Contemporary Security Policy

ISSN: 1352-3260 (Print) 1743-8764 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcsp20

The Dao of foreign policy: Understanding China’s

dual strategy in the South China Sea

Mohamad Rosyidin

To cite this article: Mohamad Rosyidin (2019): The Dao of foreign policy: Understanding China’s
dual strategy in the South China Sea, Contemporary Security Policy

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1565374

Published online: 08 Jan 2019.

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CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1565374

The Dao of foreign policy: Understanding China’s dual

strategy in the South China Sea
Mohamad Rosyidin
Department of International Relations, Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang, Indonesia

ABSTRACT
In the South China Sea, China neither implements power-maximizing policy nor
engages a peaceful approach. Instead, China implements both coercion and
cooperation in pursuing its strategic interest in the disputed area. How can
we explain China’s paradoxical behavior? This article claims that the best way
to explain China’s policy in the South China Sea is to understand the
character of dualism in China’s strategic culture. Following constructivist
theory that stresses culture, this article argues that Chinese duality approach
in the South China Sea is rooted in the philosophy of Daoism. The symbol of
Yin-Yang depicts Chinese assertive as well as cooperative behavior in dealing
with the South China Sea dispute. Although from a normative perspective
Daoism recognizes pacifism and non-violent behavior, the most important
feature of Daoism is the assumption that reality consists of two opposing
elements that are mutually embedded.

KEYWORDS Chinese foreign policy; dual strategy; South China Sea; strategic culture; Daoism

There have been enduring debates over China’s strategy in the South China
Sea. On one hand, adherents of realism posit that China seeks hegemony in
the disputed area by conducting assertive policy. Kaplan (2014), for
example, writes that China wants to expand its territorial power just like
the American domination of the Greater Caribbean during Theodore Roosevelt’s
reign. Consequently, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has threa-
tened American allies and they have urged Washington to support their
defense capabilities in order to deter Beijing’s ambition (Krepinevich,
2015). Classical realists put more emphasis on relative military capability as
a driving factor behind China’s assertive behavior in the region (Jilek,
2016), whereas defensive realists propose that China’s assertiveness reflects
an attempt to maintain its national security instead of imperial ambition
(Raditio, 2014, 2015, 2018).

CONTACT Mohamad Rosyidin mohamad.rosyidin@undip.ac.id, mohamad.rosyidin@gmail.com

Department of International Relations, Universitas Diponegoro, Jl. Prof. H. Soedarto, SH, Tembalang,
Semarang, Central Java 50275, Indonesia
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 M. ROSYIDIN

On the other hand, the neo-liberal perspective argues that instead of being
aggressive and obsessed with power, China’s strategy in the South China Sea is
more “friendly” through the principle of self-restraint. Kim (2016), for
example, argues that China’s diplomatic approach refers to Jiang Zemin’s doc-
trine of “cooperative security,” which puts forward to the principle of “peace
and development.” A similar view was proposed by Mingjiang (2010) who
argues that China has long adopted a cooperative approach as a way to
compete with other countries. In order to solve the problem, China opens dip-
lomatic channels through bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral mechanisms.
Nevertheless, existing explanations which rely on the methodological indi-
vidualism are insufficient for understanding China’s paradoxical behavior in
the South China Sea. On the one hand, realist arguments seem to ignore the
fact that China has also adopted a diplomatic approach in managing security
problems in the region. On the other hand, neo-liberals’ arguments overlook
China’s aggressive intention against the claimant states. In other words, both
fail to capture the actual situation in one of the world’s most contested waters.
Some scholars have provided better arguments. Mingjiang (2009) recog-
nizes China’s dual strategy of being aggressive toward claimant states and
encouraging cooperation at the same time. Similarly, Fravel (2011) also
argues that China is not only delaying any resolution made by countries
but also prevents the escalation of conflict. Although China tends to be asser-
tive when it comes to the issue of territorial conflict, China is also willing to
compromise. Fravel (2008) finds that aside from demonstrating its military
muscle toward other countries, China has put forward a cooperative approach
on a number of border disputes including in the South China Sea. However,
these arguments lack of an adequate analytical framework. Both Mingjiang
and Fravel focus more on empirics than on theoretical-based analysis. Conse-
quently, their arguments are unable to mediate the enduring debates between
the realists and neo-liberals. Their arguments may be useful for policy-
makers, but they contribute less to the academic debate.
This article seeks to interpret China’s dual strategy in the South China Sea
by using a constructivist standpoint. As a sociological approach, constructivism
focuses primarily on cultural elements of interstate relations. For Chinese
foreign policy, this article contends that the implementation of coercive and
cooperative strategy is largely influenced by the Daoism philosophy that
has become China’s strategic culture for decades. Daoism adopts a dualist
worldview as perfectly depicted in the symbol of Yin-Yang. The article
helps to answer why China’s behavior in dealing with South China Sea is para-
doxical; aggressive by using military instruments but remains cooperative by
engaging with international institutions. Although Daoism opposes violence
and the use of force, it strongly endorses the duality character of two opposing
elements which are mutually dependent. In other words, as an ontological
philosophy, Daoism views that coercion and cooperation are not two
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 3

elements that act independently but rather mutually embedded. This article
refers primarily to the ontological foundation of Daoism instead of its norma-
tive accounts.
This article is organized as follows. The first part will discuss the Daoist
philosophy and its influence on Chinese foreign policy. Daoism is one of
the dominant philosophies in Chinese history along with Confucianism and
Legalism. It has a unique ontological perspective on reality, quite different
from Western thought. The second part will examine the dualist character
of China’s strategy in the South China Sea and its relation with Daoism prin-
ciples. For China, in order to attain its strategic interests in the region it
should implement both a coercive and cooperative approach simultaneously.
These two approaches are not opposed but rather complementary. The argu-
ment proposed in this article has also implications for regional security man-
agement: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should adopt
a dual strategy in dealing with Chinese assertive behavior in the South China
Sea. Aside from building counter-balance strategy with other major powers,
ASEAN should co-opt China by its normative power. Given the fact that
China has demonstrated willingness to follow ASEAN’s rules, it provides
the window of opportunity for the Association to socialize its norms
beyond the region.

The logic of contradiction: Daoism as a Chinese strategic culture

The best way to understand state behavior is to understand their point of view.
Understanding China’s foreign policy requires us to understand how China
perceives itself and the world. Most theoretical traditions in International
Relations (IR) are rooted in Western experience. According to Buzan (2018,
p. 396), mainstream IR theory has been extensively rooted in Western
history and Western political theory. Western tradition and historical experi-
ence has created the so-called background knowledge which shapes how
Western scholars build their theory (Yaqing, 2018, pp. 417–418). As a
result, in many ways they are not well suited to explain developments in
regions outside Europe. Kang (2003) in his widely cited article argues that
the realist perspective contains a Eurocentrist bias so that it fails to explain
and predict the patterns of conflict and cooperation in Asia. This is the
reason why prominent IR scholars such as Acharya and Buzan (2010)
asked a question, “why is there no non-Western IR theory?” This question
has sparked speculations regarding the determinant factors behind the
absence of non-Western perspective in IR. It calls for IR academics around
the globe to seek for a more adequate way of understanding the behavior of
Asian countries.
This implies methodological rigor in order to reduce bias so that con-
clusions can be drawn based on a careful investigation using empirical data.
4 M. ROSYIDIN

Methodological rigor requires researchers to identify what factors shape states

behavior. Ideational elements such as identity, beliefs, norms, values, tra-
ditions, and so on play an important role in shaping state preferences and
actions. In terms of foreign policy, these elements affect how policy-makers
interpret reality and make policy choices. Constructivism is one of the most
important theoretical approaches in IR that adopt the view that, first, non-
material elements are more important than the material ones, and second,
the interests and actions of actors are determined largely by these non-
material elements rather than by material ones (Wendt, 1999, p. 1). Although
rooted in Western traditions, constructivism accommodates differences
because for constructivists social context is essential to understand how a
country acts (Acharya & Buzan, 2010, p. 9).
This article argues that since constructivism puts emphasis more on idea-
tional elements rather than conventional rationalist arguments, the best way
to understand the logic behind Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea
is to look beyond materialism and apply the notion of ideas in it. First, unlike
realism and liberalism that take interests for granted, constructivism defines
interests as socially constructed. Every country seeks their own interests in
international stage but these interests are not exogenously given. Instead,
they are often justified by ideational elements such as identity, norms,
culture and tradition, history, and so forth. Finnemore (1996) posits that
culture constitutes actors and “define legitimate or desirable goals for them
to pursue” (p. 326). According to Kier (1996), states preferences for particular
strategic behavior—either defensive or offensive—often refers to cultural
factors because “it is not merely derivative of functional demands or structural
imperatives” (p. 187). Simply put, understanding what state wants in inter-
national politics requires understanding what they believe in and adhere to.
Second, constructivism is a better way in understanding the very nature of
China’s paradox behavior in South China Sea than other competing expla-
nations. As mentioned earlier, China employs dual strategy by practicing
both hard and soft approach at the same time. From conventional IR theories,
this strategy might conform to the liberal notion of “smart power”—a foreign
policy strategy known to combine hard and soft power (Nye, 2011). However,
soft power lies in the attractiveness of a country based on its culture, political
ideology, and policies (Nye, 2004). China’s cooperative approach such as
complying with norm-based institutions in managing disputes with ASEAN
countries might be regarded as an effort to build positive image to the eyes
of international community. Yet, this does not change much of the perception
of many countries in the region. Most ASEAN countries perceive China to be
more assertive in South China Sea (see for example, Fitriani, 2018; Herlijanto,
2017; Liang, 2018). Attractiveness is the core element of soft power and
because attraction is largely depends on others’ mind, the perception of
other countries plays a crucial role (Nye, 2011, p. 21). Thus, the possibility
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 5

of using smart power in describing China’s dual strategy is flawed. Any analy-
sis of the concept of soft power in Chinese foreign policy should assess
whether this approach is effective in changing other countries perception
toward China.
In addition, smart power concept only contributes to describe China’s con-
temporary policy in South China Sea. It answers appropriately the “how”
question; “how does China implement its foreign policy in disputed area?”
but it would fail to answer the “why” question; such as “why does China
implement dual strategy in disputed area?” While the former is merely
descriptive, the latter seeks to analyze causal linkage between two variables.
In this regard, constructivism offers better explanation in linking between cul-
tural factors and China’s dual strategy in the South China Sea. Solving the
puzzle of the paradox of China’s foreign policy in the region requires more
than a description on how it occurs but rather an explanation of why it is
taking place. This is not to say that description is not important. Indeed, it
is a crucial part in any scientific explanation because without good description
we cannot conduct good explanation (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 34).
However, description alone is not enough to fully grasp of what has happened.
One important concept in constructivism that can be adopted to explain
China’s foreign policy is strategic culture. The concept has been popular
after Alastair Iain Johnston published his writings on Chinese foreign
policy during the Mao era. He uses the term “cultural realism” to describe
aggressive and militaristic China at the time. According to Johnston (1996),
Chinese military culture since the fifth century BC had played a crucial role
in shaping Mao’s offensive policy. China’s assertiveness in the South China
Sea is also inseparable from the so-called Middle Kingdom mentality, that
is, the idea of Chinese centrality in world politics (Rosyidin, 2017). Neverthe-
less, the term strategic culture has long emerged in security and strategic
studies. Snyder (1977) argues that the use of nuclear weapons in crisis is
influenced by historical, organizational, and political contexts. However, the
concept of strategic culture had not been familiar in IR scholarship until con-
structivism emerged as a competing paradigm against realism and liberalism
in the 1990s.
This article uses Johnston’s definition of strategic culture as
… system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies,
metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic prefer-
ences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in inter-
state political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of
factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.
(Johnston, 1995, p. 46, 1996, p. 223)

Strategic culture contains views or assumptions about reality outside the

state. It refers to how policymakers perceive the international environment
6 M. ROSYIDIN

as a matter of consideration in the decision-making process. Not only is it a

worldview but also strategies, means, procedures, or mechanisms in using
national resources to achieve national interests.
However, Johnston’s cultural realism only applies to China’s aggressive
behavior. It focuses solely on the “culture of war” in China’s foreign policy
using the evidence from strategic thinking in Chinese history. Since John-
ston’s cultural realism derived from realist perspective on the nature of
world politics, it is quite skeptical with regard to the cooperative feature of
interstate relations. The only contribution of Johnston’s cultural realism is
incorporating cultural dimensions in understanding realist’s anarchic world
(see, Johnston, 1996, p. 264). As a consequence, while Johnston’s definition
of strategic culture is very important, this article will not use his partial
theory to explain China’s strategic behavior in the South China Sea.
Instead, it will employ Daoism philosophy that perceives the world not
with the single point of view. As we shall see later, Daoism posits that the
world (politics) consists of two opposing elements that complement to each
other.
As with other Asian countries, Chinese foreign policy is strongly
influenced by traditions that have been rooted for thousands of years.
Ford (2010) asserted that, “it is worth noting that China’s thousands of
years of history have an extraordinary presence in contemporary Chinese
life and thought” (p. 11). For China, the past is the present and vice
versa. Thus, it is hard to understand contemporary China without looking
at its past. China’s long historical experience inherits a unique perspective
that is deeply rooted in the minds and hearts of Chinese society as well
as in political elites. China’s behavior toward other countries is greatly con-
strained by three enduring values: a sense of pride to the nation coupled
with a great fear of chaos, accentuating the image of a peace-loving and
defensive nation coupled with a centralized policy, and a hierarchical
mind-set but wanting mutual benefit in international relations (Swaine,
2015). All Chinese leaders are fully aware of these principles and eagerly
implementing policies accordingly.
Various traditions of thoughts have shaped Chinese politics for decades.
Three prominent philosophical traditions are Confucianism, Legalism, and
Daoism. Most experts consider Confucianism to be the most dominant phi-
losophical school in China. Confucianism has been studied on various edu-
cational levels and is among the most popular subjects on university
campuses (Bell, 2008, p. 26). Lucian Pye in his magnificent book on Asian
politics and culture wrote that Confucianism is the formal ideology of
China (Pye, 1985, p. 195). However, recently, Daoism has emerged to be an
equally important ideology in shaping China’s strategic culture. Daoism is
symbolized with the Yin-Yang, the symbol of the universe from the perspec-
tive of Chinese people. The philosophical root of Daoism is summarized in a
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 7

text called Dao De Jing or Tao Te Ching (Chinese: 道德經). This text, along
with the Bible, is one of the most widely translated book in the world and
still very influential on Chinese culture (Miller, 2003, p. 5).
The central assumption of Daoism is that everything in the universe inter-
acts with one another. It involves dialectical process in which two opposing
elements are mutually dependent. Unlike the binary opposition which
views based on contradictory logic, Daoism views that two opposing forces
bring together to form harmonious system or “complementary contrast”
(Countinho, 2014). For example, “men” are not opposed to “women,”
“good” is not opposed to “bad,” “the past” is not opposed to “the present,”
“war” is not opposed to “peace,” “aggressive” is not opposed to “offensive,”
and so on. However, the two elements are complementary to each other.
Within “men” there is “female,” within “good” there is “bad,” within con-
dition of “war” there is condition of “peace,” within an “aggressive” behavior
there is a “defensive” behavior, and vice versa. The symbol of Yin-Yang
describes this condition; within “black” there is “white” and within “white”
there is “black.” Yin represents negative, passive, weak, and destructive
while Yang represents positive, active, strong, and constructive (Dellios,
2001). The duality character of these opposing elements contains features
such as “consequence, beckoning creative, and interactive hybridities”
(Ling, 2014, p. 45).
This view differs from the Western philosophical traditions on the con-
ception of dialectic. The Hegelian-Marxian dialectic, for example, places the
“master-slave” and “capitalist-proletarian” relationship as a mutually
created but not mutually embedded. The “master” is not present within the
“slave” and the “capitalist” is not present within the “proletarian” and vice
versa (Ling, 2014, p. 41). From this viewpoint, it can be inferred four basic
principles of Daoism: (1) ontological parity; (2) creative and transformative
mutuality; (3) knowledge from here, in place; and (4) agency in context
(Ling, 2014, p. 42). Ontological parity “signifies a simultaneity of oneness
and multiplicity, difference and commonality, continuity and change”
(Ling, 2014, p. 43). This is again differs from Western thought which tends
to look at the generalization of causality or “law-like regularities” and striving
for truth “out there.” Creative and transformative mutuality means that every-
thing changes with each other where this process lasts forever. This mutuality
serves as a differentiator as well as a complement to each element. For
example, conflict and cooperation are two different things but both of them
correct each other’s weaknesses. The third principle, knowledge from here,
in place, seems to have little resemblance to the subjectivist view that assump-
tions, opinions, theories, and other knowledge are only valid when presented
based on the subject’s point of view. Understanding the thoughts, feelings, and
actions of others is only meaningful when viewed from the perspective of the
person. This principle is also different from Western philosophy which tends
8 M. ROSYIDIN

to generalize phenomenon even though it gets challenges from phenomenol-

ogy that seeks “knowledge from within.” The fourth principle, agency in
context, relates to the third principle that one must empty the mind and
heart so that our thoughts, feelings, and actions are not controlled by the
ego but respect. This principle is often justified against the assumption of
Western scholars who predict China’s ambition to become a global
hegemon; a view that reflect the Western ego.
The egocentric prejudice of Western scholars concerning Chinese hege-
mony arises from the assumption that China’s rise will lead to conflict situ-
ations. Most realists are pessimistic about the prospect of China’s rise. After
the demise of the Cold War, the scenario of China’s emergence as a super-
power was overwhelmed by worries. Roy (1994) proposes an argument that
China will be a source of danger to the Asia-Pacific region for two reasons:
China’s hegemony in the region is becoming more visible and China’s rise
will undermine peace in the region. The prediction was supported by a pro-
minent offensive realist scholar who argued that “China is likely to dominate
Asia the way the United States dominates the Western hemisphere” (Mear-
sheimer, 2006, p. 162). While Jacques (2009) suggested China’s ambition to
be a global hegemon is rooted in a tradition called the “Middle Kingdom men-
tality” (Zhongguo). Similarly, Friedberg (2011) pointed out, “it is Beijing’s
behavior in the last several years that has made the reality of the emerging
Sino-American rivalry more difficult to ignore” (p. xvi). In short, from the
Western perspective China is an imminent threat to international
community.
However, not all Western IR scholars agree. Johnston (2003), for instance,
found that there is no compelling evidence that China is a revisionist state
seeking to change the structure of global balance of power. Instead, China
is more cooperative and integrated with international institutions. Likewise,
Shambaugh (2013, p. 5), asserts that China will never “rule the world” since
it needs a very long way before it becomes a true global power. Besides,
Chinese expert Bijian (2005) challenged sceptic views of China’s rise by
saying, “China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs”
(p. 24). He goes further that China advocates a new international political
and economic order since its economic development is largely depends on
a world peace and international stability.
Thus, the key question is: Why is China not a threat to world peace? The
answer is that tradition in Chinese civilization puts more emphasis on
harmony and peace than conflict and war. This idea is rooted in several
Chinese traditional thoughts including Confucianism, Legalism, and
Daoism. Aside from fundamental differences, these philosophical ideas tend
to be harmoniously oriented (Dellios, 2011, p. 75). In other words, instead
of mutually exclusive they share common principle that emphasize on
order and harmony. For Daoism, balance and harmony are two fundamental
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 9

principles where non-violence (wu-wei) is very important (Ling, 2014, p. 42).

As a result, the China’s rise narrative demands understanding from Chinese,
not Western perspective. In line with the third and fourth principles of
Daoism stated earlier, analysts should empty their mind and heart as well
as avoid their subjective mind-set. The key factor behind the negative projec-
tion of China’s rise is the prejudice and misunderstanding of Western society
towards China. The West lacks understanding of China’s non-expansionist
and non-exploit cultures that have survived for thousands of years (Yang,
2009, p. 21). The misunderstanding remains exist when talking about
Chinese policy in the South China Sea. The next section will examine how
China’s dual strategy in the region is possible.

Chinese dual strategy in the South China Sea

According to Mingjiang (2010), the paradox of China’s foreign policy in the
South China Sea results from the dilemma of national interest. On one hand,
China rejects to compromise with its sovereignty but on the other hand wants
to maintain good neighbor policy with Southeast Asian countries, including
with claimant states. On the other hand, China has keen interest to wipe
out “Chinese threat” perception, restoring its international image, and creat-
ing a multipolar world (Mingjiang, 2010, p. 62). Beijing’s greatest interest in
the region is how to create a stable and peaceful region because the govern-
ment strongly believes that stability will be the crucial condition for economic
development. Therefore, China chooses a defensive approach in order to
avoid the escalation of conflict while vigorously signaling others not to
infringe China’s claim in the region.
This article argues that Mingjiang’s national interest dilemma is unsatisfac-
tory because it does not provide a deeper understanding of the underlying
factor behind the construction of China’s national interests. Put differently,
the key question is: Why does China face the dilemma of national interest?
In order to answer this question, this section analyzes how China’s strategic
culture shapes Chinese interests and policies in the South China Sea. This
section follows Dellios’s (1994) argument concerning China’s dual needs;
inviolability and rightful place. The first one refers to defensive strategy
while the second favors offensive or the use of force. It is noteworthy that
inviolability and rightful place are not opposed but interrelated. As Dellios
(1994) put it, “Without inviolability, ‘rightful place’ is difficult to attain.
Without the ‘rightful place’, inviolability is not assured—as far as one can
be assured of the complete security to which inviolability aspires.” The inter-
related between defensive and offensive is compatible with Daoism philos-
ophy and will be elaborated further.
Before we proceed to the elaboration of each approach, we first need to take
Daoism into consideration especially when discussing China’s foreign policy
10 M. ROSYIDIN

in the South China Sea. It is noteworthy to take a closer look at Daoism since
there have been many literatures concentrating on the impact of Confucian-
ism in the discussion of contemporary China’s foreign policy but there is a few
(if any) analysis on how Daoism actually influences China’s decision makers.
While Confucianism emphasizes on rationalism and humanism, Daoism
focuses more on mysticism and naturalism (Freiberg, 1977). That is why
the government of China has the inclination to associates their policy with
the former rather than the later. According to Bell (2008), Confucian tradition
has become Chinese identity especially in terms of politics as it is closely
related to how society and state should be governed. As a result, state
officials tend to cite Confucian ethics more frequently than Daoism which
is considered to be “too metaphysic” and relatively hard to implement.
Despite of their sharp differences, both Confucianism and Daoism share
similar principles; harmony and oneness of universe (Smith, 1978, p. 40).
For Confucian, harmony is represented by he (和) while on Daoism, it is
often dictated by the principle of wu-wei (无为) which literally means “inac-
tion” or “non-forcing.” This, however, does not entail idleness and aimless
activities, rather empower people to behave appropriately and to avoid exces-
sive force in achieving certain goals (Yu-Lan, 2017, p. 128). In Daodejing, Lao
Tzu wrote, “Therefore the Sage Casts off extremes, Casts off excess, Casts off
extravagance” (Tzu, 1993, chap. 29). When it comes to foreign policy, the
principle of wu-wei implies the use of necessary and appropriate strategies
in achieving states goals. In contrast to Confucianism which sees that
harmony can be achieved through “centrality under Heaven” as elaborated
in the classic text of Zhongyong (Li, 2006, p. 588), Daoism forbids immodera-
tion. On South China Sea, Beijing always committed not to seeking hegemony
in the region. Xi Jinping proposes a new security concept assuring that China
will not seek hegemony. Xi cited an old proverb “Strength does not come from
the muscle of the arms, but from the unison of the heart” (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014) to convince international
community that China will not become a threat to other countries, especially
to the claimant states of South China Sea.
As mentioned earlier, the central idea of Daoism is the principle of Yin-
Yang. It depicts the harmony of universe based on balance relationship
between two opposing elements. In terms of foreign policy, Chinese
officials have frequently stated that the use of force is as of important strategy
as dialogue in conducting foreign policy. In his speech delivered at the 19th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping
emphasized the centrality of military modernization to realize what he
called the “Chinese dream” while at the same time maintaining friendship
and cooperation based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (“Full
text of Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th CPC National Congress,” 2017).1 The
duality character of Chinese foreign policy can also be found in the 2015
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 11

China’s Military Strategy which stresses the necessity for China to build a
strong maritime military force to “safeguard its national sovereignty and mar-
itime rights and interests” while at the same time “participate in international
maritime cooperation” (“China’s Military Strategy,” 2015). This statement
refers to China’s territorial ambition in South China Sea although the govern-
ment rejects the notion of “hegemonic foreign policy” in disputed area.
We shall now discuss how this dual strategy is implemented in the case of
South China Sea. Using Yin and Yang metaphor, the use of force and inter-
national institutions are two opposing strategies that have been implemented
together by China to maintain its influence and territorial ambition in the
region. Cooperative approach refers to Yin since this approach is closely associ-
ated with the feminine character (soft power, dialogue, empathy, tolerance,
benign, etc.) while coercive approach refers to Yang since it is symbolized by
masculine characters (aggressive, ambition, force, assertive, confidence, etc.).
China believes that military alone will not be sufficient to defend its maritime
interests as it must be combined with other reliable means. More importantly,
this section will show that China’s dual strategy is more than just the product of
rational decision-making but is of culturally rooted actions.

Strategic culture and Chinese coercive approach

China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea can be traced back to Chinese
classical thinking. One of the most dominant thoughts is the “Middle
Kingdom” concept. According to this idea, China places itself at the center
of the world and is surrounded by countries that must be subject to its
power. This thought gave birth to the Chinese concept of “civilizational-
state,” in contrast to the Westphalian conception of “nation-state.” Conse-
quently, China views itself as “All-under-Heaven” (Tian-xia; 天下) reflecting
a hierarchical order of interstate relations and justifying the “tribute system.”
Rossabi (1983) provides an interesting illustration of how this system works:
The ideal vehicle for relations with foreigners was the tribute system. In order to
deal with the Chinese, foreign rulers were required to send tribute embassies
periodically to the Chinese emperor. When an embassy reached the Chinese
border, Chinese officials immediately took charge and accompanied the
foreign envoys to the capital. The Chinese government bore all the expenses
of the embassy during its stay in China. Its officials taught the envoys the
proper etiquette for their appearance at court. After the envoys had been prop-
erly coached, they had an audience with the emperor. They performed the
rituals, including the kotow, a symbolic recognition of their inferiority and,
more importantly, of their acknowledgment of their status as envoys of a
“vassal” state or tribe. Their conduct at court implied that their ruler was sub-
ordinate to the emperor. (p. 2)

Yet, this concept also spawned a dualistic understanding. Tian-xia is often

understood as a system of thought that justifies the conquest and ambition of
12 M. ROSYIDIN

China to become a hegemonic power. This is because as a “civilized” entity,

China is surrounded by “barbarians” grouped based to their cultural proxi-
mity (Jacques, 2009, p. 241). This view was opposed by a Chinese expert
who argued that the concept should be understood not as imperialism but
rather the legitimacy to nurture. According to Zhao (2006), “The concept
of All-under-Heaven is meant to be an empire of world-ness responsible
for the common happiness of all peoples” (p. 34). Other scholars argue
using Chinese classical thought that the notion of Tian-xia refers to world lea-
dership with a huge responsibility to ensure world harmony. It is not a status
that achieved by violence nor coercion, but rather some sort of moral vision or
world order (Xuetong, 2011, p. 85). These views seemed to be self-defense and
trapped into the bias of Chinese nationalism. It is commonly believed that
Chinese academic culture differs from the West in terms of academic
freedom. When it comes to debating pertaining issues on China, many
Chinese students and scholars are somehow politically motivated due to
Chinese Communist Party indoctrination (Shao, 2015). Aside from govern-
ment officials, scholars of the government running think tanks also play a
crucial role in disseminating positive image their country overseas (Xing,
2007, p. 142). Thus, in order to understand China’s grand strategy, the
double-edged definition of Tian-xia should be carefully considered.
However, history tells better than opinion just a political agenda behind the
“benign hegemony” narrative. During the Warring States Period (463–222
BC), warfare had become integral part of the ritual. The concept of “territorial
state” which became Chinese strategic culture to conduct politics of imperial-
ism also rose during this period. In the mid-18th century, the Qing Dynasty
expanded its sphere of influence to Myanmar, Vietnam, Taiwan, Tibet, and
Nepal. During the Qing Dynasty, the glorification of conquest had become
a ritual to demonstrate the superiority of Chinese civilization.
The celebration of victories and the commemoration of wars arose out of a
sense of cultural rivalry; it was the imperial purpose to demonstrate that
martial prowess was a mark of superior civilization, not merely an attribute
of bandits, and thus that the exaltation of warfare properly belonged at the
centre of the cultural activity of the time. (Waley-Cohen, 2006, p. 26)

Some Western and Chinese scholars often deny the facts about China’s
aggressiveness. They argue that the moral basis of China’s foreign policy is
Confucianism which emphasizes harmony and self-restraint (see for
example, Dellios & Ferguson, 2013; Feng, 2007; Heng, 2013; Scobell, 2003).
However, the assertion that Confucianism only focuses on peaceful behavior
is misleading. The myth of Confucian pacifism has been proposed by a
Chinese scholar. Zhang (2015a, p. 202) challenged this misconception by
saying, “Confucianism, in fact, never renounced force as a legitimate instru-
ment of statecraft towage ‘appropriate wars’ in the form of punitive
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 13

expedition.” Since it implies that the world order is hierarchical, Confucian-

ism is in line with the Tian-xia thinking. Instrumentalism and distribution
of ties are two fundamental principles in Confucianism that lead to a centra-
lized strategy, in which China is a central actor who has been a beneficiary
from the surrounding countries while on the other hand those countries
will depend on China (Zhang, 2015b, p. 34). In this situation, coercion can
be justified in the name of maintaining order.
In practice, China’s aggressiveness stands out during Mao Zedong’s rule
(1893–1976). At the time, China adopted an offensive strategy to expand its
influence and power. This policy, according to Johnston, was influenced by
“cultural realism” which was a way to demonstrate the use of military force
(Johnston, 1996, p. 217). One of the key figures that had greatly influenced
Mao’s offensive strategy was Sun Tzu (544–496 BC). Mao had attended a
lesson on Sun Tzu’s war strategy from Guo Huaruo, a Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) strategist and the most authoritative translator of the great
work of Sun Tzu “The Art of War” (Johnston, 1996, p. 247).
In addition, it is noteworthy that although Daoism put more emphasis on
peace and harmony—like Confucianism—it does not deny the importance of
the use of force. Defining Daoism as a pacifist doctrine is inaccurate because it
does not solely view war as a last resort but also a proper conduct of war and
its aftermath (Zhang, 2017, p. 230). Indeed, Daoist suggests policymakers to
implement, first and foremost, pacifism foreign policy but this does not
necessarily mean as retreat or quiescence (Pettman, 2005, p. 80). In Daodejing,
Lao Tzu wrote, “Weapons are ill-omened tools, not proper instruments.
When their use can’t be avoided [emphasis added], calm restraint is best”
(Tzu, 1993, chap. 31). It is obviously clear that Daoism does not reject the
use of force. The school, however, avoids using force to conquer others and
attain selfish goals. In this sense, Daoism allows coercive tools only when
state’s survival is jeopardized. According to Daoism states should not
abandon military approach to achieve their objectives only insofar as it is
not used excessively. The concept of “Tian-xia,” “Middle Kingdom,” “territor-
ial state,” combined with Sun Tzu’s offensive thinking and the non-excessive
use of coercion from Daoism are considerably central in affecting China’s
assertive policies in the South China Sea. The combination of these thoughts
has been a strong determinant factor that encourages that China’s unilateralist
policy in claiming disputed areas and its use of military force to prevent other
countries from disrupting Chinese claims. The establishment of “nine dashed
lines” ( jiu duan xian) gives the best example. In 2009 China sent a verbal note
to the United Nations affirming the claim. The verbal note stated:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and
adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant
waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map). The above
14 M. ROSYIDIN

position is consistently held by the Chinese government, and it is widely known

by the international community. (Morton, 2016, p. 919)

Although the note was contrary to the UNCLOS, China insisted that its policy
is in line with international law. China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement:
Based on the practice of the Chinese people and the Chinese government in the
long course of history and the position consistently upheld by successive
Chinese governments, and in accordance with national law and international
law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China
has territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South
China Sea. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2012)

Xi Jinping’s remark in National University of Singapore underlined that “the

South China Sea islands are China’s territory since the ancient times” (Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). When Xi met
U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, he repeated Beijing’s commitment to main-
tain militarization in the area by saying, “We cannot lose even one inch of the
territory left behind by our ancestors” (“Xi Jinping tells US defence chief
China will not give up ‘even one inch’ of territory it considers its own,”
2018). In retaining its unilateral claim, China is not reluctant to use force.
In April 2001, for example, Chinese F-8 fighter aircraft was involved an inci-
dent with the US unmanned EP-3 aircraft around Hainan Island. Again, in
2009 the Chinese submarine was engaged in an action with a US destroyer.
The incident also occurred in 2011 when Chinese patrol allegedly harassed
PetroVietnam vessels on its geological surveys (Glaser, 2012). Aside from
taking vigorous action in the disputed area, China is also counted for asser-
tiveness by showcasing its military muscle. In September 2016, China and
Russia conducted a joint military drill in South China Sea. The Chinese official
stated that this is a routine agenda and not intended to attack other countries.
The drill itself was an effort to enhance defense cooperation between the two
countries as well as to “enhance the capabilities of the two navies to jointly
deal with maritime security threats” (“China and Russia to hold joint drills
in South China Sea,” 2016). Despite of the above-mentioned vindication,
the fact that the cooperation was of military and carried out in the neighbor-
ing plant of an internationally disputed area between major military powers,
has been reasonably perceived as Chinese medium of strengthening its mili-
tary posture.
China has also reportedly built a military base on an artificial island. Sat-
ellite images show the construction of a nearly complete military base com-
prising defense facilities such as warships and submarines harbor, aircraft
runway, missile launch facilities, and radar. China is reported to have success-
fully mounted surface-to-air missile HQ-9 as well as anti-ship missiles on one
of the artificial islands (Holmes, 2017). Recently, Xi Jinping has ordered the
Southern Theater Command—one of the five war zones of China’s People
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 15

Liberation Army (PLA)—to prepare for war as the tension between China, the
US, and other powers has risen in the South China Sea (“‘Prepare for war’, Xi
Jinping tells military region that monitors South China Sea, Taiwan,” 2018).
According to a military expert from Nanyang Technological University, Bit-
zinger (2018), the militarization is “to transform the South China Sea from an
international SLOC [Sea Lanes of Communications] into a Chinese-con-
trolled waterway and a strategic chokepoint for other countries.”

Strategic culture and Chinese cooperative approach

As the dualist character of Daoism philosophy entails, China believes that
coercive approach has no meaning without cooperative approach. For
China, the use of military force is necessary but not a sufficient condition
to gain interests. In addition, China should convince others with regard to
the narrative of “peaceful rise” to the region. The statement of the Chinese
Foreign Ministry points out, “China stands ready to continue to resolve the
relevant disputes peacefully through negotiation and consultation with the
states directly concerned on the basis of respecting historical facts and in
accordance with international law” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s of Republic of China, 2012). Chinese officials repeatedly state these
diplomatic words on many occasions. Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin
said that the importance of cooperation between coastal states of the South
China Sea is to create a controlled situation. Furthermore, coastal states
should cooperate and put away prejudices over territorial claims of other
countries, increase mutual trust, strengthen cooperation, and promote
common interests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s of Republic
of China, 2017).
Despite the fact that Xi Jinping employs more assertive foreign policy in
the South China Sea, he also emphasizes cooperative approach. It seems
that he wants to balance between hard and soft approach. Xi has frequently
promoted his benevolence policy by stating over the years that China does
not intend to become a hegemon as feared by many countries. He said that
hegemony and militarism are not characteristic of China’s foreign policy.
Through the idea called “New Asian Security Concept,” Xi insists that
China will not become a hegemonic country. “China does not subscribe
to the notion that a country is bound to seek hegemony when it grows
in strength. Hegemony or militarism is not in the genes of the Chinese”
(“Xi Jinping promises neighbors China soft power,” 2014). Instead of max-
imizing power, China adopts a benign approach that does not threaten
other countries.
China’s cooperative approach can be traced back from Confucianism
which essentially teaches pacifism and benevolence. Yet, Confucianism is
not the only philosophical tradition that stresses on harmony and pacifism.
16 M. ROSYIDIN

Daoism also shares the common principle as manifested in the Lao Tzu’s
teachings of self-restraint in his Dao De Jing. Chapter 30 states:
Use TAO to help rule people.
This world has no need for weapons,
Which soon turn on themselves.
Where armies camp, nettles grow;
After each war, years of famine.
The most fruitful outcome
Does not depend on force,
But succeeds without arrogance
Without hostility
Without pride
Without resistance
Without violence
If these things prosper and grow old,
This is called not-TAO.
Not-TAO soon ends.
Pu tao tsao i. (Tzu, 1993, chap. 30)

China is committed to establishing cooperation with claimant states and

major powers either bilaterally, trilateral, or multilaterally. China never
closes the channels of negotiation for the sake of mutual progress (Feng,
2007, p. 29). The bilateral approach is carried out in conjunction with clai-
mant states such as Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. When the
China-Malaysia agreement is achieved, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu
Zhenmin stated that both countries seek to enhance naval cooperation to
ensure peace and stability in the South China Sea as well as to enhance
mutual trust (“China and Malaysia agree on military cooperation in the
South China Sea,” 2016). Important progress has also been achieved on
September 14, 2016 between China and Vietnam when both countries
agreed on a joint communiqué related to the peaceful settlement of the
South China Sea dispute. The deal was part of the invitation of Chinese
Prime Minister Li Keqiang to Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan
Phuc. Both countries agreed on one point about commitment to DOC
and COC.
The two sides agreed to continue implementing the Declaration on the Conduct
of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) effectively and in full, to expedite the
conclusion of the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea on the basis
of consensus; to properly manage disputes at sea, to avoid actions which com-
plicate or expand disputes, and to maintain peace and stability in the South
China Sea. (Tran, 2016)

China also opened a dialogue space with the Philippines, whom in 2013
had brought the dispute case between the two countries to the special tri-
bunal set up under UNCLOS. In July 2016 the tribunal issued rules against
China’s historic claim in the South China Sea. China highly disagreed and
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 17

rejected the Hague’s ruling but did not overreact. Contrary, China gave
primacy to dialogues by offering bilateral solutions to the Philippines, as
long as the country is willing to cooperate and rule out the decision of
the tribunal. As the Philippines rejected the offer, China extended the cour-
tesy by inviting the Philippines to negotiate. In August 2016, the Philip-
pines got softened as President Rodrigo Duterte dispatched high ranking
figure, the former president Fidel Ramos to meet with the delegation of
China (“China open to contact with Philippines: Chinese FM,” 2016). In
October 2016, Duterte and Xi Jinping finally met and agreed on solving
the South China Sea problem peacefully. The official statement released
after the meeting stated, “Both sides agree to continue discussions on confi-
dence-building measures … and to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of
activities in the South China Sea that would complicate or escalate dis-
putes” (Zhen, 2016). Recently, Xi visited the Philippines to meet with Pre-
sident Duterte. He also wrote an article published by three Philippines’
newspapers titled “Open up a New Future Together for China-Philippine
Relations.” Xi metaphorically called relations between the two countries
“a rainbow after the rain” which significantly indicates a positive trend
after long-vehement relationships over South China Sea issue. Xi also men-
tioned that the dispute between the two nations shall be handled through
friendly consultations and enhanced dialogue and cooperation (Jinping,
2018).
China’s diplomacy does not only involve the conflicting parties but is also
directed towards relevant major powers. The trilateral ministerial meeting
between Russia, India and China (RIC) which was held in April 2016 resulted
in a joint communiqué on a peaceful solution for the South China Sea issue.
The three major powers are committed to maintaining stability based on the
principles of UNCLOS. In addition, all disputants should be addressed
through peaceful way between the parties concerned (Panda, 2016). The
meeting could be regarded as a diplomatic attempt to counter the internatio-
nalization of the South China Sea issue by the United States and its Western
allies. The trilateral meeting should therefore not be only seen as Chinese
effort to solve the problem but also as a soft strategy of equalizing the
United States the strategy of engaging major powers in diplomatic forums
has thereby been a form of cooperative rather than confrontational.
In terms of diplomacy, although China would normally prefer the bilateral
to multilateral approach, in the South China Sea issue China is willing to
gradually shift to multilateralism as a strategy to achieve its interests. As
cases in point, in 1990s China rejected the DOC proposed by ASEAN, but
this reluctancy took a turn when China changed its decision and signed the
DOC on November 4, 2002. Also, China was also open to adopt the norm
of ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) after the signing of
Bali Concord II in 2003. The willingness to adopt both DOC and TAC is
18 M. ROSYIDIN

not something new for China since Beijing has long adopted the principle of
peace and harmony as a rising responsible power (Mingjiang, 2008). The
growing Sino-ASEAN relationship also represents a transformation in
China’s foreign policy. Beijing had previously acted as a sceptic observer of
multilateralism but later became an active dialogue partner for ASEAN
under the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other forms of regional
arrangements (Ba, 2003, p. 646). The next development includes the 2011
China-ASEAN cooperation in formulating DOC implementation guidelines.
At the ASEAN-China Summit Meeting in November 2011, Wen Jiabao stated
that China will always be a good neighbor, a good friend and a good partner
for ASEAN and will always be willing to discuss the COC draft (Mingjiang,
2014). In fact, China’s commitment on bringing the issue of the South
China Sea to the ASEAN multilateral forum seems doubtful. At the minister-
ial meeting in Cambodia, July 2012, ASEAN for the first time in 45 years since
its establishment failed to reach joint communiqué. Cambodia as the host
country asked for ASEAN member states not to discuss South China Sea dis-
putes. Many analysts argued that China is the key behind the ASEAN’s failure
by using its economic power to pressure Cambodia to reject the proposals (for
example, Bower, 2012). China’s indirect involvement in the ASEAN meeting
indicates the implementation of a dual strategy against claimant states.
Sino-ASEAN relationship has progressed even more as China demon-
strates its willingness to agree on a COC single text negotiation in ASEAN-
China ministerial meeting in Singapore, August 2, 2018. This marks a mile-
stone in the prospect of peaceful settlement of the South China Sea. Chinese
foreign minister Wang Yi stated that this agreement seems like building a
house together between China and ASEAN countries. There are no longer
11 designs from the 11 countries but now they have a single design for
how the house would look like (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China, 2018). China also conducted six days joint military exer-
cise in Zhanjiang, southern Guangdong Province. This idea was proposed by
China during the 2015 China-ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting in Singa-
pore. For China, the drill has a significant impact on Beijing’s efforts to
build close ties with ASEAN countries (Parameswaran, 2018). From Daoist
perspective, the changing course of China’s foreign policy in the region
reflects the Yin side which promotes cooperative framework or trust-building
with ASEAN countries, aside from the continuation of building military
infrastructure in the South China Sea (Rosyidin, 2018). The employment
of cooperative approach in dealing with South China Sea should be regarded
as “the other side of China’s strategy” to control the area under its jurisdic-
tion. As Xi Jinping points out, China “will not give up even one inch in the
South China Sea” and the disputed area belongs to China’s territory “since
ancient time.”
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 19

Conclusion
Chinese duality in the South China Sea dispute has become commonsense
from the perspective of scholars as well as decision makers. In other words,
the fact that China has been employing both coercive and cooperative
diplomacy should not be taken as an element of surprise. What is new in
this article is its explanation of the underlying factor behind the implemen-
tation of China’s dual strategy. Unlike realism and liberalism, the appli-
cation of constructivism should aid better in providing understanding
over China’s seemingly ambivalence in South China Sea. As this article
demonstrates, culture plays an important role in China’s approach in
South China Sea since Chinese historical experiences have a great impact
on its foreign policy. For thousands of years, China has set various philoso-
phical thinking as a guiding principle for Chinese policy-makers. Both
offensive and defensive strategies are equally rooted in this tradition. The
concept of a strategic culture of constructivism provides a deeper under-
standing than those of realists and liberals who emphasize only material
elements and national interests.
According to the ontological foundation of Daoism, reality operates in a
dialectical way in which two opposing entities do not mutually exclude
each other but rather complement each other in a single system. This
means, the typical binary opposition of Western thought becomes irrelevant.
This is why most Western scholars often misunderstand China’s behavior in
international politics. As a result, the concept of “Chinese threat” dominates
academic literatures on Chinese foreign policy produced by Western scholars.
On the contrary, the narrative of “China’s peaceful rise” has always been
echoed by most Chinese scholars, reflecting nationalistic and self-defense
standpoint instead of an objective argument.
Daoism is not the only philosophical thought that shapes the contempor-
ary China’s foreign policy. There have been numerous strands including, one
of which, is Confucianism that has also been regarded as the most influential
philosophical thought in modern China. As mentioned in the first section of
this article, Daoism is not merely an ethical standard of living. It contains an
ontological standpoint assuming that reality consists of two opposing
elements that is not independent of each other but rather mutually dependent
and complementary. Indeed, Daoism is similar to Confucianism in the sense
that peace and harmony should be the principal standard of behavior.
However, this paper has focused on the Daoism ontological assumption of
reality. However, this article has discussed not the ethical dimension of
Daoism philosophy but rather its premise that reality consists of two opposing
but interrelated elements.
This article has shown that on the issue of the South China Sea, the
impact of Daoism philosophy is evident from the use of dual strategies
20 M. ROSYIDIN

combining both coercive and co-operative approaches. China may deny

the use of military force in the South China Sea but the evidence shows
that China is often still acting aggressively against countries seeking to
disrupt its sovereign claims in the region. On the other hand, China
undoubtedly engages in many diplomatic forums. From Daoism perspec-
tive, cooperative approach does not replace the offensive one because
both approaches are not contradictory but rather complementary.
Despite the fact that China has shown commitment to norms in the
region, it does not necessarily terminate China’s militarization in the
South China Sea.
In order to deal with China’s duality approach, the international commu-
nity needs to formulate a comprehensive strategy to a seek long-term sol-
utions in the South China Sea. Power balance strategies such as “hedging”
are not sufficient as it needs to be combined with cooperative strategies
such as “constructive engagement.” ASEAN has a weak bargaining position
toward China. Therefore, ASEAN should engage with major powers such
as Russia, India, Japan, the United States, and the European Union as a
counter-balance strategy. On the other hand, ASEAN should continue enter-
tain China at the negotiating tables. China’s willingness to adopt ASEAN
norms sets a precedent for ASEAN to socialize its norms beyond the
region. It is important to convince China that there is a convergence
between ASEAN norms and Chinese cultural traditions.

Note
1. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Sanskrit: Panchsheel) were first set
forth by Zhou Enlai during the agreement between China and India from
December 1953 to April 1954. It consists of five norms of international
relations: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual
non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 4th International Conference on
Chinese-Indonesian Studies (ICCIS) “China’s Impact on Southeast Asia and Its Dia-
sporic Communities: Past, Present, Future,” Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indo-
nesia, August 22–24, 2017. The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers
for their critical and constructive comments. He would also like to thank Andi
Akhmad Basith Dir for proofreading the article.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 21

Notes on contributor
Mohamad Rosyidin is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Uni-
versitas Diponegoro. He teaches Introduction to IR, IR theories, foreign policy analy-
sis, Southeast Asian studies, and security studies. His research interests include
Indonesia’s foreign policy, constructivism IR theory, culture and foreign policy, secur-
ity in Southeast Asia, and non-Werstern IR theory. He is the author of the book The
Power of Ideas: Konstruktivisme dalam Studi Hubungan Internasional (2015) and has
published articles in East Asia, South East Asia Research, Asia-Pacific Social Science
Review, Indonesian Quarterly, as well as online magazines such as The Diplomat
and Strategic Review.

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