The United States, China, and Geopolitics in The Mekong Region

Asian Affairs: An American Review
ISSN: 0092-7678 (Print) 1940-1590 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vasa20
The United States, China, and Geopolitics in the

Mekong Region
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu
To cite this article: Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2015) The United States, China, and
Geopolitics in the Mekong Region, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 42:4, 173-194, DOI:
10.1080/00927678.2015.1106757
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Download by: [Tulane University] Date: 01 April 2016, At: 21:43

Asian Affairs: An American Review, 42:173–194, 2015
Copyright C 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0092-7678 print / 1940-1590 online
DOI: 10.1080/00927678.2015.1106757
The United States, China, and

Geopolitics in the Mekong Region
Downloaded by [Tulane University] at 21:43 01 April 2016
HIDETAKA YOSHIMATSU
Abstract:The main objective of this study is to elucidate great power politics in

the Mekong region by exploring how China and the United States have committed
to the development of Mekong countries and what characteristics are found in the
commitments. The argument that this study advances is three-fold. First, China’s
pragmatic policies and close linkages with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) have contributed to raising economic linkages and political
leverage in the Mekong region. Second, the US commitments to Mekong develop-
ment were characterized by advanced-nation-centered and ideal-oriented, which
did not necessarily lead to strengthening political and economic linkages between
the United States and Mekong countries. Third, while the US Mekong policies
have gradually become more practical by paying attention to infrastructure de-
velopment with strengthened linkages with ASEAN, the United States needs to
advance policy harmonization with Japan and search for dialogue with China in
pursuing combined objectives of governance and geopolitics.
Keywords: ASEAN, governance, Mekong development, Southeast Asia
In the new millennium, China’s ascendancy is one of the most important phe-
nomena affecting international politics and the global economy. While China’s
economic power and political influence proliferate to major parts of the world,
Address correspondence to Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, Graduate School of Asia Pacific Stud-

ies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, 1-1 Jumonjibaru, Beppu, Oita 874-8577, Japan.
E-mail: yoshih@apu.ac.jp
173
174 Asian Affairs: An American Review
from Africa to Latin America, most crucial impacts are seen in Southeast Asia.
On the one hand, China has formed closer economic linkages with countries
in the region through expanded trade and investment linkages. On the other
hand, China’s aggressive diplomatic postures have caused tensions with some
countries in the waters of the South China Sea. China’s political influence and
economic weight have provoked the US concern about the stable order and its
presence in Southeast Asia. Not only does China’s assertive diplomacy desta-
bilize the regional order, but its growing political and economic presence also
eclipse the US presence and jeopardize its political and economic interests in the
region.
In the above evolving geopolitical context, the Mekong region has emerged
as a crucial area for the political economy of Southeast Asia. The region, com-
prised of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV), as well as Thailand,
is economically underdeveloped largely because most of the regional states were
trapped into internal conflicts and political instability from the 1950s through the
1980s, and they were not integrated into the world economy for a long time.
However, the region is rich in natural resources, including water resources pro-
vided by the Mekong River. The Mekong region is geo-strategically important as
China’s southern “backyard” and a linchpin between South Asia and Northeast
Asia. Furthermore, the Mekong countries share the half of the membership of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an increasingly important
regional organization in the Asia-Pacific.
The main objective of this study is to elucidate great power politics in the
Mekong region by exploring how China and the United States have committed to
the development of Mekong countries and what characteristics are found in the
commitments. This article also investigates how the US Mekong policies need
to evolve in meeting the geopolitical reality that China has steadily increased
its presence in the Mekong region. The argument that this study advances is
three-fold. First, China’s pragmatic policies and close linkages with ASEAN have
contributed to raising economic linkages and political leverage in the Mekong
region. Second, the US commitments to Mekong development were characterized
by advanced-nation-centered and ideal-oriented, which did not necessarily lead
to strengthening political and economic linkages between the United States and
Mekong countries. Third, while the US Mekong policies have gradually become
more practical by paying attention to infrastructure development with strengthened
ties with ASEAN, the United States needs to advance policy harmonization with
Japan and search for dialogue with China in pursuing dual policy orientations of
governance and geopolitics in Mekong development.
This article is organized as follows. The following section provides analytical
frameworks for exploring the Chinese and US engagements in the Mekong region.
The third section describes China’s engagement in Mekong development and
articulates its characteristics. The fourth section shifts to an analysis of the US
The United States, China, and Geopolitics in the Mekong Region 175
policies toward the Mekong region, followed by a section to explore desirable

directions of the US Mekong policies.
Framing Chinese and US Approaches to Mekong Development
China’s political, economic, and military presence has steadily increased in

Southeast Asia. Not only has China intensified political and economic linkages
with Southeast Asian countries by forging various institutional linkages with
ASEAN, but it has also provoked concerns and tensions through its aggressive
claims to disputed territory in the South China Sea. Such moves surely raised the
US anxiety about its position and interests in Southeast Asia.
Given geopolitical evolutions caused by the Chinese ascendancy, quite a few

researchers and political observers have paid attention to China’s growing influ-
ence and its impacts on the US engagement in Southeast Asia. Several scholars
have investigated the US’s overall commitments to Southeast Asia as a response
to the Chinese ascendency.1 Kuik et al. argue that the United States has sought
to hedge against the long-term geopolitical risks of a fast-rising China by mo-
bilizing its existing alignment assets, intensifying its involvement in regional
multilateral forums, and cultivating new strategic partnerships in the larger “Indo-
Pacific” region.2 Kurlantzick holds that the United States’ undue focus on the
countries of mainland Southeast Asia has facilitated political regression in the
countries by empowering brutal militaries, condoning authoritarian regimes, and
alienating young Southeast Asian democrats, and suggests that the United States
prioritize the countries of peninsula Southeast Asia—Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Singapore—that hold greater strategic and economic values, and restore an
emphasis on democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia.3
In Sino-US strategic relations in Southeast Asia, much attention has been paid
to the South China Sea dispute. A growing number of scholars have analyzed and
evaluated the United States’ strategic responses to Chinese aggressive postures in
the sea.4 McDevitt contends that the US attempt to join littoral states pushing back
against Chinese behavior placed it in a strategic deadlock because it has little-to-no
direct leverage on key issues such as sovereignty and China’s nine-dashed line.
Given this problem, the United States needs to act as a mediator for claimants in
Southeast Asia and persuade a regional power such as Indonesia to take the lead.5
Raine and Le Mière allege that while the South China Sea has surely urged the
United States to intensify military presence and engagement in Southeast Asia
and advance the institutionalization of a stronger political and economic presence
in the region, there exist constraining factors such as scarce military resources
available, differences in ideology with Muslim majority states, and a failure to
ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).6
As the above literature indicates, the ascent of Chinese influence has surely
intensified US engagements in Southeast Asia, and such engagements took the
form of stronger commitments to multilateral forums and renewed partnerships

with major states in Southeast Asia. There is one important area where past liter-
ature has not taken into account recent dynamism concerning Sino-US relations:
the Mekong region. Indeed, past literature paid attention to the Chinese and US
interests in the Mekong region, but most of them had interests in the issues of wa-
ter resources management and hydropower dam construction.7 However, regional
politics over the Mekong region needs to be investigated more comprehensively
from the broader geopolitical perspective.
China has implemented purposeful policies toward Mekong development
through bilateral linkages with individual countries and multilateral forums formed
under the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and ASEAN.8 Consequently, Beijing
became the primary trade partner and a major source of investment for the Mekong
countries and transformed such economic clout into political leverage. With the
recognition of geopolitical importance the Mekong region holds, the US govern-
ment launched new initiatives—the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in 2009 and
the Friends of the Lower Mekong (FLM) in 2011—as key institutions to pro-
vide comprehensive support for the region. Although crucial moves in inter-state
relations and great power politics are seen, there is almost no research on a com-
prehensive analysis of exploring China and the United States’ commitments to the
Mekong region and their geopolitical implications. This research gap needs to be
filled.
In examining Chinese and US commitments to the Mekong region, this article
pays particular attention to two aspects. The first is differences in diplomatic
approach. A crucial feature in China’s commitments to the Mekong region is
pragmatism. Pragmatism is a mode of human behavior that gives respect to value-
neutral, non-deterministic, goal-oriented action. The central tenet of pragmatism is
that “the truth content of an idea is determined by its correspondence with reality,
which is determined by its real-world consequences.”9 The actors who adopt the
pragmatic approach pursue realistic and concrete consequences through a process
of continual practice and transformations. In solving problems, they adopt flexible
means by avoiding deterministic rigor, which derive from repeated trial-and-error.
Future action is guided by workable experiences and hypothetical experimentation.
China has purposefully advanced pragmatism-oriented diplomacy by avoiding
confrontational relations with the United States and other western powers or
offering practical and concrete benefits to trade partners.10 The US government
has, in formulating its diplomatic policy, put emphasis on the realization of specific
ideals represented by democracy, human rights, good governance, and the rule
of law. The Obama administration, for instance, has raised the promotion of
sustainable democracy as a pillar of its foreign policy.11 The US government
has incorporated democracy and governance as key objectives of its development
assistance policy.12 Thus, China and the United States have explicit differences
in the basic diplomatic approach, and such differences are supposed to encourage
the two states to adopt different diplomatic behavior and formulate distinctive
diplomatic policies.
In the Mekong context, China adopts the pragmatism-oriented policies. The
pragmatic approach is directed toward pursuing the production of practical
and realistic benefits by responding to real needs of a target country. The
Chinese government provides Mekong countries with support for producing
practical benefits, which will function as strong incentives to continue and ex-
pand political and economic linkages with China. The United States adopts
the ideal-oriented policies. Washington provides Mekong countries with de-
velopment support in conjunction with sustainability and human security in
objective and transparency and accountability in management. Such a policy

orientation contributes to improving the people’s overall living conditions and
enhancing government capacity for effective administration in the Mekong
countries.
The second is relevant to stakeholder formation. The development issue
covers multi-dimensional aspects from industrial upgrading in the economy,
community-building in the society, and administrative efficiency, and various ac-
tors including donor governments, regional organizations, international financial
agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in support
for the development of a country. Accordingly, close partnerships and policy
coordination among stakeholders are important for the smooth and effective im-
plementation of tangible policies and the realization of development goals. More-
over, states often set up an institution to pursue cooperative goals, including
development. In creating such an institution, who is allowed to join as a mem-
ber becomes a crucial issue.13 Thus, the membership in institution has much
to do with the issue of how the concrete process of development support is
advanced.
In the Mekong context, the presence and role of ASEAN need special attention.
The association has tackled development challenges in the Mekong region since
the 1990s as it accepted the countries in the region as new members. ASEAN
launched its own development initiatives, such as the ASEAN-Mekong Basin
Development Cooperation (AMBDC) and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration
(IAI), and encouraged its dialogue partners and international organizations to
make substantial commitments to these initiatives.14 Given ASEAN’s key pres-
ence in managing regional affairs— including inter-state cooperation in Southeast
Asia—extra-regional states, in advancing their own support for the Mekong region,
need to set up close partnerships with the association and promote harmonization
with its policies. This article explores how China and the United States have ad-
vanced institutional formation involving other stakeholders, with particular focus
on ASEAN.
China’s Commitments to the Mekong Region
China has provided significant support for development in Mekong countries

through bilateral foreign assistance. Originally, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos
were the largest recipients of Chinese foreign aid, largely due to long histori-
cal and diplomatic ties.15 In particular, China has provided Mekong countries
with generous support to finance transport systems. For instance, the Lao gov-
ernment approved China’s offer to build a cross-border railroad to connect the
capital Vientiane to the Luang Namtha Province along the border with China. This
railroad project, which is scheduled to be completed by 2018, will require over
US$7 billion, and China offered to extend a massive loan of US$7.2 billion through
its Import-Export Bank to Laos.16 Moreover, China provided US$30 million as

non-refundable aid for the Lao government to build an 85-km highway, which
would become a part of the Kunming-Bangkok highway.17 China also sought to
ensure the region’s energy supply through a series of hydroelectric dams. Along
the Lancang-Mekong River, China has built eight dams in the upstream, and eleven
dams—seven in Laos, two at the border between Laos and Thailand, and two in
Cambodia—are constructed in the middle stream. Most of the dams in Laos and
Cambodia were built with China’s funding.18
Importantly, China has extended its support reach to the Mekong region through
linkages with international organizations. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)
Economic Cooperation Program became the main locus of this method. The
GMS program, covering China, Thailand, and CLMV, was launched in 1992 with
support from the ADB. China has been substantially involved in the program
and gradually showed clearer leadership. In March 2005, China established the
Regional Cooperation and Poverty Reduction Fund within the ADB with the
contribution of US$20 million. This fund had significant implications because
it was the first fund set up by the ADB’s developing member and China’s first
financing in conjunction with any international institution. When the second GMS
summit was held in China’s Yunnan Province in July 2005, Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao made a speech entitled “A Stronger Partnership for Common Prosperity,”
in which he presented seven recommendations, such as infrastructure building,
trade and investment facilitation, and cooperation on agricultural development.19
When Premier Wen attended the third GMS summit in Vientiane in March 2008,
he delivered a speech focusing on transport infrastructure.20 In 2009, the Export-
Import Bank of China and the ADB concluded a co-financing agreement worth
US$3 million, of which the disposable means were mainly to be used for the Asian
Infrastructure Financing Initiative.21
While the GMS program pushed forward projects covering various fields, in-
cluding tourism and human resource development, its primary focus was directed
at the development of transport infrastructure. The economic corridors, such as
the North-South, the East-West, and the Southern Economic Corridors, were con-
structed in mainland Southeast Asia. China in particular engaged in the devel-
opment of the North-South Corridor that stretches from Kunming in the Yunnan
Province to Bangkok, which also includes the Southeast area from Kunming to
Hanoi. China, in parallel to the ADB and Thailand, provided US$30 million each
out of the total US$97 million in completing the 220-kilometre Route 3 highway,
and committed to other routes passing through Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam.22
China’s growing presence at the GMS program is clearly shown in statistical
data. In the first GMS Development Plan (1994–2007), the ADB accounted for
34.7% of the total 34 projects worth US$9.87 million, and China contributed to
27.2% of the total. In the second GMS Development Plan (2008–2012), approved
at the third GMS summit in March 2008, the ADB’s ratio decreased to 22.1% of
the total 110 projects worth US$15.45 million, while China’s ratio increased to
32.2% of the total.23 Thus, not only did the number and amount of the projects
increase markedly, but China also became the largest contributor to the projects
even beyond the ADB.
In addition to the GMS, China has extended its support for the Mekong countries
through ASEAN. In 1996, ASEAN leaders launched the AMBDC, and China, as
the only non-ASEAN member of the institution, has positively engaged in it. In
particular, China has been a key supporter of the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link
(SKRL), a flagship project of the AMBDC. China provided US$500 million for
the feasibility study of a 225-kilometer missing link between Phnom Penh and
Loc Ninh.24 Moreover, China has promoted the Pan-Beibu Gulf (PBG) Economic
Cooperation since 2006. The members of the PBG cooperation has organized an
annual forum to confirm the progress of various projects. The PBG cooperation
involves not only China and Vietnam but also other maritime ASEAN members
such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, and the Philippines. Under the
PBG cooperation, an emphasis was given to the development of a transportation
hub by water in order to expand trade in southwest and midwest China and the
north of the Indochina peninsula.25
There are two characteristics in China’s support for Mekong development. The
first is the pragmatic approach. Such pragmatism is shown in China’s primary com-
mitment to infrastructure development. In both bilateral and multilateral settings,
China focused on the development of infrastructure in transport. The development
of transport systems is important for economic development because “efficient
transport systems and routes can increase the volume of trade and the movement
of people, thus contributing to higher growth.”26 In particular, the development
of transport systems in mainland Southeast Asia enabled Mekong countries to
integrate their industries into large regional markets and production networks.
The enhanced transport systems also led to improved living standards of rural
residents by enabling them to have easier access to basic needs such as education
and healthcare, to sell products in larger local or regional markets at a lower trans-
portation cost, and to attract more tourists from the outside. Thus, China’s support
for development in transport systems has direct and visible impacts on improving
the Mekong countries’ economic growth and enhancing the overall welfare of the
people through raising income level.
While “growth belief” has become a target of criticism for advanced ASEAN
members that were trying to break away from the past developmental policy, “it is
an ideology exactly shared by the whole nation for CLMV.”27 In fact, the Mekong
region is among the poorest in the world. The gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam in 2011 was US$882,
US$1,262, US$853, and US$1,543, respectively—far below the world average
GDP per capita of US$10,034.28 The Mekong governments have a strong desire to
improve overall incomes, narrow development gaps with advanced ASEAN mem-
bers, and integrate themselves into the broader economic zone in Southeast Asia
and the Indo-Pacific. The continuous economic development is an indispensable
policy agenda for policymakers in order to meet the most serious needs of the entire
nation and get the people’s support for their reign. China sustained Mekong coun-
tries’ growth-belief ideology by focusing on the Mekong governments’ prioritized
policy needs: infrastructure building as the foundation for producing practical
economic benefits.
China’s pragmatic approach is also seen in trade concessions toward Mekong
countries. In the process of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA)
negotiations, China proposed the Early Harvest Program (EHP), which would
reduce tariffs for certain products mostly in the agricultural sector. The EHP was
combined with other measures, including the extension of World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) privileges to non-WTO, ASEAN members and the writing-off of
debts by ASEAN’s new members, and it implied significant material incentives.29
Since January 2006, China has unilaterally removed tariffs for more than 200
items from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar in an effort to boost bilateral trade and
increase their competitiveness.30 Since major industries in Mekong countries were
still agriculture-based, China’s trade concessions produced substantial economic
benefits for them. China calculated that as Mekong countries could see immediate
and realistic merits, they would have strong incentives to deepen trade linkages
with China, and that the short-term sacrifice of certain economic interests would
lead to long-term political and economic gains.31
The second characteristic is relevant to stakeholder formation. Part of China’s
Mekong support was provided through the ADB- and ASEAN-sponsored institu-
tions. The Chinese approach to leave the ownership to international organizations
enabled them to move ahead with their policy agendas while these bodies in turn
allowed China to develop cross-border transport linkages without straining its
financial resources or raising any suspicions of mercantilist diplomacy.32 In par-
ticular, China has embedded Mekong support into its overall ASEAN strategies.
At the ASEAN-China summit in 2001, Chinese Premier Zhu raised Mekong River
Basin development as one of five priority areas for cooperation with ASEAN
in parallel to agriculture, information and communications technology, human re-
source development, and two-way investment.33 China strengthened linkages with
ASEAN for industrial development through the formation of the China-ASEAN
Business and Investment Summit and the holding of the China-ASEAN Expo
since 2004. Furthermore, China set up the US$10 billion China-ASEAN Invest-
ment Cooperation Fund and the US$15 billion China-ASEAN Loan Program in
2010. While the loan would be used for improving roads, railways, and commu-
nications links in Southeast Asia, the fund would be mainly used for construction
activities related to connectivity in Southeast Asia. The main beneficiaries from
China’s closer linkages with ASEAN were Mekong countries, neighbors with na-
tional borders to China, which could secure funds for economic development and
markets for export expansion.
China’s support programs have produced substantial outcomes. China-funded
infrastructure projects have produced highway roads and railways that connect
Kunming to Yangon, Bangkok, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh, while a network of
hydroelectric dams, power-transmission grids and energy pipelines tied main-
land Southeast Asia to China.34 Trade between China and CLMV expanded
5.3 times from US$11.4 billion in 2006 to US$60.9 billion in 2013.35 The
development in transport systems stimulated Chinese companies’ inroads into
the Mekong region, which is explicitly shown in one data. The data on Chi-
nese companies’ affiliates indicate that the number of newly established af-
filiates in CLMV increased from 114 in 2002–5 to 688 in 2006–9, and then
to 1,009 in 2010–3. The marked increase was seen in Cambodia—from 55
in 2006–9 to 242 in 2010–3—and Myanmar—from 45 to 116 in the same
period.36
China’s commitments in the economic field have produced “economic security”
effects. The provision of economic benefits and growing economic interdepen-
dence contribute to raising China’s leverage in the political and security field. For
instance, in December 2009, Cambodia agreed to deport 20 ethnic Uighurs back to
China to be prosecuted in connection with the July 2009 violent anti-government
protest in the Xinjiang province. Several weeks later, Chinese Vice-president
Xi Jinping pledged some US$1.2 billion in grants and loans during his visit to
Cambodia.37 When the maritime security issue became a critical agenda at the
sixth East Asia Summit (EAS) summit in November 2011, Cambodia and Myan-
mar became the two exceptions that did not refer to the maritime security issue,
while all other members referred to the issue, and nearly half of them pointed
out the importance of the South China Sea problem. At the ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting (AMM) in July 2012, the Philippines and Vietnam asserted the inclusion
of disputes of Scarborough Reef and “respect for the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ)” into the statement, respectively. However, Cambodia, then ASEAN chair,
showed a cautious stance on the grounds that the inclusion of these affairs would
raise tension with China. Eventually, sharp confrontation disturbed foreign min-
isters from issuing the joint statement for the first time in the AMM’s 45-year
history.
China’s growing economic presence in the Mekong region has invited back-
lashes from the countries. For instance, Lao politicians started to push back against
China’s economic involvement in the countries’ mining, gambling, railway, and
hydroelectric industries.38 Similar moves are seen in Myanmar after a transition
to civilian rule in 2011. The newly appointed president, Thein Sein, announced
that the construction of the Myitsone Dam, a project between the government and
the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation, be suspended during his
presidential term without prior notice to Beijing.39

Despite such backlashes, policymakers in the Mekong region generally share
the view that China’s positive support for infrastructure development has served
to consolidate and ensure economic growth of their countries. Deputy Prime
Minister Somsavat Lengsavad of Laos evaluates Chinese commitments, stating
that China’s investment project would contribute to “stimulating the business and
investment climate of one of the world’s poorest nations.”40 Substantial fruits from
economic linkages provide the policymakers with strong incentives to continue
and strengthen partnership with China. Cambodian minister Kao Kim Hourn,
in relation to China’s initiative in the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, stated
that since China and ASEAN see economic cooperation as a top priority, “it is
necessary to build a maritime silk road in order to bolster economic cooperation,
particularly in the fields of trade, investment and tourism.”41
The US Commitment to the Mekong Region and Its Characteristics
The United States was positive in supporting the development of the Mekong
region in the 1950s. Washington was deeply involved in the Mekong Committee,
the former form of the Mekong River Commission, which was established in
1957 among Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. The United States
intended to apply the successful Tennessee Valley development strategy to liberal
countries in Southeast Asia and counter the communist threat by stabilizing the
region. Moreover, the Mekong region was important for Washington in terms of
the Cold War politics. The National Security Council concluded in 1956 that the
US government should “assist as feasible in the development of the Mekong River
Basin as a nucleus for regional cooperation and mutual aid” in order to “promote
increased cooperation in the area and to deny the general area of the Mekong River
Basin to Communist influence or domination.”42 However, the United States lost
interest in the Mekong region for a long time after the Vietnam War sank into a
quagmire in the 1960s, and the Communist regimes were established in Laos and
Cambodia in the 1970s.
In July 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton joined a series of

ASEAN-related meetings. During this occasion, Clinton revealed a plan to foster
sub-regional cooperation and capacity-building in mainland Southeast Asia and
convened the US-Lower Mekong Ministerial Meeting with her four counterparts
from Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as the first gathering for US coop-
eration with the Mekong region.43 The ministers agreed to enhance cooperation
under the name of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) with four policy pillars:
environment, health, education, and infrastructure development.44 Subsequently,
the LMI meeting was held in July 2010, October 2010, and July 2011.
The fifth LMI meeting in July 2012 provided new impetus for the United
States’ Mekong support. At the meeting, Clinton announced a plan to locate
the multi-year “Lower Mekong Initiative 2020” within a new integrated regional
platform for engaging bilateral and transnational issues, called the Asia-Pacific
Strategic Engagement Initiative (APSEI). The APSEI focused on key areas such
as regional security cooperation, democracy development, transnational threats,
and economic integration. Clinton committed US$50 million over three years to
complement and expand existing efforts to bolster regional capacity to address
specific cross-border challenges.45 Moreover, Myanmar was approved to join the
gathering as the sixth member and a new pillar on agriculture and food security was
added to LMI cooperation. The environmental pillar was extended to environment
and water, reflecting widening concerns about dam construction along the Mekong
River.
Among various policy pillars, the environment and water pillar has been a key
field in US commitments to the Mekong region. The pillar covered water resources
management and climate change. Climate change becomes a cause of increases
in flooding throughout the region, which then affects food production and food
security. Regarding the environmental issue, the United States has implemented
the “Forecast Mekong,” a modelling tool to show the impacts of climate change
and economic development scenarios on the Mekong River and the people who
are dependent on it for their livelihoods. The water resources management is
particularly relevant to China’s dam construction. As already explained, China
planned to build a total of 19 hydroelectric dams that included nine in Laos and
two in Cambodia. The construction of dams provoked serious concerns about
damage to fish production and increased risk of natural calamities in Cambodia,
Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, Laos.46
There are additional two important US commitments to the Mekong region.
First, the United States organized the Friends of the Lower Mekong (FLM) Min-
isterial Meeting whose first meeting was held in July 2011. The first meeting
comprised of foreign ministers and senior representatives of LMI members,
Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the ministerial representative of
the EU, and senior representatives of the ADB and the World Bank. The FLM
primarily aimed at promoting policy coordination among donor countries and in-
ternational aid agencies designed to improve efficiency, identify and meet gaps in
programs and resources, and avoid redundant and duplicated activities. The two-
track structure was endorsed at the second FLM meeting in July 2012. The first is
the Donor Dialogue among member countries’ development agencies and inter-
national organizations to expand information sharing. The second is the Annual
Policy Dialogue among foreign ministries regarding non-traditional security issues
such as the LMI Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Policy Dialogue,
and Mekong River Commission technical capacity.
The second commitment is an intensive support for the Mekong River Com-
mission (MRC).47 At the second LMI meeting in July 2010, ministers witnessed
the ceremonial signing of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a “sis-

ter river” partnership between the MRC and the Mississippi River Commission.
The MOU aimed to conduct expert exchanges, share expertise and best practices
in areas of water resources management, hydropower impact assessments, food
security, and so on.48 At the fifth LMI meeting in July 2012, the United States
announced the provision of US$1 million over three years to support the MRC’s
study on the sustainable management and development of the Mekong River as
well as a US$2 million grant to support the MRC’s fisheries program.49 The US
government has provided financial support for enhancing the capacity of the MRC
Secretariat, the riparian governments’ fisheries agencies to improve sustainable
fisheries management.
In some ways, the US and Chinese commitments and approaches to Mekong
development are complementary. Beijing highlights economic development affairs
represented by infrastructure upgrading as means to promote trade and investment
by taking advantage of geographical proximity and practical cross-border trans-
actions. Washington pays attention to human security affairs such as environment
protection and health improvement, as well as education and training, by taking
advantage of scientific knowledge and international standards.
The US support for the Mekong region focused on the people-based challenges
that have transboundary nature, and sought to foster the common general under-
standing of various challenges with which the people were confronted. Washington
has sought to achieve this goal by incorporating Mekong support into its overall
development assistance policy.50 Particularly important is that the US develop-
ment policies toward the Mekong region incorporated universal ideals such as
sustainability, governance, and transparency. This was typically shown in its en-
gagement in environmental protection. The statement of the fourth FLM meeting
in August 2014 uses the term sustainable seven times in a short document with 700
words. Washington has encouraged Mekong countries to develop river resources
management by taking into account the long-term impacts and comprehensive eco-
systems. These ideal-oriented policies are surely important in improving overall
living conditions of the people in the Mekong region in the mid- and long-term
span.
At the same time, the US commitments to the Mekong region had a geopolitical
orientation as a part of “pivot to Asia” in response to China’s growing influence in
Asia. This policy orientation is explicitly shown in the timing of the LMI, which
was launched when Secretary of State Clinton joined ASEAN-related meetings
and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in July 2009. At this
occasion, Clinton declared that
The United States is back in Southeast Asia. President Obama and I believe that this
region is vital to global progress, peace, and prosperity, and we are fully engaged with
our ASEAN partners on the wide range of challenges confronting us, from regional
and global security to the economic crisis to human rights and climate change.51
Concerns about China’s growing influence in the Mekong region were shared
within Washington’s political circles. For instance, at a Senate Hearing on Chal-
lenges to Water and Security in Southeast Asia in September 2010, Richard Cronin
stated that
What we can do—and have already accomplished to a surprising extent—is to use
our expanded engagement with the [Mekong and the wider Southeast Asian] region
to “keep China honest.” U.S. naval and other military power combined with our still
potent “soft power”—political, economic and cultural—still counts for enough to
influence our friends and worry China.52
However, the United States’ Mekong commitments did not necessarily con-
tribute to meeting geopolitical objectives. The United States has gradually formed
closer linkages with Vietnam that has intensified a strategy of balancing against
China in relation to the South China Sea dispute, and the US-Myanmar relations
have been improved to a significant degree after Myanmar realized a transition
to civilian rule in 2011. However, overall economic linkages between the United
States and the Mekong region remained stagnated even after the start of the LMI in
2009. While trade between the United States and CLMV increased from US$16.0
billion in 2009 to US$32.4 billion in 2013, the US share in the latter’s total trade
declined slightly from 10.8% to 10.4% in the same period.53 The US presence
in investment in the Mekong countries remained weak. While the US investment
in Cambodia and Laos was miniscule, its investment in Vietnam declined from
US$3,307 million in 2009 to US$52 million in 2013.54
The stagnated linkages had much to do with the weak incorporation of pri-
oritized needs from Mekong countries. The United States, on the basis of the
ideal approach, has sought to provide support for regional development priorities
on which it put emphasis. Indeed, most Mekong governments are authoritar-
ian or semi-authoritarian regimes, but even these governments put the priority
to improve their nation’s economic income and living standards. The United
States should have taken into account such realistic conditions and strengthened
policies to align with their needs to promote trade and investment, and devel-
oped infrastructure for industrial upgrading and regional networking. Such an
approach is expected to strengthen economic linkages with Mekong countries
and to meet a geopolitical goal to counter China’s growing influence in South-
east Asia by mitigating the formation of China’s political embrace zone in the
region.
The US government paid attention to the negative sides of Chinese commit-
ments, particularly environmental effects from the construction of hydroelec-
tric dams. Not only have international organizations and NGOs held a warning
for these negative effects, but local residents also began to express concerns
about them. Equally important is to pay attention to the positive sides of Chi-
nese commitments: helping to bring growth and prosperity to Mekong countries

through infrastructure development. These commitments give direct support to
economic development and the Mekong governments generally accept and wel-
come China’s positive contributions. China’s decisive commitments to infrastruc-
ture development led to the Mekong countries’ economic dependence on China
through the receipt of massive funds. Consequently, China can transform eco-
nomic might into political influence to make its political will accepted by Mekong
countries.
The United States’ Mekong commitments have limitations in approach to stake-
holder formation. This was particularly salient in relation to ASEAN. ASEAN has
regarded the alleviation of development divide between the old and new members
as one of the most crucial policy goals since the association accepted Mekong
countries as its members in the 1990s. ASEAN has undertaken the AMBDC from
1996 and the IAI from 2000, and raised equitable development as one of four
pillars for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Accordingly, the United
States should have regarded ASEAN as a main stakeholder in advancing its own
Mekong policy. The closer alignment to ASEAN’s Mekong programs and stronger
support for ASEAN’s presence were particularly important for strengthening re-
gional cohesion to counter the ascent of Chinese influence and not shifting the
main grip on the Mekong development to China.55
However, the United States did not pay sufficient attention to ASEAN’s position
and role in Mekong development. Unlike Beijing or Tokyo, Washington did not
provide development funds for Mekong countries in support of the AMBDC and
IAI. The Secretary-General of ASEAN was not invited to join the LMI meetings,
and concrete activities under the LMI did not take note of ASEAN’s programs
for Mekong development. The FLM, a forum of stakeholders that can provide
development support for the Mekong region, could incorporate ASEAN as a core
member. While the EU became an original member of the FLM, ASEAN was not
a member, and Secretary-General of ASEAN attended the meeting from the third
FLM meeting. This is superficially natural given the FLM’s basic characteristic
of a forum comprised of aid providers. However, ASEAN is the main interna-

tional organization in Southeast Asia that has made serious efforts to sustain the
development of Mekong countries.
New Development and Remaining Challenges in US Mekong Policies
The United States gradually promoted harmonization with ASEAN in advanc-

ing its Mekong policy. The Secretary-General of ASEAN joined the sixth LMI
meeting in July 2013 for the first time, and ministers referred to close alignment
and coordination between the LMI and the IAI. The Joint Statement of the LMI
meeting the following year set up an independent section of “LMI and ASEAN,”
in which ministers praised increases in information sharing between LMI mem-

bers and the ASEAN Secretariat, and “agreed to promote continued programming
collaboration so that the LMI can productively support narrowing the development
gap in ASEAN and identified priorities under the Initiative for ASEAN Integra-
tion.”56 The United States also pushed forward the involvement of non-APEC
members—Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos—in APEC capacity-building activi-
ties in order to sustain ASEAN’s advance toward the AEC. The FLM began to
pay attention to collaboration with ASEAN. The joint statement of the third FLM
meeting issued in July 2013 recommended that the LMI members and ASEAN
Secretariat ensure optimal complementarities between their activities “within the
framework of the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community and the
challenge of reducing the existing development gaps.”57 Thus, the United States
became positive in raising ASEAN’s presence in the LMI and FLM, and promot-
ing alignment and coordination with ASEAN initiatives represented by the IAI
and AEC.
Major challenges are how to establish common understanding between ASEAN
and the United States about possible conditions to maintain geopolitical stability
in East Asia. Most ASEAN members, which require funds for infrastructure
development and export markets for their products, surely have a thirst for practical
benefits resulting from closer economic interdependence with China. At the same
time, two overwhelming strategic imperatives for ASEAN are anti-hegemony
and diversification,58 and some members recognized the need of hedging against
China’s growing economic influence in Southeast Asia. The Mekong region is
the exact part of Southeast Asia where China has gradually formed a hegemonic
position as “Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos are already virtual client states of
China, while Vietnam and Thailand are economically beholden to the economic
behemoth.”59 In the geopolitical context, China’s growing influence in the Mekong
region tended to articulate the divide between the continental and maritime zones
in East Asia. While China seeks to consolidate the continental zone by including
mainland Southeast Asia into its influential areas, the maritime zone, which is
comprised of the maritime ASEAN members, Taiwan and Japan, has become
confrontational with China due to increasing tensions in the South China Sea
and the East China Sea. Under such circumstances, ASEAN cohesiveness and
unity, which are prerequisites for maintaining ASEAN centrality, can mitigate an
emergence of the divide between the two zones in East Asia. From this geopolitical
standpoint, ASEAN and the United States share common interests in reducing
Mekong countries’ over-dependence on China and enhancing their political and
economic autonomy.
Challenges regarding an approach to development are complicated. The US
Trade and Development Agency planned to lead a high-level ASEAN Ministers
Energy and Transport Infrastructure Symposium and Reverse Trade Mission in
2015. Such an event would contribute to advancing ASEAN’s infrastructure pri-

orities targeted by the US-ASEAN Connectivity Cooperation Initiative that was
designed to sustain ASEAN’s goal to foster greater connectivity in Southeast
Asia. At the seventh LMI ministerial meeting in August 2014, ministers agreed on
several renewed programs that include the Connect Mekong program to promote
physical, institutional and people-to-people connectivity through the delivery of
trainings, technical assistance and best practice exchanges, and the smart infras-
tructure for the Mekong, a technical and scientific assistance program that would
support environmentally sound and socially equitable infrastructure, clean energy,
and land/water use.
The above policies implied that the United States found growing interests in
economic linkages with ASEAN and infrastructure development in the Mekong
region. However, there are still uncertainties as to what extent preferences behind
these commitments are welcomed by the Mekong countries. These policies re-
flected US preferences for best practice and sustainable environment, and applied
them to policy fields that are linked to practical economic benefits. The relative
importance is given to the maintenance of governance ideals and sustainability,
not to economic development per se.
In this connection, it is useful to pursue closer collaboration with Japan in
advancing Mekong policy. Japan has a long history of support for Mekong de-
velopment from the 1990s through its own institutions, such as the Forum for
Comprehensive Development of Indochina and the ASEAN Economic Ministers-
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (AEM-METI) Economic and Industrial
Cooperation Committee, as well as close alignment with ASEAN’s Mekong pro-
grams represented by the IAI.60 Importantly, Japan recognized the need to com-
bine official development assistance (ODA) provision with investment and trade
expansion in Mekong support. For instance, under the Japan-Mekong Region Part-
nership Program announced in 2007, Japan pursued the promotion of integration
and linkages of regional economies, the expansion of trade and investment, and
the sharing of values and engagement in common problems through the expanded
ODA provision.61
The US approach to Mekong development had nuanced differences from the

Japanese one, and the Japanese government felt some embarrassment when the US
government suddenly began to pay attention to the Mekong region by launching
the LMI.62 Accordingly, Japan did not find much interest in pursuing partner-
ship with the US policy in advancing its own Mekong policy. It was in the 2014
statement of the Mekong-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting that Japan referred to
closer collaboration with the LMI and FLM.63 A major challenge is how to ad-
vance concrete projects that are based on common understanding of the necessity
to implement complementary roles in stabilizing the Mekong region from a geopo-
litical standpoint. In relation to the South China Sea dispute, the two states have
harmonized support for the Philippines. In December 2013, for instance, Japan
agreed to provide the Philippines with ODA for patrol ships, and this agreement
derived from policy harmonization with Washington on the basis of the “strategic
use of ODA,” which was confirmed in the “2 + 2” talks in April 2012. Similar
policy harmonization is required for the Lower Mekong—”the Next South China
Sea.”64
China’s stakeholder formation for economic development in Asia entered into
a new stage in 2013. Xi Jinping, in his speech at the Indonesian Parliament in
October 2013, revealed an idea of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR).
The MSR, which comprises the “one belt, one road project” in parallel to the
Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), aims to develop economic-oriented practical
cooperation and foster trustworthy relationships by relying on the distinctive values
and ideas of the ancient Silk Road. Indeed, the MSR covers a broad area including
the Indian Ocean states such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, Southeast Asia
as the first stop on the MSR outside China was very important for the project.
Reflecting this importance, the main theme of the 2014 China-ASEAN Expo
was “Jointly Building the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” More crucially,
Xi Jinping announced the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) in 2013. This proposal collected international attention, and the
AIIB came into operation in 2015 with 57 founding members. The AIIB aimed to
sustain infrastructure development in Asia and its membership extends countries
in South Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia. However, a core target is Southeast
Asia, and all 10 ASEAN members joined the bank. The establishment of the
AIIB, a bank with similar objectives to the ADB, enabled China to gain more
freedom to push forward autonomous policies for Mekong countries, independent
of the GMS. China’s increasingly proactive economic diplomacy in development
support could be seen as a strategy to bind “its neighbors in a web of incentives
that increase their reliance on China and raise the cost to them of adopting a
confrontational policy toward Beijing.”65
Given the reality of China’s new initiatives in development support, the United
States needs to pursue a possibility of making the Mekong development an agenda
for bilateral talks with China. China has organized the China-Japan Mekong
Policy Dialogue since 2008. This China-initiated dialogue provided opportuni-

ties to exchange perception of the Mekong region and share information about
individual Mekong policies. Similar dialogues could be launched between the
United States and China. Some studies found that China’s aid programs began to
show some harmonization with international norms through projects for bolstering
governance capacity.66 While it is still uncertain whether Beijing will strengthen
this direction in its aid policy, Washington, in collaboration with other advanced
nations, can show guidance to desirable ways to promote governance elements in
China’s aid programs.
Conclusions
China’s growing presence and its assertive diplomatic postures raise the impor-
tance of Sino-US politics in international relations of Southeast Asia. Given such
geopolitical evolutions, this article aimed to deepen research on great power poli-
tics in Southeast Asia by examining US and Chinese policies toward the Mekong
region. In particular, it sought to elucidate major characteristics in the policies
adopted by China and the United States in terms of a diplomatic approach and
stakeholder formation.
China has steadily deepened its engagement in the Mekong region through
the provision of funds for development by way of bilateral linkages and multi-
lateral forums represented by the GMS. China adopted a pragmatic approach to
sustain the development of infrastructure represented by transport systems, which
produced practical economic benefits. China has also sustained ASEAN-initiated
programs for the Mekong region and carefully incorporated ASEAN interests
in its development policy. China’s pragmatic approach with close linkages with
ASEAN led to its enhanced economic presence and diplomatic leverage in the
Mekong region.
The United States rediscovered its interests in Mekong development when it or-
ganized the LMI in 2009 and began to provide various support under this initiative.
Moreover, Washington organized the FLM in 2011 and intensified support for ac-
tivities of the MRC. In these policies, the United States adopted an ideal approach
through which it incorporated ideals such as governance, sustainability, and hu-
man security. When Washington began new initiatives in providing support for the
Mekong, it did not necessarily consider ASEAN as a crucial stakeholder, seeking
primarily to develop an advanced nation-centered donor club. Consequently, the
US support for Mekong development made little contribution to strengthening po-
litical and economic linkages between the United States and mainland Southeast
Asia.
After 2013, the United States pursued harmonization with ASEAN in advancing
its Mekong policies and began to pay attention to infrastructure development in
the Mekong region. It is still uncertain whether these new policy orientations will
serve to attract the Mekong countries to the US side. In order to promote policies
that combine practical economic benefits with ideal perspectives, it is useful to
advance cooperation with Japan that has pursued this combination policy toward
the Mekong region. Furthermore, the United States needs to set up a venue to
discuss Mekong development with China that has intensified institutional support
for infrastructure development in Asia.
Partly with Myanmar’s transition to civilian rule, the Mekong region attracts
growing interests from the world. The potential for economic growth and a geopo-
litically important position make the Mekong region a locus of great power politics
among China, the United States, and India. The policies that these powers provide
for the Mekong development should reflect real needs of the governments and the
people of the region. At the same time, development support for the region needs
to be embedded into multilateral forums where ASEAN has a special position and
concrete policies for development support should be harmonized with ASEAN’s
development goals and programs.
NOTES
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organizations.
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53. ASEAN, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2014: 69, 74.
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59. Wade, “Could ASEAN Drift Apart?”
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The United States, China, and Geopolitics in The Mekong Region

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The United States, China, and Geopolitics in The Mekong Region

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Asian Affairs: An American Review

ISSN: 0092-7678 (Print) 1940-1590 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vasa20

The United States, China, and Geopolitics in the

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2015.1106757

Published online: 06 Jan 2016.

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Download by: [Tulane University] Date: 01 April 2016, At: 21:43

The United States, China, and

Abstract:The main objective of this study is to elucidate great power politics in

Keywords: ASEAN, governance, Mekong development, Southeast Asia

Address correspondence to Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, Graduate School of Asia Pacific Stud-

policies toward the Mekong region, followed by a section to explore desirable

Framing Chinese and US Approaches to Mekong Development

China’s political, economic, and military presence has steadily increased in

Given geopolitical evolutions caused by the Chinese ascendancy, quite a few

form of stronger commitments to multilateral forums and renewed partnerships

objective and transparency and accountability in management. Such a policy

China’s Commitments to the Mekong Region

China has provided significant support for development in Mekong countries

its Import-Export Bank to Laos.16 Moreover, China provided US$30 million as

presidential term without prior notice to Beijing.39

The US Commitment to the Mekong Region and Its Characteristics

In July 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton joined a series of

the ceremonial signing of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a “sis-

nese commitments: helping to bring growth and prosperity to Mekong countries

of a forum comprised of aid providers. However, ASEAN is the main interna-

New Development and Remaining Challenges in US Mekong Policies

The United States gradually promoted harmonization with ASEAN in advanc-

in which ministers praised increases in information sharing between LMI mem-

2015. Such an event would contribute to advancing ASEAN’s infrastructure pri-

The US approach to Mekong development had nuanced differences from the

Policy Dialogue since 2008. This China-initiated dialogue provided opportuni-

63. “The seventh Japan-Mekong Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (Summary),” http://www.mofa.go.jp/

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