Except for Palestine: China, the BRI, and Peace through Development

On May 16, 2021, amid renewed violence in Gaza following the expulsion of Palestinian

families from East Jerusalem neighborhood Sheikh Jarrah, Chinese foreign Minister Wang Yi

released a statement calling for peace between Israel and Palestine and a solution to “the

Palestinian question.” During the press conference, Yi reiterated the official rhetoric of China

towards Palestine and Israel, advocating for a two-state solution and the establishment of an

independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital based on borders established after

the 1967 war.1 This response to the violence repeated past Chinese policies, laid out in official

documents such as the 2016 Arab Policy Paper. Further, the support for the two-state solution

was the fourth point of the Chinese Four-Point Peace Plan, officially released in 2013.2 While

rhetorically supportive through official statements and high-level meetings, the Chinese have

abandoned the Palestinian cause materially, rather turning their efforts towards Israel and in

effect supporting the occupation of Palestine.

The Chinese stance towards Palestine today comes in stark contrast to the past. In 1970,

former leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian President Yasser

Arafat argued China was, “… the biggest influence in supporting our revolution and

strengthening its perseverance.”3 The same year, George Habbash, leader of the Popular Front

for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) stated, “Our best friend is China.”4 These famous

Palestinian revolutionaries were referencing Chinese rhetorical, diplomatic, and material support

for the Palestinian cause, largely through arms deals.

1
Xinhua, “China puts forward four-point proposal regarding Palestine-Israel conflict,” XinhuaNet, May 17, 2021.
2
Guy Burton, “China, Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Middle East Institute, February 20, 2018.
3
Lillian Craig Harris, “China’s Relations with the PLO,” Journal of Palestine Studies 7, no. 1 (1977), 123.
4
Ibid.
2

This paper seeks to compare the historical Chinese material support for Palestine which

has shifted to rhetoric supporting peace and an independent Palestinian state with almost no

material backing. More specifically, it will address the current Chinese stance towards Palestine

through the analytical lens of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which Kamel identifies as, “…

a comprehensive long-term strategic project that seeks to integrate Asia, Europe, the Middle East

and Africa through a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and a Maritime Silk Road.”5 This

broad development initiative will be analyzed alongside the Chinese Communist Party’s peace

through development strategy. According to Ding and Cheng, China hopes to use the BRI to

increase development in the greater Middle East, including Palestine, to end turmoil and create

peace and stronger governance.6 To better understand Chinese engagement with Palestine today,

it is crucial to look at Chinese development, or the lack thereof, in Palestine, and understand

what this suggests about China-Palestine relations.

This paper will begin with a brief review of the existing literature on relations between

China and Palestine. Next, it will look at historical Chinese support for the Palestine Liberation

Organization through diplomacy and arms transfers. Finally, it will compare this historical

material support to the lack of BRI development in Palestine recently, arguing China has largely

ended its material support for the Palestinians, shifting instead to strong material support for

Israel and, in effect, abandoning the Palestinian cause it once fought for.

Other scholars of Chinese engagement with the Middle East have addressed questions of

China’s relations with Palestine and the Palestinian cause. Cooley approaches the topic

historically, analyzing the shift in China’s priority from Maoist ideology to international interest,

measured through historical material and diplomatic support to the Palestine Liberation
5
Maha S. Kamel, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East,” Cambridge Review of
International Affairs 31, no. 1 (2018), 76.
6
Jun Ding and Hongjin Cheng, “China’s Proposition to Build a Community of Shared Future for Making and
Middle East Governance,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 4 (2017), 11.
3

Organization.7 Harris takes a similar approach, outlining China-PLO relations into three time

periods from 1965 to 1977 and demonstrating the shift from active support to a cooling off after

the defeat of the PLO in Jordan in 1971.8 Rabkin highlights the role Israeli weaponry played in

attracting the Chinese towards a closer relationship with Israel, thus hurting Chinese support for

the Palestinian cause.9

While most of the scholarly literature focuses on the historical relationship between

China and Palestine, a new body of literature is arising to fill the gap. For example, Burton

analyzes Palestinian opinions of China through public polling taken by the Pew Research Center,

concluding new projects under the Belt and Road Initiative are unlikely to resolve the real

political and economic issues which Palestinians face.10 Importantly, Burton’s analysis takes a

people-level approach, moving beyond the PLO-centered scholarship from other scholars. This

research will compliment Burton’s analysis and help to fill the gap in understanding of

contemporary Sino-Palestinian relations. Through analysis of China’s Belt and Road Initiative,

the existing literature will be expanded through an understanding of China’s peace through

development strategy as it pertains to Palestine.

Historical Relations Between China and Palestine

An understanding of present relations between China and Palestine is incomplete without

an overview of the strong historical relationship between the two. In 1965, China became the

first major world power to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative

7
John K. Cooley, “China and the Palestinians,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 2 (1972), 30-31.
8
Harris, “China’s Relations with the PLO,” 124.
9
Yakov M. Ramkin, “Russia, China and India and the Israel-Palestine Conflict,” Holy Land Studies 12, no .1
(2013), 15.
10
Guy Burton, “How do Palestinians perceive China’s rise?” in China’s Presence in the Middle East: The
Implications of the One Belt, One Road Initiative, ed. by Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Niv Horesh, London:
Routledge (2017): 170.
4

of what they recognized as a Palestinian nation.11 Harris identifies two important reasons which

led China to pursue support for the Palestinian cause. First, Chinese foreign policy under Mao

Zedong stressed a staunch anti-imperialist ideology.12 This ideology stems directly from China’s

history with colonial powers and imperial manipulation prior to the founding of the PRC.

Because of this history, Mao Zedong supported anti-colonial struggles around the Arab world,

becoming one of the staunchest supporters of the Algerian anti-colonial struggle against the

French in the 1950s.13 In Palestine, China saw Israel as not only a colonial power, but more

importantly as an extension of American imperialism into the Middle East. When a PLO

delegation visited Peking in 1965, Mao Zedong stated:

Imperialism is afraid of China and of the Arabs. Israel and Formosa are bases of imperialism in
Asia. You [the Palestinians] are the gate of the great continent and we are the rear. They created
Israel for you, and Formosa for us. Their goal is the same.14

This quotation exemplifies the anti-imperialist stance which drew Maoist foreign policy to

Palestine. Importantly, Harris argues this seemingly ideological stance is still based in self-

interest, because China hoped this anti-imperialist foreign policy would improve its image

throughout the third world.15

Along with taking a stand against imperialism in West Asia, Chinese support for the

Palestinians stems from the Sino-Soviet split. Harris argues Palestinians were a direct target of

Chinese propaganda efforts aiming to weaken the view of the Soviet Union around the Middle

East.16 The Chinese saw the Soviets not only as competition for influence in the Middle East, but

as a state attempting to “tie the hands” of people in Arab countries.17 For these reasons, the

11
Harris, “China’s Relations with the PLO,” 127.
12
Ibid.
13
Cooley, “China and the Palestinians,” 22.
14
Harris, “China’s Relations with the PLO,” 127.
15
Ibid, 125.
16
Harris, “China and the PLO,” 146.
17
Ibid.
5

Chinese were keen to court Palestinian liberation movements in an effort to prevent them from

falling into the Soviet camp.

Chinese support for the Palestinians came both in the form of rhetoric, diplomatic

support, and arms transfers to Palestinian fighters. Cooley argues Chinese rhetoric contributed to

the verbal escalation that ultimately led to the 1967 war.18 For example, as Egyptian troops

moved into the Sinai and Palestinians rallied in Gaza, the Peking-based People’s Daily published

a story stating ten thousand Chinese were rallying in Peking in support of the Arab people and

the Palestinians.19 Further, the night before the war began, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai sent

messages of support to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, PLO Chairman Ahmed

Shuqairy, and Syrian President Noureddine al-Attassi.20

Along with rhetoric, the Chinese expressed support for the Palestinians through high

level diplomatic meetings. Initially, China welcomed a delegation of the PLO headed by Ahmed

Shuqairy in 1965.21 According to Cooley, Shuqairy’s visit was reminiscent of one the Chinese

would put forth for a head of state.22 The PLO delegation was met by both Mao Zedong and

Zhou Enlai, and China recognized Rashid Jarbou as an appointed envoy from Palestine,

amounting to formal diplomatic recognition of a Palestinian nation.23 Five years later, the

Chinese welcomed Fatah leader and chairman of the PLO Yasser Arafat in another high level

diplomatic visit.24 The Chinese diplomatic support for the PLO was important, as the group was

not receiving support nor recognition from major allies of Israel like the United States.

18
Cooley, “China and the Palestinians,” 27.
19
Ibid, 27.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid, 24.
22
Ibid.
23
Cooley, “China and the Palestinians,” 24.
24
Ibid, 26.
6

Finally, Chinese support for Palestine came in the form of material support through

weapons and training to various Palestinian guerilla groups charged with resisting the Israeli

occupation and Arab armies such as the Jordanians during Black September. The Chinese

military trained Palestinians in China at the Whampoa Military Academy, and Chinese

instructors traveled to Syria, Algeria, and Jordan to meet with Palestinian fighters.25 In 1966,

Ahmed Shuqairy publicly stated at a meeting in Gaza that the Chinese were training guerilla

groups.26 Along with training, weapons were transported from China through intermediaries to

Palestinians around the region. For example, China flew arms to Jordan during the 1970 civil

war, known as Black September, using Albanian cargo planes which landed at Palestinian

controlled airstrips outside of Amman.27 According to Israeli estimates, China sent $5 million in

arms to Palestinian fighter groups between just 1965 and 1969.28

While China’s history with the Palestinians under Mao Zedong was based on diplomatic,

rhetorical, and military support, there were also significant problems in the relationship that must

be considered. After providing support during Black September, the Chinese were very

disappointed by the PLO’s defeat to the Jordanian army.29 Further, the Chinese faced

disagreements with the Palestinians over the use of international terrorism by groups such as

George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and its airplane hijackings in the

1970s.30 Finally, the Chinese expressed anger towards what they viewed as Palestinian disunity.

In 1971, Zhou Enlai told a group of Arab journalists, “We suggest- and hope- that Palestinian

organizations merge in one genuine unity,” hoping to mirror what he saw as unity amongst the

25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Harris, “China’s Relations with the PLO,” 135.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid, 138.
30
Harris, “China’s Relations with the PLO,” 130.
7

Chinese Communist Party.31 It is important to understand the China-Palestine relationship was

not perfect, but the diplomatic and material support China provided to the PLO comes in stark

contrast to present day relations between the two.

The Belt and Road Initiative and Peace Through Development

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative, a broad

economic development plan seeking to promote cooperation between China and host states

through policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and

increased people-to-people bonds.32 The Middle East and North Africa are an integral part of the

BRI, serving as a gateway to both the Mediterranean and Europe. Ding and Cheng argue the

economic integration initiatives are directly tied to China’s vision for a global community, citing

President Xi Jinping’s speech at the United Nations Office at Geneva where he states:

We should strengthen coordination and improve governance so as to ensure sound growth of

economic globalization and make it open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all. We should
both make the cake bigger and share it fairly to ensure justice and equity.33

This rhetoric suggests the Chinese promote development initiatives around regions like the

Middle East equally, but the case of Palestine challenges this notion. Further, Ding and Cheng

cite the president’s speech to the Arab League in 2016, where he argued development was the

key to ending turmoil and promoting peace in the Middle East.34 Citing his speech, they argue,

“China will not only serve as a peace builder but also a facilitator of development and

industrialization in the Middle East.”35 It is important to critically analyze this notion of ‘peace

through development’ through the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly to

study who is included and who is excluded. As one of China’s major foreign policy initiatives
31
Ibid, 131.
32
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, “Full Text: Visions and
actions on jointly building Belt and Road,” Xinhua, April 10, 2017.
33
Ding and Cheng, “China’s Proposition,” 6.
34
Ding and Cheng, “China’s Proposition,” 11.
35
Ibid.
8

since 2013, the BRI as an analytical lens provides insights into priorities within Chinese foreign

policy in the Middle East today.

If Chinese rhetoric in recent years pushes peace through development through the BRI,

Palestine does not seem to be a priority for peace in Chinese foreign policy. Writing in 2018,

Burton identifies $7.5 million in Chinese investment in Palestine under the BRI.36 According to

Xinhua, Palestinian business magnate Munib Al-Masri, chairman of the Palestine Development

and Investment Company, announced a plan in 2017 to increase development in the Gaza.37 The

announcement came after Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Economy Minister Abeer

Odeh met with a Chinese delegation from the Silk Road Chamber of Commerce.38 While

announced in 2017, there is no evidence that this project was completed at the time of writing.

Additionally, data from AIDDATA identifies Chinese pledges for an industrial zone in

Tarqumiya, Palestine, but there is no evidence that the project has progressed.39 This seems

consistent with the findings of Burton, who argues the BRI does, “not directly relate to the

challenges faced by Palestinians other than lip service paid by policymakers that the conflict

needs to be resolved.”40

Another way to analyze the lack of BRI investment into Palestine is through a

comparison with BRI projects in Israel. From the 2013 establishment of the BRI to today, China

has invested an estimated $10.96 billion into projects in Israel.41 These investments include

projects such a Chinese company taking over the port of Haifa, a Chinese company constructing

36
Burton, “China and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.”
37
Xinhua, “Palestinian tycoon to set up company in Gaza in support of China’s B&R Initiative,” XinhuaNet,
October 10, 2017.
38
Ibid.
39
AIDDATA, “China pledges support for Industrial Zone in Tarqumiya, Palestine,” AIDDATA: A Research Lab
William & Mary, accessed December 13, 2021.
40
Burton, “How do Palestinians perceive China?” 166.
41
American Enterprise Institute, “China Global Investment Tracker,” AEI, 2021.
9

sections of a light rail in Tel Aviv, and investments into Israeli telecommunications companies.42

Crucially, many of these projects will be completed in areas which Palestinians cannot access

due to life under Israeli military occupation. Even if completion of projects is not considered, the

proposed Chinese investment into Palestine is only a fraction of investment into Israel.

Along with investments and construction, the Belt and Road Initiative stresses the

importance of increased people-to-people bonds between Chinese people and host countries.

Between 2006 and 2020, China has increased these interactions in the Arab world through

Confucius Institutes, which offer Chinese language courses and present Chinese cultural

activities in host countries.43 While these institutions are found around the Arab world, and there

are even two located within Israel, there is not one in Palestine.44 Again, the majority of

Palestinians are barred from entering areas in Israel like West Jerusalem and Tel Aviv to access

the two Confucius institutes that exist there. Along with construction or investment, China

excludes Palestine from the people-to-people exchanges aspect of the BRI despite its rhetoric

about peace through development.

Explaining China’s Shift Away from Palestine

Using historical analysis and Chinese implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative in

Palestine, it seems China has shifted away from its staunch support for the Palestinians. There

are multiple possible explanations for this.

First, the shift away from Palestine in Chinese foreign policy is a direct result of China’s

growing relationship with Israel. Looking back to the 1970s, Harris argues China sought to

change its reputation in an attempt to gain membership to the United Nations, seeking to work

with established foreign governments like Israel rather than revolutionary movements like the
42
Sean Mathews, “China’s ties with Israel are tested by Gaza, but solely,” Al Jazeera, June 7, 2021.
43
Roie Yellinek, Yossi Mann, and Udi Lebel, “Chinese Soft-Power in the Arab world- China’s Confucius Institutes
as a central tool of influence,” Comparative Strategy 39, no. 6 (2020), 517.
44
Ibid, 523.
10

Palestinians.45 While weapons and material support to the Palestinians decreased in this period,

Chinese exports to Israel began to consistently increase between 1971 and 1974.46 In the 1980s,

the Chinese military began to work with Israeli companies to upgrade their military technology.47

Rabkin argues the security relationship has evolved to much more, including cooperation in

agriculture, solar energy, information and communications, and construction.48 Burton shows this

growing relationship has decreased economic opportunities between Palestine and China.49

The arms relationship has only expanded since. In 2011, a retired deputy chief of staff

and minister for home defense became the Israeli ambassador to China, demonstrating the

importance of the weapons trade.50 The same year, the first China-Israel Strategy and Security

Symposium took place in Israel.51 In 2017, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking

on China-Israel relations, stated, “I believe this is a marriage made in heaven.”52 While not a

historically significant, Israeli weapons sales to China, both from the government and private

firms, have transformed the Sino-Israeli relationship and moved China away from its close

relationship to the Palestinians. Significantly, the arms transfers at the heart of China-Israeli

relations come at the direct expense of Palestinians living under occupation, as they are subjected

to violence using weapons which can then be sold to China.

Along with its relationship with Israel, the Chinese shift away from the Palestinians may

be explained through its unwillingness to invest in areas which it deems risky. Writing on post-

civil war Syria, Burton, Lyall, and Pauley argue the Chinese fear risks of volatility and violence

45
Harris, “China’s Relations with the PLO,” 140.
46
Ibid, 154.
47
Rabkin, “Russia, China and India and the Israel-Palestine Conflict,” 13.
48
Ibid.
49
Burton, “How do Palestinians perceive China?” 163.
50
Rabkin, “Russia, China and India and the Israel-Palestine Conflict,” 14.
51
Ibid.
52
Mathews, “China’s ties with Israel.”
11

in postwar Syria, which prevents them from heavily committing to investments there.53 The same

wariness may be true in Palestine, where there is ongoing violence with the Israeli military as

recent as the May 2021 Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip and violence throughout cities in the

West Bank. In other words, Chinese companies may see Palestine as an ongoing conflict zone as

long as the Israeli occupation continues, preventing them from seeking projects there.

Conclusion

China’s relationship with Palestine is a marked shift from historical support to an

abandoning of the Palestinians in all but rhetoric. After diplomatic recognition of the Palestine

Liberation Organization in 1965 and high-level exchanges between top Palestinian leaders and

top officials from the Chinese Communist Party, the relationship evolved further through

weapons transfers to Palestinian fighter groups in their conflicts both with Israel and Arab host

states such as Jordan. This historical relationship is a profound change from present day

relations. Using the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s ‘peace through development’ strategy

as an analytical lens, it is clear China has abandoned the Palestinians, evident through its

minimal investment into Palestine compared with its high-profile investment into Israel. While

the BRI framework has resulted in billions in projects between Chinese and Israeli firms, there is

little to no evidence of significant projects in Palestine moving beyond the announcement phase.

This study faced a limitation in using BRI projects as its analytical tool. While this made

for an effective understanding of current dynamics between China, Palestine, and Israel, future

research should not overlook other methods of studying China’s relations with Palestine, such as

through an understanding of Chinese voting patterns at the United Nations Security Council.

53
Guy Burton, Nicholas Lyall, and Logan Pauley, “China and the Reconstruction of Syria,” The Middle East
Journal 75, no. 1 (2021), 69.
12

The implications of China’s shift away from Palestine are significant. Most importantly,

this shift has dire negative implications for the Palestinian people, both because they are missing

out on significant development projects through the BRI and because both China and Israel are

benefiting from weapons sales which are only strengthened by the ongoing military occupation.

More broadly, it seems Chinese firms will remain wary of investment in zones of conflict such as

Palestine or Syria, despite rhetoric about pursing peace through development. In Palestine, China

has prioritized its national interests over those of Palestinians suffering under occupation,

abandoning its once revolutionary stance.

Word Count (Excludes Footnotes): 3049

13

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