Asia-Pacific Review

ISSN: 1343-9006 (Print) 1469-2937 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/capr20

“The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and

Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh
Realities

Axel Berkofsky

To cite this article: Axel Berkofsky (2016) “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and
Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities, Asia-Pacific Review, 23:2, 109-128, DOI:
10.1080/13439006.2016.1244963

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2016.1244963

Published online: 28 Nov 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 694

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=capr20
Asia-Pacific Review, 2016
Vol. 23, No. 2, 109–128, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2016.1244963

“The Chinese Dream” and

Chinese Foreign and
Security Policies—Rosy
Rhetoric versus Harsh
Realities
AXEL BERKOFSKY

The “China Dream” announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping’ in 2012 paints

a very rosy picture of China under his seemingly undisputed leadership: China’s
economic and political rise will be beneficial to China and indeed the
international community putting Beijing on top of the list of “peace-loving”
countries. Reality, however, as it turned out over the last four years, is
distinctively different as a number of countries in China’s neighborhood and
beyond can surely confirm. Indeed, Beijing unilaterally claiming and building
civilian and military facilities on disputed islands in the South China Sea are
arguably the very opposite of a peaceful contribution to world politics and
security facilitated by the rhetorical hype of Xi’s “Chinese Dream.” While
outside observers can be excused for concluding that the “Chinese Dream”
mantra is directed at the Chinese domestic audience to distract from the very
many economic, environment and social problems within China, the
consequences of Beijing’s “dreaming” of re-gaining its former undisputed
“Middle Kingdom” status in Asia are very much felt abroad. This, it is
argued, could be the time when “dreams” turn into “nightmares” for those at
the receiving end of Beijing’s dream.

Introduction
fter the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of
A China in November 2012, President Xi Jinping1 for the first time put forward
the idea of the “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo meng in Chinese) during a visit of the
exhibition “The Road towards Renewal” at the National Museum of China in

# 2016 Institute for International Policy Studies 109

Axel Berkofsky

Beijing. During that visit, Xi declared that the “Great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation is a dream of the whole nation, as well as of every individual.” While today
the rhetoric and declarations on the “Chinese Dream” continue to remain fuzzy
and probably comprehensible to Chinese ears only, specifics on what Xi means
when he talks about “resurrecting” Chinese power as part of that “dream” have
emerged very forcefully over the last four years. As it turned out, however,
details of the “resurrection” of Chinese power such as declaring that the entire
South China Sea belongs to China and the construction of civilian and military
facilities on disputed islands there have made sure that the “dream” is turning
into a nightmare for those in Asia who are at the receiving end of increasingly
and unambiguously aggressive Chinese policies related to territorial claims in
the East and South China Seas.
The conceptual and linguistic origins of the “Chinese Dream” (also cited as
“China Dream” in the press and literature2), can be dated back to the year 2010
and a book published by Liu Mingfu, senior colonel of China’s armed forces:
“The Chinese Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-
American Era.” The book calls on China to regain its position as the most power-
ful nation in the world, a position it had held, according to the colonel, for a thou-
sand years before the West and Japan invaded and colonized China as part of what
in China is referred to as “Hundred Years of National Humiliation”—the period
from China’s first “Opium War” with Great Britain in 1839 until the founding
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Chinese President Xi Jinping
must have read and studied that book when in December 2012 during an inspec-
tion tour of Chinese naval forces stationed in southern China he confessed that he
reportedly had a dream of a “Strong Army.”3 The country’s armed forces, Xi
declared back then, will continue to remain under exclusive control of China’s
Communist Party (CCP), i.e. under control of himself as the CCP’s Secretary-
General, Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party
of China (CMC) and since March 2016 as the armed forces commander-in-
chief.4 Xi commands armed forces charged with the task of defending the
country from threats from the outside as much as they are charged with the task
of defending China from threats from inside the country.5 Chinese foreign
policy, Xi and Chinese policymakers have since the end of 2012 numerous
times declared, is aimed at realizing two goals for the country: the doubling of
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) and achieving what in Beijing policymak-
ing circles is referred to as the “renewal” of the nation by 2049, the 100th anniver-
sary of the PRC’s founding by Mao Zedong. While the first objective is
comprehensible and maybe even realistic, the second is everything but that, at
least to those who are by Chinese interlocutors typically accused of being incap-
able of understanding China and the contents and nuances of Chinese slogans—for
Beijing usually all non-Chinese/Western scholars who dare to negatively

110 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016

 “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

comment on or criticize any aspect of Chinese domestic or foreign policies.6 Then

again, China’s very assertive and outright aggressive policies related to territorial
claims in the East and the South China Seas are “helping” outside observers and
analysts to understand what Xi means when he speaks of China’s “renewal”: the
“renewal” of China’s territorial borders through military coercion or force. Indeed,
over the last four years—at least so it seems judging by Chinese policies aimed at
“resolving” territorial disputes by unilaterally declaring the territories and waters
in question belong to China—China’s territorial expansionism in the East and
South China Seas has become a central instrument to “resurrect” Chinese power
as promulgated in the “Chinese Dream.” Unilateral territorial expansion in the
South China Sea, accompanied by the construction of civilian and military facili-
ties on islands claimed also by other countries is indeed a demonstration of
Chinese (military) power and the ability to reclaim and occupy what—at least
in Beijing’s view—has belonged to China since “ancient times.” Given that the
“Chinese Dream” aims at re-building the power and influence China had in the
past (before its clash with Western powers and Western colonialism and imperi-
alism in China and elsewhere in Asia), re-claiming and occupying territories
China claims to have possessed in the past is hence China’s right and—at least
from a Chinese perspective—obligation. The fact that China is no longer an
empire and Southeast Asia is no longer a group of Chinese vassal states existing
on the empire’s “periphery” seems to have been “forgotten” among Chinese pol-
icymakers. Indeed, Beijing challenging the existing territorial status quo and
refusing to accept international legal arbitration (like in July 2016, see below)
on territorial disputes continue to confirm that China behaves like a revisionist
great power relying only its very own interpretation of history, historical maps
and events.

Blurry dream, (very) tangible policies

Those in Asia who find themselves at the receiving end of China dreaming of
returning to its “glorious past” and an undisputed “Middle Kingdom” status,
will have to measure the overall level of Chinese peacefulness or belligerency
by China’s actual regional foreign policies and their impact. Unsurprisingly, uni-
laterally reclaiming islands in the South China Sea and building civil and military
facilities on them is in Southeast Asia (and pretty much elsewhere too) perceived
to be the very opposite of the kind of “peaceful development” and “Sharing the
Chinese Dream” Xi Jinping has been promising since 2012. Equally unsurpris-
ingly, Chinese policymakers with the help of Chinese scholars and analysts on
the record7 are defiant and under pressure from Chinese authorities to stick to
the official line refusing to acknowledge that actions such as claiming and occu-
pying disputed territories in the South China Sea have consequences as to how

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 23, N UMBER 2 111

Axel Berkofsky

Chinese regional policies are perceived outside of China. Indeed, when confronted
with criticism and indeed well-founded and undisputable facts and accusations
that unilaterally occupying disputed islands in the South China Sea has a negative
impact on the regional security, Chinese officials and scholars likewise typically
turn to portraying China as a “victim” of Western containment and/or a Western
strategy to contain China’s political and economic rise. In fact, the Chinese de
facto refusal to acknowledge the concept of “cause and effect”8 of Chinese pol-
icies related to territorial claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere together
with territorial claims based on Chinese maps have become an obstacle to any-
thing resembling a meaningful discussion between Chinese and non-Chinese
interlocutors. In other words: Chinese self-righteousness together with strong
pressure from the authorities to repeat and defend the official opinion on anything
on the country’s domestic and foreign policy agenda have made a constructive dia-
logue with Chinese interlocutors very often very cumbersome and indeed imposs-
ible.9
Since Beijing in July 2016 rejected the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration (based in The Hague), which ruled that there is no evidence that Beijing
had historically (i.e. since forever) exercised control over practically the entire
South China Sea, the part of the “Chinese Dream” rhetoric that promises peaceful
or “peace-loving” Chinese foreign policies must ring very hollow in China’s
neighborhood. Unsurprisingly, China’s reaction to the court’s verdict was
immediate and (very) defiant, confirming that Beijing has no intention whatsoever
to accept and abide by international law if international law limits the country’s
territorial claims and de facto expansionism backed-up by the display of military
force. In fact, the very opposite is the case: after the above-mentioned July 2016
verdict Beijing also—and again in violation of international practice and law—
announced to set up a Chinese air defense zone over the South China Sea to—
as it claims— “protect” Chinese sovereign territory.
It certainly is not the first time in recent years that grandiose Chinese political
rhetoric does not match reality. Double-digit Chinese defense budget growth rates
always somehow stood in contradiction to Beijing’s self-declared image as a
peace-loving “soft power” and continuing to threaten Taiwan militarily through
the stationing of thousands of missiles directed at Taiwanese territory continues
to provide evidence that the country is rising (far) less peacefully than former
Chinese president Hu Jintao promised the world throughout his tenure as the coun-
try’s top leader until 2012. Indeed, there are similarities between Xi’s “Chinese
Dream” and Hu’s “Peaceful Rise” (later “Peaceful Development,” for details
see below) in terms of how political rhetoric does not match reality. To be sure,
China is not the only country in which political rhetoric fails to match political
reality, but the tangible consequences (e.g. aggressive policies related to
China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea) conceptualized and facilitated

112 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016

 “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

by the “China Dream” are very significant and arguably more than a typical or
common “mismatch” between political rhetoric/propaganda and reality.

No more “Hiding and Biding”?

Judging by Xi’s rhetoric and numerous declarations over recent years, the
“Chinese Dream” takes the place of Deng Xiaoping’s “Hide and Bide” approach
to international affairs and politics. When Deng came back from being purged
during the Cultural Revolution and a short-lived exile to political power in
China in the late 1970s, he wanted China to exclusively focus on economic devel-
opment and growth while taking a low profile in international politics. China,
Deng realized, did not have the resources to continue supporting what Mao
claimed were “freedom fighters” and “revolutionaries” fighting alleged Western
imperialism and colonialism in Africa and South America. Indeed, the 30 years
of disastrous Maoism left China internationally isolated and domestically and
socially impoverished. The so-called “Great Leap Forward” (1958–1962) and
the “Cultural Revolution” led to mass famine and mass killings leading to up to
30 million casualties in China from the late 1950 until the mid-1970s.10 After
the massacre on Tiananmen Square in June 198911 Deng is cited as having pro-
claimed the slogan “Bide its time, hide its brightness, not seek leadership, but
do some things.”12 However, according to U.S. China scholar David Shambaugh
there is no empirical evidence that it was really Deng who propagated that slogan
in 1989.13 Nonetheless, “Hide and Bide” became the mantra of Chinese foreign
and security policies throughout the 1990s and it was, as Shambaugh writes,
former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who picked up the slogan and officially
attributed it to his predecessor Deng. The “Hide and Bide” policy is a policy
that has kept China from getting politically or militarily involved in international
conflicts and was accompanied by China deciding not to enter into formal military
alliances with other countries. After a long period of no political relations to speak
of in 1996, for example, China and Russia announced a “strategic partnership,”
but neither Beijing nor Moscow have ever spoken of an “alliance” between them-
selves. The same is true for Beijing’s relations with North Korea: “close partners”
yes, “alliance” between Beijing and Pyongyang no.
“Hide and Bide” today has been replaced by a more (much) more pro-active
approach to international economics, politics and security and Beijing’s “Chinese
Dream” is a reflection of that new and (much) more assertive approach towards
issues of direct Chinese political and territorial interests. China’s increasingly
deep integration into the global economy—accompanied by its global trade ties
with and foreign direct investments (FDI) in many politically and economically
unstable countries—has made it next to impossible to conduct foreign and security
policies according to Deng’s “Hide and Bide” paradigm. Indeed, Beijing has, for

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 23, N UMBER 2 113

Axel Berkofsky

example, globally deployed more Chinese UN peacekeepers than the other four
permanent members of the UN Security Council combined. Furthermore,
China’s increasing involvement in the global economy, politics and security
also means that it has become increasingly difficult for Beijing to adhere to its
sacred “Principle of Non-Interference” even if Beijing continues to insist that it
strictly adheres to that principle (also in order to discourage and indeed prohibit
others to “interfere” in Chinese domestic and foreign policies).14 China denying
others the right to “interfere” in any of what China refers to as its “internal
affairs” is (very) deeply embedded in Chinese foreign and security policy thinking
and making and Beijing will continue to take on board only the kind of advice on
its foreign and security policies that comes nowhere near to resembling “interfer-
ence” Chinese-style. However, judging by Chinese reactions to any kind of
foreign comment or advice on any issue related to Chinese domestic and
foreign policies de facto interprets any kind of outside advice on any issue
related to Chinese domestic and foreign policies, Chinese policymakers have
over recent years insisted that no outside party in general and the US (together
with Japan) in particular has the right to take a position on, i.e. “interfere in,”
China’s domestic and foreign policies, in and beyond Asia.15
Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the kind of foreign and foreign
economic policy initiatives Beijing under Xi is proposing today typically
exclude the US and US participation. The Chinese President has, for example,
repeatedly proposed creating a new regional security architecture that would
exclude the United States, and Beijing has been very active and/or taking a leader-
ship role in regional security forums in which the US is not a member: the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN plus 1, ASEAN plus 3, and the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).
Viewed against the background of recent Chinese regional foreign and security
policy behavior, an Asian security architecture under Chinese leadership is all
but close to unthinkable for Southeast Asian countries, not to mention for
Japan, South Korea, and obviously also Taiwan.16 It is fair to conclude that
none of the Asia’s democracies are in any way willing to accept a Chinese a secur-
ity architecture or structures under Chinese leadership and there are currently no
indications whatsoever that Beijing is seriously and credibly seeking to establish
such a security order under its own leadership. Firstly, this is because China’s pol-
icymakers do not seem to think they are obliged to facilitate and strive for security
structures which would in any way limit China’s ability to dominate Asian secur-
ity. Secondly, China is currently clearly in the business of re-claiming and occu-
pying disputed territories and waters, which is arguably the very opposite of
striving for regional security structures beneficial and acceptable to all involved
parties. While official declarations by Southeast Asian policymakers during offi-
cial bilateral encounters with Chinese counterparts might at times suggest other-

114 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016

 “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

wise, the same Southeast Asian policymakers are in off the record conversations
typically very wary of China’s regional growing influence and are unprepared to
turn again into Beijing’s vassal states in the periphery of the Chinese “Middle
Kingdom.”
Much closer to home, too, China’s tactics and policies hardly correspond to
the kind of regional “win-win” realities, which according to Xi Jinping are part
of the “Chinese Dream.” Since Taiwan’s newly-elected president Tsai Ing-wen
took office at the end of this May, Beijing reminded her several times to stick
to the so-called “1992 consensus” acknowledging the “One-China-Principle,”
i.e. acknowledging that there is only one China—the one represented by
Beijing. 17 Tsai has chosen not to do so and she and her country (which Beijing
insists is a Chinese province but in reality has since 1949 been a de facto indepen-
dent state) could one day become subject to some of the “Moving earth and
shaking mountains” policies Xi threatened Taipei with in case it opted for policies
aimed at turning Taiwan’s de facto independence into a formal one. Furthermore,
it remains to be seen how much longer Beijing continues to (more or less18) tol-
erate calls for democracy and truly democratic elections in Hong Kong, subject to
the so-called “One-Country-Two -Systems” formula, an agreement between Hong
Kong and Mainland China allowing Hong Kong to maintain its own economic
governance system and freely and democratically vote Hong Kong’s “Chief
Executive” into office. Despite that agreement, however, Beijing has not stuck
to its promise to allow universal suffrage in Hong Kong and the way in which
the city’s “Chief Executive” is voted into office has arguably very little (indeed
nothing) to do with the kind of representative democracy Beijing promised the
citizens of Hong Kong after the handover from Great Britain to China in 1997.
The so-called “Umbrella Movement,” a group of well-organized students and acti-
vists19 have in September 2014 in week-long mass protests and demonstrations
pointed to Beijing’s very obvious strategy to suppress democracy and democratic
governance in Hong Kong for as long and thoroughly as possible. Indeed, Beij-
ing’s “Chinese Dream” rhetoric must among pro-democracy activists and the
ordinary citizen in Hong Kong ring as hollow as it does in Taipei, for China
also a “target” of the Hong Kong-style less than perfect or indeed dysfunctional
“One-Country-Two Systems” formula.

Sweet dream versus harsh realities

State Councillor and former Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs20 Yang Jiechi
wrote in The National Interest in September 2013 that “The Chinese dream
requires a peaceful and stable international and neighbouring environment, and
China is committed to realizing the dream through peaceful development. Since
the ‘Chinese Dream’ is closely connected to the dreams of other peoples around

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 23, N UMBER 2 115

Axel Berkofsky

the world, China is committed to helping other countries, developing countries

and neighbouring countries in particular, with their development while achieving
development of its own.”21 While that sounds re-assuring on paper, the reality of
Chinese regional foreign and security policies does not get reflected in that expla-
nation of the “Chinese Dream.” Unilaterally occupying disputed islands in the
South China Sea is—at least from the perspective of those countries also claiming
the islands China is already building civilian and military facilities on—the very
opposite of the kind of “peaceful development” Yang spoke of at the time.
Obviously, China’s assessment could not be more different: the “Chinese
Dream is a continuation of China’s so-called “Peaceful Development Strategy”
announced and propagated by Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao. The origin of Hu’s
“Peaceful Development Strategy” was the “Peaceful Rise Strategy” (heping
jueqi) as proposed by Zheng Bijian from the Central Party School in 2003. “Peace-
ful Rise” became “Peaceful Development,” which in turn was complemented by
the “Harmonious World” (hexie shijie) slogan to calm Western anxiety about the
allegedly aggressive connotations of the term “rise.” Today, however, the concept
of a “harmonious world” is no longer part of Beijing’s foreign policy rhetoric and
seemingly not a concept belonging to the “Chinese Dream” either. In turn, when
Chinese policymakers talk about the “Chinese Dream” and the return to the “Glory
of the Middle Kingdom” in the same sentence, the alarm-bells go off almost
immediately among policymakers in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the return of the
concept and strategy of China as the “Middle Kingdom” in Southeast Asia
recalls the bad old days of the Ming and Qing dynasties, during which the
Chinese “Middle Kingdom” dominated much of Southeast Asia, treating all
states as “vassals” on the “periphery” of the Chinese Empire.22 In January 2014
Liu Zhenyu, journalist of the Chinese People’s Daily Online newspaper,23
wrote an article in the online newspaper The Diplomat, in which he explicitly
linked the “Chinese Dream” to the term “Middle Kingdom”: “I dream that the
Chinese people will one day fully recover from the trauma of the “Century of
National Humiliation,” when China was bullied at the hands of Western and Japa-
nese invaders, and the Middle Kingdom will restore its former glory.”24 Indeed,
there is little doubt that there is in Chinese policymaking circles a conceptual con-
nection between the “Chinese Dream” and the Middle Kingdom.25 That connec-
tion becomes evident in Xi’s project to revive the ancient Silk Road trading route
from China to Europe: indeed, the very same version of the Silk Road when China
was the “Middle Kingdom” throughout the Ming and Qing dynasties.26

Dream interpretation
Given that the “Chinese Dream” is a slogan as opposed to a well-defined concept
explaining in detail the allegedly new qualities of Chinese foreign policies, it is—

116 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016

 “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

at least for the outside and non-Chinese analyst—obviously difficult to qualify and
quantify which, how, and to what extent China’s foreign and security policies are
in Beijing’s view designed to help achieve that “dream.” That said, however, if
strengthening and expanding China’s regional and global foreign and security
policy profile and positioning is part of that “dream,” then it can be concluded
that Beijing’s (very) assertive policies related to territorial claims in the South
China Sea serve that purpose. In other words, reclaiming and occupying islands
in the South China Sea which are also claimed by other countries is—from a
Chinese perspective—seemingly an instrument to help the Chinese government
convince the Chinese people that it is able and indeed very prepared to make
the de facto expansion of Chinese territory a part of the “Chinese Dream.” Unsur-
prisingly, Chinese policymakers do not make that connection, at least not on the
official record. Instead, occupying disputed islands is from a Chinese perspective
much more simple than that: China is merely taking (back) what belonged to
China since “ancient times.”27 And China is indeed getting very good at taking
back what it argues belongs to itself. While large parts of the territorial waters
in the South China Sea are disputed, China is the country that acts on these dis-
putes by in essence declaring that there are no disputes: the disputed territories
all belong to China as far as China is concerned. In the South China Sea that
includes the Paracel Islands (also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam), the Spratly
Islands (claimed by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei)
and the Scarborough Shoal (claimed also by both Taiwan and the Philippines).
To put all of this on paper, Beijing took the so-called “Nine-Dash Line” (a line
marking the borders of Chinese territorial waters as viewed from China dating
back to the 1940s and first declared by former Chinese President Chiang Kai-
shek) out of the drawer, providing alleged “evidence” that more than 90% of
the South China Sea is part of Chinese sovereign territory. Over the last three
years, China has in the South China Sea pursued a very effective approach that
is also referred to as a “combination of punches.” Firstly, it is deploying law enfor-
cement units on the sea to assert its power while at the same avoiding direct mili-
tary clashes with other claimant countries. Secondly, it is using economic power to
divide ASEAN countries’ stances on territorial disputes with China. This dual
tactic, however, has in 2014, 2015, and 2016 been complemented by something
more concrete: unilaterally declaring that what is disputed really belongs to
China. In 2015, for example, Beijing increased the construction of facilities on
and around disputed islands, including military facilities. After declaring in
June 2015 that the process of building seven new islands by moving sediment
from the seafloor to reefs was close to completion, Beijing in the second half of
the year undertook efforts to build ports, airstrips and radar facilities on disputed
islands in the South China Sea. In April 2015 China built an airstrip on reclaimed
land on the Spratly Islands and unless there is a dramatic shift in Chinese territorial

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 23, N UMBER 2 117

Axel Berkofsky

policies—which is as unlikely as it gets—we have not yet seen the end of China
re-claiming and building facilities (including military bases) on disputed islands in
the South China Sea. To begin with, the above-mentioned verdict issued by the
Permanent of Arbitration in July has not kept China from very recently resuming
the intrusion into Japanese-controlled territorial waters in the East China Sea and
will not—unless Washington decided to intervene directly with more than verbal
warnings—keep Beijing from continuing to build facilities on disputed islands in
the South China Sea. In sum, the “Chinese Dream” suggests that China is bound to
become more proactive in international politics and security and could, as some
analysts point out, begin also to seek military alliances, with Russia on top of
the list of potential alliance partners. As mentioned above, up until today,
however, Beijing insists that it does maintain military alliances with any
country, including North Korea and Russia. The literature suggests that
Moscow and Beijing will maintain what is also referred to as an “axis of conven-
ience” as opposed to anything resembling a military partnership that goes beyond
joint opposition to U.S. and Western policies.28

Dream for China, nightmare for the others?

Chinese state-controlled media warn on a regular basis that while Beijing has
nothing against US economic involvement in East Asia per se, the expansion of
US security and defense ties in Asia through its “Asia pivot” announced in
2011 is aimed at keeping China from pursuing the “Chinese Dream” of “National
Rejuvenation.” 29 While that sounds overly dramatic to Western ears and does not
reflect the reality of what Washington’s “Asia pivot” aimed for, it is very serious
business for China as China’s most well-known scholar of international relations
Yan Xuetong30 argued in 2013 during a debate with U.S. international relations
scholar John Mearsheimer.31 China under Xi’s leadership, Yan argued at the
time, will be able to tell friends from enemies, allowing those who—as he put
it—“Play a constructive role in China’s rise to profit from it.” This looks like a
very Chinese version of a “carrot and stick policy,” “rewarding” those who play
by China’s rules and “punishing” those who dare not to. While that might
sound plausible from a nationalist point of view (while somehow smelling of a
strategy to install “hegemony” and Chinese “supremacy” in Asia), one may
wonder where the “Chinese Dream” ends and the nightmare for the rest of Asia
and beyond begins. To be sure, there are obstacles to how quickly Beijing is
able to realize its dream. The basis and fundament of rising Chinese global influ-
ence and power over the last 10 years has been an economy with double-digit
growth rates. Double-digit Chinese economic growth rates, however, today are
a thing of the past and today the country is confronted with enormous economic
and financial difficulties, which need to be addressed very urgently and very pro-

118 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016

 “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

foundly. China’s debt— public and private debt combined—could, according to

The Economist, already amount to close to 300% of the country’s GDP32—not
necessarily the strongest position from which to “reward” or “punish” those
who are and who are not playing by China’s rules in the years ahead. To be
sure, there are Chinese policymakers and scholars who are—in contradiction of
Beijing’s policymakers declare—warning of a Chinese “imperial overstretch”
and arguing that Beijing is already overplaying its foreign policies hand
harming its own political and economic interests.33 China is indeed faced with
enormous economic and social problems and very assertive foreign policy talk
and action is probably also meant to distract from the country’s economic ills.
Xi Jinping’s “strong-man” behavior, his grandiose rhetoric associated with the
“Chinese Dream” and his very assertive at times belligerent warnings to the
West and anybody else about not interfering in any of the country’s domestic
and foreign policies are not necessarily a sign of self-confidence and strength
but rather the opposite: a sign of insecurity and deep-seated concerns that the
Chinese people could, as they did on Tiananmen Square in 1989, turn against
the government and the state should the state not be able to provide the people
with the kind of public goods it promised the Chinese people: economic growth
accompanied by prosperity in the framework of what is also referred to as the
“grand bargain” between the Communist Party and the Chinese people: economic
prosperity, the right to consume and become rich in return for not daring to chal-
lenge the monopoly of power of the Communist Party. To the outside observer it
seems that the more Xi and like-minded policymakers talk tough and conduct
megaphone diplomacy warning others not to meddle with the country’s internal
and external affairs, the more insecure the leadership seems to feel today.
Chinese policymakers and scholars of course strongly beg to differ and typically
react very defensively when confronted with Western assessments of how
unstable and insecure the Chinese leadership and/or the Communist Party
seems to be.34 Indeed, Beijing usually refers to such critical analyses of the
state and the Chinese leadership’s control over China and the Chinese people as
unfounded and “malicious” speculations and Western attempts to drive a
“wedge” between the leadership and the Chinese people.

Not knowing anything about China

As mentioned above, China itself cannot find anything aggressive about any of its
regional foreign and security policies. It is—at least from its own perspective—
merely reclaiming what has belonged to China since “ancient times.” In fact,
there is very little (if any) room for negotiations with China about whom disputed
territories in Asia belong to, even if Beijing continues to insist that it is—at least in
principle and strictly on a bilateral basis—prepared to talk to other claimant

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 23, N UMBER 2 119

Axel Berkofsky

countries about conflicting territorial claims. However, there are no indications

whatsoever that Beijing is prepared to seriously negotiate on ownership of and
sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea: as defined in the
above-mentioned “Nine-Dash Line” Chinese ownership of the South China Sea
is a fait accompli as far as Beijing is concerned leaving one wondering what
exactly is there left to discuss, bilaterally or multilaterally. In the meantime,
and in an obvious attempt to avoid admitting that disputed territories are really dis-
puted as opposed to belonging to China come what may, the Chinese (U.S.-based)
scholar Zheng Wang, who—like many other Chinese scholars, too—talks about
“misperceptions” between China and some of its neighbors over sovereignty
issues.35 “Misperceptions,” however, is arguably only one way of putting it. Uni-
lateral territorial expansion in the South China Sea at the expense of militarily
weaker Southeast Asian countries is yet another and how many countries in South-
east Asia would see it. Explanations like those of Zheng Wang who de facto
argues that the West and Southeast Asia do not understand China, Chinese
history and the reasons why the disputed territories have always belonged to
China is what those who are faced with the dream’s not-so-dreamlike conse-
quences are usually confronted with. “Although outsiders almost always speak
of China’s “rise,” the Chinese like to refer to their impressive recent achievements
and future planned development as “rejuvenation” (“fuxing”). The use of that
word underscores an important point: the Chinese view their fortunes as a
return to greatness and not a rise from nothing. In fact, rejuvenation is deeply
rooted in Chinese history and the national experience, especially with regard to
the so-called “century of national humiliation” that began with the First Opium
War (1839–1842) and lasted through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in
1945. It seems inconceivable to the Philippines and Vietnam that China’s histori-
cal evidence of sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea should take pre-
cedence over modern international law. Consequently, these countries and others
perceive China’s claims and efforts to defend them as inherently aggressive, and
in turn demonstrate that China is a revisionist power,” Zheng Wang writes.
However, that is only one way of putting it —yet another would be to point out
that it seems to be inconceivable to China that modern international law takes pre-
cedence over historical evidence cited by Beijing and Beijing only. This in turn
suggests that for Beijing international law is irrelevant if it is conflict with its
own interpretation of history. Furthermore, what is very problematic from an
empirical and scientific point of view is the fact that China cites “evidence”
that is Chinese evidence and Chinese only. The maps China today refers to
were drafted by China and are not acknowledged as “evidence” of Chinese terri-
torial claims anywhere else outside of China. Put (very) bluntly: Chinese territorial
claims in Asia have been “dreamt up” in China and were inserted into the
“Chinese Dream.” Consequently, while a number of Southeast Asian countries

120 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016

 “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

would beg to differ (very strongly), the “Chinese Dream” is about getting back
what has always belonged to China. Zheng Wang therefore concludes (incor-
rectly) that China is a “status quo” power. “The Chinese see their country as a
status quo power whose actions are inherently defensive. From this perspective,
the Chinese are merely trying to protect their ancestral rights—as laid out in his-
torical documents—from the encroachment of others.” Xi Jinping’s ambitions, the
Chinese scholar Feng Zhang argues, do not stop there. “Xi isn’t content with
making China a great power in the region and beyond. He also wants to make
China the dominant power in key areas of Asia – Pacific regional relations.
Indeed, as a keen student of history, Xi may be trying to restore the role of
China in the contemporary East Asian system to its historical height during the
era of the Chinese empire (221 BC – 1911 AD).”36 The restoration of such an
Asian “master and servant system” is, from an Asian non-Chinese perspective,
arguably the very definition of a worst-case scenario for the rest of Asia if it
ever became reality.

And Europe?
Put simply, Europe and the EU have the luxury to observe the above-mentioned
results and consequences of the “Chinese Dream” from a safe enough distance.
The EU and its member states—like other like-minded countries and allies in
and outside of Asia—are left with the task of waiting and guessing what the
“Chinese Dream” will—other than and in addition to the above-mentioned
Chinese territorial expansionism—bring with it to the international community.
To be sure, the EU and its policymakers are like their counterparts in Southeast
Asia, Washington, and Tokyo undoubtedly aware of the above-mentioned gap
between the rhetoric and reality of the “Chinese Dream” and have—together
with, for example, Japan—over recent months become more outspoken about
Beijing’s very assertive and indeed aggressive foreign policies in general and
those related to territorial claims in the South China Sea in particular.
To be sure, those policymakers and scholars (like this author) who argue that
EU policies towards Beijing are too accommodating—above all due to European
business ties with and in China—would argue that EU talk is cheap and not the
same as adopting actual policies, whose impact would be felt negatively in
China (such as economic and/or political sanctions of various kinds and
degrees). While that might be true, it should not go unmentioned that the most
recent joint EU-Japan declaration on Asian security in general and Chinese terri-
torial policies in particular is in tone and contents fairly or indeed very clear when
identifying China as undoubtedly the main source of insecurity and tension in the
South China Sea. “We are concerned about the situation in the East and South
China Seas, and emphasize the fundamental importance of peaceful management

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 23, N UMBER 2 121

Axel Berkofsky

and settlement of disputes. We express our strong opposition to any intimidating,

coercive or provocative unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and
increase tensions, and urge all states to refrain from such actions as land reclama-
tions including large scale ones, building of outposts, as well as their use for mili-
tary purposes and to act in accordance with international law including the
principles of freedoms of navigation and overflight,”37 Brussels and Tokyo
jointly declared in Hiroshima in April 2016. Even if China is not explicitly men-
tioned in that statement, it is very clear that it is China’s unilateral territorial
expansionism what was meant when the statement speaks of “provocative unilat-
eral actions” as China is the only country that is unilaterally changing the territor-
ial status quo in Asian territorial waters. However, that statement has not—at least
not to the present date—been followed-up by any joint EU-Japan policies aimed at
deterring China from unilaterally expanding its territories in the South China Sea
and it continues to remain very unlikely that this will change in the near future.
While policymakers in both Europe and Japan still shy away from following-up
on joint declarations with joint actual security policies aimed at deterring and
checking on Chinese territorial expansionism, a number of scholars and analysts
have over recent years indeed suggested38 that China’s military rise and its very
assertive and indeed aggressive policies related to territorial claims in the East
and South Chinas could or indeed should lead to increased EU-Japan hard security
cooperation. That however has not happened yet even if some EU members
recently (such as France during the most recent IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Sin-
gapore in June 2016) called on fellow European countries to at least consider coor-
dinated European patrolling activities in the South China Sea.39 However,
suggesting such joint patrol activities is one thing, and deciding to do the actual
patrolling quite another as it turned out. Indeed, judging by EU reactions to the
French proposal for joint European patrolling in the South China Sea, it
remains indeed very unlikely that there will be efforts to actively consider the
possibility of coordinated European patrolling activities in the South China Sea
any time soon. The possibility of any joint European patrolling in the South
China Sea was not—at least on the official record—discussed among EU policy-
makers over recent months, and a number of EU policymakers interviewed by this
author did indeed exclude the possibility of joint European patrolling activities in
the South China Sea any time soon.40 Nonetheless, from a geopolitical and stra-
tegic point of view the possibilities of coordinated European patrolling comple-
mented by or leading to then EU-Japan joint patrolling in the South China Sea
(parallel and/or complementary to joint US-Japan patrolling in the South China
Sea has in the recent past been discussed as option to increase US-Japan security
cooperation) could and indeed should be considered a possibility if Brussels and
Tokyo decided to follow-up on the above-mentioned statements with actual pol-
icies. In other words: if European member states one day decided to jointly

122 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016

 “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

patrol the South China Sea, there is from a geopolitical or realpolitik point of view
no reason why Brussels and Tokyo could or should not opt for joint EU-Japan
patrol mission in support of the US and patrolling in the South China Sea.
In sum, EU influence on Chinese foreign and security policy behavior is very
limited and indeed non-existent, and Brussels and its EU member states continue
to be accused of avoiding to confront Beijing in view of its trade and business
interests with and in China. The US and Japan have equally significant trade
and investment ties with and in China, but have (far) less difficulty pointing to
what is and what is not acceptable in terms of Chinese foreign and security pol-
icies. To be sure, aggressive Chinese regional policies impact Washington and
Tokyo more than Europe, but geographical distance should not be used as an
excuse not to be more outspoken and assertive, at least not from an institution
(the EU), which claims to have a role in and impact on Asian security.

Conclusions
From a Chinese perspective, the US military presence in East Asia in general and
the US “Pivot to Asia” announced in 2011 in particular are standing in the way of
China achieving regional political and military supremacy, which—as has been
concluded above—appears to be the core part of the “Chinese Dream.” If China
perceives itself to be the subject of US containment policies accompanied by
the strengthening of Washington’s security and military with decades-old allies
(such as Japan and South Korea) and the development of new defense ties with
countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, and India,41 then the realiz-
ation of the “Chinese Dream” is also a response to perceived US containment and
to what Beijing refers to as “encirclement” by the US and its allies. To be sure and
in fairness it remains yet to be seen whether the “Chinese Dream” is the concep-
tual basis for China to establish itself as a permanent revisionist power aiming to
remodel the global order or whether Beijing will content itself with remaining a
status quo power.42 Indeed, much of what the “Chinese Dream” will and will
not entail will have to emerge and become (much) clearer in the years ahead.
For now, however, it is fair to conclude that the “Chinese Dream”—a “peaceful”
concept according to Beijing’s aforesaid explanation—has not stood in the way of
Chinese not-so-peaceful policies related to territorial claims in the East and South
China Seas. To Western ears, the “Chinese Dream” concept sounds—like many
other slogans of Chinese domestic and external policies over the decades—
“awkward” and indeed in short supply of tangible contents. No small wonder,
China scholars would point out: the slogan is meant mostly for domestic consump-
tion and is therefore difficult to grasp and understand for foreign ears. As men-
tioned above, Western scholars and policymakers often find themselves
confronted with Chinese accusations of not being able to “understand” China,

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 23, N UMBER 2 123

Axel Berkofsky

its history, culture, and everything else about China if and when Western scholars
and policymakers point out that slogans like the “Chinese Dream” very little in a
Western context. Indeed, accusing non-Chinese scholars and policymakers of
ignorance and inability to understand China continues to remain an important
Chinese “defense mechanism” against Western criticism, finger-pointing, and
more generally Western “interference” in China’s internal affairs. However,
China’s “non-interference” policy has gradually been transformed over the past
years, due to China’s ever deeper involvement in the global economy, making
it more difficult for Beijing to stick to Deng’s above-mentioned “Hide and
Bide” paradigm.43 Consequently, against that it is probably only secondary
whether the “Chinese Dream” entails “instructions” to modify, adjust, or indeed
overcome the “principle of non-interference”: China’s increasingly global econ-
omic and political interests make sure that changes to the “non-interference prin-
ciple” are—with or without a “Chinese Dream”—inevitable and underway
already.

Notes
1
Who is also Secretary-General of the China’s Communist Party (CCP) and
commander-in-chief of the country’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The
commander-in-chief title was added in 2016.
2
Also referred to as “China Dream” in the literature.
3
Xi was appointed See also An Uneasy Friendship; in: The Economist May
9, 2015; http://www.economist.com/news/china/21650566-crisis-
ukraine-drawing-russia-closer-china-relationship-far-equal
4
See Nathan, Andrew J., Tai Ting Cheung, Xi Jinping’s New Military
Position; China File, Asia Society May 1, 2016; www.chinafile.com/
conversation/xi-jinpings-new-military-position
5
China’s budget for internal security is slightly higher than the for external
security, i.e. the defense budget.
6
Indeed, non-Chinese analysts and scholars’ criticism is more often than
not dismissed as a product of ignorance and the lack of knowledge on
Chinese history and culture.
7
Chinese scholars are de facto obliged to “defend” Chinese foreign and
security against foreign “interference” and criticism when speaking on
the record during e.g. public events such as conferences or seminars
inside and outside China. The pressure exerted onto Chinese scholars has
rendered discussions and debates on Chinese domestic and foreign
policies often fruitless and repetitive as scholars merely repeat and
confirm the official opinion. Private conversations, the scholar Minxin Pei
argues in the below-cited article, however, can reveal a very different
picture: Chinese intellectual and business elites are very concerned about
the political and economic future and prospects in view of the many
problems and contradictions on Chinese domestic and foreign agendas.

124 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016

 “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

8
In essence the fact that aggressive Chinese policies related to territorial
claims in the East and South China Seas have an inevitable impact on how
other countries perceive China and its policies. U.S.-based China Minxin
Pei argues that the country’s political leaders could indeed not be aware
that Chinese policies related to territorial claims in the South China Sea
could be setting the country on an inevitable “collision course” with the
U.S. as he put it; for details see Pei, Minxin, Why China’s Elites Worry
about the Country’s Future; in: Nikkei Asian Review August 11, 2016.
9
This author – like many other non-Chinese scholars and analysts – has
witnessed such type of exchanges with Chinese interlocutors many times
over the last 3-4 years, which made sure that dialogue with Chinese
interlocutors on “sensitive issues” (from a Chinese perspective in essence
anything and everything in domestic and foreign policies which in
Beijing’s view must be free from outside “interference”) ended in
controversy with no results.
10
Estimates on how many Chinese people fell victim to the “Great Leap
Froward” and the “Cultural Revolution” vary significantly and almost
needless to say that Beijing itself has never published any official figures
on the number of casualties. Indeed, the “Great Leap Forward” and the
“Cultural Revolution” continue to remain taboo issues and it was Deng
himself who proclaimed the so-called infamous “70-30 percent
formula”—in almost complete denial of historical facts, Deng decided
(for the rest of the Chinese people) that 70 percent of what Mao has done
during his 30-year old tenure was “good” and only 30 percent “bad.”
11
Beijing continues to refer to the events in Beijing in May and June as
“disturbances” and a sort of foreign-sponsored conspiracy to tumble the
regime. Indeed, Beijing continues to falsify its own contemporary history
with potentially disastrous consequences. Consequences which Edmund
Burke described as “Those who don’t know their history are doomed to
repeat it.”
12
In Chinese: Taoguang yanghui, bu dang tou, yousuo zuoweo.
13
Shambaugh argues that the slogan neither featured in Deng’s speeches
nor was published in Deng’s book “Selected Works.” Instead, Deng only
once during his so-called “Southern Tour” in 1992 announced that “We
will only become a big political power if we keep a low profile and work
hard for some years, and then we will have more weight in international
affairs.” See Shambaugh, David, China Goes Global. The Partial Power;
Oxford University Press New York 2013, p. 18/19
14
See e.g. Duchâtel, Mathieu, Bräuner, Oliver, Hang, Zhou, Protecting
China’s Overseas Interests-The Slow Shift from Non-Interference; SIPRI
Policy Paper 41; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
June 2014; http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP41.pdf
15
See e.g. Godement, Francois, The End of Non-Interference?; China
Analysis, The European Council on Foreign Relations/Asia Centre October
2013; http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_Analysis_The_End_of_Non_
interference_October2013.pdf; See also Duchâtel, Mathieu, Bräuner,
Oliver, Hang, Zhou, Protecting China’s Overseas Interests-The Slow Shift

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 23, N UMBER 2 125

Axel Berkofsky

from Non-Interference; SIPRI Policy Paper 41; Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) June 2014 http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/
SIPRIPP41.pdf
16
Not to mention East Asian countries such as Japan or South Korea
17
See Rocking Boats, Shaking Mountains; in: The Economist May 28, 2016
18
“More or less” only as Beijing’s authorities have over the last 18 months
not shied away from abducting and unlawfully detaining Hong Kong
citizens (e.g. booksellers) for allegedly having violated Chinese law. Their
“real crime”, however, was their decision to sell and distribute books
critical of Xi Jinping and his policies.
19
Some of whom were voted into Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo),
Hong Kong’s 70-seat strong parliament (only 35 of the 70 seats are
directly elected by Hong Kong’s roughly 3.8 million registered voters,
while 30 seats, the so-called “functional constituencies”, are elected by
representatives of various professions. These representatives are typically
pro-Beijing and represent only 6 percent of Hong Kong’s population.
Further 5 seats are chosen by other “functional constituencies” (the so-
called “Super Seats”).
20
Between 2007 and 2013.
21
See Yang, Jiechi, Implementing the Chinese Dream; in: The National
Interest September 10, 2013; http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/
implementing-the-chinese-dream-9026?page=3
22
Indeed, long before Xi’s “Chinese Dream” became part of the official
Chinese foreign policy rhetoric, Beijing’s decision to again use the term
“Middle Kingdom” created anxiety among Southeast Asian policymakers
and scholars. The concept of China as the “Middle Kingdom” today
implies for Southeast Asian countries that China is the political, economic
centre of the region, while Southeast Asia finds itself again existing at the
“periphery” of the Chinese Empire, confined to a “vassal state” status
23
Generally referred to as the “mouthpiece” of China’s Communist Party;
the newspaper is run and owned by the Communist Party.
24
Liu, Zhenyu, I have a Dream, a Chinese Dream; in: The Diplomat January
12, 2014; http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/i-have-a-dream-a-chinese-
dream/. This author is of the opinion that the Diplomat’s decision to
accept and publish the above-mentioned article by Liu has not necessarily
increased the newspaper’s credibility and quality. While fully and
unconditionally acknowledging and embracing the principle of freedom
of speech, the above-mentioned article is hardly more than the repetition
and divulgation of Chinese government propaganda.
25
Various interviews this author conducted with Chinese ministry officials
and policymakers in 2014 and 2015 confirm this.
26
See Shi, Ting, Tweed, David, Xi Jinping Outlines “Big Country Diplomacy”
for China; in: The Sydney Moring Herald December 2, 2014; http://www.
smh.com.au/world/xi-jinping-outlines-big-country-diplomacy-for-china-
20141202-11yaj5.html
27
Panda, Ankit, Vietnam Slams Chinese Naval Drill in South China Sea; in:
The Diplomat July 27, 2015; http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/vietnam-

126 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016

 “The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

slams-chinese-naval-drill-in-south-china-sea/; also Watkins, Derek, What

China has been Building in the South China Sea; in: The New York Times
February 29, 2016; http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/
world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea-2016.
html?_r=0; Who Rules the Waves; in: The Economist, October 17th, 2015;
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21674648-china-no-
longer-accepts-america-should-be-asia-pacifics-dominant-naval-power-
who-rules
28
See Yun Sun, China-Russia Relations: Alignment without Alliance; PacNet
#67; CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies October 7, 2015;
https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-67-china-russia-relations-
alignment-without-alliance
29
Chasing the Chinese Dream in: The Economist May 4, 2013; http://www.
economist.com/news/briefing/21577063-chinas-new-leader-has-been-
quick-consolidate-his-power-what-does-he-now-want-his
30
From Tsinghua University of Beijing. Yan is known for being an outspoken
scholar and commentator with nationalist and anti-West/anti-U.S.
tendencies.
31
The full debate can be accessed on YouTube at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=wBrA2TDcNto
32
The Coming Debt Bust; in: The Economist May 7, 2016; http://www.
economist.com/news/leaders/21698240-it-question-when-not-if-real-
trouble-will-hit-china-coming-debt-bust
33
This author’s off the record interviews with Chinese scholars in Beijing in
2015 confirm that
34
A case in point is the American China scholar David Shambaugh, who in
2015 made himself unpopular among many Chinese scholars and
policymakers when he concluded (in, among others, the Wall Street
Journal) that Beijing’s very assertive domestic and foreign policies are also
a result of an insecure political leadership.
35
Zheng, Wang, Not Rising, But Rejuvenating: The "Chinese Dream"; in: The
Diplomat February 5, 2013; http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/chinese-
dream-draft/
36
See Feng, Zhang, Xi Jinping’s Real Chinese Dream: An “Imperial” China?;
in: The National Interest September 18, 2015; http://nationalinterest.org/
blog/the-buzz/xi-jinpings-real-chinese-dream-imperial-china-13875
37
See European External Action Service (EEAS) G7 Foreign Ministers’
Statement on Maritime Security April 11, 2016 Hiroshima, Japan http://
eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2016/160411_05_en.htm.
38
Including this author.
39
See e.g. Roman, David, France to Push for Coordinated EU Patrols in
South China Sea; Bloomberg News June 5, 2016; http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2016-06-05/france-to-push-for-coordinated-eu-
patrols-in-south-china-sea; 2016 in Hiroshima was not the first time that
Brussels and Tokyo expressed joint opposition to Chinese territorial
expansionism. “We continue to observe the situation in the East and
South China Sea and are concerned by any unilateral actions that change

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 23, N UMBER 2 127

Axel Berkofsky

the status quo and increase tensions. We support the full and effective
implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea and the rapid conclusion of the negotiations to establish
an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. We highlight the
constructive role of practical confidence-building measures, such as the
establishment of direct links of communication in cases of crisis and crisis
management mechanisms in this regard”, Tokyo and Brussels jointly
declared in 2015; see European Commission Fact Sheet-23rd Japan-EU
Summit, Tokyo, 29 May 2015 Joint Press Statement; http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5075_en.htm.
40
Indeed, several EU policymakers have in conversations with this author in
June and July 2016 downplayed the significance and relevance of the
French idea for joint European patrolling in the South China Sea.
41
For details on the contents and objectives see e.g. Campbell, Kurt,
Andrews, Brian, Explaining the US Pivot to Asia; Chatham House August
2013; https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/
Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf
42
See Li, Xing, Interpreting and Understanding “The Chinese Dream” in a
Holistic Nexus; in: Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 8
(4) 2015, pp. 515-520 http://vbn.aau.dk/files/218980898/Fudan_Journal_
2015.pdf
43
See e.g. Qin Liwen, Securing the “China Dream”: What Xi Jinping Wants
to Achieve with the National Security Commission (NSC); China Monitor
Number 4, February 28, 2014; Mercator Institute for China Studies
(MERICS) Berlin, Germany; http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/
download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_4.pdf

About the author

Axel Berkofsky is Professor at the University of Pavia, Italy and Senior Associate
Research Fellow at the Milan-based Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale
(ISPI). Axel Berkofsky is also Executive Committee Board Member at the Stock-
holm-based European Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN), Senior
Advisor at the Brussels-based EU-Asia Centre. Previously, Dr. Berkofsky was
Senior Policy Analyst and Associate Policy Analyst at the Brussels-based European
Policy Centre (EPC), Research Fellow at the Brussels-based European Institute for
Asian Studies (EIAS). Axel Berkofsky has published more than 200 papers, articles
and essays in journals, newspapers and magazines and has lectured and taught at
numerous think tanks, research institutes and universities in Europe and Asia. His
research interests are amongst others Japanese and Chinese foreign and security pol-
icies, Asian security and EU-Asia relations.

128 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V 2016