THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO POWER POLITICS OF CONFUCIAN CHINA VOLUME ONE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCI IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, BY YUAN-KANG WANG CHICAGO, ILLINOIS DECEMBER 2001UMI Number: 3029546 Copyright 2001 by Wang, Yuan-kang All rights reserved. UMI ‘UMI Microform 3029546 Copyright 2002 by Bell & Howell information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O, Box 1348 ‘Ann Arbor, MI 48108-1346Copyright © 2001 by Yuan-kang Wang All rights reservedTo My ParentsTABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME ONE List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgements Abstract —- ‘Chapter One: Introduction ‘The Central Question The Central Argument Importance of the Study ~ Why Study China’ Methodology of the Study - Roadmap Chapter Two: Explaining Aggressive Behavior ~- Cultural Approaches Confucian Pacifism Cultural Realism -- Structural Explanations Defensive Realism ~ Offensive Realism ~ Research Design Chapter Three: The Multi-State System Of Medieval Chin: ‘The Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127) Building a Confucian State ‘The Threat Environment ~ ‘The Northern Han Campaign ‘The Decision to Use Force Expansion of War Aim Continuing Conflicts with the Liao ~ The Decision to Use Force The Liao Empire Strikes Back The Shift to Defensive Posture The Final Showdown -- Court Debate The Negotiation ‘The Treaty of Shanyuan The Long Peace Alliance Politics of Medieval China ivThe Rise of the Tanguts The Proclamation of the Xi Xia Dynasty ~ Liao Extortion Peace with Xi Xia ~ The Song-Xi Xia War of 1081-1085 Internal Balancing ~ The Decision to Use Force Alliance with the Jin Rise of the Jurchens 10 Alliance Opportunity ul ‘The Demise of the Liao 13 Hegemonic War Conclusion — Chapter Four: The Multi-State System Of Medieval Chin: ‘The Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279) Establishment of the Southern Song Regime Song Counteroffensive ‘The Peace Negotiation The Peace of 1138 Outbreak of War The Decision to Sue for Peace Jurchen Invasion ~ Song Offensive of 1206-1208 The Decision to Use Force ‘The Rise of the Mongols Resurgence of Song Revanchism The Mongol Conquest of China Conelusion Chapter Five: The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644): Enduring Rivalries With The Mongols The Balance of Power Confucianization of the Ming Bureaucracy PERIOD ONE (1368-1449): OFFENSIVE STRATEGY -- Early Relations with the Mongol: Establishing Regional Hegemony in East Asia Mongolian Campaigns The Beginning of Ming Decline Retraction of Defense Line Economic Causes Rise of Mongol Power The Tumu Debacle PERIOD TWO (1450-1548): PASSIVE DEFENSE ‘The Shift to Passive Defense vRecovering the Ordos, Round Two - ‘The Emergence of a Powerfull Mongol Leader Declining Ming Power The Debate - The Final Policy Outcome ~ PERIOD THREE (1549-1644): APPEASEMENT ‘The Difficulty of Making Compromise The Settlement of 1571 ~ Conelusion Chapter Six: The Ming Dynasty: The Myth Of The Tribute System —— Overview of the Tribute System Annexation of Vietnam (1407-1427) - A Righteous War Turned Conquest The Decision to Withdraw Maritime Expeditions (1405-1435) ~ Inner Asia (1473-1528) ~ Hami: China's Vassal on the Western Border Losing Control Rescuing Hami — Debate over the Recovery of Hami ‘The Korean War of 1592-1598 ~ A Model Tributary State Japanese Invasion ~ China Crosses the Yalu ~ ‘The Second Invasion Conclusion Chapter Seven: Conelusion ~ ‘The Evidence Roots of Aggression Theoretical Implications Policy Implications ~ Future Research Appendices: A: Map 5.1. Ming China’s Northern Defense~ B: Chinese Characters VOLUME TWO Selected Bibliography —-— viLIST OF FIGUI Figure 2.1: Competing Theories of Chinese Strategic Behaviors. Figure 3.1: Cumulative Frequencies of Conflict Initiation (960-1127) Figure 4.1: Cumulative Frequencies of Conflict Initiation (1127-1234) — Figure 5.1: The Balance of Power between the Ming and the Mongols Figure 5.2: Grain Production in Military Colonies (1403-1571) —- Figure 5.3: Cumulative Frequencies of Conflict Initiation (1368-1643) ~ Figure 5.4: Selected Strategy vis-a-vis the Balance of Power viiLIST OF TABLES Table 1.1: Major Periods in Imperial China Table 3.1: Origins of Mid-level Officials and Above-- Table 3.2: Song State Budget, 960-1059. Table 3.3: Itemized Tax Revenue (1004-1047) — ‘Table 3.4: Summary of Findings Table 4.1: Percentage of Troops Controlled by the Four Generals — Table 4.2: Summary of Findings Table 5.1: Degrees Held by Local Officials Table 5.2: Horse Population During the Reign of Emperor Yongle ~ Table 5.3: Soldier Shortage in the Nine Garrisons (1541) —-— Table 5.4. Military Expenditures from Central Treasury to Border Areas Table 5.5: Fiscal Situation of the Ming Treasury ‘Table 5.6: Summary of Findings viiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Like many other things in life, this dissertation would not have been possible had 1 not received encouragement and support from others. My deepest thanks go to my dissertation committee: John Mearsheimer, Charles Glaser, and Robert Pape. Mearsheimer encouraged me to ask an important question and present the argument in a clear, crisp manner, and was always ready to offer invaluable advice and critical comments, Glaser was generous in providing useful insights and critiques, and cheerfully responded to my requests for help. Pape spent many hours with me over cofive discussing my dissertation and helped me sharpen the argument. Through their advice and examples, my committee members set up a standard of rigorous scholarship that I aspire to meet. The University of Chicago provided a stimulating intellectual environment that nurtured me, I was fortunate to have the company of excellent faculty members and inquisitive graduate students. I particularly thank Alexander Wendt for his thoughtful comments and suggestions. I also thank my fellow graduate students for valuable feedback and advice. Kathy Anderson provided first-class administrative support, to which I'm very grateful. Parts of this dissertation were presented at the Program on Intemational Security Policy (PISP), the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES), both at the University of Chicago, the Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs (MCAA),and the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). I thank the participants, especially Jeffrey Hart, Takayuki Nishi, Kenneth Klinkner, and Changhe Su, for their helpful comments. Financial supports greatly alleviated the anxiety of my graduate study. A three-year fellowship from Taiwan's Ministry of Education allowed me to pursue expensive graduate studies in the United States. 1 also thank the University of Chicago, the Andrew Mellon Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation, for providing generous financial supports, Assistance from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) at Harvard University permitted me to finish my dissertation, While growing up in Taiwan, I received education in Chinese history and classical Chinese (wenyanwen). Although at that time I did not understand why I had to learn that condensed form of writing and memorize the Confucian classics, as the dissertation progressed, I began to appreciate the value of my early education, For that reason, I owe a debt of gratitude to the many teachers who taught me how to read and write classical Chinese and opened my mind to the various events in Chinese history. And above all else, I thank my wife, Chien-Juh, for her love and unqualified support ‘A sociologist who believes that all reality is socially constructed, her constant quips make our life intellectually stimulating and fun. Finally, gratefully acknowledging their continued support and faith in me, I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Yung-hsiang and Ming-chiao.ABSTRACT The central question of this di sertation is: To what extent does culture influence the aggressive behaviors of states? Empirically, 1 examine Imperial China’s military policy during the Song (960-1279) and the Ming (1368-1644) dynasties. I argue that a cultural approach is not a fruitful way to understanding Chinese national security policy. Rather, Chinese behavior can be best explained by structural realism, ‘The conventional wisdom of China’s foreign relations, which I term Confucian pacifism, is that China was averse to the use of force to settle security problems. This pacifist tendency originates in the humane and benevolent ideas embedded in the Confucian culture, Traditionally, China placed a high premium on the primacy of defense and has been reluctant to use force to deal with security threats. I challenge this conventional wisdom by showing that it lacks empirical support. Contrary to what is widely believed, Imperial China had behaved according to the dictates of realism for centuries. It had preferred to use force to resolve external threats to Chinese security, adopted a more aggressive stance as its power grew, and expanded ‘war aims in the absence of systemic or military constraints. Employing the method of structured, focused comparison, I examine various decisions of national security by consulting both primary and secondary literature. 1 derive hypotheses on three important issues: 1) Use of Force, 2) Power and Coereiveness, and 3) War Aims. If Chinese behavior accords with realist predictions, xithe predominance of Confucian discourse notwithstanding, the realist claim that state behavior varies more with the distribution of power than with ideological preferences would be corroborated. This dissertation has important theoretical and policy implications. It clarifies the relationship between culture and foreign policy, speaks to the levels of analysis problem, and contributes to the debate between constructivism and realism. On the policy side, this study helps us better assess the strategic implications of China’s rise in power, and help formulate sound policies. When would China most likely use force? Would China become more coercive as it gains power? Would Chinese war aims expand? This project sheds light on these important questions. xiiCHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Scholars like to speak of China's uniqueness in intemational behavior. They point out that historically China has behaved in a way distinct from the Western traditions, The East was fundamentally different from the West, so the view goes. Unlike the European powers” inclination toward offensive campaigns, the Great Wall of China symbolizes its search for security in a defensive-minded way. The pacifist tendency of China’s Confucian culture adds to this static, defensive image of the Chinese ways in handling external relations. Scholarly works along the line of “Chinese ways in warfare” or the “Chinese world order” paint a uniquely pacifist China that was reluctant to use force to settle interstate disputes.’ According to this conventional wisdom, Chinese leaders did not believe in the utility of force, but rather in the use of diplomacy and cultural attraction as the best means to deal with external threats. In short, China was the anti-realist. But, is China really that different? John K. Fairbank, and Frank A. Kierman, Jr, ed., Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1974); John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1968). 1‘The purported pacifism or anti-militarism of Chinese military policy has attracted. the attention of both Chinese and Western students of strategy. Chinese strategists are particularly enamored of the distinction between the hegemonic way of the Westem powers (ba dao) and the benevolent way of the Chinese order (wang dao). The West, they argue, has been quick to use force to resolve interstate disputes, while China, on the other hand, has always shunned violence and preferred diplomacy and accommodation. For instance, to dismiss the China Threat thesis, Chinese think tanks and the People’s Liberation Army recently argued that China poses no threat to world security because of “the Peaceful Orientation of Chinese Civilization.” This view is probably best summarized in Ralph Sawyer’s compilation of Chinese military classics, Despite incessant barbarian incursions and major military threats throughout their history...Jmperial China was tittle inclined to pursue military solutions to external aggression. Ethnocentric rulers and. ministers instead preferred to believe in the myth of cultural attraction, whereby their vastly superior Chinese civilization, founded upon virtue and reinforced by opulent material achievements, would simply overwhelm the hostile tendencies of the uncultured..." Li Shaojun, “Lun Zhongguo Wenming de Heping Neihan: cong chuentong dao xianshi: dui “Zhongguo weixie’ lun de huida” ("The peaceful orientation of Chinese civilization: from tradition to reality: a response to ‘China threat’ theory”), Guoji Jingji Pinglun (Review of International Economy) 19, (January-February 1999), pp. 30-33, quoted in William A. Callahan, "China and the Globalisation of IR Theory: Discussion of ‘Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics’ Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 26 (2001), p. 7 > Ralph D. Sawyer, The Art of the Warrior: Leadership and Strategy form the Chinese Military Classics (Boston: Shambhala, 1996), p. 3. [emphasis added} 2Despite its preeminence, this purported Chinese pacifism is rarely, if any, subject to rigorous empirical testing, and remains mostly an assertion rather than an empirically grounded observation, Did Chinese actual behavior exhibit a discemible pacifist tendency? Did the pacifist, anti-militarist ideas embedded in the Confucian culture have an independent effect on Chinese strategic behavior? This dissertation puts the conventional wisdom to the test by examining the empirical records during the Song (960-1279) and the Ming (1368-1644) dynasties. ‘A careful study of Chinese strategic behaviors in history would add greatly to our knowledge of international relations. So far, a comprehensive study of Chinese strategic behaviors in history has yet to exist. Very few attempts have been made by scholars to apply the theory of international relations to the Chinese case. When they do, most of the current academic works focus on the People’s Republic period and its projected rise to power. They have very litte to say about China before the twentieth century.’ Furthermore, China’s recent impressive rise to power has made analysts ponder what its future will look like. If history is any guide, studying Chinese strategic behavior in the past will likely shed light on its future behavior. This dissertation contributes to the IR literature by examining the strategic behaviors of the Song and the Ming dynasties from a historical perspective. * Notable exceptions include Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000),‘The Central Question ‘The central question of this dissertation is: To what extent does culture influence the aggressive behaviors of states? Can a cultural approach replace structural realism as a better explanation of state behaviors’ Understanding the answers to these questions will have important implications for the theory of intemational relations. Realism is said to be the dominant paradigm in the study of intemational politics and security. It argues that the anarchic structure of the world compels states to engage in power competition with one another. Culture plays a minor role in explaining the behaviors of states. Yet, cultural theories challenge this view and argue that ideational factors such as culture can have an independent effect on how states behave in the world. They further maintain that cultural variables do a much better job than realism in explaining how the world works. For instance, Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara argue that a culture of pacifism has become so institutionalized in postwar Japan that Japanese policy * Among the many terms in the social sciences, the definition of culture is among one of the most nebulous anid most contested, In the 1950s, Kroeber and Kluckhohn reviewed the changing meanings of the world “culture” in English, German, and French, and estimated that there were 164 definitions in use. Given the subsequent studies of culture, the number could well have exceeded 200 today. A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluekhohn. Culture: A Critical Review of Concepis and Definitions (New York Vintage Books, 1952), p. 291 ‘A good deal of the deficiency in cultural studies arises from the lack of a precise definition, To avoid confusion, I use the definition widely accepted by the post-Cold War culturalists, In this dissertation, culture is defined as shared ideas, beliefs, and values collectively held within a society or by its elites that are transmitted from one generation to the next through socialization. See Peter J Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 6; Berger, Cultures of Antimiitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan , p. 9; Jobn S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Insitutions, and German Security Policy after Unification (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 22-23.