The National Interest, August 19, 2013

China's South Asia Drift

Jeffrey Payne

China needs a new South Asia policy. The elevation of long-lingering tensions with India,
insufficient consideration of Afghan security, and the inability to adjust to a changing
Pakistan point to the fact that China has no comprehensive strategy for the region. With its
focus firmly pointed to its east, China has overlooked the rising instability to its west. Its
activities in South Asia, rooted in domestic political needs, have contributed to, not
alleviated, tensions. The People’s Republic could be an asset for stability in South Asia if it
could alter its perspective on the region. In doing so, it would build regional goodwill and
enhance its bilateral relationship with the United States.

A La Carte is No Strategy

China’s territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, its involvement in the Korean
Peninsula, and its engagement in Southeast Asian affairs are each components of a
larger strategy designed to achieve Asia-Pacific preeminence. Yet, no similar strategic
planning exists in relation to South Asia. Chinese investment in ports throughout South
Asia may one day prove a part of a comprehensive political and military design, à la the
String of Pearls, but right now China’s port investment is as much diplomatic outreach as it
is economic planning. Relations with India have soured, primarily due to China’s maritime
presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and recent tensions concerning the Line of
Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are increasingly hesitant
about Chinese investment. Even Pakistan’s policy establishment openly wonders about
the depth of China’s commitment, viewing their strong relationship with China as useful for
building roads, but not necessarily helpful in a security setting.

Beijing’s lack of a South Asia strategy is related to two factors: internal politics and
insufficient long-term planning. It is no secret that China has reached a point where it must
make some hard choices regarding its future development. The days of astonishing
economic growth are over, as is the period where the Chinese population uniformly
supported the government. China’s population has become too wealthy and holds too
many political opinions for the state to govern without care for the opinions of citizens.
Nationalism, still actively encouraged by the state, entices the government to take
provocative action on occasion and demands the state to focus on its eastern borders.
Cybercitizens, using social-media platforms like Sina Weibo, are a constant challenge to
governance that requires immense investment to effectively monitor. In short, China’s
increasingly politicized population is not focused on and largely does not care about South
Asia.

Insufficient long-term planning is the second contributor to strategic missteps in South

Asia. China’s standard operating procedure in South Asia is to conduct bilateral
engagements with regional countries whenever possible. The reason for bilateral instead
of multilateral engagement is that it keeps China removed from contentious issues within
the region while providing multiple avenues for Beijing to pursue its national interests. This
approach also fulfills China’s long-standing ideological preferences for peaceful
development and respect for sovereignty. Yet countries in South Asia are already growing
suspicious of China’s commitment and intentions. China’s diplomatic statements of
friendship are juxtaposed with its obsession with accessing energy-transport options, its
border incursions, and its generally mercantile view of the region. Furthermore, over the
long term, China’s approach to South Asia creates yet another example of China
freeriding on security provided by others and making hollow claims about its role as a
world power.
Regional Approaches, Global Opportunity

China is aware of the problems it faces in South Asia, but it remains unclear whether the
People’s Republic will take the steps needed to improve its footing there. First and
foremost, the Chinese state must view South Asia as a strategic region, not merely a
collection of individual states. Instability in one part of the region inevitably bleeds into
other parts of South Asia. The standard Chinese approach of bilateral engagement does
nothing to alleviate regional tensions and is counterproductive to Chinese economic and
geopolitical goals in the long run.

Second, China must realize the degree to which regional instability has seized South Asia
and threatens China. The rivalry between India and Pakistan remains heated over a host
of issues. Pakistan’s internal insecurity could potentially overwhelm the state’s resources.
Afghanistan, especially after 2014, could readily become a security nightmare for all
surrounding countries. Possible conflicts between South Asian states, independent of
China, can have severe implications for China’s economy, military and international
reputation. China can no longer simply adapt to developments in the region.

China’s problems in South Asia are partly the result of perspective—the state is simply not
thinking strategically about the region. If it were, China would recognize that working to
achieve greater stability in South Asia would enhance the country’s economic
opportunities and eliminate barriers to core national interests. Furthermore, it would find
ample shared interests with the United States and potentially improve China’s most
important bilateral relationship. The People’s Republic may like to remain detached from
South Asia’s conflicts and put a greater burden on the United States, but eventually, South
Asia’s problems will become China’s problems. When that occurs, China will likely find few
sympathetic to its plight.

Jeffrey Payne is the Senior Research Associate at the Near East South Asia Center for
Strategic Studies in Washington, DC. The views expressed in this article are his alone and
do not represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the
Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.