southeast
Kitti Presertsuk, "The US-Thaila
Way Forward", in Issues & Insights
(Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum
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For a good assessment of the coup, see Storey, "Thailand's Post-Coup Relations
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[in Thai], available at <http://thepchatree.blogspot.com.au/2014/07/3-grand-strategy.
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Sheldon W. Simon, "US-Southeast Asia Relations: Mixed Reaction in Southeast

Asia to the US War on Terror", Comparative Connections 3, no. 4 (2002): 51-52.
"Academics Warn of Ethnic Backlash", The Nation, 19 September 2001; Sathit
Manassurakul, "Cooperation on Counter Terrorism between Thailand and the
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Collin S.L. Koh, "Asean's Views on US Military Role in the Region", in ASEAN
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Paul Chambers, "U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?",
Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (December 2004): 460-79,

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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 255

"You Are Either With Us or Against Us", CNN, 6 November 2001.

Chambers, "U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?", op. cit.,
p. 466.
42 Ibid., p. 469.
Dana Priest, "CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons", Washington Post,
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44 Human Rights Watch, "Thailand, Not Enough Graves: The War on Drugs, HIV/
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Asia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004).
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Japan Perspectives, edited by Jun Tsunekawa (Tokyo: The National Institute for
Defense Studies, 2007), pp. 97-110.
Chalongphob Sussangkarn, "Thailand's Debt Crisis and Economic Outlook"
(Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute, 1998), p. 3.
"World Economic Crisis: Or, the Driver (US) Will Eventually Be Defeated!" [in
Thai], Matichon, 3 October 1998; Timothy Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on
Financial Crises (New York: Random House, 2014), p. 55.
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Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global
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Nationalisms in Southeast Asia", in The Empire Reloaded, edited by Leo Panitch
and Colin Leys (London: Merlin Press, 2006), pp. 170-72.
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Ronald N. Montapeto, "China-Southeast Asia Relations: Building Integration?",
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Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign
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"Questions over NASA Request to use Thailand's U-Tapao", Jakarta Post, 4 June
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57 "NASA Cancels Plan to use Utapao", The Nation, 28 June 2012.

"Scientists Enthuse About Benefits", Bangkok Post, 26 June 2012.

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 256 Pongphisoot Busharat

Kate Bissonnette, "Houston, We h

Relations", Center for Strategic an
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impact-on-us-thai-relations/>.
"No to America's Use of U-Tapao"
61 Craig Whilock, "U.S. Seeks Retu
22 June 2012.
"Social Network claims "NASA" w
Planes for Spying on China", Man
Cheryl Pellerin, "U.S., Thai Leader
US Department of Defense, 15 N
defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?
64 Ibid.

US Department of State, "Assistant Secretary of State for Politica

Affairs Andrew J. Shapiro Travels to Vietnam, Brunei, and Thailand
at <http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/193154.htm>.
Peter Chalk, "The U.S. Army in Southeast Asia: Near-Term and L
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"Plodprasop: Cabinet to Discuss U-Tapao", Bangkok Post, 25 June 2012.
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MCOT, 21 June 2012, available at <http://www.mcot.net/site/content?id=
4ff675380b01dabf3c045376#.U-A_svmSx0Y>.
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20 January 2014, available at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/01/20/china
and-the-future-of-asia-pacific-trade/>.
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"Decision Day Imminent for TPP", Bangkok Post, 6 May 2016.
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Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and US 257

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