PEARL HARBOR THE SEEDS AND FRUITS OF INFAMY Percy L. Greaves, Jr. Bettina B. Greaves, ed. Foreword by John Chamberlain LvMI MISES INSTITUTE ISBN: 978-1-933550-33-6 Copyright 2010 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute and published under the Creative Commons Attribution License 3.0. http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/3.0. For information write the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 518 West Magnolia Avenue, Auburn, Alabama 36832. Mises.org. Contents Editors Preface, Bettina Bien Greaves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Authors Preface, Percy L. Greaves, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Foreword, John Chamberlain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix PART I: THE SEEDS OF INFAMY 1 U.S. International Policy (19331940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Foreign Relations in an Election Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3 U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 4 U.S. Military Plans and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 5 Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 6 Modus VivendiYes? No!. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 7 Japanese Action Appears Imminent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 8 Te Countdown Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 9 Tensions Mount. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 10 Signicant Information Known in Washington . . . . . . . 221 11 Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action. . . . . 239 12 December 6, Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 13 December 6, Part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 14 Te Morning of the Fateful Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281 15 Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! Tis is No Drill! . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 v vi Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy PART 2: THE FRUITS OF INFAMY 16 Te First Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 17 Te Public Had Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 18 Te Cover-up Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 19 Te Administration Initiates an Investigation . . . . . . . . . 369 20 19421944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405 21 1944: A Year of Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 22 Army Pearl Harbor Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 23 Te Navy Court of Inquiry ( July 24October 9, 1944) . . 489 24 1944: A Political Year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545 25 Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations: Clarke, Clausen, Hewitt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563 26 Safeguarding Military Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607 27 Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (November 15, 1945 May 31, 1946) Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613 28 Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (November 15, 1945 May 31, 1946) Part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 667 29 Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (November 15, 1945 May 31, 1946) Part 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727 30 Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (November 15, 1945 May 31, 1946) Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 31 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Appendix: Dramatis Personae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Editors Preface N o one can plan history. Every one of usrich and poor, pow- erful and not so powerful, famous and infamous, important and unimportantplans his or her actions in the hope of accomplishing some goal. History is the outcome of countless such purposive actions, intertwined, interconnected, interrelated. Although each action is planned by the individual actor in the hope of achieving some end, history itself is not only not planned, but unplannable. And so it is with the Pearl Harbor disaster which launched the United States into World War II. It was the unplanned, unintended consequence of countless separate pre- attack planned actions on the part of the principals concerned. And the post-attack coverup and revelations arose as the unin- tended consequences of the purposive actions of the principals concerned. Te goal of the historian of any historical event is to try to discover how it happened as an unintended consequence of the purposive actions of individuals. And that is the goal of this book, as it was also the goal of the post-attack investigations, to deter- mine how and why the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and how and why Washington o cials responded as they did. My hus- band, Percy Greaves, became interested in the pros and cons of the December 7, 1941 attack from the moment he learned, as vii viii Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy research director of the Republican National Committee dur- ing the 1944 Roosevelt-Dewey presidential election campaign, that the United States had decrypted the Japanese diplomatic code in August 1940 and since then had been reading many of Japans SECRET and SUPER-SECRET messages. Tat secret, of course, could not be divulged so long as the war continued and we were continuing to decipher Japanese messages and learn their secrets. After the war ended in August 1945, Congress established a Joint Congressional Committee to investigate the attack. As Chief of the Minority Sta of that Joint Committee my husband researched the pre-attack background, the earlier investigations, and the available documents. He helped brief the Republican Committee members in questioning witnesses as to what was known in Washington about Japans plans before the attack, what intelligence and materiel had been furnished the Pearl Harbor commanders, and whether or not they had responded appropri- ately, given the available intelligence, materiel, ships, planes, and men. Te hearings lasted almost a full year. Te Majority Report continued to place considerable blame on the Hawaiian com- manders, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short. A lengthy Minority Report held that the blame must be shared by higher-up Washington o cials. Upon the conclusion of the Congressional Committee hear- ings, my husband continued to research the Pearl Harbor attack. He interviewed surviving participants, wrote and lectured widely on the subject. My husband completed this manuscript and wrote the side heads. We proofed it together and checked all the quota- tions and footnotes against the original sources. But then he was stricken with cancer, a particularly virulent variety. He died on August 13, 1984, just over a month after the appearance of his rst serious symptoms. By the time my husband died, his eorts had yielded a mas- sive manuscript. When I reread that manuscript after his death, I decided that, although the names, dates, and documentation were Editors Preface ix all there, it was di cult to follow the sequence of events. Events alternated with revelations gleaned from the investigations and revelations alternated with events. Also Percy had included many lengthy supporting quotations within the text itself, interrupt- ing the ow of events. In the hope of making the story easier to understand, I have arranged everything in chronological order and paraphrased the quotesfrom FDRs inauguration and his early active intervention in international aairs through the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, the post attack investiga- tions, the obstacles placed in the path of investigators, down to the nal reports. He and I often talked about this book. As usual I made sug- gestions; some he accepted; others he rejected. He would say, If anything happens to me then you can do as you please. Of course, he fully expected to nish it himself. But time was not given him to do so. Although I have reworked my husbands manuscript, it remains his book. Te research and documentation are his. Te decision to present events primarily as they were viewed from Washington was his. My contribution has been to reorganize, revise, and rewrite his manuscript so as to present the events chronologically. Troughout, however, I have tried to keep the book true to his research and faithful to his interpretation. My guiding principle has always been to present the results of Percys years of research as faithfully and accurately as possible and to describe the truth about Pearl Harbor as he saw it. Although I am sure Percy would have had some criticism of the way I have nished his book, on the whole I believe he would have approved. I only wish he could have lived to see the research of his lifetime published in this form. Any errors or omissions in preparing his work for nal publication are, of course, my respon- sibility alone.
MRS. PERCY L. (BETTINA B.) GREAVES, JR. May 2007 Authors Preface W hen the attack on Pearl Harbor was announced on the radio, my sister phoned. I was outdoors playing touch football with my nine-year-old boy and some of his friends. I went inside immediately and turned on the radio. From that moment on I have followed Pearl Harbor developments closely. At dawn on December 7, 1941, the Japanese had attacked the United States U.S. Fleet stationed in Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii was then a territory of the United States, not yet a state. Nevertheless, that blow brought the United States into the war that had been started in Europe by Hitlers attack on Poland in September 1939. Te war then exploded worldwide, with fronts not only in Europe and in the Atlantic but also in Asia and the Pacic. Te generally accepted explanation for our entry into the war was simply Japans unprovoked and dastardly attack on Pearl Harbor. However, the responsibility for the extent of the disas- ter was attributed to a considerable extent to failures on the part of the two commanders at Pearl HarborNavy Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Army General Walter C. Short. To many, this settled the matter; the two commanders were to blame, held up to public shame, relieved of their commands, and forced into early retirement. xi xii Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Te rst hint I had that there was more to the Pearl Harbor story came in 1944. Te then Republican candidate for President, Tomas E. Dewey, was trying to unseat President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Several service personnel came to the Republican National Committeeof which I was then Research Director with reports that U.S. cryptographers had deciphered some of the Japanese codes and that Washington o cials had been read- ing, even before the attack, many of the Japanese governments condential communications. Dewey proposed to make a speech on the subject, but was requested in great secrecy by Army Chief of Sta General George C. Marshall, not to do so. Our ability to decipher and read Japanese messages, he said, was still playing an important role in helping us to win the war in the Pacic and thus to save the lives of U.S. sol- diers and sailors. Dewey honored that request. When Republican Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan, unaware of the reason for Deweys silence, also scheduled a speech on the subject, Dewey asked him not to. Tus the public was prevented from learning any of the true Pearl Harbor story at that time. And the voters gave Roosevelt a comfortable victory over his Republican rival. After the election, I resigned from the Party and turned to freelancing as researcher and economic columnist. 1945 was an eventful year. On January 20, Roosevelt was inau- gurated for an unprecedented fourth term. He died a few months later, on April 12. Te war was not yet over. Vice President Harry Truman took o ce. Te ghting nally ended in Europe when Germany surrendered on May 7. And the war in the Pacic came to an end with the surrender of Japan on August 14. . . . . . . . . Rumors had surfaced from time to time, in spite of eorts to maintain secrecy, to the eect that the attack on Pearl Harbor might not have been such a complete surprise to the o cials in Authors Preface xiii Washington as the public had been led to believe. Several fact- nding inquiries were set up during the war in the attempt to learn more. A great deal of information was unearthed, although it was not then made public. Pressure continued to mount for a full- edged investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. Finally when the war was over, Congress responded. A Joint Congressional Committee for the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack ( JCC) was set up in the fall of 1945. Te Democratic majority named six of the Committees ten members, the Republican minority four. Te Democratic major- ity controlled the appointment of the Committees Counsel and sta. Te Republican minority was not given funds for an ade- quate research sta. As I had earned some respect as a researcher when working with the Republican National Committee dur- ing the 1944 presidential campaign, a few persons interested in having the Joint Congressional Committee conduct a thorough and unbiased investigation arranged for me to head a small sta to assist the minority members. Te JCCs reports issued in July 1946 answered some questions but raised others. My serious interest in Pearl Harbor stemmed from my work with that Committee. For almost a full year (19451946) I had spent day and night studying Pearl Harbor documents and explor- ing Pearl Harbor leads. From that time on, I read everything I could nd that bore some relevance to Pearl and I tried to keep current on the subject. Ten, thanks to a small grant arranged by Harry Elmer Barnes I was able to travel back and forth across the country to meet and interview surviving principals. When further funds were not forthcoming, my serious study of Pearl Harbor was sidetracked for the more urgent demands of earning a living. Only in semi-retirement have I had time to concentrate on the subject again. History is a record of step-by-step progression from the past. Any event is always the end result of a long sequence of events stretching back endlessly into the past. Te historian investigating xiv Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy a particular incident must always decide where to start, how far back to go. And so it is with Pearl Harbor. Te Japanese attack in 1941 was the nal outcome of complex, interconnected occur- rences that had their origins many years before. For the purpose of this book, I have chosen to trace the conicting forces that led the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941, back to the 1894 1895 Sino-Japanese War. Events happen; once they are over and done with, they are irrevocable. Learning after the fact what actually occurred is not always easy. History needs to be written and rewritten constantly in the light of newly revealed evidence and newly acquired knowl- edge in other elds. As previously classied and secret World War II documents have been released in recent years, consider- able additional information has become available. To reconcile the conicting testimony of the many witnesses before the several Pearl Harbor investigations, to keep abreast of new material as it becomes available, to integrate new data into the previous body of knowledge, and to separate the wheat from the cha so as to make it all intelligible and meaningful, calls for painstaking research and analysis. Te task of the historian is to try to reconstruct and report the facts as accurately as possible. As historian, I have acted as sleuth or detective trying to determine the truth. Te Pearl Harbor story is like a gigantic jigsaw puzzle, the parts coming from many dierent sources, each part alone being of little value until tted into the mosaic. Hopefully this book will supply a few more pieces to the gigantic Pearl Harbor jigsaw puzzle and thus make a small contribution to this period in history. Percy L. Greaves, Jr. Summer 1984 Foreword O n October 28, 1944, in Washington, D.C., I attended a birthday party given by a friend of mine, the Russian-born foreign correspondent, Isaac Don Levine, 1 for his wife, Ruth. October 28 is my birthday too. So it became a double birthday party. At that party, a loquacious colonel, assuming apparently that he was speaking o the record, conded that the United States had decrypted the Japanese diplomatic code a year or so before the attack on Pearl Harbor. From that time on, the top U.S. administration and military o cials had been intercepting and reading many of the condential messages that passed between the Japanese government in Tokyo and her emissaries in the United States and other countries. Tanks to this source of intel- ligence, the administration in Washington had been privy before the attack on Pearl Harbor to many Japanese secrets. Republican presidential candidate Tomas E. Dewey had also learned this administration secret. But, out of patriotism, he was not exploiting it during the election campaign that was then under way. It could be that the Japanese were still using the same 1 Levine later founded and edited the anticommunist journal Plain Talk, a fore- runner of Te Freeman and National Review. xv xvi Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy code, and Dewey did not want to run the chance of alerting the Japanese to change their code and thus destroy an extremely valu- able source of U.S. intelligence. It would have been a real scoop to report this news on the pages of Life, my employer at the time. But should I? I lost no time in sending a memorandum to Henry Luce, publisher of Life, about the colonels disclosure. He reacted as Dewey had. He told me to le the information away; it would be useful after the war. Right after the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945, Luce sent me to upstate New York to interview Dewey. After an all- night train ride, I caught up with him at the Elmira Reformatory, where he was on an inspection tour. He asked me to join him in his limousine for the ride to Geneva, his next stop. We drove along scenic Lake Seneca. But I didnt glance at the beautiful Finger Lake scenery; I was enthralled with Deweys story. In September 1944, a tall, dark, and handsome colonel, Carter Clarke, had delivered to Dewey a letter from Army Chief of Sta General Marshall. Te letter told Dewey that we had cracked the Japanese diplomatic code. We were still deriving enormous mili- tary advantages from reading and decrypting coded intercepts. American lives would be lost if the Japanese changed their code. Terefore, it was of the utmost importance that no word about that should leak out that might reach the Japanese. As a result, Dewey was persuaded to keep the issues of Pearl Harbor and the Japanese code out of the campaign. Dewey told me I could use the story of his gagging, but he warned that I must not reveal my source. My article appeared in the September 24, 1945, issue of Life. Luce then gave me the assignment of attending the hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, just then preparing to get under way. Te Congressional hearings ran from November 15, 1945, until May 31, 1946, when the last witness appeared. Tose hearings Foreword xvii revealed a great deal, but probably even more signicant were some of the things that they didnt reveal. It was obvious from the testimony of some of the witnesses that they were trying not to tell everything they knew. I recall to this day the dissimulation of one key witness, Captain Alwyn D. Kramer. As Japanese translator and Navy courier, he had played an important role in the weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbor. He had distributed to the top Washington o cials many, if not most, of the secret Japanese messages intercepted during that period. He was asked at some length what he recalled about the messages he had delivered, and to whom. Kramer had testied in 1944 before the Navy Court of Inquiry. Between then and his appearance before the Congressional Committee, his rec- ollections had been refreshed, he said, as a result of his having been questioned by military personnel conducting other Pearl Harbor investigations. Te members of the Congressional Committee noted sev- eral signicant discrepancies between his testimony to them and his frank and open statements before the NCI. Two were especially notable. One dealt with the famous East Wind Rain message, a false weather report bearing a coded meaning, and the other concerned the Japanese governments instructions to their Washington ambassadors asking them to deliver their reply to the U.S. State Department proposal at precisely 1:00 p.m. Washington time on Sunday, December 7. According to Kramers testimony before the NCI, East Wind Rain indicated impending trouble, perhaps even war, between Japan and the United States. Concerning the 1:00 p.m. message, he had reported to the NCI that, when delivering it on Sunday morning, December 7, he had called the special attention of some of the recipients to the fact that 1:00 p.m. Washington time was about dawn in Hawaii. However, he denied to the Congressional Committee that he had intended to imply that either of these two messages carried any serious implications. When pressed by xviii Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Committee member Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan, he side-stepped. His earlier recollections had been faulty, he said; his memory had since been refreshed. Moreover, he atly denied that anyone had asked him to change his testimony. . . . . . . . . Percy Greaves was hired privately to help the minority Republicans, who had no funds for a research sta. He attended every session of the Congressional hearings. In the course of ful- lling my assignment for Life, I saw him there regularly. He lis- tened intently to all the testimony. Occasionally he would whis- per in the ear of a Republican Committee member or write him a note, calling attention to some particular point to pursue in his questioning. Percys serious interest in Pearl Harbor dated from those hearings. He continued to pursue the subject after the hearings closed. He interviewed participants, read everything he could nd on the subject and researched all leads. Tus this book has been many years in the making. I talked with Percy about Pearl Harbor several times over the years. Percy had completed a carefully documented draft when he died in August 1984. His widow, Bettina Bien Greaves, has done a noble job of reworking his materials, eshing them out, and preparing his manuscript for publication. His revelations, as they are presented here, should help future students interpret the ramications of the seeds that led to the Japanese attack, and of the fruits of that attack, namely the investigations and the attempted coverup. John Chamberlain January 1991 Acknowledgments A s my husband notes in the Preface to this book, his interest in Pearl Harbor stemmed from his year-long association (19451946) with the Congressional Joint Committee to Investigate the Attack on Pearl Harbor. As director of the Committees minority sta, he studied all the documents furnished the Committee and attended all the hearings. After the hearings ended, he received a small grant from Harry Elmer Barnes to seek answers to some questions raised but not answered by the several investigations. With money from the grant, he traveled back and forth across the country in the early 1960s, interviewing individu- als who had an interest in Pearl Harbor. Here they are, listed in alphabetical order: Admiral Walter S. Anderson, General Carter W. Clarke, Curtis Dall, General Bonner Fellers, Admiral Tomas L. Hart, Admiral Royall E. Ingersoll, Captain Tomas K. Kimmel, Captain Robert A. Lavender, Admiral Arthur W. McCollum, Commander Charles C. Miles, Admiral Ben Moreell, Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Admiral F.W. Rockwell, Captain Laurence F. Saord, Vice Admiral John F. Shafroth, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, and General Charles A. Willoughby. Captain Saord deserves special mention. Percy talked with him many times on his frequent visits to Washington and Saord described to him in xix xx Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy careful detail the Navys pre-war system for keeping secret the very existence of the Japanese MAGIC intercepts and the infor- mation they revealed. When Barness funds ran out, Percys seri- ous study of Pearl Harbor was sidetracked as he returned to the more urgent demands of earning a living. However, he continued reading and lecturing on the subject. Only in semi-retirement, did he again have time to actually start putting the results of his research on paper. As I have written, Percy died in 1984. His manuscript was practically nished. After his death, however, I took over the task of editing it and readying it for publication. I physically chopped up the typed manuscript and reorganized chronologi- cally his accounts of pre-war events and post-war revelations. I also put the entire manuscript on the computer. I interviewed several persons: radioman Ralph T. Briggs, the Navy code clerk who had intercepted the elusive East Wind Rain message, Admiral Kemp Tolley, commander of the Lanakai, one of the three small ships ordered by Roosevelt to be commissioned just before the attack and to take up positions in the South China Sea in the path of the south-bound Japanese convoys, and Admiral Kimmels son, Captain Tomas Kimmel, whom my husband had also interviewed. As a result of my editing, the manuscript plus its footnotes became much too long for any publisher to consider. Sheldon Richman, editor of Te Freeman, helped cut it down. Daniel Bazikian spent many hours with me proofreading the manu- script. Two Japanese friendsToshio Murata and Kentaro Nakanotranslated for me the passage in a book by Japans chief intelligence o cer in Washington, indicating that a Winds Execute (East Wind Rain) had actually been received before the attack by the Japanese embassy in Washington; this Japanese account was in contradiction of the position of U.S. Intelligence o cers who refused to admit during the Congressional hearings that such a message had been sent by Tokyo which could have Acknowledgments xxi been intercepted by Saord and his crew before the war began. And Leo Blum, nephew and friend, visited me several times in Irvington encouraging me and helping with the manuscript. I have proted also from the comments made and the questions asked by many of Percys friends and students, who had been fascinated by his account of Pearl Harbor whenever he spoke on the subject formally in lectures and informally in our living room. I can only hope he would have approved of what I have done to transform his life-long labor of love into a manuscript suitable for publication. Bettina Bien Greaves, Editor (Mrs. Percy L. Greaves. Jr.) Part 1 The Seeds of Infamy 1. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Elected President M arch 4, 1933, inauguration day, was a gray day in Washington, a depressing day like the economic depres- sion that then enveloped the nation. Te sun broke through the clouds only occasionally as President-elect Roosevelt, exu- berant over his victory, and outgoing President Herbert Hoover, gloomy and distressed not only at having lost the election but also at not having been able to stem the economic downturn, rode together up Pennsylvania Avenue to the capitol from the White House. Roosevelt took the oath of o ce, promising to the best of my ability to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. Hoover and his entire Cabinet went out of o ce when Roosevelt was inaugurated and the new president appointed an entirely new cabinet. Te Democratic Party platform on which Roosevelt had run in the presidential election of 1932 had been conservative, calling for drastic economies in government expenditures and a sound currency. Te economic crisis, sparked by the 1929 stock 3 4 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy market crash, had deepened between Roosevelts election and his inauguration. Cooperation between the outgoing and incoming presidents during the interregnum would have been in order, but considerable antagonism existed between the two men: Tey had one inconclusive meeting. Roosevelt was apparently unable or unwilling to cooperate any further. He didnt want to share the credit with anyone for what he was going to do. For a time the new presidents energies were devoted largely to domestic economic problems. All banks in the country were closed down on March 6, two days after Roosevelt took o ce. It was a low point in the countrys history. However, it wasnt long before the international situation would claim Roosevelts attention. Te idealism that had produced the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact intended to outlaw war was erod- ing. Adolf Hitler had come to power in Germany, assuming dic- tatorial powers and beginning to undo the terms of the Versailles Treaty. On November 16, 1933, the United States recognized the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R). Te professed purpose of recognition was so that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benet and for the preservation of the peace of the world. 1 Roosevelt named William C. Bullitt to be the rst U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Bullitt considered communism a harbinger for the world and was an enthusiastic proponent of the Soviet system. U.S.Far East Relations Te Asian situation was of concern. Japan had occupied Chinese territory, Manchuria. Many Japanese farmers and busi- nessmen had moved there to settle and make it their home. 1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Te Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, vol. 1: Te Genesis of the New Deal, 19281932 (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 472. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 5 Moreover, the Japanese and Chinese were ghting in northern China and Russian Communists were helping the Chinese and pestering the Japanese. Asia was not peaceful. How had condi- tions reached this pass? Japan had been almost completely isolated from the civilized world until 1852 when U.S. Navy Commander Matthew C. Perry sailed into Edo (Tokyo) Bay on a mission from the United States governmentto open Japan up to trade. After some time and a proper display of diplomacy, Perry succeeded in his mission. Japan westernized, industrialized and her population increased. Looking for resources to power her new industries, she expanded onto the relatively empty wilderness of the Asian mainland which China and Russia had previously claimed. Japan went to war with China (the Sino-Japanese War, 18941895) in order to bring Chinese-controlled Korea into Japans sphere of inuence. Ten after the Boxer Rebellion in China (18991901) Japan cooper- ated with the international force of British, French, Russians, Americans, and Germans that lifted the siege of Peking. Some Japanese remained in northern China and in time Japanese trad- ers developed a substantial textile industry there. However, Japan found herself in frequent conict with Russia, whose vast territory extended east to the Pacic, and who wanted a warm water port. Te Russo-Japanese War (1904) was sparked by Russian intru- sions into Manchuria and ended with Japans gaining control of that province. Japans rule brought law and order to Manchuria and in time it became one of the most peaceful and stable parts of China, attracting thousands of Japanese, Chinese and Korean traders and settlers. Japan was bringing civilization and stability to the region. Japan had been an ally of Britain and the U.S during the Great War (19141918) and she was included in the Washington Naval Conference (November 12, 1921January 12, 1922) when the Allied military powers sought to reduce the worldwide arms race. Te resulting Naval Limitation and Non-Fortication Treaty 6 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cut the British-American-Japanese navies down in size to a ratio of 5:5:3 for capital ships. In the hope of maintaining peace in the Far East, an Open Door agreement was reached, providing that the participant nations have equal commercial rights of entry into China. Although China was not then a united nation, she was to have her integrity preserved. Japan was to be restrained from mainland adventures and to have no military planes or ships in the mandated islands. Japan resented the second-rate status to which she had been reduced by the Naval Limitation Treaty, and also the racial slur inherent when Japanese immigration was banned by the U.S. Exclusion Act (1924) and by Australias anti- oriental Whites Only policy. Moreover, Japans relations with the rest of the world deteriorated in the 1920s. Her markets for her chief export, silk, suered as a result of worldwide protection- ism and the Great Depression and yet her dependence on U.S. oil and raw materials increased. Tere was an explosion on the Japanese railroad line at Mukden on September 18, 1931, which was blamed on local Chinese. One faction in the Japanese military had been pressing their government to take a more expansionist role in Manchuria. Te Japanese responded harshly to the Mukden explosion, fought the bandits and seized several of Chinas northern provinces. Manchuria gained its independence and then on September 15, 1932, became a protectorate of Japan, Manchukuo. U.S. Secretary of State Stimson held that Japans intervention in Manchuria was a violation of international treaties and pro- posed, in place of the Open Door agreement, a Nonrecognition doctrine which would deny recognition to any nation which had acquired territory by aggression. Stimson wanted the U.S. to impose sanctions against Japan for her aggression in Manchuria. President Hoover vetoed the idea; he was opposed in every ber of his being to any action which might lead to American partici- pation in the struggles of the Far East. In this view he had the U.S. International Policy: 19331940 7 support of the American people. 2 Te League of Nations inves- tigated the Manchurian incident and issued a report blam- ing Japan. Japan and Britain disagreed with the Leagues report. However, it was accepted and in 1933 Japan withdrew from the League. After the death in 1925 of Sun Yat-sen, revolutionary leader and president of the Southern Chinese Republic, Chiang Kai- shek assumed the presidency. Chiang began trying to unite the country. Te communists intervened, sometimes for, sometimes against, Chiangs nationalist forces. Tere was almost constant ghting by and among Chiangs nationalists, the warlords, the Chinese communists and the Russian communists. When the Chinese boycotted Japanese textiles, the Japanese retaliated by bombarding and sending troops to the Shanghai International Settlement ( January 28March 4, 1932). Many were killed. U.S. sympathy was with the Chinese; the Japanese were portrayed as the aggressors. After erce ghting, the Japanese retreated tem- porarily, and the boycott was brought to an end. Another time when Chiang Kai-sheks nationalist forces threatened Japans economic and industrial interests in Manchuria, Japan called up 5,000 troops to protect her merchants there. Te Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists were both heav- ily involved. Finally, after communist leader Mao Tse-tung told Chiang that if he stopped ghting the Red Army the Chinese Soviet government would help Chiang against Japan, Chiang nally agreed. Te Kuomintang-Communist agreement ( July 5, 1937) called for the nationalists and communists to cooperate in driving the Japanese out of Peking and the rest of North China. Peace prevailed there for a time. But not for long. 2 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947/1948), p. 233. 8 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Official U.S. Foreign Policy During the 1930s, U.S. opinion opposed involvement in for- eign wars. Congress responded in 1935 by passing neutrality leg- islation prohibiting trade in arms or implements of war with any belligerent nation. As FDR signed this legislation (S.J. Resolution 173) on August 31, 1935, he explained that it was intended as an expression of the xed desire of the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war. Te purpose, he said, is wholly excellent. Emphasizing U.S. neutrality in international conicts still more emphatically, Roosevelt added: Te policy of the Government is denitely committed to the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of any entanglements which would lead us into conict. 3 In spite of FDRs professed neutrality, however, he was appar- ently already considering the possibility of conict with Japan. Te O ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI) whose duty it was to col- lect and analyze pertinent information for the Navy, was then assembling material about potential Japanese and communist espionage agents. For instance, the ONI carded Japanese resi- dents in the New York area for use in corralling the individuals for internment or breaking down any system of espionage or sabo- tage in the event of a conict. 4 In an August 10, 1936, memoran- dum to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William D. Leahy, FDR sanctioned this operation. He expressed his support . . . for locating all Japanese for possible incarceration in a concentration camp during a crisis. 5 FDR was a charming, charismatic, and convincing speaker. From 1935, when he signed the Neutrality Act, until the attack 3 Roosevelt, Te Public Papers and Addresses, 1935, vol. 4, pp. 34546. 4 Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Conict of Duty: The U.S. Navys Intelligence Dilemma, 19191945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 65. 5 Roosevelt, August 10, 1936 memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D. Leahy. Quoted in Dorwart, Conict of Duty, p. 65. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 9 on Pearl Harbor, he reassured the American people from time to time of his steadfast commitment to peace. 6 He delivered one of his most eloquent anti-war speeches in Chatauqua, New York, only four days after signing the August 10 memorandum about the possible incarceration of U.S. Japanese residents: I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded. I have seen men cough- ing out their gassed lungs. I have seen the dead in the mud. I have seen cities destroyed. I have seen two hundred limping, exhausted men come out of linethe survivors of a regiment of one thousand that went forward forty-eight hours before. I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war. . . . I wish I could keep war from all Nations; but that is beyond my power. I can at least make certain that no act of the United States helps to produce or to promote war. . . . I speak from a long experiencethe eective maintenance of American neutrality depends today, as in the past, on the wis- dom and determination of whoever at the moment occup[ies] the o ces of President and Secretary of State. 7 During this period, Germany and Japan were being driven together out of fear of the expansionist and disruptive poli- cies of their common enemy, the Soviet Union. Both Germany and Japan recognized that the aim of the [U.S.S.R.-sponsored] Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disinte- grate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command. Tey held that the Comintern not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of 6 Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 19321940 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 15675. 7 Roosevelt, Te Public Papers and Addresses, 1936, vol. 5, pp. 28990. 10 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the world. 8 So Germany and Japan decided to cooperate against Communist subversive activities. On November 15, 1936, they signed the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact. Prospects for Peace in the Far East? Tere was a turnover in the Japanese Cabinet on June 4, 1937. Prince Konoye became prime minister. Konoye desired and sought peace with the United States. But there was still turmoil and little prospect of peace in the Far East. In 1937, the U.S.S.R. led Nationalist China to understand that if it would undertake to oer armed resistance to Japan it would condently expect the armed support of the Soviet Union. 9 Not long after receiving this assurance, the Chinese did resist the Japanese. On July 7, 1937, a Japanese soldier was miss- ing at the Marco Polo Bridge in China. Te Chinese not only refused to search for him, they also refused to let the Japanese do so. Japanese troops resorted to force and soldiers from the two countries clashed. Te inclination was to blame this incident on impetu- ous Japanese soldiers at the scene. However, the fault may not have been entirely on the Japanese side. Te U.S. ambassadors in France, China, and Japan all cabled Secretary of State Hull denying this anti-Japanese contention. Reports had come to their attention indicating that the Chinese had the encourage- ment and support of the Russians in ghting the Japanese, that the Russians had been very generous, that they had furnished China with munitions . . . costing 150,000,000 Chinese dollars, 8 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence, 19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 109. 9 Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 19331941 (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), p. 456. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 11 and that they had even shipped some munitions before China had promised to pay for them. 10 U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew wired Hull that there was not su cient evidence to justify the hypothesis that either the Japanese Government or the Army deliberately engi- neered the [Marco Polo Bridge] incident in order to force a showdown. Grew also found that communist agitators contrib- uted to the crisis by disseminating misinformation with regard to the concentration of both Chinese and Japanese troops. 11
Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out. Tokyo announced a puni- tive expedition against the Chinese troops, who have been taking acts derogatory to the prestige of the Empire of Japan. Tis was the beginning of the undeclared Japanese-Chinese war. Bombers struck three cities and shelled others as ground troops attacked Chinese forces all over the Peking area. Te outbreak of ghting between the Japanese and the Chinese aroused strong feelings among many in the United States who had emotional ties to China. Te Neutrality Act then in force prevented the U.S. from using U.S. ships to send arms to either side. On September 14, acting under this Act, FDR forbade the shipment of arms on U.S. government-owned ships to either China or Japan, thus averting the possibility of a Japanese block- ade of U.S. shipping had aid to China been allowed. Troughout this entire period, U.S. and British trade was continuing, in accord with Chinas agreement to open the country to foreign traders. In Chicago on October 5, 1937, President Roosevelt spoke out against nations that were engaging in aggression: Te peace, the freedom, and the security of 90 percent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining 10 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Te Far East, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ce), vol. 3, pp. 136, 165, et passim. 11 Tansill, Back Door to War, p. 460. 12 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 10 percent, who are threatening a breakdown of all interna- tional order and law. . . . It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease. . . . War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we can- not have complete protection in a world of disorder in which condence and security have broken down. 12
Roosevelt had not mentioned Japan, but a State Department release the next day made it clear that he had been referring to Japans attack on China; Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, the Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities and has oered to be of assistance in an eort to nd some means, acceptable to both parties to the conict of composing by pacic methods the situation the Far East. . . . In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the Government of the United States has been forced to the con- clusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations. [Te Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928] 13 12 Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce), pp. 38387. 13 Ibid., pp. 38788. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 13 On December 12, the United States was brought close to war when the Japanese sank the U.S.S. Panay, a U.S. gunboat, and three Standard Oil tankers in the Chinese Yangtze River. Several Americans were killed. However, sentiment in the United States was strongly opposed to war over the loss of a few American lives in the Far East. Terefore, when the Japanese apologized, demoted several top military o cials, and paid several million dollars in indemnity, the matter was considered closed. Serious ghting continued in China, however. In December 1937, Japanese forces took Nanking, committing mass murder and rape. Over 50,000 Chinese men were killed, many thousands more women raped, 200,000 to 300,000 civilians slaughtered. Japan was clearly the culprit. Anticipating War in the Pacific In late December FDR ordered Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, director of the U.S. War Plans Division, to London for con- versations with o cials of the British Admiralty. According to Ingersoll, it was generally assumed in military circles at that time that sooner or later the United States would become involved in a war against Japan in the Pacic, a war that would involve the British, the Dutch, the Russians, and possibly the Chinese. Tis London meeting was to explore U.S.-British arrangements in such an event for command, communications, ciphers, intelli- gence, etc. Te conference took place during the rst two or three weeks of January 1938. No rm commitments were made. 14
14 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 9, pp. 427277. Ingersoll testi- mony. After the war started in Europe, the 1938 London document became a dead cat, as Ingersoll expressed it (p. 4273), because Germany was in the war. The London conclusions were superseded by the ABC-1 plan for military U.S. cooperation with the British, the plan which was developed in Wash- ington in 1941. 14 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy On November 3, 1938, Japan announced a New Order in China, a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchukuo [ Japans name for Japanese-occupied Manchuria] and China. 15 Prime Minister Prince Konoye pointed out in a public statement that the Chiang Kai-shek administra- tion in China was little more than a local regime. Konoye declared further that Japan wanted the development and cooperation, not the ruin, of China and that she wished to establish stable condi- tions in the Far East without prejudice to the interests and rights of other foreign powers. However, Konoye went on: Te world knows that Japan is earnestly determined to ght it out with com- munism. What the Comintern intends to do is bolshevisation of the Far East and disturbance of world peace. And lest there be any misunderstanding, he added: Japan expects to suppress in a drastic manner the sources of the evils of bolshevisation and their subversive activities. 16 Konoyes position was that Japans conict was not with China so much as it was with the Comintern that was backing China. Japan compared her Manchurian venture to the way England had acquired her empireIndia, Hong Kong, etc.and to the way the United States had wrested its western territory from the Indians. And Japan thought the United Statess Monroe Doctrine protecting the Western Hemisphere from foreign inter- vention was similar to Japans wish to preserve Asia for Asians. 17
According to Japans Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (1940 1941) Japan was ghting for two goals: to prevent Asia from 15 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 1, p. 478. 16 Ibid., p. 480. 17 John Toland, Te Rising Sun: Te Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 19361945 (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 56. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 15 falling completely under the white mans domination and to save China from Communism. 18
In the United Statess view, Japans New Order was violat- ing the rights of Americans in China. In a note to the Japanese Foreign Minister (November 7, 1938), Ambassador Grew objected to actions Japan was taking on the mainland. He could see no reason why U.S. shipping on the Yangtze River should be restricted, since hostilities in that area had ceased. Grew also claimed (November 21) that there was no real excuse for the fre- quent accidental incidents in China involving not only the loss of American property but the loss of American life and the des- ecration of our ag. 19
Te Japanese continued to win in China. Tey took Hankow and Canton. Tey were preventing Chinas access to the coast and thus making it increasingly di cult for her to obtain sup- plies. As a result, Chiang was forced to move his government inland to Chungking. But the Japanese were conquering terri- tory, not people, and by the beginning of 1939, they were still far from nal victory. Tey had lost thousands of men, millions of yen and incurred the wrath of the Western world, and Americans in particular. 20
In 19371938, the Chinese built the Burma Road over rugged mountain terraina remarkable feat of engineering. Te Burma Road was opened on December 2, 1938. War supplies could then be landed in Rangoon, British Burma, shipped by train to Lashio, then over the Burma Road to Kunming in Chinas Yunnan Province, and thence to Chungking. Although most Americans did not want to become involved in a war, by the end of 1938, FDR was beginning to resent the Neutrality Act. His sympathies in the Far East lay with China 18 Ibid., p. 48. 19 Department of State, Japan, 19311941, p. 807. 20 Toland, Te Rising Sun, p. 54. 16 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy in her struggle against Japan. And the Act prevented the United States from lending support. Out of his desire to aid China, FDR sought an end to the blanket embargo on shipping arms to bel- ligerent nations. So in his January 4, 1939, message to Congress, he launched a campaign for the Acts repeal: [O]ur neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairlymay actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. 21 Congress rejected his reasoning, and on March 20 the Senate turned down Roosevelts proposal for repeal. FDR repeated his request. Hull also asked for its repeal. Britains Prime Minister Neville Chamberlains view of the Far East situation diered from that of U.S. o cials. Chamberlain did not want to prevent Japan from obtaining the military sup- plies she needed for her campaign in China. He recognized the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress and noted that as long as that state of aairs continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order. . . . His Majestys Government have no intention of counte- nancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects by Japanese forces. Chamberlain urged that British authorities and British nationals in China . . . refrain from such acts and measures. 22 Te United States and Japan had been trading partners for years. A commercial treaty permitting and encouraging trade between the two countries had been in eect since 1911. Under its terms, if one party wanted to terminate the treaty, it was required to notify the other party six months in advance. In accordance with that provision, Hull gave the Japanese ambassador notice on 21 Department of State, Peace and War, p. 49. 22 U.S. Congress, Events, pp. 19899. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 17 July 26, 1939 of our intentions to terminate. Tis dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese economyalso to world trade. And it repre- sented a signicant deterioration in our relations with Japan. 23 War Breaks Out in Europe On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Britain and France immediately notied Germany that unless it withdrew its forces, they would honor their agreement to defend Poland. Hitler did not pull out. Two days later Britain and France declared war on Germany. World War II had begun. At this juncture, FDR again reassured the country of our neutrality. He went on the radio on September 3 and announced in his very convincing manner: Tis Nation will remain a neutral nation. 24 Two days later on September 5, President Roosevelt issued an o cial proclamation of neutrality prescribing certain duties with respect to the proper observance, safeguarding, and enforcement of such neutrality. It called on all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States to exercise an impartial neutrality. 25
On September 11, only a very few days later, FDR initiated a secret correspondence with a former naval person in belligerent Great Britains cabinet. Tis former naval person was Winston Churchill, newly recalled by Prime Minister Chamberlain to serve as First Lord of the Admiralty, the same position Churchill had held during World War I. (Churchill did not become prime minister until May 1, 1940.) Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I, had visited England and been entranced by the British espionage and intelligence services. But he hadnt then met Churchill. 23 Department of State, Japan, 19311941, p. 189. 24 Department of State, Peace and War, p. 485. 25 U.S. Congress, Events, p. 215. 18 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy FDRs rst letter to Churchill began: I want you to know how glad I am that you are back again in the Admiralty. He continued: What I want you and the Prime Minister to know is that I shall at all times welcome it if you will keep me in touch per- sonally with anything you want me to know about. You can always send sealed letters through your [diplomatic] pouch or my pouch. 26
Tis expression of warm friendship was hardly the impartial neutrality he was asking of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. U.S. Neutrality Patrol in the Atlantic On September 6, Roosevelt announced that the Navy would start a Neutrality Patrol of the Atlantic up to 200 or 300 miles oshore, ostensibly to protect U.S. merchantmen: Te patrolling ships were to report all belligerent warships, except convoy escorts, by radio. In the event of a submarine contact, the movements of the submarine shall be observed and a surveillance patrol maintained in the general area. 27
And then on September 8, he proclaimed a national emergency. 28
Disturbed at the delay in getting the Neutrality Patrol underway, FDR sent a secret message on October 9, 1939, to the U.S. Navy Department: When any aircraft or surface ship 26 Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jones, eds. Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), p. 89. 27 Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy: Te Private War of the Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), p. 65. 28 U.S. Congress, Events, p. 216. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 19 sights a submarine, a report thereof will be rushed to the Navy Department for immediate action. Tis report was to be sub- mitted in English, permitting anyone capable of monitoring the Patrols English-language transmissions to benet from the sightings. Te plane or surface ship, FDR continued, will remain in contact for as long as possible. . . . Planes or Navy or Coast Guard ships may report the sighting of any submarine or suspicious surface ships in plain English. . . . [L]oss of contact with surface ships cannot be tolerated. Signed FDR. 29
Most Americans were, of course, very much concerned about the war going on in Europe. To many it looked like a repeat of the 19141918 World War. Some wanted the United States to join England and France immediately against Germany. But the majority were still anxious to stay out of the struggle. FDR, always sensitive to public opinion, again reassured the people of our neutrality. At a New York Herald Tribune Forum on October 26, he stated most emphatically: In and out of Congress we have heard orators and commenta- tors and others beating their breasts and proclaiming against sending the boys of American mothers to ght on the battle- elds of Europe. Tat, I do not hesitate to label as one of the worst fakes in current history. It is a deliberate setting up of an imaginary bogeyman. Te simple truth is that no person in any responsible place in the national administration in Washington, or in any State government, or in any city government, or in any county government, has ever suggested in any shape, man- ner or form the remotest possibility of sending the boys of 29 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, p. 68. 20 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy American mothers to ght on the battleelds of Europe. Tat is why I label that argument a shameless and dishonest fake. 30 Finally in November, after German Chancellor Adolf Hitler had attacked Poland and after Great Britain and France had declared war, Roosevelts campaign against the Neutrality Act met with some success. Congress repealed the arms embargo, which had prohibited all sales of military supplies to any bel- ligerent nation, and replaced it with a cash and carry policy. Te Neutrality Act of 1939 permitted cash and carry transactions; arms and other military supplies could be sold to belligerent nations, if they were paid for in cash, not credit, and if they were not transported in U.S. vessels. 31 Our Neutrality Patrol had not been in operation two months when the U.S. heavy cruiser Tuscaloosa, on patrol in the Atlantic, trailed and greeted by radio the German ocean liner Columbus. Columbus, on a cruise in the Caribbean when war broke out in Europe, had managed to reach Vera Cruz, Mexico. Her captain wanted to dispose of his ship there because he did not believe he would be able to run the blockade to return to Germany. However, Berlin ordered him home. He set out on December 13 and soon found his ship accompanied, in relays, by two U.S. destroyers. As Columbus sailed eastward, Tuscaloosa took over sur- veillance. In accordance with FDRs directive, it announced in English every four hours the position of the German ship. Te British destroyer Hyperion heard the announcement and investi- gated. She located Columbus on December 19, about 425 miles o Cape May, New Jersey, and red two shots. Te Germans scuttled their ship. Two of her crewmen were lost. Tuscaloosa picked up 30 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1939. Portion of address published in Franklin D. Roosevelt, Quotations from Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Repub- lican National Committee, 1940), p. 37. 31 U.S. Congress, Events, p. 223. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 21 the 555 German survivors and brought them to this country as distressed mariners. 32
At the presidents request, little publicity was given this inci- dent. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S. chief of naval operations, radioed Captain Harry A. Badt of Tuscaloosa asking that he give the impression his ship had come upon the German liner by accident and, fortunately, just in time to pursue her humane role. Captain Badt was to state that the British ship had not appeared ready to commence an action. Stark noted: We do not desire you to make public the details of the work of our . . . patrol. 33
Nevertheless, accounts of the event did appear, although they caused little excitement; people apparently approved, considering this consistent with the Patrols ostensible purposeto protect U.S. merchantmenand to keep hostilities from invading our shores. FDR again professed devotion to neutrality when he addressed Congress on January 3, 1940. Te rst president of the United States warned us against entangling foreign alliances. Te present president of the United States subscribes to and follows that pre- cept. 34 Te next day, he appointed Navy Admiral J.O. Richardson to be commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet (CINCUS), replac- ing Admiral Claude C. Bloch. Richardson was an old Navy hand, well-equipped through training and experience to take over the operation of the Fleet. Command was transferred on January 6, 1940. 35
32 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, p. 74. 33 Ibid. 34 Department of State, Peace and War, p. 511. 35 The New York Times, January 7, 1940. 22 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy U. S. Relations with Japan Te six months notice we had given Japan of our intention to terminate our 1911 commercial treaty expired on January 26, 1940. With the cancellation of that treaty, uncertainty prevailed with respect to U.S.-Japanese trade. Te Japanese were more or less assured by U.S. o cials, however, that they could expect trade to continue about as usual. But the abrogation of the treaty meant that taris, quotas, or embargoes could be imposed at any time. Te president and Congress were thus in a position to dictate the terms under which Japan might continue to trade with us. Japan at this time was trying to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity scheme New Order that she had announced in November. On February 1 the Japanese foreign minister invited other nations to join in this eort. Japan, he said, welcomed foreign trade and investments, and he asked us to participate. But we turned a cold shoulder on him and on Japan. British Military Procurement and Politics 1940 was an election year. FDR decided to break all prec- edents and run for a third term as president. For most of FDRs time in o ce, his treasury secretary was Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr. Morgenthau was Jewish and thus under- standably strongly anti-Hitler, eager to help England and to get the United States into the war against Germany. 36 Morgenthau 36 As nancial editor from 19341935 of the United States News (predecessor to U.S. News & World Report), I covered Morgenthau at the Treasury Depart- ment and came to know him well. Morgenthau was a good friend, condant, and great admirer of FDRs. He could walk unobserved through an under- ground passageway that connected the Treasury to the White House, and he often did so, to report to FDR or to assume condential assignments. Morgen- thau had a residence in New York State, not far from FDRs Hyde Park home. He was undoubtedly closer to FDR personally than any other member of the cabinet and didnt hesitate at times to try to inuence him. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 23 served as Roosevelts designated agent from September 1939 to April 1940, for dealing with the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission, newly established to handle British and French pro- curement. His sympathies clearly lay with the Allied cause. He felt frustrated by the Neutrality Act, which put all purchases on a cash and carry basis, thus limiting the assistance that could be given England and France. It was his [Morgenthaus] intention to help the democracies as much as possible. He was making an unparalleled eort to supply the Allies 37 and he encouraged the British and French to make purchases as large as possible, for he believed they were not arming fast enough. 38 Although the United States was still o cially neutral in the conict between Germany and Great Britain, Morgenthau, as FDRs intermediary, was seeking for the allies some of the new- est superchargers developed by the U.S. armed forces, but not yet released, as well as certain engines and designs classied as secret. Secretary of War Harry Hines Woodring, who had assumed that post in 1936, and Commanding General of the Army Air Corps Henry Harley (Hap) Arnold refused the necessary permis- sion. Morgenthau had therefore once again to take the Allies case to the president. 39 At a White House conference March 12, 1940, he told the president if he wanted me to do this job [the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission] . . . he would just have to do something 40 to halt the opposition coming from the War Department and the military. Roosevelt then announced that, in Morgenthaus words, there was to be no more resistance from the War Department. . . . Uncooperative o cers would nd them- selves assigned to duty in Guam. . . . Well, [FDR said] if Arnold 37 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938 1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifin, 1965), p. 109. 38 Ibid., p. 113. 39 Ibid., p. 117. 40 Ibid., p. 118. 24 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy wont conform, maybe we will have to move him out of town. Te president continued: Arnold has to keep his mouth shut. He cant see the press any more. Morgenthau was delighted; he reported to his sta later, Oh boy, did General Arnold get it! 41 At that White House conference FDR revealed that the British and French were not his only worries. He was also con- cerned about the U.S. economy. Te New Deal programs had not solved the unemployment problem. Tere were as many people unemployed in 1938 as there had been when he took o ce. Te only way FDR knew to provide jobs to U.S. workers was by government spending and the European cash and carry war orders were putting people to work. Tese foreign orders, he told Morgenthau, mean prosperity in this country and we cant elect a Democratic Party unless we get prosperity. Secretary Morgenthau agreed, And hes right. 42
In May, FDR asked Congress for more fundsover a billion dollarsto pay for 50,000 planes. 43 He was impatient. Only two weeks later he urged Congress to hurry up with the funds. 44 Tus in that election year FDR sought to solve his political problem by putting workers to work on war orders. Te manufacture of 50,000 planes would create jobs. FDR probably gave little thought to the fact that the cost of these 50,000 planes would be added to the federal debt and thus to the problems of future presidents. On April 17, 1940, Secretary of State Cordell Hull warned Japan that the U.S. would oppose Intervention in the domestic 41 Ibid., pp. 11718. 42 This description of the March 12, 1940, White House meeting is based on Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, pp.10918. Morgenthau quote appears on p. 118. 43 Roosevelts message to Congress, May 16, 1940. See U.S. Congress, Events, p. 239 (May 16, 1940 entry). See also H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce; Longmans, Green, 1955), p. 127 (the ofcial British history of World War II). 44 Ibid., p.127. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 25 aairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes. 45
British procurement of military supplies from the United States in that election year was precarious. FDR wanted to help, but the American public did not fully approve of the administra- tions partiality for the British and French. Since Roosevelt was anxious to avoid arousing the opposition of the voters who wished the United States to remain neutral, the administrations non-neu- tral agreements had to be made in secrecy. Tis was the dilemma that was continuously in the mind of the president and of the Secretary of the Treasury. Te Anglo- French Co-ordinating Committee was thus made aware that in the then state of American public opinion the Administration could not give the Allies all the help it would wish to give. 46
Te assistance Morgenthau could give the British uctuated with public opinion. European War Impacts Asian Situation At this time, the Battle of Britain was in full force over England with German planes ying hundreds of sorties almost nightly over London, British airelds and airplane factories. She was also losing ships to German submarine attacks in the Atlantic faster than they could be replaced. Her situation was desperate; she had no ships to spare for the defense of Singapore and could not aord to expand the war into the Far East. So when pressured by Japan to close the Burma Road, she agreed. Tus, the main route by which Chinas Nationalist Army had been able to receive war materiel was closed for three months from July 18, 1940 to October 18, 1940. 45 Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 51516. 46 Hall, North American Supply, p. 92. 26 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Upon the defeat of France in June 1940 by the Nazis, the Japanese began negotiations with the Vichy government of unoc- cupied France to obtain permission to send troops to French Indochina in order to prevent aid from reaching China by that route. Te weak Vichy government, in no position to protest, nally gave permission on September 23. Te Japanese occupa- tion of French Indochina then began with the arrival of 6,000 Japanese soldiers. Japan joined the Axis Powers on September 27, 1940, when she entered into a Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. All three nations pledged total aid to each other if any one of the three were attacked by a third party with which they were not then at war. German and Japanese relations with the U.S.S.R. were not to be aected. Te British were anxious to avoid war with Japan at almost any price. Tey realized their territories in southeast Asia were vulnerable if Japanese forces should move into Indochina. But rather than trying to appease Japan into not striking, which they felt would be interpreted as weakness, they determined to show rmness. Both the United States and Britain decided that the best way to oppose Japan was to strengthen and encourage China. Britain decided in January 1941 to enter into closer relations with Chiang so that, if war came, Chiang would help Britain in Burma and Hong Kong. 47
Te U.S. government made $100 million available to Chiang in December 1940 and promised him also a supply of up-to- date ghter planes. Britain even though strapped nancially, contributed 5 million to the Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund and granted export credits to China up to a maximum of 3 million. 48
47 S. Woodburn Kirby, Major-General, Te War Against Japan: Te Loss of Singa- pore (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1957), vol. 1, p. 53. 48 Ibid., p. 58. U.S. International Policy: 19331940 27 U.S. Fleet Stationed in Pearl Harbor On April 2, 1940, the U.S. Fleet left the west coast for maneuvers in Hawaiian waters. Since the eet was sched- uled to return in early May for war games, the families of the Navy personnel remained on the U.S. mainland. Ten on May 4, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Richardson, received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations Stark: IT LOOKS PROBABLE BUT NOT FINAL THAT THE FLEET WILL REMAIN IN HAWAIIAN WATERS FOR SHORT TIME AFTER MAY 9TH. 49 Ten on May 7, Stark again cabled Richardson from Washington asking him to issue a press release saying: I HAVE REQUESTED PERMISSION TO REMAIN IN HAWAIIAN WATERS TO ACCOMPLISH SOME THINGS I WANTED TO DO WHILE HERE. THE DEPARTMENT HAS APPROVED THIS REQUEST. Richardson was told to delay the eets departure for a cou- ple of weeks and to carry out regularly scheduled overhauls and movements. At the end of that time he could expect further instructions. Richardson was disturbed at being asked to make a request for which there was no logical reason. As he explained later, Te Fleet had just completed its annual Fleet Problem, the culmina- tion of a years tactical training. 50 Further, although tactical train- ing of senior o cers could be accomplished in Hawaii, training in air and surface gunnery, which was also necessary, needed large- scale facilities not available there. To use the extra two weeks to 49 James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973), p. 308. 50 Ibid., p. 309. 28 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy advantage called for making adjustments that would result in los- ing three to six weeks out of a tightly scheduled training year. Richardson felt that the Navy Department had placed him, the commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet, in a com- pletely false position, with a requirement that he announce to the public something which, on its very face, every tyro ensign would recognize as a phony. 51 He was even more disturbed by the cable he received from Washington a week later reporting on the war in Europe and concluding: PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT FLEET WILL REMAIN HAWAIIAN WATERS FOR SOME TIME. 52 Richardson was very much opposed to retaining the eet in Hawaii. He went to Washington several weeks later to explain his reasons to the president in person. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., p. 311. Te complete cable read as follows: FROM: OPNAV [O ce, Chief of Naval Operations] TO: CINCUS [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet] SOME BRITISH AUTHORITIES FEEL THAT ITALY MAY JOIN GERMANY IN ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE x THIS FEELING IS NOT SHARED BY OTHER CLOSE OBSERVERS X OUR STATE DEPARTMENT INCLINED TO DISAGREE x REGARDING DUTCH EAST INDIES JAPAN HAS MADE TWO STATEMENTS WHICH IF TAKEN AT THEIR FACE VALUE STATE THEY WISH STATUS QUO PRESERVED x GREAT BRITAIN HAS STATED SHE HAS NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING WITH STATUS QUO AND THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE HAS ISSUED A SIMILAR STATEMENT x PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT FLEET WILL REMAIN HAWAIIAN WATERS FOR SOME TIME x HOPE TO ADVISE YOU MORE DEFINITELY NEXT WEEK x 2. Foreign Relations in an Election Year U.S.-British Cooperation O n May 10, 1940, Winston Churchill became prime minister of England. He wrote Roosevelt on May 15: Although I have changed my o ce, I am sure you would not wish me to discontinue our intimate, private correspondence. 1 Te two men continued to enjoy the close relationship begun shortly after Britain and France went to the defense of Poland against Hitler in September 1939. Also about this time, Roosevelt established the rst hot line telephone in the White House, 2 enabling him, president of an o cially neutral nation, to communicate privately with Churchill, head of government of a nation at war. Te hot line left no paper trail, no printed record, of their conversations. 1 Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), p. 94. 2 Richard T. Loomis, Te White House Telephone and Crisis Management, U.S. Naval Proceedings, December 1969, p. 63. 29 30 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Churchills May 15 letter pleaded to the United States for help: I trust you realise, Mr. President that the voice and force of the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too long. . . . All I ask now is that you should proclaim nonbelliger- ency, which would mean that you would help us with every- thing short of actually engaging armed forces. Churchill listed Britains immediate needs: [F]irst of all, the loan of forty or fty of your older destroyers. . . . Secondly, we want several hundred of the latest types of air- craft. . . . Tirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition. . . . Fourthly . . . to purchase steel in the United States. Churchill continued: We shall go on paying dollars for as long as we can, but I should like to feel reasonably sure that when we can pay no more, you will give us the stu all the same. Churchills fth need was to have a U.S. squadron visit Irish ports, where there had been reports of Germans dropped by parachutes. Ten Churchill added: Sixthly, I am looking to you to keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacic, using Singapore [in Southeast Asia] in any way convenient. 3 Roosevelt assured Churchill the next day that he was most happy to continue our private correspondence. . . . I am, of course, giving every possible consideration to the suggestions made in your message. Ten he took Churchills several requests up one by one. With respect to the destroyers, FDR was not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment. As for the aircraft, he wrote [w]e are now doing everything within our power to make it possible for the Allied 3 Loewenheim, et al., eds., Roosevelt and Churchill, pp. 9495. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 31 Governments to obtain the latest types of aircraft in the United States. Concerning anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition, the most favorable consideration will be given to the request. And with respect to steel, he understood satisfactory arrange- ments have been made for its purchase. FDR was also willing to consider a visit of a U.S. squadron to Irish ports. To the request that the United States keep Japan quiet, FDR responded, As you know, the American eet is now concentrated at Hawaii, where it will remain at least for the time being. 4 Churchills letter was dated May 15, British time. Given the ten-hour dierence between London and Hawaii, some 15 to 20 hours could have lapsed by the time, late on the 15th of May, when Admiral Richardson, commander of the eet in Hawaii, received the OPNAV (Chief of Naval Operations) cable advising him that the eet was to remain in Hawaiian waters for some time 5 (see pp. 2728). In view of the timing, it is not inconceiv- able that the OPNAV cable was prompted, at least in part, by Churchills urging. The European Situation Worsens as France Falls William C. Bullitt, whom FDR had sent to the U.S.S.R. in 1933 as the rst United States ambassador to that country, left Moscow in 1936 to become U.S. ambassador to France. By the spring of 1940, Britains troops were being hard- pressed on the continent by the Nazi military forces. In May they were retreating to Dunkirk on the English Channel. From there they were evacuated to England, thanks to their heroic and dramatic rescue by a hastily mobilized British eet of 850 ships, 4 Ibid., pp. 9596. 5 James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973), p. 311. 32 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy large and small, military and private (tugs, yachts, shing smacks, launches). Tus, more than 200,000 British, French, and Belgian troops eluded the encircling Germans (May 26June 4). By June, the German Blitzkrieg was bearing down on Paris. Reynaud described Frances desperate plight to Roosevelt on June 10: For 6 days and 6 nights our divisions have been ghting without one hour of rest. . . . Today the enemy is almost at the gates of Paris. 6
Bullitt wrote Roosevelt (May 31, 1940) on behalf of French Foreign Minister Paul Reynaud that the French were most grateful for the presence of your eet in the Pacic. Without ring a shot, it is keeping the war from spreading to the French and British Empires in the Far East. We hope it will stay there. Reynaud requested that the U.S. Atlantic Fleet be sent to the Mediterranean. By keeping the enemy at bay there, Your [Atlantic] eet, he said, can play exactly the same role in the Mediterranean as the U.S. Fleet is now playing in the Pacic. Incidentally, FDR wrote Reynaud in longhand, further strong steps were taken yesterday by me in regard to the Mediterranean threat. 7
Roosevelt again, on June 13, appeared to hold out hope to Reynaud: [T]his Government is doing everything in its power to make available to the Allied Governments the material they so urgently require, and our efforts to do still more are being redoubled. 8 6 Deparment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce), vol. 1, p. 245. 7 Te New York Times, April 26, 1970, pp. 3031. 8 Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, p. 248. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 33 When Churchill saw a copy of this secret message, he wired Roosevelt that he considered it absolutely vital that this message should be published tomorrow, June 14, in order that it may play the decisive part in turning the course of world history. 9 Ten Roosevelt must have realized that he had exceeded his author- ity in giving such an assurance to a belligerent nation. He wired Ambassador Kennedy in London: My message to Reynaud not to be published in any circum- stances. . . . It was in no sense intended to commit and does not commit this Government to the slightest military activities in support of the Allies. . . . Tere is of course no authority except in Congress to make any commitment of this nature. 10 German troops entered Paris on June 14, 1940. On June 17 the French sued for peace. France and Germany signed an armi- stice ve days later. France had fallen. FDR Moves toward a Third Term as President Since February 1940, FDR had been hinting to various friends and condants that he might run for a third term, thus break- ing with the precedent set by George Washington and followed by all succeeding U.S. presidents. He made no public announce- ment, but he had apparently settled the matter in his own mind by June. Because of the international situation, the fall of France, and his unannounced intentions, FDR considered it important to have a united country. He decided to replace the two cabinet o cers who had obstructed some of his foreign-policy initia- tives and make his cabinet bipartisan. Roosevelt maneuvered the 9 Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941: Te Partnership Tat Saved the West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p.185. 10 Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, p. 250. 34 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy resignations of Secretary of War Woodring and Navy Secretary Charles Edison, 11 who had opposed FDRs proposal to transfer to England some army planes and 50 destroyers 12 and oered their posts to two RepublicansAlfred M. Landon and Frank Knox, the 1936 Republican candidates for president and vice president. Landon turned down the oer, but Mr. Knox accepted, agreeing to serve as secretary of the Navy. Roosevelt then looked for another prominent Republican who shared his views on foreign policy. He turned to Henry L. Stimson. As Hoovers Secretary of State in the 1920s, Stimson had long wanted the United States to take a rm stand against Japans operations on the Asian mainland. His position, recently set forth in a talk to some of his fellow alumni at the Yale University com- mencement, was that the United States should reject so-called neutrality and take a stronger stand against Japan and Germany. Te next day, June 18, he expressed similar ideas in a radio talk and his remarks were reported the following morning on page one of Te New York Times. FDR phoned him that very day oer- ing him the post of secretary of war. 13 When Stimson asked if the president had seen the story in the Times,FDR said he had and, according to Stimsons diary, he agreed with it. Tus reassured, Stimson accepted the position. He was sworn in as Secretary of War on July 10, 1940. Tese two new cabinet o cers soon began to inuence U.S. foreign policy; some Navy o cials even dated our commitment to war from about July 1, 1940, when Roosevelt dropped Edison 11 Prior to the post-World War II reorganization of the government, when the military forces were combined under a single Department of Defense, War and Navy were separate departments, each with full cabinet ranking. 12 James Farley, Jim Farleys Story (Irvine Calif.: Reprint Services Corp., 1948), pp. 24143. 13 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947/8), p. 324. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 35 and Woodring and replaced them with two men more willing to follow Roosevelts lead. Stimson, the new secretary of war, began almost immediately to push for compulsory military training. His eorts were soon crowned with success. Te Selective Service Act of 1940 was passed, and the president signed it into law on September 16. 14 British Secret Agent in the U.S. By the summer of 1940 Englands plight was desperate. Germany controlled most of Europe; her planes were being read- ied for nightly bombings of Britains cities; her U-boats were pre- paring to attack British shipping in the Atlantic on a massive scale. In June the British sent to New York Sir William Stephenson who opened o ces in New York in Radio City. Ostensibly a pub- lic-relations man, Stephenson was actually a British agent known as Intrepid, a secret envoy of Churchills and chief of British Security Coordination. Intrepids express purpose was to get the United States into the war. FDR reportedly told Stephenson on one occasion, apparently he wasnt kidding, Im your biggest undercover agent. 15 Stephenson met with Roosevelt in Washington. Secret arrangements were made for U.S.-British cooperation and for sharing of condential information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In retrospect, the foreign-policy decisions made in Washington from that time on seem to have been aimed relentlessly at taking the United States down the road to war on the side of England and against Germany and Japan. 14 Ibid., pp. 34548. 15 William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: Te Secret War (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 127. 36 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy U.S. Encourages British Military Purchases Britains and Frances cash and carry purchases permitted under the 1939 Neutrality Act were a stimulus to U.S. producers of arms and other military supplies. Tose huge sales had relieved much of the mass unemployment that had plagued this country since the Depression and that FDRs New Deal had failed to solve. But with the fall of France, only the British were still in a position to buy, and they were fast running out of cash. Roosevelt feared that if their purchases came to an end, mass unemploy- ment would return. He was looking for ways to keep workers employed when the British could no longer pay cash. On July 3 Lord Lothian, British ambassador to the United States, presented to the State Department a formal statement on the status of his countrys nances. Britain was overcommitted. Te United Kingdom would pay as long as she could, but in all frankness . . . it will be utterly impossible for them [His Majestys Government] to continue to do this for any inde- nite period. . . . Tis was not a request for credit. Te United States Ambassador in London had warned that such a request would be unwise. Rather, it reected British concern with their need to enter into long-term contracts so as to feel condent of their sources of supply. Te British were reassured by Washington o cials. Lord Lothian was told informally ten days later not to worry too much on the score of dollars. 16 According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, the presi- dent personally charged him with the responsibility of seeing that everything be done for them [the British] so that they could 16 H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce; Longmans, Green, 1955), p. 243. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 37 not quit ghting. 17 Morgenthau asked the British for a detailed explanation of their nances. In mid-July a representative of the British treasury, Sir Frederick Phillips, was sent to Washington to report. Te British were then placing orders for aircraft, and Morgenthau thought [t]he scope of British purchasing plans . . . would probably leave England short of gold within six months. 18
On July 24, Morgenthau gave Arthur Purvis, head of the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission, bold advice. Youve talked about how the British would like 3,000 planes a month; say to [William S.] Knudsen [chairman of the Council of National Defense], youre ready to order them. . . . Dont worry about the authorization. . . . [Y]oull get it all right. . . . Youve got to blu; stick to the 3,000 planes and put it up to Knudsen as though it were an oer you had been thinking about for weeks. . . . Tell Knudsen you want 3,000 planes and Ill back you up. As he recalled later, The tactic worked. 19
On July 25, when reporters asked Morgenthau whether the British were able to pay for the planes they were ordering, he replied he was not worried about a lack of funds: they have plenty of moneyplenty. To the British embassy this implied ultimate nancial assistance by the United States; no promise of any kind, however, had been given. . . . Te [British] war chest was emptying faster than the Treasury had expected. . . . It was clear that only the United States Government was left; without its aid purchasing from the United States must cease. 20 17 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938 1941 (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1965), pp. 171. 18 Ibid., p.170. 19 Ibid., p.175. 20 Hall, North American Supply, pp. 25152. 38 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Yet according to Morgenthau, the present temper of the country [was] absolutely opposed to making loans, or anything like that, to the British. Phillips, the British Treasury o cer sent to Washington to discuss the liquidation of Englands dollar assets, told Morgenthau the British planned to sell gold and securities to meet their de- cit. Tat would have two healthy eects, Morgenthau said. It would help to nance the purchase of necessary war materials, and it would demonstrate to the American public that England was doing everything possible in her own behalf. And the dem- onstration, that Britain was doing everything she could, might in time bring American opinion to support a loan or gift. 21 1940 was an election year in the United States. Te British realized that no aid could be given before the November presi- dential election. 22 Moreover, the British recognized that any commitments made should not become public knowledge. Nevertheless, the nancial talks with Phillips in July were not too discouraging. Tey ended with an invitation for him to come again in the autumnafter the election. 23
Because the British were running out of dollars so fast, and because exposure of Londons plight might threaten negotia- tions with the United States, British treasury o cials tried their best to follow U.S. advice. If the British were to expect nancial assistance from the United States and if the critical U.S. legisla- tion was to go through as speedily as possible after the election, the American people had to be persuaded that the British were doing their best to help themselves, that they were in fact liqui- dating all their assets and gold. Troughout the summer [1940] the American Administration had been by no means backward in telling the British how they could get by until massive aid was 21 Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, pp. 17071. 22 Hall, North American Supply, p. 252. 23 Ibid., p.250. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 39 forthcoming. 24 Spokesmen for the United States oered many creative and ingenious suggestions as to how the British might economize, scrape together as much gold as possible, liquidate assets in the United States, and even how they might borrow by oering the British-owned railroads in Argentina as collateral. Secret U.S.-British Staff Conversations At the suggestion of the British ambassador, Lord Lothian, on August 6 FDR sent to London for sta conversations three U.S. military o cers, representatives of the Navy, Army, and Air ForceAssistant Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley; Chief of the Armys War Plans Division, Major General George V. Strong; and Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force, Major General Delos C. Emmons. Tey sailed on what was supposed to have been a secret mission. But the news leaked out. One outcome of their conference was an agreement in prin- ciple on methods by which the sources of information at the disposal of the United States might be placed at the disposal of the British Government. 25 By agreeing to share our informa- tion with the British, we were taking one more step away from neutrality. Te British were anxious that such an exchange of information should be placed upon a regular basis. Lord Lothian later revived the proposal. 26 24 R.S. Sayers, Financial Policy, 19391945 (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1956), p. 369. 25 Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi- sion, 1950), p. 115. 26 Ibid., p. 118. 40 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Trade Treaty with Japan Ended As the United Statess commercial treaty with Japan had expired on January 26, 1940, Roosevelt was able, on July 5, 1941, to prohibit the export, without a license, of aircraft engines and stra- tegic materials to Japan. Ten on July 31, he embargoed aviation gas. From that time on, U.S.-Japanese relations deteriorated, as artful diplomacy alternated with concerted acts of harassment. Te international situation, both in Europe and in the Far East, was becoming increasingly ominous during the summer of 1940. Our ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, warned FDR that an oil embargo might cause Japan to institute sanctions against the United States, and that sanctions could lead to war. In spite of his warning, however, we banned the export of aviation gasoline to Japan. Japan resented this move. To compensate for the loss, she began to build planes that could operate on ordinary gasoline. Japanese Diplomatic Code Broken In August the U.S. Army and Navy communications experts succeeded in breaking the top Japanese diplomatic code. Japanese messages at that time were encoded on an extremely intricate kind of typewriter, actually two typewriters connected by wires, with complex coding wheels and switches. When a message was typed on one machine, the words were printed out mechanically on the other in code. Every few days the arrangement of coding wheels and switches was altered so as to change the cipher. To break this code it was necessary to build a machine that could do what the Japanese machine could do and that would give the same results as the Japanese machine would give whenever it was adjusted. And this task had to be accomplished without having any clues as to the nature of the encoding typewriter or of when and how the switches and coding wheels were altered to change Foreign Relations in an Election Year 41 the cipher. It was thanks to a suggestion by Navy communica- tions expert Captain L.F. Saord that one of his subordinates in the Army Signal Corps, who had been struggling with the prob- lem for some time, was nally able to solve the puzzle. 27 After the Japanese diplomatic code was deciphered, the U.S. government was able to read all of Japans diplomatic messages to and from Tokyo and her representatives in all the capitals of the world. We referred to Japans diplomatic code as Purple and to the information derived from reading it as MAGIC. Destroyers-for-Bases Deal Te rst of Churchills several requests in his May 15, 1940, letter was for the loan of forty or fty of your older destroyers. 27 Captain Saord spent many hours with this author, sharing insights gained from his pre-Pearl Harbor work in communications and security, and talking about his experiences and his knowledge of the Japanese intercepts. He played an important role, not only in deciphering Purple in 1940, but also, as we shall see, in the post-Pearl Harbor investigations. According to David Kahn (Te Codebreakers: Te Story of Secret Writing, London: Weideneld & Nicolson, 1967, pp. 10, 388, 50304): Commander Laurence F. Saord . . . founded the Navys commu- nication-intelligence organization. . . . One of his principal accom- plishments before the outbreak of war was the establishment of the Mid-Pacic Strategic Direction-nder Net and of a similar net for the Atlantic, where it was to play a role of immense importance in the Battle of the Atlantic against the U-boats. . . . He [Saord] built up the communications intelligence organization into what later became OP-20-G and, by adding improvements of his own to Edward Heberns rotor mechanisms, gradually developed cipher machines suitable for the Navys requirements of speed, reliability, and security. . . . [H]e is the father of the Navys present cryptologic organization. . . . Tanks to Commander Laurance F. Saord head of OP-20-G and father of the Navys communications-intelligence organization, the United States had, upon its entrance into the war, an Atlantic arc of high-frequency direction-nders to exploit the U-boat garrulity. 42 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy FDR had replied that he was not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment. However, he talked with Chief of Naval Operations Stark about the possibility of making such a transfer. Stark was a serious, well-rounded naval o cer. His manner was genial and courteous, not at all gru or rough. He had gradu- ated from Annapolis in 1903 and had risen up through the ranks. He and Roosevelt had known each other since 1913, when FDR was assistant secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson. Stark had then been in command of a destroyer on which FDR used to travel in Maine waters when visiting his familys summer home on Campobello, a small Canadian island just across the border from Maine. Te two men had become good friends. Roosevelt liked Stark personally and trusted him as a loyal aide. In 1939, FDR appointed him Chief of Naval Operations. FDR wrote Stark at that time that it would be grand to have you here as C.N.O. . . . [Y]ou and I talk the same language. My only objection is that if we get into a war you will be a desk Admiralbut I cannot have you in two places at once! 28
Stark took over as CNO on August 1, 1939. 29 When the question of releasing U.S. destroyers to the British came up, Stark was opposed. A law prohibited the Navy from disposing of anything that the Chief of Naval Operations could not declare unnecessary for the defense of the country and Stark believed those destroyers were necessary; they were then 28 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 19281945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. 2, p. 864. 29 Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1949), p. 46n. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 43 being used by the Atlantic Patrol. 30 In spite of his geniality, Stark was no doormat that FDR could walk over at will. At times he spoke up frankly, and he must have on this occasion. FDR was apparently reluctant also but nevertheless he decided to acquiesce to Churchills request and let Britain have the destroyers. He told Stark to make the arrangements. Stark was depressed by FDRs orders. Tat evening, as Admiral Ben Moreell, chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, was leaving his o ce for home, he just happened to stick his head in Starks o ce to say good night. He noticed that Stark appeared down- cast and went in to cheer him up. Stark unburdened himself to Moreell. Te president had just asked him to give some of the United Statess over-age destroyers to England. Stark felt that, in ordering him to arrange the transfer, FDR was asking him to do something illegal, thus placing him in a hopeless position. 31 Te nal deal agreed upon exchanged 50 U.S. destroyers for 99-year leases on bases on the Grand Banks (Newfoundland), Bermuda, the Bahamas, in the Caribbean ( Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua), and in British Guiana. 32 Stark reasoned and then certied that the exchange . . . would strengthen the total defense of the United States, and that by this standard 30 Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy: Te Private War of the Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 9295. 31 Tis high-handed disregard for legal procedure on the part of FDR was not an isolated incident. Stark mentioned a similar incident respecting a dry dock at Pearl Harbor (interview with author, December 10, 1962). Tis was long before December 1941. Moreell, whose Bureau of Yards and Docks would be constructing the dry dock, asked for written authorization. When the president refused to authorize the transaction in writing, Stark went out on a limb and provided it himself. Moreell completed the dock ten months ahead of schedule, some ten days before the Japanese attack. According to Furer (Administration of the Navy Department in World War II , p. 426) this battleship dry dock proved invaluable in repairing damaged ships after the attack. 32 Walter Karig, Battle Report: Te Atlantic War (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943), p. 25. 44 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy these destroyers were not essential to our defense. We needed the destroyers; we needed the bases more. 33 Te destroyers for bases executive agreement was announced on September 3 by Roosevelt. Tis deal, he said, had been worked out in view of the friendly and sympathetic interest of His Majestys Government in the United Kingdom in the national security of the United States and their desire to strengthen the ability of the United States to cooperate eectively with the other nations of the Americas in defence of the Western Hemisphere . . . in view of the desire of the United States to acquire additional air and naval bases in the Caribbean and in British Guiana. 34 Te rst contingent of eight U.S. destroyers, renovated and outtted, was turned over to the British in Halifax on September 9. Little or no publicity accompanied the exchange. Te men who took these ships to Nova Scotia were told that under no cir- cumstances were the American destroyermen to permit them- selves to be photographed in the company of British personnel. Te destroyers were soon plying the North Atlantic as escorts to British convoys. Te last installment of ten destroyers was handed over on November 26. 35
33 Ibid., p. 15. 34 54 Stat Pt. 2, 2405, quoted in U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence, 19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 255; U.S. Department of Navy, Naval History Division, O ce of the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Wash- ington, D.C.: Government Printing O ce, 1955), p. 5. See also Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), pp. 56465. 35 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, pp. 98102. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 45 On November 1 the Atlantic Squadron of the unneutral U.S. Neutrality Patrol became known as the Patrol Force of the newly reorganized Atlantic Fleet. Retaining the Fleet at Pearl Harbor Te U.S. Fleet, which had left the west coast on April 2, 1940, for maneuvers, had been ordered in May to stay in Hawaii. Te commander-in-chief, Admiral Richardson, had objected strenuously, but to no avail. Te eet remained in Hawaii. In July Richardson went to Washington to present to his superi- ors in person the reasons why he believed the Fleet should not be retained at Pearl Harbor. He also sought answers to several questionswhy the eet was being retained there, how long it was expected to stay there, and what eorts were being made to adequately man the eet. Richardson explained the lack of security at Pearl Harbor. He described the congestion and the di culty of operating ships in and out of its narrow entrance. He cited the inadequate facilities for eet services, training, recreation, and housing. He pointed out also that the prolonged and indenite stay away from the mainland during peacetime was bad for the morale of the men. But perhaps even more important than all these reasons was the fact that the eet at Pearl Harbor was not in a state of prepared- ness. If we went to war, it would have to return to the west coast to be outtted, and that could involve a net loss of time. 36
Richardson met and talked with the president, secretaries of state (Hull) and Navy (Knox), Chief of Naval Operations (Stark), Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Chester W. Nimitz), the Army Chief of Sta (George C. Marshall), state department o - cials, and several members of Congress. His arguments as to why the eet should not be kept in Hawaii seemed to fall on deaf ears; 36 Richardson, On the Treadmill, pp. 30718, 38395. 46 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy he didnt receive what he considered satisfactory answers to his questions. He testied later that one of Stimsons anti-Japanese appointees in the State Department, Stanley Hornbeck, appeared to be exercising a greater inuence over the disposition of the Fleet than I was. 37
Richardson was called back to Washington a second time in October, at the request of the new Secretary of the Navy, Knox. When they met, the talk turned to the possibility of war in the Pacic. Te British were planning to reopen the Burma Road shortly so as to be able to supply the Chinese forces from the south. Roosevelt was concerned about Japans possible reaction. In the event the Japanese took drastic action, he, the president, was considering shutting o all trade between Japan and the Americas, and to this end was considering establishing a patrol of light ships in two lines west of Hawaii across the Pacic. Richardson asked Knox whether the president was consider- ing a declaration of war. Te Secretary stated that the president hadnt said, and that all he, Knox, knew was what he was told. Richardson was amazed at this proposal; he said the eet was not prepared to put such a plan into eect, nor for the war which would certainly result from such a course of action. 38 Richardson also visited the president. With FDR he went over the personnel situation, pointing out the need for more enlisted men. Roosevelt believed that men in mechanical trades in civil life could be quickly inducted and made adequate sailor men, if their services were suddenly required. Richardson explained to FDR that a seasick garage mechanic would be of little use at sea, and that it took time for most young men to get their sea legs. 39 37 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 1, p. 297. 38 Richardson, On the Treadmill, pp. 399400. 39 Ibid., p. 434. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 47 Richardson then took up the question of returning the Fleet, except for a Hawaiian detachment, to the Pacic coast for train- ing and outtting. Te president stated that the eet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining inuence on the actions of Japan. Admiral Richardson doubted it would have that eect, for the Japanese military government knew full well that the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii was undermanned and unpre- pared for war. However, the president insisted: Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the eet in the Hawaiian area, has had and is now having, a restraining inuence on the actions of Japan. 40 Richardson asked the president if we were going to enter the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Tailand, or the Kra Peninsula [the southeast Asian peninsula at the southern tip of which Singapore is located], or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war contin- ued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war. 41 Te discussion [with the president] waxed hot and heavy. In Richardsons words, [I] could not help but detect that re-election political consider- ations, rather than long-range military considerations, were the controlling factor in the presidents thinking. It was less than a month before the 1940 Presidential Election, and the president was reluctant to make any commitment to increase the number of men in the Navy, which, due to the location of naval ships 40 Ibid., pp. 425, 427. 41 Ibid., p. 427; Richardsons testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee in 1945, as related in his book. 48 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy in foreign waters, would seem to run counter to his third-term campaign statements. . . . Finally, when it became fully apparent that he had no inten- tion of accepting my recommendations [to permit the Fleet to return to the west coast], I [Richardson] said to him very deliberately: Mr. President, I feel that I must tell you that the senior o cers in the Navy do not have the trust and condence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacic. Te president, with a look of pained surprise on his face, said: Joe, you just dont understand that this is an election year and there are certain things that cant be done, no matter what, until the election is over and won. 42 Financing of British Arms Purchases Assured Te president was also seriously concerned at this time with how the British were to nance their arms purchases. Te British treasury was fast being depleted. Tere was a growing sense of urgency in London. 43 It was di cult for them to know how to proceed. Earlier in the year the president had shown an inter- est in regard to British assets in Latin America, including the Argentine Railways. . . . He came back to it again in mid-October in a talk with the British Ambassador. He thought that by this means the nancial crisis might be postponed for a month or two. 44
On October 14 Lord Lothian, the British ambassador, asked Roosevelt and Morgenthau when British treasury representa- tive Phillips might return to continue discussions about Britains 42 Ibid., pp. 43435. 43 Hall, North American Supply, p. 253. 44 Ibid., p. 249. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 49 nancial resources. Lothian was told it would have to wait until after the election. 45 Shortly thereafter he returned to England for a visit. Te impasse [with respect to Britains nancial crisis] was dis- guised by the desires and explorations, of both sides, to nd some way out of the maze. Te Ambassador on his return from London nine weeks later, reported that the [U.S.] Administration was still discussing ingenious ways of giving us assistance. 46 Te British encountered continued vacillation in their deal- ings with the United States. Time after time the British side was told to go ahead with orders, only to nd the way blocked by insuperable di cul- ties. On 20th October Purvis [Britains purchasing agent in Washington] reported that in week-end talks with Secretary Morgenthau at the latters home he had received a complete green light for the immediate ordering of 9,000 aircraft. . . . In the next few days Purvis and [Sir Walter] Layton were told to go ahead with their orders on the assumption that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would pay for the capital cost. An agreement to this eect was worked out with the War Department. Te admonitions to go ahead continued at inter- vals through December. 47 FDR Winds Up His Election Campaign As the election campaign continued, Roosevelt spoke to the people more than once about his determination to keep the United States out of the war. For example, in Chicago on September 11: 45 Ibid., p. 250. 46 Ibid., p. 253. 47 Ibid., p. 254. 50 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy I hate war, now more than ever. I have one supreme deter- minationto do all that I can to keep war away from these shores for all time. I stand, with my party, and outside of my party as president of all the people, on the [Democratic Party] platform, the wording that was adopted in Chicago less than two months ago. It said: We will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our Army, naval or air forces to ght in foreign lands outside of the Americas, except in case of attack. 48 While Roosevelt and his administration were reassuring the British o and on of U.S. assistance in their war against Germany, he was reassuring the American voters of our continued neutral- ity. On October 23, he spoke in Philadelphia: 49 To Republicans and Democrats, to every man, woman and child in the nation I say this: Your president and your Secretary of State are following the road to peace. We are arming ourselves not for any foreign war. We are arming ourselves not for any purpose of conquest or intervention in foreign disputes. I repeat again that I stand on the Platform of our Party. . . . It is for peace that I have labored: and it is for peace that I shall labor all the days of my life. 48 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Te Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, vol. 1: Te Genesis of the New Deal, 19281932 (New York: Random House, 1940), p. 313; Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making: 19321940 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 31314. 49 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1940, pp. 488. Partial quote in Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Quotations from Franklin Delano Roosevelt, July 1940August 1, 1944, Republican National Committee, September 1944, p. 50. See also Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, pp. 31415. Foreign Relations in an Election Year 51 Ten on October 30, FDR made a similar pledge to the vot- ers in Boston: 50 And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars. Tey are going into training to form a force so strong that, by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war from our shores. Te purpose of our defense is defense. Roosevelt wound up his campaign with talks on Saturday evening, November 2, in Bualo, New York, and on Sunday, November 3, in Cleveland, Ohio. In Bualo, he pledged, Your president says this country is not going to war. 51 And in his nal address of the campaign, on November 3, in Cleveland, he said: 52 Te rst purpose of our foreign policy is to keep our country out of war. . . . And through it all [my past record] there have been two thoughts uppermost in my mindto preserve peace in our land; and to make the forces of democracy work for the benet of the common people of America. 50 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 19281932, p. 517; Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, p. 316. 51 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 19281932, pp. 543.; Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, p. 317. 52 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 19281932, pp. 546.; Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, p. 318. 52 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Taking the side of one of two combatants in a conict always incurs risk. For months, FDR and his close associates had been secretly encouraging the British to expect continued and increased U.S. support in their struggle against Germany. At the same time, they had been reassuring the American people they were doing everything that could be done to keep the United States neutral and at peace. Tese contradictory pronouncements were certainly inten- tional. Some time later Ambassador Bullitt, a long-time intimate and adviser of Roosevelts, as much as admitted that this equivo- cation had been deliberate. Roosevelts White House advisers, Bullitt wrote persuaded him that if he told the truth he would lose the 1940 election. Te president knew that war was com- ing to the American people. . . . Tis was a low-water mark in presidential morality, Bullitt said, but the president won the election. 53 53 William C. Bullitt, How We Won the War and Lost the Peace, 2 parts. Life (August 30, 1948), pp. 8397; (September 6, 1948), pp. 86103. 3. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened FDRs Re-election a Victory for Britain O n November 5, 1940, President Roosevelt won an unprec- edented third term, defeating Republican Wendell Willkie. However, he did not win by as large a margin as in 1936 over Republican Alfred Landon. With the election over and won, FDR no longer needed to exercise the same caution with respect to his dealings with England. Just two days after his re-election he met with British Purchasing Agent Purvis to discuss more military supplies for England. Roosevelt proposed allocating mil- itary supplies to Britain and Canada on a fty-fty basis. When the subject of ships came up, FDR mentioned leasing supplies to the Allies; and he said nothing about payment. 1 1 H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce; Longmans, Green, 1955), pp. 25657. 53 54 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy On November 8 the SS City of Rayville became the rst U.S. merchant vessel to be sunk in World War II. 2 It hit a mine laid by a German raider south of Australia in the Bass Strait. FDR did nothing about it. Meanwhile, the U.S. military was continuing to plan for war. On November 4 Chief of Naval Operations Stark drafted a new estimate of the world situation for presentation to the secretary of the Navy. In this draft, presented as a formal memorandum on November 12, Stark considered four possible plans for action: (A) limiting American activity to [western] hemisphere defense; (B) directing primary attention to Japan, and secondary atten- tion to the Atlantic; (C) directing equivalent pressure in both theaters; (D) conducting a strong oensive in the Atlantic, and a defensive [one] in the Pacic. Stark then argued for his fourth plan, Plan D or Plan Dog as it was known in service lingo. 3 U.S. Aid to the British [As] a preliminary to possible entry of the United States into the conict he [Stark] recommended that the United States Army and Navy at once undertake secret sta talks on tech- nical matters with the British in London, the Canadians in Washington . . . and the British and Dutch in Singapore and Batavia, to reach agreement and lay down plans for promoting unity of allied eort should the United States nd it necessary to enter the war. 4 2 U.S. Department of Navy, Naval History Division, O ce of the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ce, 1955), p. 6. 3 Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi- sion, 1950), p. 119. 4 Ibid. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 55 British Ambassador Lord Lothian had been advised in October that his discussions with the United States about further supplies for England would have to wait until after the election. On returning to Washington on November 23, he spoke with newsmen. Well, boys, he remarked, Britains broke; its your money we want. 5 FDR, Morgenthau, and Churchill all chided him for this calculated indiscretion. 6 In his defense, Lord Lothian reported to London that American public opinion . . . was still saturated with illu- sions . . . that we have vast resources available that we have not yet disclosed . . . and that we ought to empty this vast hypo- thetical barrel before we ask for assistance. It was this fact, he explained, which had induced him to make his statement. It is clear that the exhaustion of funds could hardly have been concealed much longer. 7 A week after that, Sir Walter Layton, director-general of pro- grams in the British ministry of supply, submitted to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau a paper headed Initial Orders to be placed for Output. Te British document cited a gure of $2,062 mil- lion plus $699 million for Capital Investment necessary for creating New Productive Capacity. 8 Morgenthau immediately took this document to FDR and asked for instructions. Tus, Roosevelt was nally forced to face up to the question, which he had successfully avoided until then, of nancing Britains urgent purchases. 5 Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds. Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), p. 125n. 6 Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941: Te Partnership Tat Saved the West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 261. 7 Hall, North American Supply, p. 258. 8 Ibid., p. 259. 56 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Roosevelt sailed aboard the Tuscaloosa on a post-election cruise for rest and reection. 9 While at sea, he received a 4,000-word plea from Churchill for American naval escorts in the Atlantic, 2,000 aircraft per month, and much, much more. Churchill stated further that orders already placed or under negotiation . . . many times exceed the total exchange resources remaining at the dis- posal of Great Britain. Te moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash. 10 Te ball was clearly in FDRs court. Stephenson, the British agent Intrepid, described the U.S.-British relationship at the end of 1940 as a common-law alliance. 11 In other words, the United States and Britain were bound in a relationship that did not enjoy the blessing or sanc- tion of law, a relationship that existed in spite of the o cially enacted U.S. Neutrality Act and in spite of Roosevelts pledges to the people of the United States that he would not permit the nation to become involved in entangling foreign alliances or intervention in foreign disputes. Lend-Lease for Peace It was apparent that the British could no longer operate on a cash-and-carry basis. FDR had been trying for some time to devise a new arrangement to help England. Finally, he hit on what became known as lend-lease. On returning from his cruise, he announced at a press conference a new aid-to-Britain program. In his folksy manner, he explained: 9 Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941, pp. 26162. 10 Loewenheim, et al., Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspon- dence, p. 125. 11 William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: Te Secret War (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 155. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 57 [I]f my neighbors house catches re . . . and I am watering the grass in my backyard, and I dont pass my garden hose over the fence to my neighbor, I am a fool. How do you think the country and the Congress would react if I should put aid to the British in the form of lending them my garden hose? 12
Tis new lend-lease program was intended to help Britain by tapping the wealth of U.S. taxpayers. A few days after FDR proposed his scheme, the German government charged that U.S. aid to the United Kingdom was moral aggression. 13 During his December 29 reside chat on the radio, Roosevelt answered Hitlers charge: Te Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world. Te intentions of the United States were completely honor- able and peaceful, he said: Tere is no demand for sending an American Expeditionary Force outside our own borders. Tere is no intention by any member of your Government to send such a force. You can, therefore, nail any talk about sending armies to Europe as deliberate untruth. Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and our people. . . . We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For 12 William C. Bullitt, How We Won the War and Lost the Peace. 2 parts. Life (August 30, 1948), pp. 8397; (September 6, 1948), pp. 86103. See also Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941, p. 263. 13 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occur- rence, 19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, pp. 1, 5. 58 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrice, as we would show were we at war. 14 FDR sent his proposal for lend-lease to Congress early in 1941. As noted New York Times correspondent Arthur Krock recalled, Congress and the public were assured, on the highest Executive word, that the measure was a means to keep the United States from becoming involved abroad, on land, sea and in the air, in World War II. For Krock, this constituted gross deception. [I]t was obviousand so pointed out repeatedly at the time that militant reaction by the Central Powers and Japan was a certainty; hence the Lend-Lease Act would inevitably change the position of the United States from a disguised cobellig- erenta status previously reached by presidential Executive Ordersto an active one. 15
Morgenthau testied for lend-lease, saying that its purpose was to save the British eet as a bulwark in the Atlantic. 16 Te House passed the bill on February 8, the Senate on March 8, and the president signed it into law on March 11, 1941. 14 Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), pp. 599607. 15 Arthur Krock, Te Consent of the Governed, and Other Deceits (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 40. 16 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938 1941 (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1965), pp. 221. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 59 Meanwhile in the Far East Te United States put $100 million at the disposal of Chiang and promised him a supply of up-to-date ghter aircraft. 17 Ten, in January 1941, Britain decided to enter into closer relations with Chiang so that, if war came, Chiang would be willing and able to help Britain in Burma and Hong Kong. 18 Moreover, former U.S. Army Air Corps Colonel Claire Chennault was openly training his Flying Tigers in Burma for air battle with the Japanese. And behind the scenes, FDR was supportive. On April 15, 1941, he signed an unpublicized executive order authorizing Reserve o cers and enlisted men to resign from the Army Air Corps, the Naval and Marine Air services so they could join Chennaults American Volunteer Group. Since the U.S. was not at war with Japan and could not deal openly with China, all arrangements had to be made with an uno cial agency to ensure secrecy. Te Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company of China was set up and authorized to hire a hundred American pilots and several hundred ground crewmen to operate, service and manufacture aircraft in China. 19
As the British and Dutch were building up their defenses in the Far East, the Japanese were pursuing their own program. Tey were concerned not only with the advance of their forces southward, obtaining supplies of oil, but also with preventing the 17 S. Woodburn Kirby, Te War Againt Japan, vol. 1: Te Loss of Singapore (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1957), p. 38. 18 Ibid., pp. 5354. 19 John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982). (1983 paperback published by Berkley Publishing, New York, includes Postscript dated August 21, 1982, p. 127n.) 60 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Communists from harassing their northern border. 20 On April 13, 1941, Japan signed a neutrality pact with Russia to safeguard her position in the north and to make it possible for her to pursue her plans southward. 21
U.S. War Planning with Britain Secret U.S.-British sta conversations, held in Washington from January 29 to March 27, 1941, led to an agreement on joint strategy. (American o cials had already met with British coun- terparts in London in January 1938, before the war in Europe began, and again in August 1940, after England was at war with Germany.) Te British sent naval and military o cers as envoys, attired in civilian dress to conceal the true nature of their mission. Te stated purpose of these secret ABC meetings (American- British-Conversations) was To coordinate, on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers and To reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of Military Cooperation between the two nations. Te agreements were to cover the principal areas of responsibility, and the major lines of Military strategy to be pursued by both nations. 22
20 Te Japanese had four ends in view: to secure their Manchurian frontier with the Soviet Union, thus enabling them to move southwards without having to look over their shoulders; to obtain oil supplies and con- cessions from the Netherlands East Indies by means other than the use of force, thus making themselves less dependent on the United States; to obtain complete control of Indo-China, so as to be able to occupy, at an appropriate moment, Siamese territory as a base from which to mount an attack on Malaya, and to prevent the United States either from entering the war on the side of Britain or interfer- ing with their own plans for their southward advance. (Kirby, Te War Against Japan, p. 59) 21 Ibid., p. 61. 22 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 61 Te agreement arrived at in Washington, known as ABC-1, sup- planted the one developed in London three years earlier ( January 1938) and outlined procedures to be followed if and when the United States entered the war. It provided that If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defen- sive. Te United States was not to increase her present military strength in the Far East, although she would employ the United States Pacic Fleet oensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier 23 by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. Also according to the agreement, the United States would so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East. 24
Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, chief of the Navys war plans division, participated in these secret conversations. According to him, the ensuing understanding was U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 15, p. 1488. See also part 15, pp. 149192: It was agreed at these meetings that: If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. Te United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacic Fleet oensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. Te United States intends so to aug- ment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East. 23 Te Malay barrier was the string of islands, stretching west from Bathurst Island, just o the northern coast of central Australia, through New Guinea, Borneo, Java, and Sumatra, to Singapore on the Malay Peninsula. See Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2864. 24 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 1485550. 62 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air, of the entire world in which it was conceived that the British Commonwealth and the United States might be jointly engaged in action against any enemy. On the conclusion of that agreement with the British, the WPL-46 [U.S. Navy war plan] was prepared after a great many talks with the Army and was approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and by the President. Te Navy issued their form of that war plan in May of 1941, and it is my recollection the Army form of it was issued about August. 25
Turner wrote further, Te plan contemplated a major eort on the part of both the principal associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period, this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate eorts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe. 26
Tus Turner rea rmed that the primary goal of the U.S.-British agreement was to help England and to target Germany. In complete disregard of the Neutrality Act o cially in force, these conversations put the United States denitely in Britains camp in her war against Germany. 25 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 264; Turner testimony at Hart Inquiry; part 15, p. 1485. Pencilled notation on United States-British Sta Conversations Report cover page: Secretary of the Navy Knox on May 28, 1941, and Secretary of War Stimson on June 2, 1941. 26 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, pp. 26465; Turner testimony before Hart Inquiry. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 63 The Undeclared Battle of the Atlantic Te Germans had invaded and occupied Denmark on April 9, 1940. Exactly one year later the United States assumed respon- sibility for the defense of Greenland, then Danish territory. According to the April 9, 1941 agreement between the United States and Denmark, the defense of Greenland against attack by a non-American power is essential to the preservation of the peace and security of the American Continent. 27 FDR wrote Churchill on April 11 that he intended to have the United States lend still more active support to the hard- pressed British in the Atlantic. To do this, We will want in great secrecy notication of movements of convoys so our patrol units can seek out any ships or planes of aggressor nations. . . . We will immediately make public to you position [of ] aggressor ships or planes when located in our patrol area. 28 Tat same day, the rst U.S. shot was red against a German target in World War II, although apparently without hitting its mark. Te U.S. destroyer Niblack had been en route from Halifax to Iceland, where she was to explore the convoying of ships to Iceland, which lay within the German submarine war zone. She responded to an SOS call from a Dutch freighter that was sink- ing after having been torpedoed by a German sub. Niblack picked up survivors. When soundings indicated a submarine in the area, Niblack dropped three depth charges, but no wreckage was seen. 29
Te president was reportedly furious when an account of this incident appeared in the press. 27 Department of State, Peace and War, p. 642; U.S. Congress, Events, p. 277. 28 Loewenheim, et al., Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspon- dence, p. 137. 29 Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy: Te Private War of the Atlantic Fleet, 19391942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 19196. 64 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy On the other side of the Atlantic, Adolf Hitler was taking great pains to avoid a clash with the United States. On April 25 he cautioned his naval forces that all incidents with American ships be avoided. Te commander-in-chief of his navy, Admiral Erich Raeder, was pushing for aggressive action against the United States. Hitler answered Raeder at a conference on May 22, order- ing that Weapons are not to be used. Even if American vessels conduct themselves in a denitely unneutral manner. . . . Weapons are to be used only if US ships re the rst shot. 30
In late April, Roosevelt extended the Atlantic patrols area of surveillance from 200 to 300 miles east of our shores, to the western border of the German submarine war zone or 26 degrees west longitude, whichever was farther west, 31 and south to 20 degrees south latitude. 32 Tis encompassed the vast expanse of the Atlantic between Bermuda and the Azores. Arrangements were also set in motion to strengthen the Atlantic Fleet at the expense of the Pacic Fleet, by transferring a carrier and ve destroyers from Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic. By May, U.S. Navy personnel were ying regularly as pilot advisers aboard some of the planes the British had received through lend-lease. On May 26 one of these advisers, ensign Leonard B. Smith, aboard a U.S.-manufactured PBY (Catalina Patrol Bomber) over the Atlantic, about 690 miles west of Brest (France), spotted the Bismarck, a huge German battleship. Although only fairly recently commissioned, the Bismarck was menacing British shipping and had already sunk the illustrious British battle cruiser Hood. When the sighting was broadcast, other American PBYs with U.S. personnel aboard, as well as some ten or twelve British warships, joined the chase. Te Bismarck tried desperately to make port, but failed. She was nally sunk 30 Ibid., pp. 164, 176. 31 Ibid., p. 154. 32 Department of Navy, United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 26. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 65 on May 27, after enduring a horrendous bombing; over 2,000 o cers and crew went down with the ship. 33 Te rst U.S. ship to be torpedoed by a German submarine was a freighter, the Robin Moor, sunk in the South Atlantic on May 21. News of the event reached the world only when survi- vors nally landed in Brazil on June 11. Roosevelt was outraged. But, although some British o cials in Washington, as well as the Presidents close friend and adviser, Harry Hopkins, wished for decisive U.S. retaliation, FDR did no more than remonstrate. 34 On June 6 Roosevelt authorized the seizure of all idle for- eign merchant ships in our ports for urgent needs of commerce and national defense. 35 German, Italian, and Danish ships had already been taken into protective custody on March 30 for the duration of the emergency. Ten on June 14 Roosevelt ordered Axis funds in the United States frozen. Two days later the United States requested with- drawal of German and Italian consular stas by July 10, charg- ing them with having engaged in activities wholly outside the scope of their legitimate duties. 36 FDR had long since given up all pretense of applying the Neutrality Act equally to all belligerents. In his view, Britain had enjoyed special status from the very beginning of the war. Ten after Germany attacked Russia on June 21, 1941, FDR refrained as well from applying the neutrality law to the Soviet Union. He released Russian credits and promised Stalin lend-lease aid. By these actions, Roosevelt was further committing this country to the British cause and against Germany. At the same time that he 33 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, pp. 18489. 34 L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Te Undeclared War (London: Royal Insti- tute of International Aairs, 1953), pp. 51920. 35 Department of Navy, United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 9. See also U.S. Congress, Events, p. 283. 36 Ibid. p. 284. 66 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy was allying the United States with the communist Soviet Union, he was also lending support to the communists on the opposite side of the worldin China. By cooling down the conversations the U.S. government had been holding with capitalistically ori- ented Japan, long engaged in a struggle against the Soviet Union in Asia, Roosevelt was taking the side of the communists and thus placing the United States directly in opposition to Japan. On July 1 the Roosevelt administration exchanged letters with Iceland, pointing out that it was imperative that the integrity and independence of Iceland should be preserved because of the fact that any occupation of Iceland by a power whose only too clearly apparent plans for world conquest included the domination of the peoples of the New World would at once directly menace the security of the entire Western Hemisphere. On July 7, the United States occupied Iceland. 37 Te Icelanders accepted the occupation fatalistically as a necessary evil. 38 The U.S. Begins Escorting British Ships Te desirability of instigating escort operations to help safe- guard U.S. and British ships plying the Atlantic was seriously discussed during the early months of 1941. Stark had pressed for escorts in June, so as not to let England fall. He proposed at one time to coordinate the departure of U.S. ships and British convoys from the vicinity of Halifax. Ten on July 2 the presi- dent approved the Atlantic Fleets plan for escort operations. Te occupation of Iceland and the need to assure the arrival there of supplies and provisions provided the immediate excuse. By late 37 Ibid., p. 288; Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 68687. 38 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, p. 201. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 67 July the decision had been made to escort, 39 and on August 20, U.S. ships actually began escorting American and British mer- chant ships in the North Atlantic to and from Iceland. 40 Te decision to escort was a policy decision, in line with that of continuing to support Britain and to oppose Germany. Historian Patrick Abbazia described it as the logical conclusion of . . . the Presidents previous policy, his determination to prevent the Germans from winning the Battle of the Atlantic. It had little to do, as is sometimes said, with the need to safeguard precious Lend-Lease cargoes as such. 41 Roosevelt Meets Churchill; They Discuss Japans Threatening Encroachment on British in Far East In August 1941 it was announced that FDR was leaving Washington on an extended shing expedition. He left aboard the Coast Guard cutter Calypso and shed o the coast of Massachusetts for a couple of days. Ten he quietly transferred to the American cruiser Augusta, which sped north to Newfoundland. Churchill, traveling from England aboard the British battleship the Prince of Wales, also headed for Newfoundland. Te two ships rendezvoused in Placentia Bay, just o Argentia, Newfoundland. Tere, from August 9 to 12, the two heads of state met, talked, and entertained one another in turn, each on his respective ship. On August 11 Churchill wired London from Argentia an account of his conversations with FDR. He reported to his secretary of state 39 Ibid., pp. 21316. 40 Langer and Gleason, Te Undeclared War, p. 665. 41 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, p. 216. 68 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy for foreign aairs, Anthony Eden, that Roosevelt had agreed to negotiate a moratorium [with Japan] of, say, thirty days, in which we may improve our position in Singapore area and the Japanese will have to stand still. But he will make it a condition that the Japanese meanwhile encroach no farther, and do not use Indo-China as a base for attack on China. He will also maintain in full force the economic measures directed against Japan. Tese negotiations show little chance of succeeding, but President considers that a month gained will be valuable. Churchills report to Eden continued: At the end of the Note which the President will hand to the Japanese Ambassador when he returns from his cruise in about a weeks time he will add the following passage which is taken from my draft: Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwest Pacic would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take coun- ter-measures, even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan. 42 During their private conference, FDR indicated to Churchill that because he was uncertain that he could carry Congress with him in a declaration of war, and because more time was needed to strengthen Americas forces, he must seek to delay a break with Japan. Churchill had hoped at this meeting to persuade Roosevelt to have the United States declare war on the German-Italian Axis. Churchill told him that he would rather have an American dec- laration of war now and no supplies for six months than double the supplies and no declaration. However, Churchill recognized the presidents constitutional di culties: He may take action as Chief Executive, but only Congress can declare war. According 42 Winston Churchill, Te Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1950), pp. 43941. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 69 to Churchill, He went so far as to say to me, I may never declare war: I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war, they might argue about it for three months. 43
Although Churchill hoped for a U.S. declaration of war, he was generally pleased at the outcome of the Argentia meeting. FDR had in eect agreed to issue an ultimatum to Japan along the lines of Churchills suggestion. No further encroachment in the southwest Pacic would be tolerated, or else various steps would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding the presidents realization that the taking of such measures might result in war between the United States and Japan. 44
Te newspapers and newsreels of the day announced the meeting at Argentia and showed the two men sitting at their ease on the deck of the Augusta, or attending Sunday church service on the Prince of Wales. When FDR returned to Washington, he let it be understood that the only outcome of the meeting had been the Atlantic Charter, 45 a plan for postwar world peace and prosperity. Te Charter, signed by both Roosevelt and Churchill, set forth certain idealistic common principles. Force was to be abandoned, peaceful trade and economic collaboration among all nations was to be assured and it was hoped that after the nal destruction of the Nazi tyranny all men in all nations would be able to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance and to live out their lives in freedom from fear and want. 43 Ibid., p. 593, Churchill reporting by letter (November 9, 1941) to General Jan Christian Smuts, prime minister of the Union of South Africa, on the meeting at Argentia. 44 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation (signed by Sumner Welles, undersecretary of state) between the president and Winston Churchill at sea, August 11, 1941. 45 U.S. Congress, Events, p. 293; Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 71819. 70 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy The Undeclared Battle of the Atlantic Continues Te U.S. Patrol Force had seen little activity since late 1940, when some of its destroyers had trailed several German ships from Mexican ports until they were intercepted by British or Dutch ships and then scuttled by their crews. 46 Ten in March 1941, all Axis ships remaining in U.S. ports had been seized. So when the decision to escort was made, the Patrol Force was sim- ply diverted from routine patrolling. After August, when convoys of British and U.S. merchant ships crossed the Atlantic to main- tain a lifeline of supplies and equipment to England, they were usually accompanied by U.S. destroyers. On September 4, the destroyer Greer was on her way to Iceland with mail and miscellaneous freight when a British bomber over- head signaled that it had sighted a German submarine in the area. Te submarine released a torpedo. Te Greer responded with a depth charge. Te submarine released a second torpedo. Neither sub nor the Greer hit its target. 47 German submarines had also torpedoed and sunk several other ships operated by non-belligerentson August 17, the SS Sessa of Panamanian registry, on its way to Iceland; also on August 17, the SS Panaman; and on September 6 in the Gulf of Suez, the SS Steel Seafarer. 48 FDR, stirred to action by the attack on the Greer, issued to the U.S. Navy serving in Americas expanded defense waters a shoot-on-sight order. He sounded angry when he spoke to the nation by radio on September 11: 49 46 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, pp. 12629. 47 Ibid., pp. 22329. See also
Department of Navy, United States Naval Chro- nology, World War II, p. 11. 48 U.S. Congress, Events, p. 297. 49 Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 73743. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 71 It is the Nazi design to abolish the freedom of the seas and to acquire absolute control and domination of the seas for them- selves. . . . We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. We do not seek it now. . . . But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. Tese Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. Tey are a menace to the free pathways of the high seas. . . . Te time for active defense is now. . . . Upon our naval and air patrolnow operating in large num- ber over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Oceanfalls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas now. Tat means, very simply and clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant shipsnot only American ships but ships of any agengaged in commerce in our defensive waters. Tey will protect them from submarines; they will protect them from surface raiders. It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas which are vital to American defense. Te aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense. But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters the protection of which is neces- sary for American defense they do so at their own peril. Te orders which I have given as Commander-in-Chief to the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policyat once. As a result of the presidents order, our destroyers escorting convoys in the North Atlantic began to engage in active defense. Tey searched, took sonar readings, frequently made contact 72 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy with German submarines, and released depth charges. German submarines truly learned that they ventured into the vicinity of British convoys being escorted by U.S. destroyers only at their own peril. On September 16, the destroyer USS Kearny, heading from Argentia to Iceland with a convoy, was trying to corral late arrivals and stragglers. To discourage a trailing submarine, the Kearny dropped a depth charge. Te sub launched several torpedoes. A number of ships in the convoy were torpedoed, set ablaze, and sunk. Te Kearny, silhouetted against the burning ships, became an easy target. Te German U-boat red three tor- pedoes, hitting her almost amidships and causing an explosion. Eleven men were killed and 22 were wounded in the attack. Yet the surviving crew members, by prodigious eort, saved the ship. She limped into Reykjavik Harbor two days later. 50 On September 22 Stark, in Washington, reported to his Asiatic Fleet Commander, Admiral Hart, on the situation: So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it [the war]. . . . If Britain is to continue, she has to have assis- tance. She will now get it openly. . . . In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys regularly from the United States to points in the Iceland area. . . . [C]ontacts are almost certain to occur. Te rest requires little imagination. 51 Starks expectations were soon borne out. Active defense in the Atlantic meant that U.S. ships searched for submarines and dropped depth charges. Unsurprisingly, a U.S. ship was soon torpedoed and sunk. In October the destroyer Reuben James was accompanying a convoy in the North Atlantic. Several submarines were harassing the convoy. On October 31 a German torpedo 50 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, pp. 26580. 51 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, pp. 220911. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 73 hit the Reuben James on her side; an explosion burst her in two. Forty-ve men were saved; a hundred died. 52 Te United States was still o cially neutral. Yet it had seized Axis ships in its harbors and frozen Axis funds. It was supplying England and her allies with weapons and supplies. Its ships were escorting British convoys in waters infested with German sub- marines, dropping depth charges on them. Its ships had trailed Axis ships, notied the British of their whereabouts, and stood by while the Axis ships were sunk. Its ships were being sunk, and its sailors were being killed. Te president of the United States, commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy under the U.S. Constitution, was doing precisely what he had told Churchill he might do: he was beginning to make war, without declaring war. 52 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, pp. 297308. See also Department of Navy, United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 11, and Samuel Eliot Morison, Te Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), p. 37. 4. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations U.S. Relations with Japan R elations with Japan had been strained for some time. Te Roosevelt administration was fully aware of Japans depen- dence on imports. Yet, as we have seen, it had terminated Americas long-standing commercial treaty with her. After January 1940 Japan had to ask permission on a case by case basis whenever she wanted to import from the United States. In July 1940 the administration had further prohibited exports to Japan by requiring her to get a license to purchase aircraft engines and strategic materials. (When sale of aviation gas, dened by the U.S. as 86 octane or higher, was embargoed on July 1, 1940, she had contrived a way to use 76 octane in her planes. 1 ) Te administra- tion was tightening an economic noose around Japans neck bit by 1 Interview by author of Captain Albert E. Hindmarsh, January 9, 1964 (type- script in authors les). According to Hindmarsh, Japanese language expert with the O ce of Naval Intelligence before the attack, the July 1941 embargo of gasoline below 86 octane really hurt Japan. 75 76 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy bit, forcing her to look elsewhere for the supplies and materials she had been accustomed to buying from the United States. Te Japanese had considerable commercial interests in south- east Asia, especially in French Indochina (now comprising the states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). After France fell in June 1940, Japan had negotiated with the Vichy government of unoc- cupied France for permission to occupy French Indochina, to take over bases there, and to maintain order. Te rather helpless Vichy government had agreed. As trade with the United States became more di cult, Japans interests in Indochina gained in importance and she turned more and more in that direction for the foods and raw materials she needed. Trade pacts concluded later with Indochina assured Japan of uninterrupted supplies of rice, rubber, and other needed raw materials. U.S. Ambassador Grew in Japan kept Roosevelt fully advised of her precarious economic situation and urgent need for imports. Chief of Naval Operations (NCO) Stark had warned the presi- dent of the danger of imposing an oil embargo on Japan. Stark had made it known to the State Department in no uncertain terms that in my opinion if Japans oil were shut o, she would go to war. He did not mean necessarily with us, but . . . if her economic life had been choked and throttled by inability to get oil, she would go somewhere and take it . . . and if I were a Jap, I would do the same. 2
Many people, including Eleanor Roosevelt, the presidents wife, were concerned about what Japan might be planning. In the fall of 1940, she had asked her husband about our continuing shipment of oil to Japan. FDR answered Eleanor on November 13, 1940: 2 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 32, p. 43. Testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 77 Te real answer which you cannot use is that if we forbid oil shipments to Japan, Japan will increase her purchases of Mexican oil and furthermore, may be driven by actual neces- sity to a descent on the Dutch East Indies. At this writing, we all regard such action on our part as an encouragement to the spread of war in the Far East. [Signed] F.D.R. 3
Tus Roosevelt had been well aware for some time that stop- ping the export of oil to Japan was fraught with danger. Japan feared also that her assets in the United States might be frozen, making her economic situation still more perilous. In February 1941 Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador in Tokyo, cabled his Foreign O ce in London that Japan would soon move against British-held Singapore, then a vital commer- cial and communications link between Britain and her overseas dominions and colonies. Anthony Eden, British secretary of state for foreign aairs, called Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese ambassador in London, into his o ce, and gave him a thorough hauling over the coals concerning the extravagant and sensa- tional telegrams emanating from the British embassy in Tokyo. 4
When Eugene H. Dooman, counselor at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, called on Japans vice minister for foreign aairs, Chiuchi Ohashi, Ohashi told him that there was no truth whatever in Sir Roberts prediction. Ohashi said he had repeatedly told Sir Robert that Japan would not move in Singapore or the Dutch East Indies, unless we (the Japanese) are pressed (by the imposi- tion of American embargoes). However, Ohashi went on to say that if disorders beyond the power of the French to control were to arise in Indochina . . . we would be obliged to step in to suppress 3 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters: 19281945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. 2, p. 1077. 4 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941. vol. 2: Te Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1956), pp. 3739; Grew memorandum of February 14, 1941. 78 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the disorders. 5 Ohashis assertion was one more reminder of the danger inherent in imposing embargoes on Japan. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall Chief of sta of the Army at this time was General George C. Marshall. Marshall had graduated from Virginia Military Institute in 1901 and began his military career as a second lieu- tenant in 1902. Te Spanish-American War had just ended and he was assigned the task of accompanying infantry troops to the Philippines. He entered World War I as a captain and before it ended was promoted to temporary colonel. In May of the fol- lowing year, he became aide-de-camp to the World War I hero General John J. Pershing, but was returned to his permanent rank of captain shortly thereafter. After the war he had to begin again to work his way up to colonel, a slow process in peacetime. 6
General Douglas MacArthur, a contemporary of Marshalls but a graduate of West Point (1903), became chief of sta in 1930 and served in that capacity until 1935. At that time, Pershing sug- gested to MacArthur that he promote Marshall, his former aide, to brigadier general. Marshall had spent most of his career up to that time in service schools and sta positions and had only just attained the rank of full colonel. To round out his experience, so as to become qualied for a generalship, he was given a command assignment with a top regiment. Tis was during the early years of FDRs New Deal, when the Army had been asked to help estab- lish the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Marshall devoted so much of his energies to the CCC that his regiments train- ing program was found to have suered seriously. Tus Marshall 5 Ibid., p. 39. 6 Katherine Tupper Marshall, Together: Annals of an Army Wife (New York/ Atlanta: Tupper & Love, 1946), Appendix 1, pp. 28390. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 79 missed this opportunity to become a general. Pershing continued to press Marshalls case, but to no avail. Marshall was relegated to the position of senior instructor for the Illinois National Guard (19331938). 7
Trough Marshalls diligence in working with the CCC, he made a number of friends in the Roosevelt administration. He came to know several persons of inuence, notably Judge Advocate Scott Lucas, later a U.S. senator who was to serve on the 1945- 1946 Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack; Major General Frank McCoy, Stimsons long- time aide; and Harry Hopkins, FDRs close adviser. Pershing also continued to support Marshall. Such friends stood him in good stead as the years went by. In July 1938 Marshall was brought to Washington as direc- tor of war plans. From then on, with the help of Hopkins and others, Marshall advanced rapidly. He was promoted to briga- dier general, eective October 1, 1938. On October 15, after only three months in war plans, he was appointed deputy chief of sta. On April 27, 1939, it was announced that Marshall would be advanced over many o cers with more seniority to become the Armys new chief of sta. He took over o cially on September 1, 1939, the very day Hitlers forces marched into Poland, becoming in the process a temporary four-star generalfrom one to four stars in less than a year! As chief of sta, Marshall was the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment. He was also charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the military program. 8 Te chief of stas obligation was to report directly to 7 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General: 18301939, (New York: Viking Adult, 1963), pp. 29099. 8 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, p. 1050. Quoted from Army regulations. 80 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the president. During the years he served in the post, Marshall proved himself to be a loyal and devoted deputy to his superior, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Te chief of stas responsibility in peacetimeand the United States was still at peace when Marshall took overwas to serve by direction of the president, as Commanding General of the Field Forces. In that capacity he was to direct eld opera- tions and the general training of the several Armies, of the oversea forces, and of the GHQ units. If war were to break out, he was to continue exercising command of the eld forces until such time as the President shall have specically designated a Commanding General thereof. 9 Marshall also had certain responsibilities with respect to the Navy when the eet was in port. More about that later. Te chief of sta and the president were the only ones with legal authority to issue command orders to the army commanders in the eld. Te secretary of war, a civilian, was outside this line of command. Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Fleet, Relieved of Command In January 1941 Richardson, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet (CINCUS), was notied that he was being relieved of his command in about three weeks. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was named to replace him, eective February 1. Richardson was deeply disappointed in my detachment, yet, as he wrote later, there was some feeling of prospective relief, for I had never liked to work with people whom I did not trust, and I did not trust Franklin D. Roosevelt. 10 9 Ibid. 10 James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973), p. 420. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 81 On his return to Washington, Richardson was directed to report to Secretary of the Navy Knox. When he called on Knox on March 24, he asked why he had been removed as CINCUS so peremptorily, after having served only 13 months of the usual 24-month tour of duty. Why, Richardson, Knox responded, when you were here in Washington last October, you hurt the Presidents feelings by what you said to him. You should realize that. 11 Richardsons relief put on notice all top-ranked o cers, includ- ing his replacement, that Roosevelt would brook no opposition to his plans. It was a warning to all military o cers that criticism of FDR, their commander-in-chief under the Constitution, was not tolerated. General Marshalls Responsibility for the Fleet Marshall appointed Lieutenant General Walter C. Short to be commanding general of the Hawaiian department, eec- tive February 7, 1941. Tat same day, Marshall wrote Short that Kimmel, who had taken over command of the eet in Pearl Harbor the week before, had written his superior, CNO Stark, about the serious shortages of army materiel needed for the pro- tection of Pearl Harbor. Kimmel had referred specically to planes and antiaircraft guns. Marshall wrote Short that Kimmel didnt realize that the army was tragically lacking in this materiel . . . and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other com- mand in the Army. Marshalls letter revealed concern for more than just the Hawaiian situation. Nevertheless, Marshall advised Short that the protection of the eet was the Armys major responsibility. Te fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major 11 Ibid., p. 424. 82 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy consideration for us. [Italics in original]. . . . [O]ur rst concern is to protect the Fleet. Marshall told Short of the pressures on the Department [from other sources] for the limited materiel we have. However, he believed the existing defenses in Hawaii would discourage an enemys attack if no serious harm is done us during the rst six hours of known hostilities. Marshall speculated on the most likely threat to Hawaii: Te risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situa- tion. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. However, Marshall reminded Short: Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. 12 Marshall wrote Short again on March 5, requesting an early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. And he added, Te establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of rst priority. 13 Marshall recognized that, as chief of sta, he was responsible for protecting Hawaii, and he was again calling the attention of his Hawaiian commander to that responsibility. 12 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 56566. Marshalls February 7, 1941, letter to Short. 13 Ibid., part 15, p. 1605. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 83 Admiral Kimmel, New Commander-in- Chief, U.S. Fleet, Strives to Build up Fleets Strength in Pearl Harbor Kimmel realized that, for strategic reasons, the Fleet did not belong at Pearl Harbor. He considered Richardsons arguments against holding the eet there valid. Yet Kimmel realized he could not oppose the president on this issue and expect to retain his command. Te best he could do was to try to get the materiel needed to defend the eet. Over the next year, in letter after letter to CNO Stark, he asked for personnel, weapons, radar, destroyers, cruisers, planes, ammunition. 14 CNO Admiral Stark gained a reputation for persistence as he continued to appeal to Roosevelt for men and materiel. He once asked FDR for 300,000 men for the Navy. Tere were a lot of people in the room at the time. FDR, always jovial when he had an audience, simply threw back his head and laughed. He then turned to the others in the room and said, Betty, referring to Stark by his nickname, usually begins working early; he starts in working a year ahead of time and he follows it up. 15 To strengthen its defenses, the Navy recommended con- struction of a battleship and cruiser dry dock at Pearl Harbor. 16
However, all the funds then available for construction had been allocated. Admiral Ben Moreell, chief of the Navys bureau of yards and docks, which would be building the dry dock, felt he should not go ahead without written authorization. He suggested that Stark ask FDR, in light of the limited National emergency then in eect, to authorize the funds in writing. Without being specic as to who had made the request, Stark approached FDR. When he reported back to Moreell, Stark said he had never seen 14 Ibid., part 16, pp. 222557. 15 Ibid., part 5, p 2273. Stark testimony. 16 Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1959), p. 404. 84 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the president so angry. He pounded the table and asked Who wants something on a piece of paper? Tell that bureau chief that he would give him something on a piece of paper, but it will not be what he expects. 17 So Stark, as acting secretary of the navy the secretary and assistant secretary were away at the timetook on himself the responsibility of authorizing the construction. Te dry dock, completed just ten days before the attack, was put to immediate use. Stark wrote Kimmel of the problems he encountered in obtaining authorization to build up the Navy. I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. . . . Te President just has his own ideas about men. I usu- ally nally get my way but the cost of eort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from the White House. 18 In answer to Kimmels requests for ships and supplies to bol- ster the Pacic Fleet, Stark often mentioned the dire straits of the British, whose economic lifeline was being threatened by German submarines. He also cited the demands for supplies being made under the lend-lease program. Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems through the administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormousalmost astronomicalquantities of ordnance supplies for the British Navy and any allies which may survive to ght the Dictators. 19 17 Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal and the Navy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 8788. 18 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, p. 2148, Stark to Kimmel, February 10, 1941. 19 Ibid., part 16, p. 2153. Stark to Kimmel, March 3, 1941. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 85 Admiral Stark Opposes Antagonizing Japan Roosevelt had been doing his best for months to give the British aid and comfort, although he had been restrained, primar- ily by public opinion, from openly involving the United States in the war against Germany. Stark shared the presidents desire to enter that war, but he did not always go along with Roosevelts risky moves in the Pacic. Starks friendship with FDR was such that he could express himself candidlyand he often did. On February 11, 1941, Stark wrote FDR a long memorandum, cautioning against the tactics he was adopting in the Pacic. 20 Te question of sending a detachment of cruisers on a tour of the Philippines had been discussed at a meeting of top administration o cials. FDR had questioned the desirability of such a maneuver, called it a blu, and said he did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6 [cruis- ers] . . . in the Philippines in case of sudden attack. Stark had then breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty denitely closed. 21
Stark opposed such a move and he explained his reasons: 22
Sending a small force [of ships to Manila] would probably be no deterrent to Japan, Stark wrote, and it would not hinder Japans southward advance. Further moves against Japan could precipi- tate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in, in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany whom we all consider our major problem. Although the Pacic Fleet was weaker in total tonnage and aircraft than the Japanese Navy, he considered it a very strong force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a con- stant serious and real threat to Japans ank. It would be a grave 20 Ibid., part 16, pp. 215051; part 33, pp. 120304. 21 Ibid., part 16, p. 2150; part 33, p. 1203. 22 Ibid., part 16, pp. 215051; part 33, pp. 120304. 86 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy strategic error at this time to divide our Pacic Fleet . . . in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacic, and Western Pacic. If we are forced into the war, Stark continued, our main eort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. Te Pacic Fleet should remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. Ten, if she moved toward Malaysia in southeast Asia, we would be in a position to vigorously attack the Mandates [an archipelago of south Pacic islands mandated after World War I to Japan to admin- ister] and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japans attack on the British and Dutch. At the same time, we could continue to lend support to the battle in the Atlantic. Stark recommended against doing anything in the Far East which would reveal our intentions. We should not send any con- siderable division . . . to Manila [as that] might prove an invita- tion to Japan to attack us. We should not indicate the slight- est interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands [lest the Japanese] smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised. Te Japanese are trained for amphibious operationswe are notand they would then be able to occupy some of those British-held islands before we could. To reinforce this position against doing anything that might appear to threaten Japan unless we were ready to ght, Stark quoted from a telegram just received from the U.S. embassy in Tokyo: Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentra- tion of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 87 risks constitute[,] the risk should not be taken unless our coun- try is ready to force hostilities. In spite of his reservations, however, Stark told FDR he was notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your nal deci- sion should be to send them. Although he disagreed with the president, he was ready to obey orders. He continued his memorandum to FDR: I just wanted to get this o my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what you decide. Stark was above all a good soldier, loyal to his commander-in- chief. On February 25 Stark sent Kimmel a copy of his memoran- dum. He and Kimmel were good friends and had been for many years, so Stark was straightforward in his analysis of the situa- tion. Stark wrote Kimmel, as he had told FDR he would, that he should make plans for oensive raids. 23 He should study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on the inammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives), and the eect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on the diversion of their forces away from the Malay Barrier. Such adventures, Stark wrote, might appear unjustied from a prot and loss viewpoint . . . [or] they might prove very protable. But, he implied, this was immaterial. In either case (and this is strictly SECRET) you and I may be ordered to make them. Terefore, Kimmel realized he would be well advised to consider plans for launching such air raids. 23 Ibid., part 16, pp. 214950. Stark letter (February 25, 1941) to Kimmel. 88 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Te question of sending a detachment of the eet to the Far East had been brought up several times. Stark and Kimmel both considered it unwise. However, Stark wrote, even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time might come when it will not. Te attitude of the people in the country with respect to the war was confused, Stark wrote. I simply can not predict the out- come. His memo to FDR represented, he said, his best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation. Admiral Kimmel in Pearl Harbor Requests Intelligence In addition to equipment and supplies, a commander in the eld also needs intelligence; that is, information, particularly information relevant for military planning and preparations. Te Navy Department in Washington inevitably receives such secret or condential information, which the commanders in the eld are entitled to have, and should have, if they are to carry out their duties. After Kimmel took over command of the eet at Pearl Harbor, he requested not only ships, men, equipment, supplies, and munitions, but also intelligence; he asked Stark to furnish him with whatever information of a secret nature was available. 24
Stark replied that this was the responsibility of the O ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI). ONI is fully aware of its responsibil- ity in keeping you adequately informed. 25
In 1941, information concerning the location of Japanese merchant vessels was forwarded weekly from Washington by air- mail to Pearl Harbor. Tus Kimmel was receiving material on a 24 Ibid., part 16, p. 2229. Kimmel to Stark (February 18, 1941). 25 Ibid., part 17, p. 2160. Stark to Kimmel (March 22, 1941). U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 89 regular basis. Given that fact, plus Starks reassurance that ONI would keep him informed, Kimmel assumed he was being sent, and would be sent, all the information of value that Washington could supply. Security Leak in Washington Since August 1940 we had been intercepting and decod- ing messages sent in the Japanese diplomatic cipher, designated Purple. Tis enabled us to read messages to and from Japans embassies all around the world. Tese secret intercepts came to be called MAGIC and were surrounded by strict security. Except for the cryptographers and translators, they were seen by only a handful of top people in the administration and the services. Ten in the spring of 1941 it was discovered that one copy of a decoded Japanese intercept was missing from the les. A magic transla- tion . . . was lost in the State Department. Te Army had sent it to them and it never came back. 26 In the words of Commander L.F. Saord, then in charge of communications security, all hell broke loose. A missing message was a serious matter. If the Japanese learned we could read messages sent in their complex diplomatic code, which we had deciphered at a cost of much time and eort, they would probably change it. We would then be deprived of an extremely valuable source of intelligence. Saord and the others concerned with security could not imagine where this missing message had gone. However, in April and May we intercepted several Purple messages between Berlin and Tokyo indicating that German intelligence sources, probably in the United States, believed that the U.S. government had deci- phered some Japanese codes. Tokyo cabled Berlin on April 16, We suspect that the several codes I b ,
80 c and OITE d are being 26 Ibid., part 8, p. 3735. 90 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cryptanalyzed by foreign powers. And from Berlin to Tokyo on May 3: STAHMER called on me this day (evening?) and . . . said that Germany maintains a fairly reliable intelligence organization abroad (orin the U.S.?), and according to information obtained from the above mentioned organization it is quite (orfairly?) reliably established that the U.S. government is reading Ambassador Nomuras code messages. 27 As a result, the Japanese warned their embassies to exercise extreme caution to protect the security of their messages. But, fortunately for the United States, Japan did not heed, or did not realize the full import of, the warnings sent her embassy in Berlin. In any event, her diplomats continued to use their Purple dip- lomatic code. The American-Dutch-British (ADB) Conversations, Singapore, April Toward the end of April the scene shifted to Singapore, where a conference of American, Dutch, and British military and naval o cers, the so-called ADB Conversations, was held in utmost secrecy. Te principals dressed in mufti (civilian attire) to conceal the nature of their visit. Te agreement reached on April 27 was subsequently signed by o cials of the Associated Powersthe United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, and India. 28 Te United States was the only signatory not then in the war. 27 Ibid., part 4, pp. 186061. Tokyo/Berlin cables; part 4, p. 1815, June 23, 1941 Tokyo to Mexico message cautioning vigilance: Tere are suspicions that they [the Americans] read some of our [ Japans] codes. 28 Ibid., part 15, pp. 155184 (Exhibit No. 50). American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941 (Short Title, A.D.B.), Report. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 91 Te 33-page ADB report that issued from this Singapore conference was classied MOST SECRET. It described specic moves on the part of Japan that would force the signers of the agreement to recommend that their governments take military action against Japan. It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would create a position in which our failure to take active military counter-action would place us at such military disadvantage, should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise our respective Governments to authorise such action: (a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. . . . (b) Te movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Tailand to the West of 100 East or to the South of 10 North. (c) Te movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra [the narrow strip of land connecting Singapores peninsula with the Asian mainland] or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6 North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao [on the southeastern-most tip of the Philippines] to Waigeo Island [the northwestern-most island of New Guinea], or the Equator East of Waigeo. (d) Te movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor. (e) Te movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands [northeast of New Caledonia]. 29 29 Ibid., p. 1564. 92 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Te ADB report also outlined cooperative procedures to be followed by the land, sea, and air forces of the several par- ties in the event of hostilities. Te United States turned down a British request at the meeting that it send the Pacic Fleet to Singapore. Roosevelt knew these agreements were not constitutional. Yet he sanctioned and continued pressing secretly for still closer ties with Britain and her allies. According to Robert Sherwood, one of FDRs speechwriters and close advisers, Roosevelt never overlooked the fact that his actions might lead to his immediate or eventual impeachment. 30 From the administrations point of view, therefore, it was imperative that the very existence of any American-British joint plans, however tentative, had to be kept utterly secret. Sherwood called it ironic that in all probability, no great damage would have been done had the details of these plans fallen into the hands of the Germans and the Japanese; whereas, had they fallen into the hands of the Congress and the press, American preparation for war might have been well nigh wrecked and ruined. 31 U.S. Ships Transferred from Pacific to Atlantic Fleet In April 1941 Kimmel learned not only that he would not be receiving the ships he had requested to strengthen his eet, 30 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 274. 31 Ibid., pp. 27374. Here Sherwood quotes noted historian, Charles A. Beard: If these precedents are to stand unimpeached and to provide sanctions for the continued conduct of American foreign aairs, the Constitution may be nullied by the President, o cials, and o cers who have taken the oath, and are under moral obligation to uphold it. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 93 but that he would be forced to relinquish several destroyers and cruisers to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet. Tis was in accord with the U.S.-British ABC-1 agreement. Te entire world set-up was gone into very carefully, Stark wrote Kimmel on April 19. A detachment of shipsthree bat- tleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers and two squadrons of destroyerswas to be transferred from the Pacic to the Atlantic. But then the president canceled the authorization for the move and gave specic directions to bring only the one CV (aircraft carrier) and one division of destroyers. Te president did not want, at this particular moment, to give any signs of seriously weakening the forces in the Pacic. 32 However, a week later, after a long conference at the White House on April 25, it was decided that the most urgent mat- ter was to go all out in the Atlantic. Stark wrote Kimmel the following day that he should get mentally prepared because a considerable detachment from your eet will be brought to the Atlantic. Stark anticipated the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs [battleships], 1 CV [aircraft carrier], 4 CLs [cruisers] and 2 squadrons of destroyers. And still further detachments from the Pacic Fleet might be expected. Action on the transfer may come at any time. 33
In May 1941 a force consisting of three battleships, an air- craft carrier and appropriate supporting vessels . . . about a quarter of the strength of the Pacic Fleet, was shifted to the Atlantic from Kimmels command in the Pacic. Tese ships then joined in the ever-extending activities of the Atlantic patrol, which was lending support to Britain. 34 32 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, p. 2164. Stark to Kimmel, April 19, 1941. 33 Ibid., part 16, p. 2165. Stark to Kimmel, April 26, 1941. 34 William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Te Undeclared War, 19401941 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), p. 451. 94 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Coordination of U.S. War Plans and Production By this time, demands for war materiel were being submit- ted to the United States from all over the world. Requests for supplies and equipment were coming in from the British, belea- guered in the Atlantic and in Singapore; from the Chinese under pressure by the Japanese; and from our own forces in the eld. Eective coordination was needed. On May 21, Marshall, under pressure from the War Department, the O ce of Production Management, and especially the White House, sought a com- plete statement of Army needsnot for 1941 and 1942 but for the actual winning of a war not yet declared. He asked the vari- ous divisions of the War Department general sta to make stra- tegic estimates of our ground, air, and naval situations, and to list items of equipment needed as an aid to industry in its planning. Te War Plans Division assigned Major (later Lt. Gen.) A.C. Wedemeyer the immense task of researching and assembling from widely scattered sources the necessary data on military requirements, supplies, reserves, and production. 35 United StatesJapan Diplomatic Conversations: in Washington Japans Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, had begun negotiations with the United States. Japan was willing to make quite a few concessions from her point of view, and for a while in June 1941, it looked as though an ami- cable conclusion might be reached. Te major bone of contention was the presence of Japanese troops in China. In the course of the discussions, Japan agreed to withdraw most of her troops from 35 Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi- sion, 1950), pp. 33637. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 95 China. Subject to further discussion, she would station a few on the northern border for protection against the entry of communistic elements from Outer Mongolia. . . . Te troops which would be maintained for resistance against communistic activities would not under any circumstances interfere in Chinese internal aairs. Japan then presented a draft proposal suggesting that Roosevelt ask China to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan based on the principles of: 36 (1) Neighborly friendship; (2) Joint defense against communism; and (3) Economic cooperation. As betting an agreement between two sovereign nations, Japan further asserted that these principles implied: (1) Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories; (2) Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neigh- bors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace; (3) Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese terri- tory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China; (4) No annexation, no indemnities; and (5) Independence of Manchoukuo. 37 Prompted by her desire for reliable sources of raw materials and given the uncertainty created by the termination of her com- mercial treaty with the United States, Japans draft proposal stated further that if the United States and Japan reached agreement on the basis of these principles, then they would cooperate in pro- viding each other with access to supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs. 38 36 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 44445, 44849. 37 Ibid., p. 423. 38 Ibid., p. 462. 96 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull were lukewarm, if not cool, to these proposals. Tey balked at the Japanese plan for Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities. 39
On June 21, Hull, handed the Japanese Ambassador a complete rewrite of the draft proposal. 40 Te talks with the Japanese were stalled. Hitlers Invasion of Russia Alters Situation and Expands Call for Worldwide Coordination During the night of June 2122 Hitler attacked the U.S.S.R. Te Soviets immediately became an enemy of Germany, and Britain immediately became an ally of the Soviets. Once we learned of Germanys invasion of Russia and of Britains alliance with the Soviet Union against Germany, U.S. policy shifted. We released Russian credits, refused to apply the neutrality law to the Soviet Union, and promised American aid to Stalins regime. 41 Roosevelt called for an additional eort to coordinate war planning and production. On July 9 he sent an urgent message to his secretaries of war and navy asking them to join . . . in exploring at once the overall production require- ments required to defeat our potential enemies . . . [and] the munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our potential enemies. 42
39 Ibid., pp. 444, 447. 40 Ibid., p. 483. See also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp. 140001. (7/24/41, re sanctions on Japan). 41 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occur- rence, 19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, pp. 28687. 42 Watson, Te War Department, pp. 33839. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 97 Te assignment Marshall had given Wedemeyer in May, to determine the needs of the Army, was to be expanded to include the Navy and Air Corps also. From this a real Victory Program was to be developed encompassing, by presidential directive (August 30, 1941), the distribution of munitions as well, not only to U.S. forces, but also to those of Great Britain, Russia, and other countries needing our help. 43 Te War Plans Divisions draft, which Wedemeyer had completed by July 1, became the basis of the more extensive project, and Wedemeyer was assigned the major responsibility for the new and larger task. 44
In view of the fact that the United States was still o cially neutral, security concerning this ultra-secret Victory Program for the winning of a war not yet declared was extremely tight. Only ve copies were prepared, each numbered and registered. Wedemeyer kept his working copy; he gave one to Stimson for presentation to FDR, and three to his superiors. It was thought that this very limited distribution would prevent any leak. U.S.-Japan Relations Treading the Evil Road As we have seen, the Japanese had received the permis- sion of the Vichy government of unoccupied France to land troops in French Indochina and to acquire there the rice and other raw materials she desperately needed. 45 Both the United States and Britain objected to these arrangements. On July 23, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles broke o the talks then going on with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. Te next day the United States denounced Japans actions in French Indochina. Ten on July 25, in retaliation for Japans Indochina moves and against the advice of Ambassador Grew in Japan and 43 Ibid., pp. 34749. 44 Ibid., p. 342. 45 U.S. Congress, Events, p. 289. 98 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Chief of Naval Operations Stark, FDR by executive order froze all Japanese assets in this country. England followed suit the fol- lowing day. 46
Tis brought all trade between the United States and Japan to an end. Japan had warned that this drastic measure would leave her in desperate straits. It hurt especially because it deprived her of regular gasoline from which she had been able to produce higher grade aviation gas. 47 Back in November 1940 Roosevelt had been well aware of the crisis that would arise if Japan were deprived of oil. Ambassador Grew and Stark understood Japans economic plight and realized she might go to war if her oil were shut o. Stark had argued that unless we were prepared for warI do not mean prepared in the sense of complete readiness for war, but unless we were ready to accept a war risk, we should not take measures which would cut oil down to the Japanese below that needed for what might be called their normal peace time needs for their industry and their ships. He said he never waivered [sic] one inch on that stand. 48 Nevertheless, the United States went ahead and imposed sanctions. Te die was cast. Stark cabled his three eet commanders on July 25 about the economic sanctions. It was expected that these sanctions would include all trade except for a few items for which export licenses would be issued. He advised the commanders to take appropri- ate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. 49 All this time, we were still intercepting, decoding, and reading Japanese messages sent in the diplomatic code, Purple. Among 46 Ibid., p. 290. 47 Interview ( January 9, 1964) of Japanese expert, Captain Albert E. Hind- marsh (typescript in authors les). 48 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, p. 43. Stark testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry. 49 Ibid., part 24, p.1355. Stark testimony before the Roberts Commission, Exhibit 13. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 99 them was a message dated July 31 from the Japanese foreign min- ister in Tokyo to Japans ambassador in Berlin concerning their desperate economic situation. 50 A copy was sent to Nomura, the Japanese ambassador in Washington. It read in part: Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradu- ally becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asun- der this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. Tat is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory . . . and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. 51
After being decoded and translated, this message was dis- tributed to Roosevelt and his advisers, the few top o cials in Washington who were privy to MAGIC. Tis cable further con- rmed Japans economic plight and the impending crisis due to the U.S. sanctions. On August 6 Japan again oered to negotiate. Japanese Prime Minister Fuminaro Konoye, who represented Japans Peace Party, suggested a personal meeting with Roosevelt, with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment [in U.S.- Japan relations] could be brought about. On August 8 Nomura asked Hull whether it might not be possible for the responsible 50 Ibid., part 12, p. 8. 51 Ibid., p. 9. 100 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy heads of the two Governments to meet, say in Honolulu. 52 On August 17, the United States rejected this proposal. Hull made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two Governments could usefully be pursued or propos- als be discussed while Japanese o cial spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeav- oring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States. 53
The First U. S. Ultimatum to Japan Te public announcement of the Argentia meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill announced the Atlantic Charter, but said nothing about the tough words FDR had agreed to address to Japan as a result of his conversations with Churchill. It had been mutually understood by the men that the Governments of both the United States and Great Britain needed more time to prepare for resistance against possible Japanese attack in the Far East. Terefore, it had been agreed that Roosevelt should make clear to Japan in no uncertain terms that further aggres- sion against her neighboring countries would not be tolerated, that such aggression would force those countries to take mea- sures to safeguard their rights. Accordingly, once FDR was back in Washington, he informed the Japanese ambassador (August 17) that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursu- ance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any 52 Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), p. 708. 53 Ibid., p. 715. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 101 and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguard- ing the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and secu- rity of the United States. 54
Te next day in a wire signed by Roosevelt, transmitted by the State Department to the U.S. embassy in London, it was reported that FDR and Hull had received the Japanese ambassador and had made to him a statement covering the position of this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you [Churchill] and I [FDR] had discussed. Te statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed. 55 Tis statement was later referred to by Stimson and others as the rst ultimatum to Japan. Kimmel Continues to Request Men and Equipment for the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii Before Kimmel took over as commander-in-chief of the Pacic Fleet at Pearl Harbor on February 1, 1941, he had had an opportunity to survey the situation briey. He had written Stark on January 27 that he was particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment, for the task of defending this base. . . . I think the supply of an 54 Ibid., p. 714. FDRs oral statement to Nomura, August 17, 1941. 55 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941. vol. 4: Te Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1956), p. 380. 102 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority. Kimmel was also concerned with the personnel shortage and wrote that he would probably be required to make recommendations on this subject shortly after I take over. It appears wise to now ll all ships with personnel to capacity, both on account of the needed increase in complement to man the ships, and to train men for new construction. 56
Tese same complaints had been made before by Kimmels pre- decessor, Richardson, just then being relieved of his command. Once in command, Kimmel continued to bombard Washington with requests for men and materiel to strengthen the eet. Yet rather than being strengthened, the eet was weak- ened by the transfer in May to the Atlantic of almost a fourth of the Pacic Fleet. Kimmel felt he knew very little of what was going on in Washington, and he persisted in asking for informa- tion and supplies. After Germany attacked Russia, Kimmel wanted to know how this would aect policy. 57 Whether or not planes are to be supplied to the Russians may be outside my province, Kimmel wrote on July 30, but I do remain keenly aware of our own deciencies in air- craft. It is quite an undertaking for the United States to supply planes to any quarter of the globe in which ghting against Axis Powers may occur. 58 56 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16. pp. 222527. Kimmel to Stark, January 27, 1941. 57 Ibid., part 16, p. 2242. 58 Ibid. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 103 Again, on August 12, Kimmel reminded Stark of the eets needs. Kimmel believed the radar equipment was far behind what it should be. . . . We need more ships of all types for a successful Pacic campaign but I believe we need submarines, destroyers, carriers and cruisers even more than we need battleships. Tis is a vast ocean. 59
Stark sympathized with Kimmels supply problem but was unable to help. He responded on August 22 to several of Kimmels more recent requests for men and materiel: I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the pic- ture presented is not too unsatisfactory. 60 Although Kimmel got some results over the months he was in command, he generally got more excuses than results. The Victory Program Completed In estimating the military and production requirements of the nation, Wedemeyer had to seek data from many sources. He looked into the status of the shipping, munitions requirements, and munitions production of U.S. troop bases. He explored the situation and capabilities of each of the major combatant nations, the capabilities and probable lines of action of both friendly and Axis powers. It was assumed that the earliest date when U.S. armed forces could be mobilized, trained, and equipped for extensive operations would be July 1, 1943. 61 Te presidents July 9 request had enlarged the scope of Wedemeyers survey. A couple of months later, Roosevelt expanded the task still further. In a memorandum to the War Department 59 Ibid., part 16, pp. 224345. 60 Ibid., p. 2181. Stark to Kimmel, August 22, 1941. 61 Watson, Te War Department, pp. 34855. 104 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy on August 30, he wrote that he wanted the department, working in cooperation with the Navy Department, to submit to him by September 10, 1941, their recommendation of distribution of expected United States production of munitions of war as between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and the other countries to be aidedby important items, quantity, time schedules, and approximate val- ues for the period from the present time until June 30 [1942]. FDR also wanted to receive their general conclusions as to the over-all production eort of important items needed for victory on the general assumption that the reservoir of munitions power available to the United States and her friends is su ciently superior to that available to the Axis Powers to insure defeat of the latter. 62 Wedemeyer completed his exhaustive study by FDRs deadline. 63 Japans Peace Party Falls; Her War Party Takes Over With our embargo in full eect, Japans economic plight was fast deteriorating. In a desperate eort to save his government, Prime Minister Konoye on August 28 renewed his plea for a per- sonal meeting with Roosevelt in Hawaii. Te administration did not reply immediately. By September 23 the conversations with the Japanese ambas- sador in Washington had practically reached an impasse. Stark had a condential talk with Hull about the situation and then reported to Kimmel: Conversations without results cannot last 62 Ibid., p. 348. 63 Ibid., p. 351. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 105 forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might the situa- tion could only grow more tense. Stark wrote that Hull kept him pretty well informed and added in a P.S. dated September 29, if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know. 64 Once more Kimmel felt reassured that he would be sent any information pertinent to Pearl Harbor. On October 2, Roosevelt and Hull, after several exchanges of notes, again turned down Konoyes proposal for a Hawaii meeting. Two weeks later, on October 6, Konoye, who had been doing his best to maintain peaceful relations between his country and the United States, was forced to resign. Konoyes successor was an army general, Hideki Tojo. With a government composed pri- marily of military men, Japans War Party was in control. Te chances of solving Japans economic needs by peaceful means faded. Stark analyzed the Japanese power shift in a cable to his three eet commanders. Te resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X. . . . Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a pos- sibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic inten- tion nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X 65 In a covering letter to Kimmel, Stark wrote: Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps 64 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, pp. 221214. Stark letter to Kimmel, September 23, 1941; postscript dated September 29. 65 Ibid., part 14, p. 1327. 106 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend. 66 Japanese Stocks of Strategic Materials Dangerously Low Estimates of Japans stocks of strategic materials fur- nished clues to the Japanese situation. Lieutenant Albert E. Hindmarsh, an economic analyst in the far eastern section of Naval Intelligence, had access to all available intelligence, includ- ing MAGIC. Hindmarsh was also regularly reading the minutes of the Japanese parliament. By following its debates, he could determine how much the Japanese government was paying per unit for storage of some 23 strategic materials. He then divided these gures into the total amounts shown in the Japanese budget for this purpose. In that way, he was able to calculate the stocks of Japans strategic materials still on hand. At regular intervals Hindmarsh personally took to Roosevelt his estimates of the stocks of these various materials. Japans severest shortage was of oil. Our oil embargo, especially the embargo on aviation gasoline, was putting Japan in a desperate plight. Hindmarsh calculated in mid-summer 1941, that she had on hand about 75 million barrels. In a war Hindmarsh gured she would need 52 million barrels per year. She had enough mica, which came from India, for four years. And her stocks of hemp and sisal were su cient, so she could safely bypass the Philippines. Hindmarsh was able to explain to FDR that, in view of Japans economic priorities, she would have to aim rst at replenishing her oil stocks; he expected her primary objective would be the 66 Ibid., part 16, pp. 221415 (Stark to Kimmel, October 17,1941). U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 107 Dutch East Indies, where she might expect to get oil production going in some six months or so. 67 The October Revolution in ONI Troughout 1941, a struggle was going on within the Navy Department as to whose responsibility it was to evaluate secret military intelligence and pass it along to the commanders in the eld. Both the chief of War Plans, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, and the chief of O ce of Naval Intelligence, Captain Alan G. Kirk, claimed this responsibility. Te table of organiza- tion at the time seemed to place the responsibility with ONI. And Starks March 22 letter to Kimmel supported that position. 68
However, Turner was aggressive and persistent. He nally per- suaded Stark to reduce ONI to a fact-gathering agency, and War Plans assumed the responsibility for evaluating available intel- ligence and for determining what should be sent to the eld commanders. Tis Occtober 1941 power struggle between ONI and War Plans confused the lines of communication and created doubt as to just where the responsibility actually lay. Ten also in October, Kirk and his top assistant were removed from duty. According to communications-security chief Saord, this was the rst time in Navy Department history that both chief and assistant chief of a bureau had been removed from o ce simultaneously. Te previous practice had been to remove only one of the two top men at a time, so as to assure continuity. Te third man in charge, then in London, was not involved. 67 Authors notes of Albert E. Hindmarsh interview, January 9, 1954. 68 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, pp. 215960. Stark to Kimmel, March 22, 1941. 108 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Berthing Plan or Harbor Bomb Plot Messages Te shift in ONI leadership took place on October 10, the day after the berthing plan messageasking the Japanese con- sul in Hawaii to report the movements of U.S. naval ships in and out of Pearl Harborbecame available in Washington. Rear Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson, who had been serving as com- manding o cer aboard the battleship USS Mississippi took over as chief of ONI on October 15. Prior to joining the ONI, he had had no experience with naval intelligence other than attendance at two international conferences for limitation of armaments in 1933 and 1934. 69 Te Pearl Harbor commanders were never advised of the berthing plan message. Te failure to notify them of its exis- tence and of the other ships-in-harbor messages decoded later in Washington, could have been due to failure on the part of those evaluating intelligence to recognize the importance of these messages. It could have been due to disarray accompanying the turnover in ONI personnel. It could have been due to mere negligence. But whatever the reason, the fact remains that neither War Plans nor ONI notied the Pearl Harbor commanders of those critical messages. Te U.S. Navys communications personnel in Hawaii were under instructions to try to solve the Japanese navy code ( JN- 25). Tey were not to spend time trying to decipher Japanese intercepts in the Japanese consular code ( J-19) or any other code; these were to be mailed to Washington for decoding and translating. Terefore, our people in Hawaii made no attempt to decode and translate these intercepts, but simply forwarded them, as instructed, to Washington. Airmail from Hawaii to Washington then was not nonstop. It was by short hops and only 69 Ibid., part 4, p. 1724. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 109 twice a week, so it took several days for an airmailed intercept to reach Washington. One J-19 message, sent from Tokyo on September 24 to Honolulu, was picked up in Hawaii and mailed, undecoded to Washington, where it was decoded, translated, and made avail- able to the top military personnel in Washington on October 9, 1941. 70 In that message, the foreign minister in Tokyo asked the Japanese consul in Hawaii to set up a system for making regu- lar reports on the movements of U.S. ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. Tis ships-in-harbor message became known as the berthing plan, or as the rst of the bomb plot messages. Pearl Harbor was not notied. On November 15 Tokyo sent a cable to Honolulu, translated in Washington on December 3, which read, As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your ships in harbor report irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. 71 Pearl Harbor was not advised. On November 29 Tokyo cabled the consul in Honolulu: We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements. 72
Washington decoded and translated this message on December 5. Pearl Harbor was not notied. Many other ships-in-harbor messages referring to Pearl Harbor, some 39 in all, were transmitted back and forth between Tokyo and Honolulu during the two months prior to the Japanese attack. Due to the pressure of other demands on the decoders in Washington, however, only 25 of these crucial intercepts were deciphered, translated, and read before the attack. 73 Yet not a sin- gle one of those 25 deciphered and translated messages was sent 70 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 261. 71 Ibid., part 12, p. 262. 72 Ibid., part 12, p. 263. J-19, #122. (Tokyo to Honolulu, November 29, 1941) 73 Ibid., part 12, p. 25470. 110 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy to the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaiithey were not even informed of their existence. To complete the record, it might be pointed out that inter- cepted Japanese cables revealed to our authorities in Washington that the Japanese were also watching ship movements in Manila. Some 59 messages were exchanged between Tokyo and the Philippines; all but two were deciphered and translated before December 7. Twenty-seven cables reporting on ship movements in and out of the Panama Canal were intercepted to and from Tokyo, 21 of which were deciphered and read before the attack on Pearl Harbor. We also intercepted eight Japanese cables between Tokyo and the west coast (San Francisco and Seattle), another eight that referred to southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies, and a couple each concerning Vancouver (Canada) and Vladivostok (Russia). 74
Te record shows that the ships in Pearl Harbor were those most closely under surveillance. Yet no hint was ever given Kimmel or Short that the Japanese, from September 24 on, were plotting regularly on grid charts the locations and movements of ships in Pearl Harbor, and forwarding this information to Tokyo. Nor was any hint ever given Kimmel or Short that as of mid- November, the Japanese consul had been asked to make these reports more frequently, at a rate of twice a week, or that he had been asked on November 29 to report even when there are no ship movements. In spite of Kimmels several requests for intel- ligence and in spite of the repeated reassurances that he would be kept informed, none of these vital intercepts was forwarded to the Pearl Harbor commanders before the attack.
74 Ibid., part 12, pp. 254, 270316. 111 5. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines Japan and Public Opinion J apans trade situation continued to deteriorate. Her situation was desperate. On November 3, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo cabled Secretary of State Hull that the greater part of Japans commerce has been lost. Japanese industrial production has been dramatically curtailed, and Japans national resources have been depleted. Grew believed that the United States would not be able to avert war in the Far East by continuing to embargo trade with Japan. He saw world political events crowding in upon Japan, forc- ing her to take some drastic actions. He cautioned that if diplo- macy failed, if Japan did not succeed in her attempts at reconcili- ation with the United States, he fully expected she would make an all-out, do-or-die attempt, actually risking national hara-kiri, to make [her] impervious to economic embargoes. Te United States should be ready to decide whether war with Japan is justi- ed by American national objectives, policies, and needs. Grew left no room for illusions. He warned in his cable that the United 112 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy States should not be deceived into thinking that Japan might not rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States. . . . It would be short-sighted for American policy to be based upon the belief that Japanese preparations are no more than saber rattling. . . . Japan may resort with dangerous and dramatic sud- denness to measures which might make inevitable war with the United States. 1
Tere were factions in both Japan and the United States that wanted to maintain peace. Japanese Prime Minister Konoye had sought some agreement with the United States and had even oered to meet with Roosevelt to try to reconcile their dier- ences. He had been rebued. As a result, he had been forced to resign. In October a more militant faction had taken over the government of Japan. In this country the sentiment against our going to war was still widespread. Public opinion polls in the spring of 1941 reported more than 80 percent of the people were against becom- ing involved. 2 Te America First Committee, established on September 4, 1940, was the most prominent organization that opposed U.S. involvement in the war. Its national chairman was General Robert E. Wood, board chairman of Sears Roebuck and Co. Among its more celebrated members were journalist John T. Flynn; Alice Roosevelt Longworth, daughter of former President 1 Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943). Ambassador Grews November 3, 1941 cable to State Department, Washington. 2 A poll conducted by public opinion statistician George Gallup indicated that 83% of the people in the United States would vote against a declaration of war if given the opportunity, although they were still convinced that the Amer- ican public would take the risk of war to help England win. James J. Martin, American Liberalism and World Politics (New York: Devin-Adair, 1964), vol. 2, p. 1275. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 113 Teodore Roosevelt; World War I aviator Edward Rickenbacker; Lillian Gish, star of the early lms; Socialist Norman Tomas; and aviator Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh. 3 Lindbergh, a national hero ever since his dramatic solo ight across the Atlantic in 1927, became America Firsts most popular spokesman. When he spoke at New Yorks Manhattan Center on April 23, 1941, the hall was jammed with 5,500 people. In subsequent appearances New York, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Hollywood, Cleveland, Des Moines, Fort Waynehe attracted even larger enthusiastic crowds, up to 22,000. 4
Others were also working to maintain peace with Japan. Among them were religious groups, the Friends, or Quakers, and the followers of the Reverend E. Stanley Jones, a well-known Methodist missionary. Reverend Jones believed the Japanese were tired of ghting in China and were ready to make peace. He hoped to act as a catalyst, to help the various parties reconcile their dierences, and had approached high Japanese and Chinese o cials informally to learn their reaction to his suggestions. He had talked with o cials in the U.S. State Department, and his suggestions had been transmitted by memoranda to the presi- dent. He wanted FDR to send a personal cable to the Emperor. Jones had also spoken to groups of ministers, usually nding them receptive to his ideas. By November 1941, Jones seemed to be making some progress with his suggestions. Te pro-peace noninterventionists, however, were gradually being overwhelmed by the pro-British propaganda emanating from the administration and the mass communications media radio, movies, newsreels, and major newspapers and magazines. Although the majority of the people in the United States still did 3 For an account of the America First Committee, see Wayne S. Cole, America First: Te Battle Against Intervention, 19401941 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971). 4 E. Eastman Irving, ed., Te World Almanac (New York: New York World- Telegram, 1942), pp. 62, 75, 78. 114 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy not want this country to become involved in the war, the climate of opinion was gradually shifting. Antiwar sentiment was begin- ning to decline. Washingtons Far Eastern Policy Warn Japan, Delay Operations to Allow U.S. Build-up in Pacific Rather than wanting to conciliate Japan, Secretary of State Hull was in favor of issuing an additional warning. Before doing so, however, he sought to determine the Armys and Navys state of readiness. Would the military authorities be ready to support further State Department warnings? On November 1 the State Department held a meeting on the far eastern situation. Messages from Generalissimo Chiang Kai- Shek, Chinas head of government at Chungking, and General John Magruder, chief of the American military mission to Chungking, were discussed. Chiang was urging that the United States warn Japan against attacking China through Yunnan, a province in southern China. To present the Navy viewpoint, Chief of Naval Operations Stark and Captain Schuirmann, the Navy liaison with the State Department, were present. Tey pointed out that Japan had already been warned. Te president had told Japan on August 17, when he returned from meeting Churchill at Argentia, that if she continued military aggression against her neighboring countries, the United States would be compelled to take action. 5 According to Schuirmann, Hull desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. 6
5 Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 71314. FDRs oral statement to the Japanese ambassador, August 17, 1941. 6 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 14, p. 1063. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 115 Another meeting was held at the State Department the fol- lowing day. At that time it was proposed that the British send some planes to Tailand and that Japan be warned against mov- ing into Siberia. 7 On November 3 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy met. Fifteen top Army and Navy o cers were pres- ent. Te deliberations were strictly condential; no hint of them was made public. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, reviewed the far eastern situation. He said that a decision had been made several months before to make the major eort in the Atlantic, and if forced to ght in the Pacic, to engage in a limited oensive eort. Tis was consistent with the U.S.-British Sta Conversations Report (ABC-1) of March 27, 1941. A major war eort in the Pacic, Ingersoll pointed out, would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas, and this would materially aect United States aid to England. Even if the eet could be moved to the Far East, he continued, there were no repair facilities at Manila or Singapore. 8
Ingersoll then assessed the possibility of a Japanese attack. Japan is capable of launching an attack in ve directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Tailand and against Malaya. He gave his recommendations as to what the United States should do in each of these ve eventualities. In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions, the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Tailand or China through Yunnan, the United States should not declare war. 9
Ingersoll felt the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks. However, he pointed out, our eet was seriously handicapped 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., part 14, pp. 106364. 9 Ibid., part 14, p. 1064. 116 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy at the time for lack of certain major naval units then in the repair yards. He recommended that oensive action in the Far East be deferred until U.S. military strength was built up in the Philippines. From what he said, it was obvious that the U.S. mili- tary was not eager to provoke a confrontation with Japan. [T]he present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. 10
Army and Navy Oppose Ultimatum to Japan Until Phillippine Strength is Developed Army Chief of Sta Marshall was also at this November 3 meeting. He said he had received information to the eect that the Japanese expected to decide in a couple of daysthat would be by November 5what action they would take. He empha- sized that it would be dangerous to move the augmented Army Air Force away from its present station in the Philippines for he believed that as long as it was there the Japanese would nd action against the Philippines or towards the south to be a very hazardous operation. Moreover, he expected the Army forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength by mid-Decem- ber and this in itself would have a deterrent eect on Japanese operations. 11
It was Marshalls position that, until U.S. power was su - ciently developed in the Philippines so we would have some- thing to back up our statements, the Japanese should not be antagonized unnecessarily. Te United States should make cer- tain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face, such as a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions. 12 However, he realized that until U.S. forces were built up in the Far East, the situation was delicate. 10 Ibid., Ingersoll remark at Joint Army-Navy Board November 3 meeting. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., part 14, p. 1064. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 117 At the conclusion of these discussions the Joint Board adopted Ingersolls proposal, with amendments suggested by Stark and Marshall. A memorandum was to be prepared for the president opposing (1) the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan, (2) military action against Japan if she moved into Yunnan, and (3) support of Chiang Kai-Shek with U.S. military forces. Te memorandum was to recommend that the State Department postpone hostili- ties with Japan as long as possible, and that some agreements be made with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months. In addition to these recommendations, the memorandum was to (1) point out how a U.S.-Japanese war in the Far East would impair the help the United States was giving Great Britain and the other nations ghting Germany, and (2) emphasize that the United States was not in a position to engage in an oensive operation in the Far East without transferring to the Pacic most of the ships now in the Atlantic. 13
Japanese-U.S. Relations on the Brink of Chaos Our facility in decoding and translating intercepted messages sent in the Japanese diplomatic code, Purple, had improved dra- matically. On November 4, we intercepted, decoded, and trans- lated a message sent from Tokyo earlier that day: Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing condence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. . . . Conditions . . . are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in any sin- cerity to maintain pacic relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided . . . to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last eort. . . . If through it we do not reach a quick 13 Ibid., pp. 106465. 118 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Ten, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense eect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die. 14
Japan was announcing that a break in the relations with the United States was imminent. And the top U.S. political and military o cials who were cleared to read the secret intelligence known as MAGIC knew it. Stark and Marshall Memorandum to FDR: Avoid War with Japan; Issue No Ultimatum to Japan As agreed at the November 3 meeting of the Joint Board, Marshall and Stark prepared a memorandum for the president, brieng him in some detail with respect to the Far East situation. One by one they pointed out the various reasons why the United States should not issue an ultimatum to Japan that might force her to take drastic action involving the United States in a Pacic war: 1. Te U.S. eet in the Pacic was inferior to the Japanese eet and was not in a position to undertake an unlimited stra- tegic oensive in the western Pacic. 2. U.S. military forces in the Philippines were not yet strong enough. Tey were being reinforced, however, and it was expected that air and submarine strength would be built up by mid-December and that the air forces would reach their projected strength by February or March 1942. 14 Ibid., part 12, pp. 9293. November 4, 1941 cable #725 from Tokyo to Wash- ington. Translated November 4, 1941. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 119 3. British naval and air reinforcements were expected to reach Singapore by February or March. Marshall and Stark reconrmed the policies and strategies agreed to in the U.S.-British sta conversations. War between the United States and Japan should be avoided, they wrote, while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance.: 1. Territory or mandated territories of the United States, the British Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies; 2. Certain parts of Tailand in southeast Asia; 3. Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, and the Loyalty Islands, all in the southwest Pacic. Te memorandum also stated that: We should not intervene against Japan if she should attack Russia. We should attempt to weaken Japan economically. We should not send troops to China, but we should give [a]ll possible aid short of actual war . . . to the Chinese Central Government. U. S. plans should be fully coordinated with the British and the Dutch. It closed with a strong recommendation: Tat no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. 15
Note that the territories Marshall and Stark named with whose defenses we were concerned and whose security to the 15 Ibid., part 14, pp. 106162. 120 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy United States is of very great importance were all thousands of miles from our shores. Japan Sets a Deadline for Signing Agreement To Save U.S. Relations From Falling into Chaotic Condition Marshall had told the Joint Board on November 3 that he had information to the eect that on November 5 the Japanese would decide their course of action. And sure enough! On November 5, we intercepted and read the following November 5 Japanese message to the Washington embassy: Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be com- pleted by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a di cult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted eort, I beg of you. Tis information is to be kept strictly to yourself only. 16
U.S. Cabinet Would Support a Strike Against Japan if She Attacked the British or Dutch in Southeast Asia? It was customary for the president to hold meetings of his cabinet on Friday mornings, and he held one as usual on Friday, November 7. Secretary of War Stimson had kept a rather com- plete diary for many years, and he continued the practice through- out his tenure, dictating rather copious notes each morning before going to his o ce in the War Department. Following the 16 Ibid., part 12, p. 100, #736, Tokyo to Washington. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 121 November 7 meeting, Stimson wrote, Te Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Hull reported that U.S. relations with Japan had become extremely critical and that we should be on the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time. But, as Marshall and Stark had stated in no uncertain terms in their memorandum to FDR just two days before, the military were anxious to avoid becoming involved in any action with Japan at that time. Nevertheless, according to Stimsons diary, our mili- tary advisors . . . had urged military action if Japan attacked . . . American, British or Dutch territory. In anticipation that we might be called on to take some such action under the Singapore agreement with the British and Dutch, the military had been y- ing heavy B-17 bombers out to the Philippines for some time, whenever they could be spared from other duties. None of the cabinet members except Hull and Stimson knew of this ongoing buildup. Roosevelt took an informal vote of the cabinet members on how the American people might react if it became necessary to strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. According to Stimsons diary, Te Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move, that is, a strike against Japan if she were to attack the British or Dutch in southeast Asia. 17
News of Victory Program Leaks; Marshall Denies Its Existence Te all-encompassing Victory Program, prepared at the Roosevelts request had been completed by September 10. It con- tained estimates of the military needs of the United States and her potential allies, and of the military stocks available worldwide to win a war in which this country was not as yet o cially involved. Te details and the very existence of the Victory Program was 17 Ibid., part 11, p. 5420. 122 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy a carefully guarded secret. Te small number of copies made had been distributed only to a select few military and administration o cials. However, if it was to be intelligently implemented, the o cers who would be involved had to know about it. Terefore, War Plans Division (WPD) prepared a strategic estimate of the situation, which it circulated in mid-November among War Department o cials. 18
In spite of the careful security surrounding WPDs estimate, news of the Victory Program leaked out. A rumor circulated in November that an American expeditionary force (AEF) was being planned. If true, this was contrary to Marshalls testimony before Congress in July when testifying on the extension of Selective Service. At that time, he had discounted any threat of militarism and assured Congress that he was not considering an AEF, but merely task forces of 5,000, 15,000, or 30,000 men. Marshall issued a categorical denial to scotch the rumor about an AEF: Tere is no foundation whatsoever for the allegation or rumor that we are preparing troops for a possible expedition to Africa or other critical areas outside this hemisphere. 19
The Japanese Push for Agreement Te seriousness of the Japanese deadline became increasingly apparent to anyone reading the secret Purple dispatches during this period. Japan was sending Nomura repeated reminders of the need for urgency. She realized she had to reach some agree- ment with the United States. And with this in mind, Ambassador Nomura and representatives of the U.S. State Department con- tinued their discussions. 18 Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi- sion, 1950), pp. 22031, 358. 19 Ibid., p. 359. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 123 In a further attempt to bring about an amicable settlement, Japan sent to Washington a second ambassador, Admiral Saburu Kurusu, to assist Nomura. Kurusu, with an American wife, was pro-American. Kurusus association with the U.S. dated back to World War I when the two countries were allies. Te U.S. gov- ernment facilitated priority passage for him and for the Japanese Foreign O ce secretary who accompanied him to the United States via a Pan American plane. 20 Kurusu arrived in Washington on November 15. His instructions were to cooperate with [Nomura] in an unsparing eort to guide the negotiations to any early settlement. Tat is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted. . . . [T]he crisis is fast approach- ing. . . . [D]o everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situa- tion. I beg of you to make every eort to have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacic. 21
On November 15 our Navy decoders deciphered and trans- lated a Japanese Purple intercept reminding the Japanese ambas- sador in Washington that the date [November 25] set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, there- fore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date. 22
Nomura immediately cabled Tokyo. He was concerned about what would happen to the Japanese nationals residing in the United States: 20 Department of State, Peace and War, p. 137. See also Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, p. 362. 21 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 13031. Tokyo to Wash- ington, #781, November 15, 1941. 22 Ibid., p. 130. Tokyo to Washington, #775. 124 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Let us suppose that the Japanese-U.S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down. . . . It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two coun- tries would be broken o immediately. . . . I presume that the government has given careful consideration as to the disposi- tion of the various o ces and our nationals residing here. I would appreciate being advised in condence of your decision in these matters. 23 Tokyo answered the following day: [Y]ou may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the eorts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please ght harder than you ever did before. . . . I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution. 24 We decoded, translated, and read both messages on November 17. Nomura presented Japans newly arrived second ambassador, Kurusu, to Secretary of State Hull on November 17. Te three men then proceeded to the White House so that Kurusu might be received formally by the president. After the courtesies were over, Roosevelt brought up the serious misunderstandings between the two countries and expressed his desire to avoid war. Te ambas- sadors said they equally wished for a peaceful settlement in the Pacic. In Kurusus words, [A]ll the way across the Pacic it was 23 Ibid., p. 133. Washington to Tokyo, #1098. 24 Ibid., pp. 13738. Tokyo to Washington, unnumbered dispatch. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 125 like a powder keg. He repeated that some way must be found to avoid war and assured the president that Prime Minister Tojo was also very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment notwithstanding he is an Army man. 25
Meanwhile, that very afternoon Hull received a cable from Ambassador Grew in Japan. Grew warned that there was need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions out- side the area of the Chinese theater of operations. It was likely, he said, that the Japanese might take every possible tactical advan- tage, such as surprise and initiative. Japan maintained extremely eective control over both primary and secondary military infor- mation, so the embassys eld of observation was restricted almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Tis meant that the U.S. embassys naval and military attaches could not be relied on to send substantial warn- ing. Te Japanese, therefore, were assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. 26
The Japanese Ambassadors Continue Trying for Agreement Te two Japanese ambassadors were back at the State Department the following day. Teir deadline (November 25) was approaching, and their immediate concern was the di cult posi- tion of the Japanese under the U.S.-imposed trade restrictions and asset-freeze. Tey pointed out that Japan was much more depen- dent on foreign trade than the United States; she was hard- pressed, and thus desirous of reaching some agreement. 25 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941, vol. 2, pp. 74043. 26 Ibid., pp. 74344. 126 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Hull responded by raising the China question, which had long been a sticking point between the two countries. Would the Japanese be willing to forgo annexation and indemnities, and to respect Chinas sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the principle of equality? Nomura replied that they would be. Hull then asked how many soldiers the Japanese would be will- ing to withdraw from China. Possibly 90 per cent, the ambas- sador replied. And how long did the Japanese intend to keep that remaining 10 percent in China? Te ambassador did not reply directly but invited attention to the fact that under the exist- ing Boxer Protocol, Japan was permitted to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area. Te next topic was Indochina. When Japan moved troops into that country in July, U.S.-Japanese conversations were interrupted and shipments of petroleum products were discontinued. Kurusu said Japan intended to withdraw her troops from Indochina as soon as a just Pacic settlement should be reached. He asked about the possibility of the United Statess ending the sanctions in the meantime. Hull said he would consult the British and the Dutch on this suggestion. 27
Te Japanese were tired of ghting China, Kurusu added, and she would go as far as she could in taking the rst step toward peace. Nevertheless, the U.S. government refused to make any concessions about aid to China. Te situation was complicated by Japans military alliance with Germany. Both England and Russia wanted Japan thoroughly occupied with her war in China so that she could not become an active ally of Germany, which would put at risk Britains possessions in Asia and Russias far eastern territory. Tus U.S. aid to China was, in eect, aid to England and Russia. 27 Ibid., pp. 74450. Memorandum of Hulls November 18, 1941 conversation with Japanese ambassadors. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 127 Judging from the cable tra c we were reading, it was becom- ing apparent that Japan was preparing for a denite break in rela- tions with the United States within a very short time. As we have seen, the Japanese embassy in Washington had cabled Tokyo on November 15 to ask advice as to the disposition of the various o ces and our nationals residing here in the event of such a break. Ten on November 17 Tokyo responded in a cable that we read on the 19th, asking the Japanese ambassador to advise the several consuls in the United States secretly to help our citizens who remain behind to work for the common good and also to destroy immediately . . . secret documents. Tokyo would soon wire a plan for reducing the members of stas. 28
A break in relations was close! 28 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 15354. 129 6. Modus VivendiYes? No! Intelligence I nformation about an enemy is intelligence. Intelligence is one of the most valuable weapons in the arsenal of a bellig- erent. Most intelligence comes in bits and piecesone fact here, another there, often seemingly unrelated. In the hands of an intelligent and capable agent, these bits and pieces may often be linked and made intelligible, yielding valuable information, intelligence. Tus coordination, analysis, and interpretation are extremely important. Te more intelligence a nation can gain about its enemiestheir forces, weapons, and plansthe more prepared it can be to forestall or oppose an attack. And the greater advantage it will have in any encounter. To gain information about their enemies, to observe and to eavesdrop, warring powers employ every available technique spies, telescopes, balloons, radio intercepts, electronic devices, sat- ellite photography, cryptography, and so on. Tey seek to intercept secret communications. Tey work to expose invisible inks, and to decipher codes and ciphers, often extremely intricate and com- plex ones that frequently are revised and altered. Espionage and counterespionage are important to both sides in any conict. 130 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy As we have seen, the United States had an advantage over the Japanese during the 19211922 Washington Naval Conference on disarmament because it was reading the Japanese governments secret instructions to its representative. But the U.S. government closed down its cryptographic agency in 1929, although the Navy continued to maintain an intelligence o ce, OP-20-G, which operated after 1916 under Commander Laurence F. Saord. And in 1930 the Army established its Signal Intelligence Service (SIS), headed by William Friedman. By 1940, these two agencies were deeply involved once more in analyzing and deciphering Japanese codes. At that time, the Japanese had many codes of varying com- plexities. Each was intended for a dierent purpose. Te most intricate were their diplomatic, consular, and naval codes. When the Japanese were especially anxious to assure the security of a message, they usually transmitted it in one of these codes. Tey considered their diplomatic code to be their most complex and most indecipherable; they thought it was absolutely secure and used it for their very most secret messages. Japans Diplomatic Code Te intelligence experts in the Armys SIS and the Navys Op-20-G cooperated in the attempt to break the various Japanese codes. Although the Japanese navy code long deed U.S. cryp- tographers, they made considerable headway in breaking several others, including the consular code. Teir most spectacular suc- cess, however, was with Japans diplomatic cipher. After some 18 or 20 months of painstaking eort, the Army and Navy experts nally succeeded in breaking this code. Tey even constructed a machine that could duplicate the operations of the Japanese machine, including replicating the daily shuf- ing and transpositional changes by which the Japanese hoped Modus VivendiYes? No! 131 to thwart would-be code-breakers. In time, six of these machines were constructed. For some time, the U.S. code name for Japan had been Orange. Te machine used for decoding a previous Japanese cipher had been known as the Red machine. So in the tradition of color code names, this new machine was called Purple. Te rst Purple machine was retained in Washington. When additional machines became available, they were distrib- uted to stations where they were expected to be most valuable. Te Navy retained one, the Army two. Te others were sent to commanders in the eld where conict with Japan seemed pos- sible. Two machines were sent to England, one of which was later forwarded to Singapore. Another machine went to Corregidor in the Philippines. Because personnel was limited there and because atmospheric conditions prevented picking up more than about 10 percent of the Tokyo-Washington messages, the Philippines handled primarily local tra c. 1 No Purple machine was ever sent to Hawaii. Te Pearl Harbor commanders had to rely for intelligence about the Japanese on radio directional ndings they could pick up and on reports relayed to them from Washington. Intercepting and decoding a Japanese message was only the rst step on the road to turning it into useful intelligence. Once deciphered, an intercept had to be translated into English. But this translation was not intelligence; it was only raw material. To become useful intelligence, it had to be properly analyzed and interpreted. Ten it had to reach those who could use it to advantage. And all this had to be accomplished without the ene- mys knowledge. 1 Percy L. Greaves, Jr., Te Pearl Harbor Investigations, in Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953), p. 410; David Kahn, Te Codebreakers: Te Story of Secret Writing (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), p. 23. See also Laurence F. Saord, two- hour tape, notes in authors possession. 132 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Developing the Purple machine seemed almost miraculous, so the information derived from it was code-named MAGIC. Since this information was extremely valuable, the U.S. govern- ment was anxious not to jeopardize its source. Should the Japanese discover their code had been broken, they would undoubtedly stop using it, revise it and/or adopt a dierent code. Te laborious task of breaking a new code would then have to begin all over again. So knowledge of Purple was conned to a very few o - cials and only about a dozen copies of each translated MAGIC intercept were made. 2 Distribution of the MAGIC intercepts was by a high-ranking special courier who usually waited to answer questions while the intercepts were being read. To maintain secu- rity, the intercepts were then retrieved and returned to a secure le. Only four copies of each decoded/translated intercept were kept; all others were destroyed. 3
Once the Japanese diplomatic code was broken, the Army and Navy intercept stations rarely missed a message. With expe- rience, the Army and Navy specialists in Washington became quite skillful at deciphering Japanese messages coded on the Purple machine. As time went by, specialists were often able to decode and translate messages so quickly that they were in the hands of Secretary of State Hull before his meetings with the Japanese ambassadors. Of the 227 messages pertaining to Japanese-American negotiations sent between Tokyo and Washington from March to December 1941, all but four were picked up. 4 And the messages we intercepted dealt not only with the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, but also with many other matters. 5
2 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 36, p. 23. McCollum testimony at Hewitt Inquiry. 3 Saord interview, April 5, 1966, notes in authors possession. 4 Kahn, Te Codebreakers, p. 13. 5 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, p. 915. Modus VivendiYes? No! 133 So throughout the months preceding the Japanese attack, U.S. o cials in Washington received a continual ow of precise and accurate information directly from the innermost chambers of the Japanese government. However, the Japanese o cials did not communicate every- thing to their representatives abroad, not even to their Washington ambassadors. So there was still much we did not know about Japans plans and intentions and there was ample room for con- jecture, speculation and interpretation. Japan Proposes a MODUS VIVENDI On November 19, Japanese ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu renewed their conversations with Hull at his apartment. Te ambassadors told Hull that Japan was being squeezed economi- cally by the U.S. embargo and by our freezing measures; she wanted a quick settlement. Tey told Hull they were momen- tarily expecting instructions from their government. Hull sug- gested that if the Japanese Government could prevail over the views of the Japanese war party, it might be possible to work out something with us. 6
By the following day, the ambassadors had received their instructions and visited Hull again. Nomura said the Japanese Government was clearly desirous of peace and that it was trying to show this peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Tailand. It was anxious to resume trade, and to accomplish this, it was oering to restrict military operations. Nomura and Kurusu pro- posed a modus vivendi. Modus vivendi is Latin meaning a living or viable method or measure. In other words, the ambassadors 6 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 75152. 134 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy were proposing a temporary working arrangement until the dis- putes could be settled. 7
Te Japanese modus vivendi contained ve points: (1) Te gov- ernments of Japan and of the United States should agree not to make any armed advancement in southeastern Asia or the south Pacic, except in French Indochina, where the Japanese troops were already stationed; (2) the Japanese government would agree to withdraw its troops from French Indochina once peace was established in the Pacic, and in the meantime, it would shift them from southern to northern French Indochina; (3) the two governments would cooperate with a view to securing in the Netherlands East Indies the various goods and commodities they might need; (4) the governments would undertake to restore pre- embargo commercial relations, and the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil; and (5) the U.S. government, in turn, should refrain from actions prejudicial to the restoration of general peace between Japan and China. 8
United States Makes a -Month MODUS VIVENDI Counter-Proposal President Roosevelt expressed his view on the Japanese modus vivendi in a handwritten note to Hull: 6 months 1. U.S. to resume economic relationssome oil and rice now more later. 2. Japan to send no more troops to Indochina or Manchurian border or any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam). 3. Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact even if U.S. gets into European war. 7 Ibid., p. 753. 8 Ibid., pp. 75556. Modus VivendiYes? No! 135 4. U.S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U.S. to take no part in their conversations. Later on Pacic agreements. 9 Apparently FDR was then willing to enter into an agreement with Japan to help relieve the economic pressures on her for six months. He would permit Japan to obtain some oil and rice. He would not insist that Japan pull out of Indochina completely. He was concerned about the Japanese-German pact. However, in item 4 FDR ignored Japans request that the United States refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to . . . the restoration of general peace in China. In other words, he did not acknowledge Japans request that the United States discontinue helping Chiangs forces. To FDR, aid to China was important; by helping China we were hurting Japan, prevent- ing her from attacking the Russian Communists in the far east, and that helped our allies, England and Russia, in their struggle against Germany in Europe. Before responding to the Japanese proposal, Hull met on November 22 with the British and Australian ambassadors and the Dutch minister to determine the reactions of their respec- tive governments. Te Chinese ambassador, also invited, was late in arriving. Hull suggested, and the others seemed to agree, that it would be better to submit a substitute proposal than to make a specic reply to the Japanese proposal, section for sec- tion. He outlined his alternative modus vivendi, the major pur- poses of which were to contain Japan and to protect China. Te ambassadors all seemed to be well pleased . . . except the Chinese Ambassador, who was somewhat disturbed. But then, in Hulls 9 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp. 110809, undated, prob- ably shortly after November 20, 1941; Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941: Te Partnership Tat Saved the West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 467. 136 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy words, he always is when any question concerning China arises not entirely to his way of thinking. 10
Japanese Deadline Extended to November , After Which Things Are Automatically Going to Happen. Te Japanese ambassadors had been told on November 5, that they must conclude their deliberations by November 25. Ten on November 22, Tokyo cabled them, extending the deadline to November 29, but urged them to continue their eorts: Stick to your xed policy and do your very best. Spare no eorts and try to bring about the solution we desire. It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date, Tokyo told the two ambassadors. Tere are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle the Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can nish your conver- sations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for youtwenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understand- ing with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be nished, we have decided to wait until that date. But, the Japanese government added, Tis time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. (Italics added.) 11
Te Japanese ambassadors were being giving a little more time. It was obvious that the failure of the negotiations would 10 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 4: Te Far East, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1956), p. 640, Hull memorandum of November 22, 1941. 11 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 165. Tokyo cable #812 to Japanese Ambassador in Washington. Modus VivendiYes? No! 137 have serious repercussions, but also that their government was not taking them into full condence. On November 22, Japan made another concession, oering to move her troops from the south of Indochina to the north. Kurusu told Hull it had taken a great deal of persuasion to induce the army to abandon a position once taken, but that both he and the Ambassador had been pleasantly surprised when the Japanese army acceded to their suggestion in regard to oering to withdraw the Japanese troops from southern Indochina. Kurusu considered this an encouraging sign. 12
On November 24, two days after U.S. intelligence experts decoded Tokyo cable #812 extending the Japanese deadline to November 29, the two ambassadors received a follow-up cable from Tokyo: Te time limit set in my message #812 is in Tokyo time. 13 Tat was 14 hours earlier than Washington time. Tus we were alerted that the timing of the deadline was crucial. Tis cable was decoded by our cryptoanalysts in Washington the same day it was sent. More Discussions Among Friends of the U.S. on U.S. Response to Japan Also on November 24, Hull met once more with the Australian, British, Chinese, and Dutch diplomats. Te Dutch minister said his government would support the [U.S.] modus vivendi proposal. However, Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih objected to several of its provisions that aected China. For one 12 Department of State, Japan, 19311941, p. 758. State Department memo- randum of Hulls November 22 conversation with the Japanese ambassadors. 13 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 173. Tokyo message #823 to Washington. 138 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thing, he believed that permitting the Japanese to retain soldiers in Indochina would pose a threat to Chinas supply line, the recently reopened Burma Road. Hull realized the urgency of the situation. He pointed out to the four diplomats the importance of reaching a temporary agreement with the Japanese to assure a few more months of peace. He said he was striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primar- ily because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to [him] that time is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be more fully prepared to deal eectively with the situation in the Pacic area in case of an outbreak by Japan. Hull also emphasized the point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occur any day after this weekunless a temporary arrangement is eected. (italics added) 14
Information then available in the Navy Department clearly indicated that the Japanese were planning some decisive action for the very near future. In the afternoon of November 24, Chief of Naval Operations Stark authorized a circular message to his eet commanders on the rim of the Pacicin the Philippines (Hart), at Pearl Harbor (Kimmel), and to the commandants of the several naval districts, Panama (15th), San Diego (11th), San Francisco (12th), and Seattle (13th)with copies for information only to SPENAVO (Special Naval Observer/London) and the commander of the Atlantic Fleet (King). (All Navy messages 14 Department of State, Te Far East, pp. 64647, Hulls memorandum of conversation. Modus VivendiYes? No! 139 were identied by a six-digit number indicating the time and date led in Greenwich, England. Tis system eliminated confu- sion that might arise when sending and receiving messages to and from dierent time zones.) In his cable Stark advised his eld commanders: Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. Tis situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Guam will be informed separately. 15
Te commanders were asked to inform senior Army o cers their areas. Following instructions, Admiral Kimmel consulted with General Short in Hawaii. Kimmel and his advisers did not dis- pute Japans capability for delivering a long-range surprise bombing attack on Pearl Harbor. Nor did they rule out the pos- sibility that Japan might attack without a declaration of war. Te Philippines and Guam seemed the only U.S. possessions imminently threatened by Japan. Te Philippines were on the ank of the most direct route from Japan to French Indochina, the Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch East Indies. And Guam, the site of a U.S. naval station, lay in the midst of the Japanese- mandated, formerly German-owned, islandsthe Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls. (After World War I, Japan, then an ally of Great Britain and the United States, had been given these islands to administer under a League of Nations mandate, and we had known for some time that Japan was constructing naval and air bases on them.) Tus, Kimmel and his advisers did not consider it likely that Hawaii would be the target of such a sur- prise aggressive movement in any direction. Tey 15 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1405. 140 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy reasoned that she [ Japan] would not commit the strategic blunder of delivering a surprise attack on United States terri- tory, the one course that irrevocably would unite the American people in war against Japan. 16
So the eect of Starks message was to turn the attention of Kimmel and his advisers toward the Far East. Objections Raised to U. S. Proposed MODUS VIVENDI Another November 24 meeting concerning the U.S. pro- posed modus vivendi took place in the o ce of Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. Also present were Harry Dexter White, an assis- tant secretary, and Russian embassy counselor (later ambassa- dor) Andrei Gromyko. White protested against a Far Eastern Munich. He drafted a letter to Roosevelt for Morgenthaus sig- nature stating that to sell China to her enemies for thirty blood stained pieces of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the luster of American world leadership in the great democratic ght against fascism. 17
Morgenthau didnt send that letter. He didnt have to; he real- ized the president needed no prodding to stand for precisely the policy which the Secretary then and later considered essential. He had, in a sense, deemed it essential ever since the fall of 1938. 18 It was in November 1938 that Japan had announced her intention 16 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39 (Report), p. 314, analysis here as culled from testimony during the JCC hearings and presented in its nal report. 17 David Rees, Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973), p. 125. 18 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938 1941 (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1965), p. 389. Modus VivendiYes? No! 141 of establishing an anticommunist New Order in Asia. Japan, Manchukuo, and China were to cooperate to secure interna- tional justice, to perfect the joint defense against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout east Asia. 19
In the evening of November 24 Chinese ambassador Hu Shih called on Stanley K. Hornbeck, State Department adviser on political relations, to register his objections to the modus vivendi the United States was considering. Te ambassador said he real- ized that it would be very helpful to keep the Japanese in suspense for another three months, but he doubted whether that could be achieved. However, he assured Hornbeck that he would try to cause his Government to see the problem in the light in which the American Government sees it. 20 Te Dutch minister had told Hull on November 22 that his government supported the U.S. proposal. However, the Dutch government had contacted him again to express reservations, as the Chinese ambassador had, to the number of Japanese troops that might be left in Indochina. Te minister also called on Hornbeck that evening to relay to him his governments second thoughts. 21
19 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occur- rence, 19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 169. November 3, 1938 entry quotes from Prime Minister Prince Konoyes November 3, 1938 radio speech announcing Japans intention of creating a new order in east Asia. For entire speech, see Department of State, Japan: 19311941, pp. 47881. 20 Department of State, Te Far East, p. 65051, memorandum of conversations of State Departments adviser on political relations, Stanley K. Hornbeck. 21 Ibid. 142 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy The U. S. Proposes
-Month MODUS VIVENDI
Te U.S. counterproposal to the Japanese modus vivendi went through several drafts. Te one nally approvedby both the War and Navy departments and then later, at a White House meeting, by FDRs so-called War Cabinetprovided for a three-month respite. Te United States was still, of course, o cially neutral and nominally at peace. However, a War Cabinet had been set up as an informal body to coordinate the activities of the civil and military branches of the executive department. Tis War Cabinet consisted of the president; the secretaries of State (Hull), War (Stimson), and Navy (Knox); the Army chief of sta (Marshall), chief of naval operations (Stark), and occasionally the command- ing general of the Air Force (Arnold). It was a sort of clearing house for information, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time also somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the group. 22
Te U.S. proposal called on Japan to withdraw her troops from French Indochina and to make no further advances in Asia or the Pacic. Tese provisions would accomplish the administra- tions goals of restraining Japan and protecting China. In return 22 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, p. 135. Quotation from Army Pearl Harbor Board Report. See also U.S. Congress, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, A Concurrent Resolution Authorizing an Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Events and Circumstances Relating Tereto and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe Together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster, 79th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), p. 513. Modus VivendiYes? No! 143 for these concessions, the United States would agree to relax her trade restrictions for three months. Te export of petroleum to Japan would be permitted upon a monthly basis for civil- ian needs only. Te United States also would try to induce the Australian, British and Dutch governments to relax their trade restrictions. .23
In a November 24 telegram to Churchill, Roosevelt summa- rized this three-month modus vivendi: Tis seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon. 24
Stimson and Knox met in Hulls o ce on November 25, where they discussed the proposal at some length. Stimson thought it adequately safeguarded all our interests, but he didnt think the Japanese would accept it because it was so drastic. 25
British Ambassador Lord Halifax called on Hull later that same morning and relayed Britains approval of the U.S. decision to present the Japanese with a counterproposal. Te British, he said, had complete condence in Mr. Hulls handling of these negotiations. Tey believed the Japanese will try to force a hur- ried decision by magnifying the dangers of delay and urged that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate 23 Department of State, Te Far East, p. 644. 24 Ibid., p. 649. 25 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433. Excerpt reprinted from Stimsons November 25 diary. 144 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all par- ties concerned. 26
China Objects to U.S. Revised
-Month MODUS VIVENDI
Word of the proposed U.S. modus vivendi soon reached Chiang Kai-shek. On November 25 numerous hysterical cable messages to dierent Cabinet o cers and high o cials in the Government began arriving from him and his associates. 27 Tey bombarded Washington with demands that no further conces- sions be made to Tokyo. 28 Chiang cabled Knox, Stimson, and Morgenthau to say the same thing. 29 He also cabled Churchill in England. Chiang appeared frantic. He asked his brother-in-law and personal emissary in Washington, Dr. T.V. Soong of China Defense Supplies, Inc., to contact Stimson and Knox. If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacri- ced by the United States. Te morale of the entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. Te Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through 26 Department of State, Te Far East, pp. 65556. British Embassy to Depart- ment of State. 27 Ibid., pp. 68587, Hull memorandum concerning November 29 conversa- tion with the Japanese ambassadors. 28 Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 124. 29 Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 386. Modus VivendiYes? No! 145 their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. 30
Another cable was sent that same day by one of Chiangs advisers, Owen Lattimore, to Lauchlin Currie, then an adminis- trative assistant to President Roosevelt and a friend of Lattimores. Currie had helped Lattimore obtain the appointment as Chiangs U.S. political adviser. 31 Lattimore cabled that he had never seen him [Chiang Kai-shek] really agitated before. Loosening of eco- nomic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japans military advantage in China. According to Lattimore, Chiang believed that A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any Modus Vivendi now arrived at with China [sic; Japan?] would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. . . . It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. Te Generalissimo [Chiang] has deep condence in the Presidents delity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japans escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory. 32
30 Department of State, Te Far East, pp. 66061, telegram from Chiang Kai- shek to Dr. T.V. Soong, November 25, 1941. 31 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Inves- tigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Institute of Pacic Relations, 82nd Congress, 2nd session, part 9, pp. 320912. 32 Department of State, Te Far East, p. 652; Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1160. 146 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Still another cable arrived from China, this one from Foreign Minister Quo Tai-chi to Ambassador Hu Shih. [T]he Generalissimo showed rather strong reaction at the news he was receiving from Washington. Quo Tai-chis wire was some- what calmer than Lattimores: Chiang got the impression that the United States Government has put aside the Chinese ques- tion in its conversation with Japan. Apparently, Chiang believed that the United States was still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China. Quo Tai-chi had explained to Chiang that the Secretary of State has always had the greatest respect for the fundamental principles, and that I believe he has made no concession to Japan. But his main point came through loud and clear. We are, however, rmly opposed to any measure which may have the eect of increasing Chinas di culty in her war of resistance, or of strengthening Japans power in her aggression against China. Please inform the Secretary of State. 33
When Hu Shih showed Hull this telegram, Hull again explained that the United States was just trying to give the U.S. military more time to build up its defenses. [T]he o cial heads of our Army and Navy for some weeks, Hull said, have been most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan until they have had an opportunity to increase further their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacic area. Terefore, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan . . . we have been carrying on conversations and [have been] making some progress thus far. Hull told Hu Shih that the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek had very recently . . . ooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the 33 Department of State, Te Far East, p. 654, November 24, 1941 telegram, Quo Tai-chi to Hu Shih. Modus VivendiYes? No! 147 Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid. Hull pointed out that practically the rst thing this present proposal of mine and the president does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma Road. . . . [O]ur proposal would relieve the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacic area. Hull continued, Of course, we can cancel this proposal, but it must be with the understanding that we are not to be charged with failure to send our eet into the area near Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a military drive southward. 34
It would seem that either Hu Shih had completely misun- derstood the provisions of the proposed modus vivendi or Chiang had. Perhaps these provisions had been misrepresented to China. As Hull explained to Hu Shih, the draft Hull had outlined pre- viously would have required Japan to withdraw all military and police forces from China proper and from Indochina. Japan would also have had to agree to support no other government or regime in China except Chiangs, then headquartered at Chungking. If Japan acceded to these provisions, it would constitute a great vic- tory for Chiangs government. Japanese Attack Appears Imminent; Stimson: Can They Be Maneuvered Into Firing the First Shot? On November 25, Navy intelligence deciphered and trans- lated a Japanese J-19 circular message (#2330) sent ten days before from Tokyo to all Japans representatives abroad. It gave 34 Ibid., pp. 65354. 148 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy them detailed instructions for the destruction of code machines to be carried out in the event of an emergency. 35 Here was clear evidence that Japan was contemplating more hostile action in the near future. At noon on November 25, FDRs War Cabinet met at the White House. [I]nstead of bringing up the Victory Parade, that is the plan for the actual winning of a war not yet declared, as Stimson had expected, Roosevelt raised another subject. He announced, Stimson recalled, that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1]. Te Japanese were undoubtedly planning an expedition to the South, which would be likely to interfere with our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. Hull laid out his general broad propositions on which the thing [our response to Japans proposed modus vivendi] should be rested the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression. FDR reminded the group that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning. Te question before the War Cabinet was how we should maneuver them into the posi- tion of ring the rst shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. Stimson conded to his diary that this was indeed a di cult proposition. Te possibility of issuing Japan an ultima- tum was also raised at this meeting. Stimson pointed out that the president had already taken the rst steps towards an ultimatum in notify- ing Japan way back last summer [August 17] 36 that if she crossed the border into Tailand, she was violating our safety. . . . [H]e had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow [sic; allow?] any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already 35 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 137. 36 Department of State, Japan: 1941, p. 558. Modus VivendiYes? No! 149 given. So Hull was asked to prepare such a statement to be submitted to Japan. 37
When Stimson returned to his o ce from this meeting, he learned from Army Intelligence, G-2, that ve Japanese divisions were headed southward from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai. Te ships had been sighted south of Formosa. He immediately phoned Hull and sent him a copy of the G-2 message. He also sent a copy to the president. 38
U.S. Proposed MODUS VIVENDI Scuttled At 6:00 a.m. the next day, a Triple Priority cable, addressed to FDR from the former Naval person, Winston Churchill, was received in Washington. Churchill acknowledged receipt of the U.S. proposed modus vivendi. Of course, it is for you to handle this business, Churchill cabled, and we certainly do not want an additional war. Tere is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? . . . If they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase. 39
Early that morning, T.V. Soong, Chiangs brother-in-law and emissary in Washington, called on Harry Dexter White. Soong pleaded with White to use his inuence with Morgenthau to try to have the proposed U.S. modus vivendi killed. White approached Morgenthau and persuaded him to call on the president. Morgenthau walked through the underground passageway link- ing the Treasury building to the White House to see Roosevelt. After Morgenthau described the Chinese ambassadors and 37 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433, excerpt from Stim- sons diary, November 25, 1941. 38 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 543334, from Stimson diary, as quoted in JCC hearings. 39 Department of State, Te Far East, p. 665. 150 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Soongs agitation, FDR agreed to see them. I will quiet them down, he said. 40
White also sent an urgent telegram to Edward C. Carter, the former secretary-general of the Institute of the Pacic Relations in New York . . . [asking] Carter to come to Washington to lobby against making any concessions to the Japanese. 41
Stimson phoned FDR that same morning and told him about the Japanese expedition southward-bound from China. Tis was news to him, for he hadnt seen the G-2 message Stimson had sent him the evening before. According to Stimson, Roosevelt blew upjumped up into the air, so to speak, and said . . . that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire trucean entire withdrawal (from China)they should be sending this expedition down there to Indochina. 42
FDR met with the two Chinese and then called Hull to the White House. Te proposed modus vivendi would be scuttled and a statement of broad basic proposals would be oered instead. 43
Te Dutch governments shift from support to criticism of our modus vivendi, the reversal of the British governments position from complete condence in Hull and support for a U.S. coun- terproposal to concern with Chiangs very thin diet, buttressed 40 Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 386. 41 Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 125. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacic Relations Hearings, July 26, 1951, part 1, pp. 15354. 42 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5434, from Stimsons diary, November 26, 1941. 43 Ibid., part 11, p. 5387, Hull reply to interrogatory submitted by the Joint Congressional Committee. Modus VivendiYes? No! 151 by Chiangs campaign of cables, had tipped the scales against Japan. Without consulting his other advisers, Roosevelt authorized Hull to give the Japanese a ten-point note based on Whites sug- gestions. Neither War nor Navy department was notied of this decision. Both Roosevelt and Hull realized their note would be unacceptable to the Japanese. Chiangs anti-Japanese campaign, orchestrated largely by three communist sympathizersWhite, Lattimore, and Currie, with Edward C. Carter standing in the wings ready to help if need behad paid o. 44
U. S. Note Delivered to Japanese Ambassadors Tat afternoon, November 26, Hull summoned the two Japanese ambassadors to his o ce and handed them the statement FDR had approved. Section I set forth a number of diplomatic platitudes. Te governments of the United States and Japan were 44 Te Communist a liations of these several advisers are on the record. Te evidence oered by Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley that White engaged in Soviet espionage was considered conclusive by Attorney General Brownell, uncontradictable by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and incontro- vertible by President Eisenhower (Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 424). After Lattimore nished testifying during the investigation of the Institute for Pacic Relations conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, the Subcommittee reported that Lattimore had been from some time in the middle 1930s a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy (Francis X. Gannon, Biographical Dictionary of the Left, Belmont, Mass.: Western Islands, 1969, consolidated vol. 1., p. 416). On November 8, 1945, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover informed President Truman that Currie was one of many persons within the federal government who have been furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn transmitting this information to agents of the Soviet Government (Ibid., p. 299). When testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activi- ties on July 1, 1948, former Soviet espionage agent Elizabeth Bentley accused Currie of having furnished United States government secrets to a Soviet spy ring (Ibid., p. 299). 152 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy both solicitous for the peace of the Pacic. Ten several general principles were presented on which their mutual relations should be governedprinciples of territorial integrity, sovereignty, non- interference in the internal aairs of other nations, equality of commercial opportunity, international cooperation, etc. Section II listed Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan. Ten points followed. 45
45 Department of State, Japan: 1931-1941, pp. 76870. Te Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows: 1. Te Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Tailand and the United States. 2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands [sic] and Tai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consulta- tion with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed neces- sary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agree- ment would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its inuence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina. 3. Te Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina. 4. Te Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not supportmilitarily, politically, economicallyany govern- ment or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking. 5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of Modus VivendiYes? No! 153 After reading the documents, Kurusu asked whether this was our reply to their proposal for a modus vivendi . . . . Mr. Kurusu oered various depreciatory comments in regard to the proposed agreement. He noted that in our statement of principles there was a reiteration of the Stimson doctrine. He was referring to the Doctrine of Non-recognition advocated by Stimson when he was President Hoovers secretary of state. 46 Kurusu objected to the proposal for multilateral non-aggression pacts and referred to Japans bitter experience of international 1901. Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in con- cessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. 6. Te Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most- favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list. 7. Te Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan. 8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States. 9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacic area. 10. Both Governments will use their inuence to cause other govern- ments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement. 46 Ibid., p. 76. See also Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 25758. 154 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy organization, citing the case of the award against Japan by the Hague tribunal in the Perpetual Leases matter. Kurusu did not believe his government could agree to para- graph (3) calling on Japan to withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from both China and Indochina, or paragraph (4) asking her to refrain from supportingmilitarily, politically, economicallyany government or regime in China other than Chiangs national government. Kurusu did not think the United States should expect Japan to take o its hat to Chiang Kai-shek and propose to recognize him. . . . He said that if this was the idea of the American Government he did not see how any agreement was possible. Hull asked if this couldnt be worked out. Kurusu responded that when they [the Japanese ambassadors] reported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands. However, he said, this was a tentative proposal without com- mitment. Perhaps they should not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents further informally here. Hull said they might want to study the document carefully, but he explained that our proposal was as far as we could go at this time. With specic reference to the oil question, Hull said public feeling [in the United States] was so acute . . . that he might almost be lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. Kurusu felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end. He wanted to know if we werent interested in a modus vivendi. Te Secretary replied that we had explored that. Mr. Kurusu asked whether it was because the other powers would not agree. Te Japanese must have been aware of the plans we had been making to coop- erate with the British and Dutch in the southwest Pacic. Te secretary [Hull] replied simply that he had done his best in the Modus VivendiYes? No! 155 way of exploration. With that the two Japanese ambassadors were dismissed. 47
British Notified of MODUS VIVENDI Rejection Almost immediately after delivering to the Japanese ambas- sadors the U.S. note with its unacceptable ten points, Hull cabled Ambassador Grew in Japan and Ambassador C.E. Gauss in China. 48 Tat evening Hull telephoned British Ambassador Lord Halifax to inform him of the nature of the document which he had handed the Japanese envoys. Neither our War nor Navy department was advised. Te following morning, Lord Halifax called on Undersecretary of State Welles to ask why the proposed modus vivendi had been overthrown and a virtual ultimatum issued. [O]ne of the rea- sons for the determination reached, Welles replied, was the half-hearted support given by the British Government to the earlier proposal. Halifax could not understand this in as much as he had communicated to Hull the full support of the British Government. Welles responded that Churchills expressed con- cern with Chiangs thin diet could hardly be regarded as full support. Halifax admitted that he had been surprised by the vigor of the Chinese objections. He had thought that the course proposed by Hull gave positive assurances to the Chinese gov- ernment that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated. He believed that the Chinese governments attitude was based partly on faulty information and partly on the almost hysterical reaction because of the fear that any kind 47 Department of State, Japan: 19311941, pp. 76466. State Department memorandum of November 26, 1941 meeting. 48 Department of State, Te Far East, p. 666, Telegram #783 to Grew; and p. 666n. Telegram #274 to Gauss. 156 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy of an agreement reached between Japan and the United States at this time would result in a complete breakdown of Chinese morale. Welles told Halifax that in his view the Chinese had real cause for concern. Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already very active. . . . Japanese forces there were being quickly increased in number . . . [indicating] that the threat against Tailand was imminent. Moreover, Welles pointed out, it was evident from the information received here that the Japanese were preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. Te gravity of the situation . . . could not be exaggerated. 49
Japan Vows to Destroy British and American Power in China Another Purple intercept, sent from Tokyo on November 14, and deciphered in Washington on November 26, reminded us again, forcibly, of Japans intentions in the Far East. Tis cable had been addressed to Hongkong and to the Japanese diplomatic o cers in 11 Chinese cities. [T]he Imperial Government [still] hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, it read. However, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will nd herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Te Japanese cabinet had made several momentous foreign policy decisions: a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China. b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy impor- tant rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China. 49 Ibid., pp. 66667, Welless November 27, 1941 memorandum. Modus VivendiYes? No! 157 c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary. Te Japanese were under no illusion as to the problems involved in ghting an expanded war. Teir forces were widely extended and their resources severely strained. Tey wanted to avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. However, they were prepared to cope with a world war on a long-time scale. If their reserves for total war and . . . future military strength wane, they would reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. Tis has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. To carry out these foreign policy objectives, the Japanese would encourage the activities of important Chinese in their eorts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Tus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far East. However, because of the U.S. embargo on exports to Japan, resources were a primary concern; great importance [was placed] upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). Te entire Japanese cabinet concurred. 50
Te military and administration o cials in Washington who read this intercept could have had little doubt as to the serious- ness of the consequences if the negotiations with the Japanese ambassadors failed. 50 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 12627. 158 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy FDR Notifies the Philippines That Japanese Aggression Appears Imminent While Hull was making plans to present the U.S. ten-point note to the Japanese ambassadors, FDR prepared a message to our high commissioner in the Philippines, Francis B. Sayre. Roosevelt explained that the Far East was a veritable tinderbox. Te Japanese are strongly reenforcing their garrisons and naval forces in the Mandates in a manner which indicates they are pre- paring this region as quickly as possible against a possible attack on them by US forces. However, FDR was not so much concerned by the Japanese attempts to defend themselves against the United States as he was by the increasing opposition of Japanese lead- ers and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai and Japan to the Formosa area. It was apparent, he continued, that the Japanese were making preparations in China, Formosa, and Indochina for an early aggressive movement of some char- acter. However, it was not yet clear whether this move would be directed against the Burma Road, Tailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies or the Philippines. Te most likely tar- get seemed to be Tailand. FDR was fearful that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan. He asked Sayre to discuss the situation with the U.S. military com- manders in Manila, Admiral Hart and General MacArthur. Te commissioner should then present my views to the president of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people. FDRs cable was transmitted by the Navy to the Philippines on the afternoon of November 26. 51
51 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5214. Modus VivendiYes? No! 159 Japanese Cabinet Expected to Decide Soon Between Peace and War Also on November 26, we deciphered a Strictly Secret cable sent the day before, via Purple, from Hanoi in Indochina, to Tokyo. 52 Japanese diplomatic o cials in Indochina had heard from military sources that the United States was expected to present its reply to the Japanese envoys modus vivendi proposal that very day, November 25. If this is true, Hanoi cabled, if the U.S. did answer Japans request for a modus vivendi as expected, the United States response would bring matters to a head. In that event, Hanoi assumed that the Japanese Cabinet would be mak- ing a decision between peace and war within the next day or two. [I]f the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a success- ful termination, Hanoi continued, they had plans for launch- ing various enterprises. Should, however, the negotiations [in Washington] not end in a success, as the military sources had implied would be the case, since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day. Hanoi was disturbed that representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and even China had been meeting with U.S. o cials in Washington and must be aware of the status of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Japans o cials in Hanoi knew from Tokyos circular message #2353 (which we had not intercepted and translated before we read this Hanoi cable to Tokyo) that the situation was becoming exceedingly critical. Our o cials in Washington who were privy to MAGIC learned from this telegram that the Japanese cabinet would soon make a decision between peace and war. If the Japanese envoys in Washington succeeded in obtaining an acceptable modus vivendi, 52 Ibid., part 12, pp. 17475. 160 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the decision would be for peace. If not, it would be for war. And by handing the Japanese ambassadors a note that we knew their gov- ernment could not accept, we were rejecting a modus vivendi. Te Japanese negotiations were not ending in success. And this, our reading of MAGIC told us, meant war! Moreover, the Japanese forces in Indochina would be able to move within the day. On the afternoon of November 26, Marshall and several mem- bers of his sta ew down to North Carolina from Washington to attend the nal phases of the First Armys maneuvers. For some 36 hours at this crucial time, he was out of touch with Washington. 53
53 Robert Payne, Te Marshall Story (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 148; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939 1942 (New York: Viking Press 1965), p. 208. 7. Japanese Action Appears Imminent U. S. War PlansTo Raid and Destroy Japanese Bases in Far East in Support of Associated Powers M ilitary forces regularly make plans for the defense of their country under various contingencies. However, by 1941 the U.S. military had developed war plans that went far beyond trying to defend the nation against foreign aggressors. Our Army, Navy, and Air forces were operating under a war plan based on a secret agreement reached during the American-British Conversations (ABC) held in Washington early in 1941. Tis agreement had been approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and by the president. 1 Chief of Navy War Plans Richmond Kelly Tuner termed it 1 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce), part 26, p. 264, testimony of Admiral Turner at Hart Inquiry. 161 162 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air, of the entire world in which it was conceived that the British Commonwealth and the United States might be jointly engaged in action against any enemy. In line with the so-called ABC-I agreement, a joint Army-Navy plan was prepared after a great many talks with the Army . . . [and] was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the Secretary of War on June 2, 1941. It bore the short title Rainbow No. 5. On the basis of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan the Navy Department promulgated the Navy Basic War Plan on May 26, 1941. Tis plan bore the short title WPL-46. . . . Te War Plan of the Pacic Fleet was distributed on July 25, 1941. 2 It had been customary to name an operating plan by the color code name assigned to the potential enemy concerned. Japan had traditionally been designated orange, other countries blue, red, and so on. However, as ABC-I contemplated action against several enemy nations, it wasnt feasible to designate its operat- ing plan by a single color. Hence the code name Rainbow. 3
Several Rainbow operating plans, each numbered consecutively and each providing for a dierent contingency, were developed to implement the ABC-I agreement. Te rst four were eventu- ally set aside. It was Rainbow No. 5 that the Navy issued in May 1941 and sent out to the eet commanders, including Kimmel in Hawaii, for distribution in July 1941 to the various task forces. Te ABC-I agreement called on the United States to employ its Pacic Fleet oensively in the manner best calculated to 2 Ibid., part 6, p. 2502; also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 17, pp. 2568600, Exhibit No. 114 (Pacic Fleet Operating PlanRainbow Five). 3 Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi- sion, 1950), pp. 10304. Japanese Action Appears Imminent 163 weaken Japanese economic power. 4 To accomplish this, our naval forces were to Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. 5 U.S. Pacic Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5 stipu- lated that In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, the senior commander, then Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, was to take such action in the defense of his command and the national interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once. 6 Te Plan called on the eet to reconnoiter, sweep, patrol, and protect. However, the primary objective prescribed for the Pacic Fleet under Rainbow No. 5 was to prepare to raid, capture, and destroy the bases in the Japanese-controlled Marshall and Caroline islands. Te assign- ments of each task force were set forth in detail in the plan. 7 Stark and Marshall Again Ask for Time to Build U.S. Defenses Before Marshall left for maneuvers on November 26, he and Chief of Naval Operations Stark prepared a joint memorandum to the president on the Far Eastern Situation. 8 Dated November 27, their memorandum expressed concern that they might not have enough time to build up their forces before a Japanese strike. 4 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 149192. 5 Ibid., p. 1511. 6 Ibid., part 17, p. 2585. 7 Ibid., part 17, pp. 2568600. 8 Ibid., part 14, p. 1083. 164 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tey reminded FDR that if the current negotiations with the Japanese ambassadors failed, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Tailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces. Navy and Army reinforcements were being rushed to the Philippines. From the U.S. viewpoint, Marshall and Stark wrote, the most essential thing now . . . is to gain time. Tey were especially concerned for the safety of an Army convoy then near Guam and a Marine Corps convoy just leaving Shanghai. Tey cautioned, however, that so long as con- sistent with national policy, we should avoid precipitating any conict. Marshall and Stark also wrote it had been agreed, after con- sultation with the British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East, that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Tailand west of 1000 East or south of 100 North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. Japan should be warned that advance beyond the lines indi- cated may lead to war. However, prior to such warning, no joint military opposition [should] be undertaken. Moreover, Marshall and Stark said, agreement with the British and Dutch should be sought on issuing such a warning. Te rst thing in the morning of November 27, Secretary of War Stimson phoned Secretary of State Hull to nd out what his nale had been with the Japanese. Had Hull handed them the three-month modus vivendi proposal, which had been approved a couple of days before? Or had he put an end to the negotiations, as he had said he might. Hull told Stimson he had broken the whole matter o: I have washed my hands of it and it is now in Japanese Action Appears Imminent 165 the hands of you and Knoxthe Army and Navy. Later FDR gave Stimson a slightly dierent view. However, he too said the negotiations had ended up, but they ended up with a magni- cent statement prepared by Hull. 9 FDR Messages British Intelligence Agent Stephenson, Japanese Negotiations Off . . . As soon as the president learned that the negotiations with the Japanese had been broken o, he sent his oldest son, James, as his emissary to British intelligence agent Sir William Stephenson. On November 26, James Roosevelt travelled to New York and informed Stephenson, of the tenuous Japanese situa- tion. Stephenson cabled Churchill on November 27: JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS OFF. SERVICES EX- PECT ACTION WITHIN TWO WEEKS. 10 Washington Warns Philippines of Possible Japanese Attack On November 27, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, met in the o ce of High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre to discuss the seriousness of FDRs November 26 warning cable to Sayre. Pacing back and forth and smoking a big black cigar, General MacArthur assured Hart and Sayre that the existing alignment and movement of 9 Ibid., part 11, pp. 543435. 10 William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: Te Secret War (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 299; also Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941: Te Partnership Tat Saved the West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 473. 166 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Japanese troops convinced him that there would be no Japanese attack before the spring. 11 Admiral Hart disagreed. Reports were arriving in Washington regularly of the daily reconnaissance overights conducted from the Philippines to keep track of the large Japanese convoy heading south from Shanghai. Tus news of the Japanese expeditionary force came in on November 27, apparently heading toward the Philippines, Burma, the Burma Road, or the Dutch East Indies. And it was expected that a concentration of Japanese troops would move over into Tailand and take a position there, from which an attack could be launched on Singapore. Stimson suggested to FDR that MacArthur in the Philippines be sent a nal alert. We had already sent MacArthur a quasi alert, but Stimson thought he should be given a further warning against a possible Japanese attack. Te president agreed. 12 Arrangements were being made to y B-l7s out to the Philippines to reinforce our defenses there. Army Air Force Commanding General Arnold called on Stimson on November 27 to present the orders for two of our biggest planes to move out of San Francisco en route to Manila and y overwhile pho- tographingthe Japanese mandated islands, where the Japanese were known to be building military bases. Tese big planes would be able to y high enough to be out of reach of the Japanese pur- suit planes. 13 Secretary of Navy Knox and Stark called on Stimson on November 27 to talk about the warning to be sent MacArthur in the Philippines. General Leonard T. Gerow, Army chief of war plans, was also present. A message to MacArthur calling for action, such as Stimson was considering, would normally have 11 Francis Bowes Sayers, Glad Adventure (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 221. 12 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5435, from Stimsons November 27, 1941, diary. 13 Ibid., part 11, p. 5435, from Stimsons November 27. Japanese Action Appears Imminent 167 been prepared and sent by the Army chief of sta. It was most unusual to send a message to a eld commander signed Marshall, which had not actually been dispatched by him. 14 Marshall was familiar with U.S. military outposts in a way that the secretary of war was not. Also, the responsibility for strategic command decisions owed from the commander-in-chief (the president) to the chief of sta; the chief of sta reported to the president. Te secretary of wars duties lay outside this line of command; they related primarily to personnel requirements and matters of supply. However, Marshall was out of the city. So Stimson, Stark, and Gerow went ahead on their own. Stark and Gerow, quite naturally, were pressing for more time for the military buildup before a Japanese strike. Stimson said he would be glad to have time but not at the expense of back- ing down. He didnt want it [time] at any cost of humility on the part of the United States . . . which would show a weak- ness on our part. Before they nished drafting their message to MacArthur, they called Hull to learn the latest on the situa- tion with the Japanese. 15 Tey sent the message over Marshalls signature. Although directed primarily to MacArthur in the Philippines, the Stimson-Stark-Gerow cable, with slight changes and also signed Marshall, went to the Armys commanding generals in Hawaii and the Panama Canal Zone. In Response to Armys Warning, General Short (Hawaii) Reports Sabotage Alert Te version of the Stimson-Stark-Gerow cable sent to Short in Hawaii advised that Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes. . . . Japanese future action 14 Ibid., part 23, p. 1012. 15 Ibid., part 11, p. 5435, from Stimsons November 27, 1941, diary. 168 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hos- tilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the rst overt act. However, this should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Reconnaissance and other measures necessary should be carried out with caution so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Short was asked to Report measures taken. 16 Te Army was responsible for protecting the eet when it was in port. On receipt of this message (No. 472) on November 27, Short called a meeting of his sta. He had been instructed to undertake such reconnaissance . . . as you deem necessary. At the same time he was not . . . to alarm civil population. Adequate reconnaissance to guard Hawaii against surprise attack would have required 360-degree surveillance, 24 hours a day. According to Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, commander of the Hawaiian Naval Base Air Force, and Commander Logan C. Ramsey, his operations o cer at the time of the attack, such wide-ranging reconnaissance was not realistic, given the planes and resources then available there. Most of their B-17s had been sent to the Philippines. Only eight that could have been used for long-range reconnaissance were available at the time of the attack, and not all of those were in ying condition. Planes can- not y continuously; they wear out and need servicing from time to time. Crews need rest too; it is estimated that crews ying long-range reconnaissance shouldnt be asked to operate more often than one in three days. 17 Tus long-range reconnaissance could not have been maintained indenitely in Hawaiiits suc- cess depended on timely warning of any potential threat. Marshall was familiar with the shortage of planes in Hawaii. But Stimson, who had drafted the November 27 warning message, 16 Ibid., part 14, p. 1328. 17 Ibid., part 8, p. 3454. Japanese Action Appears Imminent 169 was not. Te Hawaiian command had three dierent alerts from which to choose. Marshall was also familiar with the Armys sys- tem of alerts; again, Stimson was not. In view of the Armys responsibility and the instruction not to alarm the public, a large percentage of whom were eth- nic Japanese, Short decided to go on a sabotage alert, cluster- ing the planes and storing the ammunition underground. Tis was the most eective way to guard against subversive activities in an area surrounded by potential enemies. On the assumption that the cable had come from Marshall, Short wired Washington that afternoon that he had alerted to prevent sabotage and had established liaison with Navy. 18 Shorts response was received in Washington on November 28, at 5:57 am. 19 Under Army rules and regulations then in force, if a junior o cer, on receiving an order, reports measures taken and his superior o cer does not countermand them, the respon- sibility for any error or mistake in judgment lies with the supe- rior o cer. Short was the junior o cer; Marshall his superior. As instructed, Short reported the measures taken. If his action was not considered appropriate, normal Army procedure would have called for Marshall to order him to change his alert. No such order was given. Te planes and ammunition remained as they were until the Japanese attack ten days later. Admiral Starks War Warning to Hart (Philippines) and Kimmel (Hawaii) Also on November 27, CNO Stark sent his eet command- ers a war warning, reporting on the status of U.S.-Japan rela- tions. Admiral Hart, commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines, was the rst addressee; Admiral Kimmel, 18 Ibid., part 14, p. 1330. 19 Ibid., part 3, pp. 102728. 170 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy commander-in-chief of the Pacic Fleet at Pearl Harbor, was second. Information copies went to Admiral King, commander- in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet and to the special naval observer in London. Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the Pacic have ceased, Stark told his command- ers in this war warning. An aggressive move on the part of the Japanese was expected within the next few days . . . an amphibi- ous expedition against either the Philippines Tai or Kra penin- sula or possibly Borneo. . . . Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage. Te com- manders should prepare to put WPL 46 (War Plan 46, Rainbow No. 5) into operation. 20 Te morning after this dispatch was received, Kimmel dis- cussed its signicance with the senior Army and Navy o cers in HawaiiShort; Admiral Bloch, commandant of the 14th Naval District who was in charge of naval shore establishments in Hawaii; the ag o cers of the eet then in port, as well as the members of Kimmels sta. After considerable study they interpreted the warning to mean that war was imminent, and that readiness to undertake active operations was expected. To Kimmel being ready to undertake active operations meant car- rying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. And that meant pre- paring for oensive action in line with War Plan 46, then in oper- ation, against the Japanese in the Marshall and Caroline Islands in the southwestern Pacic. Tis November 27 cable did not suggest the possibility of a surprise aggressive move in any direction as had the dispatch sent three days earlier. 21 Tus the specic mention of the Philippines, Tai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo as the intended des- tination of the Japanese expedition served only to reconrm the 20 Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, CNO message #272337. 21 Ibid., part 14, p. 1405, CNO dispatch #242005. Japanese Action Appears Imminent 171 conclusion they had drawn from the earlier message, namely that the Japanese were most likely to strike in the southwest Pacic or southeast Asia. Other Washington directives served to strengthen this impression. For instance, the Navy had recently been ordered to send a squadron of submarines . . . to the Philippines, leav- ing only 5 in Pearl Harbor. And on November 28, Kimmel was advised that the Marines on the islands of Midway and Wake, in the middle of the Pacic, were to be replaced by Army troops. Tis would call for a complicated maneuver, occupying for some time a substantial portion of the U.S. Naval forces in Hawaii, thus reducing the Territorys defensive strength. 22 FDRs War Cabinet Discuss Japanese Troop Movements; FDR Should Report Danger to Congress Roosevelt scheduled a War Cabinet meeting for noon, November 28. Stimson had asked G-2 (Intelligence) to summa- rize the information available concerning the movements of the Japanese in the Far East. Te main point of the paper was a study of what the expedi- tionary force, which we know has left Shanghai and is headed south, is going to do. G-2 pointed out that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines or a landing of further troops in Indochina, or an attack on Tailand or an attack on the Dutch Netherlands, or on Singapore. 23
G-2s paper was such a formidable statement of dangerous possibilities that Stimson decided he should discuss it with the president before the War Cabinet meeting. 22 Ibid., part 39, p. 315, NCI report. 23 Stimsons November 28, 1941 note in ibid., part 11, p. 5435. 172 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy He went to the White House early that morning, even before FDR had gotten up. Analyzing the situation as he sat on his bed, the president saw only three possible alternatives: rst, to do noth- ing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would ght; third, to ght at once. Stimson rejected the rst out of hand; he did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation. Of the other two, he would choose to ght at once. Stimson left, but he returned to the White House again for the scheduled noon meeting with the president, Hull, Knox, Stark, and Marshall. FDR began the meeting by reading the possible destinations of the Japanese convoy. Ten he pointed out one further possibil- ity: if the Japanese were to attack the Kra Isthmus, that could lead to an attack on Rangoon, a short distance away, which would enable the Japanese initially to block the Burma Road. Everyone thought this was very likely. Te picture had changed radically since the last time they had discussed sending an ultimatum to Japan. Te Japanese expedi- tionary force of some 25,000 troops at sea, destined to land some- where, had changed the situation. Everyone agreed that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and . . . land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terric blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. . . . It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra [on the Malaysian peninsula], the British would ght. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to ght. And it now seems clear that if this expe- dition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot. Te consensus of the War Cabinet was that this should not be allowed to happen, and the members discussed ways to prevent it. Tey did not believe the United States should strike at the Japanese Action Appears Imminent 173 Japanese force without warning. But they didnt think we should sit still either and allow the Japanese to proceed. Tey decided the only thing to do was to warn the Japanese that if the convoy reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to ght. Te president was inclined to send a personal telegram to the emperor, as he had done with good results at the time of the Panay incident, December 1937 24 But Stimson pointed out that this would not be a suitable response in this case. In the rst place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Stimson then suggested a message from the president to the people of the United States. He thought the best way to do that would be to report to Congress on the danger and on what action we would have to take if the danger materialized. Te president acceded to this suggestion. At rst he thought of incorporating the terms of his letter to the emperor in the speech. But again Stimson pointed out that a letter to an emperor could not be publicized in that way. Te presidents letter should be entirely separate and condential. Also, his speech to Congress and to the people should be expressed in more understandable terms. FDR agreed and asked Hull, Knox, and Stimson to try to draft such papers. 25 24 On December 12, 1938, Japanese planes had bombed a U.S. river gunboat, the Panay near Nanjing, China. Te ship was sunk, killing two and wounding 30. Te U.S. demanded apologies, reparations, and guarantees against further incidents. On December 14, the Japanese complied. 25 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 543536, account of the War Cabinet meeting based on Stimsons diary. 174 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy War Department Warns Hawaiian Army and Air Commanders Late in the evening of November 28, the War Department adjutant general wired Short in Hawaii: [C]ritical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities. Short was advised to initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. At the same time, Short was to avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm. 26 Te cables emphasis on sabotage and subversion, reassured Short in his choice of alert. Te next day, Short replied that full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the eld of investigative responsibility of war depart- ment . . . and military establishments including personnel and equipment. 27
He also reported on the cooperation in protecting vital instal- lations, such as bridges and power plants being given by Hawaiis territorial governor, the FBI, and other federal and territorial o cers. Te commanding general of the Hawaiian Air Force received a similar cable that day from the War Department. It asked that all precautions be taken at once . . . to provide . . . protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda comma protection 26 Ibid., part 14, p. 1330; idem, part 24, pp. 1778, 1823. 27 Ibid., part 24, pp. 182425. Japanese Action Appears Imminent 175 of all activities against espionage comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment comma property and establish- ments period. 28 Again Short felt reassured that the sabotage alert he had ini- tiated was appropriate. Navy Ordered to Transport Army Planes to Midway and Wake; Hawaiian Forces Weakened Te day before the November 27 war warning, Kimmel was advised to prepare to send some planes, men, and provisions from Pearl Harbor to two outlying mid-Pacic islands: In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV [Chief of Naval Operations] has requested and Army has agreed to sta- tion twenty-ve Army pursuit planes at Midway and a simi- lar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable. 29
Te cabled orders that followed called on Kimmel to transport by aircraft carrier these Army planes, which were to support Navy operations, and to supply the islands with ground personnel, pro- visions, water, spare parts, tools, and ammunition. In light of WPL-46, stationing men and planes on Wake and Midway made sense. Wake was a couple of thousand miles west of Hawaii and closer to the Japanese mandated Marshall Islands. An outpost on Wake would extend the area over which reconnaissance could be conducted and would permit the United States to watch more closely what was going on in the Marshalls. At the same time, however, it meant depriving Hawaii of about 50 percent of the Armys pursuit planes then on Oahu. And the 28 Ibid., part 14, p. 1330. 29 Ibid., part 17, p. 2479. 176 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy transfer operation itself would occupy for some time the eets aircraft carriers, its main striking defense against air attack. 30 Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., in command of the carrier Enterprise, left Pearl Harbor for Wake on November 28. With him went three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. 31 On December 2 Kimmel responded at length to Starks cable. He described some of the di culties in having the Navy rein- force the outlying islands, and he made realistic suggestions for dealing with them. 32 On December 5 Admiral J.H. Newton left Hawaii aboard the carrier Lexington with another contingent of Army pursuit planes bound for Midway. Tree heavy cruisers and ve destroy- ers accompanied the Lexington. En route, the patrol planes con- ducted reconnaissance, covering a much more extensive area than they could have from their Oahu base. 33 Also on December 5 Admiral Wilson Brown left Pearl Harbor with Task Force 3, aboard the Indianapolis with six old destroyers converted to sweepers, to conduct landing exercises on Johnston Island in the mid-Pacic. 34 Japanese Negotiations Defacto Ruptured On November 28, two days after the United States responded to the Japanese request for a modus vivendi, Tokyo sent her two Washington ambassadors a cable, which we deciphered and read that same day, commending them for their superhuman eorts. However, the U.S. reply had been a humiliating proposal. Te Imperial Government could by no means use it as a basis for 30 Ibid., part 6, p. 2520; see also Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel s Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), pp. 4648. 31 Ibid., part 26, pp. 31732, Halsey testimony at Hart Inquiry. 32 Ibid., part 17, pp. 248084 (Serial 0114W). 33 Ibid., part 26, p. 343, Newton testimony at Hart Inquiry. 34 Ibid., part 26, pp. 14146, Brown testimony at Hart Inquiry. Japanese Action Appears Imminent 177 negotiations. Te Japanese government had, in eect, thrown up its hands, as Ambassador Kurusu had expected it would. Tokyo added that a report on the American proposal would be along in two or three days and then the negotiations will be defacto ruptured. However, the two ambassadors were not to give the impression that the negotiations are broken o. Merely say . . . that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrices for the sake of peace in the Pacic. Say that we have always demon- strated a long-suering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. . . . From now on do the best you can. 35 Japanese Emergency to be Announced in Winds Code, Coded Weather Forecast In the midst of this diplomatic crisis, one of the most impor- tant Japanese messages to be intercepted during this period was read in Washington. It had been sent November 19 from Tokyo in the J -19 (consular code), wasnt deciphered and translated until November 28. In case of emergency (danger of cutting o our diplomatic relations), and the cutting o of international com- munications, a signal will be included in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. Tree phrases fol- lowed. Each appeared to be a weather forecast, but to each was assigned a special meaning. In an emergency, Tokyo explained, the appropriate phrase will be repeated twice. When this is heard 35 Ibid., part 12, p. 195. 178 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy please destroy all code papers, etc. Tis is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. 36 Tis new intercept became known as the Winds Code message. Te three phrases and their meaning were: HIGASHI NO KAZE AME (East wind rain): Japan-U.S. relations in dan- ger; KITANO KAZE KUMORI (North wind cloudy): Japan- U.S.S.R. relations in danger; and NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clear): Japan-British relations in danger. When our people read this message, orders went out immedi- ately from both the Army and the Navy to their intercept stations throughout the world, asking them to monitor Japanese short- wave news broadcasts. Because weather was unpredictable and atmospheric conditions often interfered with radio transmissions, reception at our intercept stations was erratic. Terefore, the call went out to all our monitoring stations from Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes of Naval Communications 37 and from General Sherman Miles of the Armys Intelligence Division urging the code clerks to listen for the phrases. 38 Tree-by-ve cards with the three phrases were prepared and distributed: 39 HIGASHI NO KAZE AME (East wind rainwar with the U. S.) KITANO KAZE KUMORI (North wind cloudywar with the U.S.S.R.) NICHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clearwar with Great Britain.) 36 Ibid., part 12, p. 154. 37 Ibid., part 9, pp. 412628. 38 Ibid., part 10, pp. 452022, testimony of colonel Bratton. 39 Ibid., part 8, pp. 391518, testimony of Lieutenant Commander Kramer. 8. The Countdown Begins U.S.-Japanese Negotiations Broken Off U .S. naval o cials in London had been informed by the Navy Department that negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken o and that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated. 1 When British Ambassador Lord Halifax heard this, he abruptly returned to Washington from Philadelphia where he had planned to weekend. Te British government was greatly excited at the news. Halifax called on Undersecretary of State Welles that Friday evening, November 28, to see if it was actually true. As far as Welles knew, the situ- ation was exactly as it had been the night before: the Japanese ambassadors had submitted the U.S. governments statement to their government: no reply had as yet been received, so that 1 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 2: Te Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1956), pp. 68485, Welles November 28 memorandum of conversation with Halifax. 179 180 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy technically negotiations had not yet been broken o. However, the U.S. government did not expect the Japanese government to accept its proposals. Halifax called on Hull the next day to check on the outcome of the conversations FDR and Hull had been having with the Japanese. Hull blamed in part the hysterical cable messages sent by Chiang Kai-shek and his aides. Hull wished Churchill had sent a strong cable to Chiang in response to his loud protest about our negotiations . . . telling him to brace up and ght. Churchills expression of concern at Chiangs very thin diet had resulted in virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward these negotiations. Tus Chiangs November 25 cables to o cials all around the world urging that the United States reject any form of a modus vivendi with the Japanese had persuaded the United States to drop the U.S. pro- posal for a three-month modus vivendi and to submit in its place a ten point ultimatum. Te Japanese ambassadors had not been optimistic about their governments willingness to agree to the United States ten points. Although the Japanese government had not as yet replied, Hull said the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over [and] the matter will now go to the o cials of the Army and the Navy. Hull also told Halifax in great condence that he expected some action on the part of the Japanese before long. [I]t would be a serious mistake for our country and other coun- tries interested in the Pacic situation, to make plans of resis- tance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and . . . capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful coun- tries interested in the Pacic would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions. 2
2 Ibid., pp. 68587, Hull November 29 memorandum of conversation. The Countdown Begins 181 Tokyo Orders the Japanese Ambassadors Not to Break Off Negotiations But to Try Again On Sunday, November 30, U.S. Navy decoders and trans- lators intercepted, deciphered, and translated Cable #857 from Tokyo, informing the Japanese ambassadors in Washington to make one more attempt verbally. Tey should point out that Te United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial position. Tus, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government. . . . [W]hat has become of the basic objectives that the U.S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? Te two ambassadors were told that in carrying out this instruction to continue their conversations with the United States, they should please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking o of negotiations. 3 In compliance with these instructions, the Japanese ambassadors requested an appointment with Secretary of State Hull. An Inflammatory Speech in Tokyo by Japans Prime Minister Tojo Te Washington, D.C., newspaper headlines on Sunday, November 30, quoted from an inammatory speech in Tokyo 3 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 12, p. 199. Tokyo to Washington cable #857. 182 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy by Japanese Prime Minister Tojo. President Roosevelt was at his retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia. When Hull telephoned him about Tojos belligerent remarks, he took the overnight train back to Washington. Tojo had criticized the United States and Britain severely: Te exploitation of the Asiatics by Americans must be purged with vengeance. U.S. Ambassador Grew reported by quoting from Japanese press reports: [M]any countries . . . are indulging in actions hostile to us. . . . Te fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism . . . is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to sh in the troubled waters of East Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each other. . . . For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance. 4
Ambassador Nomura in Washington cabled Tokyo that he was concerned Tojos speech would be used extensively for pro- paganda purposes by the Americans. 5 Ambassador Kurusu was fearful that Tojos belligerent remarks would jeopardize their eorts to maintain the pretense of continuing to negotiate. He cau- tioned the Japanese foreign o ce in Tokyo by TransPacic Radio Telephone to watch out about these ill-advised statements. 6 Te Japanese government belittled the reports; it was abbergasted. Yamamoto, chief of the American bureau of the Japanese foreign 4 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 14849. 5 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 207. Nomura October 30 Washington to Tokyo cable. 6 Ibid., part 12, pp. 20607, Kurusu Washington to Tokyo dispatch concerning Tojo. The Countdown Begins 183 o ce, was nonplused; he asked, What speech? 7 Te Japanese government cabled an explanation. Te Washington embassys rst secretary, Hidenari Terasaki, called on Joseph W. Ballantine, a State Department o cial, on December 2, and told Ballantine that he had not come to vin- dicate themselves or to make any explanation. [He] merely wished to state the facts. 8 Relying on his governments explana- tion, Terasaki discounted the importance of the speech and also its belligerence. Te so-called speech . . . was originally drafted by members of the o ce sta of the East Asia Restoration League, a non-governmental organization of which Mr. Tojo happens to be president. It had been given out to newspaper reporters Saturday evening, November 29, before the said draft was examined by either the Premier him- self or other Government o cials, and this unapproved manu- script was printed in the metropolitan newspapers. As a matter of fact, the Premier himself made no speech of any kind on the 30th. . . . It should further be noted that the reported statement For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance is a mistransla- tion. . . . Te correct translation of the statement should be For the honor and pride of mankind, this sort of practice must be removed. 9
7 Department of State, Japan: 19311941, vol. 2, p. 777, as reported by the Japanese Embassys First Secretary Terasaki to State Departments Joseph W. Ballantine. 8 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 223, message #1234. 9 Department of State, Japan: 19311941, vol. 2, p. 77778, memorandum of Terasakis conversation with Ballantine and statement handed Ballantine by Terasaki. 184 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Hull and the Japanese Ambassadors Exchange Strong Words On December 1 the ambassadors called on Hull as scheduled. Upon [their] arrival at the State Department, [they] found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the Departmental sta crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators [spectators?] were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic. 10
Te meeting with Hull was long, and their conversation got o to a rough start when he brought up Tojos bellicose utter- ances emanating from Tokyo. Te ambassadors responded with tact: In the United States, they said, you seem to take a more serious view of the Japanese Prime Ministers utterances than was warranted. Te ambassadors told Hull that the document he had handed them on November 26, the ultimatum with its ten points, had been communicated to the Japanese govern- ment, which was now studying the case. Tey expected within a few days to receive their governments observation thereon. However, they wished the United States would reconsider its rejection of the proposed Japanese modus vivendi. Hull then remarked that we had learned of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina. He criticized Japan for mov- ing into Indochina so suddenly without any advance notice to this Government. We cant overlook Japans digging herself into Indochina, Hull said. It create[s] an increasing menace to America and her friends. . . . [W]e will not allow ourselves to be kicked out of the 10 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 21011, December 1 cable #1225 of Japanese ambassadors to Tokyo. The Countdown Begins 185 Pacific. . . . [W]hen a large Japanese army is anywhere in Indochina, we have to give that situation all the more attention when Japanese statesmen say that they will drive us out of east Asia. Hull accused the Japanese of using methods in China similar to those which are being adopted by Hitler to subjugate Europe. . . . [W]e cannot lose sight of the movement by Hitler to seize one-half of the world. Hull said he believed the Japanese mili- tarists were moving in a similar direction to seize the other half of the earth. . . . [T]his Government cannot yield to anything of that kind. Ambassador Kurusu replied there was not much dierence between Japans idea of a co-prosperity sphere and [the U.S. policy of ] Pan-Americanism, except that Japanese methods may be more primitive. He denied that it was Japans purpose to use force. . . . Japan was motivated by self-defense in the same way as Britain had been motivated by her acts, for example, in Syria. He pointed out that Japan needed rice and other materials at a time when she was being shut o by the United States and other countries and she had no alternative but to endeavor to obtain access to these materials. . . . Te Ambassador commented that today war is being conducted through the agency of economic weapons, that Japan was being squeezed, and that Japan must expand to obtain raw materials. Hull pointed out that we were selling Japan oil until Japan suddenly moved into Indochina; that he could not defend such a situation indef- initely; and that the United States would give Japan all she 186 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy wanted in the way of materials if Japans military leaders would only show that Japan intended to pursue a peaceful course. Hull said that we do not propose to go into partnership with Japans mil- itary leaders; that he has not heard one whisper of peace from the Japanese military, only bluster and blood-curdling threats. He also brought up Japans ties to Germany through the Tripartite [Germany-Japan-Italy] Pact. In view of Japans com- mitment to her ally, Germany, he said, Japan could not expect the United States to stop helping her friends, Britain and China. Kurusu felt it was a shame that nothing should come out of the eorts which the conversations of several months had represented. He said he felt that the two sides had once been near an agreement except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals seem to carry the two sides further away than before. Hull responded that every time we get started in the direction of progress the Japanese military does something to overturn us. Te Secretary expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead in view of all the threats that had been made. Te Secretary pointed out that we all understand what are the implications of such terms as controlling inuence, new order in east Asia, and co-prosperity sphere.. . . Hitler was using similar terms as synonyms for purposes of conquest. Kurusu disclaimed on the part of Japan any similarity between Japans purposes and Hitlers purposes. The Countdown Begins 187 Te Japanese ambassador pointed out that wars never settle anything and that war in the Pacic would be a tragedy. But he added that the Japanese people believe that the United States wants to keep Japan ghting with China and to keep Japan strangled. He said that the Japanese people feel that they are faced with the alternative of surrendering to the United States or of ght- ing. . . . Te Ambassadors said that they understood the Secretarys position in the light of his statements and they would report the matter to the Japanese Government. 11
Japanese Troop Movements Portend Early Attack in Far East By the end of the month, Captain Arthur H. McCollum, o cer-in-charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Navy Departments Division of Naval Intelligence in Washington, had become seriously concerned by the massive Japanese military buildup in Indochina and the preparations being made for their reinforcement. 12 McCollums duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence received concerning the Far East, correlating it, and advising the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of Naval Operations on political developments in the Far East and all forms of information concerning the Japanese Navy 11 Department of State, Japan: 19311941, vol. 2, pp. 77277. Tis account of Hulls December 1 meeting with the Japanese ambassadors is taken from State Departments Joseph W. Ballantines memorandum. 12 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 13. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. 188 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy and other countries in the Far East and their defenses and state of preparation for war. 13
Because of the mounting evidence of Japanese oensive action, McCollum assembled and evaluated the available data in a memorandum, which he took, on the morning of December 1, to his superior, Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson, director of naval intelligence. Te memorandum reported that Japanese transports had been moving large numbers of fully equipped veteran troops from Shanghai to Indochina. Others were going by rail: From 21 to 26 November 20,000 troops were landed at Saigon and 4,000 at Haiphong which with 6,000 troops already there were sent South to Saigon and Cambodia by rail. All wharves and docks at Haiphong and Saigon are reported crowded with Japanese transports unloading supplies and men. It is esti- mated that the following Japanese troops are now in French Indo-China ready and equipped for action. (a) South and Central Indo-China 70,000 (b) Northern Indo-China 25,000 Te landing of reinforcements continues and additional troops and supplies are undoubtedly available on nearby Hainan Island and more distant Formosa. McCollum also reported extensive Japanese naval activities: ships being equipped and repaired, air and surface patrols being established and ships and planes being moved to the Mandated Island area, merchant vessels being tted out as antiaircraft ships, naval task groups being reorganized, outlying naval air groups being inspected, and so on. He said the Japanese had under sur- veillance the U.S. island of Guam, more than 3,000 miles west of Hawaii. Espionage networks were being established throughout 13 Ibid., part 36, p.13. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. The Countdown Begins 189 southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies. Japanese residents, especially women and children, had been evacuated from British India, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Australia, and many had been withdrawn from the United States, Canada, and South America. 14
Admiral Wilkinson made an appointment at noon on December 1 to go with McCollum to see Chief of Naval Operations Stark. As McCollum later testied, We knew that the Japanese eet was ready for action. We knew that it had been called home, docked and extensively repaired and was looking for action. Also the Japanese eet had just changed its call signs and frequency allocations again after only a relatively short interval. Tis change in radio transmissions, when considered in conjunc- tion with the various other clues, was one further indication that something was afoot. 15
Wilkinson, in subsequent testimony, said that On the evi- dence available we had concludedthat the Japanese were con- templating an early attack, primarily directed at Tailand, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula. 16 At the meeting with Stark, both Wilkinson and McCollum urged that a dispatch of warning be sent to the eet at that time. Stark assured them that such a dis- patch had already been senton November 27and that it had denitely included the phrase, Tis is a war warning. 17
The Armys December View of Atlantic and Pacific Theaters of War Under date of December 5, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, acting assistant chief of sta, G-2 (Intelligence), prepared 14 Ibid., part 15, pp. 183942; part 36 (Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit #10), pp. 65960. 15 Ibid., part 36, p. 17, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. 16 Ibid., part 4, p. 1847, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee. 17 Ibid., part 36, p. 19, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. 190 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy a long memorandum for the benet of Marshall, an Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941March 31, 1942. 18 G-2 was responsible for the collection, interpretation, and distribution of information about our enemies or potential enemies. G-2s duties included codes and ciphers and liaison with other intelligence agencies. 19 Te assistant chief of sta of G-2 was on the list to see MAGIC, and presumably Miles, as acting assistant chief of sta also had access to this information derived from reading the Japanese Purple intercepts. 20
Miles presented a rather complete analysis of the situation from the Armys viewpoint. His memorandum 21 in brief: Tis estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and probabilities dur- ing the period December 1, 1941, to March 1, 1942. Miles went on to review the military situation in the Atlantic, Europe, Middle East, and the Pacic. Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic oensives. She was not in a position [at this time] to attempt an invasion of the [British] islands, and if she did attempt it, it will be delayed until mid-summer of 1942. 18 Ibid., part 14, pp. 137383. 19 Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi- sion, 1950), p. 73. 20 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 23, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. 21 Ibid., part 14, pp. 137384. Miles memorandum and Supporting Esti- mates. The Countdown Begins 191 Te battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sea lanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conict is now trending against Germany. . . . As the weight of the United States Navy continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured. In the Middle East, Te United States is committed to pro- viding great masses of material . . . and is undertaking vast con- struction projects to facilitate supply. In the Pacic, the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military overextension. After listing her alternatives, Miles believed her most probable line of action is the occupation of Tailand. . . . Te forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before Japan. He thought the British-Dutch- U.S. consultative association for the defense of Malaysia had been eective in slowing down the Japanese penetration to the southwest. China was containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divi- sions, an important consideration in view of our objectivethe defeat of the Nazis. China would remain in the war and will continue to contain important Japanese forces. However, Te eective use of Chinas unlimited manpower, as an anti- Axis potential depends entirely on the extent to which she is able to equip it [her manpower] particularly in artillery and aviation. . . . For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. . . . [and] China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this country. Te United States is concerned with southeast Asia and Malaysia in two dierent capacities: (1) as a possible belligerent and (2) as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. Although we were sending a few military airplanes to Tailand . . . this the- ater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. . . . 192 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Our inuence in the Far Eastern Teater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the eort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious oensive against her by Naval and Air Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia. Japan was torn between two opposing factions. Te govern- ment leaders were aware of the perils of further military adven- tures; they want to avoid a general war in the Pacic and seek a peaceful settlement with the United States. On the other hand, army hotheads and other intransigents oppose any major con- cessions. From the point of view of the government leaders, the situation appeared bleak; the conversations between the Japanese ambassadors and the U.S. government in Washington can now be said denitely to have ended in failure Miles said Japan faced a serious problem: Because of the ever increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. Te Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange, and su cient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase sharply the deciencies in these categories. . . . Te rm united front of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies in enforcing the embargo has put Japan on the spot economically. . . . If she goes to war to achieve her economic objectives, Japan faces ruin; but at the same time she feels that achievement of these objectives are vital to her existence. . . . [I]n short, economically Japan is in perilous plight. Te situ- ation calls for strenuous measures; yet, if she goes to war, she may use up her reserves, especially of oil and steel, before she can force a decision favorable to herself. Tus her economic The Countdown Begins 193 situation contributes largely to the indecision of her leaders. Tis is a problem which she must solve within then next few months. A basic assumption of Miless memorandum, in spite of United States o cial neutrality, was that we were committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany. He wrote matter-of-factly about the continued progress of America from neutrality towards par- ticipating in the war. Miles acknowledged that the Kurusu con- ference, the negotiations between the Japanese ambassadors and our State Department, can now be said denitely to have ended in failure. Yet he did not appear to view this rupture with par- ticular concern. Nor did he reect the sense of urgency that per- vaded much of Washington at that timeincluding the mem- bers of FDRs War Council or Cabinet and some of those who were working with the Japanese intercepts, notably McCollum in naval intelligence and Saord in naval communications. Miles realized that the United Statess consultative associa- tion with the British and the Netherlands East Indies for the defense of Malaysia made us a possible belligerent in that area. He knew that the increasing amount of equipment we were sending China pitted us directly against Japan. Miles also rec- ognized Japans perilous [economic] plight. After analyzing all these various factors, he concluded that the intentions of Japan were not predictable. Our economic blockade of Japan and our military forces in the Pacic, Miles wrote, are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan, we could launch a serious oensive against her by Naval and Air Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic oen- sive because . . . it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis. 194 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Honolulu Press Reports U.S.-Japanese Conversations Continuing A report of the Japanese ambassadors December 1 meeting with Hull appeared in the newspapers, including the Honolulu papers, where it was seen by Kimmel and Short. Te two Pearl Harbor commanders had no way of knowing what was going on behind the scenes, except as they were informed by Washington. Short had received Stimsons November 27 cable, sent out over Marshalls signature, telling him that Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated . . . with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and oer to continue. Kimmel was told on November 27 that negotiations had ceased and 2 days later that they appeared to be terminated with the bar- est possibilities of their resumption. Neither Kimmel nor Short had received any further o cial report of the situation, and then, as Kimmel said, they were left to read public accounts of further conversations between the State Department and the Japanese emissaries in Washington which indicated that negotiations had been resumed. 22 Tey could only assume that the report they had received of a break in negotiations had been superseded. Japan Alerts Berlin of Impending Clash of Arms with Anglo-Saxon Nations On December 1, our Navy cryptographers intercepted, decoded, and translated two November 30 messages from the Japanese government to its ambassador in Germany. Tese were long cables, sent in Purple, asking the ambassador in Berlin to notify Japans allies under the Tripartite Alliance (Germany and Italy) of the breakdown in negotiations with the United States. Tese cables were sent in three parts. Te rst part 23 reported to the ambassador the status of the conversations between Tokyo 22 Ibid., part 6, p. 2548, Kimmel statement presented to the Joint Committee. 23 Ibid., part 12, p. 204. #985 (Part 1 of 3). The Countdown Begins 195 and Washington. [I]n spite of the sincere eorts of the Imperial Government, the negotiations now stand rupturedbroken. . . . In the face of this our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Te ambassador was asked to imme- diately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and condentially communicate to them a sum- mary of the developments. He should describe the provocative attitude of England and the United States and the plan of the British and Americans to move military forces into East Asia. He should say that this makes it inevitable that Japan counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. In part 3 of this three-part cable, 24 the ambassador was to reassure the German o cials, if questioned about Japans atti- tude toward their common enemy under the Tripartite Pact, the Soviets with whom the Nazis were then engaged in a erce strug- gle to reach Moscow, that Japan did not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north. After speaking with the Germans, the ambassador was to have an Italian translation of this cable transmitted to Hitlers ally, Premier Mussolini, and his Foreign Minister Ciano. To the Japanese, the breakdown in negotiations with the United States meant war. And they were telling their German 24 Ibid., pp. 20405. #985 (Part 3 of 3). 196 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy and Italian allies that they were planning to move souththat is, in the direction of the Philippines, Indochina, and the Malay Peninsula. Te second November 30 cable from Tokyo to Berlin was in two parts. Te negotiations had been started in April under the previous Konoye administration. Te intent of these negotia- tions, Tokyo reminded the ambassador, had been to restrain the United States from participating in the war. During the negotia- tions of the last few days, however, the Japanese had found it gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. . . . Teir views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo- China), were completely in opposition to each other. Tokyo told the ambassador that before the United States brought forth this plan [to reject Japans modus vivendi proposal], they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands and Chinathey did so repeatedly. Terefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy. 25
Japan Orders her Embassies Worldwide to Destroy Codes and Code Machines On December 1, Tokyo sent two short circular cables to its embassies around the world, giving instructions for abandoning the use of code machines and describing how to destroy them. 26
25 Ibid., part 12, pp. 20506. 26 Ibid., part 12, pp. 20809. The Countdown Begins 197 Four o cesLondon, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila were told to destroy their code machines and codes; the o ce in the United States was told specically to retain its machines and machine codes. When a government orders the destruction of the code machines at its diplomatic o ces in certain countries, that is a strong indication that a break in relations with those countries is imminent. Te o cials who were reading MAGIC intercepts realized the signicance of these cables. FDR Assures British Ambassador Halifax of U.S. Support in Southeast Asia Because of the sense of growing emergency, Roosevelt had returned suddenly from Warm Springs to Washington. On the afternoon of December 1, he and his close aide Harry Hopkins met for a long interview with British Ambassador Lord Halifax at the White House. Both Halifax and FDR had considered sending a joint British-American statement to the Japanese, but rejected the idea as they expected it would only evoke an eva- sive reply from Japan. 27 Halifax was concerned about whether the United States would lend support to the British in southeast Asia, as agreed during the American-Dutch-British conversations at Singapore in April. As a signatory to the ADB agreement, the United States was committed to engage in active military coun- ter-action in the event of a direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. Te geographical area encompassed by this pact covered large portions of southeast Asia and the southwest Pacic. Te details as to how active military counteraction was to be undertaken had not been specically spelled out. However, the ADB agreement did specify that the U.S. Pacic Fleet headquartered in Hawaii 27 Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1966), pp. 52829. 198 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy whenever and wherever they can . . . should assume the oensive against Japanese naval forces and sea communications. In addi- tion to defending its base in Manila, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet was to transfer some of its cruisers with aviation units and destroyers towards Singapore . . . to operate under [the] strategic direction of the commander-in-chief, Chin. 28
Te situation in southeast Asia was becoming increasingly precarious. Large contingents of Japanese troops were moving in that direction. Te government of the Netherlands East Indies had ordered a comprehensive mobilization of its armed forces. 29
Halifax had been instructed by his government to tell the U.S. government that it expected a Japanese attack on Tailand, and that this attack would include an expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus (the narrow strip of land belong- ing to Tailand north of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore). Te British proposed to counter this plan by a rapid move into the Isthmus, and they wanted to be sure . . . [of ] American support. 30
Roosevelt told Halifax that [i]n the case of a direct attack on the British or the Dutch, we should obviously all be together. However, he wanted to explore some situations which might not be quite so clear, for instance, if there were not a direct attack on the British or Dutch, or if the Japanese moved into Tailand without attacking the Kra Isthmus. When Halifax reported this conversation to his government, he said he thought the United States would support whatever action we might take in any of these cases. 28 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 1564, 156869, Amer- ican-Dutch-British agreement, pp. 13, 17, 18. 29 Department of State, Far East: 1941, p. 701. 30 Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1962), pp. 18586. The Countdown Begins 199 FDR also told Halifax that the British could count on American support if we [the British] carried out our move to defend the Kra Isthmus in the event of a Japanese attack, though this support might not be forthcoming for a few days. FDR then suggested that the British promise the Tai government that they would respect and guarantee the full sovereignty and indepen- dence of Tailand if the Tais resisted Japanese attack or inl- tration. Roosevelt said that the U.S. Constitution did not allow him to give such a guarantee, but he told Halifax that the British could be sure that their guarantee to the Tai government would have full American support. 31
Te presidents answer was su ciently encouraging to enable Halifax to report that in his opinion the United States would support whatever action we might take in any of the contin- gencies outlined by the president. We could, in any case, count on American support of any operations in the Kra Isthmus. 32
Hart (Manila) Directed to Charter Three Small Men-of-War to Observe Japanese Convoys At the direction of the president, the Navy sent a cable about 7:00 p.m. on December 1 to Admiral Hart, commander-in-chief of our Asiatic Fleet, based at Manila. Hart was asked to charter three small vessels as soon as possible and within two days if pos- sible to form a defensive information patrol. Tese three small ships were to have the minimal requirements to be classied as U.S. men-of-war. Each was to be commanded by a U.S. naval o cer, although the crew members could be Filipinos. For weap- ons, they needed only a small gun and one machine gun. Teir 31 Ibid., pp. 18687. 32 Birkenhead, Halifax, p. 529. 200 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy mission was to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam. Te three small ships were to be stationed o the coast of French Indochina. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel o the Indo- China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel o Pointe de Camau, all locations in the anticipated path of the Japanese convoys then known to be sailing toward southeast Asia. Hart was also asked to report on the reconnais- sance measuresair, surface, and submarinebeing performed regularly by both Army and Navy. 33
Ambassador Grew Reports Gloom in Tokyo During the last few days of November, U.S. Ambassador Grew in Japan spoke with a number of prominent Japanese, some of whom have been in direct touch with the Foreign Minister, and most of them appeared to be already familiar with the substance of our Governments recent ten-point draft proposal. While desirous of continuing the Washington conversations, they all reect a pessimistic reaction, perceiving the di culties of bridging over the positions of the two countries and emphasizing what they seem to regard as the unconciliatory tone of our proposal. On the evening of December 1, Grew saw one of his old Japanese friends at the Tokyo Club, looking gray and worn. [T]he cabinet had decided to break o the conversations with the United States, he told Grew. [I]n that case, Grew feared that everything was over and that [he] would soon be leaving Japan. 34
However, the government-controlled Tokyo newspapers that 33 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1407. OPNAV CABLE #012356. 34 Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944), pp. 48485. The Countdown Begins 201 night reported that the Cabinet at its meeting today, while real- izing the di culty of adjusting the respective positions of the two countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington conversations. 35 Grew cabled Washington to that eect. In spite of this apparent good news, Grews friend remained crushed. 36
35 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp. 130102. 36 Grew, Ten Years in Japan, p. 485. 9. Tensions Mount FDR Remonstrates Against Increased Japanese Troops in Indochina S ecretary of State Hull was laid up with a cold, 1 so Undersecretary of State Welles called the two Japanese ambas- sadors to the State Department on December 2, and presented them with a statement by President Roosevelt: [C]ontinuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina, reported during the past several days, represent a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina. As FDR understood the Japanese agreement with the French Vichy government, the arrival of these forces brought the number of Japanese troops in Indochina well above the total permitted. [T]hese increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of 1 Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull: American Secretaries of State and Teir Diplomacy, vols. 12 and 13 (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), 2 vols., p. 516. 203 204 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy further aggression, since no such number of forces could pos- sibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be directed against the Philippines, the East Indies, Burma, Malaya, or Tailand. Tis, FDR maintained, would be new aggression . . . additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China. He wanted to know the intentions of the Japanese government in continuing to move troops into Indochina because of the broad problem of American defense and he asked the Japanese ambassadors to inquire as to their governments purpose in carrying out this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. 2 Nomura admitted that he was not informed by the Japanese Government of its intentions; he would contact them immediately. Kurusu said, [I]t was obvious no threat against the United States was intended, especially as the Japanese government had oered on November 20 to transfer all its forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina. Tis shift could not be easily eected, however, due to the lack of adequate transportation and of communication facilities in Indochina. 3
Although Welles stated that the United States government has not had any aggressive intention against Japan, Nomura reminded him of the U.S. economic measures against Japan, trade embargoes and the freezing of assets. [E]conomic mea- sures are a much more eective weapon of war than military mea- sures. Te Japanese people believe they are being placed under severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American position; and that it is preferable to ght rather than to yield to the American position. Te Ambassador added 2 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, p. 779. 3 Ibid. Tensions Mount 205 that this was a situation in which wise statesmanship was needed; that wars do not settle anything . . . under the circum- stances some agreement, even though it is not satisfactory, is better than no agreement at all. 4
Te Japanese ambassadors reminded Welles that the note we had handed them on November 26 contained several points which, in view of the actual situation in the Far East . . . the Japanese Government would nd it di cult to accept. Te lat- est U.S. proposal raised important questions so that it seemed to the Japanese Government to require a completely fresh start. As a result, its response might take a few days, although they expected it shortly. 5
With respect to the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, the Japanese government had been hopeful of being able to work out with us [the United States] some settlement of the three outstanding points on which our draft of June 21 6 and the Japanese draft of September 25 7 had not been reconciled. Nomura said the situ- ation called for wise statesmanship. . . . [W]ars do not settle anything. Kurusu thought considerable progress had been made and he expressed an interest in resuming the eorts to reconcile our dierences. Welles agreed to refer this question to Hull. 8
In their cable to Tokyo, the Japanese ambassadors reported: Te United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. . . . Te people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want 4 Ibid., p. 780. 5 Ibid., pp. 77981. 6 Ibid., pp. 48692. U.S. draft proposal to Japanese government, June 21, 1941. 7 Ibid., pp. 63741. Japanese proposals submitted to U.S. ambassador in Japan, September 25, 1941. 8 Department of State, Japan, 19311941, pp. 78081. 206 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. 9
Welless manner gave Nomura the impression that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave . . . room to maneuver. It was clear also, from their interview with Hull the day before that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current di cult situation. I [Nomura] am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Terefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your consideration of our reply to the new American proposals. 10
Would U.S. Fight if British or Dutch Fought in Malaya and NEI? FDR Still Plans to Address Congress Also on Tuesday, December 2, Roosevelt met with Knox, Welles, and Stimson. Hull was still sick. Te president went step by step over the situation and reported, through the State Department, on his request to the Japanese that they tell him what they intended by this new occupation of southern Indochina. He had demanded a quick reply. FDR seemed to have made up his mind to go ahead with the message to Congress and possibly also the message to the Emperor, as had been discussed at his War Cabinet meeting on November 28. 11 Tese men were watching the situation in the Far East very carefully. Stimson, for one, was in frequent conference 9 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, Washington to Tokyo message #1232, part 1 of 2, December 2, 1941, pp. 22122. 10 Ibid., part 12, Washington to Tokyo message #1232, part 2 of 2, December 2, 1941, pp. 22122. 11 Ibid., part 3, p. 1148, Marshall testimony. Tensions Mount 207 with the top Army o cialsMarshall, General Miles of G-2 (Intelligence), and also General Gerow of the War Plans Division of the general sta. Tey were anxious to strengthen the Philippines defenses and were particularly concerned with supplies which were on the way to the Philippines and additional big bombers which [they] were trying to y over there, some of which were scheduled to start at the end of the week. 12
Hull had once remarked to Marshall, apropos of the discus- sions he had been having with the Japanese envoys, Tese fel- lows mean to ght and you will have to watch out. 13 He was certain that the Japanese were planning some deviltry; and we were all wondering where the blow would strike. Te messages we were receiving now indicated that the Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam, and again we discussed whether we would not have to ght if Malaya or the Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought. We all three thought that we must ght if those nations fought. We realized that if Britain were eliminated it might well result in the destruction or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result would give the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and would make the defense of the American Republics enormously di cult if not impossible. All the reasons why it would be necessary for the United States to ght, in case the Japanese attacked either our British or Dutch neighbors in the Pacic, were discusssed at length. 14
12 Ibid., part 11, p. 5427. Excerpt from Stimson diary. 13 Ibid., part 3, p. 1148. Quote from Marshall testimony. 14 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 542829, excerpt from Stimson diary. 208 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Intercepted Japanese Message Announces System of Codewords to be Used in Certain Emergencies Among the Japanese messages our code people intercepted during this period was a long cable from Tokyo on November 27 addressed to its embassy in Washington and several of the more important Japanese embassies and consuls around the world. We decoded and translated it on December 2. In view of the fact that international relations [were] becoming more strained, it read, an emergency system of despatches was to be put into eect. Te cable contained a long list of codewords, each with a hidden meaning, which would be substituted for other words in case of certain emergencies, which were then enumerated. To distinguish one of these special messages from other messages, it would not use the usual Japanese close, OWARI. Rather it would end with the English word, STOP. 15
Tis cable was one more indication that the Japanese govern- ment anticipated a serious emergency before long. It also gave our hard-worked cryptographers one more thing to keep in mind. Tey must watch for Japanese cables ending with STOP and then not only decode and translate them, but determine the hid- den meanings in the special code words. Government Prepares for War On September 8, 1939, a few days after the start of the war in Europe, Roosevelt had announced a limited national emergency. As international tension mounted, especially after FDRs third term reelection in November 1940, various emergency interven- tionist measures were enacted aimed at placing this country on a wartime footing. A throng of government agencies were created; 15 Ibid., part 12, pp. 18688, Tokyo Circular #2409. Tensions Mount 209 some controls on industrial production were initiated; and a sys- tem of priorities was established in the attempt to assure that rms producing military equipment and supplies could obtain the materials they needed. 16
Te O ce of Production Management, headed by William S. Knudsen, Sidney Hillman, Stimson, and Knox, was established on January 7, 1941. On February 20, FDRs personal aide, Harry L. Hopkins, was appointed to a newly created Production Planning Board. By executive order of February 24, the production of alu- minum and machine tools was granted government priority. On February 25, in the interest of national defense, export licensing procedures were instituted for a long list of items, and the list was lengthened substantially in March and April. A National Defense Mediation Board was formed on March 19, to mediate strikes of labor-union members in defense industries. Te O ce of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, headed by Leon Henderson, was set up on April 11. Te O ce of Civilian Defense was orga- nized on May 20, with New York Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia in charge. Ten on May 27 FDR declared an unlimited national emer- gency. By this declaration the president gained control over labor, management, and other elements of the economy. Also, his authority to eliminate internal strife and to suppress subversive activities was increased. Te emergency agencies continued to proliferate. On May 31 Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes was appointed to the newly created position of petroleum coordina- tor for national defense. As of June 2 mandatory priorities of wartime scope were imposed on industry. On June 25 U.S. air 16 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occur- rence, 1931-1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 216, September 8 entry. Te dates in this and the following paragraphs are taken from the 1942 World Almanac. 210 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy space was zoned by the Civil Aeronautics Board to facilitate the movement of military aircraft. On August 3, to conserve gasoline, nighttime sales (7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.) were banned to motorists on the eastern seaboard, and on August 15 gasoline deliveries to 17 eastern states were cut 10 percent. On August 9, steel was placed under 100 percent priority control by the O ce of Production Management. On August 11, by executive order, installment credit for consumers durable goods was curbed. On August 16 the president signed a bill extending from one to two and a half years the period of military duty required of draftees under the Selective Service Act and of members of the Army and National Guard. 17 Ten on August 28 the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board (SPAB) was set up, with Donald M. Nelson, then on leave from Sears, Roebuck & Co., as executive direc- tor, to handle procurement and to coordinate national-defense purchases. 18
Top Washington Officials Consider War Imminent Early in the rst week in December, Roosevelt called Nelson to his o ce to talk about a priorities meeting. Teir discussion had hardly begun when the presidents appointment secretary, Pa Watson, came into the room and said, Mr. President, Secretary Hull is outside with the two Japs. FDR then told Nelson, Don, I think we shall have to postpone this discussion; I am very anx- ious to conclude the discussions with Nomura and Kurusu. As Nelson got up to leave, he asked, How does it look? FDR shook his head gravely and replied, Don, I wouldnt be a bit surprised if we were at war with Japan by Tursday [December 4]. 17 E. Eastman Irving, ed., Te World Almanac (New York: New York World- Telegram, 1942), p. 71. 18 Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy: Te Story of American War Produc- tion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 156. Tensions Mount 211 Nelson had a second shock later in the week. He was giv- ing a dinner Wednesday evening for Vice President Henry A. Wallace and had invited the members of SPAB. Wallace sat at Nelsons right and his fellow Chicagoan, Navy Secretary Frank Knox, was on his left. Remembering the presidents presentiment of war, Nelson made guarded inquiries of Knox concerning the Japanese situation. Knox was not at all reticent in his reply. Don, he said, we may be at war with the Japs before the month is over. Nelson asked, Is it that bad? Knox replied, You bet your life its that bad. Ten Nelson asked Knox what kind of a ght would we have out there in the Pacic. Knox replied, well hunt their navy down and blow it right out of the water. 19
Treasury Secretary Morgenthau Asks if Anything Might Disturb a U.S. Bond Sale Treasury Secretary Morgenthau was responsible for arranging the governments nancing. On December 1 he was preparing to make an oering on the market of $1.5 billion in U.S. bonds. Before settling on a date for the oer, he wanted to know the likelihood that some crisis might occur to disturb the nancial markets. As Morgenthau was not privy to MAGIC, he lacked detailed inside knowledge of the international situation; he asked Roosevelts advice. FDR told him to go ahead with the bond oer. But he said, I cannot guarantee anything. It is all in the laps of the gods, adding, it was apt to be worse in the following week than in the week just beginning. Morgenthau also asked Welles if something would be hap- pening Wednesday, Tursday, or Friday [December 3, 4, or 5] of real importanceI mean that might upset the people of this country. Welles was reassuring: I dont anticipate anything within that brief period. 19 Ibid., pp. 18283. 212 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Morgenthau spoke with Roosevelt again on December 3. FDR said he had the Japanese running around like a lot of wet hens and thought the Japanese are doing everything they can to stall until they are ready. Morgenthau had long been anxious for the United States to become involved in the war against Hitler, so from Morgenthaus viewpoint, Te most important thing was that the president was talking with the English about war plans as to when and where the USA and Great Britain should strike. When Morgenthau learned that the New York branch of the Bank of Japan was going to close down on December 4 or 5, he became still more worried about the market for his bond oer. He contacted the president again and nally got an all clear signal. So on Tursday, December 4, he announced the Treasury oering$1 billion of 2-1/2 per cent bonds maturing 19671972, and $500 million of 2 per cent with a shorter matu- rity 19511955. 20
Japanese Consul in Hawaii Asked to Report Weekly on Ships in Pearl Harbor For some months, U.S. intelligence o cers in Hawaii had been intercepting Japanese messages to and from the Japanese consul in Hawaii and Tokyo, messages sent in the J-19 (consular) code. U.S. intelligence personnel in Hawaii did not have the facil- ities to decipher these coded intercepts and were under instruc- tions to airmail them as they were intercepted to Washington. Airmail from Hawaii to Washington took two or three days. 21
Once in Washington, their decoding and translation was often delayed still further, for Purple messages, which usually dealt with urgent and sensitive matters, had priority. 20 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938 1941 (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1965), pp. 39193. 21 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 2, p. 791, General Miles testi- mony before the Joint Committee. Tensions Mount 213 On October 9 Washington cryptographers had deciphered a September 24 berthing plan intercept, instructing the Japanese consul in Hawaii to plot the location of ships in Pearl Harbor on a grid system and to notify Tokyo. 22 However, the Pearl Harbor commanders were not notied. On December 3 Navy cryptana- lysts in Washington decoded and translated a J-19 message more than two weeks old (November 15), sent from Tokyo to its consul in Hawaii. It read: As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your ships in harbor report irregu- lar, but at a rate of twice a week. 23
Again, this information was not passed on to our command- ers in Hawaiinot to General Short, who was responsible for the safety of the eet while in port, and not to Admiral Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the Pacic Fleet based in Pearl Harbor. Tus the U.S. commanders in Hawaii remained ignorant of the fact that the Japanese consul in Honolulu was keeping a close watch on the ships of the U.S. eet in Pearl Harbor. Japan Orders Its Embassy in Washington to Destroy Codes; U.S. Naval Intelligence Warns Outposts On December 2, Tokyo time, the Japanese government cabled its embassy in Washington further instructions about destroying its codes. Tis message was promptly decoded and translated by our Army cryptographers on December 3. 24 It said that all codes but those now being used with the machine and all secret les and documents were to be destroyed. Also, [s]top at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely. On the completion 22 Ibid., part 12, p. 261, Tokyo September 24 J-19 message to Honolulu, trans- lated October 9, 1941. 23 Ibid., part 12, p. 262, Tokyo J-19 message to Honolulu #111, translated December 3, 1941. 24 Ibid., p. 215. 214 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy of these tasks, the embassy should wire back the one code word, haruna. Tis code-destruct message and others addressed to Japanese embassies and consulates indicated to anyone familiar with such matters that the Japanese were planning to go to war very soon. Junior o cers in Naval Intelligence, who were working with these Japanese intercepts, were disturbed. Navy Captain Arthur H. McCollum, who was in charge of the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligences foreign branch, suggested that warning mes- sages be sent to the U.S. outposts in the Pacic, and he drafted the following cable: Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplo- matic and consular posts at Hongkong x Singapore x Batavia x Manila x Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important con- dential and secret documents x From foregoing infer that Orange [ Japan] plans early action in Southeast Asia. 25
McCollums superior, Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson, chief of the intelligence division, sought permission from Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, assistant chief of naval operations, to send this cable. When asked during the Pearl Harbor hearings if the destruction of codes necessarily mean[s] war, that a country that destroys its codes is going to commit an overt act of war or declare war, Ingersoll replied, It meant that to us, particularly the destruction of codes in the consulates. 26 Terefore, Ingersoll apparently assumed that the last sentence of the proposed cable was unnecessary. In any event, he okayed the code-destruction message, with the nal sentence deleted. Te shortened message 25 Ibid., part 15, p. 1866, exhibit No. 83. #031850 to CINCPAC, CINCAF, Coms. 14, 16 concerning Japanese instruction to destroy codes and ciphers. 26 Ibid., part 9, p. 4269, Ingersoll testimony before the Joint Committee. Tensions Mount 215 was dispatched priority on December 3 at 6:50 p.m. Greenwich time (1:50 p.m., Washington time), to Admiral Hart (Manila), Admiral Kimmel (Pearl Harbor), and to commandants of the naval districts in Hawaii and the Philippines. 27
Navy Captain L.F. Saord in the O ce of Naval Communications knew of the latest Japanese intercept regard- ing the destruction of codes in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila. 28 Ten he learned that the Japanese embassy in Washington also had been ordered to destroy everything they had except one copy of their high-grade [decoding] machine. And on the 3rd we received a signal from Admiralty London that [the Japanese embassy in] London had already complied. 29
Lieutenant Commander A.D. Kramer, who was attached to the far eastern section of Naval Intelligence, told Saord that McCollum was greatly worried by the lack of information that was being sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacic Fleet. Saord phoned McCollum and asked if he had read the mes- sages which we had been getting in the last three days. McCollum said he had. Do you appreciate their signicance? Saord asked. McCollum said he did. Ten Saord asked, Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacic Fleet? We are doing everything we canMcCollum emphasized both westo get the news out to the Fleet. 30 Saord didnt learn then that McCollum had nally suc- ceeded in having a warning sent, even if a watered-down one. So Saord and Kramer set out to draft their own warning. According to Saord, 27 Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, OPNAV #031850, December 3, 1941. 28 Ibid., part 12, p. 209, Tokyo to Washington #2444, December 1, 1941. 29 Ibid., part 29, p. 2396. Saord testimony before the APHB. 30 Ibid. 216 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Te C.I. [Communications Intelligence] Unit in Washington had no authority to forward to the C.I. Units in Pearl Harbor or Corregidor, or to the Commanders-in-Chief direct, any information other than technical information pertaining to direction nding, interception, and so forth. Te dissemination of intelligence was the duty, responsibility, and privilege of the O ce of Naval Intelligence as prescribed in Communication War Plans approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in March, 1940. 31
Terefore, the dissemination of intelligence was not permit- ted to Saords unit. He acted because he thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released. 32
Saords message, OpNav 031855, was released by Captain [ Joseph R.] Redman, Assistant Director of Naval Communications. It was addressed to the Philippines (CinCAF and Com 16) for action and routed to Hawaii (CinCPac and Com 14) for information. It was written in highly technical language and only one o cer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, U.S.N., on CinCPacs Sta, could have explained its signicance. 33 Saords message advised that on December 1 Tokyo had ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy their Purple machines; Batavias machine had already been returned to Tokyo. Ten on December 2 the Japanese embassy in Washington had been told to destroy its secret docu- ments, its Purple machine, and all but one copy of other systems. It also reported that the Japanese embassy in London had com- plied. 34 When Saords message reached Pearl Harbor, Kimmels intelligence o cer had to ask Coleman what a Purple machine was. Te Pearl Harbor command had never heard of the Japanese 31 Ibid., part 26, pp. 39293, Saord testimony before the Hart Inquiry. 32 Ibid., p. 392. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., part 14, p. 1408. Tensions Mount 217 diplomatic code, a code machine named Purple, or of MAGIC, the valuable intelligence derived from Purple. McCollums watered-down dispatch (#031850) 35 had actu- ally been released by Wilkinson just ve minutes before Saords (#031855). 36 McCollums message had been sent for action to Hart in Manila, Kimmel in Pearl Harbor, and to the comman- dants of the 14th (Hawaii) and 16th (Philippines) naval districts. Saords message went for action to the Philippines, with an information copy to Hawaii. U. S. Orders Destruction of Codes at Some Overseas Embassies Te repeated reminders that the Japanese were planning some aggressive action in the very near future spurred Army o - cials in Washington to action. General Sherman Miles, head of G-2, the military intelligence division of the Army general sta, was responsible for the collection, analysis, estimation, and dis- semination of information primarily for the chief of sta and the secretary of war. 37 On December 3, he cabled the U.S. military attach at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo to destroy its codes. 38
Te o ce of the chief of naval operations (OPNAV) also acted. Late in the evening of December 3, Washington time, instructions to destroy the Navys codes were sent to U.S. naval attachs in the Asiatic theaterALUSNA (naval attach) in Tokyo and Bangkok, and ASTALUSNA (assistant naval atta- ch for air) in Peiping and Shanghai, China. Information copies only were sent to CINCAF (commander-in-chief, Asiatic Fleet), that is Admiral Hart in Manila, COM 16 (commandant, 16th 35 Ibid., part 14, p. 1407. 36 Ibid., p. 1408. 37 Ibid., part 2, p. 777, Miles testimony before the Joint Committee. 38 Ibid., p. 841, Miles testimony before the Joint Committee; part 29, p. 2445, Bratton testimony before the APHB. See also part 14, p. 1409. 218 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy naval district, Philippines), and ALUSNA, Chungking, China. No copy was sent to Kimmel in Pearl Harbor, 14th naval dis- trict, Hawaii. 39 A similar message was sent a few minutes later to the naval attach in Peiping and to the marine commander in Tientsin, China. Some 17 hours later a message (042017) was sent to the naval station on Guam, the mid-Pacic island more than 3,000 miles west of Hawaii, which lay practically in the midst of the Japanese mandated islands. Guam was told to destroy all secret and condential publications and other classied matter, except that necessary for current purposes and special intelligence and to be prepared to destroy instantly any other classied matter retained. 40 Information copies were sent to Hart and the 16th naval district in the Philippines, and to Kimmel and the 14th naval district in Hawaii. On December 4, just two minutes after the one to Guam, a cable (042019) was dispatched from OPNAV in Washington to the naval attachs at Tokyo and Bangkok and to the assistant naval attachs in Peiping and Shanghai. Tey were told to destroy all secret and condential les with the exception of those which are essential for current purposes. Also all other papers which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the United States were to be destroyed. 41
Tese code-destruct messages meant Japanese action was imminentin the west Pacic and southeast Asia, probably in Indochina and Tailand. Hawaii was an ACTION addressee in only one of these urgent cablesMcCollums #031850. (Manila was a second addressee). However, the information reported in that message, gleaned from a Japanese intercept, had concerned primarily southeast Asia, ordering the destruction of codes and 39 Ibid., part 14, p. 1408. OPNAV #040339. 40 Ibid., OPNAV #042017. 41 Ibid., part 29, p. 2397, Saord before the APHB. Tensions Mount 219 ciphers at Japanese diplomatic and consular posts in Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, and Manila, as well as Washington and London. No one in Washington seemed concerned about Hawaii. 10. Significant Information Known in Washington U.S. War 1
Plans Published O n December 4, 1941, a front-page story in the Washington Times Herald and its parent newspaper, the Chicago Tribune, sent shockwaves throughout the nation: F.D.Rs WAR PLANS GOAL IS 10 MILLION ARMED MEN: HALF TO FIGHT IN AEF PROPOSED LAND DRIVE BY JULY 1, 1943, TO SMASH NAZIS Te nation was still o cially neutral. Yet here was evidence that plans had been made to build an army to ght abroad, that is, to create an American Expeditionary Force (AEF), to smash the Nazis. Te people were stunned. 1 Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi- sion, 1950), p. 337. 221 222 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Te war plans announced here were those prepared under Marshalls orders by Lt. Col. Albert C. Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer had been assigned the task in May 1941 of compiling a com- plete statement of Army needsnot for 1941 and 1942 but for the actual winning of a war not yet declared. Ten in July 1941, almost immediately after Hitler attacked Russia, Roosevelt had expanded the scope of Wedemeyers assignment to include not only the needs of the Army, but also those of the Navy and Air. 2
On August 30, FDR had enlarged it still further to encompass also the distribution of expected United States production of munitions of war as between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and the other countries to be aided. 3 Te project had been carried out in utmost secrecy, and Wedemeyer had completed his Herculean task by September 10. Te result of his eorts was known as the Victory Program. To preserve the security of the project, the number of copies and their distribution were strictly limited. 4 Nevertheless, rumors had circulated in October that the Army was currently preparing an expeditionary force for duty in Africa. To protect the secrecy of the plans, Marshall had categorically denied their existence. Tere is no foundation whatsoever, he stated, for the allegation or rumor that we are preparing troops for a possible expedition to Africa or other critical areas outside this hemisphere. 5 And now, to the chagrin of all involved, the security surrounding the program had been breached. Te militarys war plans had been leaked and published for all the world to see in the anti-administration Chicago Tribune. Tere was consternation and embarrassment in the administration. An 2 Ibid., pp. 33839. 3 Ibid., pp. 34749. 4 Albert C. Wedemeyer, Reports! (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), pp. 2021. 5 Watson, Te War Department, pp. 35859. Signicant Information Known in Washington 223 investigation was launched to discover who had been responsible for the leak. Japanese Winds Code Executed: War with England; War with the U.S.; Peace with Russia On November 28, we had intercepted the November 15 Japanese Winds Code setup (Tokyo Circular #2353), a message announcing special weather code words to be used by the Japanese [i]n case of emergency (danger of cutting o our diplomatic relations), and the cutting o of international communications. 6
By introducing these weather words, each with a hidden mean- ing, into daily Japanese language news broadcasts, the Japanese would be able to communicate secretly to their diplomatic o - cers throughout the world, even if they could no longer transmit via their cryptographic channels. Also on November 28, we had intercepted a Japanese message with the schedule of Japanese news broadcasts and the kilocycles on which transmissions were to be made. 7 Te signicance of the Winds Code message became apparent when on December 1 we translated a Japanese intercept ordering the Japanese diplomatic o ces in some coun- tries to destroy their codes and code machines. When Captain Saord, director of the Security Section of Navy Departments Communications, read the cable giving the times and frequencies of Japanese news broadcasts in conjunction with the Japanese Winds Code message, he put two and two together. According to him, 6 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 12, p. 154, Tokyo Circular #2353. 7 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 34, p. 111. 224 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy everyone in authority from the president down believed that this [a Winds Execute] would be the Japanese Governments decision as to peace or war announced to their own o cials overseas. We looked on it as our chance of a tip-o, [our chance] to gain the necessary time to prevent a surprise attack on our eet. 8 Interception of a Winds Execute was given top priority. Saord immediately alerted U.S. intercept stations to monitor Japanese-language weather and news broadcasts at the sched- uled times. 9 It was expected that the message would be trans- mitted in Japanese Morse code. Tose monitoring the broadcasts were given cards with the three Japanese phrases listed in the Winds Code messageHIGASHI NO KAZE AME, KITA NO KAZE KUMORI, and NISHI NO KAZE HAREand were instructed to listen closely for an Execute, i.e., for an actual broadcast of any one of the three crucial Japanese weather phrases. 10 Our prospects for interception looked somewhat dubious, Saord said later. 11 Te Navy even feared that this winds execute might have been sent out before the 28th, when we began listen- ing for it 12 and that we might have missed it entirely. After all, the Japanese message had gone out on November 15, almost two weeks before we decoded and translated it. All these uncertainties 8 Ibid., part 8, p. 3640, Saord testimony before the Joint Committee. 9 Ibid., p. 3580. 10 Ibid., part 33, p. 853, Kramer testimony, September 13, 1944, at Navy Court of Inquiry; ibid., part 8, pp. 391518, and ibid., part 9, pp. 412628, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee; and ibid., part 10, p. 4624, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 11 Ibid., part 8, p. 3581, Saord statement before the Joint Committee. 12 Ibid. p. 3640. Signicant Information Known in Washington 225 made the Navy very jittery. 13 Moreover, radio reception was not only poor but unpredictable. [T]he radio frequencies used between Japan and the United States were quite erratic in performance. . . . It is not at all surprising that the frequency used [by the Japanese] to reach Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires skipped over the West Coast and Hawaii. 14
Even the Japanese themselves in Washington and Rio objected to the new frequency assignments and Rome com- plained about the poor quality of the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts. 15 In view of the urgency of intercepting the Winds Execute and the uncertain nature of radio reception, Navy communications took the exceptional precaution of alerting all stations with any possibility of intercepting this important message. Nevertheless, the Navy Department was very much worried that, even with all the stations which were known to be listening for it, by some freak chance we might fail to catch it. 16 Since reception of Tokyo transmissions was often clearer on the east coast of the United States than on the west coast, Station M at Cheltenham, Maryland, was one of the several interception stations to which the alert was sent. Station chief Daryl Wigle put a notation in the supervisors instruction le, and Radioman Ralph T. Briggs, then assistant supervisor on his particular watch, saw the report. Briggs had been especially trained by the Navy in the interception of Japanese communications, and he recognized the three Japanese phrases as weather phrases. Tey were the 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., p. 3615, Saord 1945 memorandum re Winds Execute prepared for Sonnett. 15 Ibid., p. 3581. See also pp. 358185 for Saord statement to the Joint Committee (February 1, 1946) concerning radio reception at our various intercept stations and our preparations for picking up the Winds Execute. 16 Ibid., p. 3640, Saord testimony before the Joint Committee. 226 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy kinds of phrases Briggs had often picked up when searching vari- ous radio spectrums at random to practice interception and to see what kind of tra c was being transmitted. Briggs wondered why Navy intelligence was all of a sud- den targeting weather reports, and, being on good terms with his station chief, he asked why. Wigle was reluctant to explain, but he nally showed Briggs the card with the three phrases and their hidden coded meanings. Wigle couldnt give Briggs all the details, but [he said] its important that we get those. . . . [I]f you get any of them, if any of those shows up in any broadcast, be sure and transmit them immediately to OP-20-G, Captain Saords o ce in Washington, D.C. Te only broadcast on which such weather phrases might appear was the Tokyo scheduled weather and news broadcast, transmitted at dierent hours of the day and on dierent frequen- cies to Japanese ships and stations worldwide. Te Cheltenham communication intelligence trained radiomen began to monitor that broadcast. To each of the ve watch sections Wigle assigned at least one operator who was qualied in Katakana, the di cult written form of squarish Japanese characters based on Chinese ideographs, as contrasted with the simpler Kanji. On December 4 Briggs had the mid-watch, from mid- night to 8:00 a.m. Some time after midnight, probably between 3:00 and 8:00, when he was to be relieved, Briggs intercepted in Japanese Morse code a message containing the phrase Higashi no kaze ame. He excitedly rushed down the corridor to the OP-20-G teletype terminal and sent the message o immedi- ately to OP-20-G in Washington. He then phoned Wigle, who lived on the station, got him out of the sack, and told him what had happened. When Wigle checked the log sheet and the sta- tion copy of the intercept later, he conrmed to Briggs that he had gotten the real McCoy. 17 17 Tese three paragraphs based on Bettina B. Greavess interview of Ralph T. Briggs in Las Vegas, Nevada, August 14, 1988. See also John Tolands Signicant Information Known in Washington 227 Te Execute, forwarded by teletype (TWX) from Cheltenham, was received in the Navy Department in Washington by the watch o cer, who notied Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who was in charge of the translation section of the Navy Department communication intelligence unit. As soon as Kramer saw the TWX from Cheltenham, he rushed into Saords o ce with the long yellow teletype paper in his hands. 18 Te time was shortly before 9:00 a.m. on December 4. 19 Tis is it! Kramer said, as he handed the message to Saord. Tis was the broadcast we had strained every nerve to inter- cept. Tis was the feather in our cap. . . . Tis was what the Navy Communication Intelligence Division had been preparing for since its establishment in 1924War with Japan! 20 As Saord later recalled, Te Winds Message broadcast was about 200 words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo Circular 2353 appearing in interview of Briggs, April 13, 1980, led with Toland papers at Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Also see John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), pp. 19599. 18 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3619. Saord testimony; also ibid., part 18, p. 3344. 19 Considerable confusion has surrounded the actual time when the Winds Execute was received. Saord s recollection, based on the timing of messages he dispatched immediately upon receipt, was that it was picked up on the morning of December 4 (ibid., part 8, pp. 35 8688). Briggss surmise, when he was interviewed by Toland (April 13, 1980), was that he may have intercepted a winds message during his mid-watch at Cheltenham from 0001 [12:01 a.m.] to 0800 [8:00 a.m.], Washington, D.C., time on December 2. He came to this conclusion on the basis of missing messages as recorded on his Station M log sheet. However, later Briggss investigations convinced him that the date was actually December 4, as Saord maintained consistently throughout his testimony and interrogations. 20 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3586. See also Kramer testi- mony, September 13, 1944, before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Joint Committee, part 33, p. 853. 228 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the middle of the message. . . . Kramer had underscored all three code phrases on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramers handwriting, the following free translations: War with England (including NEI, etc.) War with the U.S. Peace with Russia 21 Saord immediately sent the original teletype of the Winds Execute with one of his o cers up to the o ce of his superior, Rear Admiral Noyes, director of naval communications. Saord did not explain the message or its signicance to the courier; he only told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person. If Noyes wasnt there, the o cer was to track him down and not take no for an answer. If Noyes could not be found within a reasonable time, the o cer was to let Saord know. In a few minutes, however, Saord received a report that the message had been successfully delivered to Noyes. 22 Meanwhile over at the Japanese embassy in Washington, Japanese Petty O cer Ogimoto, an intelligence o cer posing as a code clerk, had been on the alert since November 19, when the government in Tokyo had announced the Winds Code. We knew, of course, that the Japanese embassies and legations throughout the world must have been listening for the Winds Execute just as intently as we had been, although we had no way of knowing just what arrangements they had made. However, in the naval attach room, Ogimoto had been straining his ears lis- tening to shortwave broadcasts on their sophisticated radio. At about 4:00 p.m. on December 4, Ogimoto heard what he had been waiting for, East Wind Rain. He shouted out, Te wind 21 Ibid., part 8, p. 3586, Saord testimony before the Joint Committee. 22 Ibid. See also p. 3611 and ibid., part 18, p. 3347, the memorandum of May 14, 1945, prepared by Saord for Lieutenant Commander John F. Sonnett, legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt. Signicant Information Known in Washington 229 blew. Ogimoto heard the phrase East Wind Rain repeated several times. In the next room Assistant Naval Attach Yuzuru Sanematsu heard Ogimotos shout and rushed into the radio room. Te room was electric with excitement. Te two men looked at one another and said, What had to come has nally come. Tey immediately started making preparations for the destruction of the embassys secret codes, ciphers, and code machines. 23 Safford (Naval Communications, Security) Alerts U.S. Outposts to Destroy Classified Documents Indications were mounting that some form of aggressive action by the Japanese was imminent. But when? Where? Saord was concerned for the safety of the cryptographic equipment and all the classied documents at our mid-Pacic stations. Te U.S. Naval Station on Guam was only 60 miles or so from Saipan, one of the islands mandated to Japan after World War I, and according to War Plans [Guam was] not to be defended except against sabotage. So Saord thought we should clean house early there. 24 Terefore, when the Winds Execute came in on December 4, he prepared four messages to our stations in the far-western Pacic which were dispatched that afternoon. Te rst of Saords four messages was released by his supe- rior, Noyes, and the other three by Admiral Ingersoll. Saords 23 Yuzuru Sanematsu, Nichi-bei Joho Senki (Tokyo: Tosho Shuppansha, 1980), pp. 146, 235; 1982, pp. 191, 232. Tis paragraph is based on translations by Kentaro Nakano and Toshio Murata of pertinent passages in the autobiog- raphy of naval historian Sanematsu. At the time of the attack, Sanematsu was the ranking assistant naval attach and chief intelligence o cer in the Japa- nese embassy in Washington. After the war he was tried in the Japanese war crimes tribunal and served time in prison. 24 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2398, Saord testimony before the APHB. 230 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy rst message ordered Guam (more than 3,000 miles west of Hawaii) and Samoa (2,260 miles south and west of Hawaii) to destroy certain codes immediately and to substitute a new code, RIP 66, for RIP 65, then in use. It was sent Priority to Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, Hart in Manila, the commandants of their respec- tive naval districts, and the Naval Stations at Guam and Samoa. Because military intelligence, that is, the analysis, interpreta- tion, and dissemination of information, was the prerogative of the O ce of Naval Intelligence, it was outside the jurisdiction of Saords Security Section of Naval Communications. Terefore, Saords cable was drafted in technical terms and refrained from interpretation. 25 Saord then drafted a second message ordering Guam to destroy all secret and condential publications and other clas- sied matter except that essential for current purposes. . . . Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classi- ed matter you retain. It was directed to the naval station at Guam for action, with information copies to the commanders of the eets and naval districts in the Philippines and Hawaii, who might have occasion to communicate with Guam. 26 It was imperative that Saords rst message get there rst, as the second message was sent in the new RIP 66, which had just been made eective by the previ- ous message. Noyes revised Saords draft somewhat and soft- ened the degree of warning it contained, and it was dispatched 17 minutes after Saords rst message. However, it was sent Deferred Priority, thus downgrading its urgency. [B]y Navy regulations or by communication instructions deferred messages are not expected to be delivered until the 25 Ibid., p. 2397. 26 Ibid., p. 2398, Serial No. 042017. See also ibid., part 14, p. 1408. Signicant Information Known in Washington 231 beginning of working hours the next morning. In other words, any message which comes in in deferred priority automatically is not going to be considered a war warning, regardless of how you stated it. 27 Saords third December 4 message was sent to Hart in Manila, which lay on the ank of the route the Japanese con- voys were traveling. It ordered that the communications room be stripped of all secret and condential publications and papers which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the United States. 28 Te fourth message was directed for action to the U.S. naval attaches in Tokyo, Peiping, Bangkok, and Shanghai, with an infor- mation copy to Hart. No copy of this message was sent to Kimmel in Pearl Harbor. Tis message, also prompted by our receipt of the Winds Execute, ordered our outposts in the western Pacic to destroy secret and condential materials which in the hands of an enemy would be a disadvantage to the United States. 29 Saord was proud of the Navy crew at Cheltenham for hav- ing intercepted the vital Winds Execute, and he did not forget them. In the midst of the growing tension, he took time to send them a message: Well done. Discontinue coverage of the target. A day or so later, he followed that up with a bouquet of roses, not exactly the traditional gift for one man to give a group of men. But cryppies (cryptologists) had the reputation for being odd balls, and Saord was a cryppy. 30 Saord recognized that our interception of the Winds Execute had been due partly to good luck, the fact that the Japanese hadnt transmitted it between November 15, when their Winds Code setup message had gone out, and November 28, 27 Ibid., part 29, p. 2398, Saord testimony before the APHB. 28 Ibid., p. 2397, Serial No. 042018. 29 Ibid., Serial No. 042019. 30 Briggs interview, August 14, 1988, by Bettina B. Greaves. 232 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy when we decoded and translated it. It had been due partly to foresight, the ability of Intelligence to put several clues together so as to anticipate it. But our successful interception had also been due to the high quality of the Navy operators and receiving apparatus at Cheltenham. 31 Tokyo to Honolulu: Investigate Ships in Harbor; Tokyo to Embassy: Destroy Codes Also intercepted and translated on December 4, was a signi- cant J-l9 Tokyo-Honolulu cable. Honolulu was asked to investi- gate comprehensively the eet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation. 32 Te usual procedure for handling Japanese J-19 messages interception in Hawaii and airmailing to Washington as picked up, still encrypted and untranslatedhad been followed in this case. As a result, it was not until two weeks after its transmission from Tokyo that this cable was decoded and translated in Washington. However, it was available there on December 4, well before the attack. And it provided conrmation of the Ships in Harbor messages. 33 In light of the other intercepts, this new reminder that the Japanese in Hawaii had our eet at Pearl Harbor under close surveillance should have set o ashing lights and pierc- ing alarms among those in military intelligence, arousing them to alert the commanders in Hawaii. Yet no hint of either the earlier Ships in Harbor messages, or of this follow-up, was forwarded to Pearl Harbor. A Purple December 4 Tokyo cable added to the crisis atmosphere in Washington. Tis cable instructed the Japanese 31 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3586, Saord testimony before the Joint Committee. 32 Ibid., part 12, p. 263. 33 Ibid., part 12, pp. 26163. Signicant Information Known in Washington 233 ambassadors in Washington how to dispose of their codes. Te key, or guide to deciphering the code, however, was to be kept until the last moment and then sent to the Japanese ministry in Mexico. 34 Tokyo to Ambassadors: Maintain Pretense that Negotiations Continue Also on December 4, the Navy translated the Japanese gov- ernments instructions to their ambassadors in Washington as to how to quiet Roosevelts concern, as expressed in his December 2 press conference, over Japanese troop movements in Indochina. Te ambassadors were told to point out, while maintaining the pretense that the negotiations were continuing, that the move- ments in the southern part of the country, as well as in the north, have been in response to an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo China bor- der. Te movements, they maintained, have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement. 35 Nevertheless, the Japanese ambassadors in Washington were still concerned. If Japans troop movements into Indochina continued, they feared the United States might take steps to close down the Japanese consulates. So they wired Tokyo again: [C]onsideration should be given to steps to be taken in con- nection with the evacuation of the Consuls. 36 34 Ibid., p. 231. 35 Ibid., p. 224. Tokyo to Washington, #875. 36 Ibid., p. 227. Washington to Tokyo, #1243. 234 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy FDR and British Ambassador Discuss Warning Japanese Against Attacking British Malaya and NEI Roosevelt followed the Japanese situation closely, insofar as it was revealed by the MAGIC intercepts he saw. 37 Judging from the clues to Japans intentions revealed in the messages we were intercepting, it was apparent the Japanese were prepar- ing to strike. [T]he only question that remained was when and where. 38 Without revealing his reasons, on December 4 FDR asked Congressional leaders not to recess for more than three days at a time. 39 He was keeping the door open so that he could address Congress should he decide events and public opinion warranted it. Late that evening, British Ambassador Lord Halifax called on the president to express his governments very deep appreciation for his promise the evening before of armed support. Te two men discussed whether or not it would be advisable for the British, Dutch, and the U.S. governments to issue jointly a simultaneous warning to the Japanese against attacking Tailand, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, or the Burma Road through Indochina. FDR was doubtful about including the Burma Road, but otherwise agreed to the warning. However, he did not believe the warning should be a joint one. He thought that each of the three Governments should give it independently, and that the American warning should come rst, since he wanted to assure opinion in the United States 37 Henry M. Adams, Hopkins: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1977), p. 257. 38 Ibid., p. 256. 39 Ibid., p. 257. Signicant Information Known in Washington 235 that he was acting in the interest of American defence, and not just following a British lead. 40 FDR had not given up all hope of a temporary agreement with the Japanese. He led Halifax to believe that Mr. Kurusu had let him know indirectly that an approach to the Emperor might still secure a truce, and even lead to a settlement between Japan and China. Mr. Kurusus plan was that the President should try to act as an introducer between China and Japan with a view to their dealing directly with each other. Roosevelt suggested that the lines of settlement in such an agreement might be the withdrawal of the bulk of Japanese troops from Indo-China, and a similar withdrawal from North China on an agreed timetable. 41 FDR also told Halifax that the Japanese would have to have some economic relief. Actually, he said, he did not put too much importance on Mr. Kurusus approach, but he could not miss even the chance of a settlement. Besides FDR believed his own case [that the U.S. was negotiating in sincerity with Japan] would be strengthened if he had been in communication with the Emperor. 42 Tere was some danger, Halifax believed, in postponing the warning. He even suggested that the communication to the Emperor might serve as a denite warning. Te president agreed but said he would decide on December 6, after getting the Japanese reply to his enquiries [concerning the Japanese troop movements], whether to approach the Emperor. FDR told 40 Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1962), pp. 18788. 41 Ibid., p.188. 42 Ibid. 236 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Halifax that he hoped that, if he did contact the Emperor, the three-Power warning might be postponed until he had had an answer. 43 British Forces in Southeast Asia Told of Promised U. S. Armed Support On December 5 in southeast Asia (December 4 in the United States) the Dominions received from the United Kingdom Government information that it had received assurance of armed support from the United States (a) if Britain found it necessary either to forestall a Japanese landing in the Kra Isthmus or to occupy part of the isthmus as a counter to Japanese violation of any other part of Tailand; (b) if Japan attacked the Netherlands East Indies and Britain at once went to their support; (c) if Japan attacked British territory. 44 Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, British commander-in-chief in the Far East stationed in Singapore, had nally received the authority he had been requesting; he was free to launch Matador, the operation intended to forestall a Japanese landing on the Kra Isthmus. However, Londons instructions were worded in such a way as to require that he withhold any action until he was absolutely sure that a Japanese expedition was making for the Isthmus of Kra. Such a delay would mean that the chances of its [a British operation] succeeding were greatly reduced, for it would be too late to take action. 45 43 Ibid. 44 Lionel Wigmore, Te Japanese Trust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p. 109. 45 S. Woodburn Kirby, Te War Against Japan, vol. 1: Te Loss of Singapore (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1957), p. 175. Signicant Information Known in Washington 237 Te volume of Japanese intercepts being decoded and trans- lated in Washington during this time was almost overwhelming. Te purpose of such cryptanalysis is, of course, to use the intel- ligence eectively to gain an advantage over ones adversaries. Te record reveals that our cryptanalysts and translators were doing a remarkable job; they were intercepting, decoding, translating, and disseminating promptly countless Japanese messages. Tus, a great deal of information was coming into Washington. However, precious little intelligence was going outto the men in the eld who might have been able to use it. 11. Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action Tokyo: Utterly Impossible for Japan to Accept U.S. Terms P age One of Te New York Times reported on December 5 that Tokyo was struck as by a bombshell . . . with the rev- elation of the substance of the Japanese-American negotia- tions. Japans government-controlled news agency, Domei, had announced, It is utterly impossible for Japan to accept the stipu- lations of the American document presented to the two Japanese ambassadors on November 26 by Secretary of State Hull. Domei was owned by the Japanese government and carefully controlled by the Japanese Government. Any Domei report was simply what the Japanese Government wanted to have passed on to the public. 1 Te terms of the U.S. document were not reported. However, according to the story, a lively debate had taken place 1 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 2, p. 688, Testimony of Joseph C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan.
239 240 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the day before at a session of the entire Japanese Privy Council. Furthermore, Domei asserted, the document cannot serve as a basis of Japanese-American negotiations henceforth. Hulls statement means that the United States is still scheming to impose on Japan the provisions of old and obsolete principles, which are incompatible with the actual Far Eastern conditions, even of bygone days. 2
Japanese Expeditionary Force in the Southwest Pacific Te Dutch and British, with possessions in the southwest Pacic, were concerned that huge concentrations of Japanese forces were assembling and apparently preparing to move in their direction. Te commander-in-chief of all Dutch naval forces, sta- tioned in London since the German invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940, had received information that the Japanese were concentrating an expeditionary force in the Pelew [Palau] Islands in the Carolines, only about 600 miles northwest of Dutch New Guinea. 3 Te Dutch in London conferred with Anthony Eden, secretary of state for foreign aairs. Tey were seeking some type of a joint declaration of a defense zone by the United States or Great Britain to assist their defense against the Japanese. 4 Eden cabled Lord Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington, setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. . . .Tis of course relates to the matter of defense 2 New York Times, December 5, 1941, pp. 1, 4.
3 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 2: Te Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1956), vol. 4, p. 717. 4 Ibid., pp. 71719.
Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action 241 against Japan. 5 Halifax asked to see Secretary of State Hull and he called at Hulls apartment on the morning of December 5, to discuss Edens cable. Tokyo Replies to FDR Concerning Japanese Troops in Indochina On December 5 the two Japanese ambassadors called at the State Department to present formally the Japanese governments answer to FDRs question with regard to the reported move- ments of Japanese troops in French Indo-china. Te two men handed Hull the Japanese governments reply. It was short. Te ambassadors waited while the secretary read. Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of move- ments along the northern frontier of French Indo-china border- ing on China. Hence, Japanese troops . . . have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-china, for the principal purpose of taking precautionary measures. As a result, some Japanese troop movements have been carried out in southern Indochina and apparently an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. However, the Japanese govern- ment said, no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France. 6
When Hull had nished reading, he asked the ambassadors whether the Japanese considered that the Chinese were liable to attack them in Indochina. He said the Chinese contended they were massing troops in Yunnan [a province of China on the northern border of Indochina] . . . in answer to Japans massing troops in Indochina. Ambassador Nomura said that 5 Ibid., p. 719.
6 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, p. 784. 242 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy as the Chinese were eager to defend the Burma Road . . . the possibility of a Chinese attack in Indochina as a means of pre- venting Japans attacking the Burma Road from Indochina could not be excluded. Hull responded that he had never heard before that Japans troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. Tis was the rst time that he knew that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina. Hull sounded sarcastic. Te ambassadors said the Japanese were alarmed over increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD pow- ers in the southwest Pacic area. Tey said that an airplane of one of those countries had recently own over Formosa, then Japanese territory. Nevertheless, Kurusu said, the Japanese government was very anxious to reach an agreement with this [U.S.] Government, and it felt we should be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations between China and Japan were initi- ated. Hull countered by bringing up the aid Japan was giving Hitler. Kurusu asked in what way was Japan aiding Hitler. Hull replied, by keeping large forces of this country and other coun- tries immobilized in the Pacic area. 7 At this point the Japanese ambassador said under his breath, [T]his isnt getting us any- where. Nevertheless, the conversation continued. Te secretary and the two ambassadors recapitulated their respective positions more or less as they had done many times beforewith respect to U.S. aid to China, the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, Japans desire for oil, and the attitude of the United States toward supplying that oil. Hull criticized Japans bellicose slogans and the malignant campaign conducted [in Japan] through the o cially controlled 7 Ibid., pp. 78182, Joseph W. Ballantine report of December 5 meeting between Hull and the Japanese ambassadors. Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action 243 and inspired press which created an atmosphere not conducive to peace. Kurusu pointed out that on the American side we were not free from injurious newspaper propaganda. One press report had cast aspersions on him personally, saying he had been sent here to check on Nomura. Hull replied that he had heard only good reports in regard to Mr. Kurusu and the Ambassador. In spite of the formal pleasantry, the Japanese ambassadors sotte voce remark had been correctthe discussions werent get- ting anywhere. Te two ambassadors made the usual apologies for taking so much of the Secretarys time and withdrew. 8
FDR and Stimson Denounce for Lack of Patriotism Those Who Leaked U.S. War Plans Te December 4 Chicago Tribune story on F.D.R.s War Plan had aroused the country. At a White House press confer- ence the next day, Roosevelt parried questions of reporters and referred them to Secretary of War Stimson. Almost 200 newspa- per correspondents immediately ocked to his [Stimsons] press conference. 9 After reading a short statement, Stimson asked the reporters, What would you think of an American general sta which in the present condition of the world did not investigate and study every conceivable type of emergency which may con- front this country, and every possible method of meeting that emergency? He questioned the patriotism of the person or newspaper that would publish condential studies and make them available to our enemies. Te newspaper report was about an unnished 8 Ibid., pp. 78283. 9 New York Times, December 6, 1941, p. 3. 244 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy study that had never constituted an authorized program of the Government. 10
Stimson continued, While their publication will doubtless be of gratication to our potential enemies and a possible source of impairment and embarrassment to our national defense, the chief evil of their publication is the revelation that there should be among us any group of persons so lacking in appreciation of the danger that confronts the country. He denounced those who were so wanting in loyalty and patriotism to their government that they would be willing to take and publish such papers. Stimson declined to answer questions or enlarge upon it, but indicated that more would be announced after he had completed the task . . . of nding out how the leak occurred. 11
Japan Anticipates a Break with England and the United States On December 3 the Japanese ambassadors in Washington notied Tokyo by cable (which we decoded and translated on December 5) that the indications were that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war is a denite certainty in the event of an occupation [by Japan] of Tailand. 12
Also on December 5 we read a December 1 message from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in London: Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately. To 10 Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi- sion, 1950), p. 359. 11 New York Times, December 6, 1941 p. 3. 12 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 227. Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action 245 acknowledge receipt of these instructions, the embassy was to cable Tokyo in plain language . . . the one word SETUJU. When the code machine had actually been destroyed the embassy was to wire Tokyo, also in plain language, HASSO. 13 Tus communi- cations in code between the Embassy in London and Tokyo were being shut down. Some in U.S. intelligence realized that this was what Japan had been preparing for when it set up the Winds Code. Radio reception in those days was not reliable. Routine Japanese news and weather broadcasts, into which Japan inserted the special weather words with their secret meanings, could not usually be heard in the countries surrounding the Pacic. But due to freak atmospheric conditions, they could be heard . . . in the North Atlantic Ocean, the British Isles and Western Europe. Tus the primary reason for sending the Winds Execute must have been to notify the Japanese ambassador in London, after his code machine had been disposed of, that war with England and the United States was coming. [T]his was the only way that Tokyo could get news to him secretly. 14
Tat same day we intercepted a December 4 cable from the Japanese ambassador in Berlin to Tokyo. Berlin was asking Tokyo to arrange, [i]n case of evacuation from London, for the transfer to Berlin of certain embassy personnel. Why would the Japanese ambassador in Berlin anticipate the evacuation of the Japanese embassy in London, unless he expected Japan and Great Britain soon to be at war with each other? 15
13 Ibid., part 12, p. 209. 14 Ibid., part 8, p. 3585, Saord statement prepared for Joint Committee. 15 Ibid., part 12, p. 234. 246 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Confirmation from Batavia, NEI, of Significance of Japans Winds Code Te naval attach in Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, also picked up the Japanese Winds Code setup message and noti- ed Washington deferred priority on December 4, 6:21 a.m. Greenwich time (December 4, 1:21 a.m. Washington time). Te attach advised the United States that Japan will notify her con- suls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end (italics added). Ten the cable quoted the special weather words, each with its hidden meaning. 16
Te Winds Execute picked up in Cheltenham, Maryland, on December 4 was open to several interpretations. It could have indicated simply that Japanese relations with the nations men- tioned would be in danger; that Japanese negotiations would be discontinued; that diplomatic relations would be broken o; or that actual war was imminent. Tus Batavias explicit interpreta- tion, that the transmission of a Winds Execute would forebode war, lent credence to Saords and Kramers interpretation that it was actually a portent of war. However, since the cable from Batavia had not been classied URGENT, it was not decrypted immediately, but held for the December 45 nightshift of Armys G-2, Intelligence Division. When we nally read it on the morn- ing of December 5, it was old hat, for we had already picked up the Winds Execute. The Navys December View of the U.S.-Japanese Situation When Navy Director of War Plans Turner heard from Admiral Noyes that a Winds Execute referring to a break in 16 Ibid., part 9, p. 4214, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See also ibid., part 18, p. 3350. #031030 (5 Dec. 1941) from ALUSNA, Batavia (Torpe). Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action 247 U.S.-Japanese relations, had been received, he assumed Kimmel in Pearl Harbor had it. At a December 5 meeting, three top Washington Navy o cialsChief of Naval Operations Stark, Assistant Chief Ingersoll, and Turnerconcluded that all neces- sary orders had been issued to all echelons of command prepara- tory to war and that nothing further was necessary. 17 17 Ibid., part 33, p. 886. Turner testimony before the NCI. 12. December 6, Part 1 Collecting Intelligence and Determining Policy W ith the perspective of hindsight, it is easy to spot the sig- nicant clues that should have given warning that the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Out of fairness to the participants in the drama that was unfolding in 1941, however, we should keep in mind the situation as it appeared to them. A mass of information was coming into Washington in many forms from all over the world. Bits and pieces of information came from various sourcesfrom diplomatic contacts, from cable intercepts, including MAGIC, from our military and naval attachs, from direct observations, overights, radio direction ndings, and so on. Much of it was not in English. And much of this foreign- language material was in code as well. We were able to decode, translate, and read a great deal of that, although not all, quite promptly. Te coded cable tra c alone was extremely heavy. Tus the amount of this material that was available toward the end of 1941 was almost overwhelming. 249 250 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Many persons, each with his or her own expertise, played a role in the process of collecting the raw data that go to pro- vide intelligence. Tere were code specialists, communications specialists, security specialists, decoders, translators, and couriers. Tere were code clerks who listened to foreign radio broadcasts and could decipher Morse code, linguists familiar with Japanese, and radio technicians who could determine the location of naval vessels and military units by intersecting radio beacons. Tere were others at our various stations all over the world who picked cable intercepts out of the air and transmitted them to Washington. Each was familiar with only a small part of the total picture. No single person had access to all this information. Few of the many specialists were su ciently aware of the broad picture to be able to comprehend the signicance of the data they accumulated. And no one had any reason to feel a sense of urgency because no one knew what was going to happen on December 7. Te responsibility for collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and employing information was divided among various o ces and divisions of the military and the administration, each with its own specialized experts. Roughly speaking, data was collected by technical personnel in communications. Raw data was then integrated and analyzed by specialists in intelligence o ces or divisions, persons who had the training, experience, background, and knowledge of policy su cient to sift the wheat from the cha, to recognize what was pertinent and what was not, to analyze and interpret it, and to decide what information should be disseminated and to whom. Tese intelligence specialists needed to understand not only military operations, the defensive and oensive capabilities of our forces and of our potential allies and enemies, but also the diplomatic situation and government policy. Once the raw data collected was converted into intelligence, other specialists were responsible for disseminating it and issu- ing commands to the eld commanders. Tis responsibility was December 6, Part 1 251 usually in the hands of War Plans or Operations divisions. Final policy decisions were then made on the basis of the diplo- matic and political situation by the governments administrative o cials, the president and his cabinet, after taking into consider- ation the advice of the Armys chief of sta and the chief of naval operations. Te various specialists cooperated. But at the same time they were protective of the prerogatives of their own o ce or division, and anxious to prevent outsiders from invading their depart- ments turf. Tus the jurisdiction of each o ce or division was carefully prescribed. To avoid conict, each was careful to follow channels. Communications collected data; Intelligence ana- lyzed and interpreted it; orders to eld o cers, in line with the administrations policy decisions, went out from War Plans or Operations. Although the system usually functioned smoothly, its operation was sometimes disturbed as changes were made in procedure and personnel. In the Army, the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) collected information and transmitted it to Army Intelligence (G-2). Te War Plans Division (G-5) formulated plans under the direction of the Army chief of sta (ACS). Te president, the commander- in-chief, was responsible for overall policy. But orders to the eld were issued by the chief of sta, the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Field Forces. 1
In the Navy, the O ce of Naval Communications collected data. Traditionally, the O ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had had the responsibility for collating, analyzing, and disseminat- ing this information to o cers in the eld. However, when Rear Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson became director of ONI on 1 Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi- sion, 1950), p. 64. 252 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy October 15, 1941, he found that it had been reduced to a fact- gathering agency and the Navys War Plans Division had assumed the responsibility for analyzing the information that came in. 2
Te Navys top o cer, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), was responsible for keeping the Navys commander-in-chief, the president, informed. And orders to the Navys eld commanders were sent out by the CNO. Step by step, as data journeyed through channels, from the technical specialists who collected it to the o cers with training and experience who interpreted it, it became meaningful intel- ligence. Intelligence formed an extremely important compo- nent of the total 1941 picture. Te Armys chief of sta, General Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, relied on the available intelligence when advising their eld commanders on military strategy. Te top administration o - cials, that is the secretaries of State, War, Navy, and the president himself, also strove to keep abreast of current intelligence. In 1941, this meant keeping up to date on the Japanese position through the diplomatic cables and other sources. In the course of assembling, interpreting, and analyzing the data available, the most important intelligence was channeled to the men at the top. Even though each technical specialist involved in the complicated procedure was familiar with only a small segment of the total picture, the president and his top civil- ian and military advisers, who had the nal responsibility for the common defense of the nation and for resolving diplomatic and political dierences, had a birds-eye view of the overall situa- tion. Tey were also provided with the countrys most percep- tive military advice. By December 6, they were well aware, as a 2 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 36, pp. 22931, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, June 5, 1945, before the Hewitt Inquiry. December 6, Part 1 253 result of their access to MAGIC and other sources, that a clash with Japan was at hand. Teir constitutional responsibility for national defense obligated them to protect this country and its citizens and to see to it that, insofar as possible, U.S. forces, wher- ever stationed, were properly provisioned, prepared, and alerted. Teir constitutional responsibility did not call for inviting foreign intervention or defending other nations. Pilot Message Alerts Washington to Expect Japans Reply to U.S. Ultimatum Ever since November 26, when Washington o cialdom had rejected the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi, we had been anxiously awaiting Tokyos reply. We knew from reading cable intercepts that the Japanese considered our statement humiliat- ing and that relations between our two countries were considered to be de facto ruptured. It was clear to us that U.S.-Japanese relations were at an impasse. But we had also read their govern- ments instructions to the two Japanese ambassadors to keep on talking and not to give the impression that the negotiations are broken o. So we knew their interest in continuing to meet with Secretary of State Hull was merely for the sake of appearances; it did not mean a change in their deadline. 3
On Friday, December 5, Rear Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson, Director of the O ce of Naval Intelligence, had set up a 24-hour watch in the Far Eastern Section and had established a watch of the senior o cers of the Department. 4 According to Navy Captain William A. Heard, then in charge of the foreign branch, O ce of Naval Intelligence, Tere was an elaborate arrangement for prompt notication to the Director of Naval Intelligence of 3 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 195, Tokyo to Washington Purple message #844. 4 Ibid., part 4, p. 1761, Wilkinson testimony. 254 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy any matter of interest to him. Captain Heard had personally arranged for a special week-end telephone line between the O ce of Naval Intelligence and the State Department, which included my [Heards] telephone communication with both Military Intelligence and with the State Department. 5
On Saturday, December 6, at 7:15 a.m., Washington, D.C., time, the Navys intercept station on Bainbridge Island (Washington state), across the Puget Sound from Seattle, started picking up a message in Purple addressed to the Japanese ambas- sadors in Washington. 6 Tis coded message was relayed almost immediately, as was customary by TWX (teletype wire exchange) along with other messages that had been intercepted that morn- ing, to Washington, D.C. 7 It was received in Washington that same day, at 12:05 p.m. Until a message had been decoded and translated, there was no way, of course, to know if it was important. Army and Navy had only just, on December 1, worked out an arrangement to share responsibility for handling the heavy tra c of Japanese inter- cepts, the Army had the responsibility for decoding and trans- lating on even-numbered dates, the Navy on uneven-numbered dates. December 6 was an Army day. So when this message from Bainbridge came in, the Navy relayed it to the Armys SIS 8 and an Army cryptographic unit went to work right away. Tat was fortunate, for this message proved to be Tokyos announcement to her two Washington ambassadors that Japans formal reply to the U.S. note of November 26 was on its way. Tis message came to be known among those familiar with MAGIC as the Pilot 5 Ibid., part 32, p. 356, Testimony of Navy Captain William S. Heard before the NCI. 6 Ibid., part 8, p. 3559, Saord testimony before the Joint Committee. 7 Ibid., part 8, p. 3560, Saord testimony. 8 Ibid., part 14, p. 1413. December 6, Part 1 255 Message. 9 By 2:00 it had been decoded, translated, and typed up in nished form by the SIS men. 10 Presumably the Japanese code clerks in their embassy were decoding and typing this same mes- sage at the same time as were our Army decoders. Tis Pilot Message stated that the Japanese government had deliberated deeply with respect to the U.S. note and had drawn up a long 14-part memorandum that would be sent to the ambassadors separately. Te reply would be transmitted in English, so it would only have to be decoded before it could be submitted to Hull. Te situation was extremely delicate, Tokyo warned. When the ambassadors received the long memorandum, they should keep it secret for the time being. Tey would be wired special instructions separately concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States. 11
About 2:00 Saturday afternoon, as soon as the Pilot Message was ready, SIS sent it to the Military Intelligence Division of the War Departments general sta. From Military Intelligence it was distributed at about 3:00, either by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, then chief of Military Divisions Far Eastern Section, or by one of his assistants, to the Armys list of recipientsHull, Stimson, Marshall, and Chief of War Plans Division Leonard T. Gerow (G-2). 12
Te Navy courier, responsible for delivering Japanese inter- cepts to the White House and the others on the Navys list, was Lieutenant Commander A.D. Kramer. Te White House was usually rst on Kramers list and apparently Admiral Beardall, naval aide to the president at the White House, received the 9 Ibid., part 12, pp. 23839. 10 Ibid., part 9, p. 4510, testimony of Colonel Rufus Bratton before the Joint Committee. 11 Ibid., part 12, pp. 23839. 12 Ibid., part 9, pp. 450810, 451213, 4536, 4574, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 256 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Pilot Message at about 4:00 in the afternoon, shortly before leaving his o ce for the evening. 13 Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, was planning a party that Saturday evening for some of his fellow sta o cers and he said he received the message in his o ce at about 6:00 p.m., just before he left for home. 14
After reading the Pilot Message, the top o cers in the administration, Army, and Navy anxiously awaited the 14-part Japanese reply. Watching for the long Japanese memorandum was given top priority. Since FDRs naval aide Beardall had plans for the evening, he arranged for a communication watch o cer, Lieutenant Schulz, to stand by at the White House to deliver to the president any message that might come in during the evening. 15
Te rst part of Japans 14-part English-language message, heralded by the Pilot Message, began to come into Washington during the afternoon of December 6. And then the decoding began. U.S. Overflights Sight Japanese Convoys in South China Sea Heading Toward Malaya Te steady stream of Japanese messages we were intercepting gave us substantial insight into the deliberations of the Japanese government. However, these intercepts were not our only source of information about their activities. Planes from Manila conducted reconnaissance ights on a regular basis over the South China Sea and reported on Japanese movements at sea. A December 6 cable from Admiral Hart, commander-in-chief of the Asiatic 13 Ibid., part 10, p. 4668, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee; ibid., part 11, p. 5271, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee. 14 Ibid., part 4, pp. 1761, 1874, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee. 15 Ibid., part 11, pp. 527781, Beardall testimony. December 6, Part 1 257 Fleet in the Philippines was received in the Navy Department in Washington at about 8:00 a.m. that same morning. It reported that two Japanese convoys consisting of 35 ships escorted by eight cruisers and 20 destroyers had been sighted south of Indochina heading toward Malaya. 16 Tese convoys were dangerously close to the line drawn by the ADB powers (American/Dutch/British) and designated in their secret April 1941 Singapore meeting as the limit beyond which the Japanese could not advance with- out inviting active military counter-action. 17 Both convoys were south of the southern tip of French Indochina, so they had already crossed latitude 10 North. Since they were heading west toward the Isthmus of Kra, and had arrived at longitudes 106.20 East and 105 East, they were expected soon to pass the critical north- south line, 100 East. Harts message also reported 30 ships and one large cruiser sighted by his scouting force anchored in Camranh Bay o the southeast coast of Indochina, a couple of hundred miles north of Saigon (since renamed Ho Chi Minh City). Shortly after Harts cable reached the Navy Department, the State Department received a message from U.S. Ambassador John G. Winant in London conrming that these convoys were converging on waters the ADB powers considered inviolable. 18 It was not clear, however, just where they were headed. Te British undersecretary of foreign aairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, was uncertain as to whether destination of parties is Kra [Malaya] or Bangkok [Tailand]. 19 But there could be no doubt that Japanese ships and troops were moving into position for some operation in the vicinity of the Malaysian Peninsula and/or the Dutch East 16 Ibid., part 17, p. 2485. 17 Ibid., part 15, p. 1564, ADB (April 1941) Conversations. 18 Ibid., part 14, p. 1246. See also ibid., part 2, p. 493. 19 Ibid., part 14, p. 1247. See also ibid., part 2, p. 494. 258 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Indies. Te Dutch were much alarmed at the proximity of such large concentrations of Japanese troops. On December 5, U.S. Military Attach Merle-Smith in Australia had sent information about these convoys to General MacArthur in the Philippines and to General Short in Hawaii. Te fact that Japanese troops were on the move in the southwest Pacic was taken as conrmation in Hawaii of the word they had received from Washington: that the immediate threat of a Japanese strike was to southeast Asia. 20
Intercepted Messages from Italy, Japanese Embassy (Washington), Tokyo, Indicate War is Imminent In Europe the three Axis PowersGermany, Italy, and Japanwere following the diplomatic events unfolding in Washington. We learned on December 6, that Premier Benito Mussolini had told the Japanese ambassador to Italy that he had been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U.S. talks. Mussolini charged the United States with utter bull-headedness and FDR with being of a meddlesome nature. Mussolini told the ambassador that he was in complete sympathy with Japans desire to create a New Order in East Asia. Te ambassador then asked, [S]hould Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain . . . would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: Of course. 21
A December 5 message addressed to the Japanese ambassa- dors in Washington from Tokyo, also decoded and translated in Washington on December 6, provided one more clue to Japans intentions. Tis cable was short: Will you please have Terasaki, 20 Ibid., part 34, pp. 5961, Lieutenant Robert H. ODell testimony before Clarke Inquiry, October 6, 1944. 21 Ibid., part 12, pp. 22829. December 6, Part 1 259 Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days. 22 When delivered to the Navy recipients of MAGIC, a penciled footnote identied Terasaki, second secre- tary in the Japanese embassy, as head of Japanese espionage in Western Hemisphere. He and his assistants, the note read, are being sent to South America. 23
Also on December 6, we translated two other Purple mes- sages dealing with the destruction of codes at the Japanese embassy in Washington. One message from the embassy in Washington advised Tokyo that the codes had been destroyed but requested permission, since the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are still con- tinuing[,] to delay the destruction of the one code machine. 24
Te wire from Tokyo explained that the embassy was to burn one set of code machines but for the time being to continue the use of the other. 25
Tat same afternoon we intercepted and decrypted another short Japanese message from Tokyo reminding the embassy in Washington of the importance of preserving secrecy with respect to the aide memoire, the 14-part reply to our note of November 26. [B]e absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person in its preparation. 26
Still another signicant Japanese intercept from Honolulu to Tokyo was read that day. Tis message, transmitted in a code not yet decrypted, had been picked up in San Francisco on November 18 and airmailed to the SIS in Washington on or about November 21. It could be decoded and translated only after the cipher was solved on or about December 3, but it was available to our people 22 Ibid., p. 234. 23 Ibid., part 9, p. 4201. Note added by courier Kramer for the benet of Navy recipients, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. 24 Ibid., part 12, pp. 236. 25 Ibid., p. 237. 26 Ibid., part 12, p. 245. 260 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy in Washington on December 6. 27 Tis intercept reported move- ments of U.S. naval ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. No hint of its contents, or of its existence, was relayed to the commanders there. Japanese Offices Worldwide Acknowledge Code-Destruct Order Japanese diplomatic o ces all around the world seemed to be preparing for an emergency. On December 3 we had translated a Tokyo message to the Japanese embassy in Washington ordering them to destroy all but one code machine and to burn all codes but the one used with the surviving machine. When this had been done the embassy was to cable one word to Tokyo: haruna. 28 On delivering this intercept to FDR, his naval aide Beardall called it to FDRs attention. Te president read it and asked, Well, when do you think it will happen? In other words, when did he expect war to break out? Beardall replied, Most any time. 29 On receipt of this intercept, a young o cer, at Colonel Brattons request, went by the Japanese embassy in Washington during the night. He saw o cials of the Japanese embassy actually burning their code book and ciphers. On December 6, the O ce of Naval Intelligence learned about this and reported to military intelligence that the embassy had complied with the Tokyo order to destroy its codes. 30
Also on December 3, SIS began picking the word haruna in messages being transmitted by the Japanese consuls in New York, New Orleans, and Havana. Its signicance may not have been 27 Ibid., part 5, p. 2082. 28 Ibid., part 12, p. 215. Tokyo to Washington #867. 29 Ibid., part 11, p. 5284, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee. 30 Ibid., part 8, p. 3780, memorandum on the stationery of the War Depart- ment General Sta, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington, dated December 6, 1941. December 6, Part 1 261 fully appreciated at the time, for the cable directing the Japanese embassy in Washington to cable haruna to Tokyo after destroy- ing their codes and code machines had only been intercepted, decoded, and translated that very day. Te next day we inter- cepted transmissions of haruna from Portland and Panama. On December 5 the Japanese consuls in Hollywood, Seattle, and Vancouver (Canada) also cabled Tokyo haruna. Ottawa did the same the following day. 31 Security of U.S. Communications in Pacific in Jeopardy In compliance with U.S. Pacic Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. Five, Admiral Kimmel had sent reinforcements to the mid-Pacic islands under his commandWake (1,994 miles west of Pearl Harbor) 32 and Guam (located 1,334 miles farther out in the midst of the Japanese mandated islands, 3,340 miles west of Pearl Harbor). 33
In Washington, toward the end of the o ce day on December 5, one of the women employed in the Registered Publication Section realized that the forces which had gone to Wake had taken with them a lot of registered publications. Captain Saord, who was in charge of the security section of the Navys Communications Division, had warned Guam the day before to destroy all secret and classied publications and other classied matter. Saord now became concerned about Wake; he asked the persons in the Registered Publication Section to make a complete inventory of the sensitive materials there. One or two o cers and a couple of civilians in the Section worked on the assignment until about 1 oclock in the morning. [T]he next morning they gave [Saord] 31 Ibid., part 5, p. 2077. 32 Ibid., part 12, p. 339, table of distances. 33 Distances as cited in the Encylopaedia Britannica (1955), Guam entry, vol. 10, p. 929. 262 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy an inventory of 150 dierent registered publications on that lit- tle island where, you see, they had almost nothing in the way of defense. And at that time, in Saords view, war was right around the corner. 34
As communications o cer, Saord was responsible for safe- guarding the security of our lines of communications. Intelligence was not within his purview; he could not convey to the eld his judgment that war was right around the corner. However, the safety of the registered publications on Wake, under the jurisdic- tion of the Pacic Fleet, was one of his responsibilities. Terefore, Saord drafted a message for the eets commander-in-chief, Kimmel, and for the information of the senior o cers on Wake. In view of imminence of war, it read, they were to destroy all registered publications except this system and current editions of aircraft code and direction nder code. 35 Before such a message could go out, it had to be approved by Saords superior, Admiral Noyes, director of Naval Communications. So Saord took his draft to Noyes. Noyes: What do you mean by using such language as that? Saord: Admiral, the war is just a matter of days, if not of hours. Noyes: You may think there is going to be a war, but I think they are blu ng. Saord: Well, Admiral, if all these publications on Wake are captured we will never be able to explain it. Noyes then rewrote the message and left out any reference to Wake Island or the 150 publications exposed to capture, which 34 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, pp. 239899, Saord testi- mony at APHB. 35 Ibid. December 6, Part 1 263 included all our reserve publications for the next six months. Te message as it was actually released, addressed to Kimmel under date of December 6, for transmission to Wake, read as follows: In view of the international situation and the exposed position of the outlying Pacic islands you may authorize the destruc- tion by them of secret and condential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Tis ambiguous message was released by Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Ingersoll and sent to Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, who still had to relay it to Wake. Moreover, it was sent deferred precedence, which meant delivery by 9:00 on Monday morning, December 8, 1941. 36
British and Dutch on the QUI VIVE in Southeast Pacific By November 29, Singapore had begun to go on the alert. [A]ll troops away from barracks . . . had been ordered back. British Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham had ordered the second degree of readiness, and the Volunteers were being mobilized. Soon troops were recalled from leave and other precautions were taken, including the rounding up of Japanese civilians. 37
All Singapore was on the qui vive. More ships than usual were on the move. Troops were being recalled to duty. Our naval observer in Singapore, Captain John M. Creighton, was busy shuttling back and forth between his two o ces, 18 miles apart. He wanted to be physically acquainted with the dockyard so that if contingents of our eet came there [he] could guide them to 36 Ibid. For text of message #061743, see Joint Committee, part 14, p. 1408. 37 Lionel Wigmore, Te Japanese Trust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), pp. 12122. 264 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy all the shops and arrange for them to get repairs on guns, bat- teries, or anything else. He was also busy routing American mer- chant ships in that area. And he frequently had to arrange special passes for the many American visitors arriving at the airports with dispatches, money, and sometimes pistols, which were not always allowed into the country. 38
A report reached Singapore during the night of December 4 or 5 that a pilot of a British reconnaissance airplane, ying from a certain point northeast of Malaya on a regular patrol up toward Siam . . . in the late afternoon . . . had encountered a large [ Japanese] convoy of what looked to him like transports, sev- eral old battleships, an aircraft carrier, and attendant destroyers. Tey were already south and west of Indochina and were headed west and almost south of the south point of Siam. . . . [W]hen he went closer in his plane to observe them . . . Japanese ghter planes came up o the deck of the carrier and went straight at him, making it perfectly evident that they would keep him from approaching the convoy. It was presumed that after nightfall they would [either] continue west to the Kra Peninsula, north of Malaya, or shift northwest toward Bangkok, toward which many threats had been made recently. 39
Two big British ships, Repulse, a battle cruiser, and Prince of Wales, a battleship that was undergoing repairs so as to be ready for sea duty once more, had been sent out to Singapore. Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, recently appointed commander-in- chief of the Eastern Fleet, had arrived there ahead of the ships and had own on December 4 to Manila for a conference with Admiral Hart. Teir talks ended abruptly with the news of the large Japanese convoy on its way from Camranh Bay towards the Gulf of Siam. As Philllips was leaving for Singapore . . . Hart 38 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, p. 5081, Creighton testi- mony before the Joint Committee. 39 Ibid., p. 508384. December 6, Part 1 265 told him that he had just ordered four of his destroyers, then at Balikpapan (Borneo), to join Phillipss force. 40 Phillips arrived back in Singapore on the morning of December 7 (December 6, Washington time). Te entire region was on the alert. [B]ecause of the movement of Japanese task forces southward and possibly into the China Sea, a conference was called in Australia early in December by Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Burnett, chief of sta, of the Royal Australian Air Force. In attendance were representatives of the British, Dutch, and American governmentsColonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U.S. military attach at the legation in Melbourne; Commander Salm, the Dutch Indies naval liaison o cer to the Australian government; Lieutenant Robert H. ODell, then assis- tant military attach in Australia; and Air Commodore Hewitt, the Royal Australian Air Force intelligence o cer, who came and went during the conference. 41
[U]pon learning of Japanese naval movements out of Palau, one of the Caroline Islands less than 600 miles north of the Dutch East Indies, the Netherlands Far East Command had ordered on December 6 the execution of mobilization Plan A-2. 42 War Plan A-2 was a mutual agreement among Britain, Holland (the Indies), America and Australia in line with the ADB conversa- tions at Singapore in the spring of 1941. 43
Te Australians had oered to furnish some aircraft to the Dutch. But then planes reached Koepang on the island of Dutch Timor and the Netherlands command did not consider Australian 40 Wigmore, Te Japanese Trust, p. 122. 41 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2300, testimony before APHB of ODell. 42 Ibid., part 30, p. 3223 (APHB Exhibit No. 70, Exhibit A, Summary of Far Eastern Documents paragraph FE 366). See also ibid., part 9, p. 4565, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 43 Ibid., part 29, p. 2303, ODell testimony before the APHB. 266 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy air assistance necessary. However, the Australian Air Corps chief decided to go ahead just the same and furnish the Dutch with aircraft as planned. 44
With respect to Tailand, or Siam, the situation was compli- cated. Te Tai prime minister, who expected an attack within the next few daysasked on December 5 for an immediate dec- laration from the British that they should go to war with Japan if the latter attacked Tailand. . . . Churchill proposed to send the Tai Prime Minister a message telling the Tais to defend them- selves, if attacked, and promising to come to their aid. 45
Sometime during the day, December 6, Britains ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, got in touch with Roosevelt to tell him of Churchills intentions to contact the Tais. Te presi- dent agreed with the [Churchill] proposal (subject to a change in wording) and said that he [FDR] intended to send a similar message. Mr. Churchill accepted the presidents formula and sent his [Churchills] message on the night of December 67. 46
Admiral Hart (Manila) Learns of U.S. Commitment of Armed Support to British and Dutch in S.E. Asia In Singapore, Captain Creighton learned that the United States was committed to lend armed support to the British or Dutch in the event that the Japanese attacked in that part of the world. He so wired Hart at 10:26 a.m. on December 6. Creighton reported to Hart that Brooke-Popham, commander of the Royal Air Force in Malaya and of the British Army Forces, had been advised on Saturday by the War Department in London that they 44 Ibid., p. 2301. 45 Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1962), p. 188n. 46 Ibid. December 6, Part 1 267 had now received assurance of American armed support in three eventualities: (1) if the British were obliged to forestall a Japanese landing on the Isthmus of Kra (Malayan Peninsula), or on any other part of Siam, (2) if the Dutch Indies were attacked and the British went to their defense, or (3) if the Japanese attacked the British. Moreover, Brooke-Popham could put plan in action [without reference to London] if you [Brooke-Popham] have good info Jap expedition advancing with apparent intention of landing in Kra second if the Nips violate any part of Tailand. Also if the Netherlands East Indies were attacked he should put into operation the British-Dutch plans agreed upon. 47
Hart was dumbfounded at the news that the British had been assured of American armed support. He had just agreed to send four of his destroyers to join Phillipss force. However, this news from Singapore was apparently Harts rst intimation that the United States had a denite commitment to support the British or Dutch militarily if the Japanese should attack either of them at Tailand, the Isthmus of Kra, or the Netherlands East Indies. Any such commitment would necessarily involve the Asiatic Fleet under his command. Hart wired Washington for instructions. 48
47 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 508283; Creighton testimony before the Joint Committee, quoting War Department London telegram, relayed from Singapore to Manila December 7, Manila time. 48 Ibid., part 14, p. 1412, Exhibit No. 40. 13. December 6, Part 2 First Parts of Japans Reply to U.S. Note of November U .S. o cials assumed the Japanese government had not been blu ng when it wired its ambassadors in Washington set- ting a deadline after which things [were] automatically going to happen if they could not reach agreement in their nego- tiations with the United States by November 29. Tus special arrangements had been made to assure that our top o cials in Washington would receive promptly whatever reply the Japanese might make to our November 26 note, the so-called ultimatum. Te director of Naval Intelligence was to be notied immedi- ately; a special weekend phone line connected Naval Intelligence and the State Department, and a special deputy communication watch o cer was assigned duty at the White House on the eve- ning of December 6. Te Pilot Message, advising the Japanese ambassadors in Washington to expect their governments reply to the U.S. note shortly, had been intercepted, decoded, translated, and delivered 269 270 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Saturday afternoon, December 6. 1 After Commander Kramer delivered it to the Navy personnel on his listby then it was mid-afternoonhe stopped by the Navy Department to make a nal check with the Teletype Watch to see whether there was anything apparently hot coming in. . . . In view of other devel- opments that we [the United States] had seen taking place in the diplomatic tra c and otherwise it was apparent things were shaping up to some sort of a crisis. 2
Japans 14-part English-language reply to the U.S. ultimatum began to come in at Bainbridge intercept station on the west coast very early Saturday morning, December 6. Te rst part reached there at 5:03 a.m. (8:03 a.m. Washington, D.C. time). From then until 8:52 a.m. (11:52 a.m. Washington, D.C. time), when the 13th part came in, Bainbridge was busy intercepting and relaying the messages, by teletype, still in code, to Washington, D.C. 3 Te rst 13 parts had all been received in Washington, D.C., by 2:51 p.m. on December 6. Part 14 did not come in until more than 12 hours later. In 1941, before the attack on Pearl Harbor, most government o ces closed down at noon on Saturdays. Te War Department [cryptographic] unit at that time was observing normal o ce hours and secured from work at noon on Saturday, December 6, 1941, with the intention of doing no work until 8:00 on Monday, December 8, 1941. 4 Terefore, just past noon, after decoding the Pilot Message, the Army closed up shop for the weekend. 1 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 12, pp. 23839, Tokyo Purple message #901. 2 Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13, 1944. 3 Ibid., part 14, pp. 141315, exhibit No. 41. 4 Ibid., part 36, p. 66, Saord testimony at Hewitt Inquiry, May 21, 1945. December 6, Part 2 271 Te Navy Department was operating on a dierent schedule. To keep in touch with developments, Admiral Wilkinson, chief of the O ce of Naval Intelligence, had set up a 24-hour watch in the Far Eastern Section alone. [W]hen it appeared that the Japanese advance in the China Sea was becoming more and more critical, he had established a watch of the senior o cers of the Department, the heads of the branches, and the Assistant Director so that responsible o cers were on duty in rotation to cover the 24 hours each day. Admiral Beardall, himself, the Presidents naval aide, was on call. So was Captain Kramer. 5
Terefore the Navy decoders and translators were on duty that Saturday afternoon, even though this work was an Army respon- sibility on even-numbered dates. When Kramer stopped in at the department at 3:00 on the 6th, the message was coming in . . . [which] turned out to be a part of the [14-part Japanese] reply. Te Japanese govern- ment was transmitting it in English so that their ambassadors in Washington would not have to translate it before submitting it to Secretary of State Hull. Tis made the task of the Navy cryp- tographers somewhat easier. But the message was in Purple; it still had to be decoded. Kramer waited and held [his] team of translators. 6
Te Navy cryptographers turned to 7 and began decod- ing and translating. However, they were soon swamped by the heavy work load. At about 3:00 p.m., they sent an urgent call to the Army for help and got some of the Army people back and they assisted the Navy throughout the night of December 6th in 5 Ibid., part 4, p. 1761, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee, December 17, 1946. 6 Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI. 7 Ibid. 272 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy translating [sic] the very long and very important fourteen-part message. 8
[B]y 9:00 p.m. Saturday, the evening of the 6th of December, [we] had received, broken down, translated [sic], and had typed ready for delivery thirteen of those parts, several of them some- what garbled. 9
FDR Tells Australian Minister He Plans to Address Hirohito Late in the afternoon of December 6, Australias minister to the United States, Richard G. Casey, spoke with FDR. Roosevelt conded to Casey that he was planning to send a special message to Hirohito. If no answer was forthcoming by Monday evening, December 8, he intended to issue Japan another warning the fol- lowing afternoon or evening, asking that it be followed by warn- ings from the British and others. 10
Stimson Requests Inventory of U.S. Ships Around the World While the cryptographers were busy decoding the 14-part Japanese message, War Department people, at Stimsons request, were trying to determine the location of U.S. ships around the world. At about 8:00 p.m. December 6, Major George L. Harrison, an aide to Stimson, phoned the o ce of the Chief of Naval Operations asking for the following information by 9:00 a.m. the next morning: 8 Ibid., part 36, p. 66, Saord testimony at Hewitt Inquiry, May 21, 1945. 9 Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI. 10 Ibid., part 11, pp. 516667. December 6, Part 2 273 Compilation of men-of-war in Far East, British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men- of-war in Pacic Fleet, with locations, and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations. Admirals Ingersoll, Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him [Stimson] prior to 1000 Sunday, 7 Dec. 11
First Parts of Japanese Reply Delivered to FDR Between October 1 and December 7, 1941, Kramer, attached to the O ce of Naval Intelligence in Washington, was on loan to OP-20-G, O ce of Naval Communications. He was a Japanese language student and headed the translation section of the com- munications security group, then made up of a sta of three civilian translators. Kramer reviewed their translations and did an occasional translation himself. He was also responsible for seeing that the decoded and translated intercepts were delivered to the authorized Navy personnel. As the volume of intercepts increased in the weeks before December 7, Kramer necessarily assumed more responsibility for organizing the intercepts with background material and assembling them for delivery. 12
Before Beardall left for home at about 5:30 p.m. that Saturday afternoon, he turned over his post to the special deputy commu- nication watch o cer, Lieutenant Lester Robert Schulz, on tem- porary assignment with the O ce of Naval Communications. He told Schulz to remain there that night to receive [a] special 11 Ibid., part 19, pp. 353637. See also memorandum read into the record, Joint Committee, part 11, pp. 524754. 12 Ibid., part 33, pp. 84852, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13, 1944. 274 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy message for the president. Schulz was to take it to Roosevelt immediately. 13
When the rst 13 parts of the 14-part answer were in clear form, typed up, and ready for distribution, Kramer proceeded at once to the White House, left a folder [with Beardalls aide, Schulz] with that 13-part message and one or two others with rather emphatic instructions to get to the president as quickly as possible. Schulz immediately left with the locked pouch for the presidents study. Te president was entertaining at the moment, 14
but when he learned the courier had arrived he left his guests for his White House study. Schulz opened the pouch and personally handed the president the papers, perhaps 15 typewritten pages clipped together, which included the rst 13 parts of Japans 14-part reply to our November 26 note. Schulz waitedperhaps 10 minuteswhile [t]he president read the papers. Ten he [FDR] handed them to [his friend and close associate] Mr. [Harry] Hopkins, who read them and returned them to the president. 15
Te president then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance . . . Tis means war. Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps 5 minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment. Te Japanese had already landed in Indochina. Indochina was the only geographical location they mentioned. FDR and Hopkins speculated as to where the Japanese would move next. 13 Ibid., part 10, pp. 4661, 4668, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee. 14 Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13, 1944. 15 Ibid., part 10, pp. 465971. Schulz testimony before Joint Committee. December 6, Part 2 275 Neither mentioned Pearl Harbor. Nor did they give any indica- tion that tomorrow was necessarily the day. And [t]here was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert. 16
[S]ince war was imminent, Hopkins ventured, . . . since war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was too bad that we could not strike the rst blow and prevent any sort of surprise. Te president nodded. No, we cant do that. We are a democ- racy and a peaceful people. Ten he raised his voice: But we have a good record. FDR implied we would have to stand on that record, that we could not make the rst overt move. We would have to wait until it came. 17
Roosevelt went on to tell Hopkins that he had prepared a message for Hirohito, the Japanese emperor, concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in eect requesting their withdrawal. 18 FDR had not followed the usual procedure in sending this cable, he said. Rather than addressing it to Tojo as prime minister, FDR made a point of the fact that he had sent it to the Emperor as Chief of State. Te president must have been thinking also about how he would describe the situation in the speech that had been prepared in the State Department for him to present to Congress if he did not receive a satisfactory reply from Hirohito. FDR tried, unsuccessfully, to phone Chief of Naval Operations Stark. When told Stark was at the theater, Roosevelt said he could reach Stark later and hung up. FDR then returned the papers to Schulz, who left. 19
16 Ibid. Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee. 17 Ibid., part 10, pp. 465971, especially pp. 466263, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee. 18 Ibid., p. 4663. Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee. 19 Ibid., pp. 466364, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee. 276 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy First Parts of Japans Long-Awaited Reply Delivered to Navy and Army After leaving the locked pouch with Schulz at the White House a little after 9:00 p.m., Kramer delivered the papers to Navy Secretary Knox 20 at his Wardman Park apartment. After some discussion, Knox told Kramer there would be a meeting at the State Department at 10:00 the following morning, Sunday. Knox wanted Kramer there with that material and anything else that had come in. Kramer then drove to Admiral Wilkinsons home in Arlington, Virginia, where Admiral Beardall and General Miles were having dinner. Beardall and Miles saw the papers then at Wilkinsons dinner party. 21 Wilkinson asked Kramer to have that material plus anything new at the Navy Department the next morning. At about 11:30 p.m., Admiral Turner was rousted out of bed at his home to receive the 13-part message. 22 A courier with the message called at Admiral Ingersolls home at about midnight. 23
After making his deliveries, Kramer checked in at the Navy Departmentabout 12:30 a.m.to see if anything of impor- tance had come in from Tokyo or Berlin. As nothing had, he went home. In any event, he was on tap any hour of the day and night by GY Watch O cers. 24
Meanwhile, the Army courier, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, dis- tributed the locked pouch with the intercepts to Chief of Sta Marshalls secretary, Colonel Bedell Smith, 25 announcing that 20 Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI. Also ibid., part 9, p. 4514, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 21 Ibid., p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI. 22 Ibid., part 4, p. 1970, Turner testimony before the Joint Committee. 23 Ibid., part 33, p. 809, Ingersoll testimony before the NCI. 24 Ibid., p. 858, Kramer testimony before the NCI. 25 Ibid., part 29, pp. 2421, 2423, Bratton testimony before the APHB. December 6, Part 2 277 it was an important document. . . . And that the Chief of Sta should know about it. Also to General Gerows executive o - cer, Colonel Gailey, 26 and to the night duty o cer in the State Department for delivery to Hull. 27
FDR Addresses Emperor Hirohito Directly According to Hull, On December 6, our Government received from a number of sources reports of the movement of a Japanese eet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers, and 20 destroyers from Indochina toward the Kra Peninsula. . . . Te critical character of this development, which placed the United States and its friends in common imminent danger, was very much in all our minds, and was an important subject of my conference with representa- tives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day. 28
Sometime during the day, December 6, Hull drafted and forwarded to the White House a message for FDR to send the Japanese emperor. 29 Roosevelt had written a draft of his own and preferred it. 30 After a few editorial changes by the State Department, to which FDR agreed, he sent the revised version to Hull with his handwritten OK. 31
In his note to the emperor the president said that recent developments in the Pacic area contain tragic possibilities. 32
Te president desired peace, he wrote, but 26 Ibid., p. 2421. 27 Ibid., part 9, p. 4514, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 28 Ibid., part 2, p. 441, Hulls 1945 deposition to the Joint Committee. 29 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 2: Te Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1956), vol. 4, pp. 72223. 30 Ibid., pp. 72325. 31 Ibid., p. 762n. Transmitted in Telegram No. 818, December 6, 9 p.m. 32 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 78486. 278 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a rea- sonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continu- ing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its char- acter. . . . It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable. In his message, the president sought to assure Japan that Tere is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom. He continued: I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Tailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Tus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo- China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacic area. 33
Roosevelt did not address Japans economic problems, which had been aggravated by the U.S. embargoes barring her from world markets. Nor did FDR refer to the decades-long Russian- inspired conict in Manchuria and China, the source of Japans di culties on the Asian mainland. And he oered no assurance that he could, or would try to, keep the Chinese from stirring up still more trouble. (By this time, the American taxpayers were actually furnishing aid to the communist troublemakers in China and the communist forces ghting against Germany in Europe.) Te message for Emperor Hirohito was transmitted in our noncondential code at that time, the gray code, which was 33 Ibid. December 6, Part 2 279 perfectly open to anybody. 34 It left Washington at 9:00 in the evening of December 6. Our ambassador in Japan, Joseph C. Grew, was instructed to communicate the presidents message to the Japanese Emperor in such manner as deemed most appropri- ate by the Ambassador and at the earliest possible moment. 35 A copy went also to Chiang Kai-Shek in China. 36 Roosevelt announced to the press and the world that he had sent a message of peace to the Emperor. 37 However, the text of his message was not released at the time. Saturday Night, December -, at the White House A meeting of FDRs inner circle was held late Saturday night, a meeting which must have lasted from about midnight into the wee, small hours of December 7. With the president on this occasion were Stark, Marshall, Knox, Stimson, and Hopkins. Tese ve men spent most of the night . . . at the White House with FDR, all waiting for what they knew was coming after those intercepts. 38 As far as we know, no record was made of their conversation. In view of the intelligence they had been receiving of a massive buildup of Japanese forces in the southwest Pacic, apparently headed for Tailand, Malaya, or British or Dutch territory, we can only imagine what they discussed. Te six men in the White 34 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 2, p. 692, Grew testimony before the Joint Committee. 35 Department of State, Japan: 19311941, p. 784n. See also Department of State, Far East: 1941, p. 726n. 36 Department of State, Te Far East, p. 727. 37 Department of State, Japan: 19311941, p. 784n. See also Department of State, Te Far East, p. 726n. 38 Letter from James G. Stahlman to Admiral Kemp Tolley, USN (Ret.), November 26, 1973. Copy in authors les. 280 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy House that night must surely have speculated on how to respond if the Japanese attacked the Isthmus of Kra in Malaya, Tailand, the Dutch East Indies, or British Singapore. What action should the United States then take? What should FDR say to Congress? Should we go to the aid of the British and Dutch militarily, as FDR had promised British Ambassador Halifax? If we did, how would FDR and his associates justify to the American people this military intervention so far from the shores of continental United States? On the other hand, if the U.S. did not give the British and Dutch the armed support they had been promised, how would the administration explain to them, and to the world, the failure of our president to honor an agreement he had made? With the crisis developing in southeast Asia, it looked as if the United States was losing the opportunity to take the initiative as Stimson had suggested a week earliernamely to maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of ring the rst shot with- out allowing too much danger to ourselves. Of course, it was still possible that the three small vessels outtted, as FDR had directed, as minimal U.S. men-of-war might get to sea before a Japanese strike. If they did sail in time and arrive at the paths of the Japanese convoys, they could still provoke an incident with- out too much danger to ourselves. But events were crowding in around us thick and fast. 281 14. The Morning of the Fateful Day NEW YORK TIMES December , Reports: Navy Secretary Knox Says: U.S. Navy Superior to Any W hile the authorities in Washington had been deeply con- cerned for months behind the scenes with the signicance of the Japanese intercepts being decoded daily by U.S. Army and Navy cryptographers, they were also sensitive to public opinion. Especially so, since the leak on December 4 of the gov- ernments secret war plans. On December 6, Secretary of Navy Knox released the July 1, 1940, to June 10, 1941, annual report of the Navy Department, which included a statement on the current state of the Navy and its enlargement on a basis indicated by operations in the last scal year. Te New York Times headlined its page one announcement of this Navy report on Sunday, December 7, 1941: NAVY IS SUPERIOR TO ANY, SAYS KNOX. According to the news report, 282 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Te United States Navy, now in the midst of a record expan- sion program and recently placed on a war footing with full personnel manning the ships of three eets, has at this time no superior in the world. . . . On any comparable basis, the United States Navy is second to none. Knox was proud to report that the American people may feel fully condent in their Navy. In view of the uncertain interna- tional situation, Our aim must always be to have forces su cient to enable us to have complete freedom of action in either ocean while retain- ing forces in the other ocean for eective defense of our vital security. Anything less than this strength is hazardous to the security of the nation and must be considered as unacceptable as long as it is within our power to produce and man the forces necessary to meet these requirements. In substance, the departments report announced that the U.S. Navy was second to none and that it was capable of operating in both the Atlantic and Pacic. Moreover, it was being further strengthened and expanded. Tus the public was assured on the morning of December 7, 1941, that the U.S. Navy constituted an eective and reliable arm of our national defense. Part of Japans Reply to U.S. Note Te 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our November 26 note, received in Washington late on Saturday, December 6, were a fairly sober review of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations to date and the various points of agreement and disagreementnotably, the economic restrictions imposed on Japan, the embargo, the freez- ing of assets, the fact that the United States was assisting China, and the United Statess determined insistence (a) that Japan withdraw from China and (b) that she refuse to honor her mutual The Morning of the Fateful Day 283 assistance pact with Germany and Italy. Part 9 of Japans reply was more inammatory; it asserted that the United States may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war . . . aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack . . . Germany and Italy . . . and exercising . . . pressure [on Japan] by economic power. 1
After seeing these 13 parts, the top administration, Army, and Navy o cials were anxious to learn the content of the 14th part. Part 14 was picked up by Station S at Bainbridge Island on the west coast on Sunday, December 7, at 3:05 a.m. Washington, D.C. time and was in the hands of our decoders, still in code, in Washington, D.C. by about 4:00. 2 Like the earlier 13 parts, it was in English. It was decoded completed and ready for delivery to Commander Kramer at 7 a.m., December 7. 3
In part 14, Japan charged that it was the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japans eorts toward the establishment of peace . . . by keeping Japan and China at war. Terefore, Japans attempt to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacic through cooperation with the American Government has nally been lost. Te Japanese government regretted to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but 1 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 12, pp. 23945, Tokyo to Wash- ington 14-part #902. 2 Ibid., part 14, p. 1415. 3 Ibid., part 33, pp. 80304. 284 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. 4 Tis strong language left little room for doubt as to Japans intentions. According to Wilkinson, these were ghting words. He was more impressed by that language than by the break- ing o of negotiations, which of itself might be only temporary. Tose would be hard words to eat. 5
Another message from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassadors was also intercepted and teletyped from Bainbridge at the same time as part 14. It was received in Washington during the watch that ended at 7:00 a.m. Sunday morning, passed to the Army for translation by the Navy and then received back in the Navy at about 7:15 a.m. Tere it was held for Commander Kramer, the only person authorized to distribute translations to higher authorities. 6 Tis message, in Japanese, specied the precise time1:00 p.m. Washington time, December 7at which the ambassadors were to deliver their governments 14-part reply to the U.S. government. Te ambassadors were to hand the Japanese reply, if possible, directly to the secretary of state. Because of the time specied, this cable came to be known as the One p.m. Message. 7
Admiral Hart (Manila) Inquires About U.S. Commitments in Southeast Pacific Two other important messages also arrived in Washington during the night of December 67 from Admiral Hart in the Philippines. However, as a result of the heavy intercept tra c, they were not decoded immediately and did not become available to our 4 Ibid., part 12, p. 245. 5 Ibid., part 4, p. 1766, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee. 6 Ibid., part 33, pp. 80304. Testimony of Lt. Cmdr. Alfred V. Pering at NCI. 7 Ibid., part 12, p. 248. The Morning of the Fateful Day 285 o cials in Washington until the following morning. One of these messages consisted of ve parts and was signed jointly by Hart and by the British commander-in-chief, Eastern Fleet, Admiral Tom S.V. Phillips. Te other was a frantic plea from Hart for advice from Washington; Hart had just learned of U.S. promises to support the British militarily in the event of a Japanese strike in southeast Asia. Phillips had own from Singapore to Manila to meet Hart and discuss with him the problems with which we are faced in the Far Eastern area. Teir joint cable was dispatched from Manila at 3:27 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), December 7 (10:27 p.m. December 6, Washington time) and received in Washington about 11:00 p.m. on December 6. 8
Hart and Phillips had conferred about preparations for the war with Japan they both anticipated. Tey assumed that the initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese. Te two com- manders considered it important to coordinate British and U.S. operations, but they agreed that each would retain strategic con- trol of his own forces. Hart expected that his eets operations would be in accordance with plan Rainbow V, the plan prepared as the basis for U.S. oensive operations, the same plan under which Kimmel in Hawaii had been directed to operate. Teir joint message discussed the disposition to be made of British ships in the Far East and recommended that Manila be made available as a base for the British battle eet. As soon as Phillips heard of the Japanese convoy setting out for the Gulf of Siam from Camranh Bay, on the eastern coast of French Indochina, he left Manila to return to Singapore. As he was leaving, Hart told him that four of Harts destroyers then at Borneo would soon be joining Phillipss forces. 9
8 Ibid., part 4, pp. 193335. 9 Lionel Wigmore, Te Japanese Trust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p. 122. 286 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy In spite of Harts willingness to cooperate with the British, he was startled by the news he received just after Phillipss depar- ture from U.S. Naval Observer John M. Creighton in Singapore. Creighton reported that Brooke-Popham, commander of the Royal Air Force in Malaya and of the British Army Forces, had been advised on Saturday by the War Department in London that they had now received assurance of American armed support in three eventualities: (1) if the British were obliged to forestall a Japanese landing on the Isthmus of Kra, or on any other part of Siam, (2) if the Dutch Indies were attacked and the British went to their defense, or (3) if the Japanese attacked the British. Moreover London had advised Brooke-Popham that if he had reliable information that the Japanese were advancing with the apparent intention of landing on Kra or in Siam, he need not consult London to put his operation plan into action. London also advised him that the British-Dutch plan was to be put into operation if the Netherlands East Indies was attacked. 10
If the United States was committed to helping the British militarily in the event of a Japanese attack in southeast Asia, it could not be long before we would be asked to fulll that prom- ise. Te immediacy of a possible call for U.S. armed support led Hart to wire Washington about Creightons report, saying he had received no corresponding instructions. 11 Harts message left Manila three-and-a-half hours after the one sent by Hart and Phillips jointly6:45 a.m. GMT (2:45 p.m., December 7, Manila time, or 1:45 a.m. December 7 in Washington). It reached Washington during the night of December 67 but wasnt decoded immediately. An information copy went to Kimmel 10 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 508283. See Creighton (ALUSNA), Singapore telegram, December 6, 1941, to Admiral Hart in Manila, included in Creighton testimony before Joint Committee hearings. 11 Ibid., part 14, p. 1412. The Morning of the Fateful Day 287 in Hawaii, further reinforcing Kimmels impression that it was southeast Asia that was threatened by Japanese attack. Under our Constitution the only justication for having U.S. military outposts is to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. interests within and around our national borders. Yet Hart was being told by our naval observer in Singapore that the U.S. government had agreed to go to the aidnot of U.S. territory or U.S. citizens but of British military forces should they decide to take action against Japanese soldiers landing in Tailand, the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, or Singapore. President Roosevelt had apparently committed U.S. forces to helping the British thou- sands of miles from any U.S. territory. Tis was news to our top naval commander in the Far East. Part of Japans Reply Delivered to Navy Personnel Tis particular Sunday morning, anticipating he would have to deliver some messages earlier than usual, Navy courier Kramer went in to the Navy Department at about 7:30. 12 According to o cial records, both part 14 of the Japanese reply and the One p.m. Message were available before Kramer reached the depart- ment. 13 However, when Kramer set out on his rst delivery trip of the day, the One p.m. Message, which required translation, was apparently not included in his locked pouch. With the receipt of part 14, the text of the Japanese governments reply to our note of November 26 was complete, so Kramer left on his rounds. Kramers rst delivery that morning at about 8:00 a.m. was to the Navy Department, to Commander McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence. Kramer soon left McCollums o ce, but returned very shortly with a copy of the entire 14-part 12 Ibid., part 33, pp. 85859, Kramer testimony at NCI, September 13, 1944. 13 Ibid., part 33, p. 803, Pering testimony. 288 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy message for McCollums boss, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, who had just arrived. Wilkinson sent for McCollum and for 15 or 20 minutes the two men discussed the Far East situation. Ten they heard that Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, had arrived in the Navy Departmentit was quite unusual for Stark to come in to the o ce that early on a Sunday morning 14 and they went down to talk with him. When Kramer arrived at Starks o ce with the 14 parts together with the other new material, it was about 9:00 Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30. Wilkinson and McCollum were there discussing the situation with Stark. 15
McCollum stepped out of the o ce for a moment and was handed the nal note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese ambassadors. 16
Other Navy o cers of the Division of Operations began to appear in Starks o ceAdmirals Ingersoll, Brainard, Noyes, and Turner, possibly Captain Schuirmann also, as well as a few others. All joined in the discussion. McCollum himself was in and out of Starks o ce at about 0900 or 0930 and on one of his entries into Admiral Starks o ce [he] met General Marshall coming out of the o ce . . . accompanied by his aide, Colonel Bratton. 17
Kramer left to continue on to the State Department, anxious to arrive before 10:00 a.m., when Secretary of Navy Knoxs meeting 14 Ibid., part 8, p. 3905, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See also part 33, p. 869. 15 Ibid., part 36, p. 25. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. 16 Ibid., p. 26. 17 Ibid., p. 27. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. See also this authors interviews of McCollum (May 18, 1945, with Admiral Kimmel and Kimmels attorneys, Charles Rugg and Captain Robert A. Lavender; and May 3, 1961, at the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D.C., with Admirals Samuel Morison, Walter DeLany, John Shafroth, also Dr. Charles Tansill, and Mrs. Wohlstetter present). The Morning of the Fateful Day 289 with Secretaries Hull and Stimson was scheduled to begin. 18 He did not take a car to cover the eight to ten blocks but walked almost on the double . . . at least trotted part of the way. Kramer arrived in time almost exactly 10 minutes to 10. 19 He had a brief discussion with the Army courierhe thought it was Bratton and Mr. Hulls private secretary. 20
Kramer returned to the Navy Department and then went to the White House with part 14. Roosevelts aide Beardall imme- diately took the MAGIC pouch to the president, who was still in his bedroom. As FDR read the intercept, he commented, it looks like the Japanese are going to break o negotiations. 21 Beardall returned the pouch to the Navy Department, about 1111:30 a.m. 22 As far as he knew, no other deliveries were made to FDR that morning. 23
Delivery of One p.m. Message to Navy Department After delivering part 14, Kramer returned to the Navy Department to assemble several other intercepts that had been received in the interim. It was about 10:20. Undoubtedly the most important intercept he found there was the separate One p.m. Message advising the Japanese ambassadors in rather emphatic language that delivery [of the 14-part Japanese reply] be made to the Secretary of State at 1300, that is 1:00 p.m. Washington time. Among the other newly received intercepts was one that 18 Ibid., part 9, p. 4043, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. 19 Ibid., part 8, p. 3907. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. 20 Ibid., part 33, p. 868. 21 Ibid., part 11, p. 5283, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee. 22 Ibid., part 11, p. 5287. Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee. 23 Ibid., part 11, p. 5283. Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee. 290 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy directed nal destruction of Japanese codes still on hand. . . . Tere was another message thanking the ambassador for his services, another addressed to the embassy sta, and one or two others of like nature. 24
A fourth intercept was a circular telegram addressed to Japanese diplomatic o ces around the world concerning rela- tions between Japan and England. 25 Tese new messages made it obvious that the Japanese government was giving up all thought of negotiating further with the U.S. government, breaking rela- tions with England, winding down its operations in Washington, and abandoning the embassy sta to their own devices. Because the circular telegram closed with the telltale English word STOP instead of the usual Japanese OWARI, Kramer realized it was an emergency dispatch containing code words. Te Tokyo-Washington Circular #2409, containing the setup for this message and dening the hidden meanings of the code words, had been translated by the Navy on December 2. 26 Presumably it was distributed to the usual recipients of MAGIC, but it was not a subject on which witnesses were questioned during the hearings. Despite the urgency to deliver the One p.m. Message promptly, Kramer thought that delay to get this one [the circular intercept] into that folder was warranted; otherwise delivery probably wouldnt have been made until after noon since the meetings then in progress at the State Department and in CNOs o ce would probably have been adjourned and the recipients not accessible, out to lunch or one thing and another. 27
24 Ibid., part 33, p. 859, Kramer testimony at NCI. For intercepts referred to, see ibid., part 12, pp. 24849. 25 Ibid., part 12, p. 251. 26 Ibid., pp. 18687, part 37, pp. 66566, and part 36, p. 77. 27 Ibid., part 36, pp. 344, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. The Morning of the Fateful Day 291 Terefore, Kramer dictated on [his] feet while the book con- cerning the 1:00 delivery and other late urgent messages was being made up. 28 His translation of the crucial sentence in this cable read: Relations between Japan and England are not in accor- dance with expectation. 29 Kramer delivered this new material, including the One p.m. Message, within ten to fteen minutes to Admiral Starks o ce in the Navy Department building. 30
Starks meeting was still going on, so Kramer sent word in that he had something more of importance. According to McCollum, he held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the signicance at [sic] the [1 p.m. delivery] time, and he it was who pointed out the times at Honolulu as 7:30 and in the Far East as dawn, and so on. 31
McCollum took the One p.m. Message in to Stark. Te sig- nicance of the 1:00 p.m. delivery time was discussed. McCollum pointed out that 1:00 p.m. Washington time would mean about 8:00 in the morning Honolulu time . . . 7:30 . . . very early in the morning out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places . . . we didnt know what this signied, but that if an attack were coming, it looked like . . . it was timed for opera- tions out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii. Tere was no way of knowing just where the Japanese might strike, but, McCollum reasoned, because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the 28 Ibid., part 36, p. 343, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. 29 Ibid., part 36, pp. 8283, 343, Kramer testimony at Hewitt Inquiry. See also part 9, pp. 4071, 4073, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. 30 Ibid., part 33, p. 859, Kramer testimony at NCI. 31 Ibid., part 36, p. 27, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. 292 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which would move at that time. 32
Stark immediately called the White House on the telephone. 33
McCollum thought Stark also phoned Marshall. 34 Tere was considerable coming and going; not everyone was there all the time. 35 Tere is no record of what these top naval o cers talked about in Starks o ce that morning in the light of the crucial intercepts they had just received. In any event, no special notice or advice of impending conict was sent out by CNO Stark to the eld commanders. Delivery of One p.m. Message to State Department Kramer was anxious to get to the State Department before the Hull-Knox-Stimson meeting broke up. 36 When he, Kramer, arrived at Hulls o ce with the One pm. Message, he talked, not with Hull, but with a State Department Foreign Service O cer who regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull. He explained the importance of the material he was delivering and pointed out that the directive for delivery of the Japanese note at 1300 was a time which was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and was a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu [British Malaya]. In talking with the foreign service o cer, Kramer made a point of . . . inviting the attention of Mr. Knox to the times involved. He thought that Mr. Knox, being a civilian, even though Secretary of Navy, might not have seen at rst glance the implications of the times. So he simply pointed out the coincidence of those 32 Ibid., pp. 2526. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., p. 27. 35 Ibid., p. 26. 36 Ibid., part 9, p. 4052. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. The Morning of the Fateful Day 293 times to the Secretary. Te o cer then took the folder into Mr. Knox, together with [Kramers] remarks. 37
Kramer proceeded across the street to the White House for his second delivery that morning. Kramer handed the new intercepts to a senior assistant to Beardall, possibly Lieutenant Commander Leahy. 38
When Kramer returned to the Navy Department this time at about 12:30he discovered that, in his haste to translate the circular message containing code words, so as to be able to deliver it along with the One p.m. Message and the other Japanese inter- cepts, he had failed to note an important code word, minami, meaning United States. Tus the sentence he had translated as Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations was wrong; it should have read, Relations between Japan, and England and the United States are not in accordance with expectations. Kramer made a few phone calls, but it was lunchtime and he found his recipients scattered. No re-transla- tion was made and delivered, as was usual when messages were garbled or misinterpreted. Tat afternoon, after the attack had occurred, Kramer realized it would be pointless to send out a cor- rected translation. 39
Delivery of One p.m. Message to Army Personnel Te Army courier, Colonel Bratton, drove into Washington at about 9:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, December 7, with Colonel John R. Deane. 40 Bratton was in charge of the Far Eastern section 37 Ibid., part 33, pp. 85960, Kramer testimony at NCI. 38 Ibid., part, 33, p. 865, Kramer testimony at NCI. 39 Ibid., part 36, pp. 8283, Kramer testimony at Hewitt Inquiry. Also ibid., part 9, pp. 407173, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See Friedman testimony at Hewitt Inquiry (ibid., part 36, p. 308). 40 John R. Deane interview, January 2, 1964, by the author. 294 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy of Military Intelligence. He went at once to his o ce in G-2. Deane proceeded to his o ce in the Munitions Building, right across the hall from the o ce of Army Chief of Sta Marshall. Because of the furor created nationwide by the Chicago Tribunes publication on December 4 of the secret U.S. war plans, Congress had called on our top military o cials to answer some questions. Marshall was scheduled to testify on December 8, 41 and he had asked Deane to compile a one-page summary statement on the number of planes, antiaircraft guns, etc., in the United States, together with basic information on the war plans. FDR had also asked Marshall to have this information available, all on a single sheet, when he came to the meeting the president had called for 3:00 p.m. Sunday. 42 Tat was why Deane went into his o ce early. 43 Prior to December 7 there was no o cer on duty around the clock in the o ce of the Armys chief of sta, no 24-hour per day duty o cer (D.O.), so his o ce was not o cially open. However, Deane opened his o ce in the Munitions Building. 44
As soon as Bratton reached his o ce in G-2, he received the One p.m. Message from the Navy Department. It was imme- diately apparent to Bratton that this message was of such importance that it ought to be communicated to the Chief of Sta [Marshall], the A.C. of S. [assistant chief of sta military intelligence, Miles], and Chief of WPD [war plans chief, Gerow] with the least practicable delay. 45
41 Ibid. 42 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 19391942 (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 221. 43 Deane interview. 44 Ibid. 45 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at APHB. The Morning of the Fateful Day 295 It was then about 9:00 or shortly before. Bratton was immediately stunned . . . into frenzied activity because of its implications and from that time on [he] was busily engaged trying to locate various o cers of the General Sta and con- ferring with them on the exclusive subject of this message and its meaning. 46
He washed [his] hands of all other matters, turning them over to [his] assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and proceeded to take steps with the 1:00 p.m. delivery message. 47
Bratton could not locate in their o ces any of the gener- als for whom he was looking. He phoned Marshalls quarters at Fort Myer. Marshall had three orderlies, one of whom was always on duty when Marshall was outto answer the telephone, to be there until [Marshall] got back. 48 When Bratton phoned that morning, [o]ne of his orderlies answered the telephone and informed [Bratton] that the General had gone horseback riding. 49
Well, Bratton said, you know generally where he has gone. You know where you can get ahold of him? Yes, I think I can nd him. Please go out at once, Bratton continued, get assistance if necessary, and nd General Marshall, ask him totell him who I am and tell him to go to the nearest tele- phone, that it is vitally important that I communicate with him at the earliest practicable moment. Te orderly said he would do so. 50
46 Ibid., part 9, p. 4517, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 47 Ibid., p. 4524. 48 Ibid., part 3, p. 1430, Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee. 49 Ibid., part 9, p. 4524, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 50 Ibid. 296 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Bratton then called his boss, General Miles. Bratton told him what he had done and also recommended that he [Miles] come down to the o ce at once. One of them telephoned Gerow to summon him to the o ce. 51
Miles arrived at his o ce about 10:00 a.m., and Bratton joined him there. Tey discussed this whole business. Tus General Miles was thoroughly conversant with the entire matter before the two men met with Marshall later that morning. 52
Bratton held on to Marshalls copy of the One p.m. Message, waiting anxiously for the general to call back. Marshall did phone, nally, sometime between ten and eleven. Bratton told Marshall that he had a message of extreme importance which he [Marshall] should see at once. Bratton oered to take it out to his quarters and could be there in ten minutes. But Marshall told him not to do that, to report to him in his o ce, as he was on his way there. 53
Tere were two doors into Marshalls o ce. One opened directly into the hall, the other from the anteroom, the secre- tarys o ce. Te anxious Bratton waited in the anteroom while watching the hall door. Marshall nally arrived through the hall door. 54 According to Bratton, it was 11:25. 55 Bratton immediately reported to him. Miles arrived shortly thereafter. 56
51 Ibid., part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at APHB. 52 Ibid., part 9, p. 4525, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 53 Ibid., part 34, pp. 1920, Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation, September 14, 1944. 54 Ibid., part 9, p. 4517. Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 55 Ibid., part 29, p. 2420, Bratton testimony at APHB. Marshall believed he arrived earlier, more nearly 11; see his testimony before the Joint Committee (ibid., part 3, p. 1431). 56 Ibid., part 34, pp. 19, 2930. Also ibid., part 29, p. 2346. Bratton at Clarke and APHB, testifying both times from notes made by him and General Miles on or about December 8, 1941. The Morning of the Fateful Day 297 One p.m. Message Spurs ActionFinally! When Bratton and Miles walked into Marshalls o ce, Marshall had this 14-part message arranged in a book in front of him and was reading the 14 parts. Since Bratton and Miles were both concerned about the deadline implied in the One P.m. Message, they attempted to interrupt General Marshall to get him to read this One p.m. message. 57 But Marshall continued reading the fairly lengthy 14-part message, re-reading parts of it, and reecting on it, which took a while, even though Marshall said he read much more rapidly than the average man. 58
When Marshall had nally nished, Bratton handed him the short One p.m. Message, which Bratton had been trying to deliver to Marshall since about 9:00 a.m. Only then did Marshall read it. He then asked General Miles and [Bratton] what [they] thought it meant. Both men were convinced it meant Japanese hostile action against some American installation in the Pacic at or shortly after 1:00 that afternoon. At about this time General Gerow and General Bundy came into the room and there was some discussion of the 14 parts, which were then regarded in the light of an ulti- matum, and of the One p.m. delivery message. 59
Marshall asked each of the men in turn, starting with Miles, for an evaluation of the situation. Tey thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Tailand but that it might be into any one or more of a num- ber of other areas. Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and the West Coast be informed immediately that 57 Ibid., part 9, p. 4518, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 58 Ibid., part 33, p. 827, Marshall testimony at NCI. 59 Ibid., part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at APHB. See also ibid., part 34, pp. 1920, Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation. 298 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the Japanese reply would be delivered at one oclock that after- noon, Washington time, and that they, the Commanders in the areas indicated, should be on the alert. 60
After the men had all concurred in urging that our outlying possessions be given an additional alert at once by the fastest possible means, Marshall drew a piece of scratch paper toward him and picked up a pencil and wrote out in longhand a message to be sent to our overseas commanders. When he reached the bottom of the page he picked up the telephone and called the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. . . . General Marshall, in a guarded way, told Admiral Stark what he had in front of him and . . . that he was going to send a warning to Hawaii, Panama, and the Philippines and so on. 61
After some conversation with Stark, Marshall put down the phone and said: Admiral Stark doesnt think that any additional warning is necessary. 62 Stark said that all the forces had already been several times alerted, 63 they had sent so much 64 that he feared that that [another warning] would tend to confuse them. 65 More discussion. Marshall again phoned Stark. 66 He read Stark the message he had just written. Tis time apparently 60 Ibid., part 29, p. 2346. Bratton testimony before the APHB. Also ibid., part 34, pp. 1920. Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation. 61 Ibid., part 9, p. 4518. Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid., part 34, p. 20. Bratton statement during Clarke Inquiry. 64 Ibid., part 32, p. 136. Stark testimony before the NCI. 65 Ibid., part 3, p. 1111. Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee. 66 Ibid. Te record of phone calls through the White House switchboard on the morning of December 7, 1941, lists two a.m. calls by Marshall to Stark 10 minutes apart, 11:30 and 11.40. The Morning of the Fateful Day 299 Stark concurred and asked Marshall to add a phrase to the eect that the naval forces be also informed. 67
[T]o safeguard the codes, messages to Army o cers in the eld frequently included a request that the Navy be notied, and vice versa. Since two similar coded cables containing essentially the same message made the task deciphering a code that much easier, Marshall and Stark tried to avoid . . . both sending a mes- sage about the same things, to the various commanders concerned at Panama, Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines. So Marshall penciled a short sentence at the bottom of his mes- sage, Notify naval opposite. 68
During their second conversation, Stark asked Marshall if he wouldnt like to use the Navys more powerful transmitting facilities, its 25,000-kilowatt versus the Armys 10,000-kilowatt radio station. 69 Te Navys station had little di culty transmit- ting messages, while the Armys was normally out of service with Honolulu between 11 and 1:00. 70 Atmospheric conditions over the Pacic at that time of the year were poor. Marshall declined Starks oer. Marshalls handwritten message read, Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also, they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what signi- cance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication. 71 67 Ibid., part 34, p. 20. Bratton statement during Clarke Inquiry. 68 Ibid., part 33, p. 822. Marshall testimony before the NCI. See also Bratton testimony, ibid., part 9, p. 4541. Bratton said sending the same message in dierent codes jeopardized code security. 69 Ibid., part 32, p.136. Stark testimony before the NCI. 70 Ibid., part 27, p. 114, Colonel French testimony before the APHB. 71 Ibid., part 14, p. 1334, Washington to Fort Shafter #529. See also ibid., part 15, p. 1640, Exhibit 61. Also ibid., part 3, p. 1112, Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee. 300 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Marshall gave his handwritten message to Bratton and told him to take it to the Message Center and see that it was dispatched at once by the fastest safe means. 72
When Bratton was about to leave, the question was raised as to whether Marshalls message shouldnt be typed. Because time was an important factor, however, Bratton was asked to take it in its draft form to the Message Center. As he was leaving, Gerow called out, If there is any question of priority, give the Philippines rst priority.
Bratton took the message down the hall to the Army Message Center. As he handed it to Colonel Edward F. French, the signal o cer in charge, Bratton said: Te Chief of Sta wants this sent at once by the fastest safe means. 73
French found the penciled message rather di cult to read; 74
neither he nor his clerk could interpret Marshalls handwriting. So French asked Bratton to help [him] get this into readable script. Bratton dictated it to a code-room typist, which took per- haps a minute, then veried and authenticated the message 75
and put it into code. According to Bratton, it was then about 11:58 a.m. 76
French started processing the message immediately, giving the Philippines rst priority. 77 He went to the Signal Center himself and had the operator check the channel to Honolulu. Due to atmospheric conditions, Honolulu had been out of con- tact since about 10:20 that morning. 78 Transmitting the message to Honolulu via Army facilities would not only have slowed it down, but would have run a risk of garbling when it was copied 72 Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid., part 34, p. 32, French statement before the Clarke Inquiry. 75 Ibid., p. 33. 76 Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 77 Ibid., part 34, p. 20, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry. 78 Ibid., part 27, p. 108, French testimony before the APHB. The Morning of the Fateful Day 301 and retransmitted in San Francisco. Te Armys normal method when atmospheric conditions prevented sending messages via its own radio station was to use commercial facilities that were available in the Armys Signal CenterWestern Union to San Francisco, tube relay across the city, and then RCA to Honolulu. 79
So French decided the quickest method of dispatch would be via commercial service, especially as RCA had just installed a teletype circuit to Fort Shafter, Army headquarters in Hawaii, on the western outskirts of Honolulu. 80
When Bratton returned to Marshalls o ce, Marshall asked him to go back to the Message Center and nd out how long it would take for his message to reach its several addressees. Bratton returned, talked with French, who told him that the messages would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes. 81 With respect to the message to Honolulu, French estimated that it would reach there within a half hour to 45 minutes. 82 Bratton looked at [his] watch at that time and, as [he] remember[ed] it, it was about 11:58 a.m. 83 Bratton reported back to Marshall. Marshalls message was in code by 11:52 a.m. (Washington D.C. time) and was dispatched to Panama at noon, to the Philippines at 12:05, to the Presidio in San Francisco at 12:11, and to Hawaii at 12:17. 84 It was Marshalls understanding that his message went right through to the Philippines, Panama, and San Francisco. Te only problem came in raising Hawaii. 85
79 Ibid., part 34, p. 33, French testimony during Clarke Investigation. 80 Ibid. See also part 27, pp. 10810, French testimony before the APHB. 81 Ibid., part 34, p. 21, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry. 82 Ibid., p. 33. French statement before the Clarke Inquiry. 83 Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. See also part 34, p. 21. 84 Ibid., part 33, p. 1282. 85 Ibid., p. 823. Marshall testimony before the NCI. 302 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy By noon Deane had nished the one-page statement he had been preparing for Marshall to use that afternoon at his meeting with FDR and/or for testifying the next day before Congress. Marshall called him into his o ce, and he handed Marshall his memorandum. As Marshall read it, he said to Deane, it looks as though the Japs were going to issue an ultimatum about 1:30. Deane had not known of the information that administration and top military o cials had been learning during recent months from MAGIC, so was not aware of the signicance of Marshalls announcement. 86
Sunday Morning at the State Department Hull went to his o ce that Sunday morning as [he] had done almost every Sunday since [he] entered the State Department in 1933. Because of the Japanese situation, however, this one was a little out of the ordinary. Hull talked rst with the departments Far Eastern expertsStanley K. Hornbeck, adviser on political Relations; Maxwell M. Hamilton, chief of the division of Far Eastern aairs; and Joseph W. Ballantine, an expert on Japan. 87
Hull had asked Stimson and Knox to meet with him at the department at 10:00 a.m. to discuss the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indochina. 88 Te administration o cials were striving to ascertain the full signicance of those military movements, their probable destination, etcetera. 89
86 Deane interview. 87 Cordell Hull, Te Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan, 1948), vol. 2, p. 1095. See also Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull: Te American Secretaries of State and Teir Diplomacy (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), vols. 12 and 13, p. 517. 88 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5393, Hulls reply to Joint Committee interrogatory. 89 Ibid., p. 5394. The Morning of the Fateful Day 303 Stimson, Knox, and Hull were all well aware that that day was the day that the Japanese [were] going to bring their answer to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated that they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. . . . Hull [was] very certain that the Japs [were] planning some deviltry. 90
Te three secretaries were all wondering where the blow will strike. Te messages [they] were receiving now indicated that the Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam. 91
Hull, Stimson, and Knox discussed whether we would not have to ght if Malaya or the Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought. We all three thought [recalled Stimson] that we must ght if those nations fought. . . . [I]f Britain were eliminated it might well result in the destruction or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result would give the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and would make the defense of the American Republics enormously di cult if not impossible. All the reasons why it would be necessary for the United States to ght, in case the Japanese attacked either our British or Dutch neighbors in the Pacic were discussed at length. 92
Te main thing, Stimson wrote in his diary, is to hold the main people who are interested in the Far East together the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese. According to Stimson, both Hull and Knox held that the Japanese military advances in the southwest Pacic represented a threat to the United States that should be countered by us on grounds of 90 Ibid., p. 5437, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hear- ings. 91 Ibid., p. 5427, Stimson statement to Joint Committee. 92 Ibid., pp. 542728, Stimson statement to Joint Committee. 304 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy self-defense. Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it. . . . Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these dierent nations must stand together. Stimson had both men dictate their views to a stenographer. 93
Hull stated in his Proposed Statement for the president that the Japanese government, dominated by the military reeaters, [was] deliberately pro- ceeding . . . to acquire military control over one-half of the world with nearly one-half its population. . . . [D]efense of life and commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacic area must be commenced with the South Sea area. 94
According to Knoxs typed-up Suggestion, we were tied up inextricably with the British [and Dutch] in the present world situation. . . . [A]ny serious threat to the British or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United States. . . . We should therefore be ready jointly to act together. 95
Hull, Knox, and Stimson stayed together in conference until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. 96
Japanese Ambassadors Request One P.m. Appointment with State Secretary Hull Ambassador Nomura telephoned Hull about noon to ask for an appointment for himself and Kurusu at 1:00. Hull agreed. 93 Ibid., p. 5437, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hear- ings. 94 Ibid., pp. 543940. Proposed Hull statement. 95 Ibid., p. 5440. Knox suggestions. 96 Ibid., p. 5437, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hear- ings. The Morning of the Fateful Day 305 Nomura phoned again shortly after 1:00 to ask for a postpone- ment until 1:45. Hull agreed to the time change. 97
Sunday Morning at the White House Te morning of December 7 was a busy one for FDR. He had been up late the night before with Marshall, Stark, Stimson, Knox, and Hopkins, discussing until the early hours of the morn- ing the crescendo toward which the situation in the Far East was building. At about 10:00 a.m., FDRs naval aide, Beardall, deliv- ered to him in his bedroom the nal 14th part of the Japanese reply. It is possible that FDRs busy day began even earlier when Stark phoned giving him advance notice of that mornings two crucial Japanese interceptspart 14 of Japans nal reply and the extremely important One p.m. Message. In any event, when the MAGIC pouch containing the One p.m. Message was delivered to FDR later that morning, he learned rsthand about that as well as the other urgent Japanese intercepts. FDRs personal physician, Dr. Ross T. McIntire, was one of the presidents closest associates. He admired FDR greatly and faithfully kept his secrets, both medical and non-medical. From the day of FDRs rst inauguration until the day of FDRs pass- ing in 1945, McIntire saw the president each morning and again in the evening. 98 December 7, 1941, was no exception. McIntire was with him [FDR] on that Sunday morning from ten to twelve oclock, while Mr. Hull was waiting over in the State Department for the Japanese envoys to bring their governments reply to the American note. According to McIntire, FDR thought that even given the madness of Japans military masters [they] would not risk a war with the United States. Tey might well . . . take 97 Hull, Te Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1095. See also Pratt, Cordell Hull, vol. 2, pp. 51718. 98 Ross T. McIntire, White House Physician (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1946), p. 3. 306 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy advantage of Great Britains extremity and strike at Singapore or some other point in the Far East, but an attack on any American possession did not enter his [FDRs] thought. In McIntires view, the president clearly counted only on the usual evasions from the two ambassadors. 99
FDR was also in touch that Sunday morning with the British ambassador, Lord Halifax. Halifax had sent to the White House for Roosevelts comments a copy of the British governments pro- posed message to Japan. He was waiting at the British embassy for a phone call from Roosevelt. 100
China was also very much in FDRs thoughts. Te Chinese government had appreciated his eorts to strangle Japan eco- nomically. As a result, Chinese ambassador Hu Shih and FDR had developed a close and condential relationship. Roosevelt had tried to get in touch with Hu the day before, but he had been in New York. On his return Sunday morning, he returned FDRs call, and the president summoned him to the White House for a condential chat. Hu arrived about 12:30. FDR showed him the statement he had sent the Japanese emperor, his very last gesture toward peace, Roosevelt said. [I]f Hirohito didnt respond well, it would be war! FDR told Hu about the Japanese envoyss insistence on a 1:00 p.m. appointment with Hull. Roosevelt expected either an answer [from Hirohito] or a nasty move from the Japs before Tuesday morning. 101 He fully expected foul play; he had a feel- ing that within forty-eight hours something nasty might hap- 99 Ibid., pp. 13637. 100 Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (Houghton Mi in, 1966), p. 530. 101 Helen Lombard, While Tey Fought: Behind the Scenes in Washington, 1941 1946 (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1947), p. 10. The Morning of the Fateful Day 307 pen in Tailand, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, and possibly the Philippines. 102
In between these several interruptions, FDR was working on the draft of a speech, which had been prepared in the State Department that he contemplated delivering to Congress the following Tuesday or Wednesday if he received no response to his message to Emperor Hirohito. Phrasing what he wanted to say was a di cult proposition, in view of his pledge to the American people that he would not send our boys to ght on foreign soil except in case of attack and in view of the Constitutional provi- sion that only Congress could declare war. Eight months of U.S. negotiations with Japan in the attempt to reach a peaceful solu- tion had ended in failure. FDR had decided he would present the issue as one of national defense. He would compare Japanese aggressions with those of the Nazis in Europe. He would describe Japans conquest and exploitation in China and point out that she was now threatening the Philippines and British and Dutch terri- tories in Southeast Asia, as well as trade routes of vital importance to them and to us. Japans practice of aggression and conquest sets up a continuing and growing military threat to the United States. . . .Within the past few days large additional contin- gents of troops have been moved into Indo-China and prepa- rations have been made for further conquest. . . .We cannot permit, and still less can we support, the fullment by Japan of the aims of a militant leadership which has disregarded law, violated treaties, impaired rights, destroyed property and lives of our nationals, inicted horrible suerings upon peoples who are our friends. How to respond to the current crisis in the light of FDRs pledges to the American people and his assurances of armed 102 Herbert Feis, Te Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1950), p. 340. 308 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy support to the British and Dutch was di cult. FDR relied on the advice of his three secretaries, Knox, Hull, and Stimson. And that was, as Stimson put it, what we were at work on our papers about that morning. 103 Roosevelt would not ask for a declaration of war, but he would conclude by announcing his intention to embark on a de facto war: As Commander in Chief, I have given appropriate orders to our Forces in the Far East. 104
In addition to working on his proposed speech, Roosevelt must also have been thinking about the White House meeting of his War Cabinet he had called for 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. He apparently wanted to discuss his intended address with his advisers and to talk with them about the possible showdown that might follow in the Far East. 105
Lunch Break At about 12:30, after being reassured that his warning mes- sage to his eld commanders was on its way, Marshall left for lunch at his quarters. 106 Hulls meeting with Knox and Stimson wound up in time for lunch. Knox and Stimson left the State Department, Knox for his o ce and Stimson for lunch at his spacious estate, Woodley. 107 When Knox returned to his o ce in the Navy Department, he found a message from Admiral Stark who wanted him to phone. Knox immediately called Stark and 103 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438. Excerpt from Stim- sons December 7, 1941 diary reprinted in Joint Committee hearings. 104 National Archives, Civilian Records Branch, Record Group 59, Entry 398, Box 3, Location 250/46/04/01, 30pp. Hornbeck draft. FDRs intended speech printed in full in Appendix. 105 Pogue, George C. Marshall: 19391942, p. 221. 106 Deane interview. 107 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hearings. The Morning of the Fateful Day 309 the Admiral went over to Knoxs o ce. Captain (later Admiral) Turner came too and the three men met for about an hour. 108
After Dr. Hus departure at 1:10 p.m., FDR retired for lunch and to prepare for the 3:00 p.m. meeting with his advisers. * * * * To the outside observer, peace and normality appeared to reign. Yet beneath the outer calm, o cial Washington was uneasy. It was obvious that a blow was coming, but they didnt know where. If it fell on British, Dutch, or Tai territory, as seemed likely, what should the United States do? Should it implement the admin- istrations secret and unconstitutional agreement to furnish the British and Dutch with armed support, as it seemed FDR was planning to do? Would the people of this country be willing to support such a venture? Or would they reject the idea of U.S. involvement in a Japanese conict with the British, Dutch, or Tai in southeast Asia, thousands of miles from our shores? 108 Ibid., part 8, p. 3828. Testimony of Maj. John H. Dillon, aide to Knox. 15. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! Intelligence Supplied Hawaiian Commanders was Limited U nlike the top administration and military o cials in Washington, the armed forces in Hawaii did not have a Purple machine or access to MAGIC. Te Hawaiian commanders did not even know of their existence. Tey knew Washington had information not available to them and had to rely on Washington to be kept informed. When they asked for information so as to be able to make informed decisions in the eld, they were usually assured that they were being sent what they needed to know. As a matter of fact, it was Washington policy not to forward diplomatic intercepts to the forces in the eld so as to safeguard MAGIC. Te large department stas in Washington were considered better qualied to evaluate the bits and pieces of data in relation to the political situation than were the smaller stas in the eld, and the eld commanders were 311 312 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy assured that they would get what [they] needed at the time [they] needed it. 1
Te commanders in Hawaii received some advice by way of telegraphic reports from Washington and the Philippines. But otherwise, the information available to them was what they gleaned from intercepting all Japanese naval tra c, and of attacking all the Japanese naval systems contained in that tra c with the exception of one system, which was being worked on in Washington, and in Cavite. Tey had a radio intelligence unit whose duties were to obtain all information available from the Japanese naval tra c by means other than cryptanalysis, and they had a mid-Pacic direction-nding unit. 2 Tey also received reports from observers, analyzed directional radio beams, and decoded and translated Japanese messages transmitted in PA-K2 and certain lower classied, nondiplomatic codes. 3 It was obvious to the Hawaiian commanders from the cables they received from Washington, as well as from accounts appear- ing in the Hawaiian press concerning the Japanese-U.S. conver- sations, that relations between the two countries were tense. On November 27, General Short was advised that Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes. Short was asked to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as . . . necessary but . . . not . . . to alarm civil population. 4 To minimize the damage that might be done by local Japanese who were antagonistic to the United States, Short alerted for sabotage and so advised Washington. 5
1 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 10, pp. 484546. 2 Ibid., part 10, pp. 4673, 4687, testimony of Commander Joseph John Roche- fort. 3 Ibid., pp. 4674, 4676, 4677. 4 Ibid., part 14, p. 1328. 5 Ibid., p. 1330. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 313 Hawaiian Commanders Warned of Japanese Threat to Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, Borneo On November 27, eet Commander-in-Chief Kimmel in Hawaii was sent a war warning advising that Japanese troops were apparently preparing an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Tai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo. Te same cable also went to eet Commander-in-Chief Hart in Manila. Both commanders were told to implement WPL-46, the U.S. war plan then in eect, which provided for preparing to take oensive action. 6 Ten on November 28, Short was advised that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activi- ties . . . to provide for protection of your establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage. He took this as Washington approval of his earlier sabotage alert. 7
With all clues pointing to a war with Japan erupting in southeast Asia, Short and Kimmel expected their primary con- cerns would be to defend the mid-Pacic U.S. outpostsGuam, Wake, and Midwayand to carry out WPL-46 by attacking the Japanese-held Marshall Islands. Tey continued drilling their men and preparing for war. Kimmel was directed from Washington to reinforce Wake and Midway with men and planes. So on November 28 and December 5, he sent out from Hawaii two task forces, under heavy security and in a state of combat readiness, 8
with reinforcements for Wake and Midway. 9
6 Ibid., p. 1406, Chief of Naval Operations TOP SECRET cable #272337. 7 Ibid., p. 1330, War Department SECRET cable 482 to Short. 8 Ibid., part 26, pp. 32124, Admiral William F. Halsey testimony before the Hart Inquiry. 9 Ibid., p. 43, Admiral John Henry Newton testimony before the Hart Inquiry. 314 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy War in the west Pacic appeared imminent indeed to readers of page one of the Sunday, November 30, Honolulu Advertiser. A banner headline read, KURUSU BLUNTLY WARNED NATION READY FOR BATTLE. Te story that followed quoted a former State Department adviser warning the Japanese ambassador that the United States was ready to ght if Japan did not mend her aggressive ways in Asia. Another story on the papers front page suggested that it might be the Japanese encir- clement of the Philippines that would spark the war. Still another story, datelined Singapore, reported that a Japanese strike was expected there and that in the interest of preparedness all troops had been called back to barracks. But then the situation seemed to ease. Nomura and Kurusu in Washington asked the U.S. government to continue their conversations. U.S. o cials in Washington who were reading MAGIC knew this was merely a ruse to permit Japan to stall for time; they had read Tokyos November 29 instructions to the two Japanese ambassadors to please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking o of negotiations. 10 But the Hawaiian commanders did not know this. Te lengthy meet- ing of Secretary of State Hull with the two Japanese envoys on Monday, December 1, was reported in the Hawaiian press, giving the impression that the crisis was over, at least for the time being. An Associated Press story in Te Honolulu Star-Bulletin datelined Tokyo, December 5, reinforced this impression: A Japanese government spokesman expressed the belief today that the United States and Japan will continue with sincer- ity to nd a common formula for a peaceful solution in the Pacic. 11
10 Ibid., part 12, p. 199. 11 Walter Karig, Battle Report: Te Atlantic War (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943), p. 8. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 315 A December 6 story was headlined NEW PEACE EFFORT URGED IN TOKYOJOINT COMMISSION TO IRON OUT DEADLOCK WITH U.S. PROPOSED. In Hawaii it looked as if the immediate crisis had passed, even though another December 6 story struck a more ominous note: JAP PRESS ASKS FOR WAR. 12
On the basis of radio intelligence, Commander Joseph John Rochefort, o cer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, noted two signicant factors. Te Japanese, who usually changed their radio call signs no more often than once every six months, introduced new call signs on December 1, just one month after their last previous change. 13 Rochefort consid- ered it ominous also when he realized he had lost track of the Japanese aircraft carriers. 14 It was considered possible that they were still located in home waters 15 communicating with radio waves too weak to be picked up in Hawaii. However, Rochefort thought that they might be moving eastward. 16 As a matter of fact, he had located practically the entire Japanese eet that attacked Pearl Harbor in a negative sense. He had lost them; he didnt know where they were. 17
Rochefort called the loss of contact with the Japanese car- riers to the attention of Commander Edwin Tomas Layton, eet intelligence o cer and combat intelligence o cer. Layton showed the location, to the best of [his] knowledge, of the major portion of the Japanese Fleet 18 on his Communication 12 Ibid., p. 11. 13 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, p. 4680, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee. Ibid., pp. 483637, Edwin Tomas Layton testi- mony before the Joint Committee. 14 Ibid., p. 4682, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee. 15 Ibid., pp. 483738, Layton testimony before the Joint Committee. 16 Ibid., p. 4680, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee. 17 Ibid., p. 4681. 18 Ibid., p. 4838, Layton testimony before the Joint Committee. 316 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Intelligence Summary. He shared this report with Kimmel on December 2, at his usual 8:15 a.m. brieng. 19
Layton: Almost a complete blank of information on the car- riers today. . . . We havent seen the carriers except Cardiv 3 [Carrier Division 3] and sometimes Cardiv 4. . . . I felt appre- hensive. . . . I did not list Carrier Division 1 or Carrier Division 2 because neither one of those commands had appeared in traf- c for fully 15 and possibly 25 days. Kimmel: What, you do not know where the carriers are? . . . Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldnt know it? Layton: [If they were,] I hoped they would be sighted before now. 20
Dawn on Sunday at Pearl Harbor It was clearly recognized in Hawaii that the way to assure against a surprise air attack was to conduct long-range air-patrol reconnaissance. But Hawaii had nowhere nearly enough planes, trained pilots, fuel, or spare parts. As Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commander, Patrol Wing Two at Pearl Harbor, later testied: [T]o be reasonably sure that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detec- tion, would have required an eective daily search through 360 to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 25-mile radius of visibility, this would have required a daily 16 hour ight of 50 PBY-5 planes. Tis, in turn, would have necessitated a force 19 Ibid., pp. 4831, 4833. See also Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, And I Was Tere: Pearl Harbor and MidwayBreaking the Secrets (New York: W. Morrow, 1985), pp. 22830. 20 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 483739, Layton testi- mony before the Joint Committee. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 317 of not less than 150 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and ample well-trained personnel. We had 81 patrol planes in the whole Hawaiian area, including Midway. 21
Because of the shortage, the Hawaiian patrols were operat- ing on a shoestring. 22
Te Fleet operating areas were searched daily, and as planes were available rotational sweeps were conducted of those sectors thought to be most dangerous. Te planes accompanying the task forces sent out from Hawaii to Wake and Midway were also scouting morning and afternoon over 60 sectors to 300 miles on either bow. 23 On the morning of December 7 three patrol planes were in the air over the eet operating areas at Pearl Harbor and four other planes were aloft, carrying out exercises with subma- rines. Tis was in addition to the three task forces at sea that were conducting a regular wartime search by aircraft and destroyers, as required by eet orders. 24
During the early morning hours of December 7, the USS Ward, captained by Lieutenant William Woodward Outerbridge, was steaming back and forth at low speed patrolling the sea lanes converging on Pearl Harbor. 25 Outerbridges orders were that any submarine operating in the restricted areanot operating in the submarine areas and not escortedshould be attacked. 26
21 Ibid., part 8, p. 3454, Testimony of Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commander, Patrol Wing Two, Pearl Harbor. See also Homer N. Wallin, Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, 1968), p. 45. 22 Ibid., p. 45, quoting Bellinger letter, January 16, 1941. 23 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 329, Halsey testimony before the Hart Inquiry. 24 Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p. 46. 25 Karig, Battle Report, pp. 68. 26 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, pp. 5657, Outerbridge testi- mony at Hewitt Inquiry. 318 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Two minutes before 4:00 a.m. a blinker signal from the minesweeper Condor informed the Ward that it had sighted a suspicious object believed to be a submarine apparently head- ing for the entrance of the harbor. Outerbridge immediately ordered the ship to general quarters. . . . Te ship sprang to life. For nearly an hour she combed a wide area in the dark, conduct- ing a sonar search. Nothing was located. So the men aboard the Ward relaxed. 27
But then at 6:37 a.m. Outerbridge was again aroused from his bunk. Tis time he saw the U.S. target ship Antares towing a raft to Pearl Harbor. Between ship and raft the lieutenant saw a smaller object which had no right to be there . . . a submarine conning tower . . . unlike any submarines silhouette with which he was familiar. In view of his orders to attack any unauthor- ized submarine in the area, Outerbridge did not hesitate: Load all guns and stand by to commence ring. Te rst shot was a near miss. Number 3 gun opened up . . . on the pointer re, like a squirrel rie, with a point-blank range of 75 yards. . . . [T]he projectile was seen to strike the conning tower. And the sub- marine disappeared from view. Te Ward then reported its next move: We have dropped depth charges on sub operating in defensive area. Ten a few minutes later a follow-up message: WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE AREA. 28 It was 6:53 a.m. Hawaii time. 29
In 1941, the Army was in the process of installing three large xed radars on high ground in Hawaii, and six mobile radar units. Tis new radar service was operative daily from 4 a.m. to 4 p.m. only, the hours Short considered the most dangerous time for 27 Karig, Battle Report, pp. 13-14. 28 Ibid., pp. 1416. 29 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 57, Outerbridge testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 319 an air attack. 30 But on Saturday, December 6, the Signal Corps obtained permission of the control o cer to have all stations operate from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. only on Sunday, December 7. 31
However, on that morning Opana radar station actually hap- pened to stay open a little longer. Private Joseph L. Lockard, out of personal interest and a desire for experience, and Sergeant George E. Elliott, who wanted to learn plotting, had volunteered to experiment overtime. Shortly after 7 a.m., Lockard detected on the radar screen a large ight of aircraft bearing north at a distance of about 136 miles. He was confused by what he saw. A few minutes after 7, when it got down to about 132 miles, he called the information center, but no one was around. [I]t was the largest group [he] had ever seen on the oscillo- scope. . . . Ten we continued to follow the ight and to plot it, till it got within about 22 miles20 to 22 miles of the Island, at which time we lost it in this blacked-out area. 32
At that time radar was still rather primitive, basically experi- mental; there was no proper identication system to determine friend from foe, so these planes could not be identied. 33
At 7:20 Lockard reached Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler on duty at Aircraft Warning Center and reported his sightings. Tyler dis- counted the report for several reasons. Te planes sighted could be from our own two task forces at sea; they could be from Armys 30 Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p. 49. 31 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 7, p. 2951, Short statement prepared for the Joint Committee. 32 Ibid., part 27, pp. 53133, Lockard testimony before the APHB. 33 Ibid., part 7, pp. 295152, Short statement prepared for the Joint Committee. Tere is a good description of the radar installations and December 7 sight- ings in George Raynor Tompson, et al., Te Signal Corps: Te Test (December 1941 to July 1943) (Washington, D.C.: O ce of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1957), pp. 35. 320 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Hickam Field; or they could be B-17s en route from the west coast to the Philippines and due to arrive about then in Hawaii. 34
Reassured that his sighting was not anything of importance, Lockard and Elliott closed down the radar installation and left for breakfast. 35 Air Raid Pearl Harbor STOP This is No Drill At Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, the sun rose at 6:27 a.m. 36
At 7:33, Marshalls last-minute message, announcing the instructions to the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their govern- ments reply at precisely 1:00 p.m. Washington time (7:30 a.m. Honolulu time), had arrived, in code, at Western Union in down- town Honolulu. 37 It had to be sent for decoding to the Armys cryptographic center at Fort Shafter, four miles away, before it could be read. At 7:55 (1:25 p.m. in Washington, D.C.) the rst Japanese planes swooped down simultaneously at Hawaiis Army air base at Hickam Field and at Hawaiis Navy air base on Ford Island in the middle of Pearl Harbor. Almost immediately the rst Japanese torpedoes struck their targets in the harbor. 38
At 7:58 Vice Admiral Patrick Nelson Lynch Bellinger, com- mander of Patrol Wing Two at the naval air station on Ford Island, broadcast to all ships in the area, Air raid Pearl Harbor X Tis is no drill. With the emergency, the Naval Base Defense Air 34 Wallin, Pearl Harbor, pp. 4850. 35 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 27, p. 533, Lockard testimony before the APHB. 36 Ibid., part 5, p. 2439, as reported by the Naval Observatory. 37 Ibid., part 14, p. 1410; also ibid., part 34, p. 7. 38 Ibid., part 6, p. 2675. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 321 Force immediately became functional, and orders to planes in the air were sent and received by 8:05. 39
Within minutes of the attack, Kimmel cabled the Navy Department. O cial notication of the attack was received in Washington at 1:50 p.m., Washington time, by dispatch as follows: 40
AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NOT [sic] DRILL. The Attack News Reaches the Navy Department At about 1:30 p.m., as Navy Secretary Knox, Chief of Naval Operations Stark, and possibly Admiral Turner were coming out of a meeting at the Navy Department, the rst news of the attack on Pearl Harbor arrived. Te Air Raid message, delivered by Commander Fernald from Navy Communications, was handed to Knox. Knoxs immediate response was, My God, this cant be true, this must mean the Philippines. 41
No, sir, Stark said, this is Pearl. 42 Stark knew Tis is no drill were agreed-upon code words to indicate an actual outbreak of hostilities. The Attack News Reaches the White House On hearing the news, Knox immediately called on the White House phone and spoke to the president. It was 1:40 p.m. Knox 39 Ibid., part 8, p. 3452, Bellinger testimony before the Joint Committee. 40 Ibid., part 11, p. 5351. 41 Ibid., part 8, pp. 382829, 383437, Testimony of Knoxs Marine aide, Major John H. Dillon. 42 Ibid., p. 3829, Dillon testimony before the Joint Committee. 322 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy simply stated what was in the message . . . [Knox] had no further details and . . . [FDR] would be kept advised. 43
Roosevelt was nishing a late lunch with Harry Hopkins. Te president couldnt believe what he had heard. Nor could Hopkins; he didnt think Japan would dare to attack Honolulu. Tere must be some mistake, he said. 44 But there was no mistake. FDR immediately began telephoning. He called Hull. He called Marshall. He called Stimson. And FDR began receiving phone calls too, from persons all around the world. Winston Churchill was among the callers. It was Sunday evening in England when Churchill heard the news on a small wireless radio in his dining room at Chequers, the Prime Ministers residence just outside London. With him at the time were U.S. Ambassador John Winant and Averell Harriman, then a special representative of the president with ambassadorial rank. Churchill immediately placed a call to Roosevelt: Mr. President, he began, whats this about Japan? Tey have attacked us at Pearl Harbour, FDR replied. We are all in the same boat now. Winant spoke briey with FDR, and then Churchill got back on the line. Tis certainly simplies things, he said. God be with you, or words to that eect. According to Churchill, Winant and Harriman took the shock with admirable fortitude. . . . Tey did not wail or lament that their country was at war. Tey wasted no words 43 Ibid., p. 3837. 44 Robert Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins. 2 vols. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), vol. 1, p. 435, and Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Inti- mate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 43031; and Henry H. Adams, Harry Hopkins: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1977), p. 258. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 323 in reproach or sorrow. In fact, one might almost have thought they had been delivered from a long pain. 45
The Attack News Reaches the War Department A very few minutes after the news was picked up out of the air on the west coast, the news reached the War Department in Washington via the Navy. At about 1:30 p.m. a Navy enlisted man, all out of breath, rushed into Marshalls o ce. Colonel Deane was there trying to round up men, so as to have the o ce open on a skeleton basis by 3:00 p.m. that afternoon as Marshall had directed. Te Navy messenger was carrying a penciled note, supposedly a message from the Navy radio operator at Honolulu: PEARL HARBOR ATTACKED. THIS IS NO DRILL. Deane immediately telephoned Marshall at his quarters at Fort Myer where he was having lunch and told him of the message. Marshall directed Deane to contact Hawaii if possible to verify the report. Deane tried to phone, but the operator questioned his authority and refused to put the call through to Pearl Harbor, even though Deane was calling from Marshalls o ce. By this time a more o cial report came in conrming the attack. 46
The Attack News Reaches the State Department In line with the instructions from his government, Ambassador Nomura phoned the State Department at about noon to ask for a 1:00 p.m. appointment with Secretary of State Hull. Hull had read 45 Winston Churchill, Te Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1950), pp. 60405. 46 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1411, Deanes June 8, 1942 memorandum to Brigadier General W.B. Smith. 324 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the decoded Japanese intercepts that morningthe 14-part reply to our note of November 26, and the One p.m. Messageso he knew what to expect. However, the two ambassadors didnt appear at 1:00. Rather they phoned again a few minutes after 1:00 asking to have their appointment postponed until 1:45. Hull agreed. 47
He was still waiting for the ambassadors when the president telephoned from the White House shortly after 1:30. Teres a report that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor. FDRs voice was steady but clipped. In view of his impending appoint- ment with the ambassadors, Hull was especially interested. Has the report been conrmed? Not yet, the president said, but it would be checked. 48
Te ambassadors arrived at the State Department and were in the diplomatic waiting room even as Hull and the president spoke. Hull kept them waiting while he consulted his advisers Green H. Hackworth, legal adviser, and Joseph W. Ballantine, a foreign service o cer, who had participated with Hull in most of his conversations with the Japanese. Te president has an unconrmed report, Hull told them, that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor. Te Japanese Ambassadors are waiting to see me. . . . Tey are going to turn us down on our note of November 26, he said. Perhaps they want to tell us that war has been declared. I am rather inclined not to see them. 49
Hull thought over the situation and nally decided that since the presidents report had not been conrmed and there was one chance out of a hundred that it was not true, [he] would receive the envoys. Hull summoned the ambassadors to his o ce. 50
47 Cordell Hull, Te Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan, 1948), vol. 2, p. 1095. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., p. 1096. 50 Ibid. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 325 When Nomura and Kurusu entered, Hull received them coldly and did not ask them to sit down. Nomura handed Hull his governments note. Hull naturally could give no indication that he already knew its contents, so he made a pretense of glancing through it. When he had nished skimming the pages, he eyed Nomura. I must say, Hull said, that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. Tis is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortionsinfamous false- hoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them. 51
Nomuras face was impassive. He seemed to be under great emotional strain. Hull thought Nomura was about to speak, but Hull stopped him with a motion of his hand and nodded toward the door. Te Ambassadors turned without a word and walked out, their heads down. 52
The Attack News Reaches Secretary of War Stimson Te president telephoned Stimson at his home at just about 2:00 p.m. Stimson was still at lunch. [I]n a rather excited voice, the President asked, Have you heard the news? 51 Ibid. Also Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 78687, and Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing O ce, 1943), pp. 83132. 52 Hull, Memoirs, pp. 109697. 326 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Well, Stimson replied, I have heard the telegrams which have been coming in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam. Oh, no, the president responded. I dont mean that. Tey have attacked Hawaii. Tey are now bombing Hawaii. Well, Stimson thought, that was an excitement indeed! His reference to the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam was to the British patrols sightings of large Japanese forces south of Indochina and moving up into the Gulf. It had appeared that these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indochina, or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula, or probably Malay. Te British were very much excited about it and our eorts this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. Te British will have to ght if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three [Stimson, Hull, Knox] all thought that we must ght if the British fought. Tat was the reason for their Sunday morning meeting at the State Department and for the position papers they had drafted to see whether or not we should all act together. . . . But now, Stimson conded to his diary, the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii. 53 (Italics added) The Afternoon in Marshalls Office Deane had phoned Marshall immediately after receiv- ing the news of the attack. It was about a ten-minute drive from Marshalls quarters at Fort Myer to his o ce in the War Department. Although it had taken Marshall a couple of hours to respond to Brattons frantic phone call that morning, this time 53 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438, Stimson diary excerpt, as reprinted in Joint Committee hearings. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 327 Marshall reached his o ce within ten 54 or fteen 55 minutes of receiving Deanes telephone call. Marshall had many phones in his o ce, all hung on the side of his desk. He had no sooner arrived than they all began to ring at once. A regular stream of phone calls started coming in. Deane gave Marshall one instrument and then another phone would ring. Roosevelt called on the direct line from the White House, asked Marshall what he knew, but Marshall had to admit that he didnt know much. At that point another phone on the side of Marshalls desk rang. Deane answered and when he nished talking, he inadvertently hung the phone on the Roosevelt con- nection on the side of Marshalls desk, temporarily closing o the Roosevelt-Marshall conversation. Deane quickly shifted it, but he later recalled that his rst act of the war had been to cut o a telephone conversation between the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Chief of Sta. 56
Marshall sent word of the attack out to all the corps area commanders and all our people throughout the world, particu- larly in the Philippines. 57
Roosevelt asked Marshall to come over to the White House right away and Marshall immediately dashed over. Te rst call that came in after Marshall left was from a drunk in St. Louis, who had just heard what those bastards had done and oered to come to Washington to help Marshall out. Deane thanked the caller and said he would relay his oer to Marshall. To Deane, this incident illustrated how ill-prepared the Chief of Stas o ce was for the emergency; a call from a plain citizen 54 Ibid., part 14, p. 1411, Deane June 8, 1942, memorandum for General W.B. Smith. 55 Authors interview of Deane, January 2, 1964. 56 Ibid. 57 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, Stimson diary except. 328 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy had gotten through to Marshalls o ce without any trouble. Yet Deane had had di culty trying to call Pearl Harbor on behalf of the Chief of Sta. According to Deane, the War Department personnel that next week were all at sixes and sevens . . . totally unprepared for what had happened. 58
Stimsons Afternoon After hearing the news and nishing his lunch, Stimson returned to his o ce. He started matters going in all directions to warn against sabotage and to get punch into the defense move. Armed guards were stationed at the War Department building and also at Stimsons estate. He oered to provide guards for the White House, but it was decided the FBI should stand guard there. 59
Stimson attended FDRs meeting at the White House. Ten at 4:00, he joined McCoy and the chiefs of the armed services, giving them a little pep-up talk about getting right to work in the emergency. He spent most of the afternoon in conference with Marshall, Grenville Clark, Miles, Patterson, McCoy, and their assistants, Lovett and General Gullion, the provost mar- shal general. Te main topic of their conversation was the form the declaration of war should take. Grenville Clark had drawn up a copy based largely on the Woodrow Wilson one. Tey all thought that it was possible we should declare war on Germany at the same time with Japan. But that was an open question. However, Stimson thought there was now no doubt about declaring war on Japan. 60
When Stimson had rst heard the news of Japans attack, his rst feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a 58 Deane interview. 59 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, Stimson diary excerpt. 60 Ibid., p. 5438. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 329 crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. Yet the news that came in from Hawaii during the afternoon was very bad. Te Japanese seemed to have sprung a complete surprise upon our eet and [to] have caught the battleships inside the harbor and bombed them severely with losses . . . hit our airelds there and . . . destroyed a great many of our planes, evidently before they got o the ground. It was staggering, Stimson wrote, to see our people there, who [had] been warned long ago and were standing on the alert . . . so caught by surprise. Nevertheless, his dominant feeling continued to be one of relief in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. He felt that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred up by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging. 61
Sunday Afternoon at the White House Soon after receiving the news of the attack, the White House became a beehive of activity. At 2:28 p.m. FDR had a phone call from Stark telling of the heavy losses suered by the eet during the rst phase of the attack and reporting some loss of life. Stark discussed the next step with FDR, and the president wanted him to execute the agreed orders to the Army and Navy in event of an outbreak of hostilities in the Pacic. 62 At 2:30 Knox ordered all ships and stations to Execute WPL-46 against Japan. 63
Knox reached the White House almost immediately after Stark nished talking with the president. As Knox later conded, 61 Ibid. 62 Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, pp. 43536, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 431. 63 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5351, John Ford Baecher April 8, 1946, memorandum to Joint Committee Counsel Seth Richardson. 330 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy he found the president in the Oval O ce, seated, and as white as a sheet . . . visibly shaken. Te extent of the disaster, news of which was beginning to trickle in, really shook FDR. Knox thought Roosevelt expected to get hit by the Japanese, but that he did not expect to get hurt. It was not the attack itself, but the amount of the damage that shocked him. 64
FDR called in his secretary, Steve Early, and dictated a news release that Early was to give to the press immediately. A half hour later FDR dictated to Early a second press release. 65
Roosevelts oldest son, James, a captain in the Marine Corps Reserve, was on assignment in Washington at the time, as liaison between Marine Headquarters and the O ce of the Coordinator of Information. He was o duty that Sunday afternoon when the White House phoned him at his home in the suburbs; his father wanted him at the White House right away. He got there as fast as [he] could. As he entered his fathers o ce, the rst thing FDR said was Hello, Jimmy. Its happened. 66 As Elliott Roosevelt, James next younger brother wrote later, it was the target, not the attack, that amazed him. 67
Mrs. Roosevelt heard of the attack from an usher as her 30 luncheon guests of the day were leaving. FDR was occupied all that afternoon and evening with meetings, and Eleanor didnt have a chance to talk with him until later. When she and the president did speak together briey, it was her opinion that in spite of his anxiety Franklin was in a way more serene than he had appeared in a long time. She thought 64 Admiral Ben Moreell letter to Harry Elmer Barnes, December 17, 1961. 65 Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, p. 437, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 431. 66 James Roosevelt, Aectionately, FDR: A Sons Story of a Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959), pp. 32728. Also James Roosevelt with Bill Libby, My Parents: A Diering View (Chicago: Playboy Press, 1976), p. 266. 67 Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, A Rendezvous with Destiny: Te Roosevelts of the White House (London: W.H. Allen, 1977), p. 304. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 331 it was steadying to know nally that the die was cast. One could no longer do anything but face the fact that this coun- try was in a war; from here on, di cult and dangerous as the future looked, it presented a clearer challenge than the long uncertainty of the past. 68
FDR had a previously scheduled meeting of his princi- pal advisers for 3:00 p.m., and they soon began arriving: Hull, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark. In anticipation of this meet- ing, Marshall and Stimson had prepared papers on the status of U.S. military preparedness. Te atmosphere at the conference was not too tense. Te participants all looked on Hitler as the real enemy. Tey thought that he could never be defeated without force of arms; that sooner or later we were bound to be in the war and that Japan had given us an opportunity. FDR discussed at length with Marshall the disposition of the troops and particularly the air force. . . . [Marshall] said he had ordered General MacArthur to execute all the necessary movement required in event of an outbreak of hostilities with Japan. Many matters were dealt with at the meeting. Tose present agreed that some type of censorship had to be set up at once. And the president ordered the Japanese Embassy and all the consulates in the United States to be protected and ordered all Japanese citizens to be picked up and placed under careful sur- veillance. When a move required the president to sign an execu- tive order, he instructed the person to whom he talked to go ahead and execute the order and he would sign it later. 69
68 Eleanor Roosevelt, Tis I Remember (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 23334. 69 Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, pp. 43637, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 43132. 332 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy In view of the crisis, the president, at Hopkinss suggestion, decided to call a special meeting of his entire cabinet for 8:30 that evening. He then asked also to have the congressional leaders come to the White House to confer with the president after the cabinet meeting was over. CNO Stark Replies to Admiral Hart in Manila For weeks, especially during the last few days, Washingtons attention had been riveted on the western Pacic and the like- lihood of a Japanese landing in Tailand, the Kra peninsula, Singapore, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies. If the Japanese struck any of those areas, the British and Dutch were expected to ght. And if the British and Dutch fought, the United States was committed to helping them militarily. In view of the fact that our commitment was not only secret but also unconstitutional, the administration had been faced with a dilemma. Te question had been, as Stimson stated on November 25, how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of ring the rst shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. 70 But if the Japanese attacked us, we would be justied in responding. Tus, the attack at Pearl Harbor had let us o the hook. Te Hart-Phillips cable, asking how Hart should respond to Creightons news from Singapore, was a reminder of the U.S. commitment to the British. 71 Te cable had reached Washington during the night of December 67, but because of the rash of Japanese intercepts it had not been decoded promptly. It became available only on the morning of December 7, and it was not until after the attack that Stark had a chance to reply. His answer referred to the incoming cable paragraph by paragraph. It was 70 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433, Stimsons diary report on the White House meeting of November 25. 71 Ibid., part 4, pp. 193335, Hart-Phillips December 7, 1941, report from Manila. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 333 encoded and transmitted December 7, at 11:00 p.m. Washington time. 72 Stark agreed with Hart that the Japanese would be able to take the initiative in a war starting at that time, and he agreed also that the most important thing was to prevent any Japanese movement through the Malay barrier. Stark approved of the defensive strategy suggested by Hart and Phillips, but reminded them of the possibility that the major Japanese attack against Philippines may come from the eastward, that the Japanese might strike from the bases they had been constructing on their mid-Pacic mandated islands, the Marianas and the Carolines. As a matter of fact, Stark said, a Japanese concentration may be established in Halmahera [an island of the Dutch East Indies between the Philippines and New Guinea] or Mindanao [the southernmost island of the Philippines itself ] approximately in accord with ideas expressed in WPL44. Stark approved of the Hart-Phillips proposals for coordinat- ing U.S. army and navy operations and for U.S.-British coopera- tion. He said Marshall approved as well. Washington also okayed the idea of permitting the British Battle Fleet to use the naval base in Manila and asked what additional personnel material and minor forces were required for the projected eet base in Manila or alternatively in Mindanao. Tis reply was sent for action to Hart, for information to the secretary of navy, and to Kimmel. Copies went also to the British Admiralty Delegation and to the U.S. Armys War Plans Division. Hart was to inform the British and Dutch. Te U.S.-British plans for cooperation, conceived months before in London, Washington, and Singapore, when the United States was still o cially neutral, were now being put into operation. 72 Ibid., pp. 193536. 334 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy A message from the U.S. naval attach in Australia, Merle- Smith, the transmission of which had been held up 17 hours at the request of the Australian authorities, was also received in Washington on December 7. It reported on the threatening movement of the Japanese in the southeast Pacic. A strike from the Japanese island of Pelau, aimed at Menado, on the northern coast of Celebes, Dutch East Indies, and/or at Ambon, appeared imminent. Te Dutch had ordered execution of plan A2, calling for joint operations by the Australians and the Dutch. And the Dutch Indies forces were mobilizing. 73
FDRs Evening Meetings with Cabinet and Congressional Leaders As the cabinet o cers entered the Oval O ce for the 8:30 p.m. meeting, the president was seated at his desk. He nodded to everyone as they came in, but there was none of the usual cordial, personal greeting. Tis was one of the few occasions he couldnt muster a smile. However, he was calm, not agitated. He was concentrated; all of his mind and all of his faculties were on the one task of trying to nd out what had really happened. 74 Te members of the cabinet faced him in a semi-circle. FDRs secretary, Steve Early, sat at his side. Knoxs face was drawn and white. Before the meeting started he conded to Stimson that we had lost seven of the eight battle- ships in Hawaii. (As Stimson wrote in his diary, Tis, however, proved later to be exaggerated.) 75
73 Ibid., part 9, p. 4566. 74 Perkins, Te Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 379. 75 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5349, excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7, 1941. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 335 FDR opened by saying that this was the most serious meet- ing of the Cabinet that had taken place since 1861. 76 He began in a low voice, looking down at the dispatches before him as he talked. You all know whats happened. Te attack began at 1:00 [actually 1:25 p.m. Washington time]. We dont know very much yet. 77
Someone, probably Attorney General Francis Biddle, spoke up. Mr. President, several of us have just arrived by plane. We dont know anything except a scare headline, Japs Attack Pearl Harbor. Could you tell us? Te president asked Knox to tell the story, which he did, with interpolations by Stimson, Hull, and Roosevelt. 78
Dispatches were being brought in every few minutes during the meeting, and FDR enumerated the blows that had befallen us at Hawaii. He had hastily drawn a draft of a message he was planning to present to Congress, and he then read [it] to us slowly. It was very brief. 79
Te Cabinet meeting lasted for at least three-quarters of an hour. Ten the congressional leaders, who had been wait- ing below, were called in. Among those who appeared were: Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom Connally, Senator Warren R. Austin, Senator Hiram W. Johnson, Senator Alben Barkley, and Senator Charles L. McNary. And Representatives: Speaker Sam Rayburn, Foreign Aairs Chairman Sol Bloom, Charles A. Eaton of New 76 Ibid. 77 Perkins, Te Roosevelt I Knew, p. 379. 78 Ibid. 79 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7, 1941. 336 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Jersey, Majority Floor Leader John W. McCormack, Minority Floor Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr. 80
Te president began by giving them a very frank story of what had happened, including our losses. Te eect on the Congressmen was tremendous. Tey sat in dead silence and even after the recital was over they had very few words [to say]. Te president asked if they would invite him to appear before the Joint Houses tomorrow and they said they would. He said he could not tell them exactly what he was going to say to them because events were changing so rapidly. 81
Te White House meeting didnt wind up until after 11:00. As the cabinet o cers and congressional leaders were ling out, Postmaster General Frank Walker said to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, I think the Boss really feels more relief than he has had for weeks. 82 She agreed. Mrs. Perkins wrote later, A great change had come over the president since we had seen him on Friday. Ten, he had been tense, worried, trying to be optimistic as usual, but it was evident that he was carrying an awful burden of decision. Te Navy on Friday had thought it likely it would be Singapore and the English ports if the Japanese eet meant business. What should the United States do in that case? I dont know whether he had decided in his own mind; he never told us; he didnt need to. But one was conscious that night of December 7, 1941, that in spite of the terrible blow to his pride, to his faith in the Navy and its ships, 80 Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, p. 437, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 433. See also excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7 ( Joint Committee, part 11, p. 5439). 81 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7, 1941. 82 Perkins, Te Roosevelt I Knew, p. 380. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 337 and to his condence in the American Intelligence Service, and in spite of the horror that war had actually been brought to us, he had, nevertheless, a much calmer air. His terrible moral problem had been resolved by the event. 83
Looking Back A few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, FDR and his condential adviser Hopkins dined alone together. On that occa- sion, the president told Hopkins about several talks with Hull relative to the loopholes in our foreign policy in the Far East in so far as that concerned the circumstances on which the United States would go to war with Japan in event of certain eventualities. All of Hulls negotia- tions, while in general terms indicating that we wished to pro- tect our rights in the Far East, would never envisage the tough answer to the problem that would have to be faced if Japan attacked, for instance, either Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. Te president felt it was a weakness in our policy that we could not be specic on that point. Te president told [Hopkins] that he felt that an attack on the Netherlands East Indies should result in war with Japan and he told [Hopkins] that Hull always ducked that question. 84
Hopkins had talked with the president many times over the previous year, and it always disturbed him [FDR] because he really thought that the tactics of the Japanese would be to avoid a conict with us; that they would not attack either the Philippines or Hawaii but would move on Tailand, French Indo-China, make further 83 Ibid., pp. 38081. 84 Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, p. 432, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 428. 338 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy inroads on China itself and possibly attack the Malay Straits. He also thought they would attack Russia at an opportune moment. Tis would have left the president with the very dif- cult problem of protecting our interests [in the Far East]. He always realized that Japan would jump on us at an oppor- tune moment and they would merely use the one by one tech- nique of Germany. Hence, his great relief at the method that Japan used. In spite of the disaster at Pearl Harbor and the blitz-warfare with the Japanese during the rst few weeks, it completely solidied the American people and made the war upon Japan inevitable. 85 * * * * * Judging from reports of a number of the presidents intimate associates who saw him on December 7, after he had learned of the Japanese attack, he was unquestionably more soothed than surprised by the news. He was truly abbergasted at the actual site of the attack, and he was shaken by the large unexpected losses to his beloved Navy. However, it came as a relief to him that Japan had not bypassed American territory to attack the British or Dutch. FDR had faced a domestic dilemma. Te New Deal had failed to end the depression. Unemployment in 1939 was as high as when he took o ce in 1933. Only Selective Service and the war orders of France and England had succeeded in eliminating unemployment. Increased employment in the United States had been nanced rst by French and British gold and then, under lend-lease, by ination and increased public debt. Without such continued war production, the New Deal, on which FDRs great popularity rested, would have been revealed as an illusion and the 85 Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, pp. 43233, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 428. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 339 economic catastrophe it really was. Roosevelt continued to impro- vise new policies and new programs to prevent such a revelation. To put o the day of reckoning and divert public attention from his domestic failures, he had become more and more involved in foreign aairs. As Japan struggled to protect her Asian markets and sources of supply from ever-increasing communist disrup- tions, FDR had taken step-by-step actions to support China and to strangle the Japanese economy. He had also joined in parallel actions with the British and Dutch to blockade Japan and to prevent her attempts to extend her trade and inuence on the Asian mainland. Because of her straitened economic circumstances, Japan was under pressure to obtain from southeast Asia, by fair means or foul, the oil and other products she needed but which we refused to let her buy. Time and time again, Joseph Grew, our ambassador in Japan, had warned FDR that our embargo was starving Japan economically and that he feared it would eventually lead to war. Yet his warnings went unheeded. Moreover, FDR had given secret assent to naval and military agreements to provide American armed support to the British and Dutch if Japan should strike their southeast Asian territories, which seemed likely as Japan drove south for the resources she needed. Several clues were available in Washington from the read- ing of MAGIC, which indicated that the Japanese were plan- ning aggressive action against the United States itself. Yet these indications were largely ignored, or at least not recognized by the authorities as serious enough to warrant taking decisive measures, except to plead for more time to prepare for war. As a result, the military commanders in the eld remained inadequately alerted to the impending threat. As the extent of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe trickled in, the enormity of Washingtons negligence began to become apparent. Te authorities then tried to conceal their responsibility and to 340 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cover their tracks. Te tale of the subsequent investigations and the attempted Washington cover-up is dealt with in Part II of this book, Te Fruits of Infamy.
341 Front row (lrom lclt): Vinston Churchill, Franklin . Rooscvclt, and Joscl Stalin at thc Yalta Conlcrcncc, cccmbcr 1945 Prcsidcnt Franklin . Rooscvclt signing cclaration ol Var, cccmbcr 8, 1941 Sccrctary ol Statc Cordcll Hull with 8ritish Forcign Ministcr Anthony dcn Harry Hopkins, advisor to Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt Sccrctary ol Var Hcnry L. Stimson 342 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy (Abovc) Gcncral Gcorgc C. Marshall, Army Chicl ol Sta, (Abovc right) Gcncral Valtcr C. Short, Army Commandcr in Hawaii, (Right) Gcncral Lconard T. Gcrow, Assistant Army Chicl ol Sta, Var Plans ivision (courtcsy ol \irginia Military !nstitutc Archivcs). U.S. Army Gcncrals, 1945, including Gcncral Valtcr 8cdcll Smith (back row, ccntcr), and Gcncral Lconard T. Gcrow (lront row, lar right). Editors Preface 343 Admiral Husband . Kimmcl, Commandcr in Chicl, Pacic Flcct Kichisaburo Nomura, Japancsc Ambassador to thc Unitcd Statcs (standing, at lclt) Admiral Harold R. Stark and Sccrctary ol thc Navy Frank Knox, 1943 Captain Laurancc F. Saord, Sccurity Scction, Naval Communications Japancsc Purplc Ciphcr lrom thc Japancsc cmbassy in 8crlin, Gcrmany, now in thc National Cryptologic Muscum in Laurcl, Maryland. From lclt: Pcrcy L. Grcavcs, Jr., Scnators Fcrguson (RM!), Lucas (!L), and Gcorgc (GA), cccmbcr 11, 1945, during thc Pcarl Harbor hcarings. Photo lrom thc Vashington, .C. Times-Herald, cccmbcr 12, 1945. From lclt: Scnator Homcr Fcrguson, Pcrcy L. Grcavcs, Jr., and Rcar Admiral T.8. !nglis, at thc Pcarl Harbor hcarings, Novcmbcr 17, 1945. (Associatcd Prcss photo) cccmbcr 1943, standing outsidc thc Russian mbassy, lclt to right: unidcnticd 8ritish o ccr, Gcncral Gcorgc C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chicl ol Sta, shaking hands with Sir Archibald Clark Kccr, 8ritish Ambassador to thc USSR, Harry Hopkins, Marshal Stalins intcrprctcr, Marshal Joscl Stalin, Forcign ministcr Molotov, and Gcncral \oroshilov. Photograph was takcn during thc Tchcran conlcrcncc. Part 2 The Fruits of Infamy 16. The First Response Tnv Rv~c:iox :o :nv A::~cx ix V~snixc:ox A s ncws ol thc attack on Pcarl Harbor sprcad around thc world, rcports soon lollowcd ol othcr Japancsc actionsall ovcr thc Pacic. Tcy struck Singaporc in southcast Asia, whcrc thc 8ritish had a big naval basc. Tcy struck Khota 8aru on thc 8ritish Malayan pcninsula and thc 8ritish basc in Hong Kong. Tcy attackcd U.S.opcratcd Clark Ficld in thc Philippincs. And thcy struck thc U.S. islands ol Guam and Vakc. All this within scvcn hours and thrcc minutcs ol thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. And thcn a lcw hours latcr, thcy hit U.S. air and naval bascs in Manila and thc midPacic U.S. island ol Midway. 1
8clorc thc attack, onc ol Rooscvclts major conccrns had bccn that thc Amcrican pcoplc would not support a war to dclcnd thc 8ritish or utch in southcast Asia il thc Japancsc attackcd thcm thcrc. Howcvcr, thc attack on thc U.S. cct at Pcarl Harbor had radically altcrcd thc situation. Now thcrc was no doubt that thc pcoplc would support a dcclaration ol war. 1 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 6, p. 2675. 347 348 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy As FRs mccting with congrcssional lcadcrs on thc cvcning ol thc attack brokc up, cmocrat Housc Spcakcr Sam Rayburn was askcd, Vill thc prcsidcnt ask lor a dcclaration ol war: FR hadnt committcd himscll. 8ut Rayburn voluntccrcd that il hc did, that is onc thing on which thcrc would bc unity. Minority Housc Lcadcr Joscph V. Martin agrccd: Tcrc is only onc party whcn it comcs to thc intcgrity and honor ol thc country. 2
Scnator avid !. Valsh, chairman ol thc Naval Aairs Committcc, a lrcqucnt critic ol FRs lorcign policy: Tc uncxpcctcd and unprovokcd attacks upon Unitcd Statcs tcrritory and ships and thc lormal dcclaration ol war by Japan lcavc Congrcss no choicc but to takc spccdy and dccisivc mca surcs to dclcnd our country. Vc must promptly mcct thc chal lcngc with all our rcsourccs and all our couragc. 3
Vithin hours ol thc attack, many Japancsc nationals in this country wcrc pickcd up and dctaincd. Congrcssional lcadcrs madc plans to qucstion top military o cials. Tnv Movxixc Av:vv :nv A::~cx At noon thc prcsidcnt was drivcn up to Capitol Hill to addrcss a joint scssion ol Congrcss. Tc mcmbcrs ol thc Housc and Scnatc, and thcir gucsts, wcrc asscmblcd in thc Housc cham bcr whcn thc prcsidcnt cntcrcd. !t was a sombcr occasion. Tc prcsidcnt was an cloqucnt spcakcr, and cvcryonc was anxious to hcar what hc had to say. Rooscvclt bcgan clcarly and rmly: Ycstcrday, cccmbcr 7, 1941a datc which will livc in inlamythc Unitcd Statcs ol 2 New York Times, cccmbcr 8, 1941, p. 1. 3 !bid., p. 2. The First Response 349 Amcrica was suddcnly and dclibcratcly attackcd by naval and air lorccs ol thc mpirc ol Japan. Tc Unitcd Statcs had bccn at pcacc with that Nation, hc said, and its cnvoys had still bccn in convcrsation with this govcrnmcnt. Tc Japancsc govcrnmcnt has dclibcratcly sought to dcccivc thc Unitcd Statcs by lalsc statcmcnts and cxprcssions ol hopc lor continucd pcacc. FR wcnt on to statc that thc Unitcd Statcs was not Japans only targct. Ycstcrday thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt also launchcd an attack against Malaya. Last night Japancsc lorccs attackcd Hong Kong. Last night Japancsc lorccs attackcd Guam. Last night Japancsc lorccs attackcd thc Philippinc !slands. Last night thc Japancsc attackcd Vakc !sland. Tis morning thc Japancsc attackcd Midway !sland. Tc prcsidcnt callcd on thc Amcrican pcoplc to comc to thc dclcnsc ol thc country. No mattcr how long it may takc us to ovcrcomc this prcmcdi tatcd invasion, thc Amcrican pcoplc in thcir rightcous might will win through to absolutc victory. ! bclicvc ! intcrprct thc will ol thc Congrcss and ol thc pcoplc whcn ! asscrt that wc will not only dclcnd oursclvcs to thc uttcrmost but will makc vcry ccrtain that this lorm ol trcachcry shall ncvcr cndangcr us again. Hostilitics cxist. Tcrc is no blinking at thc lact that our pcoplc, our tcrritory, and our intcrcsts arc in gravc dangcr. Tc prcsidcnts short talk was a ringing call lor thc support ol thc Amcrican pcoplc. 350 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Vith condcncc in our armcd lorccswith thc unboundcd dctcrmination ol our pcoplcwc will gain thc incvitablc tri umphso hclp us God. Tc prcsidcnt thcn askcd thc Congrcss to dcclarc that sincc thc unprovokcd and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, cccmbcr 7, a statc ol war has cxistcd bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and thc Japancsc mpirc. 4 Vith Congrcsss cccmbcr 8 rcsolution, thc Unitcd Statcs was at war with Japan. Not with Gcrmany which, throughout most ol 1941, FR had considcrcd thc primc targct. V~v: Japans mpcror Hirohito promptly dcclarcd war on thc Unitcd Statcs and Grcat 8ritain. ngland, Australia, Canada, thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, and Costa Rica all rcspondcd by announcing that a statc ol war cxistcd bctwccn thcm and Japan. 5
n thc morning ol cccmbcr 11 Gcrmany and !taly both dcclarcd war on thc Unitcd Statcs. FR noticd Congrcss, which promptly issucd two joint rcsolutions rcsolving that thc statc ol war bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and thc Govcrnmcnt ol Gcrmany |and thc govcrnmcnt ol !taly| which has thus bccn thrust upon thc Unitcd Statcs is hcrcby lormally dcclarcd. 6
4 cpartmcnt ol Statc 8ullctin, vol. 5, p. 474, cpartmcnt ol Statc, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrn mcnt Printing cc, 1943), pp. 83940. 5 New York Times, cccmbcr 8, 1941, p. 1. 6 cpartmcnt ol Statc, Peace and War, pp. 84950. 17. The Public Had Questions How Mucn ~:~cv H~b :nv J~v~xvsv !xviic:vb ox Pv~vi H~vnov- T hc pcoplc in this country wcrc panicstrickcn. Why had Japan attackcd thc U.S. Flcct whilc ncgotiations with thc U.S. wcrc still ongoing: How much damagc had bccn inictcd: Vould thc Japancsc land in Hawaii: Vould thcy attack thc wcst coast ol thc Unitcd Statcs: Vould thcy attack Panama: Sccrctary ol Navy Knox dctcrmincd to invcstigatc thc sit uation in Hawaii himscll. Hc callcd on Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt Monday morning to ask pcrmission to y to Pcarl Harbor to inspcct thc carnagc rsthand, to nd out lor himscll how much damagc had bccn donc, and to dctcrminc thc rcsponsibility lor our lorccs apparcnt lack ol prcparcdncss. Rooscvclt agrccd to his trip. Knox spcnt thc day gathcring background matcrial to study on thc ight. Hawaii was still a tcrritory, not yct a statc. Sccrctary ol Navy would bc travcling outsidc thc country, so Undcr Sccrctary ol Navy Jamcs V. Forrcstal would takc ovcr as Acting Sccrctary. Forrcstal had not prcviously bccn on thc list ol thosc lcw top military and political o cials privy to thc closcly guardcd MAG!C intcrccpts. Howcvcr, as Acting Sccrctary hc 351 352 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy was cntitlcd to scc thcm, and hc askcd to bc briclcd. Navy couricr Licutcnant Commandcr Kramcr asscmblcd lor Forrcstal a sizc ablc loldcr ol thc intcrccpts bcaring on Pcarl Harbor, took thcm to Forrcstals o cc on cccmbcr 10, and spcnt somc timc going through |thc loldcr| . . . giving |Forrcstal| thc gcncral tcnor ol thc way thc things shapcd up lrom this tra c. 1
!t was a long trip to Hawaii in 1941, morc than two days cach way. Tc ight bcgan on cccmbcr 9. Accompanying Knox wcrc his aidc, Captain Frank . 8catty, Licutcnant Commandcr dward A. Haycs, USNR, Joscph V. Powcll, vicc prcsidcnt ol 8cthlchcm Shipbuilding Company and two Knox assistants, onc a spccialist in shipbuilding mattcrs. Tc Knox party cw rst to Mcmphis whcrc thc planc was gasscd up, and thcn to l Paso whcrc thcy ovcrnightcd bccausc ol bad wcathcr. Tc ncxt day was rough, thc planc iccd up hcavily going ovcr thc mountains, but arrivcd salcly at San icgo whcrc a lourcngincd ying boat, hcavily loadcd with mcdical supplics badly nccdcd in Hawaii, was waiting to takc thcm on thc 2,000 milc ovcrscas ight. Tcy had troublc taking o but nally madc it. Tcy cncountcrcd such tur bulcncc and icing conditions at 7,000 lcct that cvcryonc donncd lull coldwcathcr ying gcar and wrappcd thcmsclvcs in blankcts. Tc pilot brought thc planc down to 1,0001,200 lcct whcrc it was smooth but still intcnscly cold. Not knowing what to cxpcct in Hawaii, Knox and his party prcparcd lor thc worst. As thcy approachcd thc islands, thc plancs machinc guns wcrc manncd. vcryonc donncd lilc prc scrvcrs and parachutcs. To avoid bcing mistakcn by somc triggcr happy lookout lor an cncmy planc, thc pilot lollowcd his landing 1 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 36, pp. 8384. Kramcr tcsti mony at Hcwitt !nquiry. The Public Had Questions 353 instructions prcciscly. Tcy landcd on ahu on thc morning ol cccmbcr 11. ncc on thc ground, Knox and his companions saw wrcck agc cvcrywhcrc. Tc air station at Kancoho sccmcd to havc bccn complctcly dcvastatcd. So lar as thcy could scc, no plancs rcmaincd in ying condition. Tc wrcckagc ol Navy P8Y sca plancs which had bccn shot to picccs or burncd wcrc visiblc on thc ramps and in thc watcr. Tc largc hangars wcrc burnt out. Pcarl Harbor prcscntcd a tragic picturc. . . . |A|ll ol our modcrn battlcships, savc thc Colorado, wcrc thcrc, damagcd in various dcgrccs. Tc Arizona, a shattcrcd mass ol wrcckagc with smokc still pouring lrom hcr dcbris. Tc Oklahoma capsizcd. Tc Maryland, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania bombcd or torpcdocd. Tc Nevada groundcd ncar thc hospital, bombcd in hcr valiant cort to clcar thc harbor. 2 Admiral Kimmcl mct Knox and his companions at thc Royal Hawaiian Hotcl, grim and unlikc thc gay tourist hotcl ol pcacc timc days. 3 Tcy mct somc ol Kimmcls sta at his quartcrs. Latcr Gcncral Short joincd thcm. Ncithcr Kimmcl nor Short attcmptcd to justily thcir lack ol rcadincss to opposc thc attack. Tcy rcadily acknowlcdgcd that Tc Japancsc air attack on thc !sland ol ahu on cccmbcr 7th was a complctc surprisc to both thc Army and thc Navy. !ts initial succcss . . . was duc to a lack ol a statc ol rcadincss against such an air attack. . . . Vhilc thc likclihood ol an attack without warning by Japan was in thc minds ol both Gcncral Short and Admiral Kimmcl, both lclt ccrtain that such an attack would 2 Harry lmcr 8arncs 1953 intcrvicw ol \icc Admiral Frank . 8catty, on lc at Naval Acadcmy Library, Annapolis, p. 8. 3 !bid., p. 7. 354 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy takc placc ncarcr Japans basc ol opcrations, that is, in thc Far ast. 4
An air attack had appcarcd cxtrcmcly unlikcly bccausc ol thc grcat distancc which thc Japs would havc to travcl to makc thc attack and thc conscqucnt cxposurc ol such a task lorcc to thc supcrior gun powcr ol thc Amcrican cct. 5
Morcovcr, thcy had not cxpcctcd an attack by thc Japancsc whilc ncgotiations wcrc still going on in Vashington, as thc Hawaiian prcss had rcportcd. Kimmcl had rcccivcd a gcncral warning lrom thc Navy cpartmcnt on Novcmbcr 27. His chicl lcar had bccn ol a submarinc attack, and hc had madc all ncccssary provisions to copc with such an attack. 6 As a mattcr ol lact, thc air attack was accompanicd by a submarinc attack. Two Japancsc subma rincs wcrc sunk, onc ran ashorc, and onc small twoman subma rinc pcnctratcd thc harbor. According to Knox at thc timc ol thc attack Ncithcr Short nor Kimmcl had any knowlcdgc ol thc plain intimations ol somc surprisc movc, madc clcar in Vashington through thc intcrccption ol Japancsc instructions to Nomura, in which a surprisc movc ol somc kind was clcarly indicatcd by thc insistcncc upon thc prccisc timc ol Nomuras rcply to Hull, at 1:00 on Sunday. 7
!n contrast to Kimmcl, Short had considcrcd sabotagc thc most immincnt dangcr to thc Army . . . bccausc ol thc known 4 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2338. From Knoxs rcport on his trip. 5 !bid. 6 !bid., part 5, p. 2338. From Knoxs rcport. 7 !bid., part 5, p. 2342. From Knoxs rcport. The Public Had Questions 355 prcscncc ol largc numbcrs ol alicn Japancsc in Honolulu. Tc Armys sabotagc alcrt unlortunatcly callcd lor bunching thc plancs on thc various clds on thc !sland, closc togcthcr, so that thcy might bc carclully guardcd against pos siblc subvcrsivc action by Japancsc agcnts. . . . Tis bunching ol plancs, ol coursc, madc thc Japancsc air attack morc ccctivc. 8 Shorts lcar ol a Japancsc lth column was by no mcans unjusticd. Japancsc agcnts had providcd thc Japancsc Navy with cxact knowlcdgc ol all ncccssary dctails to plan thc attack, including cxact charts showing customary position ol ships whcn in Pcarl Harbor, cxact location ol all dclcnscs, gun powcr and numcr ous othcr dctails. Papcrs capturcd lrom thc Japancsc submarinc that ran ashorc indicatcd that thc cxact position ol ncarly cvcry ship in thc harbor was known and chartcd. 9
!t is acknowlcdgcd that thc bcst mcans ol dclcnsc against air attack consists ol ghtcr plancs. Howcvcr, thc numbcr ol such plancs availablc to thc Army lor thc dclcnsc ol thc !sland was lar lrom adcquatc. Tis, Knox rcmarkcd in his rcport, was duc to thc divcrsion ol this typc |ol planc| bclorc thc outbrcak ol thc war, to thc 8ritish, thc Chincsc, thc utch and thc Russians. 10
Tc ncxt bcst wcapon against air attack is adcquatc and wcll disposcd antiaircralt artillcry. Tc dangcrous shortagc ol this typc ol gun, Knox rcportcd, is through no lault ol thc Army Commandcr who has prcsscd consistcntly lor thcsc guns. 11
Tc Army carricd out no morning patrol on cccmbcr 7. Tc Navy scnt out at dawn a tcnbombcr air patrol, which scarchcd 8 !bid. 9 !bid., pp. 234243. 10 !bid., p. 2342. 11 !bid. 356 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc southcrn approach to thc islands, considcrcd thc most likcly dircction lrom which an attack might bc cxpcctcd, thcy madc no contacts with cncmy cralt. Tc Navys condition ol rcadincss was dcscribcd as Condition Trcc, which mcant that about onc hall ol thc broadsidc and antiaircralt guns wcrc manncd, and all ol thc antiaircralt guns wcrc supplicd with ammunition and wcrc in rcadincss. 12
Tc Japancsc air lorcc plancs had swcpt ovcr Pcarl Harbor in thrcc wavcs. Tc torpcdo plancs, ying low, appcarcd rst ovcr thc hills surrounding thc harbor, and in probably not morc than sixty scconds wcrc in a position to dischargc thcir torpcdocs. Tc rst wavc was substantially, but not complctcly, unopposcd. Tc rst rcturn rc lrom thc guns ol thc cct bcgan, it is cstimatcd, about lour minutcs altcr thc rst torpcdo was rcd, and this rc grcw rapidly in intcnsity. Tc sccond wavc ovcr thc harbor was rcsistcd with lar grcatcr rc powcr and a numbcr ol cncmy plancs wcrc shot down. Tc third attack ovcr thc harbor, about an hour and 20 minutcs altcr thc rst, was mct by so intcnsivc a bar ragc lrom thc ships that it was drivcn o without gctting thc attack homc, no ccctivc hits bcing madc in thc harbor by this last assault. 13
Knox and his companions visitcd thc Naval Hospital, whcrc thcy saw hundrcds ol woundcd, many sucring horribly lrom burns and shock. Hc was distrcsscd by thc hugc numbcrs ol dcad and woundcd: Tc sight ol thosc mcn madc mc as angry as ! havc cvcr bccn in my lilc. !t madc mc rcalizc what a big job lay ahcad ol us. 14 Hc was trcmcndously imprcsscd also by thc cour agc, daring, and hcroism dcmonstratcd by many scrviccmcn and 12 !bid., p. 2339. 13 !bid., p. 2340. 14 8arncs intcrvicw with 8catty, citcd abovc, p. 9. The Public Had Questions 357 civilians in ghting back at thc attackcrs and in rcscuing mcn lrom burning ships and thc harbors oilcovcrcd aming watcrs. Friday, cccmbcr 12, was takcn up with intcrvicws with Hawaiis lcading industrialists and scnior Army o ccrs. Knox, a vctcran ncwspapcrman, asscmblcd thc raw matcrials hc would nccd lor his rcportinlormation about damagc to ships, possiblc sabotagc, casualty lists, copics ol Japancsc charts, damagc rcpairs, ship rcpair yards and many photographs. Kxox Vvi:vs His Rvvov: ~xb viivvvs i: :o FR Knox and his party took o Friday cvcning. Knox spcnt most ol that night on thc ight back to thc mainland dralting his rcport. 8y morning it was prctty wcll nishcd in rough, handwrit tcn lorm. Tc planc landcd in San icgo at 10:30 ~.:., and whcn it took o on thc ncxt lcg ol thc journcy, Knox had a borrowcd portablc typcwritcr, papcr and carbon. 8y thc timc thcy landcd in l Paso at 4:00 v.:., Licutcnant Commandcr Haycs, a lormcr court stcnographcr, had it nishcd in typcd lorm. Tcy gasscd up, but thc wcathcr closcd in and thcy had to spcnd anothcr night in Midland, Tcxas. n Sunday cvcning thcy arrivcd in Vashington, and Knox wcnt dircctly to thc Vhitc Housc to dclivcr his rcport to Rooscvclt. Tc original copy bcars a notation in FRs hand writing: 1941givcn mc by F.K. 10:00 v.:., cc. 14, whcn hc landcd hcrc lrom Hawaii. FR. 15 Tc ncxt morning Knox rcturncd to thc Vhitc Housc. FR had gonc ovcr Knoxs rcport and writtcn out in pcncil a scrics ol points conccrning thc Pcarl Harbor attack which hc told Sccrctary Knox to usc at his prcss conlcrcncc on thc subjcct. FRs notcs, altcr dclcting mattcrs that an cncmy should not bc allowcd to 15 8catty 1953 intcrvicw citcd abovc, p. 13. 358 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy lcarn, containcd all thc inlormation that could thcn, with thc sccurity ol thc nation at stakc, bc rclcascd to thc public. 16 Tc Army and Navy wcrc to assumc cqual rcsponsibility and blamc lor thc damagc causcd by thc Japancsc attackand lor thc lailurc to bc prcparcd lor such an attack. 17
Kxoxs Pvvss Coxvvvvxcv Tat altcrnoon 200 ncwspapcr rcportcrs lcd into Knoxs o cc. Vith FRs pcncillcd notcs as a guidc, Knox issucd a lormal rclcasc and cldcd thc rcportcrs qucstions. 18 xccpt lor his praisc ol thc pcrlormanccs ol U.S. scrviccmcn during thc attack, his rclcasc borc littlc rcscmblancc to thc rcport hc had madc to thc prcsidcnt. !t bcgan: My inspcction trip to thc island cnablcs mc to prcscnt thc gcncral lacts covcring thc attack which hithcrto havc bccn unavailablc: 1. Tc csscntial lact is that thc Japancsc purposc was to knock out thc Unitcd Statcs bclorc thc war bcgan. Tis was madc apparcnt by thc dcccption practiccd, by thc prcparations which had gonc on lor many wccks bclorc thc attack, and thc attacks thcmsclvcs, which wcrc madc simultancously throughout thc Pacic. !n this purposc thc Japancsc lailcd. 2. Tc Unitcd Statcs scrviccs wcrc not on thc alcrt against thc surprisc air attack on Hawaii. Tis lact calls lor a lormal invcs tigation, which will bc initiatcd immcdiatcly by thc prcsidcnt. . . . Vc arc all cntitlcd to know it il (a) thcrc was any crror ol judgmcnt which contributcd to thc surprisc, (b) il thcrc was any dcrcliction ol duty prior to thc attack. 19
16 !bid. 17 !bid., p.14. 18 Te New York Times, cccmbcr 16, 1941, pp. 1, 7. 19 Knoxs lormal statcmcnt, as publishcd in ibid. The Public Had Questions 359 Knox wcnt on to namc somc ol thc ships that wcrc damagcd. Hc admittcd that Army losscs wcrc scvcrc, and hc citcd thc lat cst gurcs on Navy killcd and woundcd: o ccrs 91 dcad and 20 woundcd, cnlistcd mcn, 2,638 dcad and 636 woundcd. Hc thcn dcscribcd in dctail somc ol thc acts ol hcroism and valor on thc part ol Navy mcn in ghting thc Japancsc and told ol rcmarkably hcroic rcscucs ol mcn lrom thc watcr altcr thcir ships had gonc down.
Tc lollowing important points in thc rcport Knox turncd in to thc prcsidcnt wcrc spccically omittcd in his lormal prcss rclcasc: 1. In spite of the information available in Washington, Kimmel and Short had received no warning from Washington since November 27. Tc army had thcn considcrcd thc most immincnt thrcat to bc lrom sabotagc. And thc navy, warncd that southcast Asia was Japans likcly targct, was conccrncd with thc possibility ol a sub marinc attack on thc cct at Pcarl Harbor. Most importantly, ncithcr Kimmcl nor Short had any intimation ol somc surprisc movc, madc clcar in Vashington, through thc intcrccption ol Japancsc instructions to Nomura . . . by thc insistcncc upon thc prccisc timc ol Nomuras rcply to Hull, at 1:00 on Sunday, i.c., 7:30 ~.:. in Hawaii. 20 For sccurity rcasons, ol coursc, thc prcss couldnt bc told that thc Japancsc instructions had bccn intcr ccptcd and dccodcd in Vashington. 8ut Knox could havc admit tcd, without rcvcaling anything ol signicancc to thc Japancsc, that it was not astonishing that thc Hawaiian commandcrs had bccn caught by surprisc. 20 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2338. From Knoxs rcport. 360 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 2. Te Army in Hawaii didnt have enough ghter planes for the necessary reconnaissance because of the diversion of this type [of plane] . . . to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians. 21
3. U.S. soldiers and sailors responded to the Japanese attack within four minutes of the launching of the rst Japanese torpedo and the intensity of their ring increased to such an extent that the third and last wave of Japanese planes was driven o without get- ting the attack home. Although Knox praiscd thc valor ol U.S. pcrsonncl in ghting back whcn attackcd, hc didnt mcntion thc promptncss with which thcy got into action, nor thc lact that thc intcnsity ol thcir ring incrcascd to such an cxtcnt that thc third and last wavc ol Japancsc plancs, only an hour and 20 minutcs altcr thc rst onc, 22 was drivcn o without gctting thc attack homc, no ccctivc hits bcing madc in thc harbor. 4. Tc unsuitability ol Pcarl Harbor as a sitc lor a largc conccn tration ol naval vcsscls. !n his rcport, Knox raiscd thc qucstion. !n vicw ol thc attack and thc scrious damagc inictcd by it, thc usclulncss and availability ol this Naval station must bc studicd. . . . Pcnding thcsc studics and thc addition ol satislac tory salcguards, no largc conccntration ol Naval vcsscls can bc pcrmittcd at Pcarl Harbor. Knox rccognizcd that Admiral Richardson had had rcason ablc grounds lor thc doubts hc had raiscd with FR conccrning thc advisability ol holding thc cct at Pcarl Harbor. 23
Vhilc lor sccurity rcasons somc ol thcsc points could not bc rcvcalcd, it would havc bccn possiblc to admit (1) surprisc, (2) inadcquatc cquipmcnt, (3) prompt rctaliation, and (4) prcvious 21 !bid., part 5, p. 2342, lrom Knoxs rcport on his trip to Hawaii. 22 !bid., p. 2340. Scc also Homcr N. Vallin, Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal (Vashington, .C.: Naval History ivision, 1968) pp. 88, 150, 166. 23 !bid., part 5, p. 2345, lrom Knoxs rcport on his trip to Hawaii. The Public Had Questions 361 crrors in judgmcnt, without giving aid or comlort to thc cncmy. Howcvcr, such admissions might havc lcd our own pcoplc to ask cmbarrassing qucstions. For instancc, who was rcsponsiblc lor providing thc commandcrs in thc cld with intclligcncc: Vho had thc rcsponsibility lor sccing that thcy wcrc propcrly warncd and adcquatcly cquippcd and supplicd: And why was thc cct hcadquartcrcd at Pcarl Harbor anyway: Knox said thc prcsidcnt would launch a lormal invcstigation into thc attack. !n rcsponsc, thc two houscs ol Congrcss agrccd to drop thcir proposals to conduct thcir own invcstigations. 24
24 Te New York Times, cccmbcr 16, 1941, p. 7. 18. The Cover-up Begins Tnv Fivs: Vvvx Av:vv :nv A::~cx ix V~snixc:ox A ltcr thc attack, thc corts ol U.S. citizcns immcdiatcly turncd in thrcc dircctions: (1) to avcngc thc dastardly act, (2) to invcstigatc thc damagc donc by thc Japancsc, and (3) to undcrstand thc rcasons lor thc attack. Among top Vashington o cials, civil and military, thcrc was a lourth conccrn, namcly to prcvcnt public knowlcdgc ol any acts ol commission or omission on thcir part that might havc contributcd to thc tragcdy and to conccal any implication ol thcir possiblc complicity or rcsponsi bility lor having provokcd thc attack. Tc mcmbcrs ol Congrcss wcrc anxious to lcarn as much as possiblc about thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr, and thcy promptly sct thc whccls in motion to conduct various invcstigations. Scnator avid L. Valsh ol Massachusctts and Rcprcscntativc Carl \inson ol Gcorgia, chairmcn rcspcctivcly ol thc Scnatc and Housc naval aairs committccs, mct with Admiral Stark on cccmbcr 8. Tcy askcd him just how much damagc had actually bccn donc to thc 363 364 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ships at Pcarl Harbor. 1 Stark answcrcd by giving cxact dctails: Four ships sunkthc Arizona, California, West Virginia, and Olgalatwo ships capsizcdthc Oklahoma and thc Utahand 12 othcr ships damagcd, somc hcavily. 2
Valsh immcdiatcly callcd a mccting ol thc Scnatc Naval Aairs Committcc. Scnator Harry Flood 8yrd ol \irginia and scvcral othcrs adviscd Valsh to go dircctly to thc prcsidcnt. |A|sk him to tcll thc truth to thc Amcrican pcoplc. Valsh agrccd that thc truth should bc told, but, as a lormcr mcmbcr ol thc Amcrica First Committcc who had opposcd Rooscvclts lorcign policy, hc was hcsitant at rst to bc thc onc to go to thc prcsidcnt with such a rcqucst. Altcr lurthcr urging, howcvcr, hc agrccd to do so. 3 Vhcn Valsh askcd FR to tcll thc Amcrican pcoplc thc truth about Pcarl Harbor, thc prcsidcnt cw into a ragc. Hc dcmandcd Valsh divulgc thc sourcc ol his inlormation. Valsh acknowlcdgcd that it camc dircctly lrom thc Navy and Admiral Stark. Rooscvclt rcspondcd, Stark should ncvcr havc givcn out thc lacts about Pcarl Harbor, not cvcn to thc chairman ol thc Scnatc Committcc on Naval Aairs. Tcn rclcrring to thc battlcships sunk, Rooscvclt said, Vhy in hcll should wc admit that thcyrc sunk: Tcyrc rcsting in only a couplc ol lcct ol watcr, wcll raisc cm! 4
n cccmbcr 10, Valsh publicly acknowlcdgcd that Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt must bc thc judgc ol inlormation about war opcrations to bc givcn to thc Amcrican public. For that rcason, thc commit tcc will makc no cort to qucstion naval o cials on thc cxtcnt ol ship losscs at Pcarl Harbor. Hc was satiscd, hc said, that thc 1 Te New York Times, cccmbcr 10, 1941, p. 7. 2 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 5, p. 2210, part 6, p. 2674. 3 Charlcs A. Lindbcrgh, Te Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh (Ncw York: Harcourt, 8racc, Jovanovich, 1970), p. 595. 4 !bid., pp. 59596. The Cover-up Begins 365 prcsidcnt had told all hc could. Tc prcsidcnt, as Commandcr in Chicl, Valsh continucd, is in thc position ol having to dctcr minc thc linc ol dcmarcation bctwccn giving as much inlorma tion as possiblc to thc Amcrican public and ol rclraining lrom giving inlormation that will bc comlorting to thc cncmy. 5
n cccmbcr 10, Harry S. Truman, thcn chairman ol thc Scnatc clcnsc !nvcstigating Committcc, announccd that his committcc bclicvcs that it should not invcstigatc military and naval stratcgy or tactics and that thcrclorc no attcmpt will bc madc to inquirc into thc circumstanccs ol thc Japancsc surprisc attack at Pcarl Harbor Sunday. 6
Sguvicnixc Ru:ovs ~xb Kvvvixc V~v:i:v Svcvv:s MAG!C had always bccn a closcly guardcd sccrct, ol coursc, and now it was most impcrativc, lor thc sakc ol thc war cort, to kccp thc Japancsc lrom knowing that thcir Purplc codc had bccn brokcn. As thc cnormity ol thc Pcarl Harbor catastrophc bccamc apparcnt, thc top Vashington o cials rcalizcd morc strongly than cvcr that thcy would havc to kccp thc public lrom lcarning how much had bccn known about Japancsc aairs in Vashington bclorc thc attack. thcrwisc, thcy would bc askcd to cxplain why, whcn thcy had had so much inlormation, thc Army and Navy in Hawaii had had so littlc, and why our military lorccs in Hawaii had bccn so poorly prcparcd. To prcscrvc thcir own rcputations, thcrclorc, Vashington o cials who had bccn privy to MAG!C had to maintain its sccrccy. A mccting to discuss Pcarl Harbor was hcld shortly altcr thc attack in thc o cc ol thc dircctor ol Naval Communications, prc sidcd ovcr cithcr by Admiral Noycs, dircctor ol N!, or Captain 5 Te New York Times, cccmbcr 11, 1941, p. 15. 6 !bid. 366 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Rcdman, assistant dircctor ol Naval Communications. A whis pcring campaign against Admiral Kimmcl and Admiral 8loch, commandant ol thc 14th Naval istrict, Hawaii, was thcn gct ting in lull swing. 7 Noycs told his subordinatcs thcrc wcrc altogcthcr too many rumors running around thc Navy cpartmcnt and pcoplc running to thc ncwspapcrs . . . gctting in thc ncwspapcrs and on thc radio . . . saying all man ncr ol things against Admiral Kimmcl and Admiral 8loch which wcrc not truc, that wc had to put a stop to . . . thcsc rumors oursclvcs, il wc kncw anything lct it dic with us . . . and not originatc any rumors oursclvcs. 8
Tc scction hcads wcrc givcn standing ordcrs not to talk, not to sprcad thc gossip against Kimmcl and 8loch, to kccp anything wc had to oursclvcs until wc wcrc callcd to a witncss stand to tcstily o cially. Tcy wcrc told to pass that word on to |thcir| subordinatcs. 9 Tcy should tcll all |thcir| pcoplc not to talk, thcrc was too much loosc talk going around, that thcrc would undoubtcdly bc an invcstiga tion latcr and that anybody who had anything to say would bc callcd bclorc that invcstigation and pcrmittcd to say all thcy had to say, il thcy had anything to say, and il wc had writtcn out anything to dcstroy it immcdiatcly. 10
Anyonc who had kcpt any notcs or anything in writ ing should dcstroy thcm immcdiatcly. !l thcsc papcrs wcrcnt dcstroycd, thcrc was a chancc somcbody might scc thcm and start somcthing thc notctakcr hadnt intcndcd. 11
7 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3565. 8 !bid., p. 3571. 9 !bid., p. 3566. 10 !bid., p. 3565. 11 !bid., p. 3571. The Cover-up Begins 367 Vc wcrc in an cmcrgcncy situation and thcrc was panic running through thc Navy cpartmcnt at that particular timc. 12
Tc ordcr to dcstroy thc papcrs camc down lrom thc o cc ol Chicl ol Naval pcrations Stark. According to Captain Saord, in chargc ol thc Sccurity Scction ol Naval Communications, it sccmcd a pcrlcctly logical and rcasonablc ordcr 13 and hc carricd it out, passing that word on to |his| immcdiatc subordinatcs. 14
Tc ordcr applicd only to uno cial notcs or pcrsonal rccords, thc scction hcads wcrc not givcn any instructions to dcstroy lcs or any o cial rccords. 15
Conccrning sccurity in thc Army, Gcncral Marshall warncd his sta o ccrs shortly altcr thc attack that it was mandatory that knowlcdgc ol thc MAG!C intcrccpts ncvcr bc madc public. Marshall told thcm that thcy would havc to go to thcir gravcs with this sccrct. 16
Vith rcspcct to Navy sccurity, Stark tcsticd that anybody who was lct in on that |MAG!C| had to sign a papcr ncvcr to disclosc it, practically so long as hc livcd. Hc said, lor instancc, that his aidc during thc Pcarl Harbor invcstigations, Licutcnant Commandcr Richmond . . . prctty ncar signcd his dcath warrant, . . . il hc wcrc to givc anything out about it. 17
12 !bid., part 8, p. 3570. Saord tcstimony. 13 !bid., p. 3570. 14 !bid., p. 3566. 15 !bid., p. 3571. 16 An Army o ccr, who was in a position to know, told this author on two occasionsoncc in thc prcscncc ol Gcncral 8onncr Fcllcrs and a sccond timc in thc prcscncc ol Gcncral Albcrt C. Vcdcmcycrabout thc vow ol sccrccy cxactcd by Marshall lrom his o ccrs. Tc Army o ccr rcluscd to lct his namc bc uscd lcst it jcopardizc his sons Army carccr. 17 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2468, Stark tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. 368 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Snov: ~xb Ki::vi Rviivvvb ov Tnviv Co::~xbs Action on thc rclicl ol Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short was prompt. Upon Knoxs rcturn lrom Hawaii, hc conlcrrcd with Stimson. Stimson talkcd with Marshall. |A|s a rcsult a dccision was rcachcd lor thc rclicl ol both Kimmcl and Short. 18
Tcrc was no hint in Knoxs rcport ol any misconduct on Kimmcls part, no chargcs wcrc madc, no trial was hcld. Stark was not consultcd bclorchand. |A|ltcr coming lrom thc Vhitc Housc, Knox dircctcd that Kimmcl bc rclicvcd. Knox had no discussion with Stark as to thc rcasons. 8ut Stark said, A commandcr in chicl would not bc rcmovcd without thc prcs idcnts pcrmission. . . . ! imaginc that had bccn discusscd with thc prcsidcnt bccausc thc luturc ol thosc two o ccrs |Kimmcl and Short| at that timc was on a high lcvcl. 19
Kimmcls dismissal lcttcr, datcd cccmbcr 16, was lrom thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy and borc thc initials ol Stark and Admiral Nimitz, thcn Chicl ol Pcrsonncl. 20
Sccrctary ol Var Stimson discusscd Shorts situation with Marshall. Short was thcn promptly rclicvcd ol his command on thc dircction ol thc Sccrctary ol Var. His dismissal lcttcr, also datcd cccmbcr 16, was signcd by Gcncral Marshall. 21
Although rclicvcd ol thcir dutics in midcccmbcr, both Kimmcl and Short wcrc still in thc scrvicc awaiting lurthcr assignmcnts. Tcy rcmaincd in Hawaii. Kimmcl and Short had dcvotcd thcir livcs to prcparing thcmsclvcs to dclcnd thc Unitcd Statcs. Tcir corts and thcir 18 !bid., part 3, p. 1530. Mashall tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. 19 !bid., part 5, pp. 2430, 2432. Stark tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. 20 !bid., dispatch to Kimmcl, #162105. Admiral Pyc was to bc Kimmcls tcmpo rary rclicl. 21 !bid., part 3, p. 1529. The Cover-up Begins 369 accomplishmcnts ovcr thc ycars had carncd thcm rcspcct and advanccmcnt to positions in thc military hicrarchy. Kimmcl and Short had bccn givcn no indication that thcir actions had not bccn complctcly honcst and honorablc. Yct at thc vcry momcnt whcn traincd and cxpcricnccd mcn wcrc in grcatcst dcmand thcy wcrc abruptly rclicvcd ol thcir commandswithout any chargcs having bccn madc, without a hcaring, without having had a chancc to lacc thcir accuscrs, and without an opportunity to dclcnd thcmsclvcs. Pvvssuvv vov ~x !xvvs:ic~:iox Scnator Tom Connally ol Tcxas, chairman ol thc Scnatc Forcign Rclations Committcc, callcd lor a thorough invcstiga tion ol thc lcadcrship at Hawaii. Hc said, thc statcmcnt ol thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy that ncithcr thc Army nor thc Navy wcrc on thc alcrt at Hawaii . . . is astound ing. !t is almost unbclicvablc. . . . Tc naval commandcr and Army gcncral should bc vigorously invcstigatcd. Tcirs is a rcsponsibility and it ought to bc dctcrmincd whcthcr cithcr or both arc inc cicnt or criminally ncgligcnt. Tcy must bc onc or thc othcr. ! havc always bccn a big Navy man. . . . ! am paincd and gricvcd at its sccming lailurc ol its high duty. 22
At his prcss conlcrcncc lollowing his own invcstigation, Knox had avoidcd potcntially damaging statcmcnts. Still qucstions would undoubtcdly bc askcd as to why thc military lorccs at Pcarl Harbor had not bccn bcttcr providcd with plancs and antiaircralt artillcry. Vhy had thcy not bccn morc adcquatcly supplicd with intclligcncc: And why had thc Navy bccn bascd in such a vulncr ablc position lar lrom our shorcs: !t was bccoming obvious that il 22 Te New York Times, cccmbcr 16, 1941, p. 7. 370 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc administration was to rctain its good namc, an o cial invcsti gation would havc to bc arrangcd to answcr such qucstions. Lcss than 24 hours bclorc thc Japancsc attack, thc Navy cpartmcnt had announccd that thc U.S. cct was sccond to nonc. Yct now many ol its ships had bccn sunk or sct ablazc and wcrc rcsting in thc mud at thc bottom ol Pcarl Harbor. Morc than 2,500 o ccrs and cnlistcd mcn wcrc dcad and 650 morc wcrc woundcd. 23 Vhy had scasoncd Army and Navy o ccrs, who had spcnt lilctimcs prcparing to dclcnd thc nation, bccn takcn so complctcly by surprisc: Vhy had thcy bccn caught with thcir dclcnscs down: Vhy had thcy bccn so illprcparcd: Tc pcoplc wcrc cntitlcd to answcrs. Any tragcdy, cspccially onc ol this magnitudc, lcads to rccrim inations and doubts. Many ol thc individuals involvcd, dircctly or indircctly, with thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr must havc had sccond thoughts about whcthcr things might havc turncd out dicrcntly il only thcy had lollowcd anothcr path. Ccrtainly thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs thcmsclvcs must havc wishcd thcy could turn back thc clock and havc a sccond chancc. Admiral Kimmcl, lor onc, conlcsscd altcr thc attack that hc wishcd hc had takcn thc othcr coursc whcn ocrcd thc promotion to commandcrinchicl. 24
Undoubtcdly somc Vashington o cials must havc also had doubts about whcthcr thcy had lollowcd thc corrcct path. Supposc thcy had tricd to amclioratc JapancscU.S. rclations instcad ol aggravating thcm: Also, givcn what thcy kncw in Vashington about thc likclihood ol Japancsc aggrcssion, could thcy havc donc a bcttcr job ol alcrting and provisioning thc cld commands lor dclcnding thcmsclvcs: At Prcsidcnt Rooscvclts dircction, with thc sccurity ol thc nation at stakc, most ol Sccrctary Knoxs ndings on his trip to Hawaii had bccn withhcld lrom thc public. l coursc, wc 23 !bid., p. 1. 24 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 22, p.359, Kimmcl tcstimony. The Cover-up Begins 371 cannot know whom Knox rcally considcrcd rcsponsiblc, but onc admiral, Villiam H. Standlcy, commcntcd that hc thought Knox was vcry scnsitivc ol thc lailurc ol thc Navy cpartmcnt and ol himscll propcrly to alcrt thc CommandcrinChicl in Pcarl Harbor. Knox appcarcd conscious ol his sharc in thc blamc lor thc surprisc at Pcarl Harbor. 25
Tc Japancsc nc v.:. Mcssagc, which had sparkcd Marshalls last minutc cccmbcr 7 dispatch, had bccn intcr ccptcd carly in thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. 8ut apparcntly it wasnt dccodcd and rcady lor dclivcry until about 9:00 ~.:. Army couricr Coloncl 8ratton said hc had it about 9:00 or shortly bclorc. Hc had thcn tricd dcspcratcly to rcach Army Chicl ol Sta Marshall. Captain McCollum tcsticd that Navy couricr Kramcr had brought it to him just bclorc 9:30 ~.:. and that hc, McCollum, had thcn handcd it to Chicl ol Naval pcrations Stark. Stark had apparcntly phoncd FR, but takcn no lurthcr action. According to somc rcports, Marshall was with Stark in his o cc somctimc that morning. Still nothing was donc. Apparcntly no spccial action was takcn on thc nc v.:. Mcssagc until altcr 11:25 ~.:., whcn Marshall arrivcd in his o cc and 8ratton was nally ablc to dclivcr it to him pcrsonally. Marshall did not rcad it until altcr rcading thc othcr Japancsc mcssagcs that awaitcd him. nly thcn did Marshall dralt his mcssagc advising thc cld commandcrs ol thc 1:00 v.:. dclivcry timc lor thc Japancsc rcply to thc U.S. notc ol Novcmbcr 26. 8y thc timc thcsc warning mcs sagcs had bccn cncodcd and scnt to Manila, Pcarl Harbor, ctc., it was 11:58 ~.:. Altcr thc attack Marshall must havc lclt uncasy. Hc bcgan that vcry altcrnoon to chcck on thc disposition ol his lastmin utc mcssagc to his cld commandcrs, hc askcd lor an immcdi atc rcport on thc dclivcry ol that mcssagc. Licutcnant Coloncl dward F. Frcnch ol thc U.S. Armys Signal Corps wircd a 25 Villiam H. Standlcy and Arthur A. Agcton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry, 1955), pp.82, 83. 372 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy lollowup scrvicc mcssagc trying to track down whcn that mcs sagc to Pcarl Harbor had bccn dclivcrcd and to whom. !t had gonc to San Francisco by Vcstcrn Union, which had a tubc run ning across thc strcct to thc R.C.A. From thcrc it had gonc via RCAs powcrlul transmittcr to Hawaii. According to Frcnch, that was thc quickcst mcans at his disposal at thc timc. Frcnch told Vcstcrn Union that hc wantcd to know whosc hands that mcs sagc got into. Tis inquiry wcnt on latc until thc night, and 2:00 in thc morning wc hadnt as yct rcccivcd thc rcply. Frcnch also talkcd to thc signal o ccr ovcr thcrc |in Hawaii| . . . on thc wirc and told him it was impcrativc that |Frcnch| inlorm Gcncral Marshall as to who rcccivcd that mcssagc. 26
To track Marshalls mcssagc, Vashington wircd o cials in Hawaii on cccmbcr 9 asking thcm to advisc immcdiatcly cxact timc ol rcccipt ol our numbcr vc two ninc |Marshalls mcssagc|. . . . cccmbcr scvcn at Honolulu cxact timc dcciphcrcd mcssagc transmittcd by Signal Corps to sta and by what sta o ccr rcccivcd. Hawaiis rcply on cccmbcr 9, signcd by Gcncral Short, statcd that thc mcssagc was dclivcrcd to Honolulu, downtown, via RCA at 7:33 ~.:. ol thc 7th, rcccivcd, still in codc, at thc Signal cc, Fort Shaltcr, at about 11:45 ~.:. !t had thcn still to bc dcciphcrcd, and it didnt rcach thc adjutant gcncral until 2:58 v.:. in thc altcrnoon. 27 Many othcr principals conccrncd with thc nations dclcnscs may also havc had doubts and qucstions conccrning thc rcspon sibility lor thc disastcr. Somc ol thcm undoubtcdly lookcd on thc prospccts ol a lormal invcstigation with mixcd cmotions. 26 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, p. 1104, Frcnch tcstimony. 27 !bid., part 24, p. 1828. 19. The Administration Initiates an Investigation Ronvv:s Co::issiox Avvoix:vb O n cccmbcr 16 thc prcsidcnt namcd a vcman board, with Suprcmc Court Justicc wcn J. Robcrts as chairman, to invcstigatc thc attack. !n addition to Robcrts, it includcd two rctircd Navy o ccrs, onc rctircd and onc activc Army o ccr. 1 According to Admiral Villiam H. Standlcy, lormcr chicl ol naval opcrations and a mcmbcr ol thc Commission, FR hand pickcd thc othcr lour mcmbcrs in consultation with Stimson, Marshall, and possibly Knox, so that a majority could bc trustcd to concludc that Short and Kimmcl wcrc primarily rcsponsiblc lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr. 2
Tc Commissions assignmcnt was to dccidc whcthcr any dcrclictions ol duty or crrors ol judgmcnt on thc part ol Unitcd Statcs Army or Navy pcrsonncl contributcd to such succcsscs as wcrc achicvcd by thc cncmy. !l any such dcrclictions or crrors 1 Te New York Times, cccmbcr 17, 1941, p. 9. 2 Villiam H. Standlcy, Admiral (USN, Rct.) Junc 1, 1962, intcrvicw by Harry lmcr 8arncs, p. 7, notcs in authors posscssion. 373 374 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy wcrc lound, it was to dctcrminc who wcrc rcsponsiblc thcrclor. 3
Tc Commissions authority was limited to investigating Army and Navy personnel only; no civilian pcrsonncl. Tnv Co::issiox 8vcixs Hv~vixcs Tc Commission convcncd in Vashington cccmbcr 17, with only lour ol its vc mcmbcrs prcscnt. Vhcn Admiral Standlcy arrivcd thc ncxt day, hc lound thc Commission to bc a mixcd and a vcry mixcd upPrcsidcntial commission with civilian, naval and military mcmbcrs, lor which thcrc was no prcccdcnt in law, custom or jurisprudcncc. Hc was shockcd at thc irrcgularity ol thc proccdurc ol thc Commission and ol thc rcliancc placcd upon unsworn tcstimony. 4 !t was cmpowcrcd to prcscribc its own proccdurc but as originally sct up, it did not havc thc lcgal powcr to do anything which would bc usual and csscntial to carry out thc purposcs lor which it had bccn lormcd 5 to summon witncsscs, cnlorcc thcir attcndancc, administcr oaths, or takc tcs timony. Standlcy protcstcd at this lack ol lormal authority. 6
V~snixc:ox Tvs:i:oxvUxswovx Tc Commission mcmbcrs kncw nothing ol prcattack cvcnts cxccpt what thcy had rcad in thc ncwspapcrs. Tcy bcgan by qucs tioning top military o cials on thc Vashington situation. Nonc 3 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 5, p. 2210, part 23, p. 1247, part 24, p. 1306. 4 Villiam H. Standlcy and Arthur A. Agcton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry, 1955), pp. 8182. Scc also Standlcy intcrvicw in US. News & World Report, April 16, 1954, pp. 4046. 5 Standlcy, 8arncs Junc 1, 1962 intcrvicw, p. 8. 6 Standlcy, U.S. News & World Report, April 16, 1954. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 375 ol thc o ccrs was sworn. Nor wcrc thcy crosscxamincd. No tran scripts, only bricl summarics, ol thcir rcmarks wcrc publishcd. 7
Sccrctary ol Statc Hull had agrccd to advisc thc Commission by lcttcr as to warnings ol probablc Japancsc attack hc had rcccivcd lrom Stimson and Knox. 8 Tc sccrctarics ol war and navy, intcrvicwcd jointly by thc Commission mcmbcrs, ocrcd thc lullcst coopcration ol thcir cpartmcnts. Gcncral Marshall and Admiral Stark appcarcd togcthcr . . . and lurnishcd inlormation . . . showing that |Kimmcl and Short| . . . had bccn spccically warncd ol thc likclihood ol a probablc outbrcak ol war . . . on ctobcr 16, Novcmbcr 24, and Novcmbcr 27, 1941. 9
Gcncral Marshall rclatcd inlormativc or warning mcssagcs scnt to thc Commanding Gcncral ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt, including his cccmbcr 7 mcssagc to Gcncral Short which had bccn dispatchcd on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7 but which had not rcachcd Short in Hawaii until altcr thc attack. 10
Tc tcnor ol this unsworn tcstimony was that Vashington had bccn lully alcrt to thc possibility ol a surprisc Japancsc attack and ol suddcn raids on Pcarl Harbor. Stark was obligcd to admit, howcvcr, that all thc warnings scnt out lrom Vashington to thc cct commandcrs in thc months bclorc thc attack conccrning thc possibility ol attacks and cxpcditions against positions in thc Far ast convcycd thc idca that both hc and Marshall bclicvcd thc Far ast would bc thc locality whcrc thc major sustaincd 7 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 24, pp. 135561. Prccis ol Tcsti mony. 8 !bid., part 23, p. 1245. 9 !bid., p. 1246. 10 !bid., pp. 1, 2. Scc also ibid., part 14, pp. 140910 (xhibit No. 39), mcmo randa prcparcd lor thc rccord by L.T. Gcrow and V.8. Smith rcgarding Marshalls cccmbcr 7, 1941 warning. 376 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Japancsc cort would bc initiatcd. Hawaii was not spccically mcntioncd as a point ol attack. 11
Tc dircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc ivision acknowlcdgcd that sccrct inlormation had bccn rcccivcd in Vashington lcading thc Navy to concludc in Novcmbcr that thc Japancsc wcrc contcm plating an carly attack. According to him, |c|arc was takcn . . . to scc that thcsc two o ccrs |Kimmcl in Hawaii and Admiral Hart in thc Philippincs| wcrc kcpt lully adviscd as to dcvclopmcnts. 12
So hc assumcd that thcy had bccn scnt this inlormation. Pv~vi H~vnov Tvs:i:oxv Uxbvv ~:n n complction ol thc Vashington tcstimony, thc mcmbcrs ol thc Commission cw to Pcarl Harbor. 8y thcn, Congrcss had approvcd a joint rcsolution granting thc Commission powcr to conduct a propcr invcstigation and authorizing it to administcr oaths and a rmations, cxaminc witncsscs, and rcccivc cvidcncc. 13
Tus, thc military o ccrs in Hawaii tcsticd under oath. 8oth Short and Kimmcl wcrc still in thc scrvicc, although thcy had bccn rclicvcd ol thcir rcspcctivc commands on cccmbcr 16, shortly altcr thc attack. Shorts sta was availablc to hclp him, Kimmcls sta had put to sca with thc cct, so hc had littlc hclp in prcparing his tcstimony. 14
H~w~ii Swovx Tvs:i:oxv: Rvsvoxsiniii:v According to thc plan thcn in ccct, Army and Navy coordi natcd thcir opcrations lor thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor. Tc thrcc principalsKimmcl, 8loch, and Shorthad bccn vcry lrank with cach othcr, talkcd things ovcr, and Short bclicvcd thcy 11 !bid., part 23, p. 1357. 8ricl ol Admiral Starks Tcstimony. 12 !bid., part 23, p. 1361. Statcmcnt by Captain T. S. Vilkinson. 13 !bid., part 24, pp. 130708. 14 Standlcy and Agcrton, Admiral Ambassador, pp. 8384. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 377 had cnjoycd closcr coopcration in thc last cight or tcn months than . . . cvcr . . . bclorc. 15
Tcstimony rcvcalcd clcarly that rcsponsibility lor thc protcc tion ol Pcarl Harbors shorcbascd cstablishmcnts rcstcd on thc Army and Navy jointly. 16 Tc Armys rolc was basically to dclcnd onshorc cstablishmcnts, thc naval basc, and thc cct whcn it was in harbor. Tc Navys rcsponsibility was ocnsivc, to support thc Army by opcrations at sca. Tc Navy was not rcsponsiblc lor thc dclcnsc ol thc basc in casc ol an air raid, but, it was rcsponsiblc lor thc naval clcmcnts that could bc madc availablc |to thc Army and thc Army Air Forcc| lor thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor. 17 Kimmcl was not includcd in thc joint ArmyNavy plan lor dclcnding thc bascs onshorc cstablishmcnts, hc lully cxpcctcd whcn thc ght camc on that hc wouldnt bc down hcrc in thc harbor, that hc would bc on thc high scas ghting. 18 According to him, thc cct was to havc lrccdom ol action, to go and comc without bcing conccrncd about thc salcty . . . |cxccpt lor| thc broadcr stratcgy ol opcrations. 19 As Kimmcl put it, a Flcct basc is a havcn lor rct, supply, and lor rcst and rccrcation ol pcrsonncl altcr arduous dutics and strcnuous opcrations at sca. 20 Pcarl Harbors dclcnsc was in thc hands ol thc Army. Tc Navys aircralt carricrs wcrc ol spccial conccrn. Plancs could not takc o lrom a dockcd carricr, so whcn in port, both carricr and any plancs would bc vulncrablc . . . to attack and . . . dcstruction. 21 For salctys sakc, whcn in harbor, carricr aircralt 15 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 22, p.55. 16 !bid., part 22, p. 11, tcstimony ol Major Villiam S. Lawton, gcncral sta corps liaison o ccr with thc Navy, in chargc ol joint ArmyNavy activitics. 17 !bid., part 23, p. 1149. Kimmcl tcstimony, part 22, pp. 1011. Kimmcl mcmo randum ol cccmbcr 21, 1941, part 23, 1211 Kimmcl tcstimony. 18 !bid., part 22, p. 55. Short tcstimony. 19 !bid., part 23, pp. 112934. 20 !bid., part 23, p. 1129. 21 !bid., part 23, pp. 121718. 378 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy wcrc own o thcir mothcr ships. Tus, thc Navy rcquirc|d| shorc air bascs lor thc usc ol carricr aircralt in ordcr to maintain thcm in a propcr statc ol training lor war rcadincss 22 and so that in cvcnt ol bcing caught in port thosc plancs could bc usclul. Tosc shorc air bascs, also nccdcd to outt thc carricr plancs with bombs and ammunition, wcrc an Army rcsponsibility. Vhcn thc plancs assigncd to carricrs or to thc Marincs wcrc shorc bascd, thcy camc undcr thc commandcr Flcct Air ctachmcnt. 23 Air combat, Army pursuit airplancs, antiaircralt artillcry, and thc Aircralt Varning Scrvicc (radar) wcrc undcr thc command ol thc Armys intcrccptor commandcr. 24 Radar, still in its inlancy in 1941, was not lully opcrational on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, it was thcn opcrating lor drill purposcs only. 25
H~w~ii Swovx Tvs:i:oxv: Tnv Suvvvisv iv:vx: Knox, rccalling clcvcnmonth old corrcspondcncc bctwccn him and Stimson, considcrcd an air bombing attack or an air tor pcdo planc attack thc grcatcst potcntial dangcrs and urgcd Stimson to havc thc Army improvc Pcarl Harbors rcadincss to mcct such attacks. 26 Stimson assurcd Knox that thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt is thc bcst cquippcd ol all our ovcrscas dcpartmcnts, and hc was working to lurthcr improvc its dclcnsivc capabilitics: ncw pursuit plancs had bccn promiscd, Aircralt Varning Scrvicc cquipmcnt and barragc balloons wcrc on ordcr. 27
22 !bid., part 23, p. 1218, part 24, p. 1564. From Rcport ol ArmyNavy 8oard, ctobcr 31, 1941. 23 !bid., part 23, pp. 55455. 8cllingcr tcstimony. 24 !bid., part 22, p. 40. Short tcstimony. 25 !bid., part 23, p.1209. 26 !bid., 109294. Corrcspondcncc ol January 24, 1941. 27 Stimson mcmorandum, Fcbruary 7, 1941. Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, pp. 109495. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 379 8loch, who had oncc hcld Kimmcls position as commandcr inchicl ol thc cct, said that thc possibility ol a Japancsc air raid on Pcarl Harbor had always bccn a considcration, but in all cstimatcs ol thc situation that |hc was| lamiliar with . . . it was considcrcd rcmotc. 28 Ncvcrthclcss, in March Major Gcncral F. L. Martin, commandcr ol thc Armys Hawaiian Air Forcc, and Rcar Admiral P. N. L. 8cllingcr, commandcr ol thc Navys Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc, had cxamincd thc prospccts ol an attack on thc cct in Hawaii: 29
|T|hc most likcly and dangcrous lorm ol attack on ahu would bc an air attack . . . launchcd lrom onc or morc carri crs. . . . !n a dawn air attack thcrc is a high probability that it could bc dclivcrcd as a complctc surprisc in spitc ol any patrols wc might bc using and that it might nd us in a condition ol rcadincss undcr which pursuit would bc slow to start. Tc two commandcrs rccommcndcd daily patrols as lar as possiblc to scaward through 360 dcgrccs to rcducc thc probabili tics ol surlacc or air surprisc. Howcvcr, thcy rcalizcd that this can only bc ccctivcly maintaincd with prcscnt pcrsonncl and matcrial lor a vcry short pcriod and as a practicablc mcasurc cannot, thcrclorc, bc undcrtakcn unless other intelligence indi- cates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits. 30
istant rcconnaissancc, a Navy rcsponsibility, was gcncr ally acknowlcdgcd to bc thc bcst assurancc against an approach ing surprisc attack. Howcvcr, 8loch rcportcd that
rcconnaissancc plancs wcrc in scrious short supply on thc islands. !t was cstimatcd 28 !bid., part 22, pp. 46061, 8loch tcstimony. 29 !bid., part 23, pp. 114448. Martin8cllingcr mcmo, March 31, 1941. 30 !bid., p. 1145 (cmphasis addcd). 380 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy that to patrol 360 dcgrccs continually would havc rcquircd 200 300 plancs. 31 n papcr, 8loch tcsticd, |hc| had bccn givcn 108 patrol plancs lor that spccic purposc |distant rcconnaissancc|, nonc ol which had cvcr arrivcd, not onc ol thcm. 32 . . . Vc had a plancbuilding program, and on that plancbuilding program thc assignmcnt ol thc 14th Naval istrict was ninc squadrons ol patrol plancs and two squadrons ol obscrvation plancs, and thcy wcrc thc istrict lorccs that wcrc supposcd to do this rcconnaissancc, but thcrc wcrc nonc ol thcm cvcr dclivcrcd hcrc bccausc thcy hadnt bccn built. 33
Twcntylour ol ahus 72 patrol bombcrs wcrc thcn out with thc task lorccs Kimmcl had scnt to rcinlorcc thc bascs on Vakc and Midway. nly 36 plancs wcrc still at ahu, 12 ol which wcrc undcr ovcrhaul. Tcrc wcrc nowhcrc ncarly cnough plancs in Hawaii to carry out any distant rcconnaissancc. 34 8loch rclatcd his cxpcricncc in 1938, whcn hc had bccn commandcrinchicl ol thc U.S. Flcct. Tcy cndcavorcd to makc thc 360dcgrcc scarch with thc plancs thcy had, and wc had a trcmcndous numbcr ol casualtics. !n a lcw days thcy lost somcthing likc lour or vc plancs, and two ol thcm lost all thc crcws. Tcy lost thc othcr plancs that wcnt down, but rccovcrcd thc pcrsonncl. Tc lcsson lrom this mancuvcr was that to conduct a scarch c cicntly and to maintain it rcquircd a largc numbcr ol plancs, and thcy had to bc opcratcd morc or lcss day on and day o, so that onc day thcy |thc crcws| would go out, thc ncxt day thcy could rcst. !n othcr words thc strain on thc pcrsonncl was grcatcr than it was on thc matricl. 35
31 !bid., part 23, pp. 1134, 1183. Kimmcl tcstimony. 32 !bid., part 22, p. 460. 8loch tcstimony. 33 !bid., pp. 46970. 8loch tcstimony. 34 !bid., p. 487. Kimmcl tcstimony. 35 !bid., p. 466. 8loch tcstimony. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 381 Tc Navy undcr Kimmcl had bccn diligcnt in conducting rcconnaissancc, mainly antisubmarinc patrols, covcring thc 25 to 50 milc bclt around thc island that thc availablc plancs could covcr. 36 Howcvcr, Kimmcl admittcd that hc had considcrcd an air attack highly improbablc and patrols to thc northward not justicd. Had hc had warning that an air attack was any whcrc ncar probablc, hc said, ! would havc uscd cvcrything wc had, cvcrything. 37 8ut givcn thc statc ol thc plancs, it sccmcd morc prudcnt to conscrvc thcm lor action in thc war that was anticipatcd. !n addition to considcring thc likclihood ol submarinc and air attacks, thc Navy had also considcrcd thc possibility ol a tor pcdo attack. Howcvcr, this thrcat had gcncrally bccn discountcd bccausc ol thc shallowncss ol thc approach to Pcarl Harbor. 38 So thc usc ol |antitorpcdo| ba cs lor Pcarl Harbor or othcr har bors in thc Fourtccnth Naval istrict was not rccommcndcd. 39 !n Junc, thc Navy cpartmcnt again concludcd that a torpcdo planc attack in Pcarl Harbors rclativcly shallow watcr was unlikcly. !n any cvcnt, no antitorpcdo ba cs wcrc installcd. Tcrc had bccn gossip in thc ncwspapcrs in thc Statcs to thc ccct that thcrc had bccn a lot ol drinking and that somc in thc high command wcrc not t lor duty on Sunday morn ing, cccmbcr 7. 40 8oth Kimmcl and his aidc, Admiral Tcobald, dcnicd that drunkcnncss was a contributing lactor, no liquor is allowcd on board ship. 41 According to Kimmcl, thcrc had bccn vcry littlc drunkcnncss among thc o ccrs and mcn ol this cct. Vc havc dcalt vcry scriously with thc incidcnts which wcrc 36 !bid., p. 462. 8loch tcstimony. 37 !bid., part 23, p. 1183. Kimmcl tcstimony. 38 !bid., p. 1137. 39 !bid., p. 1139. 40 !bid., p. 1236. 41 !bid., p. 1235. 382 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy rcportcd by thc patrol, and thcy havc bccn isolatcd instanccs. 42
Nor was Kimmcl conscious . . . ol thc spccial dangcrs ol a Sunday, 43 whcn morc passcs and lcavcs wcrc issucd on Saturdays and lcwcr mcn and o ccrs wcrc apt to bc aboard ship, alcrt, and rcady lor action. Tcrc wcrc not apprcciably morc abscnccs ol o ccrs and mcn on Sunday than on any othcr day. Truc, somc commanding o ccrs wcrc ashorc, but that dcpcndcd on whcthcr or not thcir lamilics wcrc in Hawaii. Tcrc wcrc a grcat many o ccrs hcrc who had no lamilics, and thcy slcpt on board, so il thcrc wcrc lcwcr o ccrs aboard it was not cntircly duc to its bcing a wcckcnd. 44
H~w~ii Swovx Tvs:i:oxv: Pvvv~vvbxvss As Admiral Richardson prcparcd to rclinquish command ol thc U.S. Pacic Flcct in January 1941, hc and Kimmcl, who was prcparing to takc ovcr command, collaboratcd in a lcttcr to Chicl ol Naval pcrations Stark, conccrning thc sccurity mcasurcs rcquircd lor thc protcction ol Flcct units, at sca and in port. Surprisc raids on Pcarl Harbor, or attcmpts to block thc chan ncl, thcy wrotc, wcrc possiblc. Tc cct was scvcrcly handi cappcd in prcparing lor such contingcncics by ccrtain markcd dccicncics in thc cxisting local dclcnsc lorccs and cquipmcnt both Army and Navy. Morcovcr, many ol thc ccts lacilitics wcrc obsolcsccnt. Richardson and Kimmcl urgcd that corrccting thcsc critical dccicncics bc givcn priority ovcr thc nccds ol contincntal districts, thc training program, and matcrial aid to Grcat 8ritain. 45
Short, who was rcsponsiblc lor thc protcction ol thc cct whcn in Pcarl Harbor, said it was practically impossiblc to protcct thc 42 !bid., part 23, p. 1236. 43 !bid., p. 1184. 44 !bid., p. 1185. Kimmcl tcstimony. 45 !bid., part 22, pp. 32931. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 383 ships in such a rcstrictcd arca against a scrious attack, no mat tcr how much you tricd. Vith so many ships dockcd so closc togcthcr, hc could not havc guarantccd that no cncmy planc could gct in and makc a hit, somc would bc bound to sucr losscs. 46
Troughout 1941, thc Hawaiian commandcrsKimmcl, Short, and 8lochhad prcsscd rcpcatcdly lor additional mcn and cquipmcnt. Tcy rcccivcd some rcinlorccmcnts but thcsc lailcd to build up thc Hawaiian lorccs as hopcd, as othcr lac tors wcrc stcadily croding thcm. Rcgular and cxpcricnccd o ccrs wcrc bcing dctachcd at an alarming ratc, and many traincd cnlistcd mcn wcrc not planning to rccnlist whcn thcir duty was up. 47 !n May 1941, about a quartcr ol thc Pacic Flccts ships had bccn translcrrcd to thc Atlantic on ordcrs lrom Vashington. Morcovcr, rclativcly lcw ol thc ncw plancs, mcn, and guns that rcachcd Hawaii rcmaincd thcrc, most continucd on to thc wcst. Tc Army was cngagcd in lcrrying . . . plancs to thc Asiatics. 48
Longrangc patrol bombcrs wcrc bcing own to thc Philippincs via Hawaii, Midway, Vakc, and Australia. vcr and abovc thc Armys dclcnsivc rolc at Pcarl Harbor, thc Army air corps had a vcry spccic mission . . . ol prcparing . . . combat tcams to lcrry plancs |817s| to thc Philippincs. No onc can just stcp into thc cockpit ol a 817, a Flying Fortrcss, lrom his training ship and immcdiatcly y it across thc Pacic. A pilot must rst train on 818s and A20s, and thcn scrvc as a 817 copilot, bclorc taking ovcr as a lullcdgcd 817 pilot. !t would havc bccn risky to scnd a planc across thc Pacic with a halltraincd crcw, and Short had only six bombcrs at his disposal to do all this training. Short couldnt (1) usc thcsc six bombcrs lor training pilots lor lcrrying missions, and at thc samc timc (2) turn thcm ovcr to thc Navy lor longrangc rcconnaissancc, 46 !bid., part 22, p. 104. Short tcstimony. 47 !bid., part 23, p. 1155. Kimmcl mcmo to CN, May 26, 1941. 48 !bid., p. 1151. Kimmcl tcstimony. 384 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy and also (3) kccp thcm scattcrcd about, warmcd up 24 hours a day, and rcady to takc to thc air. Hc didnt havc cnough plancs to accomplish both (1) and (2), and hc hadnt considcrcd thc thrcat scrious cnough to justily (3). 49
n ctobcr 17 Stark had wircd Kimmcl: 8ccausc ol thc grcat importancc ol continuing to rccnlorcc thc Philippincs with long rangc Army bombcrs you arc rcqucstcd to takc all practical prccautions lor thc salcty ol thc airclds at Vakc and Midway. 50 Tc plan was to lcrry somc 60 longrangc bombcrs out to thc Philippincs via Hawaii and Vakc. As Kimmcl was rcspon siblc lor thc dclcnsc ol Vakc and lor thc dclcnsc ol Midway and lor putting Marincs and guns and all othcr dclcnsivc wcapons out thcrc, 51 hc procccdcd to strcngthcn thcir dclcnscs as bcst hc could. Tc war warning mcssagc ol Novcmbcr 27 had instructcd Kimmcl to carry out thc tasks assigncd in VPL 46, that is, to gct rcady to attack thc Japancsc bascs in thc Marshall !sland. 52 Two othcr dispatchcs on that samc day ordcrcd him to prcparc troops lor our advancc bascs and to transport 25 Army pursuit plancs with ground crcws to Vakc and Midway. Stationing thcsc plancs |on Vakc and Midway| must not bc allowcd to intcrlcrc with planncd movcmcnts ol Army bombcrs to Philippincs. 53 Kimmcl rcalizcd thc Army was short ol plancs. Shortly bclorc rcinlorcing Vakc and Midway hc had wantcd thc Army to participatc in Navy mancuvcrs, but thc Army could not do it bccausc thcy wcrc cngagcd in lcrrying thcsc plancs to thc Asiatics, and in 49 !bid., part 22, p. 76. Short tcstimony. 50 !bid., part 14, p. 1403. From CN to C!NCPAC, #171458. 51 !bid., part 23, p. 1240. Kimmcl tcstimony. 52 !bid., part 6, p. 2518. 53 !bid. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 385 gctting thcir plancs in a lcrrying condition hcrc. . . . Tcy had thcir problcms too, Kimmcl said. 54 Short and Kimmcl mct with sta mcmbcrs on Novcmbcr 27 to discuss thc translcr lrom ahu ol 25 pursuit plancs cach to Vakc and Midway, as Vashington had ordcrcd. 55 Kimmcl qucstioncd his war plans o ccr: |V|hat is your idca ol thc chanccs ol a surprisc raid on ahu: McMorris: ! should say nonc, Admiral. At thc timc, Short said, |T|hcrc was no cxccption takcn to that statcmcnt by cithcr Admiral Kimmcl or Admiral 8loch, and apparcntly thc Navy lclt that thcy had dcnitc inlormation ol thc location ol carri crs and major ships ol thc Japancsc and that thcrc was no qucs tion in thcir minds ol thc possibility or probability ol a surprisc attack upon ahu. 56
Tc construction ol thc airclds on Vakc and Midway had to bc carricd out undcr thc most advcrsc conditions. Vc wcrc laccd with thc ncccssity ol building bascs and ol protccting thcm at thc samc timc. Tc dispatch ol rcinlorccmcnts thcrc would scri ously wcakcn Hawaiis dclcnsivc lorccs. !t was nally dccidcd to scnd only hall thc numbcr ol plancs Vashington had suggcstcd. Rightly or wrongly, Kimmcl tcsticd, wc cvcntually had thcrc about 350 marincs and 6 5inch guns and 12 3inch guns and a numbcr ol machinc guns, and wc had 12 ghting plancs thcrc. 57
n Novcmbcr 28 Kimmcl dispatchcd a convoy, undcr Admiral Villiam F. Halscy, with mcn and plancs to Vakc. 8ccausc thcrc had bccn a warning lrom thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations that thc convcrsations with thc Japancsc rcprcscntativcs wcrc about to brcak down, and to bc prcparcd lor cvcntualitics, all thc ships 54 !bid., part 23, p. 1151. 55 !bid., part 22, p. 43. 56 !bid., part 22, p. 43. Short tcstimony. 57 !bid., part 23, p. 1190. Kimmcl tcstimony. 386 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy in Halscys convoy wcrc to assumc a condition ol rcadincss lor instant combat and to maintain strict radio silcncc. 58
n cccmbcr 5 Kimmcl scnt out a sccond convoy undcr Admiral J.H. Ncwton, with a squadron ol plancs bound lor Midway. 59
8loch, who had takcn ovcr thc rcsponsibility lor thc sccu rity ol thc basc, had writtcn thc Navy cpartmcnt about thc wcakncss in thc pursuit plancs, bombing plancs, and antiaircralt guns. Tc Army had dispatchcd to Hawaii a largc numbcr ol pursuit plancs and somc hcavy bombcrs, but no antiaircralt guns |wcrc| lorthcoming. 60 Vhcn 8loch prcsscd his nccd lor plancs and vcsscls, hc was told thcy wcrc doing cvcrything within thcir powcr to gct thcm and would scnd thcm as soon as thcy could. 61
As a rcsult ol 8lochs corts, Pcarl Harbor nally obtaincd onc division ol dcstroycrs, lour dcstroycrs, only onc ol which has any listcning gcar, and onc division ol lour minc swccpcrs. !n accor dancc with Kimmcls ordcr, thc dcstroycrs wcrc stationcd at thc harbor cntrancc, thc minc swccpcrs swcpt thc channcl, thc ncts wcrc opcrating, and boom and harbor patrols wcrc cxccutcd. Howcvcr, antiaircralt protcction ol Pcarl Harbor was wcak. 8loch was also chargcd on papcr with thc rcsponsibility lor dis tant rcconnaissancc, 108 patrol plancs had bccn promiscd lor that purposc, nonc ol which had cvcr arrivcd, not onc ol thcm. 62
8clorc cccmbcr 7 Short rcccivcd thrcc scrious warning mcssagcs lrom Vashingtonctobcr 16, Novcmbcr 27, and Novcmbcr 28. 63 All thrcc mcssagcs 58 !bid., part 23, p. 608. Halscy tcstimony. 59 !bid., p. 1166. Kimmcl. 60 !bid., part 22, p. 471. 8loch tcstimony. 61 !bid., pp. 461, 469. 8loch tcstimony. 62 !bid., p. 469. 8loch tcstimony. 63 !bid., p. 39. Short tcstimony. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 387 cmphasizcd right straight through that wc must not disclosc our stand and that wc must not alarm thc population and that wc must takc mcasurcs to protcct against sabotagc, against cspionagc, and against subvcrsivc action. Nowhcrc did thcy indicatc in any way thc ncccssity lor protccting against attack. Tcy also did indicatc dcnitcly that wc must avoid publicity and avoid alarming thc public. 64
Short institutcd what was known as Alcrt #1, lor sabotagc. !l thc Army had gonc to thc ncxt highcr alcrt, Alcrt #2, all anti aircralt guns would havc bccn sct out with livc ammunition right alongsidc, pcoplc would thcn havc noticcd. And that, Short maintaincd, would havc violatcd thc Var cpartmcnts intcn tions to not alarm thc population. 65 n Novcmbcr 29 hc dctailcd thc prccautions bcing takcn against subvcrsivc activitics. 66
Vashington madc no objcction whatcvcr to Shorts rcport that hc was alcrtcd lor sabotagc. Short told thc Commission, !l thcy had any idca that that was not a corrcct ordcr, thcy had all thc opportunity lrom Novcmbcr 27 to cccmbcr 7 to comc back and say, Vc do not considcr thc action takcn by you as su cicnt and that you should instcad takc action to dclcnd yourscll against air attack. Hc took Vashingtons lailurc to objcct to his action as tacit agrccmcnt with thc coursc |hc| had takcn. Hc did not scc how |hc| could draw any othcr conclusion. 67
Short bclicvcd that il Vashington rcally wantcd him to know somcthing urgcntly, it would havc contactcd him by its spccch scramblcr tclcphonc. Short had a sccrct phonc . . . with con ncctions to thc sccrct phonc right in thc Chicl ol Stas o cc. 64 !bid., p. 39, p. 58. Short tcstimony. 65 !bid., part 24, pp. 177476. 66 !bid., part 22, p. 39. 67 !bid., pp. 4548. 388 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Short had talkcd with Marshall rcpcatcdly on this tclcphonc, which was thc lastcst thing that could possibly comc through, taking only about 15 minutcs to cstablish contact. Vhilc not considcrcd as salc as codc, thcy |scramblcr phoncs| arc rcasonably salc. 68 Vashington didnt phonc Short with a spccial warning bctwccn Novcmbcr 27 and cccmbcr 7. Tc cc ol Navy !ntclligcnccs (N!) cccmbcr 5 sum mary ol thc Japancsc naval situation rcportcd that cxtcnsivc prcparations arc undcr way lor hostilitics. Troop transports and lrcightcrs wcrc pouring continually down lrom Japan and north crn China coast ports hcadcd south, apparcntly lor Frcnch !ndo China and Formosan ports. 69 And thc intclligcncc Kimmcl and Short rcccivcd lrom Vashington during this pcriod indicatcd that thc Japancsc lorccs wcrc hcading lor southcast Asia and wcrc cxpcctcd to strikc in thc vcry lar wcst at thc Philippincs, Tailand, thc Kra pcninsula, or possibly 8ornco, 70 about 3,000 milcs lrom Hawaii. 8oth Kimmcl and Short had prcparcd contingcncy plans, dctailing what to do in casc thcy wcrc attackcd. Kimmcl was by no mcans convinccd that wc wcrc going to gct into thc war at this timc and that wc would bccomc involvcd immcdiatcly. Tat was, ol coursc, hc said, |his| mistakc. 71 Ncvcrthclcss, hc had madc plans lor going to war. From Novcmbcr 30 on, hc had prcparcd daily mcmoranda to show what thc initial stcps would bc whcn war would comc. n thc morning ol cccmbcr 6 Kimmcl had gonc ovcr his cccmbcr 5 mcmorandum, which had sct lorth thc stcps to bc takcn in casc ol AmcricanJapancsc war. Hc said 68 !bid., p. 48. 69 !bid., part 23, pp. 115253. N! cccmbcr 1, 1941 rcport ol Japancsc Naval Situation. 70 !bid. 71 !bid., p. 1167. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 389 thcy wcrc alivc to thc possibility ol war. 72 |!|n accordancc with thc sccurity mcasurcs wc had in ccct, hc pointcd out, Patrol Ving 2 did not havc to wait lor spccic instructions, it sct out immcdiatcly altcr thc attack bcgan to scarch lor thc cncmy. 73
H~w~ii Swovx Tvs:i:oxv: !x:viiicvxcv Tc mcmbcrs ol thc Robcrts Commission lcarncd lrom wit ncss altcr witncss about thc intclligcncc availablc to thc Hawaiian commandcrs. !t camc principally lrom lour sourccs: (1) obscrva tion, (2) dcciphcring ol somc minor Japancsc codcs, PAK2, (3) dircctionnding (.F.) stations that analyzcd radio bcams broadcast lrom Japancsc ships, and (4) advicc lorwardcd lrom thc N! and chicl ol naval opcrations (CN) in Vashington. Rcsponsibility lor intclligcncc in Hawaii was dividcd bctwccn two authoritics: thc Combat !ntclligcncc Unit, conccrncd pri marily with thc lunctions ol thc cncmy . . . and . . . cncmy movc mcnts, and thc istrict !ntclligcncc ccr, who has morc to do with dclcnsc. . . . Subvcrsivc activitics, alicns, sabotagc, and that sort ol thing. 74 Commandcr Joscph John Rochclort ol Combat !ntclligcncc tricd to covcr cvcry possiblc transmission . . . by thc Gcrmans, !talians, Japancsc through his .F. stations and his intcrccptor watch, which intcrccpts cncmy transmissions in thc lorm ol radio mcssagcs and copics thc radio mcssagcs intact. His opcrators wcrc ablc to pick up transmissions lrom Tokyo and thc Japancsc cct. Tcn thcrc was also thc scarch watch, which scarchcd lrom thc bottom ol thc |radio| band to thc top. 75 To discovcr what thc Japancsc cct was doing, thc intclligcncc o ccrs in Hawaii did thcir bcst to piccc togcthcr what thcy could lcarn lrom thc intcrccptcd radio transmissions, radio bcams, and 72 !bid., p. 1167. 73 !bid., p. 1129. 74 !bid., part 22, pp. 673, 67677. Rochclort tcstimony. 75 !bid., pp. 67778. 390 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thcir scarch watch. thcrwisc, all thcy kncw ol thc impcnding crisis, cxccpt lor thc Vashington dispatchcs rcporting Japancsc ship movcmcnts in thc vicinity ol thc South China Sca, was glcancd lrom thc Honolulu ncwspapcrs. And according to prcss rcports, thc thrcat appcarcd to havc abatcd tcmporarily, Japancsc U.S. convcrsations in Vashington wcrc continuing. From about Novcmbcr 1 on, Hawaiian !ntclligcncc pcrsonncl rcalizcd somcthing was aloot. Tcy couldnt put thcir ngcrs on it cxactly, but it was apparcnt that somcthing was building up, just as it had bccn scvcral ycars carlicr, whcn thc Japancsc wcrc prc paring to movc against thc Chincsc island ol Hainan, and again in thc spring ol 1941, whcn thcy wcrc gctting rcady to go into !ndochina. About Novcmbcr 25 or 26, it bccamc apparcnt that Japancsc submarincs and aircralt carricrs, and probably a battlcship division, wcrc conccntratcd in thc Marshall !sland arca, south ol Vakc. 8y thc cnd ol thc month it lookcd as il cvcrything, cxccpt lor somc ships still in thc Marshalls, was wcst ol that, down around Palao, not lar lrom thc Philippincs. Tis lormation just didnt sccm logi cal, but Hawaiian !ntclligcncc was positivc, lrom thcir study ol thc tra c, that thc carricrs wcrc in thc Marshalls. So thcy scnt a dispatch to this ccct to thc Navy cpartmcnt in Vashington. About a day altcr that thc carricrs just complctcly droppcd lrom sight, ncvcr hcard anothcr word lrom thcm. . . . |T|hcy just complctcly droppcd out ol thc picturc approximatcly thc rst ol cccmbcr, battlcships likcwisc. 76
Flcct !ntclligcncc ccr Licutcnant Commandcr dwin Tomas Layton cstimatcd thcy wcrc in port, having complctcd 76 !bid., pp. 67778. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 391 two wccks opcrations, and thcy arc having an ovcrhaul lor ncw opcrations. 77
!n addition to thc tra c buildup, Hawaiian !ntclligcncc had anothcr hint ol impcnding Japancsc actionthc ccts lrcqucnt codc changcs in latc 1941. Tc Japancsc normally changcd thcir sca and shorc calls twicc a ycar, on thc rst ol Novcmbcr and thc rst ol March or April. 8ut in 1941 thcy didnt wait lor Novcmbcr. Tcy changcd thcir codcs a month carly, on ctobcr 1. Tcn thcy changcd thcm again on Novcmbcr 1, and still again on cccmbcr 1. 78 Tc Japancsc wcrc apparcntly planning somc thing. 8ut what: Vhcrc: Vhcn: Tc Armys Hawaiian dcpart mcnt rclicd on inlormation supplicd by thc Fourtccnth Naval istrict, thc Var cpartmcnts G2 in Vashington, which got its inlormation through N!. 79
Mcmbcrs ol thc Robcrts Commission askcd again and again why thc Hawaiian lorccs wcrc surpriscd so complctcly. Tc intcl ligcncc that rcachcd Hawaii lrom Vashington in thc wccks and months prcccding cccmbcr 7, 1941, warncd rcpcatcdly that a strikc was cxpcctcd in southcast Asia, thousands ol milcs lrom Pcarl Harbor. Kimmcl summarizcd: And thc cpartmcnt by thcir dispatchcs cvidcnccd considcrablc conccrn about thc sccu rity ol thcir outlying bascs. vcn Commission chairman Robcrts admittcd that anyonc who rcads thosc tclcgrams will scc that thc Naval !ntclligcncc indicatcd aggrcssivc movcmcnts many thousand milcs lrom Pcarl Harbor. 80 Tc buildup ol Hawaiis dclcnscs had bccn ncglcctcd at thc cxpcnsc ol othcr thcatcrs ol 77 !bid., part 23, p. 679. Rochclort tcstimony. Scc also part 22, p. 664. Layton tcstimony. And dwin T. Layton, Rogcr Pincau, and John Costcllo, And I Was Tere: Pearl Harbor and MidwayBreaking the Secrets (Ncw York: V. Morrow, 1985), pp. 22830. 78 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, p. 679. Rochclort tcstimony. 79 !bid., part 23, p. 1238. 80 !bid., p. 1238. Chairman Robcrts. 392 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy war, as Kimmcl had notcd. Rcpcatcd rcqucsts by thc Hawaiian commandcrs lor morc mcn and matcricl had bccn ignorcd. Pos:A::~cx Rvvvi~:ioxs ix H~w~ii !mmcdiatcly altcr thc attack, o cials ol thc F.8.!. cntcrcd thc Japancsc consulatc in Honolulu. Tcy intcrruptcd thc burning ol papcrs, arrcstcd thc consul, and scizcd Japancsc codcs and papcrs. Short said, Tcy got almost a complctc lc. 81 Vith thc hclp ol thcsc codcs, thc Navy was soon ablc to dcciphcr communications which had passcd bctwccn Tokyo and thc Japancsc consul in thc wccks prcccding thc attack. Tcsc capturcd communications undoubtcdly includcd thc ships in harbor mcssagcs that had bccn intcrccptcd in Hawaii bclorc thc attack, lorwardcd still in codc by airmail on Vashingtons ordcrs, thcn dccodcd, translatcd, and madc availablc bclorc cccmbcr 7 to Vashington o cials, though not to thc Hawaiian commandcrs. n cccmbcr 9, Kimmcl saw translations ol thcsc mcssagcs. Tcy madc it vcry clcar that Tokyo had attachcd spccial impor tancc to inlormation conccrning thc location ol ships in Pcarl Harbor. Apparcntly, Japan had no intcntion ol attacking Pcarl Harbor in thc abscncc ol a largc numbcr ol our battlcships and aircralt carricrs. 82 nc mcssagc, scnt to Tokyo by thc Japancsc consul on cccmbcr 3 83 itcmizcd laboratc arrangcmcnts . . . to rcport to Japancsc submarincs and Japancsc vcsscls at sca thc dcparturc ol aircralt carricrs and battlcships lrom Pcarl Harbor by: (1) 8roadcast advcrtiscmcnts ovcr KGM8 at 0945 daily, (2) A systcm ol lights lrom a housc on Lanakai and Kalama during thc night and visual day signals at Lanakai lrom a starboat during daylight, (3) Furthcr visual 81 !bid., part 22, p. 89. Short tcstimony. 82 !bid., part 23, p. 1153. Kimmcl tcstimony. 83 !bid. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 393 warning ol thc abscncc ol aircralt carricrs and battlcships was a bonrc to bc shown on thc !sland ol Mauri |sic| ncar thc Kula Sanatarium. 84
Had Kimmcl known on cccmbcr 3, whcn thc Japancsc con sul scnt this mcssagc to Tokyo, that a scrics ol signals was bcing sct up to indicatc which ships wcrc in thc harbor and which wcrc out, hc would havc immcdiatcly rcportcd it to Vashington and |would havc| considcrcd it almost cquivalcnt to a dcclaration ol war. 85 !l hc had had this inlormation on cccmbcr 6, hc would havc ordcrcd all units to sca, bccausc thc bcst dispositions against surprisc air attack can bc ccctcd with thc cct at sca. 86 8ut hc and Short kncw nothing ol any such mcssagcs. Tcy undoubtcdly had suspcctcd that Japancsc spics on ahu had bccn watching thc ships in thc harbor, although thcy certainly didnt know that mcssagcs about ship locations had bccn dccodcd, translatcd, and rcad by many top U.S. o cials, days, cvcn wccks, bclorc thc attack. Likcwisc, thc Robcrts commissioncrs probably did not know that somc ol thcsc mcssagcs had bccn availablc in Vashington prior to thc attackat lcast nonc ol thc Vashington o cials thcy qucstioncd had mcntioncd thcm. 8~cx ix V~snixc:ox: So:v Ab:issioxs nv M~vsn~ii Tc Commission complctcd its Hawaiian hcarings and dcpartcd on January 10, 1942. n January 15 thc mcmbcrs arrivcd back in Vashington and rcsumcd qucstioning Vashington o cials lor onc day. 87 Tcy again qucstioncd Marshall, Stark, Turncr, 84 !bid. 85 !bid., p. 1050. Kimmcl tcstimony. 86 !bid., p. 1153. Kimmcl. tcstimony. 87 !bid., pp. 1075. 394 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy and Gcrow. Tc most signicant tcstimony was that givcn by Marshall, this timc undcr oath. 88
Marshall admittcd that cvcn with thc supcrior intclligcncc availablc to him, hc had bccn surpriscd by thc attack. Japancsc movcmcnts wcrc going on around thc Philippincs, Marshall rccallcd. And il anything happcncd thcy wcrc going to gct it. . . . So, in point ol priority, il wc had turncd to thc tclcphonc to scnd a warning, hc ccrtainly would havc turncd to thc Philippincs rst. Vashington had had cvidcncc also ol gathcring strcngth in thc Mandatc !slands, air and naval vcs scls. . . . |V|c assumcd that Guam would bc wipcd out ol thc picturc right at thc start. Tat thcy |thc Japancsc| would carry thc mattcr right up to Hawaii ! didnt anticipatc. 89 Marshall admittcd also that hc had lully anticipatcd a tcr ric cort to cripplc cvcrything out thcrc by sabotagc. 90 Hc had considcrcd thc local Japancsc population to bc thc grcatcst thrcat to Hawaii. n top ol that, hc admittcd his lailurc to rcalizc that Shorts alcrt lor sabotagc callcd lor bunching thc plancs. 91 Yct thc spccic purposc ol Alcrt #1, as statcd in thc Hawaiian cpartmcnts Standard pcrating Proccdurc, was to dclcnd thc airclds and vital installations against acts ol sabotagc and uprisings. 92 !t was lor this rcason that Short ordcrcd thc plancs 88 !bid., part 23, pp. 107582. 89 !bid., p. 1081. 90 !bid., p. 1081. Marshall tcstimony. 91 !bid., p. 1079. 92 !bid., part 24, pp. 177176. Shorts Standing pcration Proccdurc, Hcad quartcrs Hawaiian cpartmcnt, 5 Novcmbcr 1941. Tc stcps to bc takcn undcr Alcrts #1, 2, and 3 arc itcmizcd: thc phrasc against acts ol sabotagc and uprisings appcar on pagc 1771 in SCT!N !!ALRTS, paragraph 14, ALERT NO. 1. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 395 kcpt in thc vicinity ol thc landing mat or thc apron in groups, so thcy could bc guardcd vcry closcly. 93
As lor naval rcconnaissancc, Marshall had assumcd that, as a rcsult ol thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning, thc Navy would havc dispatchcd ovcrwatcr patrols to scarch lor cncmy ships. 94 Hc appcarcd unawarc ol thc shortagc ol plancs in Hawaii. Vhcn Stark and Turncr wcrc qucstioncd again, this timc undcr oath, thcy appcarcd to havc a morc rcalistic vicw ol thc Hawaiian supply situation than Marshall. 95 Turncr had assumcd that thcy had a longrangc rcconnaissancc, although hc kncw that thcrc wcrc an insu cicnt numbcr ol plancs thcrc to conduct a longrangc rcconnaissancc scarch 360 dcgrccs cxtcnding ovcr a considcrablc pcriod ol timc. 96
At thc timc ol thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning, whcn Stark had ordcrcd Kimmcl to undcrtakc dclcnsivc dcploymcnt . . . in accordancc with his |war| plan, hc had cxpcctcd Kimmcl to takc dispositions to avoid surprisc, so far as he could with what he had (italics addcd). Howcvcr, Stark had thought that Kimmcl would havc bccn ablc to includc air patrols. 97 Stark had also cxpcctcd Kimmcl to gct morc plancs and pcrsonncl, and so on, out to Vakc and Midway, il possiblc, and to scnd his task lorccssomc task lorccs to sca in rcadincss to catch any raidcrs. And this, Stark admittcd, Kimmcl had donc. 98
According to Gcrow, thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning had callcd lor carrying out rcconnaissancc and othcr mcans ol guard ing against a surprisc attack. 99 Shorts lailurc to do so, Gcrow 93 !bid., part 22, p. 36. Short tcstimony. 94 !bid., part 23, p. 1077. 95 !bid., pp. 108292. 96 !bid., pp. 108586. 97 !bid., p. 1086. 98 !bid., p. 1087. 99 !bid., p. 1108. 396 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy said, did not constitutc a dircct disobcdicncc ol that dircctivc, although hc considcrcd it a lailurc to obcy ordcrs. 100 Gcrow was quitc critical ol Short lor not having conductcd morc cxtcnsivc rcconnaissancc. 101 Tc Commission nishcd qucstioning Vashington witncsscs within thc day and thcn bcgan prcparing its rcport. Co::issiox Fixbixcs !n thc month thc Commission cxistcd, it took tcstimony lrom 127 witncsscs in Vashington and Hawaii. !ts ndings camc to 2,173 pagcs ol cvidcncc and cxhibits. 102 !t spcnt January 2023 dralting its rcport. Tc rcport was nishcd on January 23 and dclivcrcd to thc prcsidcnt on thc morning ol January 24. Tc Commission thcn adjourncd. Tc rcport was publishcd in lull in thc New York Times on January 25, 1942. To Commissioncr Standlcy, it appcarcd that thc majority ol thc mcmbcrs wcrc prcjudiccd against Kimmcl lrom thc start. Tis prcjudicc cvcn carricd ovcr to thc way Kimmcls rcmarks wcrc rccordcd. Tcy wcrc carclcssly transcribcd, containcd crrors, and whcn hc suggcstcd ccrtain rcvisions, 103 thc Commission inscrtcd his corrcctions by intcrlcaving thc tcxt ol cach suggcstcd rcvision on a pagc immcdiatcly lollowing cach pagc rclcrrcd to, 104 mak ing his tcstimony di cult to rcad. To mollily him, thc corrcctcd transcript was printcd in lull at thc cnd ol thc Commissions pub lishcd hcarings, just prcccding thc cxhibits. 105
100 !bid., part 23, p. 1109. 101 !bid., p. 1112. 102 !bid., part 39, p. 1. 103 !bid., part 22, p. 315. 104 !bid., pp. 317. For corrcctcd tcstimony, scc part 23, pp.123, part 22, pp. 317411 (corrcctcd pagcs intcrlcalcd), 41559, 9311051. 105 !bid., part 23, pp. 112344. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 397 Vhat had thc mcmbcrs ol thc Commission lcarncd in thcir month ol hcarings: Tcy had lcarncd that thc intclligcncc avail ablc in Hawaii was mcagcr indccd, and cvcn mislcading. All availablc clucs had pointcd to a Japancsc strikc in southcast Asia, thousands ol milcs wcst ol Pcarl Harbor. Tc Commission mcm bcrs had lcarncd that Pcarl Harbor was lacking in plancs, antiair cralt guns, and othcr matcrial nccdcd lor thc dclcnsc ol thc basc, duc to thc dcmands ol othcr thcatcrs ol war. Tcy had discovcrcd what thcy had known bclorc thcy startcd thcir invcstigation, that thc Hawaiian commandcrs had bccn surpriscd by thc Japancsc air attack. 8ut thcy had also discovcrcd that Chicl ol Sta Marshall had bccn just as surpriscd. Ncvcrthclcss, thc Commission placcd thc rcsponsibility lor thc cxtcnt ol Japans succcss in surprising thc cct on thc two Hawaiian commandcrs. Tc Commission appcarcd to placc considcrablc crcdcncc on thc January 24, 1941, lcttcr lrom Sccrctary ol Navy Knox to Sccrctary ol Var Stimson, writtcn clcvcn months bclorc thc attack, suggcsting that, !l war cvcntuatcs with Japan, it is bclicvcd casily possiblc, that hostilitics would bc initiatcd by a surprisc attack upon thc Flcct or thc Naval 8asc at Pcarl Harbor by air bomb ing attack, air torpcdo planc attack, sabotagc, submarinc attack, mining, or bombardmcnt by gun rc. 106 isrcgarding latcr lcttcrs, intclligcncc, and communications to thc commandcrs in thc cld about thc movcmcnts ol thc Japancsc in thc South China Sca, thc Commission implicd that this should havc su ccd to alcrt thc Hawaiian commandcrs against a surprisc attack. Tc Commission lound that thc commandcrs opcratcd undcr somc disadvantagc: Tc pcrsonncl, matricl, and cquipmcnt wcrc insu cicnt to placc thc lorccs on a war looting and main tain thcm on that looting lor an cxtcndcd pcriod. Yct thc rcport continucd: Tcsc dccicncics did not prccludc mcasurcs which would havc to a grcat cxtcnt lrustratcd thc attack or mitigatcd 106 !bid., pp. 109295. 398 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy its scvcrity. 107 Morcovcr, in spitc ol thc rccognizcd shortagc ol rcconnaissancc plancs, thc Commission hcld that Mcans wcrc availablc lor distant rcconnaissancc which would havc aordcd a mcasurc ol sccurity against a surprisc attack. 108
Tc Commission admittcd that thc Hawaiian commandcrs wcrc handicappcd by lack ol inlormation as to Japancsc disposi tions and intcnt, which would havc bccn vital to thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor. Ncvcrthclcss, in thc Commissions vicw, Tc lack ol such knowlcdgc rcndcrcd morc urgcnt thc initiation ol a statc ol rcadincss lor dclcnsc. 109 According to thc Commission rcports conclusions, thc rcsponsiblc commandcrs in thc Hawaiian arca |had| prcparcd plans which, il adaptcd and uscd lor thc cxisting cmcrgcncy would havc bccn adcquatc. 110
Tc Commission mcmbcrs had hcard tcstimony to thc ccct that thc Army and Navy o cials in Hawaii had coopcratcd with onc anothcr and had cnjoycd lairly good working rclations. Yct thcy chargcd that thc Hawaiian commandcrs had lailcd to conlcr . . . and to adapt and usc thc cxisting plans to mcct thc cmcrgcncy. 111 Tc Commission maintaincd that if thc Hawaiian commandcrs had complicd with . . . ordcrs issucd by thc Chicl ol Sta and thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations Novcmbcr 27, 1941, thc Armys aircralt warning systcm and inshorc air patrols, and thc Navys distant rcconnaissancc should havc bccn opcrating, thc Army and Navy antiaircralt artillcry should havc bccn manncd and supplicd with ammunition, and a high statc ol rcadincss ol aircralt should havc bccn in ccct. Nonc ol thcsc conditions was in lact inauguratcd or maintaincd 107 !bid., part 39, pp. 1819. 108 !bid., p. 12. 109 !bid., p. 18. 110 !bid., p. 19. 111 !bid., p. 20. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 399 lor thc rcason that thc rcsponsiblc commandcrs lailcd to con sult and coopcratc. 112
Tc mcmbcrs ol thc Commission had hcard tcstimony to thc ccct that thc only surc way to bc lorcwarncd ol an approaching air attack was through continual 360dcgrcc longrangc rccon naissancc. 8ut thcy had also lcarncd that thc plancs and pcrson ncl availablc in Hawaii wcrc complctcly inadcquatc lor carrying out such rcconnaissancc. Morcovcr, thcy had lcarncd that antiair cralt artillcry is inccctivc against lowying plancs. vcn with roundthcclock, larranging rcconnaissancc and an allout alcrt, somc ol thc carly torpcdo plancs that madc thc rst strikc on cccmbcr 7 would undoubtcdly havc bccn ablc to pcnctratc thc dclcnscs and surprisc thc dclcndcrs. Tcy rccognizcd that, Tcrc wcrc dccicncics in pcrsonncl, wcapons, cquipmcnt, and lacilitics to maintain all thc dclcnscs on a war looting lor cxtcndcd pcri ods ol timc, but, thcy hcld, thcsc dccicncics should not havc acctcd thc dccision ol thc rcsponsiblc commandcrs as to thc statc ol rcadincss to bc prcscribcd. 113
Tc mcmbcrs ol thc Commission wcrc much intcrcstcd in Marshalls last minutc (cccmbcr 7) mcssagc to thc cld com mandcrs, sparkcd by thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Tcy qucstioncd him about it, but madc no criticism ol his dilatory tactics in scnd ing it out. Nor did thcy commcnt on his lailurc to usc his scram blcr phonc. And thcy did not criticizc Starks lailurc to act whcn hc rst saw thc nc v.:. Mcssagc at about 9:30 that Sunday morning. Tcy kncw that Marshalls last minutc warning did not rcach Short and Kimmcl until wcll altcr thc Japancsc plancs had dcpartcd Hawaii, but thcy discountcd thc dicrcncc its timcly arrival prior to thc attack would havc madc bccausc ol thc gcncral lack ol prcparcdncss. 112 !bid., p. 20. 113 !bid. 400 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy !n thc light ol thc warnings and dircctions to takc appropriatc action, transmittcd to both commandcrs . . . it was a dereliction of duty on thc part ol cach ol thcm not to consult and conlcr with thc othcr rcspccting thc mcaning and intcnt ol thc warn ings, and thc appropriatc mcasurcs ol dclcnsc rcquircd by thc immincncc ol hostilitics. 114
Tc Commission lound Kimmcl and Short at lault lor having lailcd propcrly to cvaluatc thc scriousncss ol thc situation. Tcsc errors of judgment wcrc thc ccctivc causc lor thc succcss ol thc attack. 115
Tc Robcrts Commissions purposc, as statcd in thc cxccutivc ordcr sctting it up, was to invcstigatc thc contributory ncgligcncc ol thc military only. Howcvcr, thc Commission wcnt bcyond its o cial authorization. !t gratuitously absolvcd thc top Vashington o cials, civilian and military, ol any blamc in a way that was not supportcd in thc Commissions publishcd rccord. !t statcd spc cically in its rcport that thc sccrctarics ol statc, war, and navy had all lulllcd thcir rcspcctivc obligations satislactorily. !t also statcd that thc top Army and Navy o ccrs in Vashington, that is Marshall and Stark, had both lulllcd thcir command rcspon sibilitics propcrly and had issucd suitablc and timcly warnings to thc Hawaiian commandcrs. 116
n thc othcr hand, thc commandcrs in Hawaii, Short and Kimmcl, wcrc pronounccd guilty ol dcrcliction ol duty. Tcy had dcmonstratcd . . . a lack ol apprcciation ol thc rcsponsibilitics vcstcd in thcm and inhcrcnt in thcir positions as commandcrs 114 !bid., part 39, p. 21. 115 !bid. 116 !bid., p. 19. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 401 in chicl, Pacic Flcct, and commanding gcncral, Hawaiian cpartmcnt. 117 Rv:ivv:vx: ov Gvxvv~i Snov: Vi:nou: Coxbox~:iox . . . :o Fu:uvv isciviix~vv Ac:iox. Vhcn thc Robcrts rcport camc out, Short was in klahoma City awaiting lurthcr assignmcnt. Hc was complctcly dumb loundcd. To bc accuscd ol dcrcliction ol duty altcr almost lorty ycars ol loyal and compctcnt scrvicc was bcyond |his| comprchcn sion. n January 26 hc tclcphoncd Marshall, an old and trustcd lricnd ol thirtyninc ycars standing. Short askcd Marshall il hc should rctirc. Stand pat, Marshall said. |8|ut il it bccomcs ncc cssary ! will usc this convcrsation as authority. 118 Short had laith in |Marshalls| judgmcnt and loyalty. Hc told Marshall that hc would placc |himscll | cntircly in his hand. Howcvcr, Short was a gcntlcman. As hc hung up thc phonc, hc dccidcd it wasnt quitc lair to |Marshall| to havc to usc thc convcrsation as authority. Hc lclt Marshall should not havc to assumc thc rcsponsibility ol dcciding Shorts latc on thc basis ol oral instructions alonc, so hc wrotc out a lormal application lor rctircmcnt and scnt it along with a pcrsonal covcring lcttcr to Marshall. |U|ndcr cxisting conditions, hc wrotc, hc would vcry much prclcr to rcmain on thc activc list. Howcvcr, hc cncloscd his application lor rctircmcnt so that you may usc it should you considcr it dcsirablc. 119
!n hopc ol soltcning any judgmcnt against him, Short thcn rcmindcd Marshall that 12 817s arrivcd lrom thc mainland in thc midst ol thc attack without ammunition, with guns cosmolincd 117 !bid., part 39, p. 21. 118 !bid., part 7, pp. 313334. 119 !bid., pp. 313435. Shorts January 25, 1942 lcttcr to Marshall. 402 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy and with skclcton crcws, rcsulting in thc dcstruction ol lour ol thcsc plancs. Tc Var cpartmcnt, which had dispatchcd thcsc plancs lrom thc mainland during thc night ol cccmbcr 67, apparcntly had not anticipatcd thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. Short considcrcd that a strong argumcnt that thc Var cpartmcnt had agrccd with |Short| that sabotagc was thc most dangcrous thing to thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt. 120
8y thc altcrnoon ol Shorts call, Marshall was ol thc opin ion that wc should acccpt Gcncral Shorts application lor rctirc mcnt today and to do this quictly without any publicity at thc momcnt. Tc Judgc Advocatc Gcncral saw no objcction to this proccdurc and statcd |q|uitc inlormally that hc considcrcd a Court ol !nquiry unncccssary . . . and that a courtmartial would not bc in thc public intcrcst at this timc. 121 Vhcn Marshall rcccivcd Shorts writtcn application a couplc ol days latcr, hc lor wardcd it to thc adjutant gcncral to hold pcnding instructions lrom Stimson. 122
Tc prcsidcnt askcd lor assurancc that acccpting Shorts rctircmcnt would not prccludc his latcr court martial and sug gcstcd including a phrasc in thc lcttcr rcading roughly as lollows: Providcd it is agrccd by you that this is no bar to bc uscd lcgally or othcrwisc to subscqucnt court martial procccdings. 123 Judgc Advocatc Major Gcncral Myron C. Cramcr qucstioncd thc advisability ol bringing a rctircd o ccr to court martial. Cramcr was doubtlul that a conviction could bc obtaincd in Shorts casc: |T|hc ocnscs chargcd against Gcncral Short arc ocnscs ol omission or nonlcasancc which rcquirc a much strongcr showing 120 !bid., part 7, pp. 313435. Short lcttcr to Marshall, January 25, 1942. 121 !bid., p. 3139. 122 !bid. 123 !bid., pp. 314041. Assistant Chicl ol Sta 8rigadicr Gcncral J.H. Hildrings lcttcr ol Fcbruary 14, 1942, to thc Attorncy Gcncral. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 403 to justily a trial than thosc involving mislcasancc or mallcasancc. Morcovcr, For thc prcsidcnt to dischargc Gcncral Short summarily undcr thc provisions ol Articlc ol Var 124 would tcnd cvcn morc strongly than a dismissal by a scntcncc ol a gcncral courtmar tial to cnablc him altcrward to claim pcrsccution. 125 To avoid thc possibility that thc prcsidcnts cxcrcisc ol discrc tion in tcrminating thc o ccrs activc scrvicc on his own applica tion might constitutc a bargain that Short would not lurthcr bc prosccutcd lor known ocnscs occurring prior to rctircmcnt, Cramcr suggcstcd that Shorts rcqucst lor rctircmcnt bc acccptcd with thc undcrstanding that it will not constitutc a condonation ol his ocnscs, il any, on thc part ol thc Var cpartmcnt, or bc considcrcd a bar to any luturc trial by gcncral courtmartial in casc such trial should bc dccmcd advisablc. 126
Acting on Cramcrs advicc, Stimson on Fcbruary 14, 1942, instructcd that a saving clausc bc includcd in thc lcttcr acccpt ing Shorts rctircmcnt without condonation ol any ocnsc or prcjudicc to any action on bchall ol thc govcrnmcnt. 127 Tc Var cpartmcnts Fcbruary 17, 1942, lcttcr to Short acccpting his application lor rctircmcnt rcad as lollows: 8y dircction ol thc prcsidcnt, Major Gcncral Valtcr C. Short . . . upon his own application, is rctircd lrom activc scrvicc to 124 !bid., pp. 314546. Judgc Advocatc Gcncral Myro C. Cramcr mcmorandum ol January 27, 1942. 125 !bid. 126 !bid. 127 !bid. 404 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy takc ccct Fcbruary 28, 1942 . . . without condonation ol any ocnsc or prcjudicc to luturc disciplinary action. 128
Gcncral Short was out ol thc Army by March 1, 1942. Rv:ivv:vx: ov Ab:iv~i Ki::vi Vi:nou: Coxbox~:iox :o Fu:uvv isciviix~vv Ac:iox. n January 25, Stark talkcd about Kimmcl with Knox. Kimmcl was thcn noticd, on ordcrs lrom Vashingtonlrom Knox himscll, Kimmcl lcarncd latcrthat Short had submittcd a rcqucst lor his rctircmcnt. 129 Until thcn, Kimmcl had not thought ol rctiring. Howcvcr, hc took that as a suggcstion that ! submit a similar rcqucst. 130 Tcrclorc, on January 26, hc too submittcd his rcqucst lor rctircmcnt. Two days latcr Kimmcl was inlormcd by phonc that his notication ol Shorts rcqucst lor rctircmcnt was not mcant to inucncc him. Howcvcr, Kimmcl wrotc back that samc day that hc wishcd his rcqucst lor rctircmcnt to stand, sub jcct only to dctcrmination by thc cpartmcnt as to what coursc ol action will bcst scrvc thc intcrcsts ol thc country and thc good ol thc scrvicc. 131
Kimmcl gathcrcd that Stark did not rcally cxpcct Kimmcl would bc rctircd at that timc. Ncvcrthclcss, thc qucstion ol Kimmcls rctircmcnt movcd ahcad. Tc wording to bc uscd in thc Navy cpartmcnts lcttcr ol acccptancc was raiscd with thc Navys assistant judgc advocatc gcncral. 132 At FRs rcqucst, 128 !bid., part 7, p. 3142. 129 !bid., part 33, p. 691. Kimmcl statcmcnt to NC! Scptcmbcr 27, 1944. 130 !bid. 131 !bid. 132 !bid., part 19, p. 3965, Lcttcr to Captain Gatch, Fcbruary 14, 1942, signcd by dwin ickinson, Spccial Assistant to thc Attorncy Gcncral, part 19, pp. 396667, part 7, pp. 314142, Assistant Chicl ol Sta 8rigadicr Gcncral J.H. Hildrings Fcbruary 14, 1942 mcmorandum lor Attorncy Gcncral Francis 8iddlc. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 405 Attorncy Gcncral Francis 8iddlc and Acting Assistant Solicitor Gcncral dward ickinson wcrc consultcd. Scvcral suggcstions with rcspcct to thc wording wcrc madc by FR and othcrs. FR was anxious to havc thc mattcr scttlcd. Finally, a phrasc vcry simi lar to that suggcstcd lor thc Var cpartmcnts lcttcr to Short was agrccd on. n Fcbruary 19 Kimmcl rcccivcd lormal notication lrom Knox that hc would bc placcd on thc rctircd list on March 1. Knoxs lcttcr rcad in part: Tis approval ol your rcqucst lor rctirc mcnt is without condonation ol any ocnsc or prcjudicc to luturc disciplinary action. 133
vcr sincc thc attack, blamc and opprobrium had bccn hcapcd on both Kimmcl and Short. Tcy had rcccivcd abusivc lcttcrs and cvcn thrcats on thcir livcs. Vhcn Kimmcl rcad thc sccond paragraph ol Knoxs lct tcr, with its conditional approval ol his rcqucst lor rctircmcnt, hc promptly wrotc Stark: Vas thc lcttcr to bc publishcd to thc country as a promisc that ! will bc disciplincd at somc luturc timc: Kimmcl stood rcady at any timc to acccpt thc consc qucnccs ol |his| acts. Hc did not wish to cmbarrass thc govcrn mcnt in thc conduct ol thc war, but hc lclt that his crucixion bclorc thc public has about rcachcd thc limit. Hc lclt that pub lication ol thc sccrctarys lcttcr with its conditional approval ol Kimmcls rctircmcnt would lurthcr inamc thc public and do |him| a grcat injusticc. 134 Kimmcl rcgrct|tcd| thc losscs at Pcarl Harbor just as kccnly, or pcrhaps morc kccnly than any othcr Amcrican citizcn. Hc wishcd hc had bccn smartcr than hc was and ablc to lorcscc thc cvcnts ol cccmbcr 7. Hc had dcvotcd all 133 !bid., part 19, p. 3963, part 33, p.692, Kimmcls statcmcnt to Naval Court ol !nquiry. And Husband . Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story (Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry Co., 1955), p. 182. 134 Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story, pp. 18182. Scc also Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2562. 406 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy his cncrgy to his job and had madc thc dispositions hc consid crcd callcd lor. Hc could not rcproach |himscll | lor any lack ol cort. Hc had bccn willing to acccpt |all this| lor thc good ol thc country out ol |his| loyalty to thc Nation. 8ut hc did think that in all justicc thc dcpartmcnt should do nothing lurthcr to inamc thc public against him. Hc thought hc was cntitlcd to somc considcration cvcn though somc may havc bclicvcd hc had crrcd gricvously. 135 Kimmcl was rctircd ccctivc March 1 altcr morc than 40 ycars ol scrvicc in thc Navy. 136 n or about that datc Kimmcl was noticd through thc public prcss . . . that thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy had dircctcd that chargcs and spccications bc prcparcd to bring |him| to trial by Gcncral Court Martial at somc luturc timc. 137
Ki::vi ~xb Snov: Fixb Pos:A::~cx Posi:ioxs Cox:vinu:ixc :o :nv V~v vvov: 8oth mcn soon lound civilian positions in which thcy could contributc to thc war cort. Short bccamc hcad ol thc tra c dcpartmcnt at thc Ford Motor Company plant in allas, Tcxas, which was dcvotcd cntircly to making war cquipmcnt. 138 Kimmcl took a position with a Ncw York rm ol consulting marinc cngi nccrs, Frcdcrick R. Harris, !nc., whcrc hc hclpcd dcsign thc rst 135 !bid. 136 !bid., part 33, pp. 69192. Kimmcls statcmcnt to thc NC!. 137 Te NewYork Times, August 11, 1942, p. 4. 138 !bid., Scptcmbcr 4, 1949, p. 49. Shorts obituary. The Administration Initiates an Investigation 407 largc scctional oating drydock capablc ol holding a battlcship. 139
Tcsc drydocks saw much scrvicc in thc war in thc Pacic. 140 Rcscntmcnt ol thc Hawaiian commandcrs did not ccasc. !n August 1942, public curiosity was arouscd by thc ncws that Kimmcl was holding a civilian job in Ncw York. Vas hc rccciving rctircmcnt pay in addition to his pay as a civilian cmploycc: Ycs, hc was, thc Navy cpartmcnt rcplicd, as a rctircd Navy o ccr, hc was clcarly cntitlcd to thrccquartcrs rctircd pay, or 86,000 a ycar, and it is absolutcly lcgal lor him or any othcr rctircd naval o ccr to takc a civilian job and draw his rctircmcnt lrom thc Navy at thc samc timc. Kimmcl was cxpcctcd to gct thc routinc rctircd salary lrom thc Navy until thc prospcctivc courtmartial is cstablishcd to try him. 141
139 !bid., May 15, 1968, pp. 1, 24. Kimmcls obituary. 140 !bid. 141 !bid., August 11, 1942, p. 4. 409 20. 19421944 Tov Svcvvcv ox :nv V~snixc:ox Ho:v Fvox: O ncc wc had dcclarcd war, a wavc ol patriotism swcpt ovcr thc country. All opcn criticism ol thc govcrnmcnts lor cign policy ccascd. Yct a dcsirc to know thc truth simmcrcd undcr thc surlacc. Many pcoplc bclicvcd that Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short, who had bccn pilloricd in thc cycs ol thc public, should havc a chancc to prcscnt thcir sidc ol thc story in opcn court, but attcmpts wcrc bcing madc to lorcstall thcir courts martial. Tcrc wcrc, ol coursc, lcgitimatc rcasons why thcir casc should not bc invcstigatcd whilc thc war was going on. !nlormation would undoubtcdly bc rcvcalcd in a courts martial trial that would bc damaging to thc war cort. !t would undoubtcdly bc brought out (1) that thc Japancsc wcrc still using thcir diplomatic codc, Purplc, lor sccrct mcssagcs. As our armcd lorccs wcrc gaining inlormation lrom rcading Purplc intcrccpts, which was valuablc lor ghting thc war, this was a lcgitimatc argumcnt lor postpon ing a trial. A trial would probably rcvcal also (2) that U.S. intcl ligcncc pcrsonncl had dcciphcrcd Purplc bclorc thc attack on Pcarl Harbor and had bccn rcading Japancsc intcrccpts cvcr sincc. 410 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Also (3) that Vashington had, thcrclorc, had considcrablc prc attack intclligcncc about Japancsc intcntions. And (4) that littlc ol this prcattack intclligcncc had bccn scnt to Pcarl Harbor. Tc administration and top military o cials wcrc dctcrmincd that thcrc bc no sccurity lcaks about Purplc and MAG!C, thc intclligcncc dcrivcd lrom it. Somc ol thcm may also havc har borcd guilt about thc inlormation thcy had scnt, or had lailcd to scnd, our military commandcrs bclorc thc attack. !l that was thc casc, thcy would not havc wantcd it known that our dccryption ol Japancsc intcrccpts had startcd before thc attack. Tus thosc who wcrc anxious to dclay or postponc indcnitcly a hcaring lor Kimmcl and Short bccausc thcy did not want it to bc rcvcalcd that wc wcrc dccoding postattack Japancsc mcssagcs had thc support ol thosc who wantcd to conccal thc lact that wc had bccn rcading preattack Japancsc mcssagcs. To salcguard this major sourcc ol intclligcncc, Army and Navy pcrsonncl lamiliar with Purplc had bccn sworn to sccrccy. Gcncral Marshall himscll, in his o cc a wcck altcr thc attack, had warncd his sta o ccrs to go to thcir gravcs with thc sccrct ol MAG!C. Tcn in 1944, witncsscs to appcar bclorc thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard wcrc again sworn not to rcvcal thc lacts, i.c., thc Purplc codc dccrypts. 1
Similar prccautions had also bccn takcn in thc Navy. Admiral Stark tcsticd, Anybody who was lct in on that |MAG!C| had 1 An admission by a rctircd Army gcncral as to thc Armys rulc ol sccrccy was madc to thc author twicc, oncc in thc prcscncc ol Gcncral 8onncr Fcllcrs and thcn again in thc prcscncc ol Gcncral Albcrt C. Vcdcmcycr. Scc also rcport ol Harry lmcr 8arncs intcrvicw ol Major Hcnry C. Clauscn, January 3, 1964, pp. 23 (typcscript in authors posscssion): ||aths had bccn takcn not to rcvcal thc lacts |thc Purplc codc dccrypts|. . . . Tc witncsscs Milcs, Marshall, MacArthur, ct al., all rcvcalcd to Clauscn that thcy wcrc sworn not to rcvcal Purplc whcn thcy wcrc bclorc APH8. N.8., by March 1945, Clauscn had bccn promotcd to licutcnant coloncl. 19421944 411 to sign a papcr ncvcr to disclosc it, practically so long as hc livcd, or cvcr to talk about itnot cvcr! 2
Navy intclligcncc o ccrs too wcrc warncd to maintain sccu rity. Somctimc within thc wcck lollowing Pcarl Harbor, thcn Commandcr Saord and othcr o ccrs wcrc callcd into con lcrcncc in thc o cc ol thc ircctor ol Naval Communications |Admiral Noycs|. . . . |A|ll scction hcads wcrc askcd to tcll all |thcir| pcoplc not to talk. Any writtcn mcmoranda, pcrsonal notcsnot o cial lcswcrc to bc dcstroycd immcdiatcly and thc o ccrs wcrc to pass that word on to |thcir| subordinatcs. 3
8ut qucstions about Pcarl Harbor did not lct up. Pos:A::~cx Pvvsoxxvi Sn~xvuv As wc havc sccn, both Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short wcrc pcrcmptorily rcmovcd lrom thcir commands altcr thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. Rcplaccmcnt o ccrs wcrc namcd, thcn promptly rctircd lrom thc military. 4 Somc suspicion rcstcd on Chicl ol Naval pcrations Stark lor not having kcpt Kimmcl and Admiral Hart in thc Philippincs bcttcr inlormcd. n March 26, Admiral .J. King took ovcr Starks position as CN. 5 Stark was in ccct kickcd upstairs, translcrrcd out ol Vashington, 2 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 5, p. 2468, Stark tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. 3 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 356566, Saord tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. 4 Shorts command was turncd ovcr to Licutcnant Gcncral clos C. mmons. Kimmcl was rcplaccd tcmporarily as Chicl ol thc Pacic Flcct by Admiral Villiam S. Pyc and thcn, oncc thc arrangcmcnts lor thc translcr could bc workcd out, by Admiral Chcstcr V. Nimitz. 5 U.S. cpartmcnt ol Navy, Naval History ivision, cc ol thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Vashington, .C.: Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1955), p. 22. 412 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy scnt to London and on April 30, 1942, givcn command ol thc rcccntly cstablishcd (March 17, 1942) Unitcd Statcs Naval Forccs uropc. 6
Chicl ol Sta Marshall appcarcd to bc abovc rcproach. !n spitc ol qucstions about his whcrcabouts on thc morning ol cccmbcr 6, hc rcmaincd in his position and wcnt on latcr to still morc important and prcstigious positionsspccial rcprcscntativc ol thc prcsidcnt to China with ambassadorial rank (19451946), sccrc tary ol statc (19471949), and sccrctary ol dclcnsc 7 (19501951). Hc cvcn rcccivcd thc Nobcl Pcacc Prizc in 1953 lor his proposal, which bccamc known as thc Marshall Plan, lor U.S. govcrnmcnt grants to hclp postwar uropcs cconomic rccovcry. Naval intclligcncc and naval communications wcrc cspccially hard hit by pcrsonncl changcs. Tc Navys traditional pridc in scrvicc at sca mcant that thc path to promotion clcarly lay in sca duty, thosc who scrvcd in intclligcncc wcrc much lcss likcly to advancc. As a rcsult, lcw naval o ccrs wcrc willing to makc a carccr in cryptography. nc notablc cxccption was Commandcr L.F. Saord, who had bccn in chargc ol thc sccurity scction ol naval communications and had madc brilliant contributions to dcciphcring and intcrprcting Japancsc intcrccpts. Shortly altcr thc Unitcd Statcs cntcrcd thc war, hc was promotcd to captain ( January 1, 1942), but at thc samc timc his dutics and rcsponsi bilitics wcrc sharply curtailcd. 8
Commandcr A.H. McCollum, hcad ol thc Far astcrn Scction ol Naval !ntclligcncc in cccmbcr 1941, was anothcr victim ol thc postattack rcorganization ol naval opcrations. Hc 6 !bid, p. 24. 7 n Scptcmbcr 18, 1947, thc cpartmcnts ol Var and Navy wcrc incorpo ratcd into a ncw cpartmcnt ol clcnsc. 8 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3556, Saord tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. Scc also L.F. Saord, \ictims ol thc Kita Mcssagc, April 8, 1968, p. 46, unpublishcd manuscript (typcscript in authors lcs). 19421944 413 had rccognizcd thc scriousncss ol thc Japancsc thrcat prior to thc attack and had draltcd mcssagcs to thc Pacic commandcrs warning ol impcnding Japancsc action. His supcriors had watcrcd down his mcssagcs so much, howcvcr, that thcy lailcd to dclivcr thc scnsc ol urgcncy McCollum had intcndcd to convcy. 9 McCollum got disgustcd with naval intclligcncc and applicd lor sca duty. n routc to his ncw post in thc southwcst Pacic hc passcd through Hawaii. Tcrc hc was gucst ol honor at a party givcn by scvcral o ccrs who had scrvcd on Kimmcls sta. McCollum told thcm somc ol thc things hc had known through his work with intcl ligcncc in Vashington. 10
Cv~cxs ix :nv Ab:ixis:v~:ioxs V~ii ov Svcvvcv nc ol thc o ccrs in Hawaii who hcard McCollum spcak was Commandcr Joscph John Rochclort, chicl intclligcncc o ccr, district sta ol thc commandant in Hawaii. Rochclort spokc Japancsc, his work in radio intclligcncc, cryptography, and cryp tanalysis had madc him onc ol thc mainstays ol thc intclligcncc unit at Pcarl Harbor. !t had bccn his rcsponsibility to prcparc daily intclligcncc summarics lor Kimmcls cct intclligcncc o ccr, Licutcnant Commandcr dwin Tomas Layton. 11 !n spitc ol 9 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 338890, McCollum tcsti mony bclorc thc Joint Committcc, part 26, p. 392, Saord tcstimony bclorc thc Hart !nquiry, part 29, p. 2396, Saord tcstimony at APH8. Scc also McCollum lcttcr, May 21, 1944, to Kimmcl and Kimmcl intcrvicw, May 18, 1945, ol McCollum (typcscripts ol both papcrs in authors lcs). 10 Saord, \ictims ol thc Kita Mcssagc, pp. 4950. Scc also Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3382. McCollum was rcassigncd lrom Vash ington to thc Southwcst Pacic Forcc in ctobcr 1942. Scc Kimmcls intcr vicw ol McCollum. 11 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 4673, 467980, Rochclort tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. Rochclort was awardcd thc istin guishcd Scrvicc Mcdal posthumously, in 1985, lor his succcss in cracking thc Japancsc codcs rcvcaling thc timc, datc, and placc ol Japans plan to invadc 414 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy his knowlcdgc and cxpcrtisc, Rochclort bccamc a victim ol thc postattack pcrsonncl changcs in intclligcncc, hc was translcrrcd out ol cryptography in ctobcr 1942, 12 ordcrcd to Vashington, and assigncd to command a oating drydock in San Francisco. 13
!n prcparation lor his ncw assignmcnt, hc was scnt to Ncw York to consult with thc marinc cnginccring rm ol Frcdcrick R. Harris, !nc. !n Ncw York, Rochclort cncountcrcd his old boss, Kimmcl, who was thcn himscll working on oating drydocks lor thc Harris rm. Rochclort told him what McCollum had rcportcd about prcattack knowlcdgc in Vashington. 14 Tus by a scrics ol coin cidcnccs, Kimmcl lcarncd in latc 1942 that crucial inlormation about Japancsc intcntions had bccn availablc in Vashington prior to thc attack, which had not bccn rclaycd to him in Pcarl Harbor. Anothcr rcsponsiblc Navy o ccr who lclt intclligcncc was Licutcnant Commandcr Alwin alton Kramcr, a Japancsc languagc scholar. !n latc 1941, hc had bccn in chargc ol thc transla tion group ol thc communications sccurity group in Vashington. As Navy couricr hc had dclivcrcd many condcntial intcrccpts, including MAG!C, to top Navy o ccrs during thc crucial wccks prcccding thc attack. !n Junc 1943 Kramcr was translcrrcd to Pcarl Harbor. And in January 1944, hc was ordcrcd to sca duty in thc South Pacic. 15
Midway (New York Times, Novcmbcr 17, 1985, 88G). Scc dwin T. Layton, Rogcr Pincau, and John Costcllo, And I Was Tere: Pearl Harbor and Midway Breaking the Secrets (Ncw York: V. Morrow, 1985), p. 464. 12 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 4673, 4679, Rochclort tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. Rochclort lclt Pcarl Harbor in ctobcr 1942. 13 Layton, And I Was Tere, p. 468 (88G). 14 Saord, \ictims ol thc Kita Mcssagc, pp. 50, 54. 15 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 389495. According to Kramcrs tcstimony, hc was on duty with Saords o cc lrom Junc 1940 to Junc 1943. 19421944 415 Ki::vi ~xb Snov: V~ivv S:~:u:v ov Li:i:~:ioxs vcr and ovcr again Kimmcl rcvicwcd in his mind thc ordcrs hc had rcccivcd as cct commandcr and his rcsponscs to thcm. Hc kcpt asking himscll what sins ol commission or omission hc could havc committcd. Hc cvcn bcgan to think that pcrhaps hc had bccn somcwhat rcsponsiblc lor thc disastcr. Yct hc could ncvcr gurc out just how. Until hc spokc with Rochclort in latc 1942, hc had assumcd, as Stark had assurcd him, that hc was bcing sup plicd with all availablc intclligcncc ncccssary lor him to lulll his rcsponsibilitics as commandcrinchicl ol thc Pacic Flcct. Not until hc lcarncd lrom Rochclort ol McCollums rcvclations did Kimmcl havc any hint that Vashington o cials had bccn privy to crucial inlormation that had bccn dcnicd him in Hawaii. Tc only hopc Kimmcl and Short had lor vindication was to obtain a hcaring at which thcy could rcvcal thc ordcrs undcr which thcy had bccn opcrating prior to thc attack and to cxplain why thcy had takcn thc actions thcy had. Tcy wcrc both anx ious lor a spccdy and opcn courtmartial. 16 According to thc rcgulations thcn in ccct, thc opportunity lor thc govcrnmcnt to courtmartial Kimmcl and Short lor any allcgcd ocnscs thcy might havc committcd and with which thcy might bc chargcd would cxpirc in two ycars, on cccmbcr 7, 1943. Tc Navy, in no hurry to scc thc two commandcrs courtmartialcd, was willing to cxtcnd thc dcadlinc. r cvcn to lct thc statutc ol limitations cxpirc. Kimmcl, lor his part, was anxious not to lct that happcn, lcst thc chancc lor a hcaring bc lost lorcvcr. Hc rcmindcd Knox (Scptcmbcr 17, 1943) ol his dcsirc lor a spccdy trial in opcn court. Howcvcr, Kimmcl wrotc, hc did not wish to put his own intcrcsts 16 Kimmcl Sccks pcn Trial at arlicst atc, Washington Star, March 29, 1944, pp. A1, 4. Scc also Kimmcl lcttcr ol March 16, 1944 (typcd copy in authors posscssion). 416 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy abovc thosc ol thc national wcllarc, which hc rccognizcd appcars to rcquirc that my trial bc dclaycd. 17 Knox sympathizcd with Kimmcl and commcndcd him lor his patriotic spirit, which was, hc said, in kccping with thc bcst naval traditions. 18
Kimmcl was cagcr to do battlc and undcrtook an activc cam paign to lcarn thc truth. Hc would not lct thc mattcr rcst. Hc bcgan to prcparc lor thc hcaring hc hopcd to havc. !n Novcmbcr 1943, hc askcd Knox lor copics ol Navy cpartmcnt dispatchcs, lcttcrs, intclligcncc rcports, ctc., scnt bctwccn January 1 and cccmbcr 17, 1941, plus copics ol thc war plans and opcrating plans that wcrc in ccct on cccmbcr 7, 1941. 19
!n January 1944, on thc advicc ol |his| trustcd longtimc lricnd, Captain Robcrt A. Lavcndcr, U.S. Navy, Kimmcl hircd Charlcs 8. Rugg ol thc 8oston law rm ol Ropcs, Gray, 8cst, Coolidgc and Rugg, to hclp in his crusadc. 20 n January 27, Kimmcl, Rugg, and Lavcndcr mct to discuss thc situation. Kimmcl askcd Rugg to go to Vashington and try to arrangc to havc thc dcadlinc lor his courtmartial cxtcndcd. Rugg warncd him: Admiral, this is thc crossroads. !l ! go down thcrc and havc this Statutc |thc cxtcnsion ol thc court martial statutc ol limita tions| passcd, wcrc going to bc in lor a tcmpcstuous timc. 17 Kimmcls Scptcmbcr 17, 1943 lcttcr to Knox quotcd in Washington Star, March 29, 1944. 18 Knox mcmo to Kimmcl, Scptcmbcr 10, 1943. 19 Kimmcl mcmo to Knox, Novcmbcr 26, 1943. 20 Husband . Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story (Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry, 1955), p. ix. Rugg was hircd January 19, 1944, according to John Tolands intcrvicw ol dward 8. Hanily, August 29,1979, on lc with Tolands papcrs in FR Library, Hydc Park, N.Y. Captain Robcrt A. Lavcndcr (Annapolis, class ol 1912, #03895) was Kimmcls counscl (Kimmcl January 24, 1944 mcmorandum). 19421944 417 !t could mcan cmbarrassmcnt and unlavorablc publicity. !l wc dont pursuc this mattcr, Rugg wcnt on, thcy may drop this busincss and you will bc lrcc lrom any morc public discussion. Kimmcl was dctcrmincd that thc Amcrican pcoplc . . . know this story and hc authorizcd |Rugg| to go all out to scc that it is donc. |Hc was| prcparcd to lacc thc conscqucnccs, cmbarrass mcnt, misundcrstanding, timc, anything. Hc told Rugg, Go to it! 21
Tus it was largcly as a rcsult ol Kimmcls corts that thc statutc ol limitations on courtmartialing Kimmcl and Short was cxtcndcdsix months lrom cccmbcr 7, 1943, to Junc 7, 1944. And cxtcndcd yct again to cccmbcr 7, 1944. 22
Short also wantcd a chancc to prcscnt his casc, but hc was a vcry dicrcnt pcrsonality and lcss aggrcssivc than Kimmcl in his pursuit ol a hcaring. 23
21 John Toland intcrvicw ol Hanily. 22 !n March 1944 somc mcmbcrs ol Congrcss urgcd a still lurthcr cxtcnsion ol thc statutc ol limitations. Tcy argucd that thc courts martial ol Kimmcl and Short should not continuc to bc postponcd indcnitcly. Tc Housc Rulcs Committcc approvcd a mcasurc cxtcnding to Junc 7, 1945, thc possiblc starting datc lor thcir courts martial. Morcovcr, rathcr than mcrcly lcngth cning thc timc during that Kimmcl and Short might bc court martialcd, thc Housc committccs mcasurc proposcd that thc Army and Navy bc ordcrcd to schcdulc thcir courts martial. Tc Scnatc Committcc thcn votcd to considcr thc Housc committccs rcsolution in closcd scssion (Washington Star, March 29, 1944). Tus thc chanccs that Kimmcl and Short would gct thcir opcn hcaring wcrc improving. Howcvcr, thc Housc committccs proposal was not acccptcd as wordcd. Rathcr thc courtmartial dcadlinc was cxtcndcd again lor anothcr six months only, i.c., until cccmbcr 7, 1944. n that datc it was cxtcndcd oncc morc, into 1945. ( Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, pp. 151718). 23 Washington Star, March 29, 1944, p. 24. 418 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy C~v:~ix S~vvovb T~ixs wi:n Ki::vi Captain Saord playcd a kcy rolc in thc wholc Pcarl Harbor picturc, both bclorc thc attack and also altcrwards during thc invcstigations. Hc scrvcd with thc Navy cpartmcnt communi cations intclligcncc unit lrom May 1936 until altcr thc attack. Hc had workcd in radio intclligcncc and cryptology, thc dcciphcring ol codcs. As chicl ol thc communications sccurity scction ol naval communications during thc months prcccding thc Pcarl Harbor attack, hc was rcsponsiblc lor thc sccurity ol thc sccrct Japancsc intcrccpts and lor kccping thcm lrom rcaching unauthorizcd hands. !n thc lall ol 1943 Saord, by thc dircction and instruction ol thc ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc, was undcr ordcrs to work on a history ol radio intclligcncc lrom 1924 to 1941. 24 Likc most pcoplc in thc country, Saord had bclicvcd that Kimmcl had lailcd to lulll adcquatcly his rcsponsibilitics as cct com mandcr, that hc had bccn rcmiss in intcrprcting thc intclligcncc and ordcrs scnt him and thus was partially culpablc lor thc scvcrc damagc donc to thc cct during thc Japancsc attack. 8ccausc ol his prcPcarl Harbor rcsponsibilitics, Saord cxpcctcd that hc would bc callcd to tcstily in any Kimmcl court martial procccdings that might bc hcld. So, as hc lookcd through thc lcs lor thc historical rcscarch to which hc was assigncd, hc startcd to rcvicw thc prcPcarl Harbor situation also and to asscmblc matcrial hc would nccd as a witncss. 25 To his amazcmcnt hc discovcrcd that thc intclligcncc dcrivcd lrom thc Japancsc intcrccpts, which Saords scction had dccodcd in thc months bclorc thc attack, had not bccn lorwardcd to thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs as hc had assumcd. Vhcn hc rcalizcd this, hc was 24 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3601, Saord tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. 25 !bid., part 36, p. 69, Saord tcstimony bclorc Hcwitt !nquiry, rcprintcd in ibid., part 8, p. 3602. 19421944 419 arouscd by thc injusticc ol thc situation. !n ccct, Kimmcl had bccn dismisscd lrom his position and pilloricd bccausc hc had not bccn scnt thc prcattack inlormation availablc in Vashington. !n Fcbruary 1944 Saord callcd on Kimmcl in Ncw York. Hc told Kimmcl that many Japancsc mcssagcs had bccn intcr ccptcd and dcciphcrcd prior to thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. Hc gavc Kimmcl a vcrbal summary ol thcir contcnts. 26 From thc lcw notcs hc had madc and lrom his mcmory, Saord rclatcd much ol thc inlormation that had bccn known in Vashington lrom rcading thosc intcrccpts, inlormation which would havc bccn invaluablc to thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. Vhcn hc rcturncd to Vashington hc sought to documcnt his statcmcnts. 8ut hc scarchcd in vain. Tc crucial intcrccpts wcrc missing lrom thc lcs! n March 23, 1944, Kimmcl askcd dward 8. Hanily, a law ycr in thc samc lcgal rm as Rugg to comc on board also to assist in his casc. 27 Hanily promptly startcd work on thc Kimmcl casc. 28
Kimmcl would not lct it dic.
1944 bccamc a ycar ol inquirics and invcstigations. Lcst somc individuals in thc military who might havc knowlcdgc conccrning thc attack bccamc casualtics ol thc war, thc Hart !nquiry was sct up. 8oth thc Army and Navy hcld scparatc, but concurrcnt, hcar ings. Tcsc hcarings wcrc supplcmcntcd by thc lollowup Clarkc, Clauscn, and Hcwitt inquirics that cxtcndcd into 1945. n thc grounds ol military sccurity, all thcsc inquirics wcrc conductcd in grcatcst sccrccy bchind closcd doors, and thcir rcports wcrc not rclcascd to thc public. 26 Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story, p. 129. 27 !bid., p. ix. 28 Toland intcrvicw. 420 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Many lacts that cxoncratcd Kimmcl and Short wcrc rcvcalcd in thcsc closcddoor hcarings. Yct thcsc lacts wcrc not madc pub lic. At thc cnd ol 1944 Kimmcl and Short wcrc still thc princi pal culprits in thc cycs ol thc public, thcir ncgligcncc considcrcd rcsponsiblc lor thc cxtcnsivc loss ol ships, plancs and mcn at Pcarl Harbor. 1944 was also a prcsidcntial clcction ycar. FR was running lor an unprcccdcntcd lourth tcrm. Tus political considcrations, as wcll as military, playcd a rolc in thcsc invcstigations. How should thcsc sccrct rcports bc handlcd: Vhat would thc public think il it kncw thc truth was bcing conccalcd: How would thc votcrs rcspond il thcy kncw thc lacts that had bccn uncovcrcd by thcsc invcstigations: Vhat would thcy think ol thc top civilian and military authoritics, who wcrc still dirccting thc war cort, il thcy lcarncd lrom thcsc rcports about thcir prcwar dccisions: How much inlormation could, or should, bc madc public: Tc top brass in Vashington laccd a dilcmma. 421 21. 1944: A Year of Investigations T hc public was no closcr in 1944 to unravcling thc mystcry surrounding thc Japancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor than it had bccn in January 1942. vcn though a spccdy and public trial, at which Kimmcl would havc an opportunity to prcscnt his sidc ol thc story, was impossiblc bccausc ol thc nccd lor wartimc sccurity, Kimmcl bcgan to prcparc. 1 Any such hcaring or trial would havc to dcpcnd on thc tcstimony ol witncsscs with knowlcdgc ol thc prccccmbcr 7 situation, many ol whom, stationcd in combat positions lrom thc northcrn Atlantic to thc southwcst Pacic, could bccomc war casualtics. n Kimmcls rcc ommcndation, thcrclorc, or as a rcsult ol his prodding, Sccrctary Knox issucd a Prcccpt, or ordcr, instructing rctircd Admiral Tomas C. Hart, commandcrinchicl ol thc U.S. Asiatic Flcct in thc Philippincs bclorc thc attack, to conduct an inquiry lor thc purposc ol rccording and prcscrving tcstimony pcrtincnt to thc 1 Knox mcmorandum to Kimmcl, March 4, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in authors lcs. 422 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Japancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor, T.H., on 7 cccmbcr 1941. 2
Tus Hart was to cxaminc such mcmbcrs ol thc naval lorccs as wcrc thought to havc knowlcdgc ol lacts pcrtincnt to thc said surprisc attack. !t was to bc a sort ol oncman board to takc tcstimony. Hart would soon bc contacting Kimmcl o cially. 3
Kimmcl had rcscrvations about Harts inquiry. Not only could it not bc lrcc and opcn, but it was too narrowly locuscd. !t was to bc limitcd to cxamining mcmbcrs ol thc naval lorccs conccrning cvcnts pcrtincnt to thc said surprisc attack. Kimmcl pointcd out that many nonNavy pcrsonncl, Army pcrsonncl and civilians, should also bc cxamincd. And thcy should bc qucstioncd not only about cvcnts pcrtincnt to thc said surprisc attack, but also about cvcnts that took placc somc timc prior to said attack and ol cvcnts at placcs not in thc Hawaiian !slands that havc an important bcaring on thc actual attack. Tc tcstimony ol such pcrsons should also bc takcn and prcscrvcd. 4 Morcovcr, Kimmcl maintaincd that hc had a right to bc inlormcd ol thc naturc and causc ol any accusation against him. 5
Although Knox assurcd Kimmcl that this cxamination would bc in no scnsc a trial, and Kimmcl would bc pcrmittcd to introducc mattcr pcrtincnt to thc cxamination, to crosscxam inc witncsscs, ctc., Kimmcl still had qualms. 6 Tc lcgal charactcr ol thc inquiry was unclcar. !t would havc somc charactcristics 2 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 26, pp. 34. 3 Hart lcttcr to Kimmcl, Fcbruary 15, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in authors lcs. 4 Kimmcl mcmorandum to Knox, March 16, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in authors lcs. 5 Kimmcl mcmorandum to Knox, Fcbruary 29, 1944. Tcrmolax copy ol orig inal in authors lcs. 6 Knox mcmorandum to Kimmcl, March 4, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in authors lcs. 1944: A Year of Investigations 423 ol dcpositions, othcrs ol courts ol inquiry, and still othcrs which wcrc ncithcr thosc ol dcpositions or courts ol inquiry. Kimmcls counscl, Robcrt A. Lavcndcr, pointcd out that it was important that any tcstimony takcn should bc scalcd and dcliv crcd to thc Judgc Advocatc ol thc court as custodian and prc scntcd to thc accuscd in a rcasonablc timc lor cxamination and to makc objcctions as to thc introduction ol cvidcncc. As thcrc was no assurancc that thc Hart !nquiry tcstimony takcn would bc scalcd and . . . hcld inviolatc until a court martial, or that a witncsss tcstimony would not bc uscd in a court martial unlcss hc was dcad, insanc, or could not appcar lor somc othcr rcason, 7
Kimmcl dcclinc|d| to attcnd or participatc in thc procccdings bclorc Admiral Hart. 8
Tnv H~v: !xguivv (M~vcn , +Juxv +, +) !n thc coursc ol intcrvicwing naval o ccrs, Hart travclcd lrom Vashington, .C., to Ncw York, San Francisco, Pcarl Harbor, thc USS Iowa, and thc island ol Guadalcanal in thc southwcst Pacic. 9 Most ol thc mcn hc qucstioncd had scrvcd with Kimmcl in Pcarl Harbor prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941, but scvcral had hcld positions in Vashington at thc timc ol thc attack and tcsticd lrom a Vashington vicwpoint. 8y cccmbcr 1941 thcrc sccmcd littlc doubt among thosc who wcrc lollowing cvcnts closcly that war with Japan was incvi tablc. As a mattcr ol lact, in Hawaii on Sunday, Novcmbcr 30, 1941, prcciscly onc wcck bclorc thc attack, banncr hcadlincs on 7 Kimmcl/Rugg/Lavcndcr mcmorandum, undatcd, copy lorwardcd to Kimmcl by Lavcndcr undcr datc ol March 18, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in authors lcs. 8 Kimmcl mcmorandum to Knox, March 16, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in authors lcs. 9 Harts itincrary, Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, pp. 9, 217, 241, 291, 299, 349, 367, 397, 403, 453, 465. 424 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy pagc 1 ol thc Honolulu Advertiser rcad KURUSU 8LUNTLY VARN NAT!N RAY FR 8ATTL. 8ritish hcld Singaporc was rcportcd on thc alcrt, all troops thcrc had bccn callcd to activc duty. Tc Philippincs wcrc thrcatcncd by Japancsc cncirclcmcnt. 10 Var sccmcd likcly. 8ut all signs pointcd to its brcaking out thousands ol milcs lrom Hawaii, possibly in Singaporc or thc Philippincs. Hart qucstioncd naval o ccrs who had bccn at Pcarl Harbor during thc attack. Vitncss altcr witncss conlcsscd that hc had bccn no lcss surpriscd than Kimmcl by thc suddcn air attack. Practically all thc inlormation availablc to thcm had dircctcd thcir attcntion clscwhcrc. Gcncrally spcaking, thcy wcrc support ivc ol Kimmcls prcattack dccisions and actions. Rcar Admiral V.V. Smith, Kimmcls chicl ol sta in cccmbcr 1941, tcsticd that whcn hc saw thc cccmbcr 3 dispatch conccrning thc burning ol documcnts by thc Japancsc at Hong Kong, Singaporc, 8atavia, Manila, Vashington, and London, hc had littlc doubt that thcy wcrc about to makc a hos tilc movc. 11 Vc had bccn told that hcavy Japancsc movcmcnts wcrc on thc way to thc southard |sic|. !t did not occur to us, Smith tcsticd, that thc attack was coming in our dircction. 12
Vc did cxpcct a submarinc attack . . . |but not| an air raid on Pcarl Harbor, although plans wcrc madc to mcct onc, as ! havc said, by thc stationing ol ships and conditions ol rcadincss. 13
Rcar Admiral Arthur C. avis, who at thc timc ol thc attack was scrving as cct aviation o ccr ol thc Pacic Flcct, had thought a surprisc air attack was possiblc. 8ut hc had con sidcrcd it prcvcntablc only by thc most cxtcnsivc scarchcs and corts lor which ncithcr thc plancs nor thc mcn ncccssary wcrc 10 Honolulu Advertiser, Novcmbcr 30, 1941, p. 1. 11 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 489, ispatch #031850. 12 !bid., p. 62. 13 !bid., p. 73. 1944: A Year of Investigations 425 availablc in Hawaii. vcn undcr thc bcst ol circumstanccs, avis said tcstilying in 1944, whcn an attack might bc cxpcctcd, it isnt casy to sight an incoming cncmy lorcc. Vc havc, oursclvcs, quitc oltcn madc an attack whcrcin Japancsc scarch plancs lailcd to sight our lorccs, cvcn though in many ol thcsc cascs wc know that thcy wcrc making intcn sivc scarch ights. !n thc Guadalcanal landing, as an cxamplc, a Japancsc scarch planc, undcr scattcrcd cloud conditions, camc closc cnough to our lorcc actually to bc sightcd by longrangc tclcscopc lrom thc ENTERPRISE, but lailcd to scc and rcport thc lorcc. 14
uc to thcir dcpcndcncc on Vashington, thc mcn in intcl ligcncc in Hawaii had no morc rcason to cxpcct a surprisc air attack on Pcarl Harbor than had thc mcn on thc Navys ships and plancs. Tcrc wcrc scrious gaps in thcir intclligcncc. Captain dwin T. Layton, cct intclligcncc o ccr at thc timc ol thc attack, said intclligcncc was cvaluatcd inlormation and a commodity ol which you can ncvcr havc quitc cnough. . . . |!|t is likc a jigsaw puzzlc with parts missing, thc wholc picturc is rarcly availablc as important picccs arc missing. Hc was convinccd thc Statc cpartmcnt must havc had inlormation during thc prc attack pcriod that would havc bccn ol valuc to thc Commandcr inChicl. 15 n thc morning ol cccmbcr 6, whcn Layton dcliv crcd to Kimmcl a rcport on thc sightings ol Japancsc ships in thc Gull ol Siam and Camranh 8ay, thc thought ol attack on Pcarl Harbor at that timc was vcry lar lrom most pcoplcs minds. 16
Naval o ccrs qucstioncd by Hart rcjcctcd thc Robcrts Commissions chargc that Kimmcl and Short had lailcd to conlcr 14 !bid., pp. 105, 109. 15 !bid., p. 226. 16 !bid., p. 237. 426 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy and coopcratc. Admiral V.V. Smith, 17 Rcar Admiral Valtcr S. Andcrson, commandcr, 8attlcships 8attlc Forcc, Pacic Flcct, 18
and Admiral Villiam F. Halscy, commandcr Aircralt 8attlc Forcc and Task Forcc Two at thc timc ol thc attack, all said that thcir rclations wcrc cxccllcnt. Admiral Kimmcl . . . pcrsonally, spcnt a grcat dcal ol timc socially with Gcncral Short. !n goll, and othcr lorms ol cxcrcisc. . . . Tis cnablcd thcm to discuss things in an inlormal way. 8ut ArmyNavy coopcration was common in Hawaii. At this timc, thcrc wcrc many Army o ccrs that wcnt to sca with thc task lorccs to obtain a rsthand knowlcdgc ol what thc Navy was doing. At thc samc timc, many naval o ccrs wcnt on mancuvcrs with thc Army. 19
Vitncss altcr witncss supportcd Kimmcls claim that hc had bccn handicappcd in opposing thc Japancsc air attack bccausc ol too lcw plancs and antiaircralt guns and insu cicnt pcrson ncl. According to Admiral Smith, Kimmcl had askcd lor mcn so many timcs that somc mcmbcrs ol thc Sta adviscd him that hc was only boring thc cpartmcnt. . . . Hc would ask lor 20,000 mcn, 10,000 to ll vacancics in thc Flcct, and 10,000 morc lor training . . . and thc answcr hc invariably got was that, Tc mcn arc not availablc. Tcy arc nccdcd in thc Atlantic. 20
\icc Admiral Villiam Sattcrlcc Pyc, commandcr at thc timc ol thc attack ol 8attlc Forcc, Unitcd Statcs Pacic Flcct, and commandcr ol Task Forcc nc, tcsticd about thc Junc 1941 dctachmcnt ol ships lrom thc Pacic to thc Atlantic: thrcc battlcships, lour light cruiscrs, onc squadron ol dcstroycrs, and othcr ships had bccn translcrrcd carlicr, so that thc powcr ol thc 17 !bid., p. 44. 18 !bid., pp. 43435. 19 !bid., p. 331. 20 !bid., p. 47. 1944: A Year of Investigations 427 Pacic Flcct had bccn matcrially rcduccd in ordcr to strcngthcn thc lorccs in thc Atlantic. 21
Vitncss altcr witncss pointcd out that thc plancs and ight crcws availablc in Hawaii wcrc clcarly insu cicnt lor longrangc survcillancc. Commandcr Patrick C. 8cllingcr ol Patrol Ving Two cstimatcd an ovcrall lorcc ol approximatcly 200 plancs (84 plancs ying daily) and 252 crcws would bc rcquircd to conduct a scarch through 360 dcgrccs, to a distancc ol at lcast 800 milcs, assuming a 15 milc radius ol visibility. 22 Givcn 25milc visibility, 150 plancs and 225 ight crcws, ying 16 hours pcr day, would bc nccdcd to scarch a radius ol 800 milcs. Tc total ol 24,750 planchours would consumc 1,980,000 gallons ol gasolinc pcr month and rcquirc an avcragc ol 82 cnginc changcs plus 182 sparc cngincs pcr month. And still thc ccctivcncss ol thc scarch would bc only about 50 pcr ccnt. 23 Tc Hawaiian Command thcn had only 81 plancs, ninc wcrc undcrgoing rcpair, 58 wcrc in com mission, and 14 wcrc in thc air. Howcvcr, bccausc ol physical latiguc, about two crcws arc nccdcd lor cvcry planc in opcration, and thc numbcr ol ight crcws in Hawaii on cccmbcr 7 lcll lar short ol thc numbcr rcquircd. 24
Rcar Admiral (commandcr at thc timc ol thc attack) Villard A. Kitts, cct gunncry and training o ccr, U.S. Pacic Flcct, did not think Kimmcl was unduly occupicd with training mattcrs to thc cxtcnt that hc lost sight ol thc othcr aspccts ol rcadincss and sccurity. Hc bclicvcd thc succcss ol thc training in gunncry had bccn bornc out by thc splcndid pcrlormancc that thc antiaircralt battcrics ol thc Flcct put lorth on thc 7th ol cccmbcr. . . . |A|t lcast twcntycight plancs wcrc shot down by vcsscls ol thc 21 !bid., p. 158. 22 !bid., p. 124. 23 !bid., p. 125. 24 !bid., p. 123. 428 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Flcct. Not a bad pcrlormancc lor mcn who had ncvcr rcd a shot in action and considcring thc numbcr ol guns cngagcd. 25
8cllingcr, who had bccn commandcr ol thc Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc, thought it was loolish to think that such a skclctonizcd organization, as thc Pacic Flcct was thcn, lunctioning on thc basis ol coopcration by thc Navy and Army Air Forccs and sct up to bc put in motion by spccial ordcrs or by an cmcrgcncy occurring, rcmaining practically noncxistcnt cxccpt during pcriodic drills, could go into action and lunction ccctivcly at thc occurrcncc ol an actual cmcrgcncy. An orga nization ol this naturc to bc ccctivc must lunction twcnty lour hours cvcry day, and prior to an air raid not subscqucnt thcrcto. 8cllingcr tcsticd that hc kncw ol no man who, undcr thc cir cumstanccs, could havc donc morc than Kimmcl did. 26
Admiral Halscy pointcd out that thc problcm was onc ol balancing sccurity against training and how lar hc could aord to lct his traincd mcn go and still havc his Flcct rcady lor instant action. Hc was constantly going ovcr in his mind how lar this should go. . . . |Kimmcl| was vcry much against thc translcr ol so many traincd mcn and thc inux ol so many rccruits undcr thc conditions that laccd us. 27
Kimmcls task as commandcrinchicl was a juggling act. !n thc light ol his ordcrs and availablc intclligcncc, hc had to wcigh thc rclativc importancc ol training against that ol prcparations lor war, hc did not darc ovcrcmphasizc onc to thc ncglcct ol thc othcr. 25 !bid., pp. 193, 201. Scc also ibid., pp. 47, 65. 26 !bid., p. 140. 27 !bid., pp. 31819. 1944: A Year of Investigations 429 Rcar Admiral Vilson 8rown, commandcr ol thc ccts Scouting Forcc, Task Forcc 3, spokc wcll ol thc ccts prcwar training: |T|hc high statc ol c cicncy maintaincd whilc doubling thc sizc ol our Flcct in two ycars, thc scamanship, gunncry, and ghting ability ol our Navy during two ycars ol war rcccts |sic| thc quality ol our naval lcadcrship and ol our training proccsscs during thc prcwar pcriod as wcll as during thc war pcriod. Tc succcss ol thc Japancsc, 8rown hcld, was not duc to laxity on thc part ol U.S. pcrsonncl, but rathcr to thc dctailcd inlormation thc Japancsc had about our Flcct. 28
Admiral Hart cxamincd ninc witncsscs who had not bccn in Pcarl Harbor during thc wccks bclorc thc attack, including scv cral who had thcn hcld important positions in Vashington and had bccn privy to cspccially important prcattack intclligcncc Rcar Admiral !ngcrsoll, assistant chicl ol naval opcrations, Rcar Admiral Turncr, chicl ol thc Navys war plans division, Rcar Admiral Vilkinson, dircctor ol naval intclligcncc. Tcy wcrc all just as surpriscd as thc Hawaiian o ccrs had bccn that thc Japancsc had targctcd Pcarl Harbor. Hart caught up with Vilkinson on Guadalcanal in thc south Pacic. Vilkinson had takcn ovcr as dircctor ol naval intclligcncc in thc midst ol thc ctobcr 1941 radical pcrsonncl shilts. From Vilkinsons tcstimony, Japans immcdiatc objcctivc appcarcd to bc thc occupation ol |thc| southwcstcrn coast ol !ndoChina, Kampot, and possibly 8angkok, or lowcr Siam on thc Malay Pcninsula. Japancsc troop transports and lrcightcrs wcrc pour ing continually down lrom Japan and Northcrn China coast ports hcadcd South, apparcntly lor Frcnch !ndoChina and Formosan ports. Much activity was going on in thc Mandatcs, 28 !bid., p. 153. 430 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc midPacic islands undcr Japancsc control consisting ol largc rccnlorccmcnts ol pcrsonncl, aircralt, munitions, and also con struction matcrial with yard workmcn and cnginccrs. Howcvcr, naval intclligcncc assumcd that thc major capital ship strcngth rcmains in homc watcrs, as wcll as thc grcatcst portion ol thc carricrs. 29
Tc Unitcd Statcs was kccping a closc cyc on thc Japancsc ship movcmcnts, according to Vilkinson, bccausc ol thc tcnta tivc Amcrican8ritish agrccmcnt that any movcmcnt bcyond ccrtain gcographical limits |100 dcgrccs longitudc, 10 dcgrccs north latitudc| in Southcast Asia would bc considcrcd as a casus bclli lor ngland and as a mattcr ol gravc conccrn lor thc Unitcd Statcs. 30 Vilkinson said Turncr bclicvcd, without spc cic cvidcncc, that thc Japancsc would launch an attack on thc Philippincs, 31 whcrc thc U.S. Asiatic Flcct was bascd. thcrwisc, according to Vilkinson, U.S. tcrritory did not appcar dircctly thrcatcncd. !ngcrsoll told thc inquiry that Vhilc thc Govcrnmcnt could not guarantcc that wc would cntcr thc war il Japan attackcd Grcat 8ritain, in linc with thc A8C Agrccmcnt, thcy lully bclicvcd that wc would do so. !n our convcrsations with thc 8ritish, howcvcr, wc ncvcr could makc a rm commitmcnt that at any particular timc thc Unitcd Statcs would cntcr thc war, lor thc rcason that unlcss wc wcrc attackcd rst thc xccutivc cpartmcnt did not havc thc powcr to put thc Country into war. 32
29 !bid., p. 303, quoting lrom N!s cccmbcr 1, 1941 lortnightly summary ol intcrnational ncws, airmailcd to all ag o ccrs aoat. 30 !bid., p. 303. 31 !bid. 32 !bid., p. 267. 1944: A Year of Investigations 431 !ngcrsoll tcsticd that thc Unitcd Statcs was virtually at war with Gcrmany in thc Atlantic, although without bcnct ol a war dcclaration. 33 !t was lclt that Gcrmany was thc principal cncmy to bc disposcd ol rst. 34 Ncvcrthclcss, !ngcrsoll said Vc lclt that thc war would bc prccipitatcd in thc Pacic and that wc would only bccomc involvcd in thc war in thc Atlantic as a rcsult ol war in thc Pacic. As a mattcr ol lact, corts had bccn madc to gct our mcrchant vcsscls out ol thc Far ast and out ol thc othcr arcas in thc Pacic whcrc thcy could bc capturcd by thc Japancsc. . . . |T|hc Atlantic situation did not prcoccupy our attcntion to thc cxclusion ol thc Pacic. 35
!ngcrsoll had anticipatcd Japan would strikc without a dcc laration ol war. 8ut that hcr surprisc attacks would bc madc against thc Philippincs and Guam with pos sibly raiding attacks on our outlying small islands to thc wcst ward ol Hawaii, and submarinc attacks against our shipping around Hawaii. . . . |Hc did| not rccall anyonc in pcrations rcprcscnting to Admiral Stark that thc war would bc prccipi tatcd by an air attack on Pcarl Harbor. 36
C~v:~ix S~vvovbs Tvs:i:oxv Captain Laurcncc F. Saord ol thc sccurity (intclligcncc) scc tion ol thc Navys communications division, mct inlormally with Hart and rclatcd to him lrom mcmory somc ol thc inlormation Vashington had dcrivcd lrom dccryptcd Japancsc intcrccpts bclorc thc attack. Hart cautioncd him against making statcmcnts hc 33 !bid., p. 469. 34 !bid., p. 461. 35 !bid., p. 470. 36 !bid. 432 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy couldnt provc and askcd him to chcck thc rccord bclorc rcturn ing to givc lormal tcstimony. Saord rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt and lookcd lor thc pcrtincnt intcrccpts. But they were missing! Tcrclorc, whcn Saord tcsticd lormally bclorc thc Hart !nquiry on April 29, 1944, 37 hc again spokc lrom mcmory and a lcw notcs. Howcvcr, hc was ablc to rccall in considcrablc dctail many ol thc impor tant Japancsc dispatchcs that had bccn intcrccptcd, dcciphcrcd, translatcd, and rcad by top military and administration o cials in Vashington bclorc thc attack. As carly as thc spring ol 1941 (May 22), thcy had rcccivcd positivc prool ol Japancsc plans lor thc conqucst ol Southcastcrn Asia and thc Southwcst Pacic. Furthcr indications ol Japans plans lor aggrcssion in thc southwcst Pacic and against southcast Asia wcrc pickcd up in Scptcmbcr and ctobcr. n Novcmbcr 4, wc rcccivcd inlormation that Japans intcrnal situation, both political and cconomic, was so dcspcratc as a rcsult ol thc U.S. cmbargo that thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt had to distract popular attcntion by a lorcign war or by somc bloodlcss diplomatic vic tory. Vc lcarncd on Novcmbcr 12 that thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt rcgardcd Novcmbcr 25 as thc dcadlinc lor ncgotiations thcn bcing conductcd in Vashington. !t was obvious that Japan was prcparing lor ocnsivc military opcrations ol somc naturc. Tc pacc ol thc urgcnt intcrccpts pickcd up toward thc cnd ol Novcmbcr. n Novcmbcr 24, 1941, wc lcarncd that Novcmbcr 29 was dcnitcly thc govcrning datc lor ocnsivc military opcra tions ol somc naturc. Vc intcrprctcd this to mcan that largc scalc movcmcnts lor thc conqucst ol Southcast Asia and thc 37 !bid., p. 387. 1944: A Year of Investigations 433 Southwcst Pacic would bcgin on that datc, bccausc, at that timc Hawaii was out ol our minds. 38 n cccmbcr 1 U.S. o cials lcarncd that Japan was going to attack 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs. Tcn on cccmbcr 4 wc rcccivcd dcnitc inlormation . . . that Japan would attack thc Unitcd Statcs and 8ritain, but would maintain pcacc with Russia. 39
At 9:00 v.:. (Vashington timc), cccmbcr 6, 1941, wc rcccivcd positivc inlormation that Japan would dcclarc war against thc Unitcd Statcs, at a timc to bc spccicd thcrcaltcr. Tis inlor mation was positivc and unmistakablc and was madc availablc to Military !ntclligcncc at this samc timc. 40
8ccausc this inlormation was so important, it was distributcd as a rush job by Licutcnant Commandcr Kramcr. Much ol thc cccmbcr 6 inlormation was distributcd ovcr thc tclcphonc by Admiral Vilkinson and by Sccrctary Hull. Tc lollowing o cials wcrc givcn this inlormation that night: Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt (via thc Vhitc Housc Aidc), Sccrctary Hull, Sccrctary Stimson, Sccrctary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rcar Admiral Turncr, Rcar Admiral Vilkinson, Rcar Admiral 8cardall. Licutcnant Coloncl R.S. 8ratton, U.S. Army, was givcn thc samc inlormation at 9:00 v.:. |cccmbcr 6| lor dis scmination to Var cpartmcnt o cials, and wc did not know any morc, cxccpt that hc got a copy ovcr to Sccrctary Hull by 10:00. 41
Finally, at 10:15 ~.:. (Vashington timc), cccmbcr 7, 1941, wc rcccivcd positivc inlormation lrom thc Signal !ntclligcncc 38 !bid., p. 390. 39 !bid. 40 !bid. 41 !bid., pp. 39092. 434 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Scrvicc (Var cpartmcnt) that thc Japancsc dcclaration ol war would bc prcscntcd to thc Sccrctary ol Statc at 1:00 v.:. (Vashington timc) that datc.
8clorc that mcssagc was prcscntcd to thc sccrctary ol thc Navy, Kramcr appcndcd a notc to thc ccct that 1:00 v.:. Vashington timc was sunrisc in Hawaii and approximatcly midnight in thc Philippincs, and this indicatcd a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in about three hours. 42
According to Saord, two spccic mcssagcs rcccivcd in Vashington bclorc thc attack gavc prctty clcar indications that Japan intcndcd to dcclarc war on thc Unitcd Statcs. Tc Vinds Mcssagc, intcrccptcd cccmbcr 4, was rcgardcd . . . as dcnitcly committing thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt to war with thc Unitcd Statcs and 8ritain. 43 And thc mcssagc rcccivcd in thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 constitutcd positivc inlormation that Japan would dcclarc war against thc Unitcd Statcs, at a timc to bc spccicd thcrcaltcr. 44
Hart: !s thcrc any documcntary rcport which shows thc datc and hour ol dclivcry ol thc lorcgoing inlormation to various o cials: Saord: Tcrc is no documcntary cvidcncc. Saord was tcstilying, hc said, on thc basis ol his rccollcction ol Licutcnant Commandcr Kramcrs vcrbal rcports. 45 Rccords ol all thc Japancsc intcrccpts had bccn madc and lcd at thc timc, but in 1944 Saord could nd no copics whatsocvcr. 42 !bid., p. 390, italics addcd. 43 !bid., p. 394. 44 !bid., p. 390. 45 !bid., p. 391. 1944: A Year of Investigations 435 Hart: Vas any ol thc lorcgoing inlormation, undcr datcs ol Novcmbcr and cccmbcr, 1941, disscminatcd by thc main Vashington unit dircct to thc corrcsponding unit in Fourtccnth Naval istrict |Hawaii|: Saord: No, sir. Tat was not pcrmittcd by a writtcn ordcr thcn in lorcc, but thcrc was onc cxccption. n thc 3rd ol cccmbcr, ! prcparcd pNav Sccrct ispatch 031855. . . . !n scnding this inlormation, ! was ovcrstcpping thc bounds as cstablishcd by approvcd war plans and joint agrccmcnt bctwccn Naval Communications and Naval !ntclligcncc. Tis inlormation was scnt to Manila lor action and it was routcd to Pcarl Harbor lor inlormation. 46 !t rcportcd thc Japancsc govcrnmcnts ordcrs to its cmissarics throughout thc world to dcstroy thcir codcs and codc machincs. 47 Hawaii could not pos sibly havc gaincd this inlormation through thcir own corts. Tc disscmination ol such intclligcncc was thc duty, rcsponsibility, and privilcgc ol thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc, not ol Saords Communications !ntclligcncc Unit. 48
Tis was Saords rst tcstimony bclorc a Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, hc had not bccn askcd to tcstily bclorc thc Robcrts Commission. His rcvclations wcrc startling. No onc appcaring bclorc Robcrts had hintcd at thc availability ol such intclligcncc as Saord dcscribcd. And ol thc Vashington witncsscs qucstioncd by Hart, only Turncr and !ngcrsoll had said anything that might havc bccn intcrprctcd as rclcrring to thc Japancsc intcrccpts. Saord appcarcd to know what hc was talking about, but hc was unablc to producc copics ol any ol thc Japancsc mcssagcs to support his tcstimony. Almost thrcc ycars had passcd sincc hc had actually sccn any ol thc intcrccpts hc was dcscribing. How 46 !bid., p. 392. 47 !bid., part 14, p. 1408, Saords Top Sccrct dispatch ol cccmbcr 3. 48 !bid., part 26, pp. 39293. 436 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy much, il any, ol Saords dctailcd tcstimony could bc bclicvcd: Saords mcmory could bc playing tricks on him.
Sccrctary ol Navy Knox dicd suddcnly ol a hcart attack on April 28, 1944, whilc thc Hart !nquiry was in progrcss. Jamcs \. Forrcstal, thcn undcrsccrctary ol Navy, was sworn in as his suc ccssor on May 19. 49
Hart concludcd his inquiry on Junc 15 and adjourncd to await thc action ol thc convcning authority. 50 Tc tcstimony ol witncsscs was rccordcd and submittcd with thc scvcral documcnts and cxhibits introduccd to Forrcstal. S~vvovb Fixbs :nv Missixc !x:vvcvv:s Altcr tcstilying at thc Hart !nquiry, Saord continucd his scarch lor thc intcrccpts. 8ut hc was unsucccsslul, all copics sccmcd to havc disappcarcd. Saord was mysticd. Finally somc onc told him about a packct ol papcrs in a Navy salc labclcd P.H. Pcrhaps that containcd thc documcnts hc was looking lor. !t did! !t containcd an almost complctc sct ol thc missing Japancsc intcrccpts. Saord thcn had copics madc and rcstorcd to thc lcs. 51
No onc has cvcr bccn ablc to cxplain how thc lour original copics ol cach intcrccpt produccd lor thc govcrnmcnts Army and Navy pcrmancnt lcs and hcld undcr tight sccurity had bccn lost or dcstroycd. Apparcntly this onc sct ol intcrccpts survivcd bccausc ol a scrics ol coincidcnccs. n cccmbcr 9, almost immc diatcly altcr thc attack, Navy Sccrctary Knox cw to Hawaii to invcstigatc thc damagc donc by thc Japancsc. Hc didnt rcturn 49 Valtcr Millis, cd., Te Forrestal Diaries (Ncw York: \iking Prcss, 1951), p. xxiii. Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26. 50 !bid., pp. 47172. 51 Saords convcrsations with author, notcs in authors lcs. 1944: A Year of Investigations 437 until cccmbcr 14. Hawaii was thcn a tcrritory, not yct a statc. Vith thc sccrctary out ol thc country, Undcrsccrctary Jamcs \. Forrcstal bccamc acting sccrctary. Forrcstal had known nothing ol Purplc and had not bccn privy to MAG!C. n assuming thc rcsponsibilitics ol sccrctary, hc askcd to bc briclcd. Tcrclorc, apparcntly on ordcrs ol Admiral Noycs, dircctor ol naval com munications, Licutcnant Commandcr Kramcr, Japancsc transla tor and Navy couricr, asscmblcd lor Forrcstal a spccial loldcr ol intcrccpts and othcr papcrs rclativc to thc brcak in diplomatic rclations with Japan. 52 8ccausc ol Saords lamiliarity with thc tra c, Kramcr had gonc ovcr thc loldcr with Saord to chcck lor complctcncss. 53 Tcn both Commandcr McCollum ol Far ast intclligcncc and Kramcr briclcd Forrcstal, cxplaining thc signi cancc ol thc various mcssagcs 54 and thc way things shapcd up lrom this tra c. 55
Vhcn Knox rcturncd and Forrcstal was rclicvcd ol his posi tion as Acting Sccrctary, his bundlc ol intcrccpts must havc bccn tosscd in a salc and lorgottcn. Couv: M~v:i~i v~biixv x:vxbvb Tc tidcs ol war had shiltcd by this timc. Tc Allics wcrc prcparing to launch a sccond lront in uropc. Tc Axis powcrs wcrc on thc dclcnsivc both in uropc and in Asia. Many pcoplc, Rcpublicans and somc antiNcw cal cmocrats, wcrc bcgin ning to ask why, altcr all this timc, it was still ncccssary to main tain sccrccy about thc Pcarl Harbor attack. Vhy couldnt thc truth bc told: Vas thc administration trying to hidc somcthing: 52 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3689, Saord tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. At thc timc, Saord was undcr thc imprcssion thc loldcr ol intcrccpts was bcing asscmblcd lor thc usc ol thc Robcrts Commis sion. 53 !bid., part 36, p. 71, Saord tcstimony bclorc thc Hcwitt !nquiry. 54 !bid., part 36, p. 71, Saord tcstimony. 55 !bid., pp. 8384, Kramcr tcstimony bclorc thc Hcwitt !nquiry. 438 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Saord had told Kimmcl about thc important Japancsc intcrccpts. 8ut cxccpt lor what hc had lcarncd about thcm lrom Rochclort in 1942, 56 Kimmcl had only Saords word that thcy had cvcr cxistcd. vcn so, Kimmcl didnt want to losc thc chancc ol having his day in court. Vhcncvcr anyonc askcd him about his possiblc court martial, hc always rcplicd that hc was rcady, hc had always wantcd a lrcc, opcn and public hcaring. !n thc critical ycars lollowing Pcarl Harbor, Kimmcl had undcrstood why hc had to bcar, in silcncc, thc burdcn ol shamc hcapcd upon |him| by thc rcport ol thc Robcrts Commission and by publishcd intcrprctations ol that rcport. Howcvcr, hc lclt that now, with our armcd lorccs on thc ocnsivc on all lronts, hc owcd it to his lamily, lricnds, and thc public to makc it clcar that hc wantcd a trial by CourtMartial at thc carlicst practicablc datc. . . . To bc hcld undcr a shadow ol blamc lor an additional prolongcd and indcnitc pcriod is intolcrablc. Tc public has a right to know what happcncd. And hc, Kimmcl, had an Amcricans right to |his| day in court. 57
Kimmcl scnt his attorncy, Charlcs 8. Rugg, and his assistant, dward 8. Hanily, to Vashington in thc spring ol 1944, to try to havc Congrcss cxtcnd thc dcadlinc lor his court martial. Altcr a rathcr hcatcd dcbatc, Congrcss approvcd anothcr sixmonth dcadlinc cxtcnsion and, at thc samc timc, passcd a joint rcsolution calling lor invcstigations ol thc Pcarl Harbor attack by both thc Army and Navy. 58
56 Saord, Tc Kita Mcssagc: No Longcr a Mystcry, manuscript (copy in authors lcs). 57 Kimmcl, May 25, 1944, lcttcr to Scnator Sinclair Vccks (R., Mass.). Copy in Tomas Kimmcl Collcction. Quotcd in Toland, Infamy, 1982, pp. 7879. 58 Te New York Times, Junc 8, 1944, p. 14. 1944: A Year of Investigations 439 FR signcd thc joint rcsolution against thc advicc ol Sccrctary ol Var Stimson and Knox. !n signing, hc statcd that hc was surc thc Congrcss did not intcnd that thc invcstigation . . . should bc conductcd in a manncr which would intcrrupt or intcrlcrc with thc war cort. n thc strcngth ol this condcncc ! havc approvcd thc rcsolution. 59
Tus, by appcaring to approvc lurthcr invcstigations ol Pcarl Harbor, thc politically astutc prcsidcnt succccdcd in shilting thc rcsponsibility lor any dclay to his sccrctarics. 59 !bid., Junc 15, 1944, p. 10. 441 22. Army Pearl Harbor Board T hc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard (APH8) was authorizcd by Congrcss to Asccrtain and Rcport thc Facts Rclating to thc Attack Madc by Japancsc Armcd Forccs upon thc Tcrritory ol Hawaii on 7 cccmbcr 1941, and to Makc such Rccommcndations as !t May ccm Propcr. 1 Licutcnant Gcncral Gcorgc Gruncrt was appointcd prcsidcnt ol this Gruncrt 8oard. Two othcr Army gcncrals also scrvcdMajor Gcncral Hcnry . Russcll and Major Gcncral Valtcr H. Frank. Coloncls Charlcs V. Vcst and Harry A. Toulmin had nonvoting positions as rccordcr and cxccutivc o ccr rcspcctivcly, and Major Hcnry C. Clauscn was assistant rccordcr. Tc Gruncrt 8oard convcncd in Vashington, .C. on July 20, 1944. 8cing an Army board, it was primarily intcrcstcd in Armys rolc, cspccially that ol Army Chicl ol Sta Marshall and Hawaiian Commandcr Gcncral Valtcr Short. Tc 8oards mcmbcrs rst rcvicwcd thc rcports ol carlicr invcstigations and studicd matcri als supplicd by various govcrnmcnt agcncics and Congrcssional 1 Public Law 339, 78th Cong., 2nd scss. ( Junc 13, 1944), scc also 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrn mcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 27, p. 12, part 31, p. 3173, part 39, p. 24. 442 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy committccs. !t also wrotc Sccrctary ol Var Stimson and Army Chicl ol Sta Gcorgc C. Marshall, listing thc subjccts thc 8oard hopcd to covcr whcn thcy tcsticd. 2 Tc APH8 did not havc thc powcr ol subpocna, but in no instancc |was| its invitation to appcar and tcstily . . . ignorcd. 3 Tc qucstioning altcrnatcd among thc mcmbcrs. Tc board intcrvicwcd 151 witncsscs and was in continuous scssion until ctobcr 20, 1944. 4 8ccausc ol thc naturc ol thc rcvclations, much ol thc tcstimony takcn during thc nal scgmcnt ol thc procccdings was kcpt o thc rccord and prcscrvcd in a scparatc TP SCRT rcport. Av:v Cnivv ov S:~vv Gvxvv~i M~vsn~ii: US.J~v~x Rvi~:ioxs ix ++, !xcvv~sixciv Tvxsv Marshall, thc 8oards rst witncss, statcd: |V|c wcrc vcry lcarlul ol somc warlikc act by thc Japancsc, which immcdiatcly would havc brought about a statc ol war in thc Pacic, lor which, at thc timc, wc wcrc not prcparcd. . . . |T|hcrc wcrc numcrous indications . . . all ol which indi catcd a vcry scrious crisis dcvcloping in thc Pacic in rclation to Japan. 5
Marshall said hc and Chicl ol Naval pcrations Admiral Stark madc it vcry clcar . . . to thc Sccrctary ol Statc, that it was ol thc utmost importancc . . . to dclay so long as possiblc any outbrcak in thc Pacic. . . . Vc anticipatcd, bcyond a doubt, a Japancsc movcmcnt in !ndoChina and thc Gull ol Siam, and against thc Malay Pcninsula. Vc anticipatcd also an assault on thc Philippincs. Vc did not, so lar as ! can rccall, anticipatc an 2 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, pp. 208789. 3 !bid., part 39, p. 24. 4 !bid. 5 !bid., part 27, p. 14. Army Pearl Harbor Board 443 attack on Hawaii. . . . |V|c thought, with thc addition ol morc modcrn plancs, that thc dclcnscs thcrc would bc su cicnt to makc it cxtrcmcly hazardous lor thc Japancsc to attcmpt such an attack. 6
!n a joint Novcmbcr 27 mcmorandum Marshall and Stark told thc prcsidcnt cmphatically: Tc most csscntial thing now, lrom thc Unitcd Statcs vicw point, is to gain timc. . . . Altcr consultation with cach othcr, Unitcd Statcs, 8ritish, and utch military authoritics in thc Far ast agrccd that joint military countcr action against Japan should bc undcrtakcn only in casc Japan attacks or dircctly thrcatcns thc tcrritory or mandatcd tcrritory ol thc Unitcd Statcs, thc 8ritish Commonwcalth, or thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, or should thc Japancsc movc lorccs into Tailand wcst ol 100
ast or south ol 10
NorthPortugucsc Timor, Ncw
Calcdonia, or thc Loyalty !slands. 7
\cry soon altcr Short assumcd command ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt, Marshall adviscd him (Fcbruary 7, 1941) ol his rcsponsibility lor protccting thc cct: Tc lullcst protcction lor thc Flcct is the rathcr than a major considcration lor us, thcrc can bc littlc qucstion about that. . . . Plcasc kccp clcarly in mind in all ol your ncgotiations that our mission is to protcct thc basc and thc Naval conccntration, and that purposc should bc madc clcarly apparcnt to Admiral Kimmcl. 8
6 !bid. 7 !bid., p. 15. 8 !bid., pp. 1618. 444 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Vhcn askcd il thc mission ol thc Army out thcrc was thc pro tcction ol thc Navy, Marshall answcrcd, Ycs. Tat is thc rcason lor thc Armys bcing thcrc. 9
Coovvv~:iox 8v:wvvx Pv~vi H~vnov Co::~xbvvs Ab:iv~i Ki::vi ~xb Gvxvv~i Snov: Tc Robcrts Commission had blamcd thc Pcarl Harbor disas tcr to somc cxtcnt on thc lailurc ol thc two Pcarl Harbor com mandcrs, Kimmcl and Short, to coopcratc. Short acknowlcdgcd that thcrc had bccn somc instanccs whcn thc channcls ol com munication bctwccn thc Army and Navy sccmcd to brcak down. For instancc, hc did not lcarn until cccmbcr 8 about thc subma rinc sunk ncar Pcarl Harbor at about 6:45 ~.:. on cccmbcr 7. 10
Howcvcr, gcncrally spcaking hc thought thc Armys rclation with thc Navy in Hawaii and his pcrsonal rclationship with Kimmcl had bccn good. Kimmcls associatcs and Hawaiian locals who wcrc qucstioncd agrccd. 11
Gvxvv~i Snov: vvvxbs His S~no:~cv Aivv: Short had bccn chargcd by thc Robcrts Commission with an crror in judgmcnt lor having institutcd Alcrt #1 to guard against sabotagc and lor not having alcrtcd lor such an attack as that ol cccmbcr 7. Tc Armys July 14, 1941, Standard pcrating Proccdurc, 12 ccctivc Novcmbcr 5, 1941, had dcscribcd thrcc alcrts. So Marshall was lamiliar with thcm. Howcvcr, hc had somc dcnitc idcas about implcmcnting thcm. Hc did not want 9 !bid., part 27, p. 18. 10 !bid., p. 285. 11 !bid., p. 798 (Admiral 8loch), part 28, p. 1447 (8usincssman Valtcr Francis illingham). 12 !bid., part 39, p. 77. APH8 Rcport, part 7, pp. 294144. Army Pearl Harbor Board 445 thc Hawaiian air lorcc uscd to dclcnd against sabotagc and ground attacks, or to providc military policc duty. Hc wrotc Short on ctobcr 10 that using thc air lorcc lor antisabotagc sccms inconsistcnt with thc cmphasis wc arc placing on air strcngth in Hawaii. 13 Marshall told Short to usc his Air Forcc lor its normal purposcs and not upon antisabotagc guard duty. 14
Var cpartmcnts Novcmbcr 27 war warning mcssagc #472 had rcad: Ncgotiations with Japan appcar to bc tcrminatcd. . . . !l hostili tics cannot rcpcat cannot bc avoidcd thc Unitcd Statcs dcsircs that Japan commit thc rst ovcrt act. Tis policy should not comma rcpcat not comma bc construcd as rcstricting you to a coursc ol action that might jcopardizc your dclcnsc. Prior to hostilc Japancsc action you arc dircctcd to undcrtakc such rcconnaissancc and othcr mcasurcs as you dccm ncccssary but thcsc mcasurcs should bc carricd out so as not comma rcpcat not comma to alarm civil population or disclosc intcnt. 15
Short lound this conlusing, hc should undcrtakc such rccon naissancc and othcr mcasurcs as you dccm ncccssary, but thcsc mcasurcs should bc carricd out so as not comma rcpcat not comma to alarm civil population or disclosc intcnt. 8ccausc ol this stricturc, Short had dccidcd upon Alcrt #1, dcsigncd spcci cally to guard against sabotagc, cspionagc, and subvcrsivc activi tics, rathcr than onc ol thc morc aggrcssivc Alcrts. 16 Short had thcn radiocd Vashington, as rcqucstcd, that hc had alcrtcd to prcvcnt sabotagc. 17
13 !bid., part 27, p. 22, Marshall tcstimony. 14 !bid., pp. 2223. Marshall tcstimony. 15 Mcssagc #472 quotcd in APH8 hcarings, part 27, p. 155. 16 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 27, pp. 156, 158. Short tcsti mony. 17 !bid., part 14, p. 1330, part 27, p. 158: Rc your radiogram 472, cpartmcnt alcrtcd to prcvcnt sabotagc. 446 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Short cxplaincd still lurthcr thc rcasons lor his sabotagc alcrt. 18
Hawaiian !ntclligcncc (G2) had rcccivcd a mcssagc#473 lrom Gcncral Shcrman Milcs, ircctor ol Military !ntclligcncc, G2advising that Subvcrsivc activitics may bc cxpcctcd. 19
Milcs cxplaincd that Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt had dclcgatcd to thc F8!, N!, and to his military intclligcncc division rcsponsibility lor countcrsubvcrsivc activitics. Vhcn Milcs lound that nothing had bccn said about subvcrsion in Gcncral Marshalls Novcmbcr 27 war warning, hc lclt it ncccssary to warn all G2 dcpartmcnts. Tc policy had alrcady bccn laid down, Milcs said, by Gcncral Marshalls tclcgram, hc was simply backing up Marshalls pol icy and cmphasizing thc lorm ol attack lor which hc, Milcs, was rcsponsiblc. 20 Upon rccciving thc Var cpartmcnts Novcmbcr 27 war warning, 21 Short thought, lrom thc caution about not taking any provocativc mcasurcs against Japan and not alarming thc public, thcrc was still somc possibility ol avoiding war with Japan. To takc thc mcssagc ol thc 16th ol ctobcr |rc Japans changc in Primc Ministcrs lrom Konoyc to Tojo| and thc 27th ol Novcmbcr togcthcr, thcy indicatcd to mc |Short| that thcy wcrc still hopclul ol avoiding hostilitics. Stark didnt hcar anything lurthcr lrom thc Var cpartmcnt cxccpt thc short Novcmbcr 28 mcssagc (#482), which wcnt into dctail about sabotagc, 22 tclling Short to protcct his cstablish mcnts against subvcrsivc propaganda and . . . cspionagc. 23 Short 18 !bid., part 27, pp. 156, 158. 19 !bid., part 14, p. 1329. 20 !bid., part 27, p. 66, 9899, tcstimony ol Gcncral H.H. Arnold, chicl ol thc Army Air Forccs. 21 !bid., part 27, p. 25. 22 !bid., p. 239. 23 !bid., part 14, p. 1330. Army Pearl Harbor Board 447 intcrprctcd thc scvcral mcssagcs lrom thc Var cpartmcnt in Vashington as approving his sabotagc alcrt. thcr witncsscs qucstioncd by thc Gruncrt board also bclicvcd Short had bccn justicd in his dccision to alcrt lor sabotagc. Short had bccn givcn no indication that thc ncgotiations in Vashington wcrc rcaching a brcaking point, hc had not bccn told that wc wcrc ncgotiating with thc 8ritish and utch about coordinatcd military action in thc Pacic arca. !l hc had known morc about what was going on in Vashington and about thc attitudc ol Vashington o cials, it would undoubtcdly havc madc him morc conscious that war was practically unavoidablc. 24
V~snixc:ox vvici~is Svv V~v ~s !::ixvx: !n thcir tcstimony, various Vashington o cials traccd thc dctcrioration ol U.S.Japancsc rclations back to various points in timc. Gcncral H.H. Arnold, chicl ol thc Army Air Forccs, said it had bccn apparcnt as carly as January 1941 that rclations wcrc quitc straincd. 25 Gcncral Lconard T. Gcrow, acting, or assistant, chicl ol war plans, said thc gcncral buildup . . . bctwccn July and Novcmbcr . . . lcd to thc conclusion in Novcmbcr that war with Japan might occur. 26 Marshall said it had bccn a gradual pro ccss, hc had comc to thc conclusion somc timc in thc lall ol 41 that war with Japan was incvitablc. 27 Gcncral Milcs ol Military !ntclligcncc also saw thc situation as prccarious lrom Novcmbcr 27, whcn wc lcarncd that wc had practically givcn what . . . prob ably would bc considcrcd by thcm |thc Japancsc| an ultimatum . . . ! considcrcd war as vcry probablc il not incvitablc. . . . ! 24 !bid., part 27, p. 240. 25 !bid., p. 89, Arnold tcstimony. 26 !bid., part 29, p. 2158. 27 !bid., p. 2326. 448 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thought that vcry dcnitcly an action by Japan, a prctty radi cal action, would bc takcn almost at oncc, that that ncccssarily would bc an ovcrt and opcn attack on thc Unitcd Statcs. Howcvcr, Milcs pointcd out, war was not thc only possibility, thcrc wcrc a good many things Japan could havc donc, il shc did brcak thosc ncgotiations, short ol opcn war with thc Unitcd Statcs, and wc wcrc considcring all ol thosc mattcrs. 28
Vn~: ib Snov: Kxow ov :nv Gvowixc U.S.J~v~xvsv Cvisis 8uiibuv- Not much! Short bclicvcd hc kncw in an indcnitc way that U.S. policy lrom somctimc in August or Scptcmbcr ol 1941 was largcly onc ol dclaying, playing lor timc, with thc rcalization that war with Japan was incvitablc. 29 8ut hc had not bccn told about thc Scptcmbcr 1941 conlcrcncc whcn Gcncral Marshall and othcrs who wcrc in conlcrcncc with thc Sccrctary ol Statc had dccidcd that war with Japan was incvitablc. Nor had hc known that wc wcrc ncgotiating with thc 8ritish and utch about coordinatcd military action in thc Pacic arca. And no onc had told him an agrccmcnt had bccn rcachcd with all nations, thc ccct ol which was that il thc Japancsc movcd lorccs into Tailand wcst ol 100 dcgrccs cast or south ol 20 dcgrccs north wc would rcgard that as an act ol war. 30
8asically, hc kncw only what was in thc papcrs. Short lcarncd lrom an ctobcr 16 StarkKimmcl mcssagc, ol thc rcsignation ol Japans Primc Ministcr Konoyc and thc risc to powcr ol thc morc militant Gcncral Hidcki Tojo crcating 28 !bid., part 27, pp. 6465. 29 !bid., p. 240. 30 !bid. Army Pearl Harbor Board 449 a gravc situation. . . . |H|ostilitics bctwccn Japan and Russia arc a strong possibility. Sincc thc US and 8ritain arc hcld rcspon siblc lor hcr prcscnt dcspcratc situation thcrc is also a possibil ity that Japan may attack thcsc two powcrs. 31
All conccrncd with thc cxisting gravc situation wcrc to takc duc prccautions. Short bclicvcd hc had donc that with his Alcrt #1: Vc had had all thc utilitics guardcd, all thc bridgcs, and . . . ! just simply cautioncd pcoplc that wcrc rcsponsiblc lor that guard ing to bc unusually carclul. Shorts intcrprctation was that thc Navy cpartmcnt lclt surc Japan was going to attack Russia, an attack on thc U.S. and G.8. was only a possibility. 32
Altcr discussion with thc Armys G2, Army Chicl ol Var Plans Gcrow rcachcd thc conclusion at that timc that thc Navy cstimatc was morc pcssimistic than wc bclicvcd it should bc. 33 Accordingly thc Var cpartmcnt scnt Short an ctobcr 20 lollowup radiogram in ccct toning down thc Navys warning: Following Var cpt. cstimatc ol Japancsc situation lor your inlormation STP Tcnsion bctwccn Unitcd Statcs and Japan rcmains straincd but no rcpcat no abrupt changc in Japancsc lorcign policy appcars immincnt. 34
n Novcmbcr 24 thc Navy scnt anothcr pcssimistic mcssagc to its cld commandcrs, including Kimmcl: Chanccs ol lavorablc outcomc ol ncgotiations with Japan vcry doubtlul x Tis situation couplcd with statcmcnts ol Japancsc Govcrnmcnt and movcmcnts thcir naval and military lorccs indicatc to our opinion that a surprisc aggrcssivc movcmcnt 31 !bid., part 14, pp. 1327, 1402. 32 !bid., part 27, pp. 21819. 33 !bid., part 29, p. 2159. 34 !bid., part 14, p. 1327. 450 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy in any dircction including attack on Philippincs or Guam is a possibility. Tc commandcrs wcrc adviscd: Chicl ol Sta has sccn this dis patch concurs and rcqucsts action adccs |addrcssccs| to inlorm scnior Army thcir arcas. 35 Short did not rccall sccing this pcs simistic Navy mcssagc. 36
Marshall dclcndcd Vashingtons warnings as adcquatc to havc alcrtcd Short to bc prcparcd lor thc crisis that was coming. !n our own vicw, Marshall tcsticd, an alcrt ol thc charactcr, particularly thc charactcr ol thc two that occurrcd at that timc, thc Naval alcrt and thcn thc latcr Army alcrt, wcrc su cicnt lor any commandcr with a grcat rcsponsibility. 37
Short thought that, il Vashington cvcr rcally bclicvcd that an attack on thc Unitcd Statcs was immincnt, it would havc lound somc mcans to inlorm him, as commandcr in thc cld, il ncccs sary by scramblcr phonc. ||rdinarily, you could gct through in tcn or ltccn minutcs. !t was rcasonablc to bclicvc, Short tcsti cd, that il thcrc was going to bc a hostilc attack, thcy would havc tricd to gct it to us by morc than onc mcans ol communication. Tus hc had bccn lorccd to concludc that thcrc was a lccling still at that timc that sccrccy was morc important than thc timc clcmcnt. 38 8ut thcrc had bccn no word lrom Vashington. Undcr Gruncrts qucstioning, Marshall admittcd that it would havc bccn both possiblc and lcasiblc to havc scnt thc substancc ol this sccrct inlormation to thc Commanding Gcncrals ol thc vcrscas cpartmcnts by couricr or othcrwisc. Howcvcr, Marshall had 35 !bid., pp. 1328, 1405, CN ispatch #242005, Novcmbcr 24, 1941. 36 !bid., part 27, p. 220. 37 !bid., part 29, p. 2329. 38 !bid., p.169. Army Pearl Harbor Board 451 bccn so scnsitivc to thc thrcat ol cndangcring Vashingtons sourcc ol intclligcnccthc MAG!C intcrccptsthat hc had considcrcd it unwisc to do so. 39
Pi~xvs ~xb Snivs vov H~w~ii No: ~ Hicn Pviovi:v Tc board qucstioncd Admiral 8loch about thc Navys cort to obtain plancs. !n 1940 thc Navy had gottcn moncy lor a 15,000planc programa numbcr ol P8Ys, ol which about 108 wcrc allocatcd to thc Fourtccnth Naval istrict (Hawaii) and 150 or so to thc U.S. Pacic Flcct. At that timc thc cct only had 81. 8loch said hc was quitc pcrsistcnt in . . . trying to gct thc plancs. CommandcrinChicl |Kimmcl| kncw . . . and hc supportcd mc. Tc corrcspondcncc wcnt to thc Navy cpartmcnt ask ing lor thcsc plancs, and ! was told rcpcatcdly thcy would bc givcn to mc but thcy would not bc givcn to mc until somc timc that was indcnitc in thc luturc. 40 . . . |!|t wasnt a qucstion ol appropriation. !t was qucstion ol prioritics: Tc war was in |thc| Atlantic, Pacic wasnt in thc war. . . . Tcy say it in thc war plan: Tc war is in thc Atlantic, thc Pacic is a morc or lcss quasidclcnsivc |thcatcr| until thcy gct around to it. 41
According to Admiral Villiam S. Pyc, commandcr battlc lorcc, Pacic Flcct, and commandcr Task Forcc 1, thc situation was said to bc scrious as carly rcally as April 1941. Howcvcr, hc rcmindcd thc board, thc Navy cpartmcnt had dctachcd lrom thc Pacic Flcct in Junc 39 !bid., part 29, p. 2328. 40 !bid., p. 800. 41 !bid., pp. 80001. 452 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy onc battlcship division, onc light cruiscr division, and two dcstroycr divisions, to scnd into thc Atlantic. !t hardly sccmcd to thc Commandcrs in thc Pacic that il thc situation was as bad as it was said to bc, that was thc timc to bc moving a largc portion ol our Flcct into thc Atlantic, cspccially as thc 8ritish Flcct, itscll, was many timcs supcrior to thc availablc Gcrman ships. 42
Not only had thc Pacic Flcct bccn guttcd, Pyc said, but thc commandcrs cncountcrcd rcsistancc lrom Vashington whcncvcr thcy askcd lor mcn and matcricl. uring this samc pcriod, it bccamc most di cult lor thc CommandcrinChicl ol thc Pacic Flcct to obtain patrol plancs or cvcn to obtain carricr plancs, and, up to cccmbcr 7, not cvcn all ol thc carricrs wcrc cquippcd with thcir normal numbcr ol plancs. . . . |8|y acts rathcr than |by| words . . . Vashington lailcd to indicatc urgcncy. Tis lcd to thc almost unilorm opinion that whilc war probably was in thc o ng, it was not cxpcctcd to comc without warning. At lcast thc ncccs sary stcps to prcparc lor a surprisc attack wcrc not bcing takcn. Tc imprcssion givcn was that il war camc, it would bc upon thc initiativc ol thc Unitcd Statcs. 43
N~vv Aivv: :o Sun:~vixv A::~cx Tnvv~: Gruncrt qucstioncd Pyc about rcconnaissancc in Hawaii, thc arcas in which thc cct opcratcd and patrollcd with thc availablc aircralt. 42 !bid., p. 548. 43 !bid. Army Pearl Harbor Board 453 Grunert: Vould it havc bccn rcasonablc to assumc . . . that thc cncmy could not wcll approach with aircralt carricrs to makc an attack on thc mainland: Pye: . . . |!|t should bc rccallcd that wc wcrc not in a statc ol war . . . . |T|hc patrol was primarily to dctcrminc thc possiblc prcscncc ol submarincs. . . . !l attacks had bccn madc by subma rincs, and thc submarinc not sightcd or sunk or capturcd, thcrc would havc bccn no way lor us to provc dcnitcly that it was not an intcrnal cxplosion in thc ship rathcr than a torpcdo. !n addition to that thcrc was always thc possibility that Gcrman crcws might man Japancsc submarincs or might, in thc last analysis, cvcn bring thcir submarincs to thc Hawaiian !slands in ordcr to try to lorcc us into war. . . . |T|hc implication |ol thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning| was that thcrc was grcat dangcr ol a submarinc attack. Grunert: Tcn it would appcar lrom what tcstimony wc havc had to datc that thc Army was sabotagcmindcd and thc Navy may havc bccn submarincmindcd. Pye: ! think thcrc is no qucstion but what thc Navy was submarincmindcd. 44
Pv~vi H~vnov A::~cx Suvvvisvb V~snixc:ox vvici~is ~s wvii ~s H~w~ii~x Co::~xbvvs Tc principal task ol thc U.S. cmbassy in Japan, particularly ol its military and naval o ccrs, was to obtain inlormation conccrn ing probablc action on thc part ol thc Japancsc Army and Navy. 45
Yct in thc months bclorc thc attack thc cmbassy o cials in Japan had lound this to bc incrcasingly di cult. Ambassador Grcw cablcd lrom Tokyo on Novcmbcr 17, 1941: Tc mbassys cld 44 !bid., pp. 53940. 45 !bid., p. 62. 454 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ol naval or military obscrvation is rcstrictcd almost litcrally to what could bc sccn with thc nakcd cyc, and this is ncgligiblc. 46
According to Gcncral Milcs, Chicl ol Armys G2, Military !ntclligcncc, many ol our sourccs ol intclligcncc had dricd up. To havc avoidcd bcing surpriscd on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, would havc callcd lor knowing about Japans naval bascs, staging arcas, and within rathcr lairly narrow limits, thc cxpcctcd timc ol thc attack and thc dircction ol approach. Hc tcsticd: ! did not think any !ntclligcncc o ccr cvcr thought that hc could bc surc ol picking up a convoy or attack lorcc or task lorcc in Japan bclorc it sailcd and know whcrc it was going. . . . !t would havc bccn almost a military intclligcncc miraclc. 47
Pyc did not bclicvc thc pcoplc in Vashington cxpcctcd thc attack any morc than thc pcoplc in Honolulu. 48 Hc thought thc attitudc ol thc o ccrs ol thc Flcct was just about thc samc as thc attitudc ol thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts. Pyc, who mct Sccrctary Knox right upon his arrival in thc Hawaiian !slands about cccmbcr 10, said thc rst thing Knox said to mc was, No onc in Vashington cxpcctcd such an attack|not| cvcn Kclly Turncr. Admiral Kclly Turncr was in thc Var Plans ivision, was thc most aggrcssivcmindcd ol all. 49
Marshall tcsticd that hc had scnt Major Gcncral Arnold, commanding gcncral, Army Air Forcc, and dcputy chicl ol sta, to Calilornia spccically to cxpcditc thc dcparturc ol thc 817 bombcrs to thc Philippincs. 50 Arnold in turn tcsticd that in 46 !bid., p. 58. Scc also U.S. Statc, Peace and War: 19311941, pp. 78899. 47 !bid., part 27, p. 62. 48 !bid., part 27, p. 550. 49 !bid., p. 554. 50 !bid., part 29, p. 2316. Army Pearl Harbor Board 455 vicw ol thc straincd rclations with Japan, wc wcrc doing what wc could to prcparc lor any cvcntuality that might occur, without causing an ovcrt act against thc Japancsc. 51 Vc had not bccn so much worricd about thc immcdiatc attack on Hawaii. !t was always a possibility, but wc all thought thcrc ccrtainly would bc an attack against Midway and Vakc. 52 Tc 817s lclt thc Vcst Coast lor Hawaii without ammunition bccausc at that timc it was a qucstion ol gasolinc or ammu nition lor that long 2400milc hop. . . . So thcy did not takc thc ammunition, and thcy got thcrc right in thc middlc ol thc Pcarl Harbor attack. 53
bviously, Arnold said, wc madc an crror, an crror in judg mcnt. Somcbody had to wcigh thc lact against thcir ccrtainty ol arriving thcrc by providing su cicnt gasolinc against thc prob ability ol thcir using thcir machinc guns and not gctting thcrc bccausc thcy wcrc carrying ammunition. Tc lact that bombcrs had bccn dispatchcd to Honolulu, unarmcd, cn routc to thc Philippincs on thc night ol cccmbcr 67, told Short that thc Var cpartmcnt lclt that thcrc was no dangcr ol an air attack on Honolulu, or bctwccn Honolulu and San Francisco. Tc cxtra wcight in ammunition was considcrcd a grcatcr hazard . . . than it was to takc a chancc ol mccting thc Japs without any ability to rcturn thcir rc. 54 |\|cry dcnitcly, Short said, thcir cstimatc was cxactly thc samc as |his|, thcy wcrc not cxpccting an air attack on Honolulu. 55
51 !bid., part 27, p. 89. 52 !bid., p. 92. 53 !bid., p. 96. 54 !bid., p. 166. 55 !bid., p. 168. 456 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Pniiivvixvs Coxsibvvvb :nv Mos: Lixviv T~vcv: Rclations bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Japan wcrc dctc riorating in ctobcr and Novcmbcr 1941. Vashington was cxpccting a Japancsc strikc somcwhcrc in thc wcstcrn Pacic or southcast Asia. !t sccmcd logical that shc would attack thc Philippincs to kccp thc Unitcd Statcs lrom intcrccpting Japancsc ships and plancs bound lor southcast Asia. Tus, thc Var cpartmcnt had bccn trying dcspcratcly to build up U.S. dclcnscs thcrc. According to Marshall, wc wcrc pouring through Hawaii, on thc way to thc Philippincs, convoys |with mcn and matcricl lor thc Philippincs|, rushing cvcrybody. vcrything was bcing pushcd to thc last cxtrcmc. 56 |F|rom thc inlormation that wc wcrc rccciving, Marshall lclt that thcy |thc Japancsc| wcrc now gctting in a highly ncrvous statc bccausc ol thc arrival ol supplics in thc Philippincs. nc MAG!C mcssagc had askcd thc Japancsc Consul Gcncral in Manila to chcck up immcdi atcly on thc prcscncc ol Flying Fortrcsscs in thc Philippincs. Tc Japancsc consul in Manila was also rcporting thc trcmcndous unloading proccdurcs bcing carricd out at night and thc movc mcnt ol things at night lrom thc docks, and cvcrybody barrcd lrom thc vicinity. Marshall concludcd that thc Japancsc wcrc in a critical posturc as to what thcy must do to prcvcnt us lrom building up lurthcr in thc Philippincs. 57
ur own bclicl, Marshall said, was that, oncc wc got thc plancs out thcrc, and particularly thcsc convoys that wcrc thcn on thc Pacic, which had, com parcd to what thc Philippincs alrcady had, a wcalth ol matcrial . . . thc Japancsc would bc in an cxtrcmcly dclicatc stratcgical 56 !bid., part 29, p. 2329. 57 !bid., p. 2326. Army Pearl Harbor Board 457 position in trying to carry out any cntcrprisc to thc south ol thc Philippincs. 58
Marshall rcalizcd that thc shipmcnts bcing rushcd out to thc Philippincs must bc alarming Japan. Nobody could look at that |buildup|, hc told thc board, without rcalizing that somcthing vcry critical was in thc wind. ur grcat problcm was how to do thcsc things . . . thc shipmcnts, and collccting thc mcans and gctting thcm out, particularly to thc Philippincs, which passcd cntircly through Hawaii without giving such noticc to thc Japancsc that it would havc an unlortunatc ccct in our stalling o this aair. 59
Tc Joint 8oard ol thc Army and Navy conlcrcncc on Novcmbcr 3 had urgcd postponing hostilitics as long as possiblc. Tc Novcmbcr 5 MarshallStark mcmorandum to FR had rccom mcndcd that wc not issuc an ultimatum that might provokc Japan to attack. 60 Yct, on Novcmbcr 26, Hull had handcd thc Japancsc ambassadors thc U.S. ultimatum hc kncw thc Japancsc govcrn mcnt would not acccpt. Vashingtons cycs appcarcd to bc glucd on thc Philippincs. Troughout this timc, rclativcly littlc thought was givcn to Hawaii. Furthcr conrmation ol Vashingtons ncglcct ol Pcarl Harbor and its conccntration on thc Philippincs camc whcn Marshall appcarcd bclorc thc board on Scptcmbcr 29, 1944. Hc was askcd spccically about thc nc v.:. Mcssagc ol cccmbcr 7 and his radiogram to Hawaii which had lclt Vashington shortly altcr noon that day but was dclaycd in transit and lailcd to rcach Pcarl Harbor until altcr thc attack. Gruncrt askcd Marshalls |r|casons lor not using thc tclcphonc to inlorm Gcncral Short 58 !bid., p. 2327. 59 !bid., part 29, p. 2329. 60 !bid., part 14, pp. 106162, xhibit No. 16. 458 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ol thc inlormation containcd in thc Chicl ol Stas radiogram ol 7 cccmbcr 1941. 61 Marshall said that il hc had uscd thc scramblcr phonc to rclay that mcssagc hc would ccrtainly havc callcd MacArthur |in thc Philippincs| rst, and thcn ! would havc callcd Panama Canal sccond. Hc had thought wc wcrc opcn in a morc vulncrablc way in thc Panama Canal, than wc wcrc in Hawaii. 62
Tc mcssagcs scnt Short in Hawaii had bccn tcrsc and rathcr cryptic, advising him that hostilitics bctwccn Japan and Russia arc a strong possibility. Sincc thc U.S. and 8ritain arc hcld rcsponsiblc by Japan lor hcr prcscnt dcspcratc situation thcrc is also a possibility that Japan may attack thcsc two powcrs. 63
Short had bccn lcd to bclicvc, by thc urgcncy ol thc shipmcnts passing through Hawaii to thc Philippincs, that Vashington must havc had dcnitc rcasons lor bclicving that thc Philippinc !slands wcrc thc U.S. tcrritory most scriously thrcatcncd by Japancsc attack. Ki::vi Tviis :nv APH8 Anou: !:vov:~x: !x:viiicvxcv No: Svx: Pv~vi H~vnov Co::~xbvvs n Friday, August 25, scvcral days altcr Kimmcl tcsticd bclorc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry, hc was callcd to thc witncss stand by thc APH8 which was going on concurrcntly. Hc was askcd thc usual qucstions about his rclationship with Short and othcr mattcrs pcrtaining to conditions bclorc thc attack. 64 Kimmcl 61 !bid., pp. 233031, Gruncrt lcttcr ol August 31, 1944. 62 !bid., p. 2313, part 27, p. 169. 63 !bid., part 14, p. 1327, Navy mcssagc #162203 ol ctobcr 16. 64 !bid., part 28, pp. 90948. Army Pearl Harbor Board 459 thcn discusscd intclligcncc. Hc said hc got inlormation lrom thc Navy cpartmcnt . . . so lar as thc c cicncy ol thc Japancsc Air Forcc |was| conccrncd. 8ut his sourccs had thcn bccn limitcd lor hc could not scnd pcoplc to thc Mandatcd !slands to discovcr what thc Japancsc wcrc doing thcrc. His ordcrs wcrc not to go anywhcrc ncar thcm. . . . Vc wantcd to go into thc Gilbcrts to makc somc survcys down thcrc . . . and thc answcr was that wc should not cvincc any intcrcst in thc Gilbcrts,
bccausc thc Japs might nd out that wc wcrc intcrcstcd. 65
!n any cvcnt, Kimmcl said, A movcmcnt such as that would havc had to bc approvcd by thc Navy cpartmcnt. Kimmcl was convinccd that no rcconnaissancc ol thc Mandatcs would havc bccn pcrmittcd by thc Navy cpartmcnt at that timc. 66 Hc had a statcmcnt to makc about thc inlormation which was supplicd to thc two rcsponsiblc commandcrs in Hawaii. Hc and Short had thoroughly considcrcd all such inlormation and had takcn thc action which wc dccmcd appropriatc. Tcrc was no disagrcc mcnt bctwccn thc Army and Navy and nonc bctwccn mc and my pcrsonal adviscrs. 67
Howcvcr, Kimmcl said, Sincc Pcarl Harbor inlormation has comc to my knowlcdgc that vital inlormation in thc hands ol thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts was not supplicd to rcsponsiblc o ccrs in Hawaii, in particular, that thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts kncw that Japan had sct a dcadlinc ol 25 Novcmbcr, latcr cxtcndcd to 29 Novcmbcr lor thc signing ol an agrccmcnt, altcr which thcy would takc hostilc stcps against thc Unitcd Statcs, that on 26 Novcmbcr an ultimatum was dclivcrcd to Japan by thc Unitcd Statcs. Tis was donc notwithstanding a joint rccommcndation 65 !bid., p. 944, part 29, pp. 227981. 66 !bid., part 28, p. 945. 67 !bid., p. 946. 460 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy to thc prcsidcnt by Gcncral Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum ol any kind should bc madc to Japan. Kimmcl said hc had bccn adviscd ol this rccommcndation and had rcccivcd no qualication ol that inlormation. Morcovcr, hc said hc had had no knowlcdgc ol thc dclivcry ol thc ultimatum to Japan on 26 Novcmbcr, 1941. 68
Furthcr, Kimmcl said, hc was ccrtain that scvcral days prior to 7 cccmbcr, 1941, thcrc was inlormation in thc Var cpartmcnt and thc Navy cpartmcnt that Japan would attack thc Unitcd Statcs and, vcry probably, that thc attack would bc dircctcd against thc cct at Pcarl Harbor, among othcr placcs, that thcrc was inlormation in thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts on 6 cccmbcr, 1941, that thc hour ol attack was momcntarily immincnt, and that carly on 7 cccmbcr, 1941, thc prccisc timc ol thc attack was known. !t was known at lcast thrcc or probably lour hours bclorc thc attack. 69
All this inlormation, Kimmcl said, was dcnicd to him and to Short, yct hc lclt thcy wcrc cntitlcd to it. Hc had bclicvcd that il thc Var and Navy dcpartmcnts had had such inlormation, thcy would surcly havc lurnishcd it to thcm. Had wc not bccn dcnicd this, many things would havc bccn dicrcnt. Had wc bccn lurnishcd this inlormation as littlc as two or thrcc hours bclorc thc attack, which was casily lcasiblc and possiblc, Kimmcl said, much could havc bccn donc. 70
Vhcn Kimmcl nishcd his statcmcnt, Gruncrt said, Somc ol thc things to which you havc rclcrrcd may bccomc thc subjcct 68 !bid. 69 !bid., p. 947. 70 !bid. Army Pearl Harbor Board 461 ol lurthcr invcstigation bclorc thc 8oard is through and hc askcd il Kimmcl would providc his sourcc. Kimmcl agrccd to coopcratc to thc bcst ol my ability, in conlormity with thc rcstrictions which |had| bccn imposcd upon mc. 71
Tc APH8 mcmbcrs could not thcn pursuc Kimmcls lcads as thcy wcrc ying to San Francisco and Pcarl Harbor to qucs tion othcr witncsscs. Kimmcls tcstimony raiscd ncw qucstions. Gruncrt wrotc Marshall anothcr lcttcr saying hc wantcd to ask Marshall about inlormation brought to thc attcntion ol thc 8oard, which it did not havc whcn you tcsticd bclorc. 72
APH8 Fiivs :o S~x Fv~xcisco ~xb H~w~ii n routc to and lrom Hawaii, 73 thc 8oard stoppcd in San Francisco to invcstigatc chargcs ol shoddy construction carricd out lor thc Army by thc Hawaiian Constructors. 74 !n Hawaii, thc board askcd Army o ccrs and local busincssmcn about Shorts prcparations lor thc islands dclcnsc. Gcncrally spcaking, thcy approvcd ol Shorts dclcnsc prcparations. And cxccpt lor a lcw Japancsc conncctcd with thc consulatc, Amcrican busincssmcn did not qucstion thc loyalty ol most cthnic Japancsc. 75
Tc APH8 mcmbcrs lclt Hawaii lor Vashington on Scptcmbcr 13 76 and rcsumcd thcir hcarings on Scptcmbcr 26. nly whcn thcy wcrc back in Vashington wcrc thc Gruncrt 8oard mcmbcrs ablc to lollow up on Kimmcls rcvclations. And thc board did not actually obtain copics ol thc documcnts on which thcy wcrc bascd until ctobcr 6, whcn thc board was 71 !bid. 72 !bid., part 29, pp. 233031. 73 !bid., part 28, pp. 9511352. 74 !bid., part 29, pp. 200760. 75 Scc lor cxamplc, ibid., part 27, p. 414, and part 28, pp. 136465, 1369, 1382 83, 142023, and 1441. 76 !bid., part 28, pp. 13552003. 462 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy winding up its hcarings. !n vicw ol thc scnsitivity ol this matcrial, and to salcguard thc condcntiality ol witncsscs, thcir rcmarks wcrc not includcd in thc rcgular printcd hcarings but placcd in a scparatc TP SCRT supplcmcnt. 77
A:n~ss~bov Gvvw vscvinvs :nv Toxvo Si:u~:iox Joscph C. Grcw had bccn U.S. ambassador to Japan lrom Junc 14, 1932, until cccmbcr 7. ncc thc two nations wcrc at war, hc was placcd undcr housc arrcst and hcld until an cxchangc ol diplomats could bc arrangcd. Grcw was qucstioncd about U.S. Japancsc rclations in gcncral. |T|hc trcnd ol our rclations during . . . thc ycars 1940 and 1941 was almost stcadily downhill. Grcw thought that in thc cmbassy thcy had donc cvcrything possiblc to arrcst that trcnd. . . . 8ut wc wcrc up against what ! would call a tidal wavc ol military cxtrcmism in Japan. . . . |N|ot bcing a dclcatist by naturc, ! was unwilling to admit that war was incvitablc, up to thc last minutc. 78
Grcw had warncd Vashington that cconomic cmbargocs should not bc imposcd until wc wcrc prcparcd to go all thc way through with whatcvcr might rcsult lrom thosc cmbargocs. . . . ||ur rclations with that country wcrc bound to go stcadily downhill and it might, and probably would, cnd in war. 79
77 !bid., part 29, pp. 233357. 78 !bid., pp. 214344. 79 !bid., p. 2144. Army Pearl Harbor Board 463 And hc rcmindcd thc board, thcrc wcrc not only thc cmbargocs, but also thc lrcczing ordcr and thc dcnunciation ol our trcaty and commcrcc with Japan. 80
Grcw thought thc attack must havc bccn a surprisc also to thc civil authoritics in Japan. !t was pcrlcctly possiblc, hc said, that thc Cabinct was not inlormcd ol thc plans lor attacking Pcarl Harbor. 81 Hc had had a convcrsation with Forcign Ministcr Togo at hall past midnight on cccmbcr 7about thrcc hours bclorc thc attackand was convinccd lrom thc naturc ol that convcrsation that Mr. Togo did not at that momcnt know that Pcarl Harbor was about to brcak. Grcw addcd: Tat docs not lor a momcnt mcan that thcy wcrc not inlormcd ol thc likclihood that undcr ccrtain circumstanccs war might occur. l coursc, thcy kncw that, without any shadow ol doubt, and Nomura and Kurusu kncw that, too. ! was rclcrring purcly to thc attack on Pcarl Harbor, itscll. 82
Gvxvv~i Snov: R~isvs Movv Quvs:ioxs Altcr Short appcarcd bclorc thc APH8, hc askcd to bc lurnishcd thc tcstimony ol othcr witncsscs and thc board had agrccd. 83 Vhcn hc appcarcd again on Scptcmbcr 29, 84 hc said hc was conccrncd about thc criticism lcvicd against thc Hawaiian commandcrs bccausc thc attack had takcn thcm by surprisc. Tcy wcrc not thc only oncs surpriscd, hc was convinccd thc attack had bccn a surprisc to Vashington o cials also. n thc thcory that 80 !bid., p. 2152. 81 !bid., p. 2151. 82 !bid., p. 2154. 83 !bid., p. 2270, Major Gcncral Ulio, adjutant gcncral, August 24, 1944, rcsponsc to Short. 84 !bid., p. 2251, Gruncrt statcmcnt. 464 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy actions spcak loudcr than words, hc pointcd to Vashingtons prcattack actions. Hc rcmindcd thc board ol Vashingtons constant dcnials ol rcqucsts lor incrcascs in pcrsonncl, lor moncy lor thc improvcmcnt ol dclcnscs, and things likc scnd ing out plancs |lrom Calilornia| thc night bclorc thc attack without ammunitionall kinds ol things, that rcally wcrc strongcr in thcir ccct than mcrc words. Assuming that thcy wcrc acting in good laith, Short contin ucd, you havc to arrivc at thc conclusion that thcy undoubtcdly wcrc not contcmplating an air attack on Honolulu. 85
Tc Army had also bccn considcrcd ncgligcnt bccausc its radar was not opcrational and had not warncd ol thc impcnding attack that morning. Tat was not duc to thc commands ncgligcncc. Rathcr, Short said, it was duc to a shortagc ol supplics lor thc radar, such as vacuum tubcs, and so lorth. !n an ctobcr 1941 mcmorandum radar cquipmcnt had bccn rcqucstcd adcquatc to opcratc 24 hours daily, but it had bccn radically cut back to allow only two hours ol opcration pcr day. Vhy: 8ccausc, according to thc Var cpartmcnt, thc Unitcd Statcs was not thrcatcncd with attack. 86
Short raiscd thrcc important qucstions: (1) Had thc APH8 lcarncd anything about thc codcd mcs sagcs scvcral witncsscs had mcntioncd: For instancc, what was thc basis lor Justicc Robcrtss qucstion conccrning A Japancsc codc mcssagc . . . intcrccptcd and . . . brokcn down by thc cpartmcnt in Vashington . . . which gavc ccrtain kcy words which would bc ashcd ovcr thc radio dirccting thc attack on Pcarl Harbor: 87
85 !bid., p. 2254. 86 !bid., part 29, p. 2261 (Powcll ctobcr 1941 mcmo to Short). 87 !bid., p. 2255. !n part 10, Short rcad lrom thc tcstimony bclorc thc Robcrts Commission ol Licutcnant Coloncl Gcorgc V. 8ickncll, assistant to thc dcpartmcnt G2 in Honolulu, part 22, p. 192. Army Pearl Harbor Board 465 (2) Vhat ncw intclligcncc had promptcd Marshall to scnd thc mcssagc conccrning thc Japancsc dclivcry timc to thc cld commandcrs at noon on cccmbcr 7: 88
(3) Vhat wcrc thc grounds lor Kimmcls statcmcnt to thc board about inlormation availablc in Vashington during thc crucial days bclorc thc attack, inlormation not lurnishcd Short and Kimmcl: 89
Short was anxious to lcarn about thc codcd mcssagcs. Hc had writtcn Stimson that vcry day asking that a scarch bc madc . . . and that, il it |thc inlormation| is not to bc lound in thc Var cpartmcnt lcs, that a dcmand bc madc on thc Navy lor thc inlormation. . . . 90 Short lclt that all pcrtincnt cvidcncc should bc madc availablc to thc board and to him, bccausc thc Var cpartmcnt had not pcrmittcd him to havc a rcprcscntativc attcnd thc APH8 hcarings and cxaminc witncsscs. 91 Howcvcr, Shorts path to sccuring this inlormation wasnt casy. Vhcn hc wrotc Sccrctary ol Var Stimson latcr (Scptcmbcr 29, 1944) ask ing lor pcrmission to scc thc SCRT documcnts, 92 Stimson agrccd that Shorts military counscl, 8rigadicr Gcncral Tomas H. Grccn, should havc acccss to this matcrial (ctobcr 2, 1944). 93
Gruncrt tricd to countcrmand that pcrmission, 94 but thc Var cpartmcnt rcluscd. Gruncrt was told to comply with thc instructions ol thc Sccrctary ol Var as issucd 95 and to allow Grccn to scc thc TP SCRT matcrial. 8ut Short was not allowcd acccss. Grccn was cvcn askcd to sign a lcttcr swcar|ing| 88 !bid., part 29, p. 2257. 89 !bid., p. 2258. 90 !bid., p. 2259. 91 !bid., pp. 243435. 92 !bid. 93 !bid., p. 2435. 94 !bid., p. 2436. 95 !bid., pp. 243637. 466 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy that you havc bccn appropriatcly warncd rclating to thc military sccurity conccrning thcsc mattcrs. 96 M~vsn~ii Rv:v:nvvs So:v vvx:s, ovs No: Rvc~ii :nvvs Vhcn Marshall appcarcd bclorc thc board again, hc was askcd about thc qucstions in Gruncrts lcttcr ol August 31, 1944. 97
Marshall was askcd about thc Japancscimposcd dcadlincs Novcmbcr 25 at rst, thcn Novcmbcr 29. |T|hc rst datc ol thc 25th ol Novcmbcr . . . puzzlcd us grcatly, Marshall said. |T|hc only thing that wc could think ol at thc momcnt was . . . that on that day thc antiComintcrn pact cxpircd. . . . uring all this pcriod thc Japancsc had bccn involvcd in actions in thc China thcatcr and towards !ndoChina, which indicatcd . . . that thcy wcrc cithcr about to cmbark on a war in thc Malaysia arca, at lcast, or wcrc in thc proccss ol carrying out vcry dirc inltration opcrations. . . . Howcvcr, wc latcr rcccivcd inlorma tion lrom our sccrct sourccs . . . that thc datc had bccn cxtcndcd to thc 29th ol Novcmbcr. Tat, in our vicw, wipcd out any thought that thc original datc ol thc 25th ol Novcmbcr pcr taincd to thc antiComintcrn pact. . . . Novcmbcr 29th arrivcd and passcd, and wc cntcrcd into cccmbcr without anything happcning othcr than thc continuation ol thcsc movcmcnts, which wc could lollow lairly wcll, down thc China coast and !ndoChina and hcadcd quitc plainly towards Tailand and thc Gull ol Siam. |!|n all thc past proccdurcs ol thc Japancsc, thcy had takcn vcry bold mcasurcs . . . on thc assumption, ! prcsumcthat thcy could gct away with thcm without thc Unitcd Statcs cntcring into war. Tcir lccling, so ncarly as wc could dctcrminc, was onc that thc Unitcd Statcs would not participatc in a war and 96 !bid., pp. 243738. 97 !bid., pp. 233031, Gruncrt August 31, 1944, lcttcr to Marshall. Army Pearl Harbor Board 467 thcy could takc advantagc ol that by doing things that othcr wisc would immcdiatcly provokc a statc ol war. 98
Troughout Novcmbcr, Marshall and Stark wcrc urging thc administration to postponc any conlrontation with thc Japancsc until thcy could build up thcir Philippinc dclcnscs. Tc 8ritish, prcoccupicd at homc with thcir strugglc against Gcrmany, wcrc ovcrcxtcndcd and wantcd to avoid opcn conict with thc Japancsc. Yct thc cmbargo on oil to Japan, with thc coopcration ol thc 8ritish and utch, impcrilcd thc Japancsc. Also thc rcopcning ol thc 8urma Road by thc 8ritish madc it casicr lor China to bc provisioncd, and this was a thorn in thc sidc ol thc Japancsc. Marshall said hc bclicvcd that thc Japancsc wcrc going ahcad to gct in as strong a position as possiblc, on thc assumption that thc rcluctancc ol thc Unitcd Statcs and thc rcluctancc ol thc 8ritish Govcrnmcnt in its dilcmma ol thc momcnt would pcrmit thcm to cstablish thcmsclvcs. 99 Hc thought thc Japancsc wcrc capitalizing on thc bclicl that it would bc vcry di cult to bring our pcoplc into a willingncss to cntcr thc war. Tat, incidcntally, was somcwhat conrmcd by thc govcrn mcntal policy on our part ol making ccrtain that thc ovcrt act should not bc attributcd to thc Unitcd Statcs, bccausc ol thc statc ol public mind at that timc. l coursc, no onc anticipatcd that that ovcrt act would bc thc crippling ol thc Pacic Flcct. Marshall bclicvcd Tat thc Japancsc wcrc going to takc cvcry conccivablc advantagc and nally would rcach thc point whcrc 98 !bid., pp. 230809. 99 !bid., p. 2309. 468 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thcy could salcly dcclarc war, involvc us in war, and gct all thc othcr things thcy wcrc altcr. 100
8y thc lall ol 1941, Marshall said, hc had comc to thc con clusion that war with Japan was incvitablc. Prudcncc dictatcd that warnings bc scnt by thc Var cpartmcnt to thosc o ccrs rcsponsiblc lor thc dclcnsc ol all our arcas within rcach ol Japancsc action. Howcvcr, inlormation availablc in thc Var cpartmcnt lcd him to bclicvc that any Japancsc attack would takc placc in thc vicinity ol thc Malay Pcninsula and thc Philippincs. 101 Hc wasnt particularly conccrncd about Hawaii, cspccially as hc con sidcrcd it bcttcr supplicd and bcttcr prcparcd to dclcnd itscll than othcr U.S. outposts. 102
APH8 board mcmbcr Gcncral Russcll qucstioncd Marshall on various points Kimmcl had raiscd. Marshall admittcd to hav ing no rccollcction ol thc scvcral advanccd warnings rcccivcd in Vashington. Hc did not rccall having lcarncd that Novcmbcr 29, Tokyo timc, was dcnitcly thc govcrning datc lor ocnsivc mili tary opcrations ol somc naturc. Hc had no rccollcction ol any mcssagcs on Novcmbcr 26, cccmbcr 1, and cccmbcr 4 giving spccic cvidcncc ol Japans intcntion to wagc an ocnsivc war against both 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs. 103
Marshall rccallcd somcthing about a Vinds Codc sctup and thc alcrting ol our codc clcrks to listcn lor thc crucial words. 8ut, hc said, Coloncl 8ratton was unablc to nd that aour rccords do not show that a Japancsc mcssagc using thc Vinds codc was intcrccptcd by thc F.C.C. or thc Army Signal Corps until altcr Pcarl Harbor. 100 !bid., p. 2326. 101 !bid., p. 2328. 102 !bid., pp. 2317, 2318. 103 !bid., p. 2321. Army Pearl Harbor Board 469 Howcvcr, hc admittcd that it did appcar lrom thc rccord, that a Japancsc mcssagc using thc Vinds codc had bccn intcr ccptcd. Tis indicatcd, Marshall said, that JapancscGrcat 8ritain rclations wcrc to bc brokcn. Marshall didnt mcntion a possiblc brcak in JapancscU.S. rclations. 104 Russcll notcd this was thc Army intcrprctation. Hc said, Tc Navy pcoplc say that thc cxccutivc ordcr |thc Vinds xccutc| whcncvcr it camc inand thcy allcgcd it camc in on thc 3rd |sic| ol cccmbcr . . . mcant that war was coming with thc Unitcd Statcs and with 8ritain, but not with Russia. 105
Marshall had undcrstood lrom 8ratton that thc intclligcncc o ccrs in Hawaii wcrc privy to thc inlormation about thc Vinds Codc mcssagc. 106
Anothcr important mattcr which Marshall did not rcmcmbcr rclatcd to thc rst 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply to our ulti matum. According to Kimmcls statcmcnt, thcy wcrc rcccivcd during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Marshall said was hc was unawarc ol this. 107
Rcsponding to Gruncrts qucstion as to whcn on cccmbcr 7 Marshall had lcarncd thc prccisc timc ol thc attack, hc rcvicwcd his cccmbcr 7 morning movcmcntshis carly horscback ridc, his arrival at his Var cpartmcnt o cc about 11 ~.:., his mcct ing with Milcs, Gcrow, and 8ratton, his discovcry ol thc long 14part Japancsc mcssagc, and, nally, thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Somcthing was going to happcn at 1:00, it was quitc cvidcnt to us. Altcr digcsting all this matcrial, Marshall draltcd thc mcs sagc that wcnt out to thc cld commandcrs at noon. 108 104 !bid., p. 2324. 105 !bid., pp. 2323, 2325. 106 !bid., pp. 232425. 107 !bid., p. 2320. 108 !bid., pp. 2310, 2311. 470 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy According to Marshall, hc had comc to thc conclusion about Novcmbcr 1 that war with Japan was incvitablc. Conccrning thc TP SCRT inlormation known to top Vashington o cials, hc admittcd that to havc scnt this intclligcncc to thc command ing gcncrals ol thc ovcrscas dcpartmcnts by couricr or othcrwisc, thcrcby avoiding thc dangcr ol cxposing thc codcs that ! was striving so diligcntly to protcct, would havc bccn both practical and lcasiblc. n thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, whcn conlrontcd with incontcstablc cvidcncc that Japan was planning somc dc nitc action that vcry day at 1:00 v.:. Vashington timc, Marshall said it would havc bccn possiblc to notily thc commandcrs by a morc rapid mcthod than thc codcd radio mcssagc actually dis patchcd at noon that day. 8ut hc lclt thcn that that would havc bccn unwisc. 109 Morcovcr, Marshall was convinccd that Short had bccn scnt su cicnt inlormation and that hc had adcquatc wcapons, ammunition, and othcr mcans lor thc dischargc ol his dclcnsivc mission in thc protcction ol thc !sland ol ahu. 110
Marshall apologizcd lor not bcing bcttcr prcparcd to answcr thc boards qucstions, but as chicl ol sta hc had bccn busy with thc war with Japan and Gcrmany and had not bccn ablc to kccp up on thc Pcarl Harbor situation. 111
Tcrc wcrc still morc qucstions thc board wantcd to pur suc with Marshall, who plcadcd prcssurc ol othcr busincss appointmcnts with a Chincsc o cial, thc combincd Chicls ol Sta, thc U.S. Chicls ol Sta, thc ambassador going to Francc. And condcntially hc was lcaving lor Francc himscll thc ncxt Tucsday. 112 Gruncrt said il it appcars ncccssary, thc 8oard might ask Marshall lor anothcr hour carly ncxt wcck. 113 Tc ncxt day, 109 !bid., p. 2328. 110 !bid., pp. 2313, 2319. 111 !bid., p. 2329. 112 !bid., pp. 232930. 113 !bid. Army Pearl Harbor Board 471 Saturday, Scptcmbcr 30, thc board scnt Marshall still morc qucs tions. 114 !n thc mcantimc, two important witncsscs tcsticd Army couricr Coloncl Rulus 8ratton and Navy Captain L.F. Saord. Coioxvi 8v~::ox Tvs:ivivs Anou: J~v~xvsv !x:vvcvv:s At thc timc ol thc attack, Coloncl Rulus S. 8ratton had bccn Chicl, Far astcrn Scction G2 and Army Couricr. Vhcn tcsti lying bclorc thc APH8, 115 hc rclcrrcd to a mcmorandum writ tcn cccmbcr 10 dctailing thc cvcnts ol cccmbcr 7, 116 and to a Summary ol Far astcrn ocumcnts, bascd on documcnts lrom 19371941 and compilcd August 1943 by thc Far astcrn scction, intclligcncc group, and by Var cpartmcnts G2.
!t had bccn compilcd lor submission to thc Army chicl ol sta and thc prcsidcnt. 8ratton was convcrsant with thc Japancsc languagc. 117
Although hc had not bccn involvcd with thc actual intcrccption and dccoding ol thc Japancsc mcssagcs on which that Summary had bccn bascdthat had bccn thc rcsponsibility ol thc Armys Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc (S.!.S.) and thc Navys cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc (.N.!.)hc had sccn all sccrct mcssagcs rclating to thc Japancsc situation rcccivcd by thc Var cpartmcnt. 118 !n August 1940, U.S, cryptographcrs had succccdcd in dcciphcring thc Japancsc diplomatic codc, which bccamc known as purplc, and cvcr sincc thcn wc had bccn rcading many, il not most, ol thc Japancsc intcrccpts transmittcd in this codc. Tc intclligcncc dcrivcd lrom this sourcc was considcrcd so valuablc that it had bccn codcnamcd MAG!C. Much ol thc inlormation Kimmcl 114 !bid., pp. 241315. 115 !bid., pp. 233555. 116 !bid., pp. 234647. 117 !bid., p. 2338. 118 !bid., p. 2335. 472 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy rclcrrcd to, that had not bccn lurnishcd thc Pcarl Harbor com mandcrs, had comc lrom MAG!C. According to 8ratton, tight sccurity maintaincd in thc distri bution ol thc Japancsc intcrccpts. As to thc intcrccpts, and translations ol Japancsc intcrccpts, thcy wcrc handlcd in a spccial way. . . . !n 1941, ccrtainly in thc lattcr part ol it, ! was thc custodian and thc disscminator ol this typc ol intclligcncc. . . . Tc translations, madc cithcr in thc Signal Corps S!S scction or in thc corrcsponding scction ol Naval Communications wcrc scnt to mc in scxtuplct, six copics ol cach onc. ut ol thc mass ol matcrial . . . say 10 to 20 pcrccnt was ol intclligcncc valuc, thc rcmaindcr dcalt with administra tivc or pcrsonal mattcrs . . . and that matcrial ! dcstroycd by burning. Tc rcmaining imsics containing military intclli gcncc ol valuc to our Govcrnmcnt o cials was arrangcd in cardboard loldcrs which in turn wcrc placcd in lockcd dispatch cascs, onc lor thc Sccrctary ol Statc. onc lor thc Sccrctary ol Var, onc lor thc Chicl ol Sta, onc lor thc AC ol S, G2, and onc lor thc AC ol S, VP. ! dclivcrcd thcsc pouchcs in pcrson to thc o ccrs conccrncd, who had kcys to thc pouchcs. . . . ! collcctcd all ol thcsc pouchcs on my ncxt visit, or on my ncxt round thc lollowing day, and dcstroycd thc contcnts ol thcm by burning and rctaining in my lc a complctc copy ol cvcrything that had bccn sccn by all ol thcsc o cials. 119
Tc critical mcssagcs scnt by G2, in Novcmbcr and carly cccmbcr, 1941: Tc translatcd intcrccpts, you rclcr to, arc on lc in G2, Var cpartmcnt. 120
uring this pcriod, 8ratton said, 119 !bid., pp. 245051. 120 !bid., p. 2417. Army Pearl Harbor Board 473 thc prcsidcnt, thc Sccrctary ol Statc, thc Sccrctary ol Var, thc Chicl, thc AC ol S G2, and thc Chicl ol thc Var Plans ivision all saw thc samc matcrial, thcy all rcad thc samc trans lations, as last as ! could gct thcm to thcm. 121
Tcsc matcrials did not go out to thc cld. . . . Vc lclt considcrably hampcrcd in G2 by two rcstrictions that wcrc placcd upon us. Tc rst ! havc mcntioncd as thc policy which prcvcntcd us lrom giving out intclligcncc to G2s in tactical units or in ovcrscas dcpart mcnt, which might havc thc ccct ol bringing about opcra tional rcsults. Tc othcr rcstriction was imposcd on us by thc Navy, who rcluscd to allow us to scnd any ol this intcrccpt intclligcncc out to any ol our pcoplc in thc cld ovcr Army nct, using any Army codc ciphcr . . . lcar ol thc Japancsc brcaking our Army codc, and nding out that wc wcrc rcading thcir own. !t was a sccurity mcasurc. 122
8ratton tcsticd that on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, bctwccn 8:30 and 9:00 ~.:., hc had rcccivcd thc short Japancsc nglish languagc intcrccpt rclating to thc dcstruction ol thc codc machincs and thc dclivcry ol thc ultimatum. Hc rcalizcd this was about thc most important mcssagc hc had rcccivcd during this pcriod and immcdiatcly phoncd Marshalls quartcrs. 123 8ratton was told Marshall had gonc horscback riding. Hc rcqucstcd his |Marshalls| ordcrly to go out and nd him at oncc and ask him to call . . . as soon as practicablc, as |hc| had an important mcs sagc to dclivcr to him. !n spitc ol thc urgcncy ol thc mcssagc, it was not until somctimc bctwccn tcn and clcvcn that Marshall rcturncd 8rattons call. 8ratton thcn told Marshall that hc had a mcssagc ol cxtrcmc importancc which hc should scc at oncc and 121 !bid., p. 2451. 122 !bid., p. 2453 123 !bid., pp. 234445. 474 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ocrcd to bring it out to Marshalls quartcrs. Marshall told him to rcport to him in his o cc. 124
Marshall arrivcd in his o cc at about 11:25. Tcn nally, almost thrcc hours altcr this mcssagc ol cxtrcmc importancc had bccn rcccivcd, 8ratton was ablc to show it to Marshall. Marshall discusscd it with 8ratton, Milcs, and Gcrow, who wcrc prcscnt. Tcy thought it probablc that thc Japancsc linc ol action would bc into Tailand but that it might bc into any onc or morc ol a numbcr ol othcr arcas. 125 Marshall thcn radiocd thc Army cld commandcrs by thc lastcst possiblc salc mcans, giving thc Philippincs rst priority, 126 advising thcm ol thc 1 v.:. dcadlinc, and tclling thcm to bc on thc alcrt accordingly. 127 Tis was thc mcssagc that rcachcd Pcarl Harbor in thc altcrnoon, hours altcr thc attack had cndcd. Tc APH8 wantcd to know whcthcr or not thc Vinds Codc sctup had cvcr bccn cxccutcd, i.c., implcmcntcd. 8ratton had known that thc FCC had bccn looking lor such a mcssagc and hc rcmcmbcrcd talking about wcathcr mcssagcs with Coloncl Sadtlcr, Navy Licutcnant Kramcr and Navy Commandcr McCollum. 8ut his mcmory was vaguc. Hc did rcmcmbcr talking with Sadtlcr on thc morning ol cccmbcr 5, who said somcthing about a mcs sagc that had comc through indicating a brcak bctwccn Japan and Grcat 8ritain. 8ratton did not rcmcmbcr sccing bclorc thc attack an implcmcntation, a Vinds Codc xccutc, with rclcrcncc to a JapancscUnitcd Statcs brcak. 128 Howcvcr, hc did rcmcmbcr, vagucly, sccing a Vinds xccutc rclcrring to a JapancscU.S. brcak in rclations after thc attack. 129 124 !bid., p. 2346. 125 !bid. 126 !bid., p. 2344. 127 !bid., part 14, p. 1334, Marshall radio mcssagc #529 to Hawaii. 128 !bid., part 29, pp. 2338, 2341. 129 !bid., p. 2341. Army Pearl Harbor Board 475 APH8 mcmbcrs Russcll and Gruncrt thcn askcd 8ratton how it would acct thc Japancsc il thcy lcarncd thcn1944 that wc had intcrccptcd a Vinds xccutc mcssagc in 1941. Hc did not bclicvc thosc codc words wcrc bcing uscd by thc Japancsc today. Hc was thcn askcd il thc Japancsc kncw wc had intcr ccptcd thcsc mcssagcs and had brokcn that codc bclorc thc war, would it givc thcm any inlormation as to whcthcr or not wc had brokcn thc codc thcy arc using today. Bratton: h, ycs, sir, it would, bccausc thcsc codc phrascs arc a codc within a ciphcr. . . . Tc wholc mcssagc about this Vinds signal was in a vcry sccrct ciphcr. . . . Grunert: And thcy arc continung to usc that ciphcr: . . . Tcrclorc, thc dangcr that any lcak ol this thing might acct thc war cort cxists now as it has in thc past: Bratton: Ycs, sir. 130
n this point, Navy Captain Saord atly disagrccd, as thc APH8 soon lcarncd. C~v:~ix L.F. S~vvovb vscvinvs :nv J~v~xvsv Vixbs Cobv !x:vvcvv:s As hcad ol thc communications sccurity division, naval opcrations, in 1941, Saord had bccn much involvcd with naval intclligcncc inlormation. 131 Hc rcmcmbcrcd many dctails lrom 1941. Howcvcr, whcn tcstilying bclorc thc APH8 on ctobcr 2, hc consultcd a rccord ol thc intcrccpts prcparcd morc rcccntly (Novcmbcrcccmbcr 1943 and JanuaryMarch 1944) lrom original sourccs borrowcd lrom P20G, i.c., thc communica tion intclligcncc scction, or communication division, ol Naval 130 !bid., pp. 234041. 131 !bid., pp. 2361400. 476 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy pcrations. 132 Russcll askcd Saord about his statcmcnt bclorc Harts invcstigation that wc had rcccivcd on Novcmbcr 26 spc cic cvidcncc ol Japans intcntions to wagc an ocnsivc war against both 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs. Saord rcplicd that this mcssagc, S.!.S. No. 25392, said that Japan would announcc hcr intcntions in rcgard to war or possibly brcaking o diplomatic rclations with Russia, ngland including thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, and thc Unitcd Statcs by mcans ol a word scnt vc timcs in thc middlc and at thc cnd ol thcir inlormation broadcast. Saord continucd, n Novcmbcr 28th, 1941, wc rcad anothcr mcssagc . . . giving a Vinds codc to bc uscd in thcir voicc broadcasts. 133 Vc had vcrication ol this Vinds Codc sctup lrom othcr sourccsHart (Manila), Singaporc, 8atavia (N!), and our intcrccpt station in thc statc ol Vashington. 134
Russell: |T|cll us about thc lollowup on this codc . . . whcthcr or not on or about cccmbcr 4th you did rcccivc inlorma tion which indicatcd that thc Japancsc mpirc had cmploycd this codc and thc intcrccptcd mcssagcs indicatcd nal dcci sions accting thc Unitcd Statcs, Russia, 8ritain, onc or morc ol thcsc powcrs. Saord: Ycs, sir, wc did. Tat was rcccivcd in thc morning ol Tursday, cccmbcr 4, 1941. !t was rcccivcd about 8:00. . . by tclctypc. ! saw it whcn ! rst camc to thc o cc . . . thc writing at thc bottom in lcad pcncil in Kramcrs handwriting, Var with ngland, war with Amcrica, pcacc with Russia. Tc mcssagc as rcccivcd was not thc way wc cxpcctcd it, bccausc 132 !bid., pp. 2362, 2367. 133 !bid., pp. 236768. 134 !bid., pp. 236871. Army Pearl Harbor Board 477 thcy had mixcd up thcir voicc proccdurc with thc Morsc codc mcssagc. 135
istribution ol this Vinds xccutc was madc, not only in accordancc with thc spccial arrangcmcnts sct up by Noycs ol naval communications, but also in thc usual lashion, through thc war and navy dcpartmcnts. And also ! know that in thc Navy cpartmcnt that copy was distributcd around noon, in conncction with thc daily routinc distribution ol translations, and that wcnt to thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations |Stark|, Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations |!ngcrsoll|, ircctor ol Naval Communications |Noycs|, ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc |Vilkinson|, and thc ircctor ol Var Plans ivision |Turncr|, also wcnt to thc Statc cpartmcnt and to thc Vhitc Housc. 136
Saord was positivc as to thc datc whcn thc Vinds xccutc camc in bccausc its rcccipt had promptcd him to scnd lour mcs sagcs that vcry day, bctwccn 3:00 v.:. and 3:19 v.:., to thc naval attachs at Tokyo, Pciping, 8angkok, and Shanghai, dirccting thcm to dcstroy all sccrct and condcntial lcs cxccpt thosc csscn tial lor currcnt purposcs and all othcr papcrs which in thc hands ol an cncmy would bc a disadvantagc to thc Unitcd Statcs. 137
Saord bclicvcd that all thc Army S.!.S. mcssagcs hc had bccn dcscribing wcrc in thc custody ol thc Armys G2, gcncral sta, and that thc samc mcssagcs, lcd by thcir Navy numbcrs, wcrc at 20G, thc Navys communication anncxexcept for the imple- mentation of the Winds Code. Unlortunatcly, wc cannot nd any writtcn rccord ol thc |Vinds xccutc| mcssagc, in spitc ol 135 !bid., p. 2371. 136 !bid., p. 2372. 137 !bid., p. 2397, PNA\ dispatch #042019. Scc also part 14, p. 1408, Mcssagc #040330, supplcmcnting #042019, which is not includcd with othcr Navy cpartmcnt dispatchcs to cld o ccrs in xhibit No. 37, ibid., part 14. 478 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy having lookcd now lor morc than six months. 138 And thcrc was no way to tracc it bccausc all thc station logs unlortunatcly had bccn dcstroycd somctimc during 43, which was |m|orc or lcss Standard pcrating Proccdurc whcn a govcrnmcnt o cc movcd or cxpandcd. 139
Morc important in Gruncrts vicw than thc Vinds xccutc itscll was whcthcr thc war cort in 1944 would sucr il thc Japancsc lcarncd that wc had intcrccptcd and dcciphcrcd this mcssagc in 1941. Russcll dcscribcd thc dilcmma: |T|hc 8oard is dcbating thc ccct on thc war cort ol a public disclosurc ol thc contcnts ol thc Vinds mcssagc. Assuming that thc Japancsc mpirc kncw that thc Amcrican Govcrnmcnt was in posscssion ol thosc lacts which arc containcd in that Vinds mcssagc, would it . . . causc thcm to makc changcs which would makc it morc di cult lor us to obtain Japancsc inlormation now: Vhcn qucstioncd, 8ratton had said it would. Saord disagrccd. No, sir, not thc Vinds mcssagc or this othcr socallcd hiddcn word or stopcodc mcssagc. Tc sctup lor thosc two was scnt in what thcy call a lowgradc ciphcr hcld by all thcir Consuls. vcrybody was solving that. Tc utch solvcd it, thc 8ritish solvcd it in Singaporc, and wc solvcd it oursclvcsboth ol thcmand thcy must know that wc havc bccn rcading thosc mcssagcs, and ! bclicvc that that particular systcm is not in usc any morc, anyhow. !t is not thc highclass machinc which is a litcral gold minc at thc prcscnt timc. Tc othcr stu it would bc vcry bad to lct public. 140
138 !bid., part 29, pp. 237172. 139 !bid., pp. 236873. 140 !bid., pp. 239293. Army Pearl Harbor Board 479 8y this othcr stu, Saord mcant thc dcclaration ol war, i.c., thc 14part rcply to our ultimatum that thc Japancsc scnt cccmbcr 67, and thcir cccmbcr 7 nc v.:. Mcssagc. Tat, Saord said, is in thcir |highclass, purplc| machinc which thcy think no onc can rcad, and thcy arc still talking thcir lool hcads o in it, particularly lrom Gcrmany. 141
vcn though thc Vinds xccutc had bccn scnt in thc lowgradc ciphcr, Saord said it was cxtrcmcly signicant. 8y announcing thc immincncc ol a brcak in rclations, or ol an outbrcak ol war, with thc Unitcd Statcs and 8ritain, Japan was cxplaining thc rcason lor hcr Novcmbcr 25 dcadlinc, latcr changcd to Novcmbcr 29. And thc dcadlinc showcd that thc brcak in rclations it portcndcd was not just talk. Tus thc Vinds xccutc madc thc dcadlinc mcssagc mcan a lot morc, and thc dcadlinc mcssagc madc that |thc Vinds Codc xccutc| mcan a lot morc. 142
Saord told thc APH8 that wc kncw lrom Japancsc intcr ccpts pickcd up cccmbcr 1 and 3, 1941 that Japancsc cmbas sics and consulatcs in London, Hong Kong, Singaporc, Manila, 8atavia, and Vashington had bccn told to dcstroy thcir codcs, ciphcrs, and codc machincs. |T|his dcstruction ol codcs immcdi atcly thrcw thc Vinds mcssagc into promincncc, Saord said. 8clorc, wc couldnt undcrstand why thcy had this |Vinds Codc| sctup arrangcd. !t sccmcd a loolish thing to do . . . but thcy had this in mind, ! think: Vcll, all right, onc stcp short ol war. Tcy arc dcstroying thcir codcs to play salc, but thcy arc still rcscrving thc dccision as to pcacc or war to comc in thc Vinds mcssagc, which was thc rcason that, lrom thc rst on, wc thought thc Vinds mcssagc was so highly important, and yct that inlormation did not gct out to cithcr 141 !bid. 142 !bid., p. 2370. 480 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy CommandcrinChicl Pacic Flcct or CommandcrinChicl Asiatic Flcct until 48 hours altcr wc had thc ncws. 143
Saord had rccognizcd thc signicancc ol thc Vinds Codc xccutc at thc timc. Howcvcr, his rcsponsibilitics wcrc limitcd to communications security. Tc cvaluation |ol a mcssagc| was out ol my hands, and that is a lunction ol Naval !ntclligcncc. 144
Tus, Saord had locuscd his cccmbcr 4 mcssagcs to thc naval attachs ncccssarily on thc issuc ol security. Gruncrt thcn turncd to anothcr subjcct. Saord had indi catcd . . . that at somctimc in thc not too distant past it was not intcndcd to givc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry and thc Army 8oard ccrtain sccrct inlormation. Had spccial instructions bccn issucd to that ccct: Tat was rathcr a long story, Saord said. Hc cxplaincd that Kimmcl had askcd to scc thc Hart rcport. n thc basis ol inlormation rcvcalcd thcrc, Kimmcl had rcqucstcd pcrmission lor his counscl, Captain Lavcndcr, to inspcct all thc lcs out at 20G, communications intclligcncc lcs, to scc what inlormation had bccn in cxistcncc in thc Navy cpartmcnt. Lavcndcr had bccn pcrmittcd to scc thc lcs and had thcn askcd lor copics ol about 60 mcssagcs. Tc dcpartmcnt had asscmblcd thc intcr ccpts, turncd thcm ovcr to thc dircctor ol naval communications, and noticd S.!.S. S.!.S. had protcstcd. Tc assistant sccrctary ol thc Navy, Ralph A. 8ard, had also disapprovcd ol thcir rclcasc. 8ut whcn Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal, thcn in London, rcturncd to Vashington, hc rcvcrscd that dccision and dircctcd that thc intcrccpts bc madc availablc to thc NC!. 8ut thc APH8 had not obtaincd copics. Saord suggcstcd thcy put in a rcqucst to thc sccrctary ol thc Navy. 145 143 !bid., pp. 239697. 144 !bid., p. 2379. 145 !bid., p. 2375. Army Pearl Harbor Board 481 M~vsn~ii vvvxbs Govvvx:vx:s Poiicv ov Svcvvcv, ovsx: Rvc~ii !:vov:~x: ocu:vx:s n Monday, ctobcr 2, 1944, Marshall rcturncd oncc morc to thc APH8 to answcr qucstions poscd in thc boards Scptcmbcr 30 lcttcr. Hc cxplaincd that it was considcrcd csscntial at all cost to prcvcnt thc cncmy lrom lcarning that Japancsc intcrccpts wcrc our sourcc ol sccrct inlormation. Var and Navy dcpartmcnt pol icy conccrning sccrct, ultrasccrct inlormation dircctcd that No action is to bc takcn on inlormation hcrcin rcportcd, rcgardlcss ol tcmporary advantagc, il such action might havc thc ccct ol rcvcaling thc cxistcncc ol thc sourcc to thc cncmy. According to Marshall, thcrc havc bccn cascs whcrc convoys havc bccn pcrmittcd to go into thc most scrious situations rathcr than divcrting thcm lrom thc asscmblagc ol thc socallcd woll packs bccausc ol thc lcar that that would convcy to thc Gcrmans that wc had somc mcans ol knowing just how this was managcd. Apparcntly, Marshall continucd, thc Japancsc thought wc wcrc obtaining knowlcdgc ol thcsc convoy movcmcnts lrom spics and obscrvation posts. So long as thcy did, wc lclt lrcc to go ahcad. |8|ut il thcrc is any dangcr ol our giving away our sourccs, thcn wc would havc to hold o somcwhat on scizing cach opportunity, lor lcar wc would losc trcmcndous longtcrm advantagcs. 146
Marshall bclicvcd hc had bccn kcpt lully inlormcd by thc Statc cpartmcnt on thc dcvclopmcnt ol thc rclations bctwccn thc Japancsc mpirc and thc Amcrican Govcrnmcnt. vcn so, hc couldnt rcmcmbcr somc important cvcnts. Hc didnt rccall 146 !bid., p. 2403. 482 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc dcpartmcnts Novcmbcr 26, 1941, mcmorandum, or ultima tum, rcjccting Japans proposal lor a modus vivendi. Nor did hc rcmcmbcr Sccrctary ol Statc Hulls rcmark to Sccrctary ol Var Stimson thc ncxt morning to thc ccct that Hull had brokcn o discussions with thc Japancsc: ! havc washcd my hands ol it and it is now in thc hands ol you |Stimson| and Knox, thc Army and Navy. 147 Marshall admittcd, howcvcr, that hc must havc known on thc 26th ol Novcmbcr that thc ncgo tiations wcrc ncaring an impassc, bccausc Admiral Stark and ! cvidcntly dircctcd thc prcparation ol a dralt ol thc 27th ol Novcmbcr warning on that day, thc 26th. 148 Marshall didnt rcmcmbcr thc Var cpartmcnts Novcmbcr 27 warning to Short (#472) advising that Ncgotiations with Japan appcar to bc tcrminatcd and asking Short to rcport mcasurcs takcn. 149 Nor did hc rcmcmbcr Shorts sabotagc alcrt rcply (#959). And hc had not rcalizcd that his lailurc to rcspond to Shorts sabotagc alcrt, admittcdly inappropriatc lor dclcnsc against attack, mcant that it had obtaincd during thc cntirc pcriod 27 Novcmbcr6 cccmbcr inclusivc. Marshall was lorccd to admit that Vashingtons Novcmbcr 27 warning did not accomplish thc dcsircd rcsults 150 ol dclcnding Pcarl Harbor against attack. Pcrhaps most astonishing ol all, howcvcr, was that Marshall still maintaincd that hc had hcard nothing at all prior to thc morning ol cccmbcr 7 about thc Japancsc rcply to thc U.S. Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum. Tis in spitc ol thc lact that thc rst 13 parts ol that rcply had bccn dclivcrcd to thc Vhitc Housc and thc Statc cpartmcnt and wcrc in thc hands ol somc agcncy 147 !bid., p. 2402. 148 !bid., p. 2405. 149 !bid., p. 2402. 150 !bid., pp. 240405. Army Pearl Harbor Board 483 ol thc Var cpartmcnt during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Marshall bclicvcd that it was not . . . until ! was bclorc thc Navy Court hcrc rcccntly that ! kncw this had comc in, had bccn madc availablc to thc Sccrctary ol Statc, thc largcr portion ol that mcssagc, thc night bclorc. 151
Russcll pointcd out to Marshall: Tc cvidcncc which is bclorc thc 8oard at this timc is to thc ccct that as carly as 8:30, possibly not latcr than 9:00 ~.:., on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7th, thc mcssagc which indi catcd that thc ultimatum would bc dclivcrcd by thc Japancsc Ambassadors at 1:00 on that day, and that thc codc machincs wcrc bcing dcstroycd, was in thc hands ol a Coloncl. . . . 8ratton ol G2. 8rattons cncrgics lrom thc timc hc rcccivcd that mcssagc wcrc dcvotcd cxclusivcly to trying to locatc Marshall and Milcs. 152 Yct Marshall couldnt bc rcachcd lor a couplc ol hours, not until hc nally arrivcd in his o cc at about 11:30 ~.:. Tc situation was lurthcr complicatcd by thc lact that thc Army apparcntly had no clcar plan lor handling cmcrgcncics whcn Marshall was not availablc. 153 Morcovcr, this was a mcssagc, APH8 mcmbcr Frank commcntcd, whcrc thc timc ol its dclivcry by two hours would havc madc an awlul lot ol dicrcncc. 154
Marshall ocrcd no cxplanation lor his inacccssibility that Sunday morning, cxccpt to dcscribc his activitics: 151 !bid., p. 2409. Scc also 8ratton tcstimony, ibid., p. 2349. 152 !bid. Scc also 8ratton tcstimony on dclivcry, ibid., pp. 234950. 153 !bid., p. 2409. 154 !bid., p. 2410. 484 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ! rcmcmbcr vcry distinctly thc mcssagc lrom Coloncl 8ratton bccausc it camc to mc as ! was coming out ol a showcr, as my habit was to ridc at 8:30 on Sunday morning, and it takcs mc about lty minutcs to go around thc only availablc loop to ridc in. !t takcs mc about cight or tcn minutcs to gct a showcr and drcss. And whcn thc mcssagc camc lrom Coloncl 8ratton hc wantcd to comc out thcrc, and ! said, No. ! am on my way down to thc Var cpartmcnt. And it couldnt havc bccn morc than vc or tcn minutcs at thc outsidc bclorc ! had lclt to comc down hcrc. ! havc a vcry clcar rccollcction ol that bccausc natu rally ! thought about it at thc timc. . . . ! was not awarc ol thc lact that this mcssagc had bccn availablc thc night bclorc. 155
Marshall concludcd his tcstimony with a lurthcr commcnt on thc importancc ol sccrccy. ||vcrybody that is conccrncd with this top sccrct thing is vcry cagcy about saying anything about it. 156 Tis, hc implicd, cxplaincd thc rcluctancc ol thc Var cpartmcnt to rclcasc TP SCRT intcrccpts to thosc invcs tigating thc Pcarl Harbor attack. Av:v Couvivv 8v~::ox Rvvov:s His viivvvivs ov J~v~xvsv !x:vvcvv:s Now that morc inlormation about thc Japancsc intcr ccpts had comc out, 8ratton rcturncd twicc morc to tcstily ctobcr 2 and 6. Hc said thc sccrct Summary ol Far astcrn ocumcnts, 157 copics ol thc translatcd Japancsc intcrccpts docu mcnting thc Summary, togcthcr with an Appcndix containing many ol thc crucial Japancsc intcrccpts, wcrc on lc in G2, Var 155 !bid., pp. 240911. 156 !bid., p. 2413. 157 !bid., part 31, pp. 320135, xhibit A to Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard Top Sccrct Transcript: Summary ol Far astcrn ocumcnts, and pp. 323558, xhibit 8 to Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard Top Sccrct Transcript. xhibit consists ol copics ol thc 4550 most important documcnts thcmsclvcs. Army Pearl Harbor Board 485 cpartmcnt, 158 bcing hcld in tight sccurity and will bc madc availablc to you latcr. 159
8ratton had bccn convinccd on cccmbcr 3 that war with Japan was immincnt. n that day a cccmbcr 2 mcssagc lrom Tokyo dirccting thc Japancsc cmbassy in Vashington to burn its codcs, to stop using thcir codc machinc, and to dcstroy it com plctcly, had bccn translatcd. 160 Altcr thc rcccipt ol this transla tion, 8ratton said, any lurthcr intcrccpts that wcrc brought to mc would simply contributc toward thc climax that ! saw coming. Tis was it. 161 Hc had a lccling that lurthcr warnings or alcrts should bc scnt out to our ovcrscas commands. Gcrow lclt that su cicnt warning had bccn scnt. Milcs thought hc couldnt go ovcr Gcrows dccision bccausc ol thc Var cpartmcnt policy thcn in ccct that Var cpartmcnt G2 (!ntclligcncc) should not scnd out any intclligcncc to thc G2s ol tactical commands or ovcrscas dcpartmcnts which might producc an opcrational rcaction, without thc complctc concurrcncc ol thc Var Plans ivision. 162
8ratton still lclt uncasy and thought lurthcr warnings should bc scnt out. Hc wcnt to thc Navy cpartmcnt to scc Commandcr McCollum, hcad ol thc Far astcrn Scction in N!. McCollum lclt as 8ratton did and was going to writc up a warning and try to gct thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations to dis patch it. McCollum told 8ratton also that thc Navys S.!.S. man in Honolulu, a Commandcr Rochclort . . . had all thc inlormation that wc had, and was listcning lor this Japancsc windswcathcr broadcast. McCollum suggcstcd that 8ratton instruct Armys G2 in Hawaii to talk with Rochclort at oncc, as in a short 158 !bid., part 29, p. 2417. 159 !bid., p. 2416. 160 !bid., part 12, p. 215, part 31, p. 3250. 161 !bid., part 29, p. 2442. 162 !bid., pp. 2444, 2453. 486 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy pcriod ol timc Rochclort could tcll Coloncl Ficldcr, our G2, cxactly what was going on and what wc kncw. Tus 8ratton tricd by this indircct routc to communicatc his lcars to Armys G2 in Hawaii. 163
Vhcn dclivcring thc Japancsc intcrccpts, 8rattons usual practicc was to go rst to Marshall, Milcs, and Gcrow, and thcn to thc Statc cpartmcnt. Hc had lollowcd this proccdurc thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6, whcn dclivcring thc rst 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply. 8ratton said hc vcry scldom dclivcrcd thc lockcd pouch ol intcrccpts to Marshall in pcrson. Tat cvcning hc had lclt thc lockcd bag containing Marshalls copy with his sccrc tary, Coloncl 8cdcll Smith, advising him that it was an impor tant documcnt. . . and that thc Chicl ol Sta . . . |s|hould scc it right away. 164
8ratton had thcn madc dclivcry in pcrson to G2s Milcs, with whom hc had discusscd thc mcssagc at somc lcngth. 165 Hc had lclt thc copy ol thc mcssagc lor Gcrow with his cxccutivc o ccr, Coloncl Gailcy. 166 Tcn, at about 10 or 10:30 8ratton had gonc with thc 13part mcssagc to thc cpartmcnt ol Statc, whcrc hc had dclivcrcd thc lockcd pouch to thc watch o ccr in thc Statc cpartmcnt, with thc rcqucst that it bc gottcn to Mr. Hull immcdiatcly. 167
Tc ncxt morning, altcr rccciving thc last installmcnt ol thc Japancsc rcply and thc 1:00 v.:. dcadlinc mcssagc at about 8:30 9:00 ~.:., 8ratton spcnt a couplc ol lrantic hours trying to locatc Marshall. Vhcn hc nally rcachcd him by phonc, Marshall askcd 8ratton to wait lor him at his o cc. Marshall arrivcd at 11:25 ~.:., 8ratton was surc ol thc timc bccausc hc kcpt looking at thc 163 !bid., p. 2444. 164 !bid., part 29, pp. 242123. 165 !bid., p. 2422. 166 !bid., p. 2421. 167 !bid., pp. 2422, 2419. Army Pearl Harbor Board 487 clock on thc wall and at my watch. Tc long Japancsc rcply was on Marshalls dcsk whcn hc camc in. Marshall rcad it and thcn a discussion ol thc cntirc communication cnsucd. 168
8ratton urgcd thc APH8 to obtain, not only thc Japancsc rcply to thc U.S. Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum, but also thc 30 or 40 othcr mcssagcs which prcccdcd it, that is, thc cxchangcs bctwccn thc Ambassador in Vashington and thc lorcign ministcr in Tokyo. . . . And considcr thc picturc that lay bclorc all ol our policymaking and planning o cials, lrom thc Sccrctary ol Statc down through thc Sccrctary ol Var, to thc Chicl ol thc Var Plans ivision. Tcy all had thc samc picturc, and it was a picturc that was bcing paintcd ovcr a pcriod ol wccks, il not months. 169
APH8 n:~ixs J~v~xvsv !x:vvcvv:s Fix~iiv: n ctobcr 6, 1944, thc board gaincd acccss to thc 45 to 50 intcrccpts rcqucstcd. 170
Altcr it actually had thc intcrccpts in hand, it qucstioncd a lcw nal witncsscs and thcn its procccdings wcrc concludcd. Tnv Av:v Pv~vi H~vnov 8o~vb Rvvov: Tc APH8s hcarings and thosc ol thc NC! had run concur rcntly, thc NC! lrom July 24 through Scptcmbcr 27, 1944, thc APH8 lrom August 7 through ctobcr 6. Tc NC! rcport was datcd ctobcr 19, that ol thc APH8, ctobcr 20, 1944. 171
168 !bid., pp. 2419, 2420, 2422. 169 !bid., p. 2424. 170 !bid., p. 2449. For list ol documcnts, scc ibid., pp. 245657, lor documcnts thcmsclvcs, scc part 31, pp. 323558. 171 !bid., part 39, pp. 23178, APH8 Rcport, ctobcr 20, 1944, ibid., pp. 179230, Appcndix to Rcport, ibid., pp. 23169, Judgc Advocatc Gcncral (Major Gcncral) Myron C. Cramcrs analyscs. 488 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tc APH8 issucd a dctailcd rcport dcscribing thc back ground ol thc attack, thc situation in Vashington and in Hawaii, and thc rcsponsibilitics ol thc scvcral o cials. !t had brought out in thc coursc ol its hcarings scvcral signicant points not prcvi ously covcrcd in dcpth: a. Tc Army was clcarly rcsponsiblc lor thc dclcnsc ol thc cct whcn it was at its homc basc in Pcarl Harbor, b. Givcn thc instructions hc had rcccivcd, Short appcarcd jus ticd in ordcring Alcrt #1 lor sabotagc, c. Shorts Vashington supcrior commandcr, Marshall, was obviously lamiliar with Shorts systcm ol alcrts and should havc noticd Short il his ordcr lor a sabotagc alcrt, issucd in rcsponsc to Vashingtons Novcmbcr 27 warning, was not considcrcd adcquatc, d. Short had bccn told vcry littlc about thc crisis that Vashington o cialdom kncw was looming, c. Tc attack on Pcarl Harbor apparcntly took cvcryonc by sur prisc, not only in Hawaii but also in Vashington. cials both in Vashington and Hawaii had cxpcctcd thc rst Japancsc strikc would bc in thc wcstcrn Pacic or southcast Asia and, quitc likcly, thc Phillippincs. l. Two witncsscsKimmcl and Saordrcvcalcd that, as a rcsult ol dccodcd Japancsc intcrccpts, Vashington o cials had had acccss to considcrablc intclligcncc conccrning Japancsc intcntions, which was not lurnishcd thc Hawaiian commandcrs. Tc APH8 was imprcsscd by thc quantity and quality ol thc intclligcncc availablc in Vashington. Tc rccord shows that lrom inlormcrs and othcr sourccs thc Var cpartmcnt had complctc and dctailcd inlormation ol Japancsc intcntions. !nlormation ol thc cvidcnt Japancsc intcntion to go to war in thc vcry ncar luturc was wcll known to thc Sccrctary ol Statc, thc Sccrctary ol Var, Army Pearl Harbor Board 489 thc Chicl ol Sta ol thc Army, thc Sccrctary ol Navy, and thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations. !t was not a qucstion ol lact, it was only a qucstion ol timc. Tc ncxt lcw days would scc thc cnd ol pcacc and thc bcginning ol war. !l it bc assumcd that lor any rcason thc inlormation could not havc bccn givcn to thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt, thcn it was a rcsponsibility ol thc Var cpartmcnt to givc ordcrs to Short what to do, and to tcll him to go on an allout alcrt instcad ol a sabotagc alcrt. 172 Tc board was cspccially conccrncd about thc warnings scnt Short, his sabotagc alcrt rcsponsc to thc Novcmbcr 27 warning, and thc lailurc ol Vashington to rcspond. Having askcd lor a rcport ol what hc was doing, thc Var cpartmcnt placcd itscll in thc position ol sharing thc rcspon sibility il it did not dircct Short to takc such mcasurcs as thcy considcrcd adcquatc to mcct this scrious thrcat. 173
Howcvcr, thc APH8 pointcd out, Short had two thrcats. Yct hc only took mcasurcs as to onc. Tc mcssagc on which hc particularly rclicd as to sabotagc camc lrom G2 on Novcmbcr 28, thc rcport said, after hc had madc his dccision to go to Alcrt Numbcr 1. Tis last mcssagc . . . docs not in any way changc prcvious mcssagcs. Short should havc known, as a traincd soldicr, that a G2 mcs sagc is inlormativc and is ol lcsscr authority than a command ing mcssagc lrom thc Chicl ol Sta. 174
172 !bid., part 39, p. 139. 173 !bid., p. 90. 174 !bid., p. 91. 490 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Altcr thc conicting Navy and Army dispatchcs ol Novcmbcr 27, and thc additional Novcmbcr 28 sabotagc mcssagcs lrom Army G2 and lrom thc adjutant gcncral, 175
Short had only silcncc lrom Vashington. Hc was givcn no lur thcr clarication ol this conict amongst thc mcssagcs. Tcrc is no cxplanation why Short was not told ol thc socallcd |Novcmbcr 26| ultimatum. !t was known to thc Japancsc bccausc it was handcd to thcm. 176
!n its rcport, thc APH8 discusscd thc intclligcncc availablc in Vashington and Hawaii, thc amiablc rclationship bctwccn Short and Kimmcl, 177 thc warnings that had bccn scnt to Hawaii, thc Hawaiian commandcrs dclcnsc plans, thc Armys radar lacil itics, Shorts sabotagc alcrt, thc shortagc ol plancs in Hawaii lor longrangc rcconnaissancc, and so on. As has bccn rcpcatcd so many timcs, thcrc was positivc cvi dcncc in thc Var cpartmcnt that it was only a mattcr ol days bclorc war would cnsuc and thc Var cpartmcnt had noticc that Hawaii was on only a sabotagc alcrt, inadcquatc lor lull warlarc. Had a lull war mcssagc, unadultcratcd, bccn dispatchcd or had dircct ordcrs lor a lull, allout alcrt bccn scnt, Hawaii could havc bccn rcady to havc mct thc attack with what it had. Vhat rcsultcd was lailurc at both cnds ol thc linc. Rcsponsibility laid both in Vashington and in Hawaii. 178 Among othcr things, thc APH8 rcport criticizcd Marshall lor not providing an arrangcmcnt by which anothcr could act in 175 !bid., part 14, p. 1406, Navy #272337, p. 1328, Army #472, p. 1329, Milcs, G2, #473, and p. 1330, Army Adjutant Gcncral, #482. 176 !bid., part 39, p. 141. 177 !bid., p. 61. 178 !bid., p. 145. Army Pearl Harbor Board 491 so critical a situation whcn hc could not rcadily bc rcachcd. 179 No accounting lor this was madc cvcn though |t|hc cvidcncc indicatcs that thc manncr in which author ity to act was dclcgatcd or not dclcgatcd had its inucncc on this situation. Tc Chicl ol Sta had thrcc dcputics, Gcncrals 8rydcn, Arnold, and Moorc. Nonc ol thcsc thrcc was givcn thc sccrct inlormation conccrning thc known Jap intcntions. . . . Complctc authority to act in Gcncral Marshalls abscncc docs not sccm to havc bccn givcn to any onc subordinatc. Had thcrc bccn an o ccr cithcr with authority or with couragc to act on thc inlormation that was in thc Var cpartmcnt on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6, and had hc scnt a mcssagc to Short, Hawaii should havc bccn lully alcrtcd. 180
Tc board rcport attributcd thc cxtcnt ol thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr primarily to two causcs: (1) Tc lailurc ol thc Commanding Gcncral |Short| ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt adcquatcly to alcrt his command lor war, and (2) Tc lailurc ol thc Var cpartmcnt, with knowlcdgc ol thc typc ol alcrt takcn by thc Commanding Gcncral, Hawaiian cpartmcnt, to dircct him to takc an adcquatc alcrt, and thc lailurc to kccp him adcquatcly inlormcd as to thc dcvclopmcnts ol thc Unitcd StatcsJapancsc ncgotiations, which in turn might havc causcd him to changc lrom thc inadcquatc alcrt to an adcquatc onc. 181
Tc board citcd scvcral lactors that contributcd to thc disastcr: Tc lailurcs ol (1) Tc Sccrctary ol Statc, Cordcll Hull, (2) Tc Chicl ol Sta ol thc Army, Gcncral Gcorgc C. Marshall, (3) Chicl ol Var Plans ivision, Var cpartmcnt Gcncral Sta, Major Gcncral Lconard T. Gcrow, and (4) Commanding Gcncral ol thc 179 !bid., p. 140. 180 !bid., pp. 14445. APH8 rcport, part 39. 181 !bid., p. 175. 492 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Hawaiian cpartmcnt, Licutcnant Gcncral Valtcr C. Short. 182
Tc APH8 rcport thcn dctailcd thc cxtcnt to which cach sharcd in thc rcsponsibility. Tc rcport was submittcd to Stimson only a couplc ol wccks bclorc thc Novcmbcr 7 prcsidcntial clcction. Tc APH8 had bccn critical ol Short, who was no longcr on activc duty. 8ut it had also criticizcd Sccrctary ol Statc Hull, Army Chicl ol Sta Marshall, and Gcncral Gcrow, all ol whom wcrc still activcly involvcd in thc administration and thc war. Tc rcports rclcasc could provc an cmbarrassmcnt to thc administration, thc prcsidcnt, and thc war cort. Vhcn Stimson rcccivcd thc rcport, it was announccd in thc prcss that it would not bc rclcascd until it had bccn rcvicwcd lor sccurity by appropriatc military authoritics. 183 Tcn, on cccmbcr 1, altcr Rooscvclt had won his clcction to a third tcrm, Stimson announccd that it would bc highly prcjudicial to thc succcsslul prosccution ol thc war and thc salcty ol Amcrican livcs to makc public dur ing thc war thc rcport ol thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard or thc rccord on which it is bascd. Tus both sccrctarics, war and navy, rcluscd |o|n thc ground ol national sccurity . . . to makc thc rcal story ol Pcarl Harbor, as rcvcalcd in thc NC! and APH8 rcports public until thc war had cndcd. 184
182 !bid., pp. 17576. 183 New York Times, ctobcr 24, 1944, p. 12, col. 2. 184 New York Times, cccmbcr 2, 1944, pp. 1, 5. 493 23. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) O n July 13, 1944, 1 thc ncw Navy Sccrctary, Jamcs \. Forrcstal, ordcrcd thc convcning ol a Navy Court ol !nquiry (NC!) lor thc purposc ol inquiring into all circumstanccs con ncctcd with thc attack madc by Japancsc armcd lorccs on Pcarl Harbor, Tcrritory ol Hawaii, on 7 cccmbcr 1941. 2 Trcc rctircd admirals wcrc appointcd to thc court: rin G. Murn, prcsi dcnt, dward C. Kalblus, and Adolphus Andrcws. Commandcr Harold 8icscmcicr was namcd judgc advocatc. 3 Tc court opcncd its doors on July 24, and took tcstimony ovcr 32 days. Admirals Harold R. Stark, chicl ol naval opcrations at thc timc ol thc attack, Claudc C. 8loch commandant ol thc 14th Naval istrict (Hawaii), and Husband . Kimmcl, who had bccn commandcr inchicl ol thc Pacic Flcct, 4 wcrc namcd intcrcstcd partics, cntitlcd to attcnd thc hcarings, havc counscl, and crosscxaminc 1 New York Times, Junc 15, 1944, p. 10. 2 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 32, p. 5. 3 !bid., p. 9. 4 !bid., p. 12. 494 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy witncsscs. Tc court bcgan by cxploring thc situation at thc timc ol thc attack and thus covcrcd much ol thc samc tcrritory as had thc Robcrts and Hart invcstigations. Tc jurisdiction ol thc NC! was not limitcd to invcstigat ing Navy pcrsonncl only, it was to inquirc into all circumstanccs conncctcd with thc attack madc by Japancsc armcd lorccs on Pcarl Harbor (italics addcd). Morcovcr, as Captain L.F. Saord had locatcd thc Japancsc intcrccpts and had had copics rcplaccd in thc lcs by thc summcr ol 1944, thcsc intcrccpts wcrc availablc to bc introduccd to thc NC!. Kimmcl was dctcrmincd that thcy bc madc a part ol thc rccord. 8ut obtaining NC! acccss to thcm would not bc casy. J~v~xvsv !x:vvcvv:s Loc~:vb Kimmcl brought thc subjcct ol thc intcrccpts up at his rst opportunity. Hc said hc had bccn brandcd throughout this coun try as thc onc rcsponsiblc lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr. Hc was anxious that this invcstigation should go lar cnough to disclosc all thc lacts in conncction with thc mattcr, it should call wit ncsscs lrom thc Army, lrom thc Statc cpartmcnt, or lrom any othcr lcdcral dcpartmcnt in ordcr to cstablish thc lacts that arc ncccssary . . . to rclutc thc uttcrly lalsc and mislcading statcmcnts madc throughout thc Robcrts Commission. 5 Unlcss thc intcr ccpts wcrc introduccd, Kimmcl maintaincd, it would bc impos siblc to propcrly assign rcsponsibility lor thc disastcr. Judgc Advocatc 8icscmcicr askcd Forrcstal on August 1 lor acccss to thc Japancsc intcrccpts. No answcr. n August 4 8icscmcicr was told that thc lcttcr had bccn misplaccd. Tcn apparcntly it was lound and rcturncd to 8icscmcicr with a rcqucst lor a changc in its classicationlrom SCRT to 5 !bid., p. 19. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 495 TP SCRT. 6 Finally on thc morning ol August 8, duc to thc purcly lortuitous circumstancc that Admiral rncst J. King was acting sccrctary ol thc Navy that day, 7 8icscmcicr rcccivcd Forrcstals pcrmission lor onc ol Kimmcls attorncys to cxam inc thc sccrct lcs. 8 Mr. Knox promiscd you acccss to all thc lcs, King said, so ! can scc no rcason to rclusc. 9 Tus Navy Captain Robcrt A. Lavcndcr ol Kimmcls lcgal sta was givcn thc chancc to inspcct thc sccrct lcs. Hc madc his inspcction that vcry altcrnoon. 10
Vhcn Lavcndcr was ushcrcd into thc room whcrc hc was to cxaminc thc intcrccpts, hc was astoundcd to scc a stack two and a hall lcct high ol intcrccptcd mcssagcs. Hc had only a lim itcd timc to look through thcm. 8ut Saord had givcn him thc numbcrs ol thc most important intcrccpts, so hc was ablc to makc his cxamination rathcr quickly. Lavcndcr bccamc physically nau scatcd, hc said, whcn |hc| rcalizcd what thc inlormation in |his| hands would havc mcant to Kimmcl and thc mcn ol thc Flcct who dicd. Hc sclcctcd somc 43 mcssagcs that hc thought should havc bccn scnt to Kimmcl in Pcarl Harbor and had thcm copicd and authcnticatcd. 11 Tat cvcning, attorncys Rugg and Hanily dincd with Lavcndcr. Lavcndcr was still so sickcncd by what hc had uncovcrcd that hc could not cat. 12
Tc ncxt day, Gcncral Joscph McNarncy, thcn dcputy chicl ol sta ol thc Army and an FR appointcc to thc Robcrts Commission which had hcapcd opprobrium on Kimmcl and 6 !bid., p. 54. 7 Husband . Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story (Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry Co., 1955), p. 130. 8 !bid., pp. 5354. Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 5354. 9 John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Gardcn City, N.Y.: oublcday, 1982), p. 81. 10 Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story, p. 123. 11 !bid. Scc also Toland, Infamy, p. 82. 12 Toland, Infamy, p. 82. 496 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Short, protcstcd to Naval Communications that Lavcndcrs acccss to thc sccrct lcs violatcd ordcrs. Vhcn thc dircctor ol naval communications said hc had rcccivcd no such ordcrs, McNarncy backcd down. Howcvcr, Admiral King, who had agrccd to Lavcndcrs cxamination, told Kimmcl latcr that hc would not rccommcnd making thc inlormation availablc. And thcn Naval Communications rcluscd to turn ovcr to Lavcndcr thc copics ol thc intcrccpts hc had sclcctcd. 13 8ut Kimmcl did not lct thc mat tcr rcst. Hc askcd thc judgc advocatc to pursuc thc mattcr with Navy sccrctary Forrcstal, 14 who rcplicd on August 10 that it was not in thc public intcrcst to introducc this typc ol matcrial in cvidcncc. . . . 15 Howcvcr, Kimmcls man had sccn thc intcrccpts. So Kimmcl pcrsistcd. uring thc courts rst 19 days, Kimmcl madc rcqucsts almost daily to havc thc sccrct Japancsc intcrccpts introduccd in cvi dcncc. Finally on thc 20th day, August 28, Kimmcls corts borc lruit. Tc lc copics ol thc sclcctcd documcnts, duly authcnti catcd undcr o cial scal, wcrc placcd in thc NC!s rccord at thc rcqucst ol thc judgc advocatc ol this court. 16 Tc rcmaining days ol thc !nquiry, thcrclorc, dcalt with this ncw matcrial. . Howcvcr, bclorc gctting to that, wc should rst rcvicw bricy thc situation bclorc thc intcrccpts wcrc introduccd. CN H~voib R. S:~vx ovsx: Rvc~ii Pvv~::~cx v:~iis Tc courts rst witncss, Chicl ol Naval pcrations Stark 17
ocrcd no startling rcvclations. Stark hcld that hc had sought 13 !bid. 14 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 10304. 15 !bid., pp. 12021. 16 !bid., part 33, p. 735. 17 !bid., part 32, pp. 11152, 24750, 52738, 72731. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 497 to kccp Kimmcl inlormcd so lar as wc thought hc could havc a vital intcrcst. 18 id hc know ol any important dcvclopmcnt prcccding thc attack ol which Kimmcl had not bccn adviscd, as Kimmcl had rcqucstcd, by thc quickcst sccurc mcans thcn avail ablc: Stark rcplicd: ! havc scarchcd my brain, my conscicncc, my hcart, and cvcry thing ! havc got, sincc Pcarl Harbor startcd, to scc whcrcin ! was dcrclict or whcrcin ! might havc omittcd somcthing. Tcrc is only onc thought . . . that ! rcgrcttcd . . . . |T|hat was thc dispatch which was scnt by thc Army on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, that ! had not parallclcd it with my own systcm, or that ! had not tclcphoncd it. . . . |T|hat is thc onc conscious rcalization ! rcmcmbcr and rcgrct. 19 Tc Japancsc intcrccpts had not bccn actually introduccd into thc rccord, but Kimmcl uscd what hc had lcarncd about thcm lrom Captain Lavcndcr in qucstioning Stark. Kimmcl askcd Stark il hc had rcccivcd inlormation that thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt rcgardcd Novcmbcr 25 as an absolutc immovablc dcadlinc lor thc ncgotiations thcn bcing conductcd bctwccn Japan and Amcrica. Stark: No, ! dont rcmcmbcr that. Vhcn Kimmcl tricd to rclrcsh Starks mcmory by rclcrring to Saords tcstimony bclorc Admiral Hart, 8icscmcicr objcctcd: !t was an attcmpt to show in thc lorm ol a qucstion that thcrc was ccrtain cvidcncc bclorc thc Hart cxamination, what thc cvidcncc was, and thc lact that thc cvidcncc was givcn undcr oath. 20
Kimmcl tricd anothcr tack. 8ctwccn cccmbcr 1 and cccmbcr 4 |had Stark rcccivcd| inlormation that Japan was 18 !bid., p. 82. 19 !bid., p. 99. 20 !bid., part 33, pp. 72728. 498 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy going to attack 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs and maintain pcacc with Russia: Stark: Not that ! rccall. Kimmel: o you rccall thc phrasc Vinds Mcssagc: Stark: ! dont rccall such a mcssagc. . . . Not thc slightcst rccol lcction ol a discussion ol thc socallcd Vinds Mcssagc. And morc in thc samc vcin. 21
8icscmcicr objcctcd. 22 Kimmcl thcn askcd Stark il hc rccallcd rccciving any impor tant intclligcncc on cccmbcr 6, thc cvcning bclorc thc attack. Stark: ! couldnt say what ! was doing that cvcning. My rcmcmbrancc is! think ! was homc but ! couldnt say. ! dont rccall clcarly. . . . ! havcnt thc slightcst rccollcction ol any mcs sagc bcaring on this, or any othcr subjcct, bcing givcn to mc bctwccn thc timc ! lclt thc o cc and thc . . . ncxt morning. 23 Stark did rcmcmbcr a discussion with Marshall Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7 about thc mcssagc asking thc Japancsc ambassador to call on Hull that day at 1:00 v.:. 8ut othcrwisc hc rccallcd nothing ol signicancc about that mcssagc. 24 Ab:iv~i Scnuiv:~xx, N~vv Li~isox wi:n S:~:v vv~v::vx:, v~sivv Rcar Admiral R.. Schuirmann, who had bccn dircctor ol Ccntral ivision, cc ol Chicl ol Naval pcrations, and liai son with thc Statc cpartmcnt, was not much morc rcsponsivc. 21 !bid., p. 729. 22 !bid., p. 730. 23 !bid., part 32, pp. 13233. 24 !bid., pp. 13436. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 499 !n answcr to Kimmcls rcpcatcd qucstioning, Schuirmann hcsi tatcd and rcplicd only that it would involvc thc disclosurc ol inlormation dctrimcntal to thc public intcrcst. . . . |H|c claimcd his privilcgc against rcvcaling statc sccrcts. 25 Finally altcr bcing rccallcd to tcstily altcr thc court rcscindcd its carlicr rul ing rcstricting qucstions on subjccts not prcviously in cvidcncc bclorc thc court, 26 Schuirmann admittcd having known about thc Japancsc dcadlincsNovcmbcr 25 and 29. 27 Hc also said thc dis patch dirccting thc Japancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thcir rcply to Hull on Sunday, cccmbcr 7, at prcciscly 1:00 v.:. Vashington timc, had bccn availablc by 9:30 ~.:. whcn Stark rcachcd his o cc. And Schuirmann also rccallcd thc MarshallStark tclc phonc convcrsation conccrning thc last minutc mcssagc to thc cld commandcrs. 28 V~snixc:oxs Abvicv :o Pv~vi H~vnov Co::~xbvvs Coxvusixc, Coxviic:ixc Gcncral Short, thc Armys commandcr at Pcarl Harbor at thc timc ol thc attack, was NC!s ncxt witncss. Likc Kimmcl, Short had bccn undcr a cloud ol suspicion cvcr sincc thc publi cation ol thc Robcrts Commission rcport. nc ol Shorts most tclling points was that thc plancs which had bccn cn routc to thc Philippincs via Hawaii, thc plancs that had arrivcd ovcr Hawaii during thc attack, had bccn scnt out lrom Calilornia unarmed. As latc as 1:30 ~.:. in thc Var cpartmcnt on cccmbcr 7, whcn thc plancs wcrc dispatchcd lrom Calilornia, Short said, thcy did not bclicvc thcrc was any dangcr ol air attack at Honolulu, or thcy ncvcr would havc bccn so rash as to scnd 25 !bid., p. 159. 26 !bid., part 33, pp. 73233. 27 !bid., p. 733. 28 !bid., p. 759. 500 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy plancs out in thosc conditions. . . . Vhocvcr scnt thcm out lclt that thc hazard ol carrying thc ammunition was grcatcr than thc hazard ol a Japancsc attack. !n othcr words, hc |thc dispatchcr| considcrcd that thcrc was no probability ol an air attack at Pcarl Harbor on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7 or thc plancs would not havc bccn startcd lrom Hamilton Ficld in that condition, as latc as thcy wcrc. 29 Tcn Kimmcl himscll spcnt thrcc days on thc witncss stand, August 1517. Hc spokc about thc Armys rcsponsibility lor thc dclcnsc ol thc cct whcn in port, his training proccdurcs, thc pos sibility ol a submarinc attack, and so on. 8clorc thc attack, hc had madc lrcqucnt rcqucsts to Vashington lor inlormation and had rcccivcd rcpcatcd assuranccs that |hc| would bc kcpt inlormcd. Howcvcr, Kimmcl lclt surc that thcrc must bc dctails |known in Vashington| about which |hc| was not inlormcd, dctails about which hc could only gucss. 30
Kimmcl had known that both Marshall and Stark had rcc ommcndcd against our issuing an ultimatum to thc Japancsc. Howcvcr, hc did not know that whcn hc rcccivcd thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning, thc Statc cpartmcnt had issucd Japan an ulti matum thc day bclorc. Hc had simply assumcd that onc ol thc primary causcs lor thc |war warning| dispatch was, as statcd, that ncgotiations had ccascd and that U.S.Japancsc rclations wcrc rcaching a brcaking point. Kimmcl rcccivcd no latcr mcssagc lrom thc CN canccling or modilying thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning. As a rcsult, whcn latcr prcss rcports indicatcd that lur thcr convcrsations wcrc continuing bctwccn thc Japancsc ambas sadors and thc Statc cpartmcnt, thc warning lost much ol its lorcc. 31 29 !bid., part 32, p. 186. 30 !bid., p. 291. 31 !bid., p. 233. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 501 Kimmcl was askcd about thc lastminutc cccmbcr 7 MarshallStark dispatch stating that thc Japancsc ambassadors wcrc prcscnting at 1:00 v.:. astcrn Standard timc today what amounts to an ultimatum. Marshall had closcd this dispatch by saying, Just what signicancc thc hour sct may havc wc do not know but bc on alcrt accordingly. 32 Tis mcssagc did not rcach Short and Kimmcl until wcll altcr thc attack. cvastatcd by thc disastcr, Kimmcl had told thc couricr thcn that it wasnt ol thc slightcst intcrcst to mc at that timc, and ! thrcw thc thing in thc wastc baskct. 33
Askcd what dicrcncc it would havc madc had hc rcccivcd thc warning bclorc thc attack, Kimmcl said two othcr lactors wcrc morc signicant. nc was that an ultimatum was bcing dclivcrcd. Tc othcr was that . . . thc Japancsc Ambassador had instructions lrom his govcrnmcnt to dclivcr it at a spccic timc. 34 Kimmcl had bccn undcr ordcrs to pcrmit Japan to commit thc rst ovcrt act. Tcchnically, Kimmcl said, ! could not rc a shot at a Japancsc Flcct until altcr thcy had rst shot at us, and also, tcchnically, had ! scnt out patrol plancs armcd, ! would havc had to wait until thc cncmy rcd at thcsc patrol plancs or committcd somc othcr ovcrt act bclorc ! could do anything morc than protcst. 35
Tc warwarning dispatch had givcn Kimmcl an cxcusc to do somcthing that ! had wantcd to do lor scvcral months . . . to bomb submarinc contacts. 36 Kimmcl considcrcd his ordcrs conlusing. Just thc day bclorc thc war warning, Stark had adviscd him that thc Army had 32 !bid., part 33, p. 1282. 33 !bid., part 32, p. 253. 34 !bid., p. 264. 35 !bid., p. 254. 36 !bid., p. 259. 502 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy agrccd to station 25 Army pursuit plancs at Midway and a simi lar numbcr at Vakc. 37 Short had rcccivcd a Var cpartmcnt mcssagc along thc samc linc, asking him to rclicvc thc marinc inlantry units on thc outlying islands with Army pcrsonncl. 38
Tc proximity ol thcsc two mcssagcs in point ol timc to thc war warning mcssagc . . . lcsscncd thc lorcc ol thc war warning mcssagc. Apparcntly, Kimmcl said, CN Stark was willing to tcmporarily upsct, to a considcrablc dcgrcc, thc dclcnscs ol Pcarl Harbor as wcll as ol thc outlying bascs to rcinlorcc Vakc and Midway, cspccially as thc Navy was bcing askcd to transport thc plancs, ground crcws, csscntial sparc parts, tools, and ammuni tion. Now, Kimmcl said, thc di cultics ol rcinlorcing thc outly ing stations wcrc undoubtcdly wcllknown to thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations, so that thc Var cpartmcnts mcssagc indicatcd a conict bctwixt thc idcas ol thc Var cpartmcnt and thc Navy cpartmcnt at that timc. Pv~vi H~vnov, U.S. Fivv:s 8~sv, \uixvv~niv :o A::~cx Tc NC! qucstioncd Admiral Jamcs . Richardson, Kimmcls prcdcccssor as commandcrinchicl ol thc U.S. Flcct at Pcarl Harbor. Richardsons tcstimony rcvcalcd that hc had also cncoun tcrcd di cultics in obtaining mcn and matcricl, in conducting rcconnaissancc, and in acquiring rcliablc inlormation to guidc him in planning, training, and prcparing lor dclcnsc. 39 Richardson had also objcctcd to basing thc cct at Pcarl Harbor and had rcc ommcndcd that it bc hcadquartcrcd on thc Vcst Coast, cxccpt a 37 !bid., part 33, p. 1177. 38 !bid., part 32, p. 238. 39 !bid., pp. 624, 629. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 503 dctachmcnt to rcmain in Pcarl Harbor that could bc adcquatcly carcd lor by thc lacilitics thcrc. 40 Hc said thc opcrating arcas wcrc not adcquatc, cithcr lor surlacc ships or air, thcrc wcrc no air clds adcquatc to carc lor thc plancs that wcrc on carricrs, and could not bc traincd lrom thc carricrs bccausc ol thc shortagc ol lucl. Tc only salc anchoragc was Pcarl Harbor, and it was cntircly inadcquatc to handlc thc Flcct, thc distancc lrom thc Vcst Coast incrcascd thc cost and thc dclay and thc di culty ol maintaining and supplying thc Flcct, that thcrc wcrc no rccrcational lacilitics, that in timc ol pcacc thc mcn and o ccrs could not scc any rcason lor rcmaining lor such a long timc away lrom homc, that thcy wcrc two thou sand milcs ncarcr a possiblc cncmy, that wc wcrc unprcparcd to undcrtakc ocnsivc opcrations lrom Pcarl Harbor, and that il wc wcrc involvcd in war, it would bc ncccssary lor us to rcturn to thc Vcst Coast lor stripping and mobilization and prcpara tion lor war, and that our prcscncc in thc Hawaiian arca, whcn wc wcrc absolutcly not traincd, couldnt makc any military pco plc bclicvc that wc wcrc planning ocnsivc opcrations. 41 !n spitc ol Richardsons objcctions, Stark had dircctcd him in May 1940 to announcc to thc prcss that thc Flcct would rcmain in Hawaiian watcrs at Richardsons rcqucst to carry out cxcrciscs that |hc| had in mind. 42 Askcd il hc kncw why Stark had ordcrcd thc Flcct hcld in Hawaii, Richardson rcplicd For thc rcstraining inucncc it might cxcrcisc on thc action ol thc Japancsc nation. 43 Vhcn Richardson was still commandcr ol thc U.S. Flcct, hc had bccn warncd scvcral timcs that war was possiblc. Hc had rcccivcd 40 !bid., p. 628. 41 !bid., pp. 62728. 42 !bid., p. 624. 43 !bid., p. 628. 504 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy an incrcasing numbcr ol warnings. . . . Tcy wcrc not clcarcut. . . . Tcy wcrc in pcrsonal lcttcrs, thc gcncral tcnor bcing! hopc you will kccp cvcr prcscnt in your mind thc possibility that wc may bc at war tomorrow. Tc rst warning had not comc lrom thc Navy cpartmcnt, but rathcr lrom thc Var cpartmcnt to thc Commanding Gcncral ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt, probably on Junc 19, 1940. Vhcn Richardson askcd thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations lor inlorma tion rcgarding it |this warning| hc rcccivcd no rcply. 44 Kimmcl agrccd . . . in gcncral with Richardson as to thc inadvisability ol basing thc cct at Pcarl Harbor and hc had dis cusscd Richardsons objcctions with Stark. Howcvcr, whcn hc took command, hc had not madc any lormal protcst, hc had acccptcd thc situation. Latcr hc had pointcd out thc dangcrs that cxistcd so long as thc cct was in Pcarl Harbor. Tc singlc cntrancc might bc blockcd, it took a long timc lor thc Flcct to sortic, and thc oil stocks wcrc vulncrablc. !n vicw ol thcsc dan gcrs, Kimmcl had rcqucstcd rcpcatcdly, in corrcspondcncc that hc bc kcpt inlormcd ol dcvclopmcnts. 45 !n ordcr to rcach thcir own conclusions, thc NC! wcnt ovcr much ol thc samc matcrial covcrcd by thc Robcrts and Hart invcstigations. And it inquircd about thc radar lacilitics in Hawaii at thc timc ol thc attack. Commandcr Villiam .G. Taylor, U.S. Navy Rcscrvc, radar cxpcrt on tcmporary duty with thc Pacic Flcct, tcsticd that thc Army radar opcrators thcmsclvcs wcrc wclltraincd, although givcn thc tcchnology availablc at thc timc, it was impossiblc to dccidc whcthcr thc plots pickcd up by thc radar station wcrc a Japancsc raid, an air group lrom onc ol our 44 !bid., p. 626. 45 !bid., p. 282. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 505 own carricrs, or somc plancs bcing lcrricd in lrom thc Unitcd Statcs. 46
Tc two mcn who had actually manncd thc radar station on ahu on cccmbcr 7, Joscph L. Lockard, radar opcrator, and Gcorgc . lliott, told ol having pickcd up a clustcr ol blips on thc radar scrccn indicating an unusually largc ight . . . coming in lrom almost duc north at 130 somc milcs. Vhcn thcy rcportcd this to thc inlormation ccntcr, it was assumcd thcsc blips wcrc lrom 817 bombcrs bcing lcrricd to Hawaii lrom Calilornia. So thcir radar rcport was not passcd along to highcr authority. 47 Admiral P.N.L. 8cllingcr, who on cccmbcr 7 had bccn commandcr ol Hawaiian 8ascd Patrol Ving Two and liaison with thc commandant ol thc 14th Naval istrict, tcsticd: ! was surpriscd to nd that thcrc in thc Hawaiian !slands, an important naval advancc outpost, wc wcrc opcrating on a shocstring, and thc morc ! lookcd thc thinncr thc shocstring appcarcd to bc. Morcovcr, according to a lcttcr lrom NC Stark, it appcarcd that thcrc was no intcntion to rcplacc thc prcscnt obsolcsccnt typc ol patrol plancs in Patrol Ving Two prior to onc ycar, and that Patrol Ving Two would practically bc thc last wing to bc lur nishcd ncw plancs. Tis, togcthcr with thc many cxisting dccicncics, lcd 8cllingcr to concludc that thc Navy cpartmcnt as a wholc did not vicw thc situation in thc Pacic with alarm, or clsc is not taking stcps in kccping with thcir vicws. 48 Tcrc wcrc by no mcans cnough 46 !bid., pp. 461, 47374. 47 !bid., Lockard and lliott tcstimony, pp. 47596. 48 !bid., p. 501, 8cllingcr tcstimony rclcrring to Stark scrial lcttcr 95323. 506 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy mcn and cquipmcnt to carry out thc kind ol continual longrangc survcillancc that would havc bccn rcquircd to guard against a sur prisc attack. N~v~i Couv: ov !xguivv G~ixs Accvss :o J~v~xvsv !x:vvcvv:s Finally on August 28, thc 20th day ol thc inquiry, Kimmcls corts to havc thc Japancsc intcrccpts introduccd borc lruit. 8icscmcicr introduccd 40 or 50 itcms sclcctcd lrom among thc sccrct Japancsc Purplc intcrccpts known as MAG!C rcccivcd lrom Novcmbcr 26 to cccmbcr 7, 1941. 49 Tc intcrccpts wcrc not actually cntcrcd into thc tcxt ol thc hcarings, but would bc availablc to thc court lor rclcrcncc. Tcy wcrc cxtractcd lrom thc rccord and dcpositcd with thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy . . . in thc intcrcst ol national sccurity and thc succcsslul prosccution ol thc war. 50
Stark objcctcd strcnuously: Should thc sccrct classication ol thc procccdings ol this court bc rcmovcd, or should a copy ol thosc procccdings or inlor mation gaincd thcrclrom comc into thc posscssion ol pcrsons unlricndly to this country whilc thc prcscnt war with Japan is still in progrcss, thcsc ccrtain qucstions . . . might suggcst cnough to thc cncmy to bc dcnitcly injurious to our prcscnt and continuing war cort. . . . |!|n duc timc, hc said, procccdings ol this court and all ol thc cvidcncc it might havc sccurcd will bc a mattcr ol opcn rccord availablc to thc public. Tcrclorc, as a rcsponsiblc naval o ccr and as a lormcr Chicl ol Naval pcrations with knowlcdgc ol many ol thc intcl ligcncc activitics ol my subordinatcs, Stark urgcd that 49 !bid., part 33, pp. 735, 76769. 50 !bid., part 32, p. 521. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 507 that part ol thc rccord which would in any way idcntily matc rial now hcld so sccrct that it has bccn dcnicd this court bc takcn out ol thc rccord and placcd in a top sccrct status which will absolutcly prccludc any lcak and rclcrcncc thcrcto. Judgc Advocatc 8icscmcicr concurrcd. As a rcsult, substantial blocks ol NC! tcstimony rclcrring to sccrct intclligcncc wcrc dclctcd lrom thc rccord and lcd in a sccurc placc with duc rclcrcncc to thcm so that thcy may bc sccn by propcr authoritics on dcmand. 51 Schuirmann was callcd back again to tcstily. Now that thc MAG!C intcrccpts had bccn introduccd, hc was somcwhat morc, although not much morc, rcsponsivc. 52 Hc did not rcmcmbcr somc documcnts. His rccollcction ol thc mcssagc sctting up thc Vinds Codc was quitc hazy or cxtrcmcly hazy. 53 Vhcn askcd about thc cccmbcr 6 13part Japancsc rcply to our Novcmbcr 26 pro posal, hc asscrtcd without hcsitation that hc was not acquaintcd with thc contcnts on thc 6th ol cccmbcr, 1941. 54 Schuirmann did admit discussing somc ol thc Novcmbcr 26 to cccmbcr 7 mcssagcs with Admiral Stark. Schuirmann: Ycs, sir. ! did discuss thc situation but whcn it camc down to pointing out ccrtain mcssagcs, you ask il ! madc a particular point ol discussing that particular mcssagc with thc Admiral and ! just dont rcmcmbcr. 55
Tcrc was a gcncral lccling, Schuirmann said, 51 !bid., pp. 24950. Vhcn thc hcarings wcrc publishcd altcr thc war, thcsc spccial scctions wcrc printcd out ol contcxt in a latcr part ol thc hcarings, lorcing thc rcadcr to shu c pagcs continually back and lorth to lollow a witncsss tcstimony. 52 !bid., p. 159. 53 !bid., part 33, pp. 738, 755. 54 !bid., p. 749. 55 !bid., p. 758. 508 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy that cvcrybody rccognizcd that thcrc was a vcry tcnsc situa tion, that diplomatic rclations wcrc in dangcr ol bcing scvcrcd, but that a scvcrancc ol diplomatic rclations did not ncccssarily mcan that war was going to rcsult. Hc could not spcak lor othcrs, but my own opinion . . . was that Japan would go hcr own way in ast Asia and would put up to thc Unitcd Statcs thc onus ol using lorcc to opposc hcr. 56 C~v:~ix S~vvovb Rvi~:vs M~xv V~vxixcs Cox:~ixvb ix J~v~xvsv !x:vvcvv:s At thc timc ol thc attack, Captain L.F. Saord had bccn in chargc ol thc sccurity scction ol Naval Communications, which was conccrncd with sccurity propcr, that is, codcs and ciphcrs, and survcillancc ovcr thcir usc . . . also . . . Communications !ntclligcncc |C.!.|. Tc namc was uscd in pcacctimc, Saord cxplaincd, purcly to mask thc major mission ol thc scction . . . col- lecting information from enemy or prospective enemy nations through their communications (italics addcd). Most ol thc scctions cort at that timc had bccn conccntratcd on Japan. Saord had bccn in chargc ol thc intcrccpt stations, dircction ndcr cxchangcs, and dccrypting units. 57
Saords tcstimony was lorthright and lactual. Hc idcnticd thc sclcctcd Japancsc intcrccpts that had bccn madc availablc to thc NC!. Askcd what inlormation, il any, had bccn rcccivcd in thc C.!. Unit in Vashington prior to thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6th that indicatcd a brcak in rclations bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Japan, 58 Saord discusscd scvcral intcrccpts othcr than thosc availablc to thc NC!, with which hc was lamiliar bccausc ol his dutics in communications intclligcncc. Hc pointcd out that on 56 !bid., pp. 75970. 57 !bid., p. 769. 58 !bid., p. 775. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 509 Novcmbcr 5 thc Japancsc sct a Novcmbcr 25 dcadlinc lor thc signing ol thc agrccmcnt thc Unitcd Statcs and Japancsc ambas sadors wcrc working on. 59 n Novcmbcr 14 thc Japancsc adviscd thcir Vashington ambassador, Should ncgotiations collapsc . . . wc will complctcly dcstroy 8ritish and Amcrican powcr in China. 60
n Novcmbcr 16, Tokyo wircd that Tc latc ol our cmpirc hangs by thc slcndcr thrcad ol a lcw days. 61 n Novcmbcr 22 Tokyo postponcd thc dcadlinc to Novcmbcr 29, advising Nomura, Tcrc arc rcasons bcyond your ability to gucss why wc wantcd to scttlc JapancscAmcrican rclations by thc 25th, but il within thc ncxt thrcc or lour days you can nish your convcrsations with thc Amcricans, il thc signing can bc complctcd by thc 29th . . . and in short il cvcrything can bc nishcd, wc havc dccidcd to wait until that datc. 62 Saord tcsticd about othcr Japancsc intcrccpts that gavc still lurthcr indications ol impcnding war. n cccmbcr 1 wc translatcd and rcad a Novcmbcr 30 dispatch lrom Tokyo to thc Japancsc ambassador in 8crlin advising him: Tc convcrsations . . . bctwccn Tokyo and Vashington . . . now stand rupturcd. . . . |T|hcrc is cxtrcmc dangcr that war may suddcnly brcak out bctwccn thc AngloSaxon nations and Japan through somc clash ol arms, and . . . this war may comc quickcr than anyonc drcams. 63
59 !bid, part 12, p. 100 ( Japancsc intcrccpt #736, Novcmbcr 5), also part 33, p. 1365. 60 !bid., part 33, p. 776 ( Japancsc Circular 2319), also part 12, pp. 12627. 61 !bid., part 33, p. 775, 1366, also part 12, pp. 13738. 62 !bid., part 33, p. 1366 ( Japancsc intcrccpt #812), also part 12, p. 165. 63 !bid., part 33, p. 776 ( Japancsc intcrccpt #985), also part 12, p. 204. 510 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Also on cccmbcr 1, wc rcad a long intcrccptcd mcssagc lrom thc Japancsc ambassador in 8crlin to Tokyo rcporting that Gcrman Forcign Ministcr Ribbcntrop had said, Should Japan bccomc cngagcd in a war against thc Unitcd Statcs, Gcrmany, ol coursc, would join thc war immcdiatcly. 64 Tokyo also adviscd its Vashington ambassadors on cccmbcr 1 that London, Hong Kong, Singaporc, and Manila had bccn instructcd to abandon thc usc ol codc machincs and to disposc ol thcm. 65 Tokyo adviscd Hsinking (Changchun, Manchuria) on cccmbcr 1, in vicw ol various circumstanccs it is our policy to causc Manchuria to participatc in thc war in which cvcnt Manchuria will takc thc samc stcps toward ngland and Amcrica that this country will takc in casc war brcaks out. 66 n cccmbcr 2, wc translatcd and rcad a Novcmbcr 28 dis patch to Tokyo lrom Hsinking: |!|n thc cvcnt that war brcaks out with ngland and thc Unitcd Statcs . . . |p|crsons to bc intcrncd: a. 8ritish nationals339. b Amcrican citizcns81 . . . d. Nationals ol thc Sovict or othcr third powcrs obscrvcd to bc obnoxious charactcrs with pro 8ritish and Amcrican lcanings arc to bc suitably takcn carc ol. 67 Vc had intcrccptcd scvcral mcssagcs to and lrom Tokyo and thc Japancsc consul in Honolulu conccrning survcillancc ol thc ships at Pcarl Harbor. n cccmbcr 3 wc rcad a Tokyo mcssagc 64 !bid., part 33, p. 776 (8crlin to Tokyo #1393, Novcmbcr 29, 1941), also part 12, pp. 20002. 65 !bid., part 33, p. 77677 ( Japancsc circular #2444, cccmbcr 1, 1941), also part 12, p. 209. 66 !bid., part 33, pp. 75556 ( Japancsc intcrccpt #893), also part 12, pp. 0910). 67 !bid., part 33, p. 776 ( Japancsc intcrccpt #781), also part 12, p. 198. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 511 to Honolulu datcd Novcmbcr 15, asking thcm to makc your ships in harbor rcport irrcgular, but at a ratc ol twicc a wcck. 68 n cccmbcr 4, wc lcarncd that on Novcmbcr 20, Tokyo had told thc consul gcncral in Honolulu to invcstigatc comprchcnsivcly thc cct _______|sic| bascs in thc ncighborhood ol thc Hawaiian military rcscrvation. 69 Saord tcsticd: n cccmbcr 5 wc lcarncd that Tokyo had instructcd |thc consul| in Honolulu on Novcmbcr 29: !n thc luturc, rcport cvcn whcn thcrc arc no ship movcmcnts. 70
uring thc Hart inquiry, Saord had tcsticd about thc Vinds Codc, but thc Japancsc intcrccpts had not thcn bccn availablc. Saord brought thc subjcct up again. Tc Japancsc mcssagc sctting up thc Vinds Codc had bccn scnt lrom Tokyo, Saord said, on Novcmbcr 19. 71 !t providcd lor inscrting lalsc wcathcr rcports, cach containing a sccrct mcaning, in thc mid dlc and at thc cnd ol daily Japancsc languagc shortwavc ncws broadcasts, pcrmitting thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt to rcach hcr rcprcscntativcs around thc world in thc cvcnt it could no longcr communicatc in normal codc. 72 Saord tcsticd that his rst indi cation thc codc sctup had bccn implcmcntcd and that a Vinds Codcs xccutc had actually bccn pickcd up camc on cccmbcr 4, around 8:00 ~.:. Hc had not sccn a copy ol thc translation sincc about thc 15th ol cccmbcr, 1941, but to thc bcst ol his rccol lcction, thc translation had said, Var with Amcrica, war with ngland, and pcacc with Russia. 73 Tis Vinds Codc xccutc, thc Navy cpartmcnt communications intclligcncc unit had thcn 68 !bid., part 33, p. 777 ( Japancsc intcrccpt #111), also part 12, p. 262. 69 !bid., part 12, p. 263 ( Japancsc intcrccpt #111). 70 !bid., part 33, pp. 777, 1379 ( Japancsc intcrccpt #122), also part 12, p. 263. 71 !bid., part 33, pp. 738, 1368 ( Japancsc circular #2353), also part 12, p. 154. 72 !bid., part 33, pp. 77075, Saord tcstimony. 73 !bid. 512 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy rcgardcd . . . as dcnitcly committing thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt to war with thc Unitcd Statcs and 8ritain. 74
Saord was askcd: Captain, in a prcvious answcr you statcd that thc copy ol thc intcrccpt using thc winds codc which you saw on thc morning ol 4 cccmbcr 1941 indicatcd a brcak in diplomatic rclations bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Japan and Japan and Grcat 8ritain, and war bctwccn thcsc nations. Vas thcrc anything in thc cstablishmcnt ol thc codc originally which would indi catc . . . war as contrastcd with a mcrc brcak in diplomatic rclations: Saord said, Tc utch translation said war. Tc Japancsc languagc is vcry vaguc and you can put a numbcr ol constructions or intcrprcta tions or translations on thc samc mcssagc. !n vcry important documcnts it was customary lor thc Army and Navy to makc indcpcndcnt translations. . . . Tc gcncral lacts would bc alikc. Howcvcr, thc pcoplc in Communications !ntclligcncc and thc pcoplc in Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc and thc pcoplc in thc Far astcrn Scction ol Naval !ntclligcncc, as wcll as thc ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc, considcrcd that mcant war, that it was a signal ol cxccutc lor thc Japancsc war plans. 75
Saord continucd, |!|mmcdiatc distribution |ol thc Vinds Codc xccutc| was madc to thc rcgular pcoplc bclorc 9:00 ~.:., that morning. !t wcnt to thc dircctor ol naval intclligcncc (Vilkinson), thc dircctor ol war plans (Turncr), thc dircctor ol naval communications (Noycs), thc assistant chicl ol naval opcra tions (!ngcrsoll), and thc chicl ol naval opcrations (Stark). Copics wcrc also scnt to thc Statc cpartmcnt, thc Vhitc Housc, and thc 74 !bid., part 26, pp. 39094, cspccially p. 394, Saord tcstimony bclorc thc Hart !nquiry. 75 !bid., part 33, pp. 77273. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 513 Var cpartmcnt. And, Saord said, this mcssagc was includcd in thc routinc distribution, which was madc around noon cach day. 76 Saords doggcd scarch lor thc prcattack intcrccpts locatcd most ol thcm, including thc Novcmbcr 19 Vinds Codc sctup mcssagc. 77 Howcvcr, in spitc ol rcpcatcd scarchcs sincc mid Novcmbcr 1943, hc said hc could nd no tracc ol its implc mcntation. 78 Tus doubt was cast on whcthcr thc Japancsc had cvcr actually uscd a Vinds Codc xccutc to communicatc with thcir ovcrscas o cials. A grcat many mcssagcs and othcr matcrial wcrc misplaccd during lrcqucnt movcs conscqucnt to thc growth ol thc Naval !ntclligcncc organization, Saord said, although hc thought all thc Japancsc mcssagcs intcrccptcd had bccn locatcd or accountcd lor except this Winds Code Execute. vcn thc Armys Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc had lailcd to locatc a singlc copy. |T|his Vinds Mcssagc, Saord said, is vcry con spicuous by its abscncc. 79 Hc continucd with his tcstimony about intcrccpts not givcn to thc court. n Novcmbcr 26, 1941, thc Unitcd Statcs had rcjcctcd thc Japancsc proposal lor a modus vivendi. Tcnsion and unccrtainty prcvailcd among top Vashington o cials, thc Statc cpartmcnt was on thc qui vive. n Novcmbcr 28, whcn our Statc cpartmcnt o cials rcad thc intcrccpt saying that Tokyo would rcply in two or thrcc days to what thcy callcd our humil iating proposal, thc cpartmcnt rcalizcd thc Japancsc govcrn mcnt was not going to agrcc to our tcrms. Japans ambassadors wcrc told by thcir govcrnmcnt that ncgotiations will bc dc lacto rupturcd but not to givc thc imprcssion that thc ncgotiations 76 !bid., p. 773. 77 !bid., pp. 738, 1368 ( Japancsc circular #2353), pp. 755, 1367 ( Japancsc circular #2354), also part 12, pp. 15455. 78 !bid., part 33, p. 772. 79 !bid., p. 782. 514 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy |wcrc| brokcn o. Mcrcly say to thcm |thc U.S. o cials| that you arc awaiting instructions. 80 Tus thosc privy to thc intcrccpts kncw that, in thc words Stanlcy K. Hornbcck, spccial assistant to Sccrctary ol Statc Hull, |T|hcrc would bc no lurthcr ncgotia tions bctwccn Japan and thc Unitcd Statcs. 81 Saord tcsticd that Tokyo scrial No. 901 |thc Pilot Mcssagc announcing thc impcnding arrival ol Tokyos #902, thc 14part rcply| in nglish to thc Amcrican notc ol Novcmbcr 26, 1941. 82 Saord continucd: n this wcckcnd |cccmbcr 67| wc handlcd about thrcc timcs thc normal mcssagcs lor a busy day. Tc most important was a vcry long, 14part mcssagc which containcd thc Japancsc dcclaration ol war. . . . Up to this timc, thc languagc implicd had bccn vcry courtcous. 8ccausc ol thc harsh and abusivc languagc uscd throughout this |thc Japancsc rcply|, thcrc was no doubt in thc minds ol thc mcn who wcrc on watch at thc timc that thc Japancsc mcant war and that this was thcir dcclaration. 83
Saord was askcd il hc kncw whcthcr any inlormation con ccrning thc mcssagcs which you havc outlincd was scnt to Kimmcl or 8loch in Hawaii. Saord: Tc only inlormation scnt him |sic|, was with rclcr cncc to thc Japancsc dcstroying thcir codc machincs. 84
Saord was thcn askcd spccically about thc mcssagc trans latcd and rcad in Vashington on cccmbcr 1, in which Tokyo noticd 8crlin that war may suddcnly brcak out bctwccn thc 80 !bid., part 12, p. 195, Japancsc intcrccpt #844. 81 !bid., part 33, p. 784. 82 !bid., p. 783. 83 !bid., p. 783. 84 !bid., p. 782. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 515 AngloSaxon nations and Japan. . . . |T|hc timc ol thc brcaking out ol this war may comc quickcr than anyonc drcams. Saord: Tat was not scnt . . . ncithcr to |Kimmcl| nor |Hart in Manila|. 85 Saord kncw ol onc attcmpt to disscminatc intcrccpt inlor mation to Kimmcl and 8loch. Commandcr McCollum, chicl ol thc Far astcrn scction ol naval intclligcncc, wrotc up a long mcssagc about 4 or 5 or 6 pagcs long, approximatcly 500 words, giving a complctc and bricl and vcry lorcclul summary ol dcvcl opmcnts up to that timc, up to 4 cccmbcr, 1941. n thc altcr noon ol cccmbcr 4, Saord had bccn in thc o cc ol Admiral Lcigh Noycs, dircctor ol naval communications, whcn Captain Tcodorc S. Vilkinson, dircctor ol thc o cc ol naval intclligcncc, camc in with McCollums mcssagc lor Kimmcl and gavc it to Noycs to rcad. As Noycs nishcd a pagc, hc handcd it to Saord to rcad. According to his tcstimony, !t was a vcry complctc summary ol what had happcncd. !t bcgan with thc withdrawal ol Japancsc mcrchant ships lrom thc Atlantic and !ndian ccans in July. !t mcntioncd thc cvacuation ol Japancsc Nationals lrom Malaya and thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics. !t includcd thc lact that diplomatic rclations wcrc at an impassc, that ncithcr party would yicld, and it had a dircct rclcrcncc to thc winds mcssagc . . . and said that wc considcrcd that this was . . . thc signal ol cxccutc ol thc Japancsc war plans, that wc cxpcctcd that war was immincnt. According to Saord, McCollum had donc a vcry thorough job. Vhcn Noycs nishcd rcading, Vilkinson askcd what hc thought ol it. Noycs rcspondcd, ! think its an insult to thc intclligcncc ol thc CommandcrinChicl. 85 !bid., p. 782. For Tokyo8crlin mcssagc, scc part 12, pp. 20405. 516 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy According to Saords tcstimony, Vilkinson disagrccd, saying Admiral Kimmcl is a vcry busy man and may not scc thc picturc as clcarly as you and ! do. ! think it only lair to thc CommandcrinChicl that hc bc givcn this inlormation and ! am going to scnd it il ! can gct it rclcascd by thc lront o cc. Vilkinson thcn lclt, Saord prcsumcd, to scc Admiral Royal . !ngcrsoll, assistant CN, and to havc thc mcssagc rclcascd. Until Novcmbcr 1943, Saord had assumcd that it had bccn scnt. 8ut it hadnt! 86 CN Ab:iv~i S:~vxs Mv:ovv is Poov Admiral Stark was thcn callcd back to thc witncss stand and askcd about spccic mcssagcs. His Novcmbcr 24 mcssagc to thc cld commandcrs may wcll havc bccn bascd upon or ccr tainly had takcn into considcration thc Japancsc intcrccpts. !t had warncd that a lavorablc outcomc ol ncgotiations with Japan vcry doubtlul. . . . |A| surprisc aggrcssivc movcmcnt in any dircc tion including attack on Philippincs or Guam is a possibility. 87
Morcovcr, thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning mcssagc announccd, Ncgotiations with Japan . . . havc ccascd and an aggrcssivc movc by Japan is cxpcctcd within thc ncxt lcw days . . . against cithcr thc Philippincs Tai or Kra pcninsula or possibly 8ornco. 88
!n his mcssagcs to thc cld commandcrs Stark had not mcn tioncd any ol thc Japancscannounccd dcadlincs in his dispatchcs, hc had bccomc lccry ol datcs. !l ! had sct a datc ol thc 25th, lor cxamplc, hc said, 86 !bid., part 33, pp. 77475. 87 !bid., p. 788, scc CN ispatch 242005, part 14, p. 1405. 88 !bid., part 33, p. 789, scc CN ispatch 272337, part 14, p. 1406. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 517 and nothing happcncd on thc 25th, it would havc, in my opin ion, bccn bad ball. Again, il ! had scnt a datc ol thc 29th . . . and nothing had happcncd, again it would probably havc wcakcncd thc dispatch which wc did scnd, and which, in my opinion, covcrcd thc situation. Judging by what is now pcrhaps hind sight, ! am glad that ! did not includc thc datcs. 89
Starks mcmory appcarcd poor. Hc did not rccall sccing thc documcnt mcntioning thc Vinds Codc. According to him, thc sctup intcrccpt, translatcd Novcmbcr 28, addcd nothing to what ! had alrcady scnt in thc |war warning| dispatch ol thc 27th. 90
Hc did not rccall thc Japancsc ambassadors twopart dispatch ol Novcmbcr 26, summarizing lor thcir govcrnmcnts bcnct thc U.S. proposal ol that day. 91 Nor did Stark rcmcmbcr sccingin thc lorm in which it was prcscntcd to thc NC!thc Tokyo mcs sagc ol cccmbcr 1 rcporting that thc situation continucs to bc incrcasingly critical but that to prcvcnt thc Unitcd Statcs lrom bccoming unduly suspicious wc |thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt| havc bccn advising thc prcss . . . thc ncgotiations arc continu ing. !t may vcry wcll havc bccn discusscd at that timc. 8ut in any cvcnt, hc said, it addcd nothing . . . to what had bccn scnt out lormcrly. 92 Stark did not rcmcmbcr spccically thc Tokyo rcqucsts lor rcports rclativc to ships in Pcarl Harbor. Nor did hc rccall Tokyos rcqucst about ships by spccic arcas thcrc. Vhcn askcd il hc rcmcmbcrcd thc mcssagc translatcd cccmbcr 6, rcl ativc to thc movcmcnts ol Amcrican warships in Pcarl Harbor, thc courscs takcn and spccds maintaincd, hc answcrcd, No, ! do not. 89 !bid., part 33, pp. 78889. 90 !bid., p. 789. 91 !bid. 92 !bid., p. 791. 518 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Vas any inlormation conccrning |thc shipsinharbor mcs sagcs| scnt by you to thc CommandcrinChicl, Pacic Flcct: Stark: No ! think not. 93 And Stark did not rccall sccing thc Pilot Mcssagc intcrccpt. 94
Askcd il hc had sccn or bccn madc acquaintcd with thc contcnts ol Japans 14part rcply bclorc thc attack, Stark said hc had not sccn it and didnt havc thc slightcst rccollcction ol having sccn its contcnts. 95 Vhcn askcd latcr il hc kncw on cccmbcr 6 that 13 parts wcrc at thc Navy cpartmcnt, hc rcplicd, ! did not know it. 96 Many mcssagcs wcrc rcccivcd in Vashington during thc wccks bclorc thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. !t was physically impos siblc, Stark said, lor him to havc rcad, or cvcn to havc sccn, all thc intcrccpts. Hc cxplaincd thc Navy cpartmcnt proccdurc lor dclivcring classicd inlormation to him as CN: Somc ! saw dircctly. Somc camc to mc with cvaluations. Somctimcs somc camc to mc with a gcncral picturcsomc timcs orally, somctimcs on a writtcn mcmorandum. To takc a singlc dispatch with a spccic qucstion, wc may rcad into it now, in thc light ol hindsight, what wc couldnt scc thcn. Stark said, howcvcr, that hc was in complctc touchat lcast that ! assumcd ! was in complctc touchwith thc broad gcn cral trcnd. Vc wcrc unqucstionably continually talking things ovcr. And, hc said, hc always aimcd to kccp thc commandcrs in thc cld adviscd ol thcir conclusions, wc did not scnd thcm cvcry spccic documcnt. 97 Tc gcncral tcnor ol Starks rcmarks 93 !bid., pp. 79394. 94 !bid., p. 792. 95 !bid. 96 !bid., p. 801. 97 !bid., p. 791. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 519 throughout his tcstimony was that hc bclicvcd hc had convcycd to Kimmcl all thc inlormation hc nccdcd. Av:v Cnivv ov S:~vv Gvxvv~i M~vsn~iis Mv:ovv is Poov Gcncral Marshall appcarcd bclorc thc NC!. Sincc that trag cdy occurrcd, hc said, his wholc attcntion had bccn turncd to othcr things lrom that instant, and ! didnt scc a rccord or look at a thing until, as a mattcr ol lact, thc last day or two, trying to gct somcthing lor this board. Hc had considcrcd thc prcattack cvcnts simply watcr ovcr thc dam. 98 Marshall tcsticd at lcngth about thc problcms ol supply ing mcn and matcricl to thc outlying military postsHawaii, thc Philippincs, Panama, and thc Pacic !slandswhilc at thc samc timc supporting Grcat 8ritain in thc Atlantic and Alrica, and continuing thc training ol mcn hcrc at homc. 99 ||ur rcla tions with thc Japancsc appcarcd to dcgcncratc progrcssivcly throughout 1941, hc said. !n Fcbruary thc Army and Navy dcpartmcnts dccidcd to takc all thc womcn and childrcn out ol thc Philippincs. According to Marshall, in July and August thc situation bccamc conspicuously critical. Tat was thc timc ol thc cnlorccmcnt ol thc cconomic sanctions against Japan. Hc had thought lor somc timc that war was immincnt. Hc and Stark wcrc trying to do all in our powcr hcrc at homc, with thc Statc cpartmcnt or othcrwisc, to try to dclay this brcak to thc last momcnt, bccausc ol our statc ol unprcparcdncss and bccausc ol our involvcmcnt in othcr parts ol thc world. 100 98 !bid., part 32, p. 557. 99 !bid., pp. 55459. 100 !bid., p. 560. 520 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Marshall continucd: Tc inlormation that wc obtaincd lrom thc Japancsc actions in China, and particularly as thcy approachcd !ndoChina, as wcll as lrom our most sccrct sourccs, pointcd to an cvidcnt intcntion to movc into Tailand. . . . !t sccmcd to us that thcy wcrc dcnitcly going to takc somc action to cut thc 8urma Road, possibly closing thc port ol Rangoon. !t sccmcd cvidcnt to us that Malaysiathc MalayKra Pcninsulawas vcry dcl initcly thrcatcncd. !t was plainly cvidcnt to us that thcy wcrc accumulating supplics to go into !ndoChina, and apparcntly wcrc going into Tailand. Vc had no spccic indications . . . ol thcir intcntions rcgarding thc Philippincs othcr than thosc which automatically suggcstcd thcmsclvcs to us gcographically. . . . |V|c had rcports ol movcmcnts ol convoys down thc coast ol !ndoChina. Marshall rccallcd no indication ol any Japancsc plans in prcpara tion lor an assault on Hawaii. 101 Vith rcspcct to thc intcrccpts, Marshall did not rccall thc Tokyo mcssagc sctting Novcmbcr 29, 1941, as thc dcadlinc by which thc Japancsc ambassadors should complctc thcir ncgotia tions with thc Unitcd Statcs, although hc was rcasonably ccrtain that hc had sccn or bccn inlormcd about it. 102 Hc had a vcry dim rccollcction ol thc Vinds Codc sctup intcrccpt, but didnt rccall any inlormation about any part ol thc Vinds Codc hav ing bccn put into ccct. 103
Marshall had no dcnitc rccollcction ol bcing on thc alcrt, cxpccting a Japancsc rcply to Hulls Novcmbcr 26 notc to thc Japancsc. 104 Askcd whcthcr, on Saturday, cccmbcr 6, hc had bccn acquaintcd with thc lact that Japan had scnt to hcr ambassadors 101 !bid., p. 561. 102 !bid., part 33, p. 820. 103 !bid., pp. 82122. 104 !bid., p. 821. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 521 13 ol 14 parts ol a mcssagc or notc to bc dclivcrcd or transmittcd at somc latcr datc to our Sccrctary ol Statc: hc rcplicd: ! do not rccall that ! was awarc ol such inlormation. Vas his lailurc to rcccivc this inlormation Saturday duc to somc lailurc in thc cchclons ol command in transmitting thc inlormation to |him|: Marshall: ! couldnt say ohand. !t would dcpcnd on whcrc ! was which ! do not rccall on that particular Saturday. ! might havc bccn quitc a numbcr ol placcs. ! dont know now whcrc ! actually was. . . . Q: And you havc no rccollcction ol whcrc you wcrc on Saturday night: Marshall: No, ! havcnt. 105
Marshall statcd atly that until Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, hc had rcccivcd nonc ol thc 14part Japancsc rcply. 106 Marshall was willing to talk about Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7. Hc had bccn horscback riding and had comc in to thc Var cpartmcnt immcdiatcly altcr thc ridc. Tcrc hc had lound thc long rcply lrom thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt. Tis was a most unusual mcssagc, hc said. 107 Hc rcad it through, natu rally carclully, and somc parts ol it scvcral timcs to gct thc lull signicancc ol it. As ! nishcd it ! lound anothcr pagc which was thc mcssagc rclcrring to 1:00 v.:. as thc spccicd dclivcry timc. 108 Marshall thcn told about thc lastminutc mcssagc hc had draltcd, which hc and Stark scnt to thc cld commandcrs, advis ing thcm that thc Japancsc had bccn instructcd to dclivcr thcir 105 !bid., pp. 82526. 106 !bid., p. 823. 107 !bid., pp. 82627. 108 !bid., p. 822. 522 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy rcply to Hull that day at prcciscly 1:00 v.:., Vashington timc. 109
Tis mcssagc, codcd and scnt as a radiogram, lclt Vashington about noon on cccmbcr 7. !t apparcntly wcnt through without dclay to thc Philippincs, Panama, San Francisco. 8ut lor somc rcason, possibly unusual air turbulcncc, Hawaii couldnt bc raiscd by radio. So thc dispatch to Hawaii was dclaycd. !t was scnt lrom San Francisco via Vcstcrn Union. 110
Altcr 24 days ol hcarings, thc NC! translcrrcd its opcrations to Hawaii. Kimmcls prcattack dccisions and actions wcrc gcn crally dclcndcd by his lcllow o ccrs. !t was rccognizcd, how cvcr, that bccausc ol thc shortagcs ol mcn and matcricl thcrc was incvitably a nccd lor compromiscs bctwccn prcparing lor war and conducting survcillancc. N~vv Couvivv Co::~xbvv Kv~:vvs Mv:ovv Sn~vv ~xb Civ~v 8y lar thc most signicant tcstimony takcn by thc NC! at Pcarl Harbor was that ol Commandcr A.. Kramcr. Kramcr, a Japancsclanguagc scholar, had bccn stationcd in Vashington at thc timc ol thc attack. Hc had bccn attachcd to thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc, Navy cpartmcnt, Vashington, on loan to P20G, cc ol Naval Communications. Hc bccamc hcad ol thc translation scction ol thc communications sccurity group and was rcsponsiblc lor translating all dccryptcd tra c obtaincd lrom intcrccpts. Kramcrs translation scction had a sta ol civil ian civilscrvicc translators. Hc normally lookcd ovcr thc impor tant mcssagcs and cditcd thc translations bclorc thcy wcrc typcd up, hc translatcd only an occasional mcssagc himscll. As a Navy couricr also, Kramcr had dclivcrcd many ol thc crucial dccryptcd 109 !bid. For tcxt ol Marshall/Stark mcssagc, scc ibid., p. 1282. 110 !bid., p. 823. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 523 and translatcd intcrccpts to Navy o cials and othcrs authorizcd to scc thcm. 111
Soon altcr Kimmcls counscls, Lavcndcr and Hanily, arrivcd in Pcarl Harbor, thcy cncountcrcd Kramcr in thc corridor as hc was gctting o an clcvator. Kramcr had only just arrivcd lrom duty in thc southwcst Pacic. Tc two lawycrs introduccd thcm sclvcs and said: Tcrc is probably onc qucstion, Commandcr Kramcr, that you will bc askcd. o you rccall thc Vinds Codc: Hc said hc did. Tcn, o you rccall whcthcr or not thcrc was cvcr an xccutc ol thc Vinds Mcssagc: Kramcrs answcr was immcdiatc: Ycs. Higashi No Kazeame. ast Vind Rain. Right likc that, Hanily rcportcd latcr. Vithout any hcsita tion. Hcrc was a man, just in lrom thc Pacic, and hc was that dcnitivc about that lormulation. 112 Vhcn Kramcr tcsticd bclorc thc NC!, hc was just as opcn and lorthright in his tcstimony bclorc thc court as hc had bccn in rcsponding to Hanily and Lavcndcrs inlormal qucstions. Hc dcscribcd thc proccdurc lor proccssing and dclivcring thc largc volumc ol Japancsc intcrccpts pickcd up in thc wccks prcccd ing thc attack. Hc discusscd spccic dispatchcsthc Japancsc instructions to thcir ovcrscas diplomatic o ccs to dcstroy thcir codcs, thc shipsinharbor mcssagcs, thc Vinds Codc xccutc, and thc cccmbcr 67 dclivcry ol thc Japancsc rcply to thc Unitcd Statcs Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum. 113 Tc grcatcst pcrccntagc ol thc tra c in thc lall ol 41, Kramcr said, had to do with two main typcs ol matcrial: nc was thc JapancscU.S. ncgotiations, and thc othcr was thc circuit 111 !bid., pp. 848, 849. 112 John Toland intcrvicw ol Hanily, August 29, 1979, on lc with Toland papcrs, Franklin clano Rooscvclt Library, Hydc Park, N.Y. 113 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, pp. 84776. 524 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy lrom 8crlin to Tokyo. Tcsc two catcgorics ol tra c wcrc bcing lollowcd with considcrablc intcrcst and dctail by all thc scnior addrcssccs. . . . Tcy thcrclorc wantcd to scc thosc things as promptly as possiblc. Tc skill ol thc U.S. cryptographcrs was such that, in spitc ol thc daily adjustmcnts madc by thc Japancsc to thcir Purplc codc machinc, thc U.S. cryptographcrs wcrc oltcn ablc to dccrypt a Japancsc intcrccpt and havc it translatcd an hour or two bclorc thc Japancsc ambassador was to mcct Sccrctary ol Statc Hull to discuss it. 114 To spccd up thc dclivcry ol this matcrial to Hull and our othcr top o cials, Kramcr said hc didnt takc timc to writc summarics during thc nal wccks, as hc had donc carlicr, but would only indicatc subjcct mattcr by attaching clips to thc mcssagcs in thc loldcrs . . . ol most immcdi atc intcrcst. 115 Although thc intclligcncc glcancd lrom thc intcrccpts was ncccssarily incomplctc, Kramcr notcd many clucs to Japans intcntions. Tc Japancsc wcrc ncgotiating lor Tailand to cntcr thc conict on thcir sidc, on Novcmbcr 30, thcy rcportcd to thcir Gcrman allics on thc status ol thcir ncgotiations with thc Unitcd Statcs, thcy askcd thcir spccially traincd cspionagc man in thc Unitcd Statcs, Tcrasaki, mistakcnly callcd Takahashi by Kramcr, to lcavc thc country. n cccmbcr 6 Japancsc ships had bccn sightcd moving down thc coast ol Frcnch !ndochina and rounding its southcrn tip approximatcly a days run lrom Kota 8haru, 116 north ol Singaporc on thc Malayan pcninsula ncar thc bordcr ol Tailand, and thc Japancsc wcrc vcry conccrncd about what action wc wcrc taking, whcrc our Flcct might bc, what action wc might takc in casc thc Japs did makc a movc against thc 8ritish. 117 Kramcr tcsticd that thc Japancsc had wircd thcir ambassador in 8crlin 114 !bid., pp. 85152. 115 !bid., p. 852. 116 !bid., pp. 85960. 117 !bid., p. 867. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 525 thcrc is cxtrcmc dangcr that war may suddcnly brcak out bctwccn thc AngloSaxon nations and Japan through somc clash ol arms and . . . thc timc ol thc brcaking out ol this war may comc quickcr than anyonc drcams. 118 Kramcr said hc prcparcd a spccial paraphrascd vcrsion ol that lor Mr. Rooscvclt which hc rctaincd, othcrwisc, ncithcr thc Statc cpartmcnt nor thc Vhitc Housc wcrc cvcr pcrmittcd . . . to rctain any ol thcsc dispatchcs. 119 Kramcr rcmcmbcrcd thc Vinds Codc sctup clcarly. n rcccipt ol this particular mcssagc, on thc instructions ol thc ircctor ol Naval Communications, Admiral Noycs, Kramcr prcparcd somc cards with thc cxprcssions containcd in this cxhibit, and thc mcaning: 120 H!GASH! N KAZAM (ast wind rain, JapanUnitcd Statcs rclations in dangcr), K!TANKAZ KUMR! ( JapanU.S.S.R. rclations in dan gcr), N!SH! N KAZ HAR (Vcst wind clcar, Japan8ritish rclations in dangcr). 121 Noycs indicatcd that hc intcndcd to lcavc thcsc cards with ccrtain scnior o ccrs ol thc Navy cpartmcnt. According to Kramcr, Noycs arrangcd with Captain Saord, thc hcad ol p20G, thc scction ol Communications that handlcd this matcrial, to havc any mcssagc in this phrascology handlcd promptly by watch o ccrs, not only in P20G but through thc rcgular watch o ccrs ol thc Communications scction ol thc Navy cpartmcnt. 122 |A|ll that p20G organization wcrc vcry much on thc qui vive looking lor that . . . warning, Kramcr 118 !bid., p. 869. Scc also part 12, p. 204 ( Japancsc intcrccpt #985). 119 !bid., part 33, p. 873. 120 !bid., p. 853. 121 !bid., p. 738, (TokyoVashington Circular #2353). Scc also part 12, p. 154. 122 !bid., part 33, p. 853. 526 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy tcsticd. 123 Kramcr also rcmcmbcrcd thc Vinds Codc xccutc. Hc said hc was shown such a mcssagc by thc GY watch o ccr, rccognizcd it as bcing ol this naturc, walkcd with him to Captain Saords o cc. 124
Vhcn this Vinds Codc xccutc camc through on cccmbcr 3 or 4, Captain Saord took thc ball. Kramcr did not handlc its distribution himscll bccausc ol thc lact that this was a plain languagc mcssagc, and bccausc ol thc lact that spccial arrangcmcnts had bccn madc to handlc it. 125 Kramcr bclicvcd Saord took thc mcssagc dircctly to Admiral Noycs o cc, hc kncw that Admiral Noycs was highly intcrcstcd in that par ticular plain languagc codc bccausc ol his prcvious instructions to mc |Kramcr| to makc out thcsc cards so that hc could lcavc it with ccrtain high o ccrs and thc Sccrctary, all with thc vicw ol gctting thc word to thosc pcoplc promptly, whcthcr it was any timc ol thc day or night. 126
Kramcr rccallcd thc Japancsc languagc words, H!GASH! N KAZAM. Tcir litcral mcaning, hc said, is ast Vind, Rain. Tat is plain Japancsc languagc. Tc scnsc ol that, howcvcr, mcant straincd rclations or a brcak in rclations, possibly cvcn implying war with a nation to thc castward, thc Unitcd Statcs. 127
!t could bc inlcrrcd to imply as including an actual rupturc ol rclations, or possibly cvcn war. 128 Kramcr continucd: |V|c kncw thcy wcrc planning somcthing against 8ritain. . . . Vc kncw, too, that thc Japs wcrc vcry much awarc ol thc lact wc 123 !bid., p. 871. 124 !bid., p. 853. 125 !bid., p. 853. 126 !bid., p. 871. 127 !bid., p. 853. 128 !bid., p. 867. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 527 wcrc doing a grcat dcal lor thc 8ritish in thcir war and working closcly with thcm. !n lact, it was almost a joint lront as rcgards ncgotiations with thc Japs. Tat notc that wc had handcd thc Japancsc on 26 Novcmbcr had only bccn givcn to thcm altcr consultation, with Japancsc knowlcdgc, with thc utch and Chincsc as wcll as thc 8ritish. Conscqucntly . . . thc Japs wcrc vcry conccrncd about what action wc wcrc taking, whcrc our Flcct might bc, what action wc might takc in casc thc Japs did makc a movc against thc 8ritish. 129 Kramcr tcsticd about rclaying inlormation to Stark and occasionally cvcn discussing it with him. Tc majority ol timcs, Kramcr said, thc loldcr |ol Japancsc intcrccpts| was lclt with his aidc. Just how much Stark rcad, Kramcr didnt know, but Kramcr said hc madc a point ol pointing out to his aidc, his ag sccrctary, which wcrc thc things ol most immcdiatc importancc or intcrcst to thc Admiral. ccasionally ! would indicatc that thc Admiral should scc thcm at oncc, or as soon as possiblc. At othcr timcs whcn a particular hot itcm . . . camc in, ! would rcqucst pcr mission to scc thc Admiral dircctly and would takc it in. Tat happcncd quitc lrcqucntly during thc lall ol 41. 8y lrcqucntly, Kramcr mcant, two or thrcc or lour timcs a wcck. 130
Vhcn askcd whcthcr Stark had sccn onc ol thc intcrccptcd TokyoHonolulu shipsinharbor mcssagcs, Kramcr couldnt bc positivc whcthcr thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations actually saw it, but . . . it would havc bccn in a loldcr that was lclt in his o cc. 131
129 !bid., p. 867. 130 !bid., p. 852. 131 !bid., p. 856. 528 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Had Stark rcccivcd thc Novcmbcr 28 intcrccpt stating that, with thc Japancsc govcrnmcnts rcply in two or thrcc days to thc Statc cpartmcnts notc ol Novcmbcr 26, 132 thc ncgotiations will bc dc lacto rupturcd: Tis mcssagc was dclivcrcd, Kramcr said, as all thc ncgotiation mcssagcs wcrc dclivcrcd, to thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations. Kramcr was as ccrtain as hc could bc that all thcsc important mcssagcs wcrc dclivcrcd to thc cc ol thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations. 133
Among thc most important mcssagcs Kramcr handlcd was this Japancsc rcply to our Novcmbcr 26 134 humiliating, accord ing to thc Japancsc, proposal. n cccmbcr 6 wc intcrccptcd thc Pilot Mcssagc 135 announcing to thc Japancsc ambassadors that Tokyo would soon bc scnding thcir govcrnmcnts rcply to thc Unitcd Statcs Novcmbcr 26 proposal. Tis rcply would bc in nglish and would bc vcry long, lourtccn parts. 136 !n thc middlc ol thc altcrnoon, Kramcr bccamc awarc that this mcssagc was coming in. 137 |!|n guardcd languagc hc cxplaincd to Admiral Vilkinson thc naturc ol thc mcssagc. Tcn hc procccdcd to thc Vhitc Housc. From thcrc hc wcnt to Knoxs apartmcnt and Vilkinsons homc. Kramcr was unablc to rcach Stark that cvc ning, although hc bclicvcd Vilkinson was in touch with him or his aidcs. 138
132 !bid., part 33, pp. 870, 1370, also part 12, p. 195. Japancsc intcrccpt #844, Novcmbcr 28, 1941. 133 !bid., part 33, p. 870. 134 !bid., part 12, p. 195. Tokyo to Vashington, #844, Novcmbcr 29, 1941. 135 !bid., part 33, p. 1380. Also part 12, pp. 23839. Tokyo to Vashington #901 (Pilot Mcssagc). 136 !bid., part 14, pp. 23945. Tokyo to Vashington #902, 14 part mcssagc, cccmbcr 6/7, 1941. 137 !bid., part 33, p. 857. !t was in thc Japancsc codc so it had to bc dccryptcd, but |a|ll parts ol thc |14part| mcssagc wcrc in nglish, so that translation was not rcquircd (ibid., part 14, p. 1413). 138 !bid., part 33, p. 857. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 529 Tc ncxt morning at thc Navy cpartmcnt, Kramcr said hc lound thc nal part ol Japans rcply as wcll as onc or two othcr mcssagcs. 139 Hc put part 14 plus thc othcr 13 parts and othcr ncw mcssagcs in a loldcr that hc lclt in Starks o cc at about 9:00 ~.:. 140 Vhcn Kramcr rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt at approxi matcly 1020, a mcssagc dirccting |thc Japancsc ambassadors| in rathcr cmphatic languagc that dclivcry |ol thc Japancsc 14part rcply| bc madc to thc Sccrctary ol Statc at 1300 (1:00 v.:.) had bccn rcccivcd. Also rcccivcd was a scrics ol othcr mcssagcs, addrcsscd to thc Japancsc ambassadors. nc dircctcd nal dcstruction ol Japancsc codcs still on hand. . . . Tcrc was anothcr mcssagc thanking thc ambassador lor his scrviccs, anothcr addrcsscd to thc cmbassy sta, and onc or two othcrs ol likc naturc. Tat matcrial was dclivcrcd within tcn to ltccn minutcs to Admiral Starks o cc. 141 Kramcr dclivcrcd thc ncw intcrccpts to thc Statc cpartmcnt, whcrc Hull, Stimson, and Knox wcrc mccting. !n giving thcm to Hulls sccrctary, Kramcr cmphasizcd thc 1:00 v.:. dclivcry timc (7:30 ~.:. in Hawaii), lcaring that Knox, a civilian would miss its signicancc. 142
Ab:iv~i Tuvxvv (V~v Pi~xs) H~b Ax:iciv~:vb :nv A::~cx, Ab:iv~i Novvs (Co::uxic~:ioxs) guivoc~:vs Tc NC! stoppcd in San Francisco on thcir rcturn trip lrom Hawaii to Vashington, to qucstion ircctor ol Var Plans Admiral Richmond K. Turncr and ircctor ol Naval Communications 139 !bid. 140 !bid., pp. 85859. 141 !bid., p. 859. 142 !bid. 530 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Lcigh Noycs, both ol whom had bccn stationcd in Vashington bclorc thc attack. Turncr was askcd what hc kncw about Starks knowlcdgc ol thc Japancsc intcrccpts. Hc said hc had discusscd thc supcr sccrct dccryptcd mcssagcs with Stark lrcqucntly, although thcy hadnt talkcd about thc importancc ol transmitting thcir contcnts to Kimmcl. 143 As a mattcr ol lact, Turncr got thc imprcssion lrom what Stark said that Hawaii had lacilitics lor dccoding thcsc mcs sagcs and that thcy wcrc actually doing morc ol thc dccrypting in Pcarl Harbor than wc wcrc in Vashington. 144
According to Turncr, a Var Plan (Rainbow Trcc) was issucd in January 1941 that cnvisagcd a major attack, a major linc ol cort ol Japan against thc Philippincs and cithcr 8ornco or Malaya, ultimatcly both, dcpcnding on thc dircction ol thc strcngth that thcy had avail ablc. . . . |V|c considcrcd that any attack ol that naturc would almost surcly bc accompanicd by an attack on thc Hawaiian !slands and thc Flcct ol onc or morc lorms ol attackair, sub marinc, Flcct, or a combination ol any ol thosc. 145
Turncr tcsticd that hc had anticipatcd a JapancscUnitcd Statcs war cvcn bclorc thc Japancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor. Hc rcalizcd that 8ritish and Unitcd Statcs rclationships had bccomc vcry closc. Although hc kncw nothing about what assuranccs wcrc givcn by thc prcsidcnt to Grcat 8ritain . . . |hc| was convinccd thcn that il Japan attackcd 8ritain in thc Far ast that thc Unitcd Statcs would immcdi atcly cntcr thc war against Japan. Turncr bclicvcd 143 !bid., p. 886. 144 !bid., pp. 88182. 145 !bid., part 32, p. 605. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 531 a ccrtain scction ol thc Japancsc hicrarchy wcrc vcry anxious to kccp thc Unitcd Statcs out ol thc war, that is, kccp thc Unitcd Statcs lrom assisting Grcat 8ritain, but many ol thc movcs that had bccn madc against Japan during 1940 and 41 wcrc madc by thc Unitcd Statcs. 146
Vhcn thc Japancsc asscts in thc Unitcd Statcs wcrc lrozcn by cxccutivc ordcr in July 1941, Turncr said hc had cxprcsscd thc opinion prcviously, and ! again cxprcsscd it, that that would vcry dcnitcly bring on war with Japan. Tcrc was no possibility ol composing mattcrs altcr that unlcss Japan madc a complctc backdown, which it was vcry apparcnt shc was not going to do. 147 Turncr had hclpcd dralt thc Navys Novcmbcr 24 mcssagc warning thc cld commandcrs that a surprisc aggrcssivc movc mcnt |by thc Japancsc| in any dircction including attack on Philippincs or Guam is a possibility. 148 8y that timc, hc was pcrsonally convinccd that thcy wcrc going to go into Siam and also into thc Malay Pcninsula as thc initial movc and also attack thc Philippincs. 149
Turncr rccallcd discussing with Stark thc substancc ol thc U.S. notc, thc socallcd ultimatum ol Novcmbcr 26. According to Turncr, Stark said at thc timc that thcrc wasnt any possi bility that Japan would acccpt it. 150 Turncr said, Mr. Hull kcpt Admiral Stark vcry wcll inlormcd at all timcs. . . . Tcir rcla tions, Turncr tcsticd, wcrc vcry closc and cordial. So Starks Novcmbcr 27 war warning mcssagc to Kimmcl had bccn bascd, 146 !bid., p. 604. 147 !bid. 148 !bid., part 33, pp. 117374, CN Stark Novcmbcr 24, 1941 dispatch to cld commandcrs, #242005, also part 14, p. 1405. 149 !bid., part 33, p. 878. 150 !bid., pp. 87778. 532 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy on Hulls advicc ovcr thc intcro cc phonc . . . that to all intcnts and purposcs thc thing was all ovcr as lar as ncgotiations wcrc conccrncd. 151
Turncr wrotc thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning, discusscd it with Stark, and it wcnt out with Turncrs rccommcndation. Turncr was askcd: Vhy was it |that| thc Hawaiian !slands wcrc not includcd |in that mcssagc| as a possiblc objcctivc lor Japan: Turner: Tc objcctivcs which wcrc put in thcrc wcrc thc stra tcgic objcctivcs. Vc did not bclicvc that Japan would launch an amphibious attack against thc Hawaiian !slands. 152
Howcvcr, Turncr had lclt an attack was coming, and ! was not at all surpriscd at thc air attack. ! kncw our carricrs wcrc out, and with thc warnings which had bccn givcn, ! lclt wc would givc thcm a prctty bad bcating bclorc thcy got homc. . . . Vc had donc what wc could to takc prccautions against thc attack carrying through. Tc ordcr was issucd to dcploy thc Flcct in a dclcnsivc dcploymcnt. 153
According to Turncr, that ordcr mcant To scnd scouting lorccs out ol dicrcnt kinds, to dcploy sub marincs in thrcatcncd dircctions, to put thc Flcct to sca and in a covcring position lor thc Hawaiian !slands and a supporting position lor Midway. 154 151 !bid., p. 878. 152 !bid., part 32, p. 616. 153 !bid. !ncludcd in thc Novcmbcr 27, 1941 war warning mcssagc (#272337): ibid., part 33, p. 1176, also part 14, p. 1406, was thc dircctivc xccutc an appro priatc dclcnsivc dcploymcnt prcparatory to carrying out thc tasks assigncd in VPL46. 154 !bid., part 33, p. 879. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 533 Turncr said hc bclicvcd that thc cccmbcr 7, 1:00 v.:., dcliv cry timc indicatcd an attack by thc Japancsc against thc Unitcd Statcs or Grcat 8ritain. ||n ccrtainly thc Kra Pcninsula, Turncr said, a landing in Siam and attacks ol onc naturc or anothcr, air probably, on thc Philippincs, bccausc wc had scouting plancs out thcrc, and somc lorm ol attack in Hawaii. Turncr considcrcd that an air attack against thc Hawaiian !slands was onc ol thc possibilitics, cvcn a probability. Q. Vcrc you surpriscd on thc morning ol thc 7th whcn Japan madc an air attack on thc Hawaiian !slands: Turner: Not in thc lcast. 155 At thc timc ol thc attack, Admiral Noycs had bccn scrving in Vashington as dircctor ol naval communications. According to him, Tc handling ol communication intclligcncc was a joint aair bctwccn cc ol Naval Communications and thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc, thcn hcadcd by Vilkinson. Naval Communications was rcsponsiblc lor thc mcchanics ol crypto analysis, including intcrccption which could bc donc by naval mcans. As intclligcncc was dcvclopcd it was turncd ovcr to thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc to handlc according to thcir usual proccdurc. Howcvcr, Noycs pointcd out, thc intcrccpts wcrc not handlcd by thc usual proccdurc as thcy wcrc considcrcd most sccrcta much highcr dcgrcc ol sccrccy than thc ordi nary dcsignation, Sccrct, duc to thc lact that it is usclcss il any inkling rcachcs thc cncmy ol thc lact that wc arc ablc in any way to rcad his communications. 156 Noycs provcd a rcluctant witncss. Hc avoidcd issucs, or lim itcd his rcsponscs to thc obvious or irrclcvant. Vhcn askcd, 155 !bid., part 32, p. 616. 156 !bid., part 33, p. 889. 534 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Vcrc you acquaintcd with thc contcnts ol this |war warning| dispatch on or bclorc 7 cccmbcr 1941: hc rcplicd, Tcsc arc my initials on this dralt, thosc arc my initials. 157 Q. Vcrc you prcscnt at any conlcrcncc or discussion rcgarding this dispatch prior to its having bccn rclcascd: Noyes: Admiral Turncr showcd mc that dispatch bclorc hc took it in lor rclcasc. Tcsc arc his initials. (!ndicating.) Tcsc arc minc. (!ndicating.) !t was prcparcd by p12, which was Var Plans. 158 Noycs couldnt rcmcmbcr what had sparkcd thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning that Ncgotiations with Japan . . . havc ccascd. |!|t wasnt bascd on any inlormation that camc through mc. Vhatcvcr thc statcmcnt was, ! assumcd at thc timc it was cor rcct. ! hadnt any doubt it was corrcct. ! will bc glad to cxprcss an opinion. !t is purcly my rccollcctiona gcncral rccollcc tion, it may not bc corrcct. ! think that at that timc Nomura and Kurusu statcd that thcy wcrc through. Tc Unitcd Statcs hadnt acccptcd what thcy had proposcd, and ncgotiations wcrc supposcd to bc ovcr. Altcrwards, thcy wcrc rcopcncd, likc all diplomatic situations, it was a casc ol blu at thc timca dip lomatic blu in rcgard to thc ccasing ol ncgotiations, but that is purcly my mcmory, and that wasnt anything that ! had any o cial knowlcdgc ol. 159 Tc judgc advocatc tricd to dctcrminc il thcrc was somc spc cial rcason lor scnding, on cccmbcr 4, thc dispatch dirccting thc Naval Station, Guam, to dcstroy all sccrct and condcntial 157 !bid., p. 892. 158 !bid. 159 !bid. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 535 publications. 160 Tat was whcn Saord said thc Vinds Codc xccutc had bccn rcccivcd, Noyes: Tis was onc ol a scrics ol dispatchcs scnt, dirccting thc dcstruction ol all sccrct publications in thc Pacic that could bc sparcd in vicw ol thc immincncc ol war. ! prcparcd it. !t was scnt on thc 4th ol cccmbcr. Tis is my handwriting (indicating), and ! prcparcd this dispatch, which is onc ol somc othcrs. 161 Judgc Advocatc 8icscmcicr pursucd thc mattcr: !mmincncc ol war with what country, Admiral: Noyes: Japan. 8icscmcicr prcsscd on. Vhy did Noycs bclicvc a war with Japan was immincnt: Noyes: Tc scriousncss ol thc situation in thc Pacic. ! couldnt givc you thc cxact itcms as thcy camc up bctwccn thc 27th |thc datc ol thc war warning| and thc 4th. Tings had gottcn progrcssivcly worsc. . . . 162 Judge Advocate: 8ut you havc not yct told us thc dcvclopmcnts |bctwccn 27 Novcmbcr and 4 cccmbcr 1941| . . . which madc you think this dispatch was ncccssary: Noyes: No, ! dont think ! could givc you thc cxact scqucncc ol cvcnts bctwccn thosc two datcs. Ambassador Nomura, and ! cxpcct, Ambassador Kurusu, wcrc in Vashington, and thc ncgotiations wcrc apparcntly not procccding wcll. Tcrc was 160 !bid., pp. 117879, PNA\ mcssagc #042017, scc also part 14, p. 1408. 161 !bid., part 33, p. 893. 162 !bid., pp. 89394. 536 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy no spccic cvcnt that occurrcd on thc morning ol thc 4th that causcd mc to scnd this dispatch. 163 Vhcn 8icscmcicr askcd Noycs whcthcr hc had sccn thc Vinds Codc sctup intcrccpt on or altcr Novcmbcr 28, Noycs said hc had and that hc took stcps to gct immcdiatc noticc lrom our intcrccpt stations to covcr this point. 164 Tis rcsponsc was consistcnt with Kramcrs tcstimony that Noycs had had cards madc up with thc Vinds codc words on thcm. 165 Howcvcr, whcn askcd latcr about thc cards, Noycs couldnt say. 166
Had Noycs known bclorc thc attack ol thc sccrctary ol statcs Novcmbcr 26 proposal to thc Japancsc: Noyes: ! couldnt say whcthcr ! was lamiliar with this particular papcr or not. . . . Tat is thrcc ycars ago. ! cant say on what day. Tis tra c which has my initials, and things that ! prcparcd, ! am glad to tcstily to, but ! cannot say cxactly whcn ! saw or il ! did scc many ol thcsc hundrcds ol dispatchcs. 167
Q. Vc havc tcstimony bclorc this court, Admiral, lrom sub ordinatcs who wcrc in your o cc as ol this pcriod immcdi atcly prcccding 7 cccmbcr 1941, that all pcrsonncl wcrc on thc alcrt lor thc rcccipt ol somc vcry importantor a vcry important answcr lrom thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt. o you havc any knowlcdgc ol this situation: Noyes: From thc timc ol thc 27 ol Novcmbcr, gradually gct ting morc acutc, wc wcrc making cvcry cort to obtain any inlormation possiblc. ! couldnt say that wc cxpcctcd any par ticular mcssagc. . . . 163 !bid., p. 894. 164 !bid. 165 !bid., p. 853, Kramcr tcstimony. 166 !bid., p. 899. 167 !bid., p. 895. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 537 Q. 8ut wcrc you cxpccting any inlormation ol importancc immcdiatcly prcccding 7 cccmbcr 1941, lrom thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt: Noyes: ! might say wc wcrc hoping. ! couldnt say wc wcrc cxpccting. 168 Had Noycs sccn or bccn inlormcd about parts 1 to 13 ol thc Japancsc rcply, intcrccptcd, dccodcd, and dclivcrcd to top Vashington o cials during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6: Hc said hc had not sccn or bccn inlormcd ol thc subjcct mattcr bclorc cccmbcr 7. Hc did not know whcrc hc was altcr working hours on thc night ol cccmbcr 6. Nor did hc know whcthcr hc wcnt back to thc o cc or staycd homc. Q. 8ut your prcscnt rccollcction is that you havc no knowlcdgc ol having sccn that documcnt, Parts 1 to 13, on thc night ol 6 cccmbcr 1941: Noyes: Tat is my rccollcction. Askcd about part 14, hc rcplicd, Tis mcssagc wasnt translatcd until thc 7th ol cccmbcr. Q. Had you cvcr bccn inlormcd ol it at any timc, and il so, whcn: Noyes: ! will havc to say ! dont rcmcmbcr. Noycs said hc did not scc thc nc v.:. Mcssagc instructing thc Japancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thcir govcrnmcnts rcply to thc sccrctary ol statc at that timc until altcr 7 cccmbcr. 169 Askcd il thc Navy had lacilitics in Pcarl Harbor lor intcrccpt ing inlormation in thc Purplc codc, which was usually scnt by 168 !bid., pp. 89596. 169 !bid., p. 896. 538 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cablc, Noycs rcplicd, At thc timc thcrc wcrc no lcgal lacilitics |in Pcarl Harbor| lor intcrccpting cablc. . . . Q. o ! undcrstand your answcr to mcan that thcy wcrc not rccciving thcsc cablc dispatchcs transmittcd in thc purplc codc: Noyes: ! should say thcy probably wcrc not. 170 Q. id you cvcr inlorm thc Chicl ol thc Var Plans ivision, Captain Turncr, that thc CommandcrinChicl ol thc Pacic Flcct was dccrypting intclligcncc inlormation ol a char actcr similar to that which you wcrc rccciving in thc Navy cpartmcnt: Noyes: No. 171
Vhcn Noycs was askcd whcthcr any ol thc codc words as sct out in documcnt 15 |thc Vinds Codc sctup mcssagc| wcrc rcccivcd in thc Navy cpartmcnt, cithcr in Japancsc or in plain nglish: that is whcthcr thcrc had bccn a Vinds Codc xccutc, hc rcplicd, Tcy wcrc not. 172 Tcstimony had bccn prcscntcd bclorc this court to thc ccct that thc cxccution ol thc winds codc systcm was rcccivcd and that a thorough scarch in thc Navy cpartmcnt lcs had lailcd to rcvcal a copy ol thc cxccution signal. Noycs was askcd about that: Vould thc ircctor ol Naval Communications lcs bc thc normal placcd in which that rccord would bc kcpt: Noyes: !l it was rcccivcd by naval mcans, ycs. . . . thcrwisc, thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc. 170 !bid., p. 898. 171 !bid., p. 897. 172 !bid., p. 894. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 539 Q. Tc tcstimony bclorc this court was that it had bccn rcccivcd by naval intcrccpting mcans and thcrclorc thc rccord ol this mcssagc would naturally bc kcpt in thc lcs ol thc ircctor ol Naval Communications, would it not: Noyes: Ycs. Q. Can you cxplain why this documcnt is missing lrom thc lcs ol thc ircctor ol Naval Communications: Noyes: ! dont think . . . that any such mcssagc was rcccivcd by naval mcans. Q. Tcn at no timc did you lcarn lrom anyonc ol thc cxccution ol thc winds mcssagc in any lorm, and at no timc did you tcll anyonc ol thc cxccution in any lorm ol thc winds mcssagc: !s that thc way you want to lcavc your tcstimony on that subjcct: Noyes: Tat is right, ycs. 173 . . . |T|o thc bcst ol my rcmcm brancc no cxccution ol thc socallcd Vinds Mcssagc was nally rcccivcd. 174 At thc conclusion ol Noycss qucstioning, hc apologizcd lor not hav|ing| bccn ablc to answcr thc qucstions morc spcci cally. 8ut, hc rcmindcd thc Court, it had bccn thrcc ycars sincc hc had handlcd any ol thcsc mcssagcs, and thcrc had bccn thou sands ol thcm. Scptcmbcr 21, 1944, lound thc NC! back in Vashington, with only a lcw morc witncsscs to bc hcard. !xvov:~:iox ox Sniv Movv:vx:s At thc rcqucst ol Stark, 16 mcssagcs bctwccn Tokyo and Manila, Tokyo and Scattlc, Tokyo and Singaporc, and Tokyo and 173 !bid., p. 900. 174 !bid., pp. 90506. 540 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy San Francisco conccrning thc movcmcnts ol U.S. ships into and out ol thosc harbors wcrc introduccd into thc rccord. 175 Admiral Joscph R. Rcdman, Assistant ircctor ol Communications, was askcd il thcrc wcrc othcr similar rcports to Tokyo. Redman: Vhy, thc gcncral tcnor ol thc Japancsc tra c was in a scarching cxpcdition all ovcr thc world as to thc movcmcnts not only in Unitcd Statcs ports but also in thosc ol lorcign coun trics. |!t had bccn going on lor somc timc.| uring thc scvcral months prcccding cccmbcr, 1941, it was intcnsicd. 176 Rcdman admittcd that thc Novcmbcr 16 Honolulu to Tokyo mcssagc conccrning thc location ol ships in Pcarl Harbor had bccn morc spccic than thc othcr Japancsc mcssagcs hc had sccn rcporting on ship movcmcnts, 177 cvcn morc spccic than any answcr lrom Manila, bccausc this apparcntly rclcrrcd to somc particular chart upon which hc was rcporting. 178 Rcdman was askcd, Can you givc thc court any rcasons why that |diplomatic tra c| should not havc bccn transmittcd to all commandcrs in thc Pacic, including thc coastal lronticr com mandcrs on thc Pacic Coast: 179 Altcr somc discussion ol thc di culty ol rctaining sccurity il mcssagcs wcrc rccordcd word lorword, or il thcy wcrc scnt by airmail, Rcdman nally admit tcd that thc inlormation could havc bccn scnt by couricr. 8ut a couricr wasnt uscd. 180 r it could havc bccn briclcd, cncodcd, 175 !bid., pp. 908 and xhibit #68, pp. 139196. For morc complctc compilation ol such mcssagcs including thosc not madc availablc to NC!, scc part 12, pp. 270310. 176 !bid., part 33, pp. 91415. 177 !bid., Japancsc !ntcrccpt #222, translatcd cccmbcr 6, 1941, pp. 138485. 178 !bid., p. 917. 179 !bid., p. 915. 180 !bid., p. 917. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 541 and thcn scnt, with littlc thrcat to sccurity. 181 8ut that hadnt bccn donc cithcr. Ki::vi Rvvivws Pvv~::~cx Pv~vi H~vnov Si:u~:iox Admiral Kimmcl said hc had rcccivcd nonc ol thc sccrct Japancsc intcrccpts introduccd to thc NC! that had bccn rcccivcd in Vashington bctwccn Novcmbcr 1 and cccmbcr 7, 1941. 182
Hc had, ol coursc, rcccivcd thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning dispatch. !n rcsponsc to that, on Novcmbcr 30 hc sct lorth in a mcmorandum thc action which wc would takc in casc hostilitics should suddcnly brcak out. Hc thought that it was wcll to bc prcparcd and rcady to takc action immcdiatcly. Tcsc plans wcrc rcviscd as ncccssary lrom timc to timc and on cccmbcr 5, a ncw mcmorandum was prcparcd and approvcd and put in thc hands ol thc Sta uty ccr . . . so that hc would know cxactly what to do . . . in casc ol an cmcrgcncy. 183
Kimmcl rcvicwcd again thc situation at Pcarl Harbor in thc months prcccding thc attack. 184 uring thc months prcccding thc attack, Stark scnt Kimmcl a numbcr ol rathcr gcncral warnings conccrning thc Japancsc thrcat in thc Pacic. !n Vashington, tcn sion was building toward thc cnd ol Novcmbcr, many Japancsc mcssagcs wcrc bcing intcrccptcd, dccryptcd, and translatcd cvcry day ocrcd clucs to thc thinking ol thc Tokyo govcrnmcnt. Tosc privy to this ultra sccrct MAG!C wcrc wcll awarc that thc Japancsc wcrc planning somc kind ol aggrcssivc action. Yct in spitc ol Kimmcls lrcqucnt rcqucsts to Stark lor inlormation, 181 !bid., pp. 915, 918. 182 !bid., part 32, p. 654. 183 !bid., p. 653. 184 !bid., pp. 65859. 542 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc actual warnings scnt to Kimmcl rcvcalcd littlc ol this growing scnsc ol cmcrgcncy. 185
!n Hawaii, Kimmcl put into ccct all thc sccurity mcasurcs that ! thought wc could put into ccct, and still continuc thc training at anywhcrc ncar a satislactory condition. Tc war warning ol Novcmbcr 27 as wcll as thc warnings hc had rcccivcd carlicr, Kimmcl said, lollowcd a pattcrn that had continucd lor somc timc. Hc lclt that bclorc hostilitics camc that thcrc would bc additional inlormation, that wc would gct somcthing morc dcnitc. Vhcn thc attack actually camc without his having hcard anything morc spccic, hc was inclincd to blamc myscll lor not having bccn much smartcr than ! was. 8ut whcn ! lound, somc timc latcr, that thc inlor mation was, in lact, availablc in thc Navy cpartmcnt, that thc inlormation which, il it had bccn givcn mc, would havc changcd my attitudc and would havc changcd thc dispositions, ! ccascd to blamc myscll so much. 186
Hindsight is always bcttcr than lorcsight. Yct Kimmcl bclicvcd that, il hc had known what was in thc Novcmbcr 26 Statc cpartmcnt notc to thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt and that thc Navy cpartmcnt thought this notc would provc cntircly unac ccptablc to thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt, his outlook would havc bccn acctcd vcry considcrably. 187 Morcovcr, thc shipsinhar bor mcssagcs inquiring as to thc disposition ol ships insidc Pcarl Harbor itscll, wanting to know which oncs wcrc in arcas, thc rcport ol thc Japancsc Consul giving in dctail thc courscs takcn by thosc in thc harbor, would havc indicatcd to mc that thcy |thc Japancsc| wcrc not only intcrcstcd in thc ships that wcrc in thc 185 !bid., pp. 65557. 186 !bid., p. 659. 187 !bid., p. 660. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 543 Pcarl Harbor arca but that thcy wcrc intcrcstcd in cxactly whcrc thcy wcrc in Pcarl Harbor propcr. 188
Tcrc wcrc only two ccctivc lorms ol attack against ships in Pcarl Harbor itscll. nc would bc lor submarincs actually to cntcr thc harbor. At that timc Kimmcl would havc discountcd largcly that possibility bccausc hc didnt know thcy had midgct submarincs. Hc would also havc discountcd thc possibility ol an aircralt torpcdo attack. Hc would havc considcrcd that about thc only thing that could gct in would bc a bombing attack. Tcrclorc, il hc had known about thc Japancsc mcssagcs asking about thc spccic locations ol ships in thc harbor, hc would havc concludcd, Vcll, thcy probably arc going to makc an air bomb ing raid hcrc. Kimmcl could not scc any othcr conclusion you can draw lrom it, unlcss you put it down to Japancsc stupidity in wanting all this inlormation. And Kimmcl did not think thcy wcrc so stupid. 189 Vith rcspcct to thc Vinds Codc Mcssagc, Kimmcl said hc did not want to appcar to bc so wisc now that cvcrything has happcncd. 8ut still, hc said, hc had a right to an opinion. . . . Tc dcnitc lact that Japan, at lcast, was going to brcak o diplomatic rclations and, at most, was going to war with us would havc had a vcry grcat ccct on mc and all my advisors. Tat would havc bccn somcthing dcnitc. 190 Vhat would Kimmcl havc donc il hc had bccn privy to thc intclligcncc availablc in thc sccrct intcrccpts that had bccn intro duccd to thc NC!: Hc said that was a vcry di cult qucstion to answcr . . . altcr thc lact. Howcvcr, hc was surc hc would at lcast havc alcrtcd all shorcgoing activitics in thc Hawaiian !slands, including thc Army. Hc would havc 188 !bid., part 33, p. 920. 189 !bid., pp. 92021. 190 !bid., p. 921. 544 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy in all probability, had thc Flcct put to sca . . . probably 300 milcs wcst ol ahu in an intcrccpting position lor any attack ing lorcc that would havc comc cithcr to thc northward or to thc southward. Hc couldnt put thcm too lar away, lor hc had to considcr thcir lucling. 8ut hc would havc put thcm just lar cnough so thcy couldnt bc rcadily locatcd. Hc was torn bctwixt a dcsirc lor thc sccurity ol thc Flcct and lor prcparations to makc thc initial movcs in casc ol war with Japan. . . . Any Flcct which sits and waits to bc attackcd, Kimmcl addcd, labors undcr an cnormous handicap. Howcvcr, hc thought it lair to say that hc would havc alcrtcd cvcrything on shorc to its maximum that could bc maintaincd ovcr a long pcriod. Hc would havc institutcd thc rcconnaissancc to thc bcst ol our ability and ! would havc had thc Flcct put to sca. 191 Kimmcl addcd, howcvcr, that it was wcll within thc rcalm ol possibility that had ! takcn thc Flcct to sca, thc losscs could havc bccn grcatcr than thcy actually wcrc lrom submarinc and air attack |in thc harbor|. Howcvcr, you must also rcalizc, hc said, that you prcsupposc thcn that thcy would havc lound our Flcct and that thcy would havc bccn ablc to dclivcr an attack. !t is not impossiblc that, had thc Flcct gonc to sca, thc Japancsc would not havc attackcd at that timc at all. Tcy might havc dclcrrcd thc attack. Vc all know how di cult it is to locatc a Flcct at sca, particularly il thcy do not want to bc locatcd. All this is in thc rcalm ol conjccturc, but ! think it is lair to say that thcrc arc somc things to bc said lor kccping thc Flcct in port, and thc only changc wc would makc would bc to go to a littlc highcr statc ol alcrt than wc had at thc timc. 192 191 !bid., part 32, p. 659. 192 !bid., p. 661. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 545 |T|hc c cicncy ol thc Japancsc Air Forcc was, Kimmcl thought, a surprisc to thc Navy cpartmcnt as wcll as to thc pcoplc in Hawaii. Vc had on thc ships no adcquatc antiaircralt dclcnsc. 193 Nor did wc havc su cicnt patrol plancs to maintain an adcquatc patrol ovcr a long pcriod ol timc. . . . |A| patrol out to 300 milcs or lcss is ol vcry doubtlul valuc, Kimmcl said, particu larly against air raid. !t was almost usclcss, hc addcd. Kimmcl wantcd it clcarly undcrstood that giving thc ordcrs to thc plancs was his rcsponsibility, hc had uscd thcm to protcct opcrating arcas and in training in prcparation lor war. Hc bclicvcd that by my doing so wc wcrc cmploying thcm to thc vcry bcst advantagc. . . . l coursc, had thc patrol plancs, plus all thc Army bombcrs, bccn out on scarch, wc would not havc had any striking lorcc lclt. 194
To dctcct a carricr lorcc, it was ncccssary to know that it was on thc way and also its approximatc timc ol arrival at a ccrtain placc. To conrm thc di culty ol locating an incoming lorcc, Kimmcl mcntioncd scvcral attacks, just within thc prcvious thrcc or lour wccks, whcn our own Navy has gonc in and madc attacks on Japancschcld positions at Saipan, Palau, and Manila. !n cach casc our plancs ccctcd what amounts to a tactical surprisc. And this in spitc ol thc lact that thc Japancsc should havc bccn on thc alcrt lor wc had bccn at war lor ncarly thrcc ycars. |V|hat is so oltcn ovcrlookcd in conncction with this Pcarl Harbor aair is that wc wcrc still at pcacc and still conducting convcrsations. . . . Vc wcrc still in thc pcacc psychology, and ! myscll, was acctcd by it just likc cvcrybody clsc. 195
193 !bid. 194 !bid., p. 662. 195 !bid., p. 663. 546 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy N~vv Couv: ov !xguivv Rvvov: Tc court complctcd taking tcstimony on Scptcmbcr 27 and issucd its rcport on ctobcr 19, 1944. !n thc coursc ol 19 Findings ol Facts, it rcvicwcd thc inlormation rcvcalcd in thc NC!s ninc and a hall wccks ol hcarings ( July 24 to Scptcmbcr 27). 196
Tc NC! concludcd that Admiral Kimmcls dccision, madc altcr rccciving thc dispatch ol 24 Novcmbcr, to continuc prcparations ol thc Pacic Flcct lor war, was sound in thc light ol thc inlormation thcn avail ablc to him. . . . |A|lthough thc attack ol 7 cccmbcr camc as a surprisc, thcrc wcrc good grounds lor thc bclicl on thc part ol high o cials in thc Statc, Var, and Navy cpartmcnts, and on thc part ol thc Army and Navy in thc Hawaiian arca, that hos tilitics would bcgin in thc Far ast rathcr than clscwhcrc, and that thc samc considcrations which inucnccd thc scntimcnt ol thc authoritics in Vashington in this rcspcct, support thc intcrprctation which Admiral Kimmcl placcd upon thc war warning mcssagc ol 27 Novcmbcr, to thc ccct that this mcs sagc dircctcd attcntion away lrom Pcarl Harbor rathcr than toward it. . . . |T|hc Court is ol thc opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark. . . . lailcd to display thc sound judgmcnt cxpcctcd ol him in that hc did not transmit to Admiral Kimmcl, CommandcrinChicl, Pacic Flcct, during thc vcry critical pcriod 26 Novcmbcr to 7 cccmbcr, important inlormation which hc had rcgarding thc Japancsc situation and, cspccially, in that, on thc morning ol 7 cccmbcr, 1941, hc did not transmit immcdiatcly thc lact that a mcssagc had bccn rcccivcd which appcarcd to indicatc that a brcak in diplomatic rclations was immincnt, and that an attack in thc Hawaiian arca might bc cxpcctcd soon. . . . 196 !bid., part 39, pp. 297322, Addcndum, pp. 32330. The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 547 Finally, bascd upon thc lacts cstablishcd, thc Court is ol thc opinion that no ocnscs havc bccn committcd nor scrious blamc incurrcd on thc part ol any pcrson or pcrsons in thc naval scrvicc. 197
Tc rcport was promptly prcscntcd to Sccrctary ol thc Navy Forrcstal. 198 Tc prcsidcntial clcction was lcss than thrcc wccks o. Rooscvclt was running against Rcpublican candidatc Tomas . cwcy lor an unprcccdcntcd lourth tcrm. Tc war was still going on. Tc rcport dcalt with an cxtrcmcly scnsitivc topic, thc rcading ol thc Japancsc codcs that wcrc still hclping thc Unitcd Statcs in its strugglc against Japan. Morcovcr, it had cxoncratcd Kimmcl, who had bccn blamcd lor thc cxtcnt ol thc catastrophc and hastcncd into rctircmcnt on thc basis ol thc ndings ol thc prcsidcntially blcsscd Robcrts Commission. Tcn, too, thc NC!s criticism ol Stark, a closc lricnd and adviscr ol FRs, could provc dangcrous in thc political campaign. Forrcstal laccd a dil cult qucstion: Vhat should hc do: 197 !bid., p. 321. 198 Te New York Times, ctobcr 21, 1944, pp. 1, 9. 549 24. 1944: A Political Year I n politics, as in war, crisis is thc normal statc ol aairs. !n 1944, with thc nation at war, thc Gcrmans and thc Japancsc wcrc doing thcir utmost to crcatc criscs lor thc Unitcd Statcs lorccs ovcrscas. Tc pcoplc ol this country, unitcd in thc war cort, wcrc working hard. ur lactorics wcrc booming, wcapons, ships, and plancs wcrc coming o asscmbly lincs at unprcccdcntcd ratcs. Yct politics docsnt takc timc o lor war. Although thc pcoplc wcrc patriotic and unitcd in thc national war cort, thcy wcrc dividcd politicallybctwccn proadministration cmocrats and antiadministration Rcpublicans. And in politics onc can bc surc ol onc thing, both partics will try to crcatc criscs lor thc othcr. Tnv Pvvsibvx:i~i No:ix~:ioxs n Junc 26, thc Rcpublican National Convcntion, mccting in Chicago, nominatcd as its prcsidcntial candidatc thc vigor ous 42ycarold Tomas . cwcy, a lawycr and lormcr district attorncy lor Ncw York County, who had won acclaim as a crimc bustcr, had put mob lcadcrs Lcgs iamond and Lucky Luciano 550 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy bchind bars, 1 and had bccn clcctcd, and was thcn scrving, as gov crnor ol thc Statc ol Ncw York. Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt had alrcady brokcn thc traditional two tcrm limit by running lor a third tcrm in 1940. Although many pcoplc suspcctcd hc would run in 1944, cvcn his closcst associatcs did not know lor surc. Finally, on July 11, with thc cmocratic convcntion littlc morc than a wcck away ( July 1921), hc answcrcd thc qucstion rcportcrs had bccn asking. Hc rcad to thcm lrom a lcttcr hc had writtcn thc national chairman ol thc cmocratic Committcc, Robcrt . Hanncgan: 2 ! do not want to run. . . . All that is within mc crics out to go back to my homc on thc Hudson Rivcr, to avoid public rcsponsibilitics. . . . |8|ut, hc continucd, as a good soldicr, . . . ! will acccpt and scrvc in this o cc, il ! am so ordcrcd by thc CommandcrinChicl ol us allthc sovcrcign pcoplc ol thc Unitcd Statcs. 3 !t was no surprisc, thcrclorc, that Rooscvclt was nominatcd on July 20 to run on thc cmocratic tickct lor a lourth tcrm. FR was 62 ycars old. Although hc had lost thc usc ol his lcgs in 1921 through inlantilc paralysis, 4 hc had always bccn vig orous, hcalthy, and rcsilicnt. 8y 1944, howcvcr, hc was showing thc strain ol almost 12 ycars ol hcavy rcsponsibility as thc war timc commandcrinchicl. Hc lookcd thin and gaunt. His doc tors insistcd that hc rcducc his hours ol work and gct plcnty ol rcst. 8ut FR and his political adviscrs did cvcrything thcy could to makc him appcar wcll and vigorous. Rooscvclt took scvcral 1 Jamcs MacGrcgor 8urns, Roosevelt: Te Soldier of Freedom, 19401945 (Ncw York: Harcourt 8racc Jovanovich, 1970), p. 501. 2 Jonathan anicls, White House Witness, 1942-1945 (Gardcn City, N.Y.: oublcday, 1975), p. 234, Villiam . Hassctt, O the Record with F.D.R., 19421945 (Ncw 8runswick, N.J.: Rutgcrs Univcrsity Prcss, 1958), pp. 26061. 3 Lcttcr to Robcrt . Hanncgan, Vhitc Housc rclcasc, July 10, 1944. 4 Jamcs Rooscvclt and Sidncy Shalctt, Aectionately, F.D.R.: A Sons Story of a Lonely Man (Ncw York: Harcourt, 8racc, 1959), pp. 14145. 1944: A Political Year 551 long trips during thc campaign. Travcl lor Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt was not strcnuous, as it was lor common lolks, rathcr it was a timc ol rcst and rclaxation, on trains in comlortablc privatc cars or aboard luxurious ships in lrcsh occan air and sunshinc. Tnv v:ocv~:s iiv::~ !n political campaigns, both partics cxpcct criscs. Howcvcr, FR and his administration laccd two potcntial criscs ol which thc Amcrican pcoplc wcrc complctcly unawarc. 8oth conccrncd thc supcrsccrct Japancsc MAG!C intcrccpts. !n thc rst placc, thc administration lcarcd thc rcaction ol thc votcrs il thcy lcarncd at this juncturc, in thc middlc ol thc war, that Vashington o cials had bccn intcrccpting, dcciphcring, and rcading sccrct Japancsc mcssagcs as carly as 1940 and that, thcrclorc, thcy had known a grcat dcal about Japancsc intcntions before thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. Vhy, thcn, thc pcoplc would ask, hadnt Vashington o cials adcquatcly alcrtcd thc Hawaiian commandcrs: Vhy hadnt thcy sccn to it that thc cct at Pcarl Harbor was bcttcr providcd with thc inlormation, mcn, wcapons, and plancs nccdcd to rcsist attack: Altcr having lost thousands ol lovcd oncs at Pcarl Harbor and altcr having livcd through almost thrcc ycars ol war, how would thc votcrs lccl toward thc prcsidcnt and his lcllow cmocrats: Vould thcy lccl rcvulsion at having bccn dcccivcd and bctraycd: And would thcy cxprcss that rcvulsion at thc ballot box in thc coming clcction: Vould thcy votc lor thc Rcpublican candidatc and against FR: !n thc sccond placc, thc administration lcarcd thc consc qucnccs lor thc war cort. Vhat il thc Japancsc lcarncd that thc Unitcd Statcs was ablc to dcciphcr somc ol Japans supcrsccrct codcs, codcs shc was still using to scnd mcssagcs to hcr diplo matic and military pcrsonncl throughout thc world: !l Japan rcalizcd that thc Unitcd Statcs was continuing to rcad many ol hcr most privatc communications, shc would changc hcr codcs 552 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy immcdiatcly, our armcd lorccs would losc a valuablc sourcc ol intclligcncc, and thc ghting and killing would bc prolongcd. Rvvuniic~x Pvvsibvx:i~i C~xbib~:v vwvv Siivxcvb Tc Rcpublican Party had lcarncd that U.S. cryptographcrs had dcciphcrcd somc Japancsc codcs and had bccn rcading somc Japancsc intcrccpts sincc bclorc Pcarl Harbor. As Rcscarch ircctor lor thc National Rcpublican Party in 1944, ! lcarncd that cwcy wantcd to makc a spccch on Pcarl Harbor and Vashingtons knowlcdgc ol thc Japancsc intcrccpts. Vhcn Army Chicl ol Sta Marshall got wind ol this, hc considcrcd this mat tcr ol such a highly sccrct naturc that hc lclt compcllcd to prc vcnt cwcy lrom spcaking on thc subjcct. n Scptcmbcr 25 hc wrotc a Top Sccrct lcttcr FR MR. VYS YS NLY and had his cmissary, Coloncl Cartcr Clarkc, handdclivcr it to cwcy, thcn on thc campaign trail in klahoma. 5
Marshall wrotc cwcy that hc was contacting him without thc knowlcdgc ol any othcr pcrson cxccpt Admiral King (who concurs) bccausc wc arc approaching a gravc dilcmma in thc political rcactions ol Congrcss rcgarding Pcarl Harbor. Vhat ! havc to tcll you bclow is ol such a highly sccrct naturc that ! lccl compcllcd to ask you cithcr to acccpt it on thc basis ol your not communicating its contcnts to any othcr pcrson and rcturning this lcttcr or not rcading any lurthcr and rcturn ing thc lcttcr to thc bcarcr. 6
5 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 3, pp. 1130, 1133. 6 !bid., p. 1130. 1944: A Political Year 553 cwcy rcad no lurthcr bclorc handing thc lcttcr back to Clarkc. Hc lclt hc could not acccpt thc proviso that hc not com municatc its contcnts to any othcr pcrson. 7
Marshall discusscd thc situation with Clarkc and Gcncral 8isscll, hcad ol army intclligcncc. Tcy concludcd that thc mat tcr was so important that wc must makc it a mattcr ol rccord. So Marshall again scnt Clarkc, travcling in civvics, to scc cwcy, by thcn in Albany. Clarkc phoncd Marshall lrom cwcys o cc, saying cwcy was unwilling to rcad thc lcttcr unlcss hc could sharc thc inlormation with at lcast onc adviscr and bc pcrmittcd to rctain thc lcttcr in his lcs. Marshall agrccd. 8 cwcy thcn rcad thc lcttcr. Marshall wrotc that hc would havc prclcrrcd to talk to you in pcrson but ! could not dcvisc a mcthod that would not bc subjcct to prcss and radio rcactions as to why thc Chicl ol Sta ol thc Army would bc sccking an intcrvicw with you at this particular momcnt. . . . Tc most vital cvidcncc in thc Pcarl Harbor mattcr consists ol our intcrccpts ol thc Japancsc diplomatic communications. vcr a pcriod ol scvcral ycars, Marshall wrotc, our crypto graph pcoplc had succccdcd in rcproducing a copy ol thc Japancsc cncoding machinc so that wc could dcciphcr thc Japancsc diplo matic codc. Tc Japancsc wcrc still using thc samc codc, and this sourcc was providing us with a grcat dcal ol valuablc inlormation. !t had hclpcd us to win victorics at Midway, in thc Alcutians, it told us ol thc movcmcnts ol Japancsc convoys and hclpcd us in raiding Japancsc shipping. Marshall told also ol thc scrious conscqucnccs whcn thc SS had sccrctly scarchcd thc Japancsc mbassy in Portugal. As a rcsult ol that incidcnt, thc Japancsc 7 !bid., p. 1133. 8 !bid., p. 1135. 554 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy had changcd thcir military codc all ovcr thc world, thus dcpriving us ol an invaluablc sourcc ol inlormation. You will undcrstand lrom thc lorcgoing, thc uttcrly tragic conscqucnccs il thc prcscnt political dcbatcs rcgarding Pcarl Harbor disclosc to thc cncmy, Gcrman or Jap, any suspicion ol thc vital sourccs ol inlormation wc posscss. 9
As a patriotic Amcrican, cwcy honorcd this rcqucst. Shortly altcr this, Rcpublican Scnator Homcr Fcrguson ol Michigan, unawarc ol thc rcason lor cwcys silcncc, also schcd ulcd a spccch on thc prcwar rcading ol thc Japancsc codcs. cwcy callcd Fcrguson to Albany and askcd him not to say any thing about it. Tcrc was no lurthcr rclcrcncc to thc mattcr dur ing thc political campaign. nc crisis lor thc administration was salcly ovcr. 8ut anothcr loomcd. APH8 ~xb NC! Rvvov:s Co:viv:vb Two Vvvxs 8vvovv Novv:nvv ivc:iox Vhilc thc NC! and APH8 invcstigations wcrc going on, FR bccamc worricd lor lcar thcrc would bc an advcrsc rcport by thc Gruncrt |APH8| Committcc just bclorc lcction. 10
Stimson was worricd too. Tc lorccs in Congrcss which had lcd to thc inquiry wcrc largcly political, hc said, and wcrc trying to cmbarrass thc prcsidcnt. So Stimson had spcnt considcr ablc timc prcparing lor his appcarancc bclorc thc board in thc hopc ol showing how basclcss thc chargcs arc that wc pcoplc in Vashington wcrc ncgligcnt in any way. 11
9 !bid., pp. 112835. 10 Stimson, Hcnry L. iary. Yalc Univcrsity Library. \olumc 48, p. 101, Scptcmbcr 21, 1944. 11 !bid., p. 102. 1944: A Political Year 555 FR wondcrcd whcthcr it |thc APH8| could not bc askcd to adjourn |its hcarings| until altcr lcction. 12 n ctobcr 13, Stimson conlcrrcd with thc Navy as to what wc should do in rcgard to thc two Pcarl Harbor 8oards. 13 Vhcthcr or not thcy tricd to pcrsuadc thc Gruncrt board to discontinuc its hcarings tcmporarily is immatcrial, it didnt. Tc NC! and thc APH8 rcports wcrc submittcd to Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal and Sccrctary ol Var Stimson on ctobcr 19 and 20, rcspcctivcly, only a couplc ol wccks bclorc thc Novcmbcr 7 clcction. As FR and Stimson had lcarcd, thc two rcports shiltcd thc burdcn ol blamc lrom Pcarl Harbor to Vashington. Tc NC! ccctivcly absolvcd Kimmcl ol rcsponsibility by concluding that thc stcps hc took had bccn adcquatc and ccc tivc, that his action in ordcring that no routinc, longrangc rcconnaissancc bc undcrtakcn was sound, and that his dccision to continuc prcparations ol thc Pacic Flcct lor war, was sound in thc light ol thc inlormation thcn availablc to him. Tcn, altcr lctting Kimmcl o thc hook, thc NC! had chargcd Chicl ol Naval pcrations Stark with having lailcd to display thc sound judgmcnt cxpcctcd ol him in that hc did not transmit to Admiral Kimmcl . . . important inlormation which hc had rcgarding thc Japancsc situation. 14
Tc APH8s allcgations against Gcncral Marshall, who was in Stimsons words invaluablc in thc war 15 disturbcd Stimson cspccially. To bc surc, thc APH8 had placcd a sharc ol thc blamc on Shorts lailurc adcquatcly to alcrt his command lor war. 16
Howcvcr, it criticizcd Vashington o cials scvcrcly: Sccrctary ol Statc Hull lor having issucd thc ultimatum to thc Japancsc 12 !bid., Scptcmbcr 26, 1944, p. 107. 13 !bid., ctobcr 13, 1944, p. 142. 14 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, p. 321. 15 Stimson iary, vol. 49, p. 51, Scptcmbcr 27, 1944. 16 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, pp. 17576. 556 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy on Novcmbcr 26, in spitc ol thc corts ol thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts to gain timc lor prcparations lor war, 17 also Marshall 18 and Gcrow 19 lor not having kcpt Short adcquatcly inlormcd. n rcccipt ol thcsc rcports, thc two sccrctarics laccd a dilcmma. To makc thc rcports public would rcvcal to thc Japancsc that wc had brokcn thcir codcs. To rclusc to makc thcm public would lcad pcoplc to think thc administration had somcthing to hidc, cspccially in vicw ol thc rumors circulating that thc rcports would absolvc thc two Pcarl Harbor commandcrs ol blamc and shilt thc rcsponsibility to Vashington. Tc immcdiatc rcsponsc ol thc sccrctarics was to rclusc to rclcasc thc rcports at that timc. Parts ol both rcports wcrc classicd Sccrct and Top Sccrct, so thcy plcadcd rcasons ol sccurity. 20
Forrcstal acknowlcdgcd rcccipt ol thc NC! rcport to Admiral rin G. Murn, prcsidcnt ol thc Naval Court. Hc would pcr sonally cxaminc thc rcport and rccord ol thc Naval Court altcr thcy had bccn cxamincd and approvcd by thc Judgc Advocatc ol thc Navy as to lcgal lorm. Hc would consult also with Admiral rncst J. King, commandcrinchicl ol thc Unitcd Statcs Flcct and chicl ol naval opcrations, to asccrtain how much ol this matcrial su cicntly acctcd prcscnt military opcrations as to mcrit a sccurity classication. !n thc mcantimc, pcnding inspcc tion, thc rcport would not bc madc availablc to thc public. 21
Tc Var cpartmcnt proposcd a commission to rulc on thc Top Sccrct issuc. 22
17 !bid., pp. 135., 175. 18 !bid., pp. 144., 175. 19 !bid., pp. 142., 176. 20 Te New York Times, ctobcr 21, 1944, p. 9. 21 !bid., ctobcr 21, 1944, pp. 1, 9. 22 Stimson iary, vol. 48, p. 186, ctobcr 26, 1944. 1944: A Political Year 557 Fovvvs:~i ~xb S:i:sox Coxsui: Av:v ~xb N~vv Lvc~i xvvv:s vcn as Forrcstal was announcing that thc NC! rcport would not bc madc public, inlormation about it was bcing lcakcd. Tc samc New York Times story that rcportcd Forrcstals intcntions to kccp thc rcport condcntial told ol rcports that had comc lrom somc quartcrs in rcccnt months, and somctimcs with a political background, that rcvclation ol all dctails ol thc Pcarl Harbor attack would clcar Rcar Admiral Husband . Kimmcl and Licut. Gcn. Valtcr C. Short ol suspicion and, on thc othcr hand, cast discrcdit on thc administration 23 this in dircct contradiction to thc ndings ol thc proadministration Robcrts Commission. Tus, thc rclcasc ol sccrct or topsccrct inlormation might not only cndangcr thc military but, il thc rcports rcally did clcar Kimmcl and Short and cast discrcdit on thc administration, could provc a scrious cmbarrassmcnt to thc administration in thc coming prcsidcntial clcction. Forrcstal askcd thc opinion ol thc Navys scnior lcgal o ccr, Judgc Advocatc Gcncral T.L. Gatch, 24 and ol |Commandcr in Chicl, Atlantic Flcct| King. 25 Tc Army consultcd its top lcgal adviscr, Judgc Advocatc Major Gcncral Myron C. Cramcr, who wrotc a long mcmorandum lor thc sccrctary ol war. 26 Tcsc mcn concludcd that ccrtain portions ol thc rcports should not bc rclcascd in any casc. Cramcr, Gatch, and King all wcnt ovcr thc APH8 and NC! hcarings and rcports. !n rcporting to Forrcstal and Stimson, thcy hcld that thc two boards had bccn in crror in maintaining that insu cicnt inlormation had bccn supplicd thc Hawaiian 23 Te New York Times, ctobcr 21, 1944, p. 9. 24 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, pp. 33032. 25 !bid., pp. 33235. 26 !bid., pp. 23169. 558 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy commandcrs. !n commcnting on thc APH8 rcport, Cramcr rclcrrcd to Marshalls tcstimony to thc ccct that |t|hc |scram blcr| tclcphonc was not considcrcd . . . bccausc . . . it would havc bccn too timc consuming to scrvc as a rapid and rcliablc mcans lor transmitting an urgcnt warning. 27 As to Gcncral Marshall, Cramcr wrotc thc conclusions ol thc 8oard arc unjusticd and crroncous. 28 And Short, Cramcr hcld, had bccn adcquatcly adviscd ol thc immincnt rupturc in diplomatic rcla tions bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Japan, ol thc immincncc ol war, ol thc probablc momcntary outbrcak ol hostilitics by Japan against thc Unitcd Statcs, and ol thc possibility ol sabo tagc and cspionagc. Shorts lailurc stcmmcd lrom a mistakc ol judgmcnt on his part. . . . |Hc| had adoptcd wholchcartcdly what was apparcntly thc vicwpoint ol thc Navy, namcly, that thcrc was litcrally no chancc ol a surprisc air attack on Pcarl Harbor. 29
According to King, Kimmcl could and should havc judgcd morc accuratcly thc gravity ol thc dangcr to which thc Hawaiian !slands wcrc cxposcd. 30 Conccrning thc NC! rcport, King warncd that, il thc ncccssary dclctions wcrc madc, a disjointcd picturc would bc prcscntcd, lull ol uncxplaincd gaps . . . |which| would lcad to a dcmand ol Congrcss and by thc prcss lor morc inlormation, on thc ground 27 !bid., p. 260. 28 !bid., p. 267. 29 !bid., pp. 239, 268. 30 !bid., p. 344. Yct King admittcd to Kimmcl a month latcr, in an intcrvicw cccmbcr 7, 1944, that hc had ncvcr rcad thc procccdings upon which thc Court had bascd thcir ndings (Admiral Kimmel s Story, Hcnry Rcgncry, 1955, p. 161). 1944: A Political Year 559 that thc part madc public was incomplctc, and that withhold ing ol any inlormation is indicativc ol a dcsirc on thc part ol thc Navy to whitcwash high naval o ccrs. A situation such as this might wcll lcad to discussions that would inadvcrtcntly dis closc just thc inlormation that wc lccl is vital to kccp sccrct. King pointcd out that thc law calling lor thc NC! docs not obligatc thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy to makc any public statcmcnt ol what thc Court ol !nquiry has asccrtaincd. Tcrclorc, hc con cludcd, there is no necessity for making anything public. 31 (!talics addcd. ) Stimson worricd a grcat dcal about how to handlc thc APH8 rcport. Hc rcscntcd Congrcss lor having quitc unncccssarily thrown on him this wrctchcd piccc ol labor . . . thc most wcar ing and rasping thing that ! havc had in thc lour ycars that ! havc bccn hcrc. 32 Hc rclcrrcd to this task in his diary variously as his cross, 33 and as |t|hc miscrablc Pcarl Harbor busincss. 34 Hc had had to spcnd his timc stopping ratholcs bccausc ol |t|hc con loundcd Pcarl Harbor casc. 35 Tc analyscs ol thc APH8 by Cramcr and ol thc NC! by Gatch and King providcd Stimson and Forrcstal with thc ratio nalc thcy nccdcd to rcvcrsc thc APH8 and NC! ndings, to oncc morc placc thc blamc lor thc cxtcnt ol thc disastcr on thc Hawaiian commandcrs, and to vindicatc thc acts ol Vashington o cials. Stimson considcrcd Cramcrs analysis a vcry nc job rcally a humdingcr . . . a vcry good hclp. . . . |H|c handlcd thc Pcarl Harbor 8oard without glovcs and had analyzcd vcry carc lully and yct lairly all thcir mistakcs. 36
31 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, pp. 33334. 32 Stimson iary, vol. 49, p. 22, Novcmbcr 11, 1944. 33 !bid., p. 36, Novcmbcr 20, 1944. 34 !bid., p. 47, Novcmbcr 24, 1944. 35 !bid., p. 51, Novcmbcr 27, 1944. 36 !bid., p. 49, Novcmbcr 24, 1944. 560 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Sooncr or latcr, ol coursc, o cial statcmcnts about thc Army and Navy rcports would havc to bc issucd. 8ut lrom thc point ol vicw ol thc sccrctarics, latcr was bcttcr than sooncr. Tcy ago nizcd lor wccks ovcr how to word thcir rclcascs. Tcy consultcd. Tcy composcd scvcral dralt statcmcnts. And thcy agrccd that thcir announccmcnts should bc coordinatcd and issucd simulta ncously. 8ut thcy disagrccd as to how lrank thcy should bc. Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal, apparcntly undcr thc inucncc ol King, lcancd toward making no mcntion at all ol any NC! criti cism ol Vashington o cials. Sccrctary ol Var Stimson lclt that hc should at lcast acknowlcdgc that thc APH8 had criticizcd Vashington o cials, including Marshall. 8ut Stimson cxpcctcd to cxplain, at thc timc ol making such an acknowlcdgmcnt, that thc chargcs had not bccn justicd. Howcvcr, his rccommcndation lor acknowlcdging thc APH8 criticism ol Marshall mct opposi tion in thc Var cpartmcnt. 37 Stimson rcasoncd that il wc do not takc thc initiativc oursclvcs and publish thc lact that Marshall has bccn criticizcd at thc samc timc with thc vindication ol it, why it will lcak out in a much morc disadvan tagcous way lrom thc cncmics who arc alrcady in posscssion ol thc sccrct. 38
According to Stimson, Marshall, who has most to losc by thc publicity which would comc out ol it, lavorcd Stimsons vcrsion as altogcthcr thc wiscst thing. 39
Uxvixisnvb Av:v ~xb N~vv 8usixvss Ncithcr thc Army nor thc Navy was willing to lct thc nd ings ol thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard and Navy Court ol !nquiry 37 !bid., p. 27, Novcmbcr 15, 1944, and p. 36, Novcmbcr 20, 1944. 38 !bid., p. 36, Novcmbcr 20, 1944. 39 !bid., p. 42, Novcmbcr 22, 1944. 1944: A Political Year 561 stand as thc nal word. Tcy both authorizcd lollowup inscr vicc invcstigations. n thc oral instructions ol Marshall, Cartcr Clarkc was askcd to cxplorc thc manncr in which Top Sccrct communications wcrc handlcd. 40 Stimson dircctcd Major Hcnry C. Clauscn to invcstigatc Uncxplorcd Lcads in Pcarl Harbor !nvcstigation. 41 And Admiral Kcnt H. Hcwitt was askcd to conduct Furthcr invcstigation ol lacts pcrtincnt to thc Japancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor. 42
Stimsons and Forrcstals stalling tactics succccdcd. No rclcascs about thc rcports wcrc issucd bclorc thc clcction. n Novcmbcr 7 FR won rcclcction lor a lourth tcrm. FRs vcibvs How ~xb Vnvx :o Rviv~sv NC! ~xb APH8 Rvvov:s Tc prcsidcnt was to cast thc dccisivc votc on how thc NC! and APH8 rcports wcrc to bc prcscntcd to thc prcss. Finally on Novcmbcr 21, Stimson had a chancc to talk with FR and to show him his dralt announccmcnt about thc Armys Pcarl Harbor rcport. Tc prcsidcnt had cvidcntly alrcady sccn and approvcd ol Forrcstals proposcd noncommittal rclcasc. FR thought thc lcss said thc bcttcr. Stimson said thc Var cpartmcnt could not aord to go ahcad and bc lrank whcn thc Navy was not bcing lrank. And hc thought thc bcst hopc lor kccping o a Congrcssional invcstigation was to makc such a disclosurc as ! proposcd to do. 43
Stimson showcd Rooscvclt thc conclusions ol thc Gruncrt board, and FR rcad thcm carclully. Vhcn hc saw thc namcs ol thc pcrsons thc Army 8oard had criticizcd, hc said, Vhy, this 40 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 34, p. 2. 41 !bid., part 35, p. 6. 42 !bid., part 36, p. 359. 43 !bid. pp. 3940, Novcmbcr 21, 1944. 562 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy is wickcd, this is wickcd. FR thcn rcad Stimsons papcr and praiscd it. 8ut hc still adhcrcd to his vicw that thc salcr plan was to lollow as ncarly as possiblc thc Forrcstal mcthod. Vc must takc cvcry stcp against Congrcss gctting hold ol thc papcrs and thc lacts. Vc must rclusc to makc thc rcports public, hc said. |T|hcy should bc scalcd up and our opinions put in with thcm and thcn a noticc madc that thcy should only bc opcncd on a Joint Rcsolution ol both Houscs ol Congrcss approvcd by thc prcsidcnt altcr thc war. Tis rcsolution, FR said, should say that that was in thc public intcrcst. 44
!n spitc ol thc lact that no ncws rclcasc conccrning thc Navy courts conclusions had as yct bccn issucd, thc New York Times ol Novcmbcr 26, 1944, rcportcd that thc Army and Navy Journal had suggcstcd |that| as a rcsult ol thc rcccnt |Naval| Court ol !nquiry, Rcar Admiral Husband . Kimmcl might ncvcr bc courtmartiallcd lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr and that his Army associatc at Hawaii, Maj. Gcn. Short, would bc vindicatcd. Tc Times quotcd thc Journal as saying: Tcrc will bc no courtmartial lor Admiral Kimmcl. . . . undcr thc ndings ol thc Court ol !nquiry hcadcd by Admiral Murn, according to gossip in wcllinlormcd Vashington circlcs. . . . As to thc Army 8oard, which simultancously invcs tigatcd thc disastcr, it also is said to support thc ndings ol thc Robcrts 8oard in thc mattcr ol thc lailurc ol o ccrs ol thc Var cpartmcnt to commcnt to Gcncral Short upon thc mcasurcs hc had rcportcd hc took to guard thc basc in accor dancc with thc instructions givcn him. . . . !n thc unlikcly casc 44 !bid., p. 40. 1944: A Political Year 563 that Gcncral Short should bc courtmartiallcd, his lricnds arc convinccd that hc would bc vindicatcd. 45
Finally on Novcmbcr 30, altcr Stimson and Forrcstal had madc somc lurthcr rcvisions, thc prcsidcnt approvcd thcir rcspcctivc statcmcnts and authorizcd thcir rclcasc. Stimson and Forrcstal planncd to issuc thcm simultancously within thc ncxt two or thrcc days. 46
n cccmbcr 1, thc Army and Navy rclcascd to thc public thcir statcmcnts on thc ndings ol thc APH8 and NC! invcsti gations. 47 According to thc New York Times (cccmbcr 2, 1944), Stimson and Forrcstal rcvcalcd that thcy had lound no cvidcncc to justily a courtmartial ol Maj. Gcn. Valtcr C. Short and Rcar Admiral Husband . Kimmcl. . . . 8oth Sccrctarics wcrc carclul to spcak ol thc cvidcncc now availablc, and promiscd lurthcr invcstigation to obtain cvcry bit ol tcstimony. . . . n thc ground ol national sccurity, both Sccrctarics rcluscd to makc thc rcal story ol Pcarl Harbor pub lic until thc war had cndcd. Mr. Stimson considcrcd it highly prcjudicial to war prosccution and thc salcty ol Amcrican livcs to disclosc it bclorchand. Tc Navy cpartmcnt said tcrscly that thc rccord ol thc Court ol !nquiry will not bc madc pub lic whilc thc war continucd. !n thcir individual statcmcnts, Sccrctarics Stimson and Forrcstal conccdcd crrors on thc part ol unnamcd o ccrs at Pcarl Harbor and in Vashington. Tcsc o ccrs, Mr. Stimson statcd, did not pcrlorm thcir dutics with thc ncccssary skill or cxcrcisc thc judgmcnt nccdcd. Mr. Forrcstal sponsorcd a statcmcnt that thcrc wcrc crrors ol judgcmcnt by o ccrs ol his scrvicc. 45 Te New York Times, Novcmbcr 26, 1944, p. 44. 46 Stimson iary, vol. 49, p. 62, Novcmbcr 30, 1944. 47 Te New York Times, cccmbcr 2, 1944, p. 5. 564 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Howcvcr, Mcssrs. Stimson and Forrcstal madc it plain that no prosccution ol any o ccr was contcmplatcd now. 48
Pvvss Rvvov:s No:v Cox:v~bic:ioxs 8v:wvvx NC!/APH8 Rvvov:s ~xb ~viivv Ronvv:s Coxciusioxs Tc rcspcctcd journalist Arthur Krock ol thc New York Times commcntcd on thc Forrcstal and Stimson rclcascs. Hc pointcd to a lundamcntal conict ol nding bctwccn thc rcports on Pcarl Harbor ol thc commission hcadcd by Justicc Robcrts and ol thosc composcd ol admirals and gcncrals as rcvicwcd by thcir dcpartmcntal supcriors. !l Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short . . . wcrc guilty ol dcrcliction ol duty, as thc Robcrts commis sion concludcd, thcn it cannot cqually bc truc, as thc Sccrctarics ol Navy and Var appraiscd thcir o ccrs inquirics, that on thc basis ol availablc cvidcncc no grounds cxist lor thc courtsmar tial ol thc arca commandcrs or any othcrs in thc scrvicc. crcliction ol duty is basis lor a courtmartial, and thc Robcrts commission imputcd this to both Kimmcl and Short. Tis lact, Krock said, whcn contrastcd with thc ncgativc rcsults ol thc o cial inquirics by thc Army and Navy, makcs an unsatislactory situation lor cvcryonc conccrncd, including thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs, who wcrc rcmovcd, rcduccd in rank and rcluscd thc courts martial lor which thcy rcpcatcdly applicd. 49
48 !bid. pp. 1, 5. 49 !bid., cccmbcr 5, 1944, p. 22. 1944: A Political Year 565 Vcrc Kimmcl and Short guilty ol dcrcliction ol duty and lia blc lor courtsmartial: r wcrcnt thcy: Krock bclicvcd Congrcss would want to scc thcsc contradictions rcsolvcd. Many mcmbcrs ol Congrcss havc cxprcsscd this dissatislac tion, and thcir statcmcnts indicatc rcvival ol thc suspicion that thc lault lor thc surprisc clcmcnt in thc air attack on Pcarl Harbor by thc Japancsc rcsts morc hcavily on Vashington than any publishcd rcport has indicatcd. Congrcss lorccd thc o ccrs boards ol inquiry on thc Administration, which clcarly wantcd to lct thc cntirc controvcrsy await thc cnd ol thc war. . . . Now Congrcss, unlcss thc continucd invcstigation promiscd by Sccrctarics Forrcstal and Stimson disposcs ol thc conict bctwccn thc two rcports and xcs rcsponsibility on thc basis ol pcrsuasivc cvidcncc, can bc cxpcctcd to try to nd out thc lacts lor thc public and lor itscll. Krock rccognizcd, howcvcr, that such an invcstigation would havc to await wars cnd. To rcvcal thc cvidcncc rcquircd to rcsolvc thc conict, as cwcy had lcarncd during thc prcsidcntial cam paign, would havc bccn to invitc a chargc ol impcriling sccurity and thc prospccts ol thc Pacic war. 50
Tc cditorial board ol thc vcncrablc New York Times camc to csscntially thc samc conclusion: Tc Sccrctarics ol thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts, and thcir adviscrs . . . havc dccidcd that on thc cvidcncc now avail ablc courtsmartial ol any o ccrs arc not indicatcd. . . . !l thc Sccrctary ol Var and thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy, both honor ablc mcn, both loyal and dcvotcd Amcricans, both vitally and succcsslully cngagcd in thc prosccution ol thc war, givc it as thcir considcrcd judgmcnt that lull publicity and a public dis cussion now ol thc many ramications ol thc Pcarl Harbor 50 !bid. 566 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy attack would bc inimical to thc succcsslul prosccution ol thc war, thcn that opinion must bc hcard with rcspcct. Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short arc cntitlcd to a lull and opcn inquiry into all thc circumstanccs ol thcir prcparation, or lack ol it, to mcct a Japancsc attack. Tcy arc cntitlcd to an opportunity to givc a public cxplanation. . . . 8ut rst things comc rst. Vinning thc war is thc paramount duty now bclorc cvcry o cial and cvcry citizcn. Tc bcst intcrcsts ol thc country will bc scrvcd il thc qucstion ol rcsponsibility lor thc disastcr ol Pcarl Harbor is put asidc lor thc duration. 51
Tc ncxt day, cccmbcr 6, an unplcasant account about thc Pcarl Harbor invcstigation by muckrakcr ncwspapcrman rcw Pcarson appcarcd on thc lront pagc ol thc Miami Herald. Stimson considcrcd it unlortunatc that thc prcsidcnt had thwartcd his original plan lor giving a lull and lrank statcmcnt, and hc con dcd to his diary that hc had warncd thc prcsidcnt that thc thing was surc to lcak and hcrc rcw Pcarson had gottcn hold ol so many lacts that it lookcd as il all ol thc rcst would probably comc out. Fortunatcly Marshalls namc was not mcntioncd and somc ol thc things that Pcarson said wcrc cntircly inaccuratc and wrong and can bc dcnicd. 52
51 !bid., cditorial, p. 22. 52 Stimson iary, vol. 49, pp. 6869, cccmbcr 110, 1944. 567 25. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations: Clarke, Clausen, Hewitt E ach ol thc thrcc supplcmcntary invcstigations was uniquc. Tc rst ol thcsc thrcc supplcmcntary invcstigations, thc Clarkc !nvcstigation, was launchcd at thc rcqucst ol Army Chicl ol Sta Marshall, whilc thc APH8 was still undcr way, to hclp him prcparc lor his ncxt appcarancc bclorc that board. 1 Tc sccond invcstigation, thc Clauscn !nvcstigation, was instigatcd by Sccrctary ol Var Stimson to look into uncxplorcd lcads in thc Pcarl Harbor situation lrom thc Armys point ol vicw. 2 Tc third invcstigation, thc Hcwitt !nquiry, dcalt primarily with thc Navys situation and was ordcrcd by Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal who had lound thc NC! invcstigation had not cxhaustcd all possiblc cvi dcncc. 3 !mplicit, il not cxplicit, in thc dircctivcs sctting up thc 1 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 34, p. 2. 2 !bid., part 35, p. 5. 3 !bid., part 36, p. 359, Forrcstals May 2,1945, mcmorandum to Admiral H. Kcnt Hcwitt. 568 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Clauscn and Hcwitt invcstigations was a dcsirc to uncovcr inlor mation that might contradict, discrcdit, or at lcast cast doubts on thc ndings ol thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard and Navy Court ol !nquiry, which thc administration had lound unacccptablc. Tnv Ci~vxv !xguivv (Svv:v:nvv +:o, +) Altcr thc APH8 lcarncd ol thc Japancsc intcrccpts, Marshall was again callcd to answcr qucstions. !n prcparation lor that appcarancc, Marshall askcd Coloncl Cartcr V. Clarkc to cxplorc thc manncr in which ccrtain Top Sccrct communications wcrc handlcd. 4 Marshall hadnt bccn ablc to rccall thc cxtrcmcly important Japancsc rcply to thc U.S. Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum prior to thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Yct scvcral witncsscs had rcportcd that thc rst 13 parts (ol that 14part rcply) had bccn rcccivcd and dclivcrcd to top Vashington o cials thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Marshall was also intcrcstcd in rcvicwing thc cvcnts ol thc morning ol cccmbcr 7 and his rcsponsc to thc radio gram advising thc Japancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thcir govcrn mcnts rcply to Sccrctary ol Statc Hull on cccmbcr 7 at prcciscly 1:00 v.:., Vashington timc. Clarkc intcrvicwcd clcvcn witncsscs who had bccn involvcd with thc rcccipt and distribution ol thc intcrccpts. Marshall had Coloncl Rulus S. 8ratton, Army intclligcncc (G2), rccallcd lrom thc uropcan thcatcr whcrc hc was thcn scrving. 8ratton had bccn rcsponsiblc lor thc prcPcarl Harbor distribution ol intcrccpts to Army pcrsonncl. 8ratton dcscribcd thc proccdurc lor distributing various Japancsc intcrccpts to thc top military and civilian o cials in Vashington, including Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt, Marshall, and thc sccrctarics ol statc, war, and navy. 4 !bid., part 34, p. 1. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 569 8ratton was also askcd about thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning to Short and about what intclligcncc had bccn scnt to Hawaii. 8ratton bclicvcd that Japans 14part rcply startcd coming into thc Navy on thc 6th, and his rccollcction was that hc transmit tcd a copy to thc Sccrctary ol Statc that night. 5 Vhcn tcstily ing, 8ratton rclcrrcd to a mcmorandum hc had prcparcd shortly altcr cccmbcr 7. 6 Hc dcscribcd his corts to locatc Marshall that morning, Marshalls arrival in his o cc at 11:25 ~.:., thc discussion thcn ol thc signicancc ol thc nc v.:. Mcssagc, Marshalls dccision to notily Short, his consultation with CN Stark, and thc transmission ol thc lastminutc warning. 7
Clarkc thcn qucstioncd Coloncl dward F. Frcnch, Army Communications Scrvicc, who had actually transmittcd Marshalls last minutc cccmbcr 7 mcssagc to thc cld commandcrs. !ts transmission was dclaycd, Frcnch said, as Marshalls pcncilcd dralt was rathcr di cult to rcad and it had to bc typcd, vcri cd and authcnticatcd bclorc bcing cncodcd. ||ur channcl at Honolulu was out, duc to atmosphcric conditions. To avoid thc risk ol any garbling or crror in rclaying thc mcssagc via Army lacilitics through San Francisco, Frcnch dccidcd thc quickcst mcthod ol dispatch would bc via commcrcial scrvicc. So thc mcssagc to Hawaii was handlcd dircctly to San Francisco via thc Vcstcrn Union and on a tubc rclay ol this mcssagc to thc RCA o cc in San Francisco. 8
Major Gcncral Gcrow, assistant chicl ol sta, war plans divi sion, prcscntcd Clarkc with a mcmorandum hc had prcparcd cccmbcr 15, 1941 conccrning thc nc v.:. Mcssagc: n Sunday, cccmbcr 7, 1941, about 11:30 ~.:., .S.T., Gcncral Marshall callcd mc to his o cc. 8ratton was thcrc and was 5 !bid., p. 21. 6 !bid., p. 19. 7 !bid., pp. 10, 1920, 2021. 8 !bid., pp. 3233. 570 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy dircctcd to takc Marshalls pcncilcd dralt to thc mcssagc ccntcr and havc it scnt immcdiatcly by thc most cxpcditious mcans to thc Philippincs, Panama Canal, Hawaii and thc Vcst Coast command. 9 Gcrow told Clarkc that G2 (Army !ntclligcncc), not his war plans division, was to advisc Hawaiian G2 with rcspcct to sabo tagc. Tcrclorc, any rclcrcncc to subvcrsivc activitics and sabo tagc had bccn strickcn out ol thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning. Gcrow had considcrcd that mcssagc a dcnitc warning to bc on thc alcrt, not only against sabotagc, but also against a possiblc cncmy ocnsivc. Gcrow admittcd Shorts rcsponsc lclt no room lor misundcrstanding, hc had dcnitcly takcn all thc ncccssary prccautions against sabotagc 10 and sabotagc only. Gcncral Milcs, acting assistant chicl ol sta, G2, also tcsticd lor Clarkc. Milcs was thoroughly lamiliar with thc MAG!C intcr ccpts, but his mcmory was vcry hazy about whcthcr thc Vinds Mcssagc had bccn implcmcntcd, hc did not rcmcmbcr sccing any documcnt on it, any writtcn statcmcnt on it. 11 According to Milcs, 8ratton, chicl ol thc Far astcrn scction during this pcriod, sclcctcd thc important Ultra inlormation lor Marshall. 12
Milcs had known wc wcrc watching lor thc Japancsc rcply to thc Novcmbcr 26 U.S. ultimatum vcry cagcrly. 13 Hc lcarncd during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 that it was in, and hc had thc wholc 14part rcply whcn hc got to thc o cc thc ncxt morning. Signs that war was coming had bccn apparcnt cvcrywhcrc and thc Var cpartmcnt, Milcs said, had cvcn madc plans lor put ting ccnsorship into opcration and was training ccnsors. 14
9 !bid., p. 41. 10 !bid., p. 40. 11 !bid., p. 50. 12 !bid., p. 49. 13 !bid., p. 58. 14 !bid., p. 58. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 571 !n addition to qucstioning thc witncsscs scparatcly, Clarkc hcld a roundtablc discussion with Milcs, 8rigadicr Gcncral Haycs A. Kroncr (chicl, intclligcncc branch, military intclligcncc divi sion), Coloncl John T. 8isscll (chicl ol thc countcr intclligcncc group ol military intclligcncc), and 8rattonto iron out any littlc dicrcnccs that may havc appcarcd in thcir tcstimony. 15 For instancc, 8isscll and Kroncr had said that thc Ultra sccrct intcl ligcncc dcrivcd lrom MAG!C had not bccn madc availablc to thcm prior to Pcarl Harbor but 8ratton said it had bccnthrough mcmoranda conccrning subvcrsivc activitics. 8ratton rcportcd that MAG!C was rcgularly distributcd to thc top administration and military o cials. 16
Tcsc lour mcn, all conccrncd with somc aspcct ol prc war military intclligcncc, discusscd thcir prcattack vicw ol thc Japancsc thrcat. Although Kroncr hadnt sccn MAG!C himscll, hc kncw 8ratton and Milcs wcrc handling it and insisting it bc kcpt sccrct. 17 Vhcn ncws ol thc attack camc on cccmbcr 7, Kroncr had actually bccn rcading Milcss Novcmbcr 29 cstimatc ol thc Far astcrn situation, so hc rcmcmbcrcd distinctly that that cstimatc did not includc in thc lincs ol action opcn to Japan, an attack on Pcarl Harbor. 18
According to Milcs, thc bulk ol our inlormation, all ol it including Magic, indicatcd thc major probability ol a Japancsc movc to thc south, !ndo China, Siam, Tailand, pcrhaps thc utch Vcst |sic| (ast:) !ndics, pcrhaps Malaya. . . . Vc did not cxcludc war with thc Unitcd Statcs sincc wc spccically mcntioncd thc Philippincs as bcing part ol thc Japancsc southcrn push and in a war with thc Unitcd Statcs ol coursc thcrc was a possibility, particularly 15 !bid., p.72. 16 !bid., pp. 70, 72. 17 !bid., pp. 4248. 18 !bid., p. 48. 572 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy with thc Japancsc that a surprisc attack might bc madc any whcrc, ccrtainly including Hawaii which had bccn armcd and prcparcd lor such an attack lor twcnty ycars. 19
8ratton bclicvcd that initially . . . any attack against an Amcrican installation in thc middlc or castcrn Pacic would bc in thc naturc ol a divcr sion and having as its objcctivc thc immobilizing ol any lorcc that wc might call in to hclp thc utch and 8ritish in wcst and southwcst Pacic, but . . . thcir primary initial objcctivc was thc dcstruction ol Grcat 8ritains powcr in southcast Asia. 20
Clarkc qucstioncd witncsscs about thc clusivc Vinds xccutc. Cryptanalyst Fricdman had had no dircct knowlcdgc ol a Vinds xccutc himscll, hc had only lcarncd ol it com parativcly rcccntly in talking with Col. Sadtlcr and Capt. Saord ol thc Navy. 21 8ut hc had known monitoring stations had bccn alcrtcd to watch lor a Vinds Codc implcmcntation. Furthcr, hc said, a diligcnt scarch, il not a complctcly cxhaustivc scarch, had lailcd to nd a singlc bit ol cvidcncc to indicatc that an Army station actually intcrccptcd a Vinds xccutc mcssagc. 22
Coloncl tis K. Sadtlcr, chicl ol thc Army Communications Scrvicc at thc timc ol thc attack, told thc inquiry hc hcard lrom Admiral Noycs that thc mcssagc is in, mcaning that thc Vinds xccutc had bccn rcccivcd, and it said war would bc dcclarcd bctwccn Japan and Grcat 8ritain. Hc didnt say with thc Unitcd Statcs also, but hc couldnt vcrily that lor hc didnt know thc word in thc Japancsc tcxt. 23 Var was cxpcctcd in thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics too, by cccmbcr 5 thc utch had ordcrcd thc cxccution 19 !bid., p. 71. 20 !bid. 21 !bid., part 34, p. 34. 22 !bid., p. 36. 23 !bid., p. 68. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 573 ol thc Rainbow Plan, A2 |lor U.S. naval participation| . . . . a part ol thc joint Abducan plan only to bc takcn in thc cvcnt ol war. 24
Clarkc prcscntcd his ndings to Marshall on Scptcmbcr 20, 1944. Vhcn Marshall rcturncd to thc APH8 (Scptcmbcr 29 and ctobcr 2), his mcmory was rclrcshcd.
Tnv Ci~usvx !xvvs:ic~:iox (Novv:nvv :, +Svv:v:nvv +:, +) Tc APH8 rcport concludcd that Marshall, Gcrow, and Short had lailcd in thc pcrlormancc ol thcir dutics. 8oth FR and Stimson had bccn shockcd, thcy much prclcrrcd thc Robcrts Commission ndings that Kimmcl and Short wcrc rcsponsiblc lor thc cxtcnt ol thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr. Tus, Stimson dircctcd Major Clauscn, an attorncy who had scrvcd as assistant rccordcr lor thc APH8 to look into uncxplorcd lcads in thc Pcarl Harbor situation. 25 Tc invcstigation was to bc limitcd strictly to mattcrs which havc a bcaring on thc part that Army pcrsonncl, organiza tion, or action may havc had in thc disastcr. 26 Clauscns assignmcnt was classicd an cmcrgcncy war mission, 27 hc had an unlimitcd cxpcnsc account, pcrmission to travcl in and out ol thc war thc atcrs, pcrsons intcrrogatcd by Clauscn wcrc to answcr his inqui rics lully, all papcrs, sccrct or top sccrct, wcrc to bc lurnishcd him, any prcscnt dircctivcs to thc contrary notwithstanding. 28 His invcstigation appcars to havc bccn aimcd primarily at cxploring 24 !bid., part 34, pp. 60, 63. Tcstimony ol Lt. Robcrt H. cll. 25 !bid., part 35, p. 5. 26 !bid., p. 7, Stimson Fcbruary 6, 1944, lcttcr to Navy Sccrctary. 27 !bid., p. 9. 28 !bid., p. 5. Stimsons dircctions to assistant chicl ol sta, G2, rc Clauscns assignmcnt. 574 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc proccdurc lor distributing MAG!C, in ordcr to discovcr who was rcsponsiblc lor dclivcring to Marshall thc crucial cccmbcr 67 intcrccpts, and il thcy had not bccn promptly dclivcrcd, why not. Clauscns qucstions also indicatcd conccrn with thc inlorma tion providcd, or not providcd, to Short. For almost tcn months, Novcmbcr 23, 1944, to Scptcmbcr 12, 1945, Clauscn travclcd ovcr 55,000 milcs by air and intcrvicwcd 92 Army, Navy and civilian pcrsonncl, 52 ol whom prcscntcd thcir rccollcctions ol prcPcarl Harbor cvcnts in sworn a da vits. 29 From timc to timc, Clauscn rcportcd to Stimsons spccial assistant. Major Clauscn was promotcd to Licutcnant Coloncl by March 24, 1945. 30
nc ol Clauscns rst intcrvicwccs was Coloncl Carlislc C. uscnbury, 8rattons assistant. uscnbury said hc and 8ratton altcrnatcd in asscmbling and dclivcring thcsc intcrccpts . . . daily about lty to scvcntyvc ol thcsc intcrccpts . . . sortcd to about twcntyvc lor distribution. uscnbury rccallcd that thc 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply startcd coming in on thc night ol 6 cccmbcr 1941. Hc and 8ratton wcrc both on duty. uscnbury said 8ratton rcmaincd until about hall ol it had bccn rcccivcd. Tcrcupon, hc lclt and wcnt homc at about 9 v.:. uscnbury staycd and waitcd lor thc rcmaindcr. Tc lourtccnth part, bcing thc nal part ol thc mcssagc, was rcccivcd about 12 that night. Tcrcupon ! lclt and wcnt homc. . . . Nonc ol thcsc parts comprising this intcrccpt was dclivcrcd bclorc thc morning ol 7 cccmbcr 1941 bccausc thc rst hall had bccn rcccivcd whilc Coloncl 8ratton was on duty and hc had sccn this and had not had it dclivcrcd that night. . . . ! did not wish to disturb thc usual rccipicnts who wcrc probably at 29 !bid., p. 1, 2021. 30 !bid., p. 10, Stimson March 24, 1944, mcmorandum. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 575 homc aslccp, as ! did not scc thc implications ol immcdiatc hostilitics. 31
uscnburys a davit contradictcd 8rattons prcvious tcs timony bclorc both thc APH8 and thc Clarkc invcstigation. 8ratton had told Clarkc that hc had transmittcd to thc sccrctary ol statc a copy ol thc rst 13 parts thc night thcy wcrc rcccivcd. 32
Two wccks latcr, hc had told thc APH8 that hc had also dclivcrcd thc 13 parts to thc o cc ol thc Chicl ol Sta |Marshall|, |and| thc A.C. ol S., G2 |Milcs|. 33 Tcn a lcw days latcr, hc had told thc APH8 that hc rccallcd that Marshall, Milcs, and Gcrow got thcir copics thc cvcning ol thc 6th. !t was his practicc, 8ratton said to dclivcr to thcm thcir copics |ol thc Japancsc intcrccpts| bclorc ! wcnt to thc Statc cpartmcnt. 34
!n March, Clauscn sccurcd thc a davit ol 8rigadicr Gcncral Charlcs K. Gailcy, a major and Gcrows cxccutivc o ccr on cccmbcr 6. Tc a davit signcd by Gailcy, but unqucstion ably draltcd by Clauscn, statcd that it was Gailcys customary practicc to dclivcr to Gcrow as soon as practicablc thc dcci phcrcd and translatcd Japancsc intcrccpts rcccivcd lrom 8ratton or uscnbury. Gailcy did not rccall having rcccivcd any pouch or intcrccpts lrom Coloncl 8ratton or Coloncl uscnbury or lrom any othcr sourcc on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Gailcy was ccr tain that il Gcrow hadnt rcccivcd any intcrccpts that cvcning, thcy hadnt bccn dclivcrcd to him, as, il thcy had bccn, ! would havc givcn thcm to him |Gcrow|. 35
Clauscn thcn cw to thc Pacic thcatcr, Guam and Honolulu. Hc was in thc Philippincs on \ ay, and lrom thcrc hc cw to Gcrmany, Francc, !taly, and ngland. 31 !bid., pp. 2526. 32 !bid., part 34, p. 21. 33 !bid., part 29, p. 2349. 34 !bid., p. 2421. 35 !bid., part 35, pp. 3940. 576 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy !n Junc, at Mainz, Gcrmany, Clauscn tacklcd Valtcr 8cdcll Smith, who had bccn Marshalls sta sccrctary in cccmbcr 1941 and had riscn rapidly in thc ranks. 8y thcn, hc was a licutcn ant gcncral and iscnhowcrs chicl ol sta. n cccmbcr 67, 1941, 8cdcll Smith and his assistants wcrc supposcd to maintain a 24hour watch outsidc Marshalls o cc, know whcrc Marshall was at all timcs and scc that important mcssagcs rcachcd him promptly. Clauscn summarizcd, lor 8cdcll Smith, 8rattons tcs timony bclorc thc APH8. 8cdcll Smith thcn gavc Clauscn an a davit sctting lorth, not his rccollcctions ol thc prcattack situ ation, but rathcr his usual practicc lor handling thc pouchcs ol scnsitivc matcrial intcndcd lor Marshall. Vhcn instructcd that thc contcnts should rcach him at oncc . . . thc uty ccr ol thc Gcncral Sta Sccrctariat would takc thc pouchcs to Gcncral Marshall at his quartcrs or whcrcvcr hc happcncd to bc. . . . 8oth ! myscll and thc Assistant Sccrctarics undcrstood that thcsc pouchcs containcd inlormation ol such valuc and importancc that thcy should bc shown to thc Chicl ol Sta without dclay. 36 8cdcll Smith had no rccollcction ol having rcccivcd, or known ol, an urgcnt dclivcry on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. To thc bcst ol my rccollcction, hc sworc, ! lclt thc o cc at thc usual timc on thc cvcning ol 6 cc. 41, that is about 7:00 v.:., turning ovcr to thc Night uty ccr. 8cdcll Smith was quitc ccrtain that ! was not at thc o cc altcr 10:00 v.:. !l thc intcrccptcd radio mcssagc rclcrrcd to by Coloncl 8ratton was dclivcrcd cithcr to mc or to thc Night uty ccr, it would havc bccn dclivcrcd in thc lockcd cnvclopc . . . to thc Chicl ol Sta in accordancc with our usual proccdurc, cithcr by thc o ccr on duty or by Coloncl 8ratton himscll. 37
36 !bid., p. 91. Smiths Junc 15, 1945, a davit. 37 !bid. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 577 !n his rolc as sccrctary to thc chicl ol sta, 8cdcll Smith had scvcral assistant sccrctarics. nc ol thcm must havc bccn on duty that night. 8ut Clauscn intcrvicwcd only onc, John R. canc, who had not bccn on duty that night. 38
Gcrow had bccn chicl ol army war plans in 1941. Vhcn Clauscn sccurcd Gcrows a davit, at Canncs, Francc, Gcrow was both positivc and dircct. uring Novcmbcr and cccmbcr 1941 hc had rcccivcd and rcvicwcd thc MAG!C intcrccpts in thcir raw, uncvaluatcd lorm, and had always rcturncd thcm promptly to G2. Hc rccallcd sccing thc rcqucsts lrom Tokyo lor rcports on ship movcmcnts at Pcarl Harbor, but as thcsc rclatcd cspc cially to Navy, ! assumcd that thc Navy was lully cognizant, and would intcrprct this inlormation. Howcvcr, Gcrow did not con sidcr Pcarl Harbor to bc Japans only intcrcst, hc rccallcd similar inquirics madc ol Japancsc consuls at Manila and Scattlc. Gcrow did not rcmcmbcr convcrsations with cithcr 8ratton on cccmbcr 4 or Sadtlcr on cccmbcr 5 conccrning alarming Japancsc intcrccpts, at which timc Gcrow had rcplicd that su cicnt warnings had alrcady bccn scnt to thc ovcrscas command crs. !n his opinion, howcvcr, thc Var cpartmcnt had scnt amplc warnings to thc ovcrscas commandcrs, including Gcncral Short. . . . Gcncral Short at no timc inlormcd thc Var cpartmcnt that hc was not in lull agrccmcnt with Var cpartmcnt cstimatcs and plans lor thc dclcnsc ol ahu. Conccrning thc MAG!C mcssagcs, Gcrow again warncd that it was ncccssary to guard most carclully against compromising thc sourcc ol this cxtrcmcly valuablc intclligcncc. 39 Hc did not rccall sccing thc 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply to our ultimatum bclorc thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. 38 !bid., p. 96, cancs July 24, 1945, a davit. 39 !bid., p. 93. 578 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy !n July in Paris, Clauscn intcrvicwcd 8ratton. Hc showcd 8ratton tcn a davits hc had collcctcd bcaring on thc Vinds Codc mcssagc and dclivcry ol thc 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply to our ultimatumthc vc alrcady mcntioncd (uscnbury, Gailcy, 8cdcll Smith, Gcrow, and canc) and vc othcrs by Army o ccrs who said thcy couldnt rccall dctails ol prcattack cvcnts. Tcsc a davits did not rcally dicr lrom 8rattons APH8 tcstimony, lor most ol thc o ccrs didnt answcr Clauscns qucstions dircctly. nly uscnburys a davit actually conictcd with 8rattons prc vious statcmcnts, and whcn uscnbury crrcd, 8ratton pointcd that out. Clauscn usually typcd thc a davits, somctimcs rctyp ing thcm whcn an intcrvicwcc rcqucstcd changcs. At thc Joint Congrcssional Committcc 8ratton rccallcd: |!| dictatcd what ! thought ! should say, making corrcctions as wc wcnt along. Finally wc got it all in shapc in pcncil. Tcn hc |Clauscn| put a piccc ol papcr into thc typcwritcr and typcd thc a davit. 8ratton madc somc lurthcr suggcstions and corrcctions, only altcr 8ratton was satiscd that thc a davit rcprcscntcd his bcst rccollcction did hc sign it. 40
Tc Japancsc rcply to our ultimatum, 8ratton said in his a davit, startcd coming in lrom thc Navy thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Hc and uscnbury wcrc on duty togcthcr. 8rattons account dicrcd lrom uscnburys. Altcr rcccipt ol thc 13th part, 8ratton dctcrmincd lrom S!S that thc 14th part was not likcly to comc in that night. 8ratton and uscnbury thcn asscmblcd thc 13 parts in prcparation lor dclivcry to thc authorizcd rccipicnts. 8ratton dircctcd Coloncl uscnbury to dclivcr thc sct lor thc Chicl ol Sta |Marshall| to his homc at Fort Mycr that night as Coloncl uscnbury wcnt to his homc in Arlington. Tis was about 10:00 v.:. 40 !bid., part 10, p. 4616. 8ratton bclorc thc Joint Committcc. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 579 8ratton said in his a davit that thc only sct hc dclivcrcd that cvcning was to thc sccrctary ol statc, bctwccn 10:00 and 11:00 v.:. to thc Statc cpartmcnt night duty o ccr. Tc scts lor Milcs, Gcrow, and Stimson, 8ratton said, wcrc not dclivcrcd thc night ol 6 cccmbcr 1941, but wcrc dclivcrcd thc ncxt morning, 7 cccmbcr 1941, with thc lourtccnth part. 8ratton concludcd his a davit: Any prior statcmcnts or tcstimony ol minc which may bc con trary to my statcmcnts hcrc . . . should bc modicd and con sidcrcd changcd in accordancc with my statcmcnts hcrcin. Tis a davit now rcprcscnts my bcst rccollcctions ol thc mattcrs and cvcnts sct lorth . . . altcr having my mcmory rclrcshcd in scvcral ways and rcspccts. 41
~viv Aucus: vouxb Ci~usvx n~cx ix :nv Uxi:vb S:~:vs !n thc a davit Coloncl Sadtlcr, a signal corps o ccr at thc timc ol thc attack, signcd lor Clauscn in August in Vashington, .C., hc discusscd a possiblc Vinds Codc cxccutc mcssagc that Noycs had givcn him on cccmbcr 5, 1941. Sadtlcr was alrcady alarmcd by thc scrics ol Japancsc diplomatic and consular intcrccpts which ! had bccn rcading ovcr a considcrablc pcriod ol timc, and thc mounting tcnsion, and thc inlormation which Admiral Noycs had just givcn mc. Altcr conlcrring with Milcs and 8ratton, hc had gonc to his o cc and pcrsonally typcd a proposcd warning which ! intcndcd to rccommcnd bc scnt to thc ovcrscas commandcrs. 42 According to Sadtlcrs rccollcction, it rcad substantially as lollows: 41 !bid., part 35, pp. 9798. 42 !bid., pp. 9899, August 13, 1945, a davit. 580 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy C.G.P.!., HawaiiPanama. Rcliablc inlormation indicatcs war with Japan in thc vcry ncar luturc stop takc cvcry prccau tion to prcvcnt a rcpctition ol Port Arthur stop notily thc Navy. Marshall. Sadtlcr hadnt shown his dralt warning to anyonc in 1941, and hc had madc no copy at thc timc. Howcvcr, hc tcsticd hc had talkcd with Gcrow and 8cdcll Smith altcr dralting it. Howcvcr, in Junc 1945, ncithcr Gcrow nor 8cdcll Smith rcmcmbcrcd such a convcrsation with Sadtlcr 43 and altcr rcading thc Gcrow and 8cdcll Smith a davits Sadtlcr bclicvcd thcy wcrc corrcct in say ing that hc had not talkcd with thcm about it in cccmbcr 1941. Morcovcr, Gcrow didnt bclicvc that Sadtlcr, purcly a Signal Corps o ccr, should bc conccrncd with thc disscmination or intcrprctation ol Magic. 44
Sadtlcr also dcnicd hc had cvcr urgcd Gcncral Shcrman Milcs, G2, or any othcr rcprcscntativc ol G2, to scnd any warn ing mcssagc to thc ovcrscas commandcrs. Hc dcnicd that hc had madc lurthcr corts to obtain thc |Vinds| cxccutc mcssagc mcntioncd by Admiral Noycs. And hc dcnicd Fricdmans statc mcnt to Clarkc that hc, Sadtlcr, had matcrial in a salc dcposit box conccrning thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr. 45
Clauscn was in Vashington on \J day, his invcstigation almost ovcr. 8ut hc wcnt to 8oston to intcrvicw Major Gcncral Milcs, brigadicr gcncral and chicl ol army intclligcncc in 1941. Milcs said that on thc instructions ol Marshall, transmittcd through Gcncral smun and Coloncl Clarkc ol G2, hc had said nothing to thc APH8 about thc topsccrct MAG!C sourccs. Hc had known about thc 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 bccausc hc had bccn dining that cvc ning at Admiral Vilkinsons homc. Admiral 8cardall, FRs 43 !bid., p. 91, Junc 15, 1945 a davit. 44 !bid., p. 92, Junc 20, 1945 a davit. 45 !bid., pp. 99100. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 581 aidc, who was thcrc also, had brought it to Vilkinsons attcntion, and Vilkinson had shown it to Milcs. Milcs had bccn undcr thc imprcssion that bclorc cccmbcr 7 thc Navy in Hawaii had bccn intcrccpting, dccrypting, dccoding, and translating Japancsc dip lomatic and consular mcssagcs. 46
8ack in Vashington, Clauscn mct with Marshall. !n his a davit Marshall said that whcn hc rst appcarcd bclorc thc APH8 on August 7, 1944, hc had inlormcd thc voting mcmbcrs in a onchour closcd scssion ol thc charactcr ol inlormation which had bccn dcrivcd bclorc 7 cccmbcr 1941 lrom Top Sccrct sourccs thcn callcd Magic. !n that bricl mccting, Marshall said, hc did not cxplain thc naturc ol thc inlormation glcancd lrom thcsc sourccs cxccpt to say that ncithcr this inlormation nor thc sourcc thcrcol should bc madc public bccausc it would rcsult in at lcast tcmporarily, il not pcrmancntly, cxtinguishing that sourcc. According to Marshall, it was not until it dcvclopcd that thc Magic papcrs wcrc bcing discloscd bclorc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry that Army o ccrs conccrncd with MAG!C had bccn authorizcd to go into all thc dctails rcgarding Magic. 47
Marshall statcd that it had bccn his undcrstanding that in thc pcriod prcccding 7 cccmbcr 1941 . . . thc Commanding Gcncral ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt |Short| was awarc ol and was rccciving somc ol this inlormation lrom lacilitics availablc in his command. !n this Marshall was mistakcn. 48 Marshall told Clauscn that hc had adviscd Short by corrcspondcncc (Fcbruary 7 and March 5, 1941) ol thc 46 !bid., pp. 10102. 47 !bid., pp. 10405. 48 !bid. 582 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy risk ol sabotagc and thc risk involvcd in a surprisc raid by air and by submarinc. . . . At no timc did Gcncral Short inlorm mc or, to my knowlcdgc, anyonc clsc in thc Var cpartmcnt that hc was not in lull agrccmcnt with thcsc Var cpartmcnt cstimatcs and plans lor thc dclcnsc ol ahu, which in ccct warncd him to cxpcct air and submarinc attacks as primary thrcats in thc cvcnt ol war with Japan. 49
Marshall did not say whcthcr hc had scnt Short any advicc or warning latcr than Fcbruary or March 1941 conccrning thc impcnding crisis. Howcvcr, Marshall did say that Shorts assis tant G2 o ccr, Coloncl Gcorgc V. 8ickncll, had sccn a Navy wirc scnt to Pcarl Harbor on or about cccmbcr 3, 1941, con ccrning instructions to thc Japancsc diplomatic rcprcscntativcs in thc southwcst Pacic, Vashington, and London to burn thcir codcs and ciphcrs. 50
Clauscns invcstigation had sct out to look into uncxplorcd lcads, primarily lor Marshalls bcnct, about MAG!C and cspc cially about thc Japancsc rcsponsc to thc U.S. ultimatum. Hc tricd to discovcr to whom it had bccn dclivcrcd on cccmbcr 67. Clauscn had also inquircd altcr thc Vinds Codc and its implcmcntation, thc Vinds Codc xccutc. And hc had askcd what inlormation had bccn lurnishcd Gcncral Short in Hawaii conccrning thc impcnding crisis. Although many qucstions rcmaincd unanswcrcd, thc Clauscn a davits did ocr two pos siblc cxcuscs lor Marshalls lailurc to notily Short ol thc dcvclop ing cccmbcr 67 crisis: 1. 8ratton and uscnbury had bccn rcmiss in not dclivcring thc important 13part Japancsc dispatch to Marshall on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. 49 !bid. 50 !bid. Scc also p. 30, 8icknclls Fcbruary 25, 1945, a davit lor Clauscn. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 583 2. Vashington o cials, including Marshall and Milcs, bclicvcd that thc Japancsc mcssagcs wcrc bcing intcrccptcd and dccryptcd in Hawaii.
Tnv Hvwi:: !xguivv (M~v + :o Juiv ++, +) Upon thc complction ol thc Navy Court ol !nquirys rcport, Sccrctary ol thc Navy Forrcstal lound crrors ol judgmcnt on thc part ol ccrtain o ccrs in thc Naval Scrvicc, both at Pcarl Harbor and at Vashington. Tc Sccrctary has lurthcr lound that thc prcvious invcstigations havc not cxhaustcd all possiblc cvidcncc. . . . |and| has dccidcd that thc |NC!| invcstigation . . . should bc lurthcr continucd until thc tcstimony ol cvcry witncss in posscssion ol matcrial lacts can bc obtaincd and all possiblc cvidcncc cxhaustcd. 51
Tcrclorc, Forrcstal on May 2, 1945, appointcd Admiral H. Kcnt Hcwitt, U.S. Navy, as invcstigating o ccr, with John F. Sonnctt as counscl, and Licutcnant John Ford 8acchcr, USNR, as assistant counscl, to cxaminc such witncsscs and to obtain such othcr cvidcncc as might bc ncccs sary in ordcr to lully dcvclop thc lacts in conncction with thc Japancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor. 52
Altcr rcvicwing thc ndings ol thc prcvious invcstigations, Hcwitt dccidcd his task was to cxplorc lurthcr what inlorma tion was availablc in Vashington and at Pcarl Harbor bclorc thc attack, to ask spccically about intcrccptcd Japancsc tclcphonc and cablc mcssagcs, cspccially thc Vinds Codc, to nd out 51 !bid., part 36, p. 359, Forrcstals May 2,1945, mcmorandum to Admiral H. Kcnt Hcwitt. 52 !bid., p. 364. 584 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy whcthcr or not Japancsc submarincs had bccn opcrating in and around Pcarl Harbor prior to cccmbcr 7, and also to dctcrminc Kimmcls undcrstanding ol various plans lor thc dclcnsc ol thc cct. 53 Vith thcsc goals in mind, Hcwitt took tcstimony lrom 39 witncsscs ovcr 26 days, lrom May 14 to July 11. 54
As thc Hcwitt !nquiry opcncd, Captain Arthur H. McCollum, who in cccmbcr 1941 had bccn thc ccrinChargc ol thc Far astcrn Scction ol thc ivision ol Naval !ntclligcncc, Navy cpartmcnt, rcvicwcd thc intclligcncc thcn availablc conccrn ing thc Far ast. Hawaii was dcpcndcnt on data dcrivcd lrom dircction ndcrs, radio intclligcncc ol cct activitics conrmcd latcr by ncwspapcr accounts, and inlormation lrom Vashington. 8clorc thc war startcd on cccmbcr 7, thcy wcrc not pcrmittcd by U.S. law to tap tclcphoncs or intcrccpt mcssagcs to or lrom thc Japancsc consul in Honolulu. Hawaii did not havc a Purplc machinc, which would havc givcn thcm acccss to Japancsc dip lomatic mcssagcs. Mcssagcs in othcr codcs that could not bc dccodcd in Hawaii wcrc mailcd to Vashington lor dccrypting. Altcr thc imposition ol thc U.S. cmbargocs on Japancsc tradc and thc outbrcak ol war in uropc, lcw Japancsc mcrchant vcs scls ploughcd thc scas, lcw Japancsc ships crosscd thc Pacic to ports in thc Amcricas, and U.S. ships no longcr travcrscd thc north Pacic. Tus wc had lost thc mcans ol kccping track ol thc lcw Japancsc ships that wcrc still sailing, as wcll as thc cycs ol obscrvcr agcnts at various ports in Asia. 55
Givcn his position at thc timc ol thc attack, Captain McCollum was ablc to kccp abrcast ol dcvclopmcnts in U.S.Japancsc rcla tions. Vhcn McCollum appcarcd bclorc thc Hcwitt inquiry on May 15 hc brought with him an analysis ol thc situation as it lookcd to mc at that timc which hc had submittcd on cccmbcr 53 !bid., pp. 79. 54 !bid., pp. 7355, 361, 57374. 55 !bid., pp. 1315. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 585 1, 1941, to Admiral Vilkinson, dircctor ol naval intclligcncc. Hc and Vilkinson had thcn mct with Stark and urgcd that a dis patch ol warning bc scnt to thc cct. Stark assurcd thcm that such a dispatch had bccn scnt on thc 27th ol Novcmbcr which dcnitcly includcd thc tcrm, Tis is a war warning. Subscqucnt to this, McCollum said, thc situation lurthcr dctcrioratcd. Hc and Vilkinson did scnd dispatchcs out to our naval attachcs and various naval agcncics throughout thc Far ast dirccting that thcy dcstroy all thcir codcs and ciphcrs. Tis was |s|omc timc altcr thc 1st |ol cccmbcr|, possibly around thc 4th. 56
Rcgarding thc Vinds Codc, thcrc was no doubt that thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt sct up a schcmc ol wcathcr words with hid dcn mcanings. Yct, mystcry and conlusion surroundcd practically cvcry othcr aspcct ol thc mattcr. According to McCollum, |!|n onc instancc it |thc wcathcr codc| mcant war with Russia, in thc ncxt instancc it mcant war with ngland, and anothcr onc . . . it mcant war with thc Unitcd Statcs. Tosc wcrc thc thrcc possibilitics. 8ut a litcral translation ol thc Japancsc did not actually say war. McCollum wcnt on. !nstcad ol war, thc tcrm uscd was, !n casc rclations arc in dangcr,. . . . Tcrc is thc vcrbatim translation, in Japancsc this says, !n casc thcrc is dangcr ol cutting o our dip lomatic rclations. 57
Vhcn Hcwitt qucstioncd Captain Saord about thc Vinds Codc mcssagc, Saord insistcd, as hc had in carlicr hcarings, that a Vinds xccutc had bccn rcccivcd bclorc thc attack, that it mcntioncd thc Unitcd Statcs, that it mcant war, that hc and Kramcr had lookcd at it togcthcr, that it had bccn dclivcrcd to ircctor ol Naval Communications Admiral Noycs, that latcr hc, Saord, could nd no rclcrcncc to thc Vinds Codc xccutc in 56 !bid., pp. 1819. 57 !bid., p. 23. 586 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc lcs, and that hc had bccn unablc to locatc any copics ol it at all. 58 Saord couldnt undcrstand what could havc happcncd to thcm. Vhcn Kramcr tcsticd bclorc thc NC! in Hawaii dur ing thc summcr ol 1944, hc had not hcsitatcd to say that thc Vinds xccutc had bccn rcccivcd and that it rclcrrcd to thc Unitcd Statcs as wcll as to Grcat 8ritain. 8ut a ycar latcr, bclorc thc Hcwitt inquiry, hc was lcss positivc ol that now. Kramcr did rccall dcnitcly bcing shown such a mcssagc by thc GY watch o ccr and walking down with him to Saords o cc and bcing prcscnt whilc thc GY watch o ccr turncd it ovcr to him. A bricl convcrsation cnsucd and thcn Saord had takcn thc mcs sagc, Kramcr assumcd, to Noycs. And that was thc last Kramcr saw ol it. Hc did not rccall thc prccisc wording ol that mcssagc. Hc had a rathcr sharp rccollcction in thc lattcr part ol that wcck |cccmbcr 17, 1941| ol lccling thcrc was still no ovcrt mcntion or spccic mcntion ol thc Unitcd Statcs in any ol this tra c. His rccollcction was no longcr clcar, hc was undcr thc imprcssion that thc mcssagc rclcrrcd to ngland and possibly thc utch rathcr than thc Unitcd Statcs, although it may havc rclcrrcd to thc Unitcd Statcs, too. 59
!l a Vinds xccutc was rcccivcd, as Saord claimcd, hc was undcr thc imprcssion that it had bccn turncd ovcr to thc Robcrts Commission. 60 8ut within thc past month Kramcr had told Saord that a copy ol thc winds mcssagc and othcr papcrs rclativc to thc brcak in diplomatic rclations with Japan wcrc not turncd ovcr to thc Robcrts Commission but wcrc givcn to Assistant Sccrctary ol thc Navy Forrcstal about 9 cccmbcr 1941 whilc 58 !bid., pp. 6877. 59 !bid., p. 81. 60 !bid., p.71. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 587 hc was Acting Sccrctary in thc abscncc ol Mr. Knox who had own to Hawaii. 61
Tis is likcly bccausc, according to Forrcstals schcdulc ol appointmcnts, hc saw both Kramcr and McCollum on cccmbcr 10, 1941. 62
Many arguc that thc rcason no copics ol a Vinds xccutc havc bccn lound in thc lcs is bccausc Tokyo did not scnd onc. !t may also bc, as Kramcr inlormcd Saord on anothcr occasion, that no writtcn copy was lurnishcd thc Army and no writtcn copy was distributcd in thc Navy cpartmcnt in thc customary manncr bccausc Admiral Noycs had givcn spccic ordcrs not to do so and that hc would handlc disscmination ol this mcs sagc himscll. 63
Saord told Hcwitt that hc had hcard through Fricdman, cryptanalyst, that writtcn copics ol thc winds mcssagc had bccn dcstroycd in thc Var cpartmcnt by thcn Coloncl 8isscll on thc dircct ordcrs ol Gcncral Marshall. 64
Villiam F. Fricdman, Chicl Cryptanalyst, had bccn rcsponsi blc, with his tcam in thc Army cryptoanalytic burcau, 65 lor having dcciphcrcd altcr 1820 months ol hard conccntration, thc pur plc (diplomatic) codc in August 1940. Fricdman tcsticd bclorc Hcwitt on Junc 22, 1945: Captain Saord indicatcd that . . . thcrc had bccn a winds cxccutc mcssagc, that no copics ol it wcrc to bc lound in thc Navy lcs, and that ncvcrthclcss thcrc had bccn tcstimony to 61 !bid. 62 Forrcstals appointmcnt rccords (Princcton Univcrsity Library). 63 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 72, Saord tcstimony. 64 !bid., p. 70. 65 !bid., part 34, pp. 8485. 588 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc ccct that it had bccn intcrccptcd. His story was that it was intcrccptcd by onc ol thcir ast Coast stations, hc bclicvcd, and was promptly lorwardcd into Vashington. . . .|H|c |Saord| indicatcd that it not only had thc a rmativc lor brcak in rcla tions bctwccn Japan and thc Unitcd Statcs, but it also had a ncgativc lor a brcak in rclations bctwccn Japan and Russia. 66
Fricdman thcn said hc had had a convcrsation about a ycar and a hall ago with Coloncl Sadtlcr who had indicatcd that thc winds codc cxccutc mcssagc had comc in somc timc on thc 4th or 5th ol cccmbcr . . . that hc hadnt himscll sccn a copy, but that hc had bccn told by somcbody that thc copics had bccn ordcrcd or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. (!talics addcd) Fricdman said hc had rcgardcd this as mcrcly hcarsay cvi dcncc and nothing morc than that, highly inconccivablc. . . . ! probably just passcd that |story| out |to Saord| as onc ol thosc crazy things that gct startcd. Fricdman said hc shouldnt havc donc it, hc ccrtainly had no idca that hc |Saord| would rcpcat it. 67
As a rcsult ol this Junc 22, 1945, tcstimony by Fricdman, thc Clarkc invcstigation was latcr rcopcncd to invcstigatc thc chargcs. Hcwitt was intcrcstcd also in thc dclivcry ol thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Tc 14th part ol thc Japancsc rcply was coming in whcn McCollum arrivcd at his o cc carly Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7. Vhilc hc and Vilkinson wcrc discussing thc situ ation with Stark, about 8:30 to 9:00, thc dispatch dirccting thc Japancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thcir rcply to Hull at prcciscly 1 v.:. was brought in. Stark immcdiatcly callcd thc Vhitc Housc. 66 !bid., part 36, pp. 30506 (Hcwitt). 67 !bid. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 589 At thc timc, thc possiblc signicancc ol thc timc ol dclivcry was pointcd out to all hands. . . . |V|c didnt know what this signicd, but that il an attack wcrc coming, it lookcd likc thc timing was such that it was timcd lor opcrations in thc Far ast and possibly on Hawaii. 68 Kramcr told Hcwitt a similar story. Vhilc thc loldcrs lor thc rccipicnts ol MAG!C intcrccpts wcrc bcing madc up that morn ing, hc rccallcd drawing a navigators timc circlc to scc il this 1:00 v.:. Vashington timc ticd up at all with thc dcvclopmcnts in thc Malay arca, which wc had bccn lollowing in considcrablc dctail thc prcvious wcck. Hc was imprcsscd with thc lact that 1:00 v.:. hcrc was scvcral hours bclorc sunrisc in thc Kra Pcninsula arca, whcrc wc kncw thc Japancsc had bccn contcmplating an attack on Kota 8haru with thc connivancc ol thc Taiian Chicl ol Sta. Tat lurthcr ticd up with thc movcmcnt ol a largc Japancsc convoy down thc coast ol China thc prcvious thrcc or lour days. Vhcn dclivcring thc loldcr lor Knox, who was thcn at a mccting in thc Statc cpartmcnt, Kramcr also pointcd out thc timc at various points in thc Pacic whcn it was 1:00 v.:. in Vashington. Hc may havc mcntioncd thc timc dicrcncc to cight or tcn othcrs, including McCollum, 8ratton, scvcral pcoplc in thc Statc cpartmcnt, possibly Vilkinson, Stark, and, hc thought, Saord. 69
All thosc qucstioncd by Hcwitt who had bccn stationcd in Hawaii at thc timc ol thc attack wcrc wcll awarc that Japan was on thc vcrgc ol going to war with somconc somcwhcrc. Captain Rochclort, who had bccn in chargc ol communication intclli gcncc in Hawaii, notcd that |o|n cccmbcr 1 all scrvicc radio calls wcrc changcd, and that this indicatcd an additional progrcs 68 !bid., pp. 2526. 69 !bid., p. 84. 590 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy sivc stcp in prcparing lor activc opcrations on a largc scalc. 70
According to Rochclort, it was gcncrally agrccd that thcrc was a dcnitc ocnsivc movcmcnt in thc works. Tc only crror madc was in thc dircction. 71 All attcntion had bccn turncd toward thc lar wcst, thc Philippincs, Malaysia, and Tailand. Captain Layton, who had bccn cct intclligcncc o ccr lor Pacic Flcct, at thc timc ol thc attack, also tcsticd bclorc Hcwitt that thc Japancsc Navy had changcd all calls only onc month altcr thc prcvious changcsix months had bccn thc usual pcriod. To Layton, scrvicc calls lasting only onc month indicatcd pro grcssivc stcps in prcparing lor activc opcrations on a largc scalc. 72
Vhcn hc lcarncd during thc rst wcck ol cccmbcr that thc Japancsc consul in Hawaii was burning papcrs, hc said, Tat ts thc picturc that thc Japancsc arc prcparing lor somcthing, dcstroy ing thcir codcs. 73 Layton said thcrc had bccn scvcral rcports ol unidcnticd submarinc soundings in Hawaiian watcrs. 74
McCollum tcsticd that wc had suspcctcd lor somc timc that Japancsc submarincs wcrc kccping our cct bascd in Pcarl Harbor undcr obscrvation. 75 \icc Admiral Charlcs H. McMorris, who had bccn war plans o ccr lor CincPac at thc timc ol thc attack, told Hcwitt hc considcrcd it highly important to maintain anti submarinc patrols in thc opcrating arcas. 76 Hc thought an air attack on Pcarl Harbor possiblc but not probablc and that thc cct should not takc as its solc objcct ol cxistcncc thc dclcnsc ol itscll against a surprisc attack, but that it should also carry 70 !bid., p. 35. 71 !bid., p. 37. 72 !bid., p. 128. 73 !bid., p. 137. 74 !bid., pp. 16465. 75 !bid., p. 20. 76 !bid., p. 182. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 591 on othcr lundamcntal dutics. 77 Admiral Patrick N.L. 8cllingcr, commandcr ol thc Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc, acknowlcdgcd that thcrc had bccn sound contacts, indicating thc possiblc prcscncc ol submarincs, but most such rcports wcrc unconrmcd: |N|o submarinc was cvcr sccn. 78 Ncvcrthclcss, thc thrcat ol a submarinc raid was widcly acknowlcdgcd as rcal, much morc rcal than thc likclihood ol an attack by air. Many othcr witncsscs conccdcd that an air attack on Pcarl Harbor was possiblc but not probablc. Kimmcls chicl ol sta, Admiral Villiam V. Smith, tcsticd: Vc wcrc particularly guarding against thcir submarinc raids in thc arca. . . . Vc bclicvcd that that was Japans rst attack to bc madc upon us and wc madc cvcry cort to guard against it. 79 Smith kncw ol no onc in this arca who rcally bclicvcd thcrc would bc a hostilc air attack on thc Hawaiian !slands. 80
Hcwitts inquiry rcvcalcd that thc Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc pcration Plan, submittcd April 9, 1941, by a group hcadcd by 8cllingcr, anticipatcd a possiblc air attack by plancs launchcd lrom onc or morc carricrs which would probably approach insidc ol thrcc hundrcd milcs. . . . A singlc submarinc attack might indicatc thc prcscncc ol a considcrablc undiscov crcd surlacc lorcc probably composcd ol last ships accompa nicd by a carricr. Tis plan ol opcrations pointcd out that such an attack at dawn ocrcd a high probability that it could bc dclivcrcd as a complctc surprisc . . . and that it might nd us in a condi tion ol rcadincss undcr which pursuit would bc slow to start. 81
77 !bid., p. 193. 78 !bid., p. 293. 79 !bid., p. 201. 80 !bid., pp. 205, 212, 220. 81 !bid., part 37, p. 949. 592 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tis sccnario was lollowcd almost prcciscly on cccmbcr 7. Tc sighting and sinking, shortly before dawn, ol a Japancsc subma rinc by thc dcstroycr Ward, was lollowcd vcry shortly after dawn by thc surprisc attack on Pcarl Harbor by plancs launchcd lrom carricrs about 200 milcs away. !t was acknowlcdgcd that Tc mission ol thc Army on ahu is to dclcnd thc Pcarl Harbor naval basc against all attacks by an cncmy. 82 Tc Navy was assigncd thc rcsponsibility lor long rangc rcconnaissancc. Howcvcr, thcrc wcrc nowhcrc ncar cnough plancs or crcws on ahu to conduct longrangc rcconnaissancc lor any lcngth ol timc whilc training and prcparing lor ocnsivc action in accordancc with thc war plan, Rainbow Fivc. !n his tcs timony, 8cllingcr cstimatcd that hc could havc conductcd 360 dcgrcc rcconnaissancc with thc availablc Navy plancs . . . pcrhaps lour or vc days . . . 128 dcgrccs approximatcly on a daily basis . . . until thc lailurc ol plancs and lack ol sparc parts rcduccd thc plancs to an cxtcnt that it would havc madc it impossiblc. Pcrhaps it could havc bccn carricd on lor two wccks, pcrhaps, but this cstimatc is . . . bascd on maintaining plancs in rcadincss lor ight. 83
Morcovcr, according to McMorriss tcstimony, had thc maximum scarch bccn institutcd lrom Midway and Pcarl Harbor on thc 27th ol Novcmbcr warning, thc situation with rcgard to aircralt cngincs by thc 7th ol cccmbcr would havc bccn in a highly critical situation. 84
82 !bid., part 36, p. 285. 83 !bid., pp. 278302. 84 !bid., p. 194. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 593 !l allout rcconnaissancc was to bc carricd out in anticipation ol an attack, it was impcrativc not to start so soon that thc plancs and crcws would bc cxhaustcd whcn thc cmcrgcncy arosc. As Hcwitt pointcd out, whcn thc war warning was rcccivcd on 27 Novcmbcr thcy had no idca that thc attack was coming |1 wccks latcr| on thc 7th. Tcy had no way to timc it. Tcy had to makc plans lor patrol indcnitcly. 85
Hvwi:: !xguivv Coxciusioxs Hcwitts invcstigation was complctcd on July 12. Tc 134 pagc rcport rcvicwcd thc prcvious invcstigations, discusscd war and dclcnsc plans, Japancsc cspionagc, naval intclligcncc, rccon naissancc, and thc cccmbcr 7 attack itscll. Tc NC! rcport had absolvcd Kimmcl ol rcsponsibility lor thc cxtcnt ol thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr. Tc Hcwitt rcport crcd itcd Kimmcl with bcing cncrgctic, indclatigablc, rcsourcclul, and positivc in his corts to prcparc thc Flcct lor war, 86 and it rcc ognizcd thc di cultics hc had laccd in trying to jugglc his lim itcd rcsourccs to maintain rcconnaissancc, training, antiaircralt dclcnscs, patrols against submarincs, and moralc. Howcvcr, thc rcport rcvivcd somc ol thc criticism lcvicd against Kimmcl by thc Robcrts Commission. !t hcld that hc did havc su cicnt inlorma tion in his posscssion to indicatc that thc situation was unusually scrious, and yct hc had not disscminatcd |this inlormation| to all ol his important subordinatc commandcrs whosc cognizancc thcrcol was dcsirablc. 87
Tc Hcwitt rcport lollowcd thc lcad ol thc NC! rcport in attributing somc ol thc blamc lor thc disastcr to Stark: 85 !bid., p. 297. 86 !bid., part 39, p. 526. 87 !bid., p. 524. 594 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy |T|hc Chicl ol Naval pcrations did not communicatc to |Kimmcl| important inlormation which would havc aidcd him matcrially in lully cvaluating thc scriousncss ol thc situation. !n particular, thc lailurc to transmit thc Statc cpartmcnt mcssagc ol Novcmbcr 26th and to scnd, by tclcphonc or othcr cxpcditious mcans, inlormation ol thc 1:00 v.:. mcssagc and its possiblc import, wcrc unlortunatc. . . . Although vari ous mcssagcs ol thc Japancsc Consul Gcncral at Honolulu, which indicatcd Japancsc intcrcst in spccic locations ol ships in Pcarl Harbor, wcrc intcrccptcd by radio intcrccpt stations ol thc Army and Navy and dccryptcd prior to thc attack, this inlormation was not transmittcd by thc Navy cpartmcnt to Admiral Kimmcl. . . . A thorough apprcciation ol thc dangcr, thc capabilitics ol thc availablc plancs, and thc importancc ol thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor might havc justicd thc allotmcnt by thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations ol additional patrol plancs to thc Pacic Flcct. 88
Rcgarding thc cxistcncc ol a Vinds xccutc, thc rcport hcld uncquivocally that no mcssagc was intcrccptcd prior to thc attack which uscd thc codc words rclating to thc Unitcd Statcs. 89
Vith thc Hcwitt !nquiry rcport nishcd, Forrcstal submit tcd it lor analysis and rccommcndations to thc cpartmcnts judgc advocatc gcncral and Admiral King, commandcrinchicl, U.S. Flcct and Chicl ol Naval pcrations. n August 10, Judgc Advocatc Gcncral T.L. Gatch wrotc that now that this rcport is in thc invcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor attack should bc con sidcrcd complctcd. . . . !t appcars that thcrc was no lack ol 88 !bid., pp. 52327. 89 !bid., p. 523. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 595 apprcciation on thc part ol any ol thc rcsponsiblc o ccrs that war was coming, and coming quickly, during thc critical pcriod immcdiatcly prcccding 7 cccmbcr 1941. Tc point on which thosc o ccrs lailcd to cxcrcisc thc disccrnmcnt and judgmcnt to bc cxpcctcd lrom o ccrs occupying thcir positions, was thcir lailurc to apprcciatc, lrom thc inlormation availablc to thcm, that Pcarl Harbor was a likcly targct lor acrial attack and thcir lailurc to takc thc ncccssary stcps to prcvcnt or minimizc such a surprisc attack. ach ol thcsc o ccrs, in cstimating thc critical situation, dcmonstratcd a poor quality ol stratcgi cal planning, in that hc largcly rulcd out all possiblc courscs ol action by which thc Japancsc might bcgin thc war cxccpt through an attack in thc Vcstcrn Pacic. . . . ! submit that thc importancc ol inlormation lrom Japancsc sourccs has bccn ovcr cmphasizcd: lor had morc basically sound principlcs bccn obscrvcd, thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr would not havc occurrcd. Tc sccurity ol Pcarl Harbor was thc vcry corc ol our Pacic stratcgy, a lact which did not rcccivc su cicnt considcration in thc stratcgic conccpt ol rcsponsiblc o ccrs. Gatch did not rccommcnd court martialing any o ccr, although hc hcld that thc Navy cpartmcnt is morally obligatcd to ordcr Admiral Kimmcl tricd by gcncral courtmartial should Admiral Kimmcl so insist. Howcvcr, no courts martial should bc hcld prior to thc cnd ol hostilitics with Japan, not only would it bc highly impractical but it would also bc dctrimcntal to thc war cort. 90
!n his August 13 cndorscmcnt ol thc Hcwitt rcport, King hcld that thc cvidcncc is not su cicnt to warrant trial by court martial ol any pcrson in thc Naval Scrvicc. . . . Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmcl, though not culpablc to a dcgrcc warranting lormal disciplinary action, wcrc ncvcrthclcss inadcquatc in cmcrgcncy, 90 !bid., pp. 38889. 596 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy duc to thc lack ol thc supcrior judgmcnt ncccssary lor cxcrcis ing command commcnsuratc with thcir dutics. Appropriatc action appcars to mc to bc thc rclcgation ol both ol thcsc o ccrs to positions in which lack ol supcrior stratcgic judgmcnt may not rcsult in luturc crrors. Tc action has bccn takcn in thc casc ol both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmcl. No lurthcr action is rccommcndcd. 91
Ci~vxv !xvvs:ic~:iox, P~v: !! ( Juiv ++, +) Tc Clarkc invcstigation was rcopcncd in July 1945 at Marshalls rcqucst. 92 !ts primary purposc was to invcstigatc Fricdmans statcmcnts bclorc thc Hcwitt inquiry |May 14July 11, 1945| about thc dcstruction, under Marshall s orders, ol Pcarl Harbor rccords, cspccially ol a Vinds Codc cxccutc, il onc had actually bccn rcccivcd. 93 According to Army couricr Coloncl 8ratton at thc APH8 94 and Chicl ol G2, Military !ntclligcncc, Major Gcncral Shcrman Milcs 95 lc copics ol all thc Japancsc intcrccpts wcrc supposcd to havc bccn hcld in tight sccurity in both Army and Navy lcs. Yct no Vinds Codc cxccutc could bc lound. So Clarkc wantcd to clcar up that mystcry. Villiam F. Fricdman, Chicl Cryptanalyst, told Clarkc that hc had had convcrsations with Captain Saord who said thcrc had bccn such a Vinds cxccutc mcssagc and that hc bclicvcd that a copy ol it was still in somcbodys salc in thc Navy cpartmcnt but that all ol his attcmpts to locatc a copy ol thc Vinds cxccutc 91 !bid., p. 387. 92 !bid., part 34, p. 77. 93 !bid., pp. 7879. 94 !bid., part 29, p. 2416. 95 !bid., part 2, p. 789. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 597 mcssagc in thc o cial lcs ol P20G had bccn lruitlcss. 96
Months latcr, somcbody highcr up in thc Var cpartmcnt pcrhaps Gcncral 8issclldircctcd that a scarch bc madc through our lcs at Signal Sccurity Agcncy to scc il wc could locatc such a Vinds cxccutc mcssagc, and that was lruitlcss. 97 Yct Saord was quitc convinccd that disscmination had bccn madc to thc Army, il not to thc Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc thcn to somc body in G2. Saord could not cxplain this mystcrious disappcarancc . . . ol all copics ol thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc, cspccially as cop ics ol all thc Japancsc intcrccpts wcrc supposcd to havc bccn hcld in tight sccurity in both Army and Navy pcrmancnt lcs. Tis mystcrious disappcarancc was naturally also ol cxtrcmc intcrcst to mc, and somc timc altcr my rst or pos sibly sccond, convcrsation with Capt. Saord, ! lcarncd ol thc rcturn to Vashington lor duty ol Coloncl Sadtlcr. Vc wcrc old lricnds. . . . Shortly altcr hc camc back hc camc ovcr to my o cc onc dayand ! dont know whcthcr hc had spccically in mind to talk about Pcarl Harborhc may havcbut at any ratc in thc coursc ol our rcminisccnccs about thosc days, hc told mc somc vcry startling things. . . . ! askcd him about thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc his rccollcction was apparcntly cxtrcmcly clcar, and hc ccrtainly was positivc about this rccollcction ol thc lact that such a Vinds cxccutc mcssagc had bccn intcrccptcd by a Navy sourcc, bccausc hc told mc that hc was callcd ovcr to cithcr Gcn. Milcs o cc or Col. 8rattons o cc . . . ! rccall now that hc said that Adm. Noycs callcd him onc morning and my rccollcction is that it was on cccmbcr 4might havc bccn thc 5th1941, sayingand this stands vcry bright in my mcmory !ts in, mcaning that thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc had bccn transmittcd and had bccn intcrccptcd and that it mcant a brcak in rclations bctwccn . . . Japan and ngland, and that hc had thcn gonc ovcr to cithcr Gcn. Milcs o cc or to Col. 8rattons 96 !bid., part 34, p. 78 (scc Hcwitt, part 36, pp. 30506). 97 !bid., part 34, p. 78. 598 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy o ccor Adm. Noycs had tclcphoncd thc samc mcssagc or thc purport ol thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc to Gcn. Milcs or to Col. 8ratton. At any ratc, Col. Sadtlcr was cithcr summoncd or prcscntcd himscll to G2 and said that thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc had comc in and that somcthing should bc donc right away. . . . Col. 8ratton, thc Japancsc languagc cxpcrt, wantcd Col. Sadtlcr to tcll him what thc Japancsc word was that had bccn includcd in thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc. . . . Sadtlcr said that hc himscll had not sccn thc mcssagc, hc had gottcn thc inlorma tion lrom thc Navy sourcc by tclcphonc and that hc thcrclorc couldnt givc thc Japancsc word. . . . |V|hcn hc was unablc to producc thc mcssagc or thc Japancsc word thcy said thcrc was nothing thcy could do. . . . |H|c bcing dccply conccrncd about thc thrcat ol ncgotiations with thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt and noting thc tcnor ol thc mcssagcs that wc wcrc turning out in translation, bccamc cxtrcmcly apprchcnsivc that war might brcak out at almost any hour without any dcclaration on thc part ol thc Japancsc. And hc lclt that somcbody high up in thc Var cpartmcnt ought to scnd a mcssagc out to Gcn. Short warning him . . . thc typc ol mcssagc that hc actually prcparcd in his own hand: 8rcak in rclations bctwccn Japan and Unitcd Statcs may bc cxpcctcd within thc ncxt 24 or 48 hours. Takc all ncccssary stcps to insurc that thcrc will bc no rcpctition ol Port Arthur. . . . Vcll hc tricd to intcrcst somc ol thc pcoplc in thc highcr cchclons. . . . Hc tricd somcbody in G2, hc tricd somcbody in pcrations ivision, thc Sccrctary ol thc Gcncral Sta! cant cnumcratc thcm all nowbut at any ratc hc said that hc got turncd down all thc way and nobody would pay any attcntion to him. . . . Vcll, in thc coursc ol this convcrsation ! askcd him, Vhat do you supposc happcncd to thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc which wc bclicvc so rmly was intcrccptcd: Vcll hc said hc was told that thcy wcrc ordcrcd dcstroycd. And that sort ol took mc aback, and ! said, 8y whom: And hc said, 8y Gcn. Marshall.. . . . |M|y disbclicl ol thc story was discrcditcd by him apparcntly, bccausc hc still rcmaincd vcry rm in his bclicl that all copics Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 599 ol thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc, both in thc Army and in thc Navy, had bccn dcstroycd and ordcrcd to bc dcstroycd. . . . ! am quitc surc that it was not ol his own knowlcdgc. Hc was pass ing on sccondhand inlormation. 98
Friedman: Col. Sadtlcr didnt imposc any sccrccy upon what hc was tclling mc. h naturally hc trustcd to my discrction. . . . ! ccrtainly wouldnt havc said anything to Capt. Saord about it il hc imposcd somc sort ol sccrccy upon what hc was tclling mc, and ol coursc you undcrstand that, not giving any crcdcncc to it myscll, ! didnt lccl that Saord would bclicvc any ol it. 8ut to my astonishmcnt, Saord sccmcd to think thcrc might bc somcthing to it, at lcast hc thought thcrc was a Vinds cxc cutc mcssagc and now it cant bc lound. 99 Colonel E.W. Gibson, aidc to Clarkc !nquiry: Mr. Villiam F. Fricdman has tcsticd bclorc Adm. Hcwitt ol thc cpartmcnt ol thc Navy rcccntly as lollows: Tcn il ! rcmcmbcr corrcctly ! askcd Col. Sadtlcr whcthcr hc had a copy, had cvcr gottcn or sccn a copy ol this mcssagc |thc Vinds Codc cxccutc|, and his answcr was, il ! rcmcmbcr corrcctly that hc hadnt himscll sccn a copy but that hc had bccn told by somcbody that thc copics had bccn ordcrcd or dircctcd to bc dcstroycd by Gcn. Marshall. Col. Sadtler: ! will makc an absolutc at dcnial ol that statc mcnt madc by Mr. Fricdman bccausc as lar as ! know, that mcssagc was ncvcr in thc Var cpartmcnt and ! ncvcr madc any statcmcnt that Gcn. Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd or that anyonc told mc that Gcn. Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd. . . . Gibson: At somc timc did somcbody tcll you that mcssagcs pcrtaining to thc Pcarl Harbor aair wcrc bcing dcstroycd: 98 !bid., pp. 7981. 99 !bid., p. 82. 600 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Sadtler: Ycs. Somctimc during 1943 Gcn. !saac Spalding at Ft. 8ragg, North Carolina, told mc somcthing to thc ccct that J.T.8. 8isscll had told him that cvcrything pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor was bcing dcstroycd or had bccn dcstroycd. Sadtlcr said that hc might possibly havc told that to Fricdman in onc ol thcir convcrsations. 100 Sadtlcr wcnt on to tcll about thc warning mcssagc hc had writtcn: Altcr lcaving Gcn. Milcs o cc whcrc Gcn. Milcs and Col. 8ratton morc or lcss casually thrcw o this inlormation about thc cxccutc ol thc Vinds mcssagc, ! wcnt back to my o cc and thought that somcthing ought to bc donc. Tc mcssagc was typcd up and ! wcnt to scc Gcn. Gcrow and talkcd this ovcr lor a lcw momcnts with him and suggcstcd that hc notily thcm. Gcrows rcply to thc ccct was that thcy had bccn adcquatcly noticd, as ! rccall it. ! thcn wcnt to scc Sccrctary ol Gcncral Sta, Col. 8cdcll Smith, and told him what had bccn donc and suggcstcd hc scnd a mcssagc. His rcply was to thc ccct that hc rcluscd to discuss it lurthcr. 101
Sadtler: ! ncvcr madc any statcmcnt that Gcn. Marshall ordcrcd it |a Vinds Codc xccutc| dcstroycd or that anyonc told mc that Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd. . . . Somc timc during 1943 Gcn. !saac Spalding at Fort 8ragg, North Carolina, told mc somcthing to thc ccct that J.T.8. 8isscll had told him that cvcrything pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor was bcing dcstroycd or had bccn dcstroycd. 102
Clarkc and Gibson qucstioncd Spalding pcrsonally about Fricdmans tcstimony about Sadtlcr having said that Spalding 100 !bid., p. 86. 101 !bid., pp. 8687. 102 !bid., p. 86. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 601 said ccrtain mcssagcs had bccn dcstroycd undcr ordcrs lrom Marshall and 8isscll, 103
Spalding: ! did not tcll him that in substancc, answcring spc cically your qucstion, but ! did tcll him ccrtain things. 8ut at no timc was thc namc ol Gcn. Marshall cvcr brought into thc convcrsation. . . . ! wish it to appcar in my tcstimony that it is my lull bclicl that thc Sccrctary ol Var, Mr. Stimson, and thc Chicl ol Sta, Gcn. Marshall, arc not involvcd in any way whatsocvcr with thc tcstimony which ! am about to givc, and it is my bclicl that ncithcr onc kncw anything ol it. . . .Vc |Spalding and 8isscll, whcn at Ft. 8ragg in thc summcr ol 1943| talkcd about thc Pcarl Harbor incidcnt. ! rcmcmbcr cxprcssing to him my lailurc to undcrstand how Shcrman Milcs and thc Navy could lail to discovcr that thosc Japancsc vcsscls had lclt homc ports. . . . ! rcmcmbcr shooting o my mouth about Shcrman Milcs, lor whom ! didnt havc a vcry high rcgard prolcssionally . . . and 8isscll said that ccrtain mcssagcs had bccn rcccivcd and wcrc in thc lcs ol G2 and hc dccmcd it most ncccssary to dcstroy thcm. ! got thc imprcssion that thcsc mcssagcs wcrc dcrogatory to thc Var cpartmcnt and that hc |8isscll| on his own rcsponsibility dcstroycd thcm. ! had thc imprcssion that thcy wcrc sccrct inlormation which it was most dcsirablc that thc prcsidcnt, Congrcss, thc public, Mr. Stimson and Gcn. Marshall not know about. ! had a lccl ing that 8isscll dcstroycd thcm without cvcn Gcn. Raymond Lcc, thc G2 at that timc, knowing thcy wcrc in cxistcncc. . . . 8isscll having told mc that hc had dcstroycd what ! would call vital rccords which, il known, would bc vcry unplcasant lor thc Var cpartmcnt. 8isscll was thc only man who cvcr told mc anything that ! rcmcmbcr. ! hopc it is clcar in hcrc that ! wouldnt want anything ! say to transgrcss thc intcgrity ol Mr. Stimson or Gcorgc Marshall. Tcy arc two ol thc ncst mcn in thc world and thcy would hcw to thc linc ! know. 104
103 !bid., p. 90. 104 !bid., pp. 9093. 602 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Clarkc and Gibson qucstioncd Maj. Gcn. Ralph C. Smith: At any timc during your scrvicc in thc Var cpartmcnt in 1941 until you lclt in March 1942, to your knowlcdgc wcrc any ol thc rccords ol G2 dcstroycd: Smith: Catcgorically, no. . . . ! am vcry ccrtain that no pcr mancnt rccords altcr January 1941, pcrhaps, wcrc rcmovcd or dcstroycd. Gibson: At anytimc did you cvcr rcccivc any ordcr lrom any onc altcr Pcarl Harbor whilc you wcrc in thc Var cpartmcnt to dcstroy or havc any rccords dcstroycd: Smith: ! did not. . . . Gibson: As lar as you know, arc thc rccords ol G2 that pcrtain to Pcarl Harbor lor 1941 and up until March 1942 complctc: Smith: To thc bcst ol knowlcdgc thcy arc. Gibson: Prior to ycstcrday had you cvcr hcard any commcnt madc that il ccrtain rccords in G2 bccamc known or wcrc madc public that it would bc vcry damning to thc Sccrctary ol Var or Chicl ol Sta: Smith: No ! had ncvcr hcard any such commcnt. Gibson: id Col. 8isscll to your knowlcdgc, cvcr, dcstroy any rccords in G2 in thc cpartmcnt: Smith: Hc did not during my tcnurc ol o cc, and ! bclicvc that il hc had ! would havc known about it lrom my subordinatcs. Gibson: id Col. 8isscll cvcr tcll you that hc had dcstroycd somc rccords dcaling with Pcarl Harbor: Smith: Hc did not. . . . Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 603 Clarke: o you know whcthcr or not thc Chicl ol thc Countcr !ntclligcncc Group, Col. 8isscll, had at his disposal all ol thc inlormation and intclligcncc which was availablc to thc !ntclligcncc Group: Smith: ! havc a vaguc rccollcction that somc point was brought up cithcr shortly bclorc Pcarl Harbor or possibly altcrward that somc sourccs ol Countcr !ntclligcncc data wcrc in cxis tcncc but not bcing cxploitcd to thc maximum. ! think ! can statc as a ccrtainty that thc Countcr !ntclligcncc 8ranch did not rcccivc thc pouch containing thc lull Magic matcrial. ! do, howcvcr, havc a vaguc rccollcction that thc Far astcrn 8ranch had somc contacts with thc Countcr !ntclligcncc 8ranch on activitics ol Japancsc agcnts in this country. 105
8rigadicr Coloncl John T. 8isscll, namcd by Sadtlcr and Spalding as having dcstroycd documcnts, was thcn qucstioncd: 106
Gibson: Gcn. Spalding has tcsticd that, among othcr things you told him that ccrtain mcssagcs had bccn rcccivcd, thcsc mcssagcs pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor and wcrc in thc lcs ol G2 and that you dccmcd it most ncccssary to dcstroy thcm. id you cvcr makc such a statcmcnt: Bissell: No ! did not. . . . Gibson: To your knowlcdgc, whilc you wcrc conncctcd with G2 wcrc cvcr any rccords pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor or any thing clsc dcstroycd: Bissell: Not as lar as ! know. Gibson: And oncc a mcssagc was okaycd and scnt it was kcpt: 105 !bid., pp. 9899. 106 !bid., pp. 99102. 604 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Bissell: !t wcnt to thc lc immcdiatcly. Gibson: And no lcs wcrc cvcr dcstroycd. Bissell: Not as lar as ! know. . . . Gibson: id you tcll Gcn. Spaulding |sic| at any timc, in sub stancc that you had dcstroycd what you would call vital rccords, rccords which il known to cxist would bc vcry unplcasant to thc Var cpartmcnt: Bissell: ! did not. Gibson: id you cvcr tcll him anything lrom which hc might inlcr such: Bissell: No. 107
Clarkc qucstioncd not only Fricdman but also thc lour army o ccrs supposcdly implicatcdColoncl tis K. Sadtlcr, 8rigadicr Gcncral !saac Spalding, Major Gcncral Ralph C. Smith, and 8rigadicr Gcncral John T. 8isscll. ach in turn dcnicd hav ing actually sccn a possiblc Vinds Codc xccutc. Ci~vxv !xvvs:ic~:iox P~v: !! Su::~vv Fricdman was told by Sadtlcr that hc rcmcmbcrcd hcaring that a Vinds Codc cxccutc had bccn rcccivcd on cccmbcr 4 or 5 and that it had bccn dcstroycd on GCMs ordcrs. 108 Sadtlcr told Fricdman hc had hcard this lrom Spalding. 109
Sadtlcr latcr contradicatcd this tcstimony. Hc said hc had ncvcr sccn a Vinds Codc cxccutc himscll. 110 Hc latcr madc an 107 !bid., pp. 10102. 108 !bid., pp. 7981. 109 !bid., p. 81. 110 !bid., p. 80. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 605 absolutc at dcnial ol that . . . bccausc as lar as ! know that mcs sagc was ncvcr in thc Var cpartmcnt and ! ncvcr madc any statcmcnt that Gcncral Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd or that anyonc told mc that Gcncral Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd. 111 Sadtlcr said hc was told by Spalding in August 1943 that J. T. 8. 8isscll said cvcrything pcrtaining to PH was dcstroycd. 112 Spalding thcn addcd |A|t no timc was thc namc ol Gcn. Marshall cvcr brought into thc convcrsation or discussion. 113
Spalding was told by 8isscll that hc dccmcd it ncccssary to dcstroy lcs in G2, implying that hc had donc this on his own rcsponsibility. 114 Spalding said lurthcr ! hopc it is clcar in hcrc that ! wouldnt want anything ! say to transgrcss thc intcgrity ol Mr. Stimson or Gcorgc Marshall. Tcy arc two ol thc ncst mcn in thc world and thcy would hcw to thc linc ! know. 115 8isscll latcr tcsticd that as lar as hc kncw no mcssagcs pcr taining to Pcarl Harbor had bccn dcstroycd, oncc a mcssagc was okaycd and scnt, !t wcnt into thc lc immcdiatcly. . . . And no lcs wcrc cvcr dcstroycd. 116
Ci~vxvs Rvvov: Altcr quoting Fricdmans statcmcnt bclorc thc Hcwitt !nquiry, Clarkc statcd: ! nd that Mr. Fricdman . . . was told by Col. Sadtlcr at somc timc in 1943 that 8rig. Gcn. !saac Spalding told Col. Sadtlcr that 8rig. Gcn. J.T.8. 8isscll had told Gcn. Spalding that 111 !bid., p. 86. 112 !bid., p. 86. 113 !bid., p. 90. 114 !bid., pp. 9093. 115 !bid. 116 !bid., pp. 10102. 606 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cvcrything pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor was bcing dcstroycd or had bccn dcstroycd. ! nd that Col. Sadtlcr was told by 8rig. Gcn. !saac Spalding somctimc in August 1943 that 8rig. Gcn. J. T. 8. 8issscll had told Gcn. Spalding that ccrtain mcssagcs, pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor had bccn rcccivcd and wcrc in thc lcs ol G2 on 7 cccmbcr 1941 and that 8isscll had dccmcd it most ncccssary to dcstroy thcm. Ci~vxvs Coxciusioxs ! nd that Spalding was not told by 8isscll that ccrtain mcs sagcs had bccn rcccivcd, wcrc in G2s lcs and that 8isscll dccmcd it ncccssary to dcstroy thcm. ! nd that Sadtlcr did not tcll Fricdman that Spalding had told Sadtlcr that ccrtain mcssagcs implcmcnting thc Vinds Codc mcssagc wcrc dcstroycd as a rcsult ol an ordcr ol Marshall. !n thc cnd, Clarkc concludcd: ! nd that no writtcn mcssagc implcmcnting thc Vinds Codc mcssagc was cvcr rcccivcd by G2 |Military !ntclligcncc, Army|, and ! nd that no rccords pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor havc bccn dcstroycd by G2 or by anybody conncctcd with G2. Hc so rcportcd to Chicl ol Sta Marshall. 117
S:i:sox !ssuvs vvici~i Rvvov: . . . (Aucus: :, +) As wc havc sccn, Stimson rclraincd lrom rclcasing thc APH8 rcport whcn it was complctcd in ctobcr 1944. Howcvcr, upon 117 !bid., pp. 7576. (August 13, 1945) Clarkc rcport (part 34, p. 76). Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 607 conclusion ol Clauscns invcstigation Stimson promptly issucd an cial Rcport . . . Rcgarding thc Pcarl Harbor isastcr, datcd August 29, 1945. 118 Clauscns a davits did not rcally dcal with thc APH8 chargcs, but Stimson uscd thcm and othcr docu mcnts Clauscn had asscmblcd to ovcrturn its ndings, cspccially with rcspcct to Marshall, and to rcconrm thc ndings ol thc Robcrts Commission. !n this rcport, Stimson dclcndcd Marshall and Gcrow lor having adcquatcly alcrtcd Short to thc impcnding crisis, dclcndcd Hull, and placcd thc primary blamc oncc morc on Short. Stimson lound that insolar as thc Army was conccrncd, Short borc |t|hc primary and immcdiatc rcsponsibility lor thc protcc tion ol thc !sland ol ahu and Pcarl Harbor and that hc was rcpcatcdly adviscd ol thc critical cvcnts which wcrc dcvclop ing. Stimson did not nd that thcrc was any inlormation in thc posscssion ol thc Var cpartmcnt and which was not madc availablc to Gcncral Short which would havc modicd thc csscncc ol thc abovc inlormation which was scnt to him or which would havc acctcd or incrcascd thc dutics ol vigilancc and alcrtncss thus alrcady imposcd upon him. His lailurc adcquatcly to alcrt his command to thc dcgrcc ol prcparcdncss which thc situation dcmandcd . . . contributcd mcasurably to thc cxtcnt ol thc disastcr. . . . Tis lailurc rcsultcd not lrom indolcncc or indicrcncc or will lul disobcdicncc ol ordcrs but lrom a vital crror ol judgmcnt . . . |duc to| Gcncral Shorts condcncc that Japan would not thcn attack Pcarl Harbor. . . . To sum up thc situation tcrscly, Gcncral Short was warncd by Vashington that thcrc was immcdiatc dangcr both ol an attack 118 !bid., part 35, pp. 1319. 608 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy lrom without by Japan and ol an attack lrom within by sabo tagc. Tis warning rcquircd him to bc alcrt against both lorms ol dangcr. Hc chosc to conccntratc himscll so cntircly upon a dclcnsc against sabotagc as to lcavc himscll morc complctcly cxposcd to an attack lrom without than il thcrc had bccn no alcrt at all. . . . To such an crror ol judgmcnt it is no cxcusc that hc rclicd upon assuranccs lrom anothcr scrvicc, cvcn though hc thought that that scrvicc was bcttcr inlormcd than hc was as to thc disposition ol thc Japancsc cct. 119
As to thc APH8s conclusions conccrning Vashington o cials, Stimson wrotc, Such dutics as thc Var cpartmcnt in Vashington had in thc supcrvision ol thc dclcnsc ol Hawaii dcvolvcd primarily upon what was thcn known as thc Var Plans ivision ol thc Gcncral Sta. . . . Tc !ntclligcncc Scction ol thc Gcncral Sta (G2) also had dutics ol collccting and analyzing inlormation and transmitting inlormation to othcr scctions ol thc Var cpartmcnt and to thc thcatcr commandcrs. ! nd . . . that thc mcssagcs scnt to Gcncral Short gavc him adc quatc inlormation as to thc statc ol thc ncgotiations with thc Japancsc and thc dcvclopmcnt ol thc situation. . . . Furthcrmorc, . . . ! do not think that any spccial and dctailcd warnings against sabotagc should havc bccn considcrcd by Gcncral Short as jus tilying his dccision that an alcrt against any possiblc cncmy action was not also his duty. 120
Vith rcgard to thc chargcs against thc war plans division, Stimson bclicvcd it madc a mistakc in not transmitting to Gcncral Short morc inlormation than it did. . . . |A| morc c cicnt lunctioning ol 119 !bid., pp. 1416. 120 !bid., p. 16. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 609 thc division would havc dcmandcd that a carclul inquiry as to thc mcaning ol Gcncral Shorts mcssagc |rcporting his sabo tagc alcrt| bc madc and no room lor ambiguity pcrmittcd. Howcvcr, Stimson madc cxcuscs lor thc division. !t must clcarly bc bornc in mind that in Novcmbcr and cccmbcr 1941, thc rcsponsibilitics ol thc Var Plans ivision covcrcd many clds and many thcatcrs. . . . Tcir conduct must bc vicwcd in an cntircly dicrcnt light lrom that ol thc thcatcr commandcr, such as Gcncral Short, who was likc a scntincl on post and whosc attcntion and vigilancc must bc cntircly conccntratcd on thc singlc position which hc has bccn cho scn to dclcnd and whosc alcrtncss must not bc allowcd to bc distractcd by considcration ol othcr contingcncics in rcspcct to which hc is not rcsponsiblc. Undcr all circumstanccs, ! nd nothing in thc cvidcncc as now rccordcd which warrants thc institution ol any lurthcr procccdings against any o ccr in thc Var Plans ivision. 121
Stimson was cspccially anxious to ovcrturn thc APH8s wickcd (FRs tcrm) criticism ol Marshall: !n my opinion, this criticism is cntircly unjusticd. !t ariscs lrom a lundamcntal misconccption ol thc dutics ol thc Chicl ol Sta and ol his rclations with thc divisions and activitics ol thc Gcncral Sta. !t is not thc lunction ol thc Chicl ol Sta spccically to dircct and pcrsonally supcrvisc thc cxccution in dctail ol thc dutics ol thc various scctions ol thc Gcncral Sta. . . . Tc shortcomings ! havc pointcd out thus cannot in any lairncss bc attributcd to thc Chicl ol Sta. n thc contrary, throughout this mattcr ! bclicvc that hc actcd with his usual grcat skill, cncrgy, and c cicncy. 122
121 !bid., p. 18. 122 !bid., pp. 1819. 610 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tcstimony as to thc dclivcry ol MAG!C to Marshall on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6, had bccn contradictory. 8ratton, thcn with Var cpartmcnts G2, had told thc APH8 that hc had pcrsonally dclivcrcd that cvcning thc 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply not only to Hulls duty o ccr, but also to Milcs and Marshalls sccrctary. 123 Howcvcr, in his a davit lor Clauscn hc corrcctcd his prcvious tcstimony and said hc had told uscnbury to dclivcr Marshalls sct to his homc at Fort Mycr, and lurthcr that thc only mcssagc hc, 8ratton, had dclivcrcd that night was to thc duty o ccr lor thc Sccrctary ol Statc. 124 Stimson ignorcs thcsc con tradictions and simply acccpts thc statcmcnt in 8rattons a da vit. !n his cial Rcport Stimson wrotc: Tcrc is no disputc, howcvcr, that Gcncral Marshall did not gct this inlormation |thc Japancsc rcply| until thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. 125
Tc APH8 had suggcstcd also that il Hull had lollowcd a dicrcnt proccdurc with thc Japancsc cnvoys, hc might havc prolongcd thc ncgotiations until such timc as thc Army and Navy wcrc bcttcr prcparcd lor hostilc action. Tis, Stimson said, amounts at bcst only to a conjccturc. Hc considcrcd thc boards commcnt in this rcspcct uncallcd lor. 126
To thc apparcnt satislaction ol thc administration, thc thrcc supplcmcntal invcstigations had shiltcd thc major rcsponsibility lor thc Japancsc attack away lrom top Vashington o cials Marshall, Gcrow, and Hulland back oncc morc to Kimmcl and Short, with somc blamc lclt ovcr lor Stark. Tc administration considcrcd thc mattcr closcd. 123 !bid., part 29, p. 2349. 8ratton tcstimony bclorc APH8, Scptcmbcr 30, 1944. 124 !bid., part 35, pp. 9798. 125 !bid., p. 17. Stimsons cial Rcport rcgarding thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr (August 29, 1945). 126 !bid., p. 19. 611 26. Safeguarding Military Information B y March 1945 thc Allics wcrc making progrcss on all lronts. Tc Gcrmans, bcsicgcd lrom thc cast by thc Russians and lrom thc wcst by Allicd lorccs, wcrc pulling back. Tc Japancsc wcrc in rctrcat in thc Pacic and southcast Asia. Altcr lcaplrogging lrom onc Pacic island to anothcr, thc U.S. Army undcr MacArthur had advanccd as lar as thc Philippincs. Howcvcr, morc ghting lay ahcad. Tc proccdurc cstablishcd to makc surc that our cncmics did not lcarn that wc wcrc rcading thcir codcs sccmcd to bc ccctivc. 1
Vhcn thc Pcarl Harbor invcstigations startcd, Army and Navy o ccrs wcrc prohibitcd lrom mcntioning thc intcrccpts. 2 Tcrc had bccn onc lcak in thc spring ol 1941, cvcntually attributcd to thc Statc cpartmcnt, which had rcccivcd lrom thc Army 1 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 8, pp. 368182. (Saord tcsti mony). 2 !bid., part 35, p. 101 (Milcss a davit lor Clauscn). 612 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy but had not rcturncd a Japancsc MAG!C translation. 3 Tcn in Junc 1942 thc Chicago Tribunes publication ol thc namcs ol thc Japancsc ships at Midway indicatcd that wc had acccss to sccrct Japancsc mcssagcs. 4 As notcd, during thc 1944 campaign, Marshall had succccdcd in prcvcnting Rcpublican prcsidcntial candidatc Tomas . cwcy lrom spcaking out on thc subjcct ol thc sccrct Japancsc intcrccpts. 5 Rumors pcrsistcd, howcvcr. 8ut thcrc had as yct bccn no public disclosurc that wc had brokcn thc Japancsc Purplc codc. For all practical purposcs, inlormation about MAG!C had bccn limitcd to thc lcw o cials privy to thc intcrccpts bclorc and during thc war and thosc involvcd in thc invcstigations. And thc authoritics wcrc anxious to kccp it that way. 6
Svx~:v 8iii S.8o n March 30, 1945, cmocratic Utah Scnator lbcrt Tomas, chairman ol thc Scnatc Committcc on Military Aairs, introduccd S.805 to insurc thc lurthcr military sccurity ol thc Unitcd Statcs by prcvcnting disclosurcs ol inlormation sccurcd through o cial sourccs. Tis bill providcd hcavy pcnaltics lor disclosing, without propcr authorization, inlormation about U.S. or lorcign codcs acquircd whcn scrving in U.S. or lorcign armcd lorccs or whcn cmploycd or pcrlorming scrviccs lor thc Unitcd Statcs or a lorcign govcrnmcnt. Authorization to rclcasc such inlormation acquircd whilc working lor thc Unitcd Statcs shall bc grantcd only in accordancc with rcgulations prcscribcd by thc prcsidcnt. !nlormation acquircd as a rcsult ol pcrlorming scrviccs lor a lorcign govcrnmcnt could not bc rclcascd without joint 3 !bid., part 8, p. 3735. 4 !bid., pp. 373538. 5 !bid., part 3, pp. 112436. 6 !bid., part 29, p. 2413. Safeguarding Military Information 613 authorization by thc Sccrctary ol Statc, thc Sccrctary ol Var, and thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy. 7
Admiral Kimmcl rcad a bricl vclinc noticc about this bill in thc New York Herald-Tribune, March 31, and immcdiatcly wrotc his chicl counscl, Charlcs Rugg, to invcstigatc. Scvcral days latcr Rugg nally obtaincd a copy ol thc bill and noticd Kimmcl and Scnator Homcr Fcrguson ol Michigan. Rugg said that its pas sagc would closc thc door to any invcstigation ol Pcarl Harbor. 8
Scnator Tomas statcd that this bill providcs lor lling a gap in rcgard to thc punishmcnt ol pcrsons who may divulgc military sccrcts. . . . Tc bill is sponsorcd by both thc Army and thc Navy. !t is a mcasurc which is ncccssary in pcacctimc, but at thc prcscnt timc it is cxtrcmcly ncccssary. Vithout any lurthcr discussion or dcbatc, thc bill was passcd by voicc votc, no roll call was takcn. Kimmcl was dcspcratc bccausc il thc Housc passcd thc bill, that was thc cnd ol all disclosurcs about Pcarl Harbor. 9
Scnator Fcrguson had bccn out ol thc country whcn thc bill camc bclorc thc Scnatc on April 9. n his rcturn to Vashington hc cntcrcd a motion to rcconsidcr thc votcs by which thc bill had bccn passcd. Hc said it was vcry important that thc Scnatc should givc lurthcr considcration to thc mcasurc, and that it should bc amcndcd. 10 Fcrgusons motion was agrccd to on April 11, and S.805 was tcmporarily sct asidc. 7 Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st scss., 1945, vol. 91, part 3, p. 3196. 8 Husband . Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story (Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry, 1955), p. 127. 9 !bid., p. 127. 10 Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st scss., 1945, vol. 91, part 3, p. 3267. 614 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Pv~cv:i:v Cvxsovsniv- Kimmcl was in Vashington on April 12. Hc wcnt to thc Washington Post with thc lacts and his vicws about thc bill. Hc also callcd scvcral mcmbcrs ol Congrcss. 11
Tc ncxt morning, an cditorial sparkcd by Kimmcls rcvcla tions, Vraps on History, appcarcd in thc Post. !t statcd thc issuc clcarly: !t is rcgrcttablc to notc that wc can no longcr dcpcnd upon thc Scnatc to protcct thc Nation against cxccutivc dcpriva tions ol our libcrtics. Tc latcst illustration is S.805, which would takc away lrom thc Amcrican pcoplc that vcry lrccdom ol inlor mation which wc arc sccking to promotc in othcr countrics. Tc bill was passcd on Monday without cxciting a ripplc, cithcr insidc or outsidc thc Scnatc. nly onc hcaring was hcld, and that in camera. !t was rcportcd that Army and Navy spokcsmcn had told thc Scnatc Military Aairs Committcc that thc bill was mcrcly intcndcd to protcct o cial inlormation and thc Committcc had acccptcd thc bill on that absurd justication. . . . Te Washington Post cditorializcd: n Monday no disscnticnt could bc lound in a body sworn to uphold thc Constitution. ithcr lrom incrtia or somnolcncc, cithcr lrom lack ol intcrcst or just plain complaisancc, thc Scnators approvcd thc sayso ol Chairman Tomas. . . . Yct this bill would gag anybody who would publish any inlormation which originally took thc lorm ol a codcd mcssagc. . . . And you may bc surc, il this bill is cnactcd, almost cvcrything that it is sought to kccp lrom thc prying cycs ol thc public will rst bc put in codc. . . . To our way ol thinking, thc nccd lor scrutiny ol rcqucsts lrom thc armcd scrviccs has always bccn prcscnt, and it has ncvcr bccn pointcd up as it is today. Vith thc approach ol thc cnd ol thc ght lor libcrty, wc arc bcginning to rcprosclytizc lor it. 11 Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story, p. 127. Safeguarding Military Information 615 Frccdom ol inlormation, spccically, is our immcdiatc crusadc. . . . Tat thc Scnatc on Monday blackcd it out in thc Unitcd Statcs was thc worst blackout that thc Scnatc has sustaincd in our mcmory. 12 Axo:nvv Ax~ivsis ov S.8o n April 13 thc New York Times rcportcd on S.805: Fcaring that a bill intcndcd to protcct military sccrcts, passcd unanimously by thc Scnatc Monday, might intcrlcrc with Congrcssional invcstigation ol govcrnmcnt dcpartmcnts and supprcss lcgitimatc public inlormation, Scnators havc takcn stcps to halt thc mcasurc and pcrhaps to rccxaminc thc Var and Navy o ccrs who sponsorcd thc proposal. Scnator Homcr Fcrguson, Rcpublican, ol Michigan, has movcd lor rcconsidcration ol thc bill. Although hc sccs no sinistcr dcsign in thc mcasurc, hc bclicvcs that through misusc thc lcg islation could imposc a ccnsorship on ncwspapcrs and dcprivc Congrcssional committccs ol many lacts. . . . isclaiming any dcsirc to intcrlcrc with propcr protcction ol military sccrcts, Scnator Fcrguson considcrs thc bill so broadly drawn as possi bly to supprcss many political qucstions with which thc public has a right to bc inlormcd. . . . High Var and Navy o ccrs stood back ol thc bill, which it was undcrstood today was submittcd by thc military authoritics in pcrlcct good laith. !n its rcport to thc Scnatc thc Military Aairs Committcc said thc bill had approval ol thc joint Chicls ol Sta and was dccmcd csscntial in thc intcrcsts ol national dclcnsc and sccurity. 13
12 Washington Post, April 12, 1945, p. 8. 13 Te New York Times, April 13, 1945, p. 30. 616 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Tc Times ol April 13 also rcportcd thc dcath ol Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt, which occurrcd thc day bclorc, April 12. Hc had bccn at his rctrcat in Varm Springs, Gcorgia. FRs pcrsonal physi cian wrotc latcr that thc prcsidcnt had laintcd at 1:20 v.:., and dicd shortly thcrcaltcr, at 3:35 v.:. 14
Latcr whcn S.805 camc bclorc thc Housc committcc, action was dclaycd su cicntly to allow lor a thorough invcstigation. Vhcn thc bill was nally brought to thc oor a couplc ol months latcr, it was dclcatcd. 15 14 Ross T. Mc!ntirc, White House Physician (Ncw York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1946), pp. 24143. 15 Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story, p. 127. 617 27. Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack November 15, 1945May 31, 1946: Part 1 A ltcr almost lour ycars ol ghting on land, sca, and in thc air, altcr thc dctonation ol two atomic bombs on Japanonc on Hiroshima (August 6) and thc othcr on Nagasaki (August 8)thc Japancsc nally admittcd dclcat. n August 25 mpcror Hirohito broadcast to thc Japancsc pcoplc that thc countrys lorccs wcrc surrcndcring. August 25, 1945, was dcclarcd \J ay. Vorld Var !! had cndcd. A couplc ol wccks latcron August 29thc ncw prcsi dcnt, Harry S. Truman, who had takcn o cc altcr thc dcath ol Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt on April 12, 1945, rclcascd thc rcports ol thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard and Navy Court ol !nquiry. 1 A vcrita blc rcstorm cruptcd. Tc carlicr Robcrts Commission had lound 1 New York Times, August 30, 1945. pp. 1, 4, 5, 6, and S. 615. 618 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc two Hawaiian commandcrs, Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short, guilty ol dcrclictions ol duty and crrors ol judgmcnt and thcy had bccn rctircd lrom scrvicc and dcmotcd in rank. Tc Army and Navy rcports rclcascd by Truman ccctivcly absolvcd Kimmcl and Short ol blamc and placcd much ol thc rcsponsi bility on lour toplcvcl Vashington o cialsSccrctary ol Statc Cordcll Hull, Army Chicl ol Sta Gcncral Gcorgc C. Marshall, Chicl ol thc Armys war plans division Gcncral Lconard T. Gcrow, and Chicl ol Naval pcrations Admiral Harold R. Stark. As thc New York Times rcportcd, !t was not a prctty story that Prcsidcnt Truman rclcascd in mak ing public Var and Navy rcports on thc rcasons why Army and Navy o cials at ahu wcrc takcn by surprisc in thc Japancsc attack on cc. 7, 1941. 2
!n spitc ol thc volumc ol matcrial rclcascd by Truman, thc public still was not satiscd. Tcrc wcrc obvious omissions. Undcr ordcrs ol thc sccrctary ol war and thc sccrctary ol thc navy, scctions ol both rcports had bccn dclctcd. And Top Sccrct por tions wcrc still bcing withhcld. !n thc words ol Scnatc Majority Lcadcr Albcn 8arklcy, thc rcports wcrc conlusing and conict ing whcn comparcd with onc anothcr, and to somc cxtcnt contain contradictions and inconsistcncics. 3 Morcovcr, both Sccrctary ol Var Hcnry L. Stimson and Navy Sccrctary Jamcs Forrcstal had, according to Scnator Homcr Fcrguson, issucd critical opinions ol thc ndings ol thcir own boards. 4
2 !bid., p. 1. 3 Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, rcprintcd in 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 1, p. 11. 4 !bid, p. 16. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 619 Joix: Coxcvvssiox~i Co::i::vv ( JCC) s:~niisnvb Tc Rcpublicans in Congrcss, anxious to lcarn thc truth, dcmandcd a lurthcr invcstigation. Scnator Fcrguson urgcd thc cstablishmcnt ol a committcc to invcstigatc thc attack, 5 and on Scptcmbcr 6 8arklcy introduccd a concurrcnt rcsolution similar to Fcrgusons proposal. 6
Tc Scnatc dcbatc was subducd and politc. 7 !t was agrccd that thc rccord so lar was incomplctc, conlusing, and conicting. 8arklcy proposcd an inquiry ol such dignity and authcnticity as to convincc thc Congrcss and thc country and thc world that no cort has bccn madc to shicld any pcrson who may havc bccn dircctly or indircctly rcsponsiblc lor this disastcr, or to condcmn unlairly or unjustly any pcrson who was in authority, military, naval, or civilian, at thc timc or prior thcrcto. 8arklcys Concurrcnt Rcsolution 27 sct up a Joint Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack ( Joint Congrcssional Committcc, or JCC) with broad authority to makc a lull and complctc invcstigation ol thc lacts rclating to thc cvcnts and circumstanccs lcading up to or lollowing thc attack madc by Japancsc armcd lorccs upon Pcarl Harbor in thc Tcrritory ol Hawaii on cccmbcr 7, 1941. 5 Te New York Times, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, p. 1. Scc also Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, p. 14, which rcprints Fcrgusons suggcstion lrom thc Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945. 6 Te New York Times, Scptcmbcr 7, 1945, p. 7. Scc also Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, p. 13, which rcprints 8arklcys concurrcnt rcsolution lrom thc Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945. 7 Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, rcprintcd in Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, pp. 1023. 620 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tc committcc was to complctc its tcstimony in lour months and rcport to thc Scnatc and Housc not latcr than January 3, 1946. Tc rcsolution was passcd unanimously by thc Scnatc on Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, and by thc Housc on Scptcmbcr 11. 8
Tcn mcmbcrs ol Congrcss, all lawycrs, wcrc appointcd to thc committcc. 9 n thc Scnatc sidc, thrcc cmocrats: 8arklcy ol Kcntucky, chairman, Valtcr F. Gcorgc ol Gcorgia, and Scott V. Lucas ol !llinois, and two Rcpublicans: wcn 8rcwstcr ol Mainc and Fcrguson ol Michigan. n thc Housc sidc, thrcc cmocrats: Jcrc Coopcr ol Tcnncsscc, vicc Chairman, J. 8ayard Clark ol North Carolina and John V. Murphy ol Pcnnsylvania, and two Rcpublicans: 8crtrand V. Gcarhart ol Calilornia and Frank 8. Kcclc ol Visconsin. Villiam . Mitchcll, who had scrvcd as solicitor gcncral lor lour ycars undcr Calvin Coolidgc and attorncy gcncral lor lour ycars undcr Hcrbcrt Hoovcr, was sclcctcd to scrvc as gcncral counscl. 10 Gcrhard A. Gcscll was namcd Mitchclls chicl assistant counscl, with Julc M. Hannalord and John . Mastcn as assistant counscls. 11
8arklcy statcd that thc JCC should conduct its invcstigation without partisanship or lavoritism. . . . Such an invcstigation should look solcly to thc asccrtainmcnt ol thc cold, unvarnishcd, indisputablc lacts so lar as thcy arc obtainablc. 12 Scnator avid !. Valsh ol Massachusctts had praiscd 8arklcy lor having liltcd this qucstion abovc partisanship, and madc an appcal lor what thc country wantsa highmindcd, clcan, judicial invcstigation 8 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, pp. 34. 9 !bid., p. 4. 10 !bid., part 4, p. 1587. 11 !bid., part 1, p. 4. 12 !bid., p. 12. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 621 ol all thc lacts conncctcd with thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr. 13 Yct thc congrcssional committcc was soon cmbroilcd in politics. Tc makcup ol thc committcc, with six cmocrats and lour Rcpublicans, was stackcd in lavor ol thc administration. Tc Rcpublicans maintaincd that thcir acccss to govcrnmcnt rccords was bcing rcstrictcd and that thc cmocratic majority was try ing to curb, by strict partylinc votc, thc scopc ol thc inquiry. No provision was madc lor a sta to assist thc Rcpublican mcmbcrs. Tc cmocrats claimcd thc Rcpublicans wcrc anxious to usc thc inquiry to smcar Rooscvclt, whilc thc Rcpublicans implicd thc cmocrats wcrc trying to shicld thc Rooscvclt administration. Housc Majority Lcadcr John V. McCormack accuscd thc com mittcc minority ol witchhunting. 14
Tis account ol thc Congrcssional hcarings is prctty much lactual and nonpartisan. Tc cvcnts arc prcscntcd morc or lcss in thc ordcr in which thc witncsscs to thcm appcarcd bclorc thc Committcc. Somc witncsscs contradictcd othcr witncsscs, somc cvcn contradictcd thcir own carlicr tcstimony, and thc rccollcc tions ol othcrs wcrc oltcn conluscd or hazy. Pressure may have been used to persuade some witnesses to change their stories. JCC Committee members often encountered di culty in obtaining access to informa- tion. Also, lricnds ol thc administration somctimcs tricd to sidc track thc probing into scnsitivc issucs by disrupting thc procccd ings. Tus a study ol thc hcarings alonc yiclds a rathcr disjointcd picturc. nly altcr trying to rcconcilc thc various contradictions and conlusions and arranging thc cvcnts rcvcalcd chronologically, as has bccn donc in thc nal chaptcr ol this book, is it possiblc to rccognizc thc rolcs playcd by thc scvcral principals involvcd in thc Pcarl Harbor disastcrthcir actions, inactions, thcir ncgligcncc and dilatorincss. 13 Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, rcprintcd in Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, p. 22. 14 Te New York Times, Novcmbcr 15, 1945, p. 3. 622 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Quvs:ioxs Tn~: Mus: 8v Asxvb As thc hcarings progrcsscd, much timc and cncrgy was dcvotcd to trying to nd answcrs to lour major qucstions: 1. Had top Vashington o cials, including thc prcsidcnt, com mittcd this country to war in support ol thc 8ritish and utch without rst obtaining congrcssional approval as rcquircd by thc Constitution: 2. How much was known bclorc thc cccmbcr 7, 1941 Japancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor about Japans plans to go to war against thc Unitcd Statcs: Had Vashington o cials kcpt thc cld commandcrs adcquatcly inlormcd: 3. Vas thcrc prcattack cvidcncc to indicatc a U.S. tcrritory, possibly cvcn Pcarl Harbor, was a likcly targct ol thc Japancsc: !l so, wcrc thc Hawaiian commandcrs so adviscd: !l not, why not: 4. Had thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs madc rcasonably intcl ligcnt dccisions, givcn thc inlormation and rcsourccs availablc to thcm: Joix: Coxcvvssiox~i Co::i::vv Co::vxcvs Tc committcc opcncd its hcarings on Novcmbcr 15. !t was gcncrally admittcd that morc intclligcncc was availablc in Vashington than in Hawaii. Tus any scrious attcmpt to account lor thc trcmcndous losscs at Pcarl Harbor would havc to start by cxploring thc inlormation availablc in Vashington bclorc thc attack and by dctcrmining how much ol it had bccn scnt to Hawaii. Tc JCC obtaincd at thc start ol its hcarings thc sccrct Japancsc dispatchcs which U.S. cryptographcrs had intcrccptcd, dccodcd, and translatcd bclorc thc attack. Tcsc mcssagcs, most ol thcm transmittcd on thc Purplc codc machinc, which U.S. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 623 cryptographcrs had rcplicatcd in August 1940, yicldcd valuablc intclligcncc known as MAG!C. xhibit 1 consistcd ol diplomatic mcssagcs scnt and rcccivcd by thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt and its lor cign cstablishmcnts which had bccn intcrccptcd, dcciphcrcd and translatcd by U.S. cryptographcrs bctwccn July 1 and cccmbcr 8, 1941. 15 xhibit 2 containcd intcrccptcd mcssagcs conccrn ing military matters such as military installations, ship movements, espionage reports, etc., scnt and rcccivcd by thc Japancsc gov crnmcnt and its lorcign cstablishmcnts in Purplc and othcr codcs bctwccn cccmbcr 2, 1940, and cccmbcr 8, 1941. 16 Tc MAG!C inlormation dcrivcd lrom thcsc intcrccpts had bccn thc basis ol much prcattack U.S. intclligcncc conccrning thc movc mcnts and intcntions ol thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt. U.S. A:n~ss~bov Josvvn C. Gvvw Rvvov:s Pvv~::~cx Si:u~:iox ix Toxvo nc ol thc rst witncsscs was Joscph C. Grcw, U.S. ambas sador to Japan sincc 1932. Altcr thc attack hc had bccn hcld undcr housc arrcst until Junc 25, 1942, whcn hc was rcpatriatcd by thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt. Grcw tcsticd it was obvious that by Novcmbcr 3 thc |U.S.| tradc cmbargocs had not scrvcd to rcstrain thc Japancsc Army lrom its cxpansion. Tcy wcrc going right ahcad. 17 !n his vicw, thc risk and dangcr ol war was vcry grcat and incrcasing. 18 Japans totalitarian rcgimcs propaganda was lostcring antiAmcricanism. And in Vashington, thc U.S. Japancsc ncgotiations wcrc clcarly dctcriorating. Although Grcw 15 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, pp. 1253. 16 !bid., pp. 254316. 17 !bid., part 2, p. 677. 18 !bid., p. 680. 624 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ncvcr gavc up hopc, by carly cccmbcr it was apparcnt that war bctwccn Japan and thc Unitcd Statcs was cxpcctcd. 19
N! ~xb VP Juvisbic:iox~i isvu:v isvuv:s Cus:o:~vv !x:viiicvxcv issv:ix~:iox nc goal ol thc committcc in invcstigating thc cvcnts and circumstanccs lcading up to and lollowing thc attack was to dctcrminc what had bccn known by thc top o cials bclorc thc attack in Vashington, whcrc sccrct Japancsc mcssagcs wcrc rcgularly bcing intcrccptcd, dcciphcrcd and translatcd, and how much intclligcncc dcrivcd lrom thcsc intcrccpts had bccn rclaycd bclorc cccmbcr 7 to thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. Tc situa tion was compoundcd by conlusion ovcr a jurisdictional disputc bctwccn thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc (N!) and thc Navys Var Plans ivision (VP). Vhcn Kimmcl took ovcr thc com mand ol thc Pacic Flcct in Fcbruary 1941, hc had askcd CN Stark to makc surc that thc rcsponsibility lor kccping him lully inlormcd with pcrtincnt rcports on subjccts that should bc ol intcrcst to thc Flcct bc clcarly dctcrmincd so that thcrc will bc no misundcrstanding. 20 Stark rcplicd on March 22, that thc chicl ol thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc, Captain Alan G. Kirk, was lully awarc ol |N!s| rcsponsibility in kccping you adcquatcly inlormcd. 21
8ut thc policy was changcd. Admiral Richard K. Turncr, chicl ol thc Navys Var Plans ivision, had lought and won a battlc with N! lor thc cxclusivc right to prcparc and disscminatc to thc cct commandcrs inlormation about potcntial cncmy plans and opcrations, including intclligcncc obtaincd by intcrccpting and dccoding Japans most sccrct diplomatic mcssagcs. As \icc 19 !bid. 20 !bid., part 16, p. 2229. 21 !bid., part 4, p. 1835. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 625 Admiral Tcodorc S. Vilkinson, who bccamc N!s dircctor on ctobcr 15, 1941, cxplaincd to thc JCC, N! had bccn rcduccd by thcn, lor all practical purposcs, to a lactgathcring agcncy. !t was no longcr an analytical organization. Tc rcsponsibility lor analysis had bccn takcn ovcr, thcorctically, by thc Navys Var Plans ivision. 22 Stark told thc JCC, N! had to givc thc matc rial, all it had, to Var Plans. . . . 8ut thc nal cstimatc, which wcnt into thc war plan . . . rcstcd with Var Plans. 23 Vilkinson tcsticd that thc o cial rcgulations spccicd that N! valuatc thc inlormation collcctcd and disscminatc as advisable |italics addcd|. Tus, N!s rcsponsibility lor disscmination was quali cd by thc words as advisablc. 24 Hc and Turncr clashcd vcry dcnitcly on that issuc. 25 Tis jurisdictional disputc lclt a crack in thc traditional channcl lor disscminating inlormation to thc Navy commandcrs in thc cld. M~ix:~ixixc :nv Svcvvcv ov :nv J~v~xvsv !x:vvcvv:s Vilkinson tcsticd on his undcrstanding conccrning thc importancc ol maintaining thc sccrccy ol MAG!C, thc intcl ligcncc dcrivcd lrom thc Japancsc intcrccpts. Hc told thc JCC that undcr ordcrs lrom Admiral Stark, ! was not authorizcd to scnd to thc cld inlormation conccrning sccrct diplomatic convcrsations . . . bccausc ol thc gcncral sccurity attachcd to thc codcbrcaking activitics. . . . ! was not to put anything in 22 !bid., pp. 1729, 183449. 23 !bid., part 5, p. 2460. 24 !bid., part 4, p. 1730. 25 !bid., part 5, p. 2460. Congrcssman Kcclc, committcc mcmbcr, summarizing to Stark his intcrprctation ol Vilkinsons tcstimony. 626 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy |my lortnightly summarics|, anything dcrivcd lrom what was known as ultra or magic. 26
Tc situation was lurthcr complicatcd by thc lact that scvcral top military o cials in Vashington bclicvcd, or at lcast thcy so tcsticd, that Hawaii was intcrccpting and dccoding thc Japancsc mcssagcs thcmsclvcs and thus had acccss to thc inlormation Vashington o cials wcrc dcriving lrom MAG!C. Gcncral Milcs, Military !ntclligcncc (G2), told Clauscn that hc bclicvcd thc Navy in Hawaii was dccoding and translating Japancsc diplo matic and consular mcssagcs, although hc latcr told thc JCC that Gcncral Short did not havc dccoding lacilitics. 27 And Admiral Turncr told thc JCC that it was his bclicl at that timc, and it was Admiral Starks bclicl, that all ol thcsc major diplomatic mcssagcs, at lcast in thc Pacic, wcrc bcing dccryptcd by both Admiral Hart |Manila| and by Admiral Kimmcl |Pcarl Harbor|. Turncr said hc did not know that Admiral Kimmcl did not hold thc codc lor thosc dispatchcs until ! was so inlormcd at thc timc ol thc Navy court ol inquiry on Pcarl Harbor. 28
Although thcsc top Vashington o cials tcsticd that thcy bclicvcd Hawaii had acccss to thc samc inlormation thcy had in Vashington, thcir actions bclicd thcir words. Tcy actcd as il it was thcir rcsponsibility to kccp Hawaii adviscd. n Novcmbcr 27 both Army and Navy scnt thc Hawaiian commandcrs spccial dispatchcs bascd on MAG!C intclligcncc thcn availablc in Vashington. Tc radiogram to Short rcad: Ncgotiations with Japan appcar to bc tcrminatcd. 29 Tc dispatch to thc Navy startcd out: Tis dispatch is to bc considcrcd a war warning. 30 Army Chicl ol Sta Marshall said in his a davit lor Clauscn that hc undcrstood Short was 26 !bid., part 4, pp. 173132. 27 !bid., part 2, p. 791. 28 !bid., part 4, p. 1923. 29 !bid., part 14, p. 1328, Armys ispatch #472. 30 !bid., p. 1406, Navys Novcmbcr 27, 1941, war warning ispatch #272337. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 627 rccciving somc MAG!C inlormation through Army lacilitics on ahu. 31 8ut in thc vcry ncxt paragraph hc contradictcd that undcr standing whcn hc acknowlcdgcd that Shorts assistant intclligcncc o ccr (G2), Coloncl Gcorgc V. 8ickncll, rclicd on Vashington lor inlormation. 32 And Marshalls urgcnt lastminutc mcssagc on cccmbcr 7, ccrtainly indicatcd that hc didnt bclicvc his cld commandcrs would havc sccn thc 14part MAG!C Japancsc rcply to our Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum or Tokyos mcssagc instructing thc Japancsc ambassadors in Vashington to makc dclivcry ol that rcply at prcciscly 1:00 v.:., Vashington timc. At thc timc ol thc attack, Gcncral Milcs, hcad ol G2, thc Armys military intclligcncc division, acknowlcdgcd undcr qucs tioning by thc JCC that Tcrc wcrc no stcps takcn to distributc thcsc |intcrccptcd and translatcd| mcssagcs to |Gcncral Short in Hawaii|. . . . Tat lollowcd lrom thc gcncral policy laid down by thc Chicl ol Sta that thcsc mcssagcs and thc lact ol thc cxistcncc ol thcsc mcssagcs or our ability to dccodc thcm should bc conncd to thc lcast possiblc numbcr ol pcrsons, no distribution should bc madc outsidc ol Vashington. 33
Milcs was gcncrally supportivc ol thc policy not to disscmi natc thc MAG!C intcrccpts to Hawaii and othcr U.S. outposts. Howcvcr, hc admittcd that thc succcss ol that Japancsc attack |had| dcpcndcd, in vcry largc mcasurc, on thcir catching thc lorccs unalcrtcd and thcrclorc unprcparcd to mcct that attack. 34 Milcs said hc had not mcntioncd MAG!C bclorc thc APH8 in April 1944, whcn thc war was still in progrcss, bccausc undcr no condition would ! havc . . . intimatcd in any way thc cxistcncc 31 !bid., part 35, p. 104. 32 !bid., pp. 10405. Marshall a davit lor Clauscn. 33 !bid., part 2, p. 791. Scc also pp. 810, 81112. 34 !bid., p. 877. 628 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ol that sccrct without spccic authority ol thc Sccrctary ol Var or thc Chicl ol Sta. Hc did not want to givc thc imprcssion that hc had bccn gaggcd by thc Chicl ol Sta into trying to covcr anything up, hc was only acting to protcct this vital military sccrct that wc wcrc all guarding with thc grcatcst ol carc. 35 8ut by thc timc hc gavc his a davit to Clauscn (August 16, 1945) and bclorc hc tcsticd at thc JCC hcarings, thc situation had changcd radically, thc war with Japan was ovcr and thc stricturcs against mcntioning MAG!C did not apply. Milcs pointcd out that much ol thc inlormation availablc in Vashington did not dircctly apply to thc ovcrscas dcpartmcnts unlcss and until it bccamc morc than inlormation and cntcrcd thc rcalms ol an cstimatc ol thc situation which callcd lor mili tary action on thc part ol thosc high commandcrs, and that was a lunction ol thc command, in othcr words, ol thc Chicl ol Sta himscll. Milcs rcalizcd, howcvcr, that thc availability ol intcl ligcncc in Vashington which was not acccssiblc in thc cld placcd a highcr dcgrcc ol rcsponsibility on Vashington to scc that thc cld commandcrs wcrc adcquatcly prcparcd, alcrtcd, and instructcd. 36
Milcs said thc Novcmbcr 27 mcssagc scnt ovcr Marshalls signaturc had bccn dcsigncd to alcrt thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt. Tat was a command action. 37 Milcs thought Short had not rcc ognizcd thc signicancc ol Marshalls signaturc. |T|hc mcrc lact that that mcssagc was signcd by thc Chicl ol Sta himscll had a ccrtain signicancc. . . . Tc mcssagcs com monly go out on thc signaturc ol thc Adjutant Gcncral. . . . |8|y putting his namc to that mcssagc, it carricd to any military 35 !bid., p. 801. 36 !bid., p. 793. 37 !bid., p. 839. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 629 mind . . . a much grcatcr signicancc than had it bccn signcd . . . |by| anybody clsc. 38
!n Milcss opinion Shorts rcsponsc to Marshalls warning that hc had alcrtcd lor sabotagc was a totally inadcquatc rcply to thc mcssagc it purportcd to rcply to. 39 Howcvcr, Milcs thought lurthcr warnings to Short, though dcsirablc, would havc bccn rcdundant. . . . You do not havc to tcll a commanding gcncral but oncc that a dangcr laccs him. You may, howcvcr, scc t to givc him lurthcr inlormation as to thc situation hc laccs. 40
Pv~vi H~vnov No: Mvx:ioxvb ix V~snixc:oxs PvvA::~cx ocu:vx:s Vashington o cialdom had known lor somc timc that a brcak in U.S.Japancsc rclations was incvitablc. Vc wcrc thor oughly prcparcd, Milcs tcsticd, and had bccn lor somc days to rcccivc an unlavorablc rcply to thc mcssagc ol Novcmbcr 26. Hc said hc had a vcry strong imprcssion that hc rst kncw that thc rst 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply to thc U.S. socallcd ultima tum, wcrc in and wcrc translatcd on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6, ccrtainly bclorc hc lclt lor homc that Saturday. Hc had callcd thc Army couricr |Coloncl 8ratton|, who had satiscd mc that thc mcssagcs wcrc bcing dclivcrcd or would bc dclivcrcd carly thc ncxt morning whcn thc complctc mcssagc was in. 8ut Milcs saw no rcason that cvcning lor alcrting or waking up Marshall or Hull. 41
JCC mcmbcrs Clark, Murphy, and Gcarhart callcd Milcss attcntion to thc lact that thc prcattack cvaluations issucd by his 38 !bid., pp. 87778. 39 !bid., pp. 87980. 40 !bid., pp. 90001. 41 !bid., pp. 94042. 630 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy own division had givcn no hint that an attack might bc cxpcctcd on Pcarl Harbor. 42 Milcs rcspondcd: Vc had known lor many ycars that all thrcc ol thosc outposts |Philippincs, Panama, and Hawaii| would probably bc subjcct to an attack in a Japancsc war. Tat is why wc had our lorccs on thcm and why thc Chicl ol Sta warncd thcm whcn hc considcrcd thc timc had arrivcd that hostilc Japancsc action was possiblc at any momcnt. 43
Murphy was disturbcd by thc inlcrcncc in Milcss tcsti mony that hc was probably thc only pcrson in Vashington who cxpcctcd thc attack at Pcarl Harbor. Timc altcr timc Milcs had said how obvious it was, and how inhcrcnt it was in thc situa tion. Yct Murphy said hc had rcad Milcss rcports lrom covcr to covcr and . . . havc not sccn it |Pcarl Harbor| mcntioncd oncc. Apparcntly pcoplc at Hawaii did not think it was so obvious bccausc thcy wcrc takcn by surprisc, and appar cntly thc othcrs in Vashington did not think it was so obvious bccausc thcy wcrc takcn by surprisc. 44
Gcarhart pointcd out to Milcs, |T|hcrc is plcnty in all ol this litcraturc, an abundancc, which points out thc possibility ol attack in thc Philippincs, in thc Kra Pcninsula, in Tailand, in !ndochina, cvcrywhcrc cxccpt on thcsc two vcry grcat lortrcsscs at Singaporc and Hawaii. . . . !l you havc anything to thc contrary ! would likc to havc you point it out. . . . Vhy, cvcn on thc 27th, altcr Mr. Hull had handcd his nal statcmcnt to thc Japancsc, a lcttcr was writtcn by thc Joint Chicls ol Sta in which thcy point out all ol thcsc 42 !bid., pp. 87576, 902, and 92122. 43 !bid., pp. 89091. 44 !bid., p. 902. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 631 othcr placcs as possiblc objcctivcs ol Jap attack, and Hawaii is not mcntioncd cvcn thcn. 45
Milcs admittcd that it was not until cccmbcr 6 or cccmbcr 7 that cvcnts nally ccntcrcd his attcntion on thc probablc Japancsc attack somcwhcrc coincidcnt with thc dclivcry ol thc Japancsc rcply at 1:00 that day. 46 Tc rst 13 parts had told thcm only that thc Japancsc rcply was unlavorablc. Tc 14th part and thc mcssagc instructing thc Japancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thc rcply at 1:00 v.:. wcrc intcrccptcd Sunday morning. Vhcn wc got thc lourtccnth part . . . |and| whcn wc got thc 1:00 v.:. mcs sagc, wc saw quitc a dicrcnt picturc. 47 Tc nc v.:. Mcssagc, hc said, mcant troublc somcwhcrc, against somconc, but still not ncccssarily against thc Unitcd Statcs. Howcvcr, wc kncw somc thing at last, not whcrc or against whom, but whcn. 48 Howcvcr, 1:00, as wc now know, mcant about 7:00, ! think, in Hawaii. . . . a likcly timc ol attack on thc islands. . . . a likcly timc, not thc only timc lor an attack. 49
Gvxvv~i Gvvow (Av:v V~v Pi~xs) vvvvs :o Rviivvv M~vsn~ii ov Cuiv~niii:v vov Axv F~iiuvv :o Ac: Tc JCC had planncd to intcrrogatc pcrsons with background inlormation about thc intcrccpts bclorc qucstioning toplcvcl wit ncsscs, including Marshall. Howcvcr, Prcsidcnt Truman had just appointcd Marshall ambassador to China and was anxious lor him to lcavc promptly lor his ncw post. 8ut Licutcnant Gcncral Lconard T. Gcrow was callcd ahcad ol Marshall as, according to 45 !bid., pp. 92122. 46 !bid., p. 922. 47 !bid., p. 942. 48 !bid., part 3, p. 1362. 49 !bid., part 2, p. 931. 632 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy committcc counscl Mitchcll, hc kncw ccrtain things that would bc wcll to lay into thc rccord. 50 Gcrow was a muchdccoratcd war hcro and hc lookcd thc part. PrcPcarl Harbor hc had bccn thc Armys chicl ol war plans. uring thc Var hc bccamc com mandcr ol Army Filth Corps, which had takcn part in thc ay landings going ashorc in Francc on maha 8cach. Hc had lought wcll lor his country. Although not prcviously implicatcd in thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr, Gcrow was onc ol thc lour top Vashington o cials who had bccn criticizcd by thc APH8. Hc was chargcd with having lailcd to kccp Short adcquatcly inlormcd, scnd a clcar, concisc dircctivc on Novcmbcr 27, 1941, rccognizc Shorts sabotagc alcrt as inadcquatc, and implcmcnt thc cxisting Joint ArmyNavy plans. 51
Gcrow was askcd about Shorts rcsponsc to thc Army dis patch ol Novcmbcr 27 (#472). Tat dispatch had bccn prcparcd by Stimson, Stark, and Gcrow whcn Marshall was out ol town, but had bccn scnt out ovcr Marshalls namc, giving it thc status ol a command action. 52 !n vicw ol thc impcnding crisis, Gcrow tcsticd, it had bccn draltcd primarily with thc Philippincs in mind, but csscntially thc samc mcssagc was also scnt to thc othcr Pacic cld commandcrs. 53 !t rcad in part: Ncgotiations with Japan appcar to bc tcrminatcd. . . . Japancsc luturc action unprcdictablc but hostilc action possiblc at any momcnt. !l hostilitics cannot . . . bc avoidcd thc Unitcd Statcs dcsircs that Japan commit thc rst ovcrt act. Tis policy should not bc construcd as rcstricting you to a coursc ol action that might jcopardizc your dclcnsc. 50 !bid., p. 863. 51 !bid., part 39, p. 264. 52 !bid., part 2, p. 839. 53 !bid., part 3, p. 1021. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 633 Tc radiogram wcnt on to say that thc commandcr should undcrtakc such rcconnaissancc and othcr mcasurcs as |hc| dccm|cd| ncccssary. All cld commandcr addrcssccs wcrc askcd to Rcport mcasurcs takcn. Tc vcrsion scnt to Short had an addcd phrasc, cautioning him not to alarm civil population or disclosc intcnt. 54
!n rcsponsc, Short wircd that hc had ordcrcd a sabotagc alcrt. 55 Tc dctails ol his thrcc possiblc alcrts wcrc a mattcr ol rccord in Vashington, 56 so Shorts sabotagc alcrt gavc noticc to thc Var cpartmcnt that hc had bunchcd his plancs and placcd his ammunition whcrc it was rclativcly inacccssiblc. Hc rcccivcd no rcsponsc lrom Vashington to indicatc whcthcr his sabotagc alcrt was, or was not, satislactory. Stimson, who was rcsponsiblc lor scnding thc Novcmbcr 27 mcssagc ovcr Marshalls signaturc, saw Shorts answcr, initialcd it, and did nothing. 57 Gcrow also saw Shorts rcply, initialcd it, and did nothing. 58 As lor Marshall, thcrc was no clcar cvidcncc that hc actually saw Shorts rcply, thc lc copy did not bcar Marshalls initials, Shorts rcply had bccn staplcd and circulatcd undcrncath a mcssagc lrom MacArthur, which Marshall did initial. 59
Gcrow admittcd that a lollowup inquiry to clarily Shorts rcsponsc might havc bccn dcsirablc. . . . |!|t would probably havc dcvcl opcd thc lact that thc commanding gcncral in Hawaii was not 54 !bid., part 14, p. 1328. 55 !bid., p. 1330. 56 !bid., part 7, p. 2941. 57 !bid., part 11, pp. 5426, 5429. 58 !bid., part 3, pp. 1027, 1031. 59 !bid., pp. 102829. Scc also xhibit 46, ibid., part 15, pp. 147275, photos ol mcssagcs routcd to Marshall. 634 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy at that timc carrying out thc dircctivc in thc mcssagc signcd Marshall. 60
Gcrow voluntccrcd to rclicvc Marshall ol culpability: |!|l thcrc was any rcsponsibility to bc attachcd to thc Var cpartmcnt lor any lailurc to scnd an inquiry to Gcncral Short, thc rcsponsibility must rcst on Var Plans ivision, and ! acccpt that rcsponsibility as Chicl ol Var Plans ivision. . . . !t was my rcsponsibility to scc that thosc mcssagcs wcrc chcckcd, and il an inquiry was ncccssary, thc Var Plans ivision should havc draltcd such an inquiry and prcscntcd it to thc Chicl ol Sta lor approval. 61
Hc was thcn askcd about thc Japancsc Pilot Mcssagc, which had bccn availablc in Vashington on thc altcrnoon ol cccmbcr 6. Tc Pilot Mcssagc had announccd that Japans rcply to thc U.S. notc ol Novcmbcr 26 was cn routc. Gcrow was also askcd about thc rst 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply, which 8ratton said hc dclivcrcd to Gcrow on cccmbcr 6. 62 Gcrow said hc had no clcar rccollcction ol whcrc ! was on thc altcrnoon ol thc 6th. 63
Hc thought hc was at his o cc until 6 or 7 or 8:00 and that hc was at homc in thc cvcning altcr thc dinncr hour. 64 !n any cvcnt, il thc Var Plans o cc was closcd, it should havc bccn pos siblc to rcach him by tclcphonc, Gcrows numbcr was on rccord in thc Var cpartmcnt. r hc could havc bccn rcachcd through thc duty o ccr who rcmaincd at his tclcphonc and could inlorm him ol any important mcssagcs that might bc intcndcd lor mc. . . . |!|l thcy had an important mcssagc to dclivcr to mc such as thc rst 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply, Gcrow bclicvcd Coloncl 60 !bid., part 3, p. 1031. 61 !bid., p. 1036. 62 !bid., part 4, p. 1632. 63 !bid., p. 1594. 64 !bid., part 4, pp. 1632, 1594. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 635 8ratton, who usually dclivcrcd thosc mcssagcs, would havc tclc phoncd mc at homc, rathcr than going through thc duty o ccr. Mitchcll pursucd thc mattcr. Gcrow told thc committcc that To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc and bclicl, hc had not rcccivcd or lcarncd ol thc 13part mcssagc on thc night ol cccmbcr 6. Hc did not rccall having rcccivcd thc carlicr Pilot Mcssagc cithcr. 65
And hc was positivc hc had ncvcr sccn that 14part mcssagc, or any part ol it, or thc 1:00 v.:. mcssagc, until hc rcachcd Marshalls o cc around 11:30 on thc morning ol thc 7th. 66
Gvxvv~i Gvovcv C. M~vsn~ii ovs No: Rvc~ii !:vov:~x: vcv:nvv 6 vvx:s Marshall was undoubtcdly thc most important witncss thc committcc could summon. Hc had bccn dccply involvcd in all thc prcattack dcvclopmcnts, with thc possiblc cxccption ol thc diplomatic phasc. Hc was thc only surviving principal in thc prcPcarl Harbor drama still in good hcalth and ablc to tcs tily. Rooscvclt and Knox wcrc dcad. Hull had rctircd right altcr FRs clcction lor a third tcrm and by thc lall ol 1944 was in poor hcalth and too wcak to lacc crosscxamination by thc Rcpublican mcmbcrs ol thc committcc. 67 As lor Stimson, thc accumulatcd strain ol vc ycars in Vashington had bcgun to acct his hcart. Hc had rcsigncd on his 78th birthday, Scptcmbcr 21, 1945. 68 8ut Marshall could not plcad inrmitics. Tcrc was no way hc could avoid tcstilying. Tc mcmbcrs ol thc committcc had many qucs tions. Tcy wcrc anxious to lcarn what hc could tcll thcm. And thcy wcrc anxious to lcarn what hc would tcll thcm. 65 !bid., p. 1595, also p. 1632. 66 !bid., part 3, p. 1042. 67 Julius V. Pratt, Cordell Hull (Ncw York: Coopcr Squarc Publishcrs, 1964), vol. 2, pp. 76566. 68 Hcnry L. Stimson and McGcorgc 8undy, On Active Service in Peace and War (Ncw York: Harpcr & 8ros., 1947/1948), pp. 331, 656, 668. 636 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy !n qucstioning Marshall, thc committcc lollowcd its usual proccdurc. !ts counscl lcd o, thc cmocratic mcmbcrs lollow ing onc by onc, thcn thc Rcpublican mcmbcrs. Marshall camc bclorc thc JCC on cccmbcr 6. All that rst day, hc was cxamincd in a lricndly manncr by Mitchcll. Many ol thc gcncrals answcrs wcrc cvasivc. Tcrc wcrc things hc could not rccall, could not rcmcmbcr, could not rccollcct. Vhcn hc had appcarcd bclorc thc NC! in Scptcmbcr 1944, hc had not bccn ablc to rccall thc intcrccpt xing Novcmbcr 25, 1941, as thc dcadlinc lor thc Japancsc ambassadors to rcach a lavorablc conclusion in thcir ncgotiations. 69 Howcvcr, whcn Mitchcll askcd Marshall il hc rcmcmbcrcd sccing any ol thosc |mcssagcs| in which thc Japs instructcd thcir Ambassadors hcrc to gct an a r mativc agrccmcnt rst by thc 25th ol Novcmbcr and latcr at lcast by thc 29th Marshall rcplicdhis mcmory rclrcshcd pcrhaps by Clarkcs inquiry which had bccn instigatcd by Marshall! rcmcmbcr that vcry wcll, sir. 70
Tc ncxt day Mitchcll askcd Marshall il hc rcmcmbcrcd his movcmcnts on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Marshall said hc could only account lor thcm by sort ol circumstantial cvidcncc. Hc cnumcratcd a numbcr ol placcs whcrc hc was not. Altcr rclcr ring to Mrs. Marshalls cngagcmcnt book, hc concludcd, thc probability is . . . wc wcrc homc. 71
Mitchcll askcd: You arc surc you wcrc not at thc Vhitc Housc that cvcning: Marshall rcplicd, No, sir, not at all. 72 Vhat did that mcan: Tat hc wasnt at thc Vhitc Housc: r that hc wasnt surc hc was not at thc Vhitc Housc: 69 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, p. 820. 70 !bid., part 3, p. 1091. 71 !bid., p. 1110. 72 !bid. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 637 Tc gcncral was supposcd to havc had a duty o ccr at his o cc and an ordcrly at his homc who kncw whcrc hc was at all timcs. Nonc ol his duty o ccrs or ordcrlics was callcd to tcstily. Mitchcll askcd Marshall whcn hc rst kncw about thc 14part Japancsc mcssagc and thc nc v.:. Mcssagc, and undcr what circumstanccs. Hc did not answcr dircctly. ! rst was awarc ol this mcssagc whcn ! rcachcd . . . thc o cc on thc morning ol Sunday, cccmbcr thc 7th. n that par ticular morning, ! prcsumably had my brcaklast at about cight, and lollowing thc routinc that ! had carricd out on prcvious Sundays, ! wcnt riding at somc timc thcrcaltcr. Howcvcr, hc said that on lurthcr considcration and discussion with othcrs, hc had comc to thc conclusion, purcly by induction and not by dcnitc mcmory, that that morning hc must havc gonc out riding latcr than 8:00, just what timc ! do not know, but bctwccn 8:00 and thc timc ! wcnt to thc Var cpartmcnt ! atc my brcaklast, ! probably lookcd at thc Sunday papcrs and ! wcnt lor a ridc. Marshall thcn discusscd thc avcragc lcngth ol his ridcs, about 50 minutcs, bccausc ! rodc at a prctty livcly gait, at a trot and a cantcr and at a lull run down on thc cxpcrimcntal larm whcrc thc Pcntagon now is and rcturncd to thc housc, so ! would say that thc high probability is that thc ridc was an hour or lcss, gcncrally or ccrtainly not longcr. 73
Tis cntirc tcstimony rclatcd to what Marshall prcsumably, probably, gcncrally did on a Sunday morning, not what hc actually did on that spccic Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, 1941. Marshall continucd in thc samc vcin, saying nothing about thc Japancsc intcrccpts hc had bccn askcd about. n this particular Sunday morning, 8ratton had bccn try ing to locatc Marshall sincc 9 or 9:15 ~.:. with thc 14th part ol Japans rcply and thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Vhcn hc callcd 73 !bid., p. 1108. 638 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Marshalls homc, an ordcrly told him Marshall was out riding. 8ratton askcd thc ordcrly to locatc Marshall and havc him con tact 8ratton as promptly as possiblc. According to 8ratton, Marshall callcd back somctimc altcr 10:00. 74
Marshalls rccollcction was that hc was cithcr in thc showcr, or gctting in thc showcr, whcn hc hcard that 8ratton was trying to rcach him with somcthing important. Marshall said 8ratton wantcd to comc out to Fort Mycr, but Marshall scnt word that hc was going into his o cc and 8ratton should mcct him thcrc. Marshall thcn nishcd his showcr, drcsscd, and lclt lor thc Var cpartmcnt. Hc said his avcragc timc ol taking a showcr and drcssing would bc about 10 minutcs, possibly lcss. Hc had no rccollcction as to what timc ! arrivcd at thc Var cpartmcnt. Tat would bc a mattcr ol conjccturc. 75
Anyway, Marshall continucd, shortly thcrcaltcr, il not immcdiatcly thcn, ! was at thc Var cpartmcnt, bccausc it was a vcry quick drivc, and on Sunday thcrc was no tra c. !t was a mattcr ol about 7 minutcs lrom my housc to thc Munitions building. 76
Using his own cstimatc (allowing tcn minutcs lor his showcr and drcssing and scvcn minutcs lor thc drivc), hc should havc bccn ablc to rcach his o cc 20 or 30 minutcs altcr hc spokc with 8ratton at 10 ~.:. 8ut according to 8ratton, who had bccn waiting lor Marshall in thc sccrctarys antcroom, Marshall didnt arrivc until 11:25 ~.:. 77
Vhcn Marshall arrivcd, 8ratton immcdiatcly walkcd in with his papcrs. Marshall startcd rcading thc 14part Japancsc rcply, portions ol which Marshall rcad through twicc. Hc told thc 74 !bid., part 9, pp. 452425. 75 !bid., part 3, p. 1108. 76 !bid., p. 1109. 77 !bid., part 9, p. 4517. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 639 committcc, Vhcn ! rcachcd thc cnd ol thc documcnt thc ncxt shcct was thc 1:00 mcssagc ol cccmbcr 7. Tis was indicativc to Marshall and to all thc othcrs who camc into thc room, ol somc vcry dcnitc action at 1:00, bccausc that 1:00 was Sunday and was in Vashington and involvcd thc Sccrctary ol Statc. Takcn togcthcr, all thcsc lactors wcrc rathcr unusual. 78
Marshalls account ol his rcsponsc to thc mcssagcs was similar to thosc ol 8ratton and Gcrow, both ol whom had tcsticd on thc basis ol mcmoranda prcparcd shortly altcr thc attack. 79 Marshall told ol contacting Stark and ol dispatching thc lastminutc warn ing to thc cld commandcrs in thc Pacic, giving rst priority to thc Philippincs and Panama. Altcr 8ratton had takcn Marshalls dispatch to thc mcssagc ccntcr and rcturncd, Marshall scnt him back with Coloncl 8undy, thc o ccr in chargc ol thc immcdiatc dctails ol all Pacic aairs, to ask whcn thc mcssagcs would bc dclivcrcd. Tcy camc back with cstimatcs ol thc dclivcry timcs in various parts ol thc world. 80
Tc ncxt inlormation Marshall rcccivcd was thc notication ol thc actual attack on Pcarl Harbor. Hc said hc could not rccall whcthcr ! was at thc Var cpartmcnt or at thc housc. Hc said Gcncral canc, acting sccrctary ol thc gcncral sta at that timc, had told him that hc had rcturncd to his homc, but his ordcrly said hc was at thc Var cpartmcnt. 81
Most astonishing! Tc Armys chicl ol sta, who was dircctly conccrncd with thc dclcnsc ol thc country and thc protcction ol thc cct whcn in harbor, who had just rcd o an urgcnt mcs sagc to thc cld commandcrs, who had bccn conccrncd about thc likcly timc whcn thc mcssagcs would bc dclivcrcd, didnt know 78 !bid., part 3, p. 1108. 79 8ratton tcstimony, APH8 and bclow, pp. 77885 and 80204, Gcrow tcsti mony, abovc, pp. 62731. 80 !bid., p. 1109. 81 !bid. 640 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy whcrc hc was whcn hc hcard thc ncws ol thc attack. And yct that Japancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor so shockcd thc rcst ol thc coun try that almost cvcrybody rcmcmbcrs vividly prcciscly whcrc thcy wcrc whcn thcy hcard thc ncws. Marshall said inlormation about thc attack thcn camc in in lullcr dctail, and tclcphonc communication was cstablishcd. Hc talkcd on thc phonc with Shorts chicl ol sta, Coloncl Phillips. Gcncral Short had gonc to his command post and thcrclorc was not ablc to talk to mc dircctly. Marshall voluntccrcd: You could hear the explosions at the time. 82
JCC Couxsvi Asxs M~vsn~ii ~nou: His Co::~xb S:vuc:uvv id you havc your sta organizcd at that timc so that il an cspccially signicant or important intcrccpt was madc ol a Jap mcssagc, was thcrc anyonc on duty who had authority, il thcy wcrc unablc to rcach you, to scnd a warning mcssagc out: Marshall said hc didnt think thcrc was a sctup lor that spc cial purposc. Tc Var cpartmcnt had an arrangcmcnt thcrc whcrcby thc o ccr on thc rccciving cnd . . . kncw whcrc thc prin cipal pcoplc wcrc, whcrc to rcach thcm. !n his own casc, Marshall said that during that pcriod and lor about a ycar thcrcaltcr, hc always maintaincd an ordcrly at thc housc at thc tclcphonc. !l ! lclt thc housc to go to a moving picturc, which was about thc only placc ! wcnt, |thc ordcrly| was thcrc and kncw whcrc to rcach mc. 83 Mitchcll thcn askcd him, 82 !bid., pp. 110910. mphasis addcd. 83 !bid., p. 1114. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 641 !l thcy had not bccn ablc to rcach you on thc morning ol thc 7th, or at any timc whcn an important mcssagc camc in, was thcrc anybody but yourscll that had authority to scnd a warn ing mcssagc to thc outlying posts: Ycs, Marshall said. Tc authority was vcstcd, lor instancc, in thc cputy Chicl ol Sta |Major Gcncral Villiam 8rydcn|. r cvcn thc hcad ol Var Plans ivision |Gcrow|. 84
According to Army rcgulations No. 1015, updatcd to cccmbcr 7, 1941, howcvcr, this was not thc prccisc situation. Tc cputy Chicl ol Sta was thc only o ccr who had thc authority to act lor thc chicl ol sta in his abscncc. rdcrs could bc scnt to Short in Pcarl Harbor by Rooscvclt, Marshall, or Marshalls dcputy. Ncithcr Stimson nor Gcrow was in thc linc ol command. Tat was why thcy had choscn to scnd thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning ovcr Marshalls namc. 85
Latcr in answcr to a qucstion lrom Scnator Fcrguson, Marshall said that Gcrow did not normally havc any right to issuc ordcrs to Short on a command basis, in pcacctimc it would havc rcquircd quitc an assumption ol authority on his part to do that without somc conrmation lrom a scnior o ccr. Howcvcr, Marshall said, Tc prcsidcnt, thc Sccrctary ol Var, and myscll, and in my abscncc, thc dcputy had authority to ordcr into ccct a war plan, Rainbow, or any othcr ordcrs. 86
!n any cvcnt, apparcntly no arrangcmcnt was in placc lor any onc to act in Marshalls stcad on that latclul morning ol cccmbcr 7, 1941, whcn hc was unavailablc. And thc ordcrly, supposcdly on duty at his homc, lailcd to rcach him promptly.
84 !bid. 85 !bid., part 14, pp. 141621, xhibit 42. 86 !bid., part 3, p. 1115. 642 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy M~vsn~ii !x:vvvoc~:vb ~nou: vcv:nvv vvx:s Mitchcll askcd Marshall, id you havc any talk on thc morning ol thc 7th with Sccrctary Stimson bclorc thc ncws ol thc attack camc in: Marshall didnt rccall talking with Stimson that morning, couldnt rccall sccing him bclorc lunch, although hc kncw Stimson was at thc Statc cpartmcnt that morning. 87
A littlc latcr Mitchcll askcd: o you rcmcmbcr whcthcr you had bccn told or tclcphoncd or inlormcd in any way on thc cvcning ol thc 6th, latc in thc cvcning, that any arrangcmcnt had bccn madc lor a mcct ing bctwccn Sccrctary Stimson and Mr. Hull on thc ncxt morning: Marshall had no such rccollcction. 88
Tcn how did Marshall know Stimson was at thc Statc cpartmcnt on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7: Tc mccting ol Stimson and Knox with Hull at thc Statc cpartmcnt had bccn arrangcd Saturday night after thc thrcc sccrctarics wcrc inlormcd ol thc rst 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply. 89 Yct Marshall dcnicd that hc had bccn inlormcd in any way on thc cvcning ol thc 6th ol thc plan lor that mccting. And if hc kncw ol that mccting, why did hc not also know about thc 13part Japancsc rcply that had sparkcd it: Marshall tcsticd consistcntly that hc rst saw thosc 13 parts, togcthcr with thc 14th part, only altcr hc arrivcd at his o cc in thc Var cpartmcnt at about 11:30 on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. JCC mcmbcr Coopcr askcd Marshall il in thc wccks bclorc thc attack hc had bccn kcpt lully adviscd as to diplomatic 87 !bid., p. 1115. 88 !bid. 89 !bid., part 33, p. 857. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 643 dcvclopmcnts. Marshall said, |S|o lar as Mr. Hull pcrsonally |was| conccrncd, hc had bccn. Marshall had a vcry distinct rcc ollcction ol Hulls saying with considcrablc cmphasis in thosc last days apropos ol his discussions with thc Japancsc cnvoys, Tcsc lcllows mcan to ght and you will havc to watch out. 90
Marshall said hc had cxpcctcd that thc rst Japancsc attack on thc Unitcd Statcs would occur in thc Philippincs. Hc thought thcy would go dircctly south towards Singaporc, that that would bc thc main campaign, and thc Philippincs, ol coursc, would bccomc involvcd in it. . . |and hc| assumcd that Guam . . . and . . . Vakc would lall almost immcdiatcly. 91
|Hc| lclt . . . that il thc Japancsc bccamc cngagcd in hostili tics dircctcd toward thc Malay Pcninsula that our situation dcmandcd that wc takc action to dclcnd our position. Tat, howcvcr, was my opinion, and that would havc to bc dctcr mincd by govcrnmcntal action. 92
As thc usual timc lor adjournmcnt on Friday altcrnoon approachcd, thc lth ol thc six cmocratic Committcc mcmbcrs was just starting his qucstioning. Murphy: Had you any warning, Gcncral, or any rcason to cxpcct on thc night ol cccmbcr 6 or on thc carly morning ol cccmbcr 7 that thcrc was any spccial urgcncy rcquiring you to bc at thc Var cpartmcnt carlicr than thc hour you did arrivc thcrc on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Marshall: ! had no such conccption or inlormation. 93
90 !bid., part 3, p. 1148. 91 !bid., p. 1149. 92 !bid., p. 1338. 93 !bid., p. 1163. 644 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 8y this timc Marshall had bccn on thc witncss stand lor two lull days, and thc Rcpublicans had not bcgun to qucstion him. Tc committcc rcgularly hcld Saturday hcarings, so it rcccsscd until 10 thc ncxt morning. M~vsn~iis !x:vvvoc~:iox Cox:ixuvb Vhcn thc hcaring rcsumcd on Saturday morning thc Rcpublicans bcgan qucstioning Marshall. ctcrmincd to nd out il hc could cxplain somc ol thc mystcrics surrounding thc Japancsc attack, thcy rcluscd to yicld to cmocratic prcssurc to curtail thcir intcrrogation. Gcarhart bcgan. Hc told Marshall that Gcrow had acccptcd lull rcsponsibility lor not having actcd on thc inadcquacy, as hc callcd it, ol Shorts Novcmbcr 27 rcport that hc had alcrtcd lor sabotagc. Marshall had not bccn in thc room whcn Gcrow tcs ticd but, hc said, hc admircs vcry much his attitudc. Vhcn Gcarhart askcd Marshall why hc had not takcn cxccption to Shorts rcply, thc gcncral could only say that was my opportunity to intcrvcnc and havc a lurthcr chcck madc and ! did not takc it. Just why, ! do not know. 94 Short had bccn issucd a command, Marshall said, and dircctcd to do somcthing. . . . ncc you issuc an ordcr, amcndmcnts or, you might say, codicils arc vcry dangcrous busincss whcn it is an opcrational ordcr. . . . |!|l possiblc . . . you must avoid conlusing thc commandcr with a mass ol data. 95
Gcarhart rcad to Marshall thc scvcral socallcd 8omb Plot mcssagcs conccrning thc location ol ships in Pcarl Harbor, which had bccn rcccivcd, dccodcd, and translatcd in Vashington prior to thc attack. Vasnt it 94 !bid., pp. 117273. 95 !bid., pp. 117677. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 645 quitc apparcnt lrom thc rcading ol thosc mcssagcs that wcrc rcccivcd, dccodcd, and placcd on your dcsk, rcad or not rcad, that many mcssagcs dirccting thc attcntion ol our military and naval authoritics to Hawaii had bccn rcccivcd: Marshall had no rccollcction ol having rcad any ol thosc mcs sagcs until prcparing lor thc JCC hcarings. 96
Marshall also dclcndcd himscll against thc APH8s scvcral chargcs: 1. In response to the charge that hc had lailcd To kccp thc Commanding Gcncral ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt lully adviscd, Marshall insistcd hc had givcn Short thc inlormation hc nccdcd, as a rcsponsiblc commandcr, to bc prcparcd lor thc possibility or probability ol war. Tc mass ol data that pourcd into Vashington, hc said, would mcrcly imposc an additional burdcn. !t was a mattcr ol judgmcnt how much additional inlormation should havc gonc to him. Marshall thought only thc cccmbcr 7 mcssagc ol 1:00 v.:. applicd, although hc admit tcd ohand that thc mcssagcs you just rcad |thc shipsinharbor bomb plot mcssagcs| . . . would havc bccn hclplul to Gcncral Short, but particularly morc so to Admiral Kimmcl. 97
2. In response to the charge that hc should havc gottcn in touch with Short on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6, whcn thc critical inlormation indicating an almost immcdiatc brcak with Japan had comc in, Marshall tcsticd that hc did not bclicvc it had any spccic bcaring onc way or thc othcr on Gcncral Shorts situation and rcsponsibility. 98 Morcovcr, hc rcitcratcd that hc kncw noth ing ol thc |13part| mcssagc whatsocvcr until his arrival in thc Var cpartmcnt on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Hc prcsumcd it was not thought ncccssary to bring that to my immcdiatc 96 !bid., p. 1181. 97 !bid. 98 !bid., p. 1182. 646 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy attcntion bccausc thc rst to thc thirtccnth part did not includc thc critical statcmcnts. 99
3. In response to the charge that hc had lailcd to invcstigatc and dctcrminc Shorts statc ol rcadincss . . . bctwccn Novcmbcr 27 and cccmbcr 7, hc dcnicd that thcy had in Vashington any intimation that that |Hawaiian| command was not rcady. As a mattcr ol lact, hc had no rcason to bclicvc that that command was anything othcr than highly c cicnt and alcrt. 100
At midmorning Saturday, whcn Gcarhart nishcd his qucs tioning, Fcrguson took ovcr. As chicl ol thc (privatcly paid) minority sta, ! was at his clbow as usual with a collcction ol doc umcnts and a host ol important qucstions to bc askcd. 101 Fcrguson pcrsistcd in his qucstioning until Marshall had to admit it was his rcsponsibility, not Gcrows, to scc that Short was adcquatcly alcrtcd. Fcrgusons pointcd qucstioning lastcd thc rcst ol thc day. Marshall nally had to admit that hc was thc only Army o ccr with authority ovcr Short, 102 that Gcrow had no authority undcr Army rcgulations lor scnding an alcrt to Short, 103 that no rcspon siblc Army o ccr was on duty Saturday cvcning, cccmbcr 6, or Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, who could takc action bclorc Marshalls bclatcd arrival at his o cc that morning, 104 that thc 99 !bid., pp. 132021. 100 !bid., pp. 118283. 101 Congrcss had providcd no lunds lor a rcscarch sta to assist thc Commit tccs minority mcmbcrs. Tcrclorc, journalist John T. Flynn, who had bccn intcrcstcd lor somc timc in cstablishing thc rcsponsibility lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr, had raiscd lunds to pay lor mc and a sta ol scvcn to assist thc Rcpub licans. Flynn had writtcn and publishcd privatcly two pamphlcts which had crcatcd quitc a scnsation: Tc Truth About Pcarl Harbor (rst publishcd in thc Chicago Tribune, ctobcr 22, 1944) and Tc Final Sccrct ol Pcarl Harbor (Scptcmbcr 1945). 102 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, pp. 1183, 1188. 103 !bid., pp. 1188, 1202. 104 !bid., pp. 1114, 118485. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 647 shortagc ol manpowcr in dcciphcring Japancsc codcs was not duc to lack ol congrcssional appropriations, 105 that wc had bccn trying to kccp sccrct thc lact that Grcat 8ritain was inlormcd ol what wc wcrc rcading in thc Japancsc codcs bclorc thc attack, 106 that hc, Marshall, was not awarc that thc scnding ol diplomatic intcl ligcncc to Kimmcl was discontinucd somctimc in August 1941, 107
that Marshall dcnicd knowing that thc Japancsc had lcarncd wc wcrc rcading thcir codcs, 108 that portions ol thc Robcrts rcport wcrc withdrawn bclorc it was madc public, 109 that thc Unitcd Statcs initiatcd thc AngloutchAmcrican Agrccmcnt, 110 that hc, Stimson, and Knox had approvcd thc agrccmcnt, 111 that it wcnt into gcncral ccct bclorc thc attack bccausc it involvcd thc policy ol thc main ght in thc Atlantic and thc dclcnsivc prin ciplc in thc Pacic, 112 and that prior to cccmbcr 1941 o ccrs ol thc Unitcd Statcs wcrc lurnishcd to China lor combat duty against Japan. 113
Marshall also admittcd that hc thought thc Japancsc wcrc cngagcd in a campaign southward lrom thc China Sca. . . . Vc had in mind thc possibility ol an cort on thc Panama Canal. Vc had in mind thc possibility ol an cort to strikc a blow at our air plants in Scattlc, at our air plants in San icgo, and wc had in mind thc possibility ol a blow in thc Ccntral Pacic, in thc Hawaiian district. Vc thought thc 105 !bid., pp. 119697. 106 !bid., p. 1198. 107 !bid., p. 1199. 108 !bid., p. 1203. 109 !bid., p. 1206. 110 !bid., p. 1218. 111 !bid. 112 !bid., p. 1221. 113 !bid., pp. 122930. 648 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy lattcr was thc most improbablc. . . . Vc thought it |Hawaii| was imprcgnablc against a Japancsc landing cxpcdition. 114
Although hc had known lrom Admiral Richardson that thc cct would havc to bc built up and propcrly supplicd bclorc going out to sca, hc didnt think anyonc had cvcr told him, prior to cccmbcr 7, that thc Unitcd Statcs Flcct in thc Pacic ccan, was not ablc to takc carc ol itscll in thc cvcnt ol an attack. 115
Fcrguson continucd to qucstion Marshall whcn thc com mittcc rcasscmblcd on Monday, hc qucstioncd him all that day and Tucsday morning also. Hc askcd Marshall about thc Pilot Mcssagc, which had bccn rcccivcd in Vashington on cccmbcr 6, and how hc accountcd lor its not bcing dclivcrcd to him that day. Marshall didnt answcr dircctly. Hc digrcsscd about thc rst 13 parts and admittcd hc had bccn in Vashington that cntirc day. Hc said thcrc was somconc on duty in thc o cc ol thc Chicl ol Sta, thcrc was somconc on duty in thc o cc ol thc Var Plans ivision, thcrc was somconc on duty in thc o cc ol G2, who prcsumably could havc rcccivcd this particular mcssagc and actcd. Finally, howcvcr, as Fcrguson prcsscd him, hc statcd: Tc point is ! did not rcccivc thc |Pilot| mcssagc that day. 116
Vhcn thc altcrnoon scssion opcncd, thc chairman announccd that Marshall had bccn callcd to thc Vhitc Housc lor a conlcr cncc with Prcsidcnt Truman about his mission to China. Marshall lclt thc hcaring room at 3:00. 114 !bid., pp. 117071. 115 !bid., p. 1163. 116 !bid., pp. 132122. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 649 Hv~vixcs !x:vvvuv:vb A S:v~xcvv ~: :nv Co::i::vv T~niv- Gcncral Milcs rcturncd bricy to thc witncss stand, and Scnator Fcrguson, a Rcpublican, continucd thc qucstioning. Scnator Lucas, a cmocrat, intcrruptcd: A momcnt ago, whcn ! mcrcly suggcstcd to Scnator Fcrguson that hc lct Gcncral Milcs answcr thc qucstion, thc gcntlcman on Scnator Fcrgusons right got a hcarty chucklc out ol it. ! would likc to know just who thc gcntlcman is and what right hc has to sit alongsidc ol thc committcc tablc and chucklc at a mcmbcr ol thc Unitcd Statcs Scnatc. . . . ! do not proposc to sit around this tablc and pcrmit somc individual that ! do not know anything about, who is constantly in this casc and con stantly rcminding Scnators ol thc typc and kind ol qucstions thcy should ask, to givc a hcarty chucklc to somcthing ! might suggcst in conncction with this hcaring. 117
Fcrguson spokc up. His namc is Pcrcy Grcavcs. Hc is with Scnator 8rcwstcr and has chargc ol Scnator 8rcwstcrs lcs in this casc. Scnator 8rcwstcr was out ol town on this particu lar day attcnding his lathcrs luncral. Fcrguson had shiltcd into 8rcwstcrs scat and ! had movcd with my papcrs and documcnts lrom my usual placc bchind thc committcc tablc to a scat ncxt to Fcrguson at thc committcc tablc. Scnator Lucas had known Marshall wcll whcn hc had bccn Judgc Advocatc ol thc !llinois National Guard in thc 1930s and Marshall had bccn Spccial !nstructor ol thc National Guard. Tc cmocrat committcc mcmbcrs had bccn disturbcd lor somc timc by thc sharp and pcrsistcnt intcrrogation ol administration wit ncsscs and Lucas was cspccially upsct by thc pointcd qucstioning ol Marshall. 117 !bid., p. 1372. 650 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Senator Lucas: Vasnt hc |Grcavcs| thc Rcpublican National Committcc rcscarch man in thc campaign ol 1944: Mr. Greaves: ! was with thc Rcpublican National Committcc up until thc cnd ol last ycar |1944|. Senator Lucas: Tis is a nonpartisan hcaring. Chairman Barkley: !n vicw ol that inlormation, would it bc out ol placc to inquirc who has compcnsatcd Mr. Grcavcs lor thc scrviccs hc has rcndcrcd to Scnator 8rcwstcr or Scnator Fcrguson: Ferguson: Hc is not rcndcring any scrviccs lor mc. Lucas: Not much! Barkley: Hc has bccn sitting by thc Scnator lrom Michigan |Fcrguson| during thcsc wholc hcarings and apparcntly prompting thc Scnator in thc intcrrogatorics hc has addrcsscd to thc witncsscs. Maybc that is not a scrvicc to thc Scnator lrom Michigan and thc Scnator will havc to bc thc judgc ol that, but it has bccn a mattcr ol common obscrvation that that has transpircd cvcr sincc wc bcgan thc hcaring. 8arklcy said hc did not objcct pcrsonally, hc didnt carc how many assistants any mcmbcr ol this committcc may havc, or dcsirc, or nccd. 8ut hc thought it was not out ol placc that thc committcc know who it is who is compcnsating anybody who is assisting any Scnator. . . |and that| thc public would bc intcrcstcd in knowing whcthcr thcrc is any partisan compcnsation bcing paid to anybody who is cmploycd by a mcmbcr ol this committcc. Fcrguson said that 8arklcy would havc to talk with 8rcwstcr about that. 118
118 !bid., p. 1373 (cccmbcr 11). Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 651 At thc closc ol thc scssion, rcportcrs crowdcd around. Tc Vashington Times-Heralds story, hcadlincd Spy !dcnticd at Pcarl Harbor Probc, had a lourcolumn photo ol mc scatcd at thc committcc tablc ncxt to Fcrguson with Scnators Lucas and Gcorgc in thc background. Ncw Yorks PM rclcrrcd to mc as Tc mystcrious sixth Scnator, whosc Incognito is Punctured When He Chuckles Out of Turn. . . . Tcrc wcrc somc liltcd cycbrows at his prcscncc at thc Committcc tablc, but his gcncral busyncss and thc imprcssivc aspcct ol thc documcnts hc luggcd to and lrom thc scssions gavc him status as somc sort ol lunctionary. Tc ncxt day PM dcscribcd a disputc bctwccn Fcrguson and 8arklcy: !t Sccms !dca Vas To Gct GPs Grcavcs ut ol thc Hcadlincs. Vhcn 8rcwstcr rcturncd to Capitol Hill a lcw days latcr, hc told thc committcc that my position was not a mattcr about which thcrc nccd bc any mystcry, hc had announccd my appointmcnt at a prcss conlcrcncc in his o cc somc wccks ago. My dutics consistcd ol rcading and analyzing thc voluminous documcnts, lcs, and cxhibits prcscntcd to thc committcc, and scarching thc rccord lor lcads to pcrsons who might bc callcd as witncsscs. ach cvcning ! studicd thc background ol schcdulcd witncsscs and thc matcrials pcrtincnt to thc ncxt days hcarings. Tcn cach morn ing bclorc thc hcarings startcd, ! briclcd thc minority mcmbcrs, suggcsting possiblc lincs ol inquiry. 8rcwstcr said hc was sorry that thc committcc hadnt lound it practicablc to allow thc minority somc assistancc, so hc had sccurcd Mr. Grcavcs. ! was 8rcwstcrs assistant and was bcing paid by him. 8rcwstcr wantcd to makc it clcar that ! had not had lor many months any conncction whatsocvcr with thc Rcpublican National Committcc. Hc considcrcd mc a vcry compctcnt man. . . . |Hc| is my assistant. . . . ! hopc hc may continuc. Ncithcr hc 652 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy nor ! wantcd to do anything which would in any way impair thc propcr conduct ol this vcry important invcstigation. 119
!n a mcmorandum to 8rcwstcr, ! apologizcd to thc committcc mcmbcrs. ! statcd that ! had grcat rcspcct lor Mcmbcrs ol both Houscs ol Congrcss and had not intcndcd to insult or rccct on any Mcmbcrs ol thc Unitcd Statcs Scnatc by thought, word or action. ! thought Lucas had misconstrucd an unconscious and . . . silcnt smilc that wcnt unnoticcd by anyonc clsc. ! also said ! was a rcgistcrcd Rcpublican but rcccivcd no compcnsation lrom Rcpublican Party sourccs, and had not lor many months bclorc cntcring 8rcwstcrs scrvicc. ! assurcd 8rcwstcr that my activitics lor him had not bccn ol a partisan or a political naturc. 120
Tc incidcnt, a oncday mcdia scnsation, disruptcd thc hcar ings only slightly. !t was soon lorgottcn and ! rcsumcd my scat bchind, not at, thc committcc tablc. Tc invcstigation continucd. 8~vxivv Rviv~svs TP SCRT APH8 Rvvov: n thc morning ol cccmbcr 12 Vashington was grcctcd by a story in thc Washington Times-Herald bascd on thc TP SCRT Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard Rcport. 8arklcy had rclcascd it to rcportcrs thc cvcning bclorc, and thcy had pounccd on its rcvclations. Tc Times-Herald story rcad: Hcrctolorc top sccrctarmy documcnts on thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr rcvcalcd . . . that army and navy witncsscs tcsticd that Japancsc war plans wcrc known lour days bclorc thc Hawaiian attack, but that thc witncsscs latcr changcd thcir tcstimony. 119 !bid., part 4, pp. 171920 (cccmbcr 17). 120 !bid., p. 1720. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 653 A cartoon by C.. 8atchclor publishcd in thc samc issuc por traycd Japancsc Primc Ministcr Tojo in thc garb ol a towncricr marching through thc strccts ol Vashington with a sandwich board rcading, Vc arc going to attack carly in cccmbcr. Plcasc dont tcll Kimmcl and Short, signcd TJ. 8clow thc cartoon thc words: Tcy didnt. Tc TP SCRT documcnts that 8arklcy gavc thc prcss introduccd to thc public still morc cvidcncc ol warnings rcccivcd in Vashington in advancc ol thc Japancsc attackthc dcad lincs thc Japancsc had xcd lor scrious ncgotiations with thc Unitcd Statcs to cnd, a cccmbcr 3 intcrccpt rcporting that thc Japancsc wcrc dcstroying thcir codcs and codc machincs, and thc U.S. Navys intcrccption on cccmbcr 4 ol thc Japancsc Vinds xccutc indicating Var with ngland, war with Amcrica, pcacc with Russia. 121
M~vsn~ii is Asxvb ~nou: Vixbs Cobv Mvx:ioxvb ix APH8 Rvvov: Marshall rcturncd to thc hcarings altcr mccting with Truman. His qucstioning continucd with Rcprcscntativc Kcclc, a tall man with broad shouldcrs, a lawycr with a dccp voicc whcn hc wantcd to usc it. Hc intcrrogatcd Marshall vigorously, introducing into thc rccord a grcat dcal ol inlormation prcviously misscd. Hc did not lct thc gcncral cvadc rcsponsibility lor thc lailurc to rcspond to Shorts inadcquatc sabotagc alcrt, or lor his uncxplaincd unavail ability during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 and thc carly morning hours ol cccmbcr 7. 122
Vhcn Marshall took thc witncss scat on Tursday, cccmbcr 13, Scnator Lucas askcd about thc Vinds Codc, which had bccn mcntioncd in thc APH8 documcnts just rclcascd. Had 121 !bid., pp. 144397. 122 !bid., pp. 142122, 142930. 654 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Marshall cvcr sccn any mcssagc . . . implcmcnting this winds codc mcssagc: Marshall rcplicd: Not to my knowlcdgc. 123
Finally, at noon, altcr cach mcmbcr had anothcr chancc to qucstion him, thc committcc nishcd its intcrrogation ol Marshall, rclcascd him, and hc was lrcc to y to Chungking. 124
Gvxvv~i Miivs Rvc~iis :nv Piio: Mvss~cv, Gvxvv~i M~vsn~ii ovs No: Altcr Marshall had complctcd his tcstimony, Milcs took thc stand oncc morc. Fcrguson again askcd him about thc Pilot Mcssagc, Japans announccmcnt that hcr rcsponsc to thc U.S. ultimatum was cn routc. Tis timc Milcs rcplicd that to thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc and bclicl it was in thc Saturday altcr noon lockcd pouch among scvcral othcr mcssagcs, which you will nd wcrc translatcd on that day, and that it did go to Gcncral Marshall. Hc docs not rcmcmbcr sccing it. 125 Tat was as lar as Milcs would go toward contradicting Marshall. Pv~vi H~vnov Hv~vixcs, Scnvbuivb :o L~s: Fouv Vvvxs, :o nv x:vxbvb wi:n Nvw Couxsvi ~xb S:~vv
Tc Congrcssional Committcc had bcgun its hcarings Novcmbcr 15. Gcncral Counscl Mitchcll and his chicl assistant, Gcscll, had cxpcctcd to do most ol thc sclcction and qucstioning ol witncsscs, with thc committcc mcmbcrs obscrving and asking only occasional qucstions. Howcvcr, public intcrcst in thc invcs tigation was intcnsc, and thc mcmbcrs discovcrcd many points to probc. Tc Rcpublican mcmbcrs cspccially, Mitchcll said, had 123 !bid., p. 1507. 124 !bid., p. 1541. 125 !bid., p. 1555. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 655 cngagcd in cxtcnsivc cxamination . . . lar bcyond what thc lcgal sta anticipatcd. 126
Mitchcll rcmindcd thc committcc on cccmbcr 14 that it has bccn sitting rcgularly lor a month, including all Saturdays but onc. uring that pcriod only 8 witncsscs havc bccn com plctcly cxamincd . . . thcrc rcmain at lcast 60 witncsscs to bc cxamincd. Many ol thcsc witncsscs arc quitc as crucial as thosc who havc tcsticd. At thc ratc ol progrcss during thc past month, it sccms ccrtain that scvcral morc months ol hcarings will bc rcquircd. . . . Tc joint rcsolution ol thc Congrcss undcr which thc commit tcc is acting rcquircs a nal rcport ol thc committcc to bc madc not latcr than January 3, 1946. . . . Sincc thc start ol thc hcar ing it has bccomc incrcasingly apparcnt that somc mcmbcrs ol thc committcc havc a dicrcnt vicw than that cntcrtaincd by counscl, cithcr as to thc scopc ol thc inquiry or as to what is pcrtincnt cvidcncc. As a rcsult, thc hcarings had bccn prolongcd. Tcrclorc, it was ncccssary lor Mitchcll to ask thc committcc to arrangc lor othcr counscl to carry on. 127
Congrcss grantcd thc committcc an cxtcnsion. Vhilc thc committcc scarchcd lor rcplaccmcnts lor Mitchcll and his sta, thc hcarings continucd with tcstimony lrom scvcral morc top military o cials. 126 !bid., part 4, p. 1586. 127 !bid., pp. 158586. 656 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Gvxvv~i Gvvow (Av:v V~v Pi~xs) iscussvs Snov:s S~no:~cv Aivv: ~xb vcv:nvv 6 vvx:s Gcncral Gcrow maintaincd his Novcmbcr 27 dispatch had givcn Short su cicnt warning and that Shorts rcplyRcport dcpartmcnt alcrtcd to prcvcnt sabotagc. Liaison with Navy could havc bccn takcn to mcan that hc was alcrtcd to prcvcnt sabotagc and . . . also prcparcd to conduct rcconnaissancc and othcr dclcnsivc missions. 128 !t could cvcn havc bccn intcrprctcd as mcaning that thc Commanding Gcncral, Hawaiian cpartmcnt, had prcparcd lor an attack ol thc kind that was actually madc. 129
Hcncc no lollowup had bccn considcrcd. Scnator Fcrguson, a rclcntlcss cxamincr, quotcd lrom thc Sta O cers Field Manual: Tc rcsponsibilitics ol thc commandcr and his sta do not cnd with thc issuc ol thc ncccssary ordcrs. Tcy must insurc rcccipt ol thc ordcrs by thc propcr commandcrs, makc ccrtain thcy arc undcrstood, and cnlorcc thcir ccctivc cxccution. 130
Hc askcd Gcrow il Short, altcr having rcportcd thc mcasurcs takcn and |n|ot having hcard anything lor thc numbcr ol days bctwccn thc 28th and thc 7th, wouldnt havc had a right to rcly upon that lact, that |hc| had undcrstood his ordcr, and that hc had propcrly intcrprctcd thc ordcr ol thc 27th: Gcrow rcplicd: ! think that is corrcct. 131
128 !bid., part 4, p. 1638. 129 !bid., p. 1640. 130 Var cpartmcnt. Sta O cers Field Manual: Te Sta and Combat Orders. FM 1015. August 19, 1940, prcparcd undcr thc dircction ol thc Chicl ol Sta, G.C. Marshall, p. 39, paragraph 63, Supcrvision ol xccution. 131 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 4, p. 1647. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 657 Gcrow voluntccrcd a dcscription ol his rcsponsibility as chicl ol Var Plans. !t had bccn to prcparc |action, not inlormation| mcssagcs and submit thcm to thc Chicl ol Sta and thc Sccrctary ol Var lor thcir approval. !n any cmcrgcncy, il thc Chicl ol Sta was not thcrc, ! would assumc thc rcsponsibility lor scnding thcm and acccpt thc conscqucnccs il ! madc a mistakc. 132 Fcrguson also qucstioncd Gcrow about crucial cccmbcr 1941 mcssagcs. Gcrow rca rmcd his statcmcnts to Licutcnant Coloncl Clauscnhc rccallcd ncithcr 8rattons rccommcnda tion that additional warnings bc scnt thc ovcrscas commandcrs bccausc Japancsc diplomats had bccn told to dcstroy thcir codcs and codc machincs, 133 nor Sadtlcrs tclling him on cccmbcr 5 that a Vinds Codc xccutc had bccn rcccivcd. 134 And hc dcnicd rccciving thc Pilot Mcssagc and thc rst 13 parts ol Japans rcply on cccmbcr 6, hc didnt scc thcm until cccmbcr 7 at 11:30 in thc Chicl ol Stas o cc. 135
Ab:iv~i Tuvxvv (N~vv V~v Pi~xs): U.S. vvvxsv xco:v~ssvs vvvxsv ov U.K. Ac~ixs: J~v~x ~xb Gvv:~xv Admiral Turncr, thc 1941 chicl ol thc Navys war plans scc tion, rst camc bclorc thc JCC on cccmbcr 19. Hc was am boyant, somcthing ol a braggadocio, with a rcputation lor liking morc liquor than was good lor him. Hc had boastcd bclorc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry that hc had cxprcsscd thc opinion prcvi ously that thc July 1941 lrcczing ol Japancsc asscts in thc Unitcd 132 !bid., p. 1653. 133 !bid., pp. 162730. 134 !bid., p. 1631. 135 !bid., pp. 163436 658 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Statcs would vcry dcnitcly bring on war with Japan. 136 Hc had cxpcctcd thcy |thc Japancsc| would makc somc sort ol an attack on Hawaii. 137 Hc told thc JCC hc had considcrcd a surprisc attack on Pcarl Harbor not simply a possibility but probablc. 138
Tc attack, hc said, had comc as no surprisc to him. Vhcn stationcd in Japan in 1939, Turncr tcsticd, hc kncw thc Japancsc naval attach. 8oth mcn had comc to Vashington at about thc samc timc. Altcr Japancsc Ambassador Nomura arrivcd in Vashington in Fcbruary 1941, thc naval attach arrangcd lor Turncr to mcct Nomura about March rst. Turncr wrotc a mcm orandum to CN Stark about that mccting, saying hc thought hc should continuc thc talks. 139 Tcy mct scvcral morc timcs. n July 21, 1941, Turncr told thc Ambassador |Nomura| that ! bclicvcd that Congrcss would dcclarc war il thcy |thc Japancsc| attackcd cithcr thc utch or thc 8ritish in Malaya. 140
According to Turncrs mcmorandum ol that mccting, Turncr had pointcd out to Nomura that it is dccidcdly against thc military intcrcsts ol thc Unitcd Statcs to pcrmit thc Unitcd Kingdom to bc ovcrcomc by Gcrmany. For this rcason any action which thc Unitcd Statcs could takc against Gcrmany is ncccssarily onc ol scll dclcnsc and would ncvcr bc considcrcd as aggrcssion. Furthcrmorc, anything that accts thc luturc sccurity ol thc Unitcd Kingdom in any part ol thc world, also is ol intcrcst to thc Unitcd Statcs lrom thc dclcnsivc vicwpoint. 141
136 !bid., part 32, p. 604. 137 !bid., part 33, p. 878. 138 !bid., part 4, p. 1940. 139 !bid., p. 2041. 140 !bid., p. 2042. 141 cpartmcnt ol Statc, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1943), vol. 2, p. 519. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 659 Turncr was uncquivocal: Any U.S. action against Gcrmany would bc scll dclcnsc and would ncvcr bc considcrcd aggrcs sion! |T|hc luturc sccurity ol thc Unitcd Statcs and that ol thc Unitcd Kingdom wcrc incxtricably allicd lrom thc dclcn sivc vicwpoint! Rooscvclt, Hull, and Stark wcrc all scnt copics ol Turncrs mcmorandum ol that mccting. Turncr told thc JCC hc rcccivcd no indication lrom any ol thcm that thcy disagrccd or disapprovcd ol what hc had writtcn. 142
Vhcn askcd about thc cccmbcr 6 Japancsc intcrccpts, Turncr rccallcd sccing thc Pilot Mcssagc and thc rst 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply somc timc just prcccding thc 7th, somc night, and ! now bclicvc it to havc bccn thc night ol cccmbcr 6, about 11:30 v.:. Hc said an o ccr camc to his housc, hc had bccn in bcd but wcnt down and rcad a long dispatch in scvcral parts which hc bclicvcd was thc dispatch in qucstion. Vhcn askcd to whom thc o ccr had shown thcsc papcrs, thc o ccr rcplicd, Admiral Vilkinson, Admiral !ngcrsoll, and Sccrctary Knox. Tus assurcd that thc rcsponsiblc Navy o cials had bccn adviscd, Turncr did nothing morc about it. Hc did not rccall sccing thc 14th part until altcr thc attack. 143
At about 10:30 on Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, Stark phoncd Turncr at his homc, asking him to comc to thc o cc. ncc thcrc, Stark askcd him to dralt a rcply to Harts inquiry con ccrning Crcightons rcport that thc Unitcd Statcs had promiscd armcd support to thc 8ritish and utch in thc lar cast. 144 Turncr had bccn working on that whcn Stark summoncd him, at about 12 or 12:15, and showcd him thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Stark told 142 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 4, p. 2041. 143 !bid., pp. 197071. 144 !bid., p. 1971, Stark tcstimony. Scc also ibid., pp. 193516, Turncr tcstimony conccrning rcply prcparcd cccmbcr 7 lor Hart, and part 10, pp. 508283, Crcighton tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. 660 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Turncr that Marshall had noticd thc army cld commandcrs ol that mcssagc, tclling thcm to inlorm thc naval authoritics. 145
Ab:iv~i S:~vx ox Joix: U.S.8vi:isn V~v Pi~x ~xb Movxixc ov vcv:nvv Admiral Harold R. Stark, chicl ol naval opcrations at thc timc ol thc attack, was sccond in linc ol command to thc prcsidcnt in protccting thc Unitcd Statcs and its Navy. Stark had bccomc CN on August 1, 1939, just onc month bclorc Hitlcrs lorccs marchcd into Poland, launching what bccamc Vorld Var !!. Stark was known to his associatcs as 8ctty, his nicknamc lrom Annapolis days. 146 Hc was gcnial, politc, soltspokcn, not blunt or brusquc likc Admiral Richardson, who had stood up boldly to FR. 8ut Stark was no milquctoast cithcr. n occasion hc would tcll FR lrankly what hc thought, as hc had, lor instancc, whcn opposing thc dcstroycr dcal. Stark appcarcd bclorc thc JCC on cccmbcr 31, 1945. Hc opcncd his tcstimony by rcading a statcmcnt containing substan tial quotations lrom rcports and lcttcrs to his cld commandcrs during his tcrm ol o cc. 147 Vhcn hc assumcd o cc, Stark rcal izcd U.S. naval lorccs wcrc wcak, so hc had immcdiatcly sct about trying to obtain morc ships, plancs, wcapons, and mcn. Navy bud gct rcqucsts wcrc rst madc to thc 8urcau ol thc 8udgct, which makcs rccommcndations lrom which thc prcsidcnts budgct is prcparcd and submittcd to Congrcss. 148 Stark had appcarcd bclorc congrcssional committccs to rcqucst authorization and lunds, pointing out thc incrcasing dcmands lor mcn and matcricl lor thc 145 !bid., part 4, pp. 197172. 146 !bid., part 5, p. 2172. 147 !bid., pp. 209735. 148 !bid., p. 2458. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 661 Atlantic thcatcr. 149 Hc had lound Congrcss coopcrativc: ||vcr thc scal ycars 1934 to 1941, inclusivc, thosc gurcs show that thc Congrcss cxcccdcd thc Prcsidcntial 8udgct cstimatc . . . in thc mattcr ol appropriations. 150 Stark also told ol his strugglc with thc prcsidcnt in sccking approval lor cxpanding thc naval lorcc. Hc had plcadcd with FR on bchall ol thc Pacic Flcct, it should at lcast at rst rcmain strong until wc scc what Japan is going to do. 151 Stark tcsticd that as CN hc had dcvclopcd war plans Rainbow No. 3 lor govcrning naval opcrations in casc ol war with Japan, Gcrmany, and !taly, 152 and thcn Rainbow No. 5, which hc had hclpcd to dcvclop with thc Army. Rainbow No. 5 was a joint basic war plan bascd on undcrstandings with thc 8ritish and Canadians in A8C1January 29March 27, 1941. 153
Stark said his dutics includcd kccp|ing| thc cct command crs in Atlantic, Pacic, and Asiatic watcrs inlormcd ol signi cant dcvclopmcnts in political and military mattcrs ol conccrn to thcm. 154 n April 3, 1941, Stark wrotc Kimmcl about thc joint U.S.8ritish war plan that had bccn drawn up and on which 8asic Var Plan Rainbow No. 5 had bccn bascd. 8oth hc and Marshall had approvcd this war plan. Stark had discusscd it at lcngth with Rooscvclt, had rcad to him his April 3 lcttcr to Kimmcl sctting lorth thc plans provisions, and had rcccivcd his |FRs| gcn cral asscnt, and at an appropriatc timc, |thc plan| is cxpcctcd to rcccivc thc |o cial| approval ol thc prcsidcnt. 155 According to Rainbow No. 5, VPL46, thc U.S. Pacic Flcct was to 149 !bid., pp. 210001. 150 !bid., p. 2459. 151 !bid., p. 2112. 152 !bid., p. 2102. 153 !bid. 154 !bid., pp. 2109, 217577. 155 !bid., part 33, pp. 135758. 662 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy support thc lorccs ol thc Associatcd Powcrs in thc Far ast by divcrting cncmy strcngth away lrom thc Malay 8arricr through thc dcnial and capturc ol positions in thc Marshalls, and through raids on cncmy sca communications and positions. 156
n April 4 Stark rca rmcd to Kimmcl FRs approval ol thc U.S.Grcat 8ritain agrccmcnt lor joint military action. 157
Starks prcparcd statcmcnt to thc committcc rcad in part: 8ascd on thc undcrstandings arrivcd at in A8C1, thc Army and Navy dcvclopcd a Joint 8asic Var Plan, known as Rainbow No. 5, which was approvcd by thc Sccrctarics ol Var and thc Navy. Stark continucd: You will notc that ! havc crosscd out thc words and by thc prcsidcnt. Tat is thc only changc madc in this statcmcnt. 158
Vhcn Scnator Fcrguson askcd why hc had dclctcd thosc lour words, Stark cxplaincd that hc had no documcntary prool ol it. ! do know thc prcsidcnt, cxccpt o cially, approvcd ol it, 159 although it shows hc was not willing to do it o cially until wc got into thc war. Ncvcrthclcss ! scnt that plan out on April 3. . . . ! told Kimmcl and told TommyAdmiral Hartthat ! had rcad to thc prcsidcnt my o cial lcttcr ol April 3 and that thc prcsidcnt had approvcd it and kncw ! was scnding it out. Tcrclorc, ! think it is salc to say that thc prcsidcnt ccrtainly approvcd ol it. 160
!n othcr words, FR had approvcd an agrccmcnt, wcll bclorc thc war startcd, to hclp thc 8ritish and utch militarily in south cast Asia in thc cvcnt ol Japancsc aggrcssion, even if the Japanese had not actually attacked the United States itself. 156 !bid., part 18, p. 2889, xhibit 129. 157 !bid., part 16, pp. 216061. 158 !bid., part 5, p. 2102. 159 !bid., part 18, pp. 2875941, xhibit 129. 160 !bid., part 5, p. 2391. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 663 Quoting Kimmcls Junc 30, 1941, rcport, Stark said hc rcal izcd thc dclcnsc lorccs at Pcarl Harbor wcrc |i|nadcquatc . . . to providc lor thc salcty ol thc Flcct in harbor. 161 Tcy had bccn lurthcr wcakcncd in mid1941, as had bccn contcmplatcd in thc Navy 8asic Var Plan, VPL46, whcn somc ol thc ccts ships wcrc translcrrcd to thc Atlantic to bc uscd in taking thc Azorcs. Although that plan was ncvcr carricd out, thc ships rcmaincd in thc Atlantic and wcrc not rcturncd to Hawaii. 162 Tcn just bclorc thc attack, thc strcngth ol thc cct was again rcduccd whcn 50 pursuit plancs wcrc translcrrcd, 25 cach, to Vakc and Midway. 163
n Novcmbcr 27, thc day altcr Hull prcscntcd thc Unitcd Statcss notc to thc Japancsc ambassadors, thc Navy had scnt thc thrcc cct commandcrsHart, Kimmcl, and Kinga war warning. Japan was cxpcctcd within thc ncxt lcw days to launch an amphibious cxpcdition against cithcr thc Philippincs, Tai or Kra pcninsula or possibly 8ornco. 164 Stark tcsticd that hc had workcd lor hours on this mcssagc, particularly thc war warning, which was all out. Hc thought it would convcy what ! intcndcd it should convcy. ! thought it was vcry plain and it cw all thc dangcr signals. 165
Stark had clcarcd thc mcssagc pcrsonally with thc sccrctary ol thc Navy and hc had cithcr told thc prcsidcnt bclorchand or immc diatcly altcr. Stark did know that within 24 hours, il not bclorc . . . it had his lull approval and that hc gavc us an .K. 166
Also on Novcmbcr 27 thc Army scnt warnings to MacArthur in thc Philippincs and Short. 167 According to Stark, |T|hc outstanding things in thc Army mcssagc . . . was that war might comc at any momcnt. Tc mcssagc dircctcd Short 161 !bid., part 5, p. 2107. 162 !bid. Scc also part 6, p. 2505, Kimmcl statcmcnt to thc Joint Committcc. 163 !bid., part 5, pp. 215471. 164 !bid., part 14, p. 1406, CN ispatch #272337. 165 !bid., part 5, p. 2447. 166 !bid., p. 2151. 167 !bid., part 14, pp. 132829. 664 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy to makc a rcconnaissancc and ! had dircctcd Kimmcl to makc a dclcnsivc dcploymcnt. Stark lclt Tc two |warnings| hookcd up togcthcr. 168
Vhilc qucstioning Stark, Rcprcscntativc Kcclc said hc had hcard him say rcpcatcdly that hc did not cxpcct an attack at Pcarl Harbor, you wcrc surpriscd, thc prcsidcnt was surpriscd, Gcncral Marshall was surpriscd, you wcrc all surpriscd . . . and yct you cxpcctcd Kimmcl with lcss inlormation than you had ol thc situation, cvcn conccd ing this ordcr which was givcn on thc war warning . . . to bc prcparcd against an attack which nonc ol you thought would takc placc. Kcclc lound it di cult . . . to rcconcilc thosc two positions. 169
Stark admittcd hc had not cxpcctcd an attack on Pcarl Harbor, although wc all rccognizcd it to bc a possibility. 170 Hc had scnt to Kimmcl lor action a war warning signal containing a dircc tivc and containing what inlormation wc had. !t had dircctcd Kimmcl to makc a dclcnsivc dcploymcnt. Stark had thought that with such a warning thc cct would bc put on a war looting out thcrc so lar as any surprisc was conccrncd. 171
Starks rcsponsibility includcd kccping thc cct commandcrs inlormcd and assuring thc salcty ol thc Navy. Yct undcr qucstion ing Stark admittcd to having no rccollcction ol having sccn thc Japancsc Pcarl Harbor bomb plot or shipsinharbor mcssagcs. 172
And hc dcnicd having hcard that a Vinds xccutc was rcccivcd bclorc thc attack. 173 Morcovcr, hc said hc had not known until thc 168 !bid., part 5, p. 2447. 169 !bid., pp. 244748. 170 !bid., p. 2448. 171 !bid., p. 2445. 172 !bid., pp. 217374, 2396400. 173 !bid., p. 2182. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 665 morning ol cccmbcr 7 about thc Pilot Mcssagc, which had bccn rcccivcd in Vashington thc altcrnoon ol cccmbcr 6. And Stark said hc had not lcarncd until thc morning ol cccmbcr 7 ol thc rst 13 parts ol thc 14part Japancsc rcply, which had bccn intcrccptcd and dccodcd thc prcvious altcrnoon and cvc ning. 174 Hc did not rcmcmbcr whcn hc had rcccivcd thc complctc 14part rcply. Hc maintaincd only that hc rst saw it altcr ! got in thc o cc on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, just what timc hc could not rccall. 175
Stark said hc bclicvcd hc was at homc thc cvcning ol thc 6th, il hc was out, a scrvant, il not a duty o ccr, was on hand to takc mcssagcs. Hc did not think anyonc had callcd him. 176 Hc also maintaincd that hc had gonc as usual to his o cc that Sunday morning: ! usually got down to thc o cc Sunday mornings about 10:30 and ! just assumcd that ! had gottcn thcrc somcwhcrc around 10:30 or 11:00. ! was lazy on Sunday mornings unlcss thcrc was somc spccial rcason lor gctting up carly. ! usually took a walk about thc grounds and grccnhouscs at thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations quartcrs and didnt hurry about gctting down and my usual timc, as ! rccall, was about 10:30 or 11. Vhat timc it was on this particular Sunday morning ! couldnt go bcyond that. 177
Tis tcstimony contradictcd othcr witncsscs, and Stark kncw it. Vilkinson was onc who tcsticd that Stark was in his o cc considcrably carlicr than 10:30about 9:15, hc saidwhcn hc arrivcd with part 14 ol thc Japancsc rcply. Altcr dclivcring that 174 !bid., pp. 2183, 2187. 175 !bid., p. 2187. 176 !bid., pp. 2187, 2291, 2335. 177 !bid., pp. 2183, 2335. 666 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy mcssagc, Vilkinson said, hc lclt, only to rcturn at 10:30 or 10:40 with thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. 178 Stark did not rcmcmbcr thc dclivcry ol thc nc v.:. Mcssagc and had no rccollcction as to whcn hc rcccivcd it. My rcmcmbrancc, as ! said, was 10:40. Vhcn you say at lcast 10:30, ! think you will nd tcstimony to that ccct by a wit ncss, and il hc statcs that, and ! think hc probably has good sup porting data, ! acccpt it, that it was dclivcrcd to my o cc and thcn altcr that was givcn, by whomcvcr hc gavc it, to mc. 179 Captain Arthur H. McCollum also said Stark must havc arrivcd in his o cc considcrably carlicr than usual that Sunday morning. McCollum said hc and Vilkinson had gonc togcthcr to Starks o cc whcn thcy lcarncd that hc had arrivcd in thc Navy cpartmcnt, probably about 9 or 9:15. Stark was alonc whcn McCollum and Vilkinson cntcrcd but, according to McCollum, various othcr o ccrs soon arrivcd!ngcrsoll, 8rainard, Noycs, Turncr, and possibly Schuirmann. McCollum said, Tcrc was considcrablc going in and out at that timc. 180 JCC Chicl Assistant Counscl Gcscll commcntcd that onc witncss had said thcrc wcrc 15 o ccrs in thcrc. 181 Starks o cc was apparcntly a busy placc that Sunday morning. Starks acknowlcdgcd rccollcction ol that Sunday morn ing bcgan only with his talk at 11:30 ~.:. with Marshall about thc nc v.:. Mcssagc and thc dccision to scnd a lastminutc mcssagc to thc cld commandcrs. Howcvcr, Stark was ccrtain nobody mcntioncd Honolulu with rclcrcncc to a daylight attack. 178 !bid., part 4, pp. 176668. 179 !bid., part 5, pp. 218485. 180 !bid., part 36, p. 26. 181 !bid., part 5, p. 2185. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 667 Hc was positivc ol that. 182 Hc was qucstioncd about thc nc v.:. Mcssagc by JCC Counscl Mitchcll. Mitchell: Vcll, this was what wc lawycrs call a last clcar chancc. Tcsc pcoplc wcrc not rcady at Pcarl Harbor, thc Jap Flcct was piling in, hcrc was a chancc to gct a mcssagc to thcm that might havc savcd thcm, it rcachcd your hands, wc will say, at 10:40, thc chancc wasnt takcn. ocs that sum up thc situa tion as you scc it: . . . Stark: ! gathcr lrom your qucstion you arc now pointing that dispatch dircctly at Pcarl Harbor. !t didnt mcntion Pcarl Harbor. !t gavc no inlcrcncc with rcgard to Pcarl Harbor any morc than it did thc Philippincs or thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics. . . . !n thc light ol hindsight, il wc had rcad into that mcssagc that it mcant an attack at that hour, and had scnt it out, ol coursc, it would havc bccn hclplul. ! wish such an inlcr cncc could havc bccn drawn. Mitchell: Tc xing ol an cxact hour to dclivcr thc diplomatic mcssagc and rout out thc Sccrctary ol Statc on a Sunday at 1:00 v.:., wasnt it obvious that thcrc was somc spccial signi cancc, having in mind thc history ol thc Japs striking rst and dcclaring war altcrwards: Stark: !l so, Mr. Mitchcll, ! would likc to say that so lar as ! know thc Sccrctary ol Var didnt rcad that inlcrcncc into it, thc Sccrctary ol Statc didnt rcad that inlcrcncc into it, thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy didnt rcad that inlcrcncc into it. Gcncral Marshall and his sta didnt rcad that inlcrcncc into it, and nobody mcntioncd it to mc. Mitchell: !s it lair to say that il Marshall hadnt spottcd that mcssagc and startcd to scnd word out to Pcarl Harbor that you probably wouldnt havc scnt anything: 182 !bid., p. 2185. 668 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Stark: ! dont know that ! would. ! think that might bc a lair dcduction. 183
Fivs: Pos:A::~cx !xvvs:ic~:iox (vcv:nvv ++) Sccrctary ol thc Navy Frank Knox had own to Pcarl Harbor almost immcdiatcly altcr thc Japancsc attack in ordcr to invcsti gatc thc cxtcnt ol thc damagc. Hc had writtcn a rcport. No copics ol that rcport had bccn rclcascd and it had rcccivcd practically no publicity at thc timc. Howcvcr, during thc JCC hcarings !, as chicl ol thc committccs minority sta, locatcd a copy. n January 4, 1946, toward thc cnd ol Starks tcstimony, Fcrguson askcd him to rcad Knoxs rcport into thc rccord. 184 Knox had madc thrcc signicant points: 1. Ncithcr Short nor Kimmcl, at thc timc ol thc attack, had any knowlcdgc ol thc plain intimations ol somc surprisc movc, madc clcar in Vashington, through thc intcrccption ol Japancsc instructions to Nomura . . . by thc insistcncc upon thc prccisc timc ol Nomuras rcply to Hull, at onc oclock on Sunday. 185
2. Trcc wavcs ol cncmy air lorcc swcpt ovcr Pcarl Harbor dur ing thc assault. 8ccausc ol thc clcmcnt ol surprisc, thc rst wavc, which lastcd lrom 7:55 to 8:30 ~.:., was substantially unopposcd and wrcakcd considcrablc havoc. Yct, Navy anti aircralt guns bcgan ring in only about lour minutcs altcr thc attack startcd. Tc sccond wavc ovcr thc harbor |9:9:30 ~.:.| was rcsistcd with lar grcatcr rc powcr and a numbcr ol cncmy plancs wcrc shot down. Tc third attack ovcr thc harbor |lrom about 11:30 to 1:00 v.:.| was mct by so intcnsivc a barragc lrom thc ships that it was drivcn o without gctting thc attack 183 !bid., pp. 218586. 184 !bid., pp. 233845. 185 !bid., p. 2338. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 669 homc, no ccctivc hits bcing madc in thc harbor by this last assault. 186
3. Tc Armys lack ol thc bcst mcans ol dclcnsc against air attack . . . ghtcr plancs . . . |was| duc to thc divcrsion ol this typc |ol aircralt| bclorc thc outbrcak ol thc war, to thc 8ritish, thc Chincsc, thc utch and thc Russians. 187
Stark said hc hadnt sccn thc Knox rcport bclorc, but cxprcsscd no particular surprisc at its rcvclations. 188 Hc said thcrc is vcry lit tlc in that rcport that hc |Knox| didnt tcll a considcrablc numbcr ol us in his o cc. 189 !t may bc, as Stark said, that thc Knox rcport was no rcvclation to him. 8ut hc madc no mcntion ol two ol thc thrcc aspccts that most imprcsscd thc committcc mcmbcrs: thc lact that Kimmcl and Short had rcccivcd littlc intclligcncc lrom Vashington, and that onc major rcason lor thc shortagc ol rccon naissancc plancs in Hawaii was thc spccicd divcrsion ol ghtcr plancs to thc 8ritish, thc Chincsc, thc utch and thc Russians.
Stark was thc last witncss to tcstily bclorc Mitchcll and his lcgal sta lclt thc committcc. A wccks rcccss was callcd so thc ncw staScth V. Richardson, gcncral counscl, Samucl H. Kaulman, associatc gcncral counscl, John . Mastcn, dward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lanccould bccomc lamiliar with thc 186 !bid., p. 2340. Tcstimony conccrning thc timing ol thc thrcc wavcs ol Japa ncsc attack vary according to thc dicrcnt vantagcs ol thc scvcral witncsscs. For instancc, scc ibid., part 1, pp. 43, 47, and 48, account ol Admiral T.8. !nglis, part 24, p. 1569, account ol Kimmcl, and part 22, pp. 8788, account ol Short at thc Robcrts Commission. 187 !bid., part 5, p. 2342. 188 !bid., p. 2337. 189 !bid., p. 2352. 670 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy rccord. Tc hcarings rcsumcd January 15, 1946. 190 Scvcral impor tant witncsscs still rcmaincd to bc hcardnotably Short and Kimmcl, Saord, and thc Army and Navy couricrs Kramcr and 8ratton, rcspcctivcly. 190 !bid., p. 2493. 671 28. Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack November 15, 1945May 31, 1946: Part 2 S~vvovb x :nv Tv~ii ov :nv ~s: Vixbs xvcu:v O utsidc thc doors ol thc Committccs hcaring room, Captain L.F. Saord continucd to pursuc thc latc ol thc missing Pcarl Harbor documcnts. Saord playcd a crucial rolc in thc scvcral invcstigations. !t was Saord who rst callcd Kimmcls attcntion to thc lact that Vashington had rcccivcd inlormation through Japancsc MAG!C intcrccpts, inlormation that had not bccn sharcd with thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. !t was Saord who discovcrcd that thc intcrccpts wcrc missing. !t was Saord who nally locatcd most ol thcm and had thcm copicd and rcplaccd in thc lcs whcrc thcy bclongcd. Howcvcr, hc was ncvcr 672 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ablc to locatc onc particular intcrccpt that hc considcrcd crucial. Tis was thc Vinds Codc xccutc, with thc codcd wcathcr words ast Vind Rain, announcing that thc Unitcd Statcs would bc involvcd in Japans intcndcd aggrcssion lrom thc vcry bcginning. Saord dcscribcd to thc Congrcssional Committcc in con sidcrablc dctail thc proccdurc which had bccn lollowcd to prc vcnt knowlcdgc ol MAG!C and cspccially ol thc Vinds Codc xccutc lrom bccoming known. A copy ol this winds cxccutc mcssagc should havc bccn in thc lcs ol Saords division, in thc lockcd salc ol thcn Commandcr, now Captain, Kramcr. Tc pcrsonal or immcdiatc custodian was Licutcnant Commandcr Harrison, U.S. Naval Rcscrvc. Saord cxplaincd that thc only pcoplc who had acccss to Captain Kramcrs salc wcrc thosc on duty undcr Captain Kramcr. vcrything was normally clcarcd through Commandcr Harrison. Tcrc wcrc not morc than tcn pcoplc at thc mosttranslators and thc ycomcn on duty in Kramcrs scction, thc hcad ol thc scction, Saord, or thc o ccr who rclicvcd Saord, or it is possiblc that thc ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc might havc callcd lor lcs at any timc. Any highcr authority would havc bccn givcn thc lcs without qucstion il hc had rcqucstcd it. 1
Saord: To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc thc combination to thc salc was hcld by Kramcr and Harrison alonc. Tcrc was a copy ol thc combination in a scalcd cnvclopc in my salc. Tcrc was anothcr copy ol thc combination in a scalcd cnvclopc in thc salc ol thc Aidc to thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations. Tat was rcquircd lor all salcs in naval opcrations, so in casc ol casualty to thc man who rcgularly opcncd thc salc thc salc could bc opcncd whcn wc had to. . . . ! know ol no occasion whcn wc 1 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 8, pp. 367576. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 673 cvcr had to opcn thosc scalcd cnvclopcs, and cntcr thc salc. ! might add, whcncvcr an o ccr was rclicvcd, wc changcd thc combination on his salc and substitutcd thc ncw cards, and that was thc only timc wc cvcr had to gct into thosc cnvclopcs. 2
Saord had appcarcd as a witncss bclorc thc Hart inquiry, thc Navy Court ol !nquiry, thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, and thc Hcwitt inquiry. Hc cxpcctcd to bc callcd again to tcstily il Congrcss should dccidc to invcstigatc lurthcr altcr thc war cndcd. Tcrclorc, as arrangcmcnts wcrc bcing madc to sct up thc con grcssional committcc in thc lall ol 1945, hc continucd his scarch lor thc missing Vinds xccutc, which hc was convinccd had bccn rcccivcd. 8ccausc ol thc crratic pcrlormancc ol radio wavcs and atmo sphcric disturbanccs, Saord kncw that thc bcst chancc ol intcr ccpting thc Tokyo broadcasts at thc schcdulcd timcs in Novcmbcr cccmbcr 1941 would havc bccn on thc cast coast ol thc Unitcd Statcs. His rccollcction was that thc Vinds xccutc had bccn pickcd up on cccmbcr 4, at Station M ol thc communica tion intclligcncc group (Com!nt) in Chcltcnham, Maryland, and thcn transmittcd by tclcwritcr to Saords o cc, P20G, in Vashington, .C. 3
As Saord wcnt through thc lcs, hc ran across thc initials RT on somc ol thc Chcltcnham intcrccpts. vcry codc clcrk had his own pcrsonal sign, initials by which thc mcssagcs hc intcrccptcd could bc idcnticd. Saord discovcrcd that RT was thc sign ol Chicl Varrant ccr Ralph T. 8riggs, who had bccn stationcd in Chcltcnham on cccmbcr 4, 1941, and who, in 1945, was back in Vashington at onc ol thc o ccs ol Naval 2 !bid. 3 Tis account ol Saords contact with 8riggs is bascd primarily on 8cttina Grcavcss intcrvicw ol 8riggs in Las \cgas, Ncvada, August 14, 1988, typc script in thc authors lcs. 674 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Sccuritys group command hcadquartcrs. Saord phoncd 8riggs and askcd him to comc to his o cc. vcn though thc war was ovcr and thc JCC was rcvcaling a grcat dcal about MAG!C, 8riggs was still sccurity conscious. Hc kncw that thc prcss was trying to discrcdit Saord as thc onc pcr son who continucd to insist that thc Vinds Codc xccutc had bccn rcccivcd before thc Japancsc attack and that it had indicatcd war with thc Unitcd Statcs and Grcat 8ritain. Nonc ol thc pcr sons who, Saord claimcd, had sccn thc mcssagc on cccmbcr 4 or 5 had comc lorward to support his position. 8ccausc ol sccurity considcrations, 8riggs was rcluctant to talk. Howcvcr, whcn Saord showcd him somc ol thc inlorma tion hc had lound, 8riggs bcgan to lccl that this man kncw what hc was talking about. Hc rcalizcd Saord dcspcratcly nccdcd support. 8riggs wantcd to hclp. Tc two mcn mct scvcral timcs. 8riggs told Saord hc had pickcd up thc Vinds Codc xccutc in Morsc codc. 4 Saord askcd 8riggs il hc would bc willing to tcstily bclorc thc JCC. Ycs, hc rcplicd, !d bc glad to. Somc timc altcr that mccting, Captain John S. Harpcr, thc commanding o ccr ol thc Naval Sccurity station to which 8riggs was thcn assigncd, summoncd 8riggs to his o cc. 8riggs dcscribcd Captain Harpcr latcr as vcry much chainolcommand oricntcd, strictly a linc o ccr. Hc wantcd strict dccorum, rcgula tion unilorm at all timcs, nonc ol this running round in public with hats o as mcn did in thc Army and Air Forcc. Hc was a gungho o ccr in all rcspccts. Harpcr conlrontcd 8riggs. ! undcrstand that you havc bccn sccing Captain Saord. Tats right. 4 Captain L.F. Saord, Cryptolog, 4:2, cccmbcr 7, 1982. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 675 n what authority: Harpcr askcd. !m thc commanding o ccr ol this station. Yct, ! had no knowlcdgc ol that mccting. Vhy didnt you inlorm mc: Vhy, ! didnt know you nccdcd to know, Captain. Harpcr continucd: !t is my undcrstanding that hc has askcd you to tcstily. Ycs, thats right. Vcll, lor your inlormation, Harpcr said, you arc not to tcs tily. ! cant givc you thc rcasons at this timc, but somc day youll undcrstand why. . . . ! know you must bc intcrcstcd in hclping Captain Saord but at this point in timc too much damagc has alrcady bccn donc. Much too much has bccn rcvcalcd. ! want you to undcrstand that you arc not to tcstily and thats it! ! dont want you to mcct with Captain Saord anymorc. o you undcrstand: 8riggs was shockcd, shakcn up. 8ut hc obcycd Harpcrs ordcrs, hc lclt hc had to. Hc assumcd Saord must havc contactcd somc body on thc committcc, suggcstcd 8riggs as a potcntial witncss, and told whcrc hc could bc locatcd. Vhcn 8riggs got back to his o cc, hc phoncd Saord. At rst, Saord grcctcd his announcc mcnt with stunncd silcncc. Tcn hc said, Vcll, !m sorry to hcar that. 5
Howcvcr, 8riggs had supplicd Saord with thc conrmation hc had bccn sccking lor so long, thc Japancsc had actually implc mcntcd bclorc thc attack thc lalsc wcathcr rcport ast Vind Rain, indicating troublc ol somc sort, possibly war, with thc Unitcd Statcs as wcll as with ngland. 8ut Saord rcalizcd that hc wouldnt bc ablc to usc 8riggss namc. 5 Quotations as rcportcd by 8riggs in 8cttina 8icn Grcavcss 1988 intcrvicw. 676 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Vhcn thc committcc rcconvcncd on January 14, 1946, thcrc wcrc still scvcral important witncsscs to bc hcardnotably Short and Kimmcl, Saord, and thc Army and Navy couricrs Kramcr and 8ratton, rcspcctivcly. Ab:iv~i Husn~xb . Ki::vi Uvox Avvoix::vx: ~s CixC 8vcixs Rv~bvixc Fivv: vov V~v Kimmcl was thc lcado witncss altcr thc ncw lcgal sta took ovcr. Hc bcgan by rcading a prcparcd statcmcnt to thc commit tcc. Hc said hc rcalizcd thc cct was vulncrablc at Pcarl Harbor, but hc had acccptcd thc dccision as an historical lact. 6
Tc cct was not thcn rcady lor war. So, Kimmcl said, hc sct out through an intcnsivc training program to makc it rcady. 7
As notcd, thcrc wcrc shortagcs in Hawaii ol plancs, cspccially lor rcconnaissancc and longrangc attack, shortagcs also ol planc crcws and ol antiaircralt guns. 8 Kimmcl visitcd Vashington in Junc 1941 and discusscd thc mattcr with Stark. Hc also had somc convcrsations on thc subjcct with thc prcsidcnt, who was lully cognizant ol thc problcm. 9 8y that timc thc cct had bccn sub stantially wcakcncd by thc shilt to thc Atlantic ol a largc con tingcnt ol ships, about onc quartcr ol thc cct. Kimmcl told thc committcc hc lclt that a strong Pacic Flcct was a rcal dctcr rcnt to Japan, but that a wcakcr |cct| might bc an invitation to attack. 10 According to his statcmcnt, Kimmcl had argucd 6 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2498. 7 !bid., p. 2499. 8 !bid., pp. 2720, 2722. 9 !bid., p. 2719. 10 !bid., p. 2565. Scc also part 16, pp. 224849, Kimmcl lcttcr to Stark, Scptcmbcr 12, 1941. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 677 vchcmcntly against still lurthcr translcrs, and in that hc had prcvailcd. 11
Kimmcls dilcmma, givcn thc situation, had bccn to dccidc how bcst to cmploy thc ccts limitcd ships, plancs, antiaircralt guns, ammunition, othcr cquipmcnt and supplics, as wcll as his mcn so as to lulll his scvcral rcsponsibilitics. Undcr qucstion ing by thc committccs lcgal sta Kimmcl again rcvicwcd thc situation that laccd him as commandcr ol thc Pacic Flcctnot only thc shortagcs ol mcn and supplics but also thc conicting and conlusing intclligcncc hc had rcccivcd, thc nccd to dcvclop a traincd lorcc ol ghting mcn, and thc di culty ol rcconcil ing Vashingtons rccommcndations lor still lurthcr rcductions in cct strcngth with his instructions to prcparc lor ocnsivc action as callcd lor undcr thc war plan, VPL46. Kimmcl said hc had writtcn CN Stark and Chicl ol thc 8urcau ol Navigation Nimitz again and again ol thc dangcrous conditions crcatcd by thc shortagc ol qualicd aviators and thc continucd dctachmcnt ol qualicd o ccrs and cnlistcd mcn nccdcd il thc cct wcrc to rcach thc high statc ol c cicncy dcmandcd by a campaign. Hc could not sparc any considcrablc numbcr ol qualicd o ccrs lrom thc Flcct without assuming an cnormous risk. 12 vcry action has its cost, ol coursc. Tc trans lcr ol ships to thc Atlantic in mid1941 rcduccd thc strcngth ol thc Pacic Flcct. Passing 26 817s, thc plancs most suitablc lor rcconnaissancc, 13 through Hawaii on thcir way to thc Philippincs, outtting thcm with crcws, guns and ammunition, did not improvc Pcarl Harbors rcconnaissancc capabilitics, at timcs it cvcn rcduccd thcm as, Short tcsticd latcr, Hawaii had had to rclinquish somc ol its own 817s lor thc bcnct ol thc Philippincs. 14 Nimitz had 11 !bid., part 6, p. 2505. 12 !bid., p. 2499, Kimmcl lcttcr to Nimitz, Fcbruary 16, 1941. 13 !bid., p. 2731. 14 !bid., part 7, pp. 2970, 3203. 678 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy warncd Kimmcl (March 3, 1941) that thc cnactmcnt ol lcnd lcasc would makc thc supply situation still worsc, it would bring about an cnormousalmost astronomicaldcmand lor ord nancc supplics lor thc 8ritish Navy and Allics. 15 As a mattcr ol lact, 1,900 plancs wcrc scnt abroad lrom Fcbruary 1 to cccmbcr 1, 1941 (about 1,750 ol thcm going to thc 8ritish), and 1,900 antiaircralt guns wcrc distributcd undcr lcndlcasc (somc 1,500 ol thcm going to thc 8ritish). Tat mcant 1,900 lcwcr plancs and 1,900 lcwcr antiaircralt guns availablc to improvc Pcarl Harbors dclcnscs. 16
Ki::vis v~v:n ov !xvov:~:iox Kimmcl may havc lound it di cult to obtain clcar instruc tions and to procurc thc mcn and matcricl nccdcd to build thc cct to ghting strcngth, but probably his chicl complaint was lack ol inlormation. !n his dual capacity as thc commandcr in chicl ol thc Unitcd Statcs Flcct and thc commandcr in chicl ol thc Pacic Flcct, hc said hc lclt hc was cntitlcd to cvcry scrap ol inlormation thcy had in Vashington. !t nccd not havc bccn sup plicd in lull, hc said, it could havc bccn scnt in summarizcd lorm. 8ut hc lclt hc was cntitlcd to all thc csscntial inlormation which had to do with thc Pacic situation. 17 According to Kimmcl, hc had rcccivcd during July 1941 at lcast scvcn dispatchcs quoting intcrccptcd Japancsc mcssagcs. As a mattcr ol lact, hc had bccn givcn thc imprcssion that thcy were scnding him all thc impor tant inlormation availablc. Yct littlc or nonc ol thc inlormation glcancd lrom latcr intcrccpts was lurnishcd Kimmcl. 18
15 !bid., part 6 pp. 2499500, Nimitz March 3, 1941, lcttcr to Kimmcl. 16 !bid., part 10, pp. 487375, Var cpartmcnt Fcbruary 14, 1946 mcmo randum lurnishcd thc Joint Congrcssional Committcc at rcqucst ol Scth V. Richardson, gcncral counscl. 17 !bid., part 6, p. 2628. 18 !bid., p. 2540. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 679 Kimmcl had tricd to imprcss on thc Navy cpartmcnt that what hc nccdcd out thcrc was inlormation . . . inlormation upon which to basc my actions. Hc had rccognizcd thc vulncrability ol thc cct largcly duc to thc lact that wc had only onc basc |at Pcarl Harbor| and to thc limitations ol lucl and othcr things. Furthcr, hc had hopcd and bclicvcd that thc inlormation would comc . . . in timc to at lcast allcviatc thc situation. Having pointcd out thc problcm, hc said, hc acccptcd thc risks. 19
Latcr whcn qucstioning Kimmcl, Rcprcscntativc Gcarhart agrccd that, rathcr than bcing a dctcrrcnt, kccping thc cct at Pcarl Harbor had actually provcd to bc a dircct invitation to thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt to comc thcrc and put our cct out ol commission. !l it had bccn stationcd on thc wcst coast, as Richardson had rccommcndcd, thc addcd distancc would havc madc a Japancsc attack morc di cult. Morcovcr, thc wcstcoast location, with a land mass on onc sidc, would havc simplicd thc task ol rcconnaissancc, U.S. air patrols would havc had to survcy only a radius ol 180, not 360 as in Hawaii. 20
Altcr rccciving thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning and thc Novcmbcr 29 noticc dcscribing thc practical cnd ol U.S.Japancsc ncgotiations, Kimmcl said hc rcccivcd no lurthcr ncws lrom Vashington on thc rclations bctwccn thc two countrics and was lclt to rcad public |ncwspapcr| accounts ol lurthcr convcrsa tions bctwccn thc Statc cpartmcnt and thc Japancsc cmissar ics in Vashington which |in contradiction ol thc Vashington mcssagcs| indicatcd that ncgotiations had bccn rcsumcd. 21
Hc also said that bctwccn Novcmbcr 27 and thc attack, thcrc was in Vashington a rising intcnsity in thc crisis in Japancsc 19 !bid., pp. 271819. 20 !bid., pp. 284849. 21 !bid., p. 2548. 680 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Unitcd Statcs rclations apparcnt in thc intcrccptcd dispatchcs. 22
Hc itcmizcd somc ol thc dispatchcs hc had not sccn at thc timc but had sincc lcarncd about. For instancc, thcrc was thc intcrccpt conccrning thc conccalcd Japancsc plans which automatically wcnt into ccct on Novcmbcr 29. 23 Tc Navy cpartmcnt had also known, Kimmcl said, ol thc lalsc wcathcr broadcast, ast Vind Rain, indicating a brcak in JapancscU.S. rclations. 24 Hc citcd scvcral intcrccpts that had bccn pickcd up, dccodcd, and translatcd during this pcriod asking thc Japancsc consulatc in Hawaii lor inlormation on thc bcrthings ol ships in Pcarl Harbor. 25 Tcsc intcrccpts, Kimmcl said, wcrc only somc ol thc signicant indications ol crisis that had bccn availablc in Vashington bctwccn Novcmbcr 27 and cccmbcr 7. Vhcn qucstioning Kimmcl, Gcarhart quotcd a twopart Tokyo8crlin mcssagc ol Novcmbcr 30 that had bccn intcr ccptcd, dccryptcd, and translatcd, and that had bccn availablc in Vashington on cccmbcr 1. !n that mcssagc Japan rcassurcd Gcrmany that thc !mpcrial Govcrnmcnt adamantly stuck to thc TriPartitc Alliancc as thc corncrstonc ol its national policy. Tc Unitcd Statcs had takcn thc stand, Tokyo told 8crlin in part onc ol this dispatch, that As long as thc mpirc ol Japan was in alliancc with Gcrmany and !taly, thcrc could bc no maintcnancc ol lricndly rclations bctwccn Japan and thc Unitcd Statcs. . . . |!|t has bccomc gradually morc and morc clcar that thc !mpcrial Govcrnmcnt could no longcr continuc ncgotiations with thc Unitcd Statcs. !t bccamc clcar, too, that a continuation ol ncgotiations would incvitably bc dctrimcntal to our causc. 22 !bid. 23 !bid., p. 2547. 24 !bid., p. 2549. 25 !bid., p. 2547. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 681 !n part two ol this dispatch, Tokyo told 8crlin that onc particular clausc in thc notc thc Unitcd Statcs had handcd thc Japancsc ambassadors on Novcmbcr 26 was cspccially insulting. Tat clausc mcant in ccct that in casc thc Unitcd Statcs cntcrs thc uropcan war at any timc thc Japancsc mpirc will not bc allowcd to givc assistancc to Gcrmany and !taly in accord with thcir TriPartitc Alliancc. Tis clausc alonc, lct alonc othcrs, makcs it impossiblc to nd any basis in thc Amcrican proposal lor ncgotiations. Vhat is morc, bclorc thc Unitcd Statcs brought lorth this plan, thcy conlcrrcd with ngland, Australia, thc Ncthcrlands, and Chinathcy did so rcpcatcdly. Tcrclorc, it is clcar that thc Unitcd Statcs is now in collusion with thosc nations and has dccidcd to rcgard Japan, along with Gcrmany and !taly, as an cncmy. 26
Kimmcl said thc Navy cpartmcnt had rcalizcd that thc high point in thc crisis in JapancscAmcrican aairs would bc rcachcd whcn thc Japancsc rcply to thc Amcrican notc ol Novcmbcr 26 was rcccivcd and thc cpartmcnt had bccn looking lor it cvcr sincc that datc. 27
Ki::vis !xs:vuc:ioxs: C~vvv ou: V~v Pi~x 6 Starks Novcmbcr 27 war warning had adviscd Kimmcl that an aggrcssivc movc by Japan is cxpcctcd within thc ncxt lcw days. Tc numbcr and cquipmcnt ol Japancsc troops and thc organization ol naval task lorccs indicatcs an amphibious cxpc dition against cithcr thc Philippincs Tai or Kra Pcninsula or 26 !bid., pp. 285455. Scc also ibid., part 12, pp. 20506, Japancsc Mcssagc #986. 27 !bid., part 6, p. 2549. 682 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy possibly 8ornco. xccutc an appropriatc dclcnsivc dcploymcnt prcparatory to carrying out thc tasks assigncd in VPL46. 28
Vashingtons attcntion was apparcntly locuscd on southcast Asia, and Kimmcls attcntion was also dircctcd thcrc by this war warning. Kimmcl tcsticd that also on Novcmbcr 27, thc Navy cpartmcnt suggcstcd that ! scnd lrom thc immcdiatc vicinity ol Pcarl Harbor |to Vakc and Midway| thc carricrs ol thc cct which constitutcd thc ccts main striking dclcnsc against an air attack. Tat samc day, hc said, thc war and navy dcpartmcnts suggcstcd that wc scnd lrom thc island ol ahu, 50 pcrccnt ol thc Armys rcsourccs in pursuit plancs. . . . !n thcsc circum stanccs no rcasonablc man in my position would considcr that thc war warning was intcndcd to suggcst thc likclihood ol an attack in thc Hawaiian arca. 29
Kimmcl lound his prcattack instructions most conlusing, prcscnting him with a oont situation. Tc Novcmbcr 29 Navy mcssagc had told him that thc Unitcd Statcs dcsircs that Japan commit thc rst ovcrt act. . . . |U|ndcrtakc such rccon naissancc and othcr mcasurcs as you dccm ncccssary but thcsc mcasurcs should bc carricd out so as not rcpcat not to alarm civil population or disclosc intcnt. . . . Undcrtakc no ocnsivc action until Japan has committcd an ovcrt act. 30 Army Mcssagc #472 ol Novcmbcr 27 had givcn similar instructions to Short. 31
Kimmcl cxplaincd: 28 !bid., part 14, p. 1406, Navy cpartmcnt ispatch 272337. 29 !bid., part 6, p. 2520. 30 !bid., part 14, p. 1407, CN Mcssagc #290110, datcd Novcmbcr 29, draltcd Novcmbcr 28, 1941. 31 !bid., p. 1328, Army Mcssagc #472, Novcmbcr 27, 1941. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 683 Tc Pacic Flcct was bascd in an arca containing ovcr 130,000 Japancsc, any onc ol whom could watch its movcmcnts. You can apprcciatc thc psychological handicaps ordcrs ol this kind placcd upon us. !n ccct, ! was told: o takc prccautions. o not alarm civilians. o takc a prcparatory dcploymcnt. o not disclosc intcnt. o takc a dclcnsivc dcploymcnt. o not commit thc rst ovcrt act. nc last lcaturc ol thc socallcd war warning dispatch rcmains to bc notcd. Tis is thc dircctivc with which it closcd: xccutc an appropriatc dclcnsivc dcploymcnt prcparatory to carry|ing| out thc tasks assigncd in VPL46. Undcr VPL46, thc rst task ol thc Pacic Flcct was to support thc lorccs ol thc Associatcd Powcrs (8ritain, thc Ncthcrlands, and thc Unitcd Statcs) in thc Far ast by divcrting cncmy strcngth away lrom thc Malay barricr. 32
Tc Malay 8arricr was dcncd in VPL46 as thc Malay Pcninsula, Sumatra, Java, and thc chain ol islands cxtcnding in an castcrly dircction lrom Java to 8athurst !sland, Australia, 33 it cncompasscd 8ornco, Ncw Guinca, thc Kra Pcninsula, thc Kra !sthmus, which was a Malay Statc, and also 8ritish Singaporc. 34
According to Kimmcl, Tc Navy cpartmcnt cmphasizcd this instruction |to divcrt cncmy strcngth away lrom thc Malay 8arricr| by rcpcating it on Novcmbcr 29. Tc dispatch ol that datc dircctcd: 32 !bid., part 6, p. 2525. 33 !bid., part 18, pp. 2877941, xhibit No. 129, Navy 8asic Var Plan Rainbow No. 5 (VPL46). Scc cspccially ibid., p. 2909. 34 !bid., part 6, p. 2864. 684 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 8c prcparcd to carry out thc tasks assigncd in VPL46 so lar as thcy apply to Japan in casc hostilitics occur. Tus in two scparatc dispatchcs ! was ordcrcd by thc Navy cpartmcnt to havc thc Pacic Flcct rcady to movc against thc Marshalls upon thc cxpcctcd outbrcak ol war in thc Far ast. Tis was a dctcrminativc lactor in thc most di cult and vital dccisions ! had to makc thcrcaltcr. Tcrc was not a hint in thcsc two dispatchcs ol any dangcr in thc Hawaiian arca. 35
n thc onc hand, Kimmcl had bccn instructcd to Undcrtakc no ocnsivc action until Japan has committcd an ovcrt act, that is to sit and wait. And on thc othcr hand hc had bccn ordcrcd to continuc prcparing to go on thc ocnsivc against thc Japancsc in thc Marshall !slandsas callcd lor in thc war plan. Uxi:vb S:~:vs8vi:isn Miii:~vv Acvvv:vx:- !n vicw ol this countrys policy ol coopcrating with thc 8ritish, it was impcrativc that thc cld commandcrs bc adviscd ol any U.S. agrccmcnts or commitmcnts that would involvc thcm and thc military lorccs undcr thcm. uring thc months prcccding thc attack, Kimmcl had qucstioncd Stark rcpcatcdly as to what thc Unitcd Statcs would do and what Kimmcls rcsponsibilitics as commandcrinchicl ol thc Pacic Flcct would bc il thc Japancsc attackcd thc 8ritish and utch in southcast Asia without striking U.S. tcrritory. To hclp him makc his own judgmcnts, hc prcsscd Stark to kccp him postcd as to diplomatic and military aairs accting thc situation. n May 26, 1941, Kimmcl wrotc Stark: Full and authoritativc knowlcdgc ol currcnt policics and objcc tivcs, cvcn though ncccssarily latc at timcs, would cnablc thc 35 !bid., pp. 252526. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 685 CommandcrinChicl, Pacic Flcct to modily, adapt, or cvcn rcoricnt his possiblc courscs ol action to conlorm to currcnt conccpts. Hc askcd that hc bc immcdiatcly inlormcd ol all important dcvclopmcnts as thcy occur and by thc quickcst sccurc mcans availablc. 36
uring thc summcr ol 1941 altcr Gcrmany, 8ritains cncmy, had attackcd thc U.S.S.R., which thcn bccamc 8ritains ncw ally, thc conccrn bccamc whcthcr or not Japan, Gcrmanys ally undcr thc TriPartitc Alliancc, might attack Russias maritimc provinccs on thc Asiatic coast wcst ol Japan, just north ol Korca. Kimmcl continucd to prcss Stark lor inlormation. n July 26 Kimmcl askcd spccically about thc U.S. attitudc towards Russian participation in thc war. Vhat rolc il any would thc Pacic Flcct havc to play bctwccn thc U.S. and Russia il and whcn wc bccomc activc participants. . . . (1) Vill ngland dcclarc war on Japan il Japancsc attack Maritimc Provinccs: (2) !l answcr to (1) is in thc a rmativc, will wc activcly assist, as tcntativcly providcd in casc ol attack on N..!. |Ncthcrlands ast !ndics| or |8ritish| Singaporc: (3) !l answcr to (2) is in thc a rmativc, arc plans bcing prcparcd lor joint action, mutual support, ctc.: 37
!n ctobcr Kimmcl lcarncd lrom a travclcr who had visitcd Singaporc, Manila, Java, utch ast !ndics, Australia and Ncw Zcaland that il Japan attacks Russia thc 8ritish mpirc will dcclarc war on Japan. . . . |T|hc utch ast !ndics would lollow Grcat 8ritain. n ctobcr 29, Kimmcl askcd Stark, !l thcy do cmbark on such an advcnturc and 8ritain and thc utch ast !ndics dcclarc war on Japan, what will wc do: 38
36 !bid., part 16, p. 2238, Kimmcl lcttcr to Stark, May 26, 1941. 37 !bid., pp. 223942. 38 !bid., p. 2251. 686 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy n Novcmbcr 7, Stark wrotc Kimmcl: Tings sccm to bc moving stcadily towards a crisis in thc Pacic. Just whcn it will brcak, no onc can tcll. Starks principal rcaction was that it continually gcts worscr and worscr! A month may scc, litcrally, most anything. 39
n Novcmbcr 14, Stark scnt Kimmcl a copy ol thc Novcmbcr 5 mcmorandum hc and Marshall had scnt thc prcsidcnt. 40 !n that mcmorandum, Stark and Marshall had writtcn: Tc only currcnt plans lor war against Japan in thc Far ast arc to conduct dclcnsivc war, in coopcration with thc 8ritish and utch, lor thc dclcnsc ol thc Philippincs and thc 8ritish and utch ast !ndics. . . . Var bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Japan should bc avoidcd whilc building up dclcnsivc lorccs in thc Far ast, until such timc as Japan attacks or dircctly thrcat cns tcrritorics whose security to the United States is of very great importance. 41
Tc closcst thing to a rcply that Kimmcl rcccivcd to his scv cral rcqucsts lor inlormation as to how thc Unitcd Statcs would rcspond il thc 8ritish and utch wcrc attackcd was Starks post script to a Novcmbcr 25, 1941, lcttcr: Ncithcr |FR nor Hull| would bc surpriscd ovcr a Japancsc surprisc attack. From many anglcs an attack on thc Philippincs would bc thc most cmbar rassing thing that could happcn to us. Somc think such an attack likcly, Stark said, but hc did not givc it thc wcight othcrs did. Hc gcncrally hcld that it was not timc lor thc Japancsc to pro cccd against Russia. . . . |Rathcr hc lookcd| lor an advancc into Tailand, !ndoChina, 8urma Road arca as thc most likcly. Hc said hc wouldnt 39 !bid., part 33, p. 1360. 40 !bid., part 16, pp. 222021. Stark Novcmbcr 14, 1941, lcttcr, cnclosing copy ol Marshall/Stark Novcmbcr 5, 1941, Mcmorandum lor thc Prcsidcnt (part 14, pp. 106162). 41 !bid., pp. 222223, italics addcd. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 687 go into thc pros or cons ol what thc Unitcd Statcs may do. ! will bc damncd il ! know. ! wish ! did. Tc only thing ! do know is that wc may do most anything and thats thc only thing ! know to bc prcparcd lor, or wc may do nothing! think it is morc likcly to bc anything. 42
Latcr whcn Gcarhart qucstioncd Kimmcl, hc supportcd Kimmcls rcasoning that Vashington cxpcctcd thc Japancsc to movc against thc Philippincs and/or southcast Asia, thousands ol milcs wcst ol Hawaii. Gcarhart considcrcd this consistcnt with thc jurisprudcntial intcrprctation ejusdem generis rulc, namcly that A gcncral statcmcnt lollowcd by a spccic limitation, always limits thc intcrprctation in thc courts to thc things ol thc samc charactcr ol thc spccic things mcntioncd. 43 !n othcr words, thc gcncral statcmcnt in thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning to thc ccct that an aggrcssivc movc by Japan is cxpcctcd within thc ncxt lcw days was limitcd by thc spccic statcmcnt that lollowcd indicat ing an amphibious cxpcdition against cithcr thc Philippincs Tai or Kra pcninsula or possibly 8ornco. 44
Ki::vi H~b 8vvx Toib Li::iv ov No:nixc vv U.S.8vi:isn Miii:~vv Acvvv:vx:s ~xb J~v~xvsv Tnvv~: ix Sou:nv~s: P~civic Tc U.S. Pacic Flccts task undcr thc war plan was to sup port thc lorccs ol thc Associatcd Powcrs, i.c., thc Unitcd Statcs, thc 8ritish Commonwcalth, and thcir allics, in thc Far ast by divcrting cncmy strcngth away lrom thc Malay 8arricr, 45 thc 42 !bid., part 16, pp. 222425. 43 !bid., part 6, p. 2858. 44 !bid., p. 2857. Gcarhart quotcs lrom thc Navys Novcmbcr 27 war warning (!bid., part 14, p. 1406), NC #272337. 45 !bid., part 18, pp. 28752941, xhibit 129, Navy 8asic Var PlanRainbow No. 5 (VPL46). For U.S. Pacic Flccts task, scc chaptcr !!. Scction 1, Task a. 688 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy imaginary linc connccting thc Malay Pcninsula, via Sumatra, Java, and thc various islands to thc cast cxtcnding to 8athurst !sland, just o thc northccntral coast ol Australia. Vhcn Fcrgusons turn camc to qucstion Kimmcl, thc scnator dcvotcd most ol thc timc to trying to nd out whcthcr inlormation availablc in Vashington had bccn rclaycd to him, what thc Unitcd Statcs intcrcst in thc Malay 8arricr was, and what commitmcnts, il any, thc Unitcd Statcs may havc madc to thc 8ritish and utch. Vhcn Fcrguson qucstioncd Kimmcl hc summarizcd Turncrs carlicr JCC tcstimony on thc situation in thc wcstcrn Pacic. Turncr (Navy Var Plans) had said that hc bclicvcd that wc would bc attackcd, dcnitcly . . . |i|n thc Philippincs and il wc wcrc attackcd in thc Philippincs ! kncw it would bc war. ! thought it would bc war il wc wcrc not attackcd, ! thought it would bc war il thcy attackcd thc 8ritish and thc utch, but thcrc would havc bccn somc dclays possibly. Fcrguson said, !n othcr words, il thcy |thc Japancsc| attackcd thc 8ritish and thc utch alonc you thought it mcant war and |you madc| a distinction that il thcy attackcd thc utch, thc 8ritish, and thc Amcricans at thc Philippincs it did mcan war. Turncr had agrccd with Fcrgusons summary. 46
Ferguson: |V|crc you awarc that Admiral Turncr had inlormcd thc Japancsc Ambassador . . . July 23 or 24, that thc Unitcd Statcs would not tolcratc, in vicw ol its policy ol aiding 8ritain and its intcrprctation ol sclldclcnsc, a Japancsc thrcat to thc Malay 8arricr: 46 !bid., part 4, p. 2044, italics addcd. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 689 Kimmel: ! did not know that hc had madc any such statcmcnts. 47
Ferguson: Now il you would havc had that inlormation in rcla tion to Admiral Turncrs convcrsation . . . ncvcr disputcd as lar as Turncr was conccrncd and hc was ncvcr callcd on thc carpct, or it was ncvcr takcn up with him that hc was wrong . . . il you had known ol that would you thcn havc known thc policy ol Amcrica in casc ol an attack upon thc Malay 8arricr: Kimmel: !t would havc bccn most hclplul to mc and il ! had known all thc circumstanccs and thc lact that that was thc pol icy ol thc Govcrnmcnt, ycs, it would havc hclpcd immcnscly. 48
Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you cvcr told that Admiral Stark was callcd to thc Vhitc Housc by thc prcsidcnt on July 24 and that thcn hc hcard a statcmcnt by thc prcsidcnt to Japan to thc ccct . . . that il Japan attcmptcd to gct utch oil by lorcc, thc 8ritish and utch would ght and thcrc would thcn rcsult a most scrious situation bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Japan: Kimmel: ! dont rcmcmbcr cvcr having bccn inlormcd ol that convcrsation. . . . No, sir. 49
Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you adviscd that rcsponsiblc lcadcrship was intcrccpting sccrct Japancsc mcssagcs whcrcin thc Japancsc Ambassador was advising his Govcrnmcnt that it must cxpcct armcd opposition lrom Grcat 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs should Japan movc against thc Malay 8arricr: Kimmel: ! was ncvcr inlormcd ol that. 50
47 !bid., part 6, p. 2866. 48 !bid., p. 2867, scc Turncr tcstimony rc his July 21, 1941 convcrsation with Nomura, ibid., part 4, pp. 204142. 49 !bid., part 6, p. 2867. Scc also cpartmcnt ol Statc, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 52728. 50 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2868. 690 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you awarc lrom your own judgmcnt, likc Admiral Stark and Admiral Turncr havc statcd hcrc, that AngloutchAmcrican cmbargocs on Japan oil supplics, rcgardlcss ol thcir justication lor such cmbargocs, constitutcd an actual and a logical causc ol war with Japan: Kimmel: Vcll, ! thought that thc cmbargocs would irritatc Japan considcrably and ! kncw about thc cmbargocs. Ferguson: Vcll, did you think it would irritatc thcm cnough, as has bccn statcd by Admiral Stark, that wc should havc antic ipatcd war ovcr that: Kimmel: Not ncccssarily, no. 51
Ferguson: Vcll, now, wcrc you adviscd that on August 17, whcn thc prcsidcnt rcturncd lrom thc Atlantic conlcrcncc |with Churchill|, that thc prcsidcnt callcd thc Japancsc Ambassador to thc Vhitc Housc and told him in diplomatic languagc, and it was rathcr blunt and in writing, that a Japancsc thrcat or show ol lorcc against thc Malay 8arricr or any movcmcnt in thc Pacic would compcl thc Unitcd Statcs immcdiatcly to takc any and all stcps ncccssary to protcct our rights: Kimmel: No, sir, ! did not know about that. 52
Ferguson: Now, did that task |divcrting cncmy strcngth away lrom thc Malay 8arricr as prcscribcd in thc U.S. war plan| dcpcnd upon your rst knowing that Amcrica was in thc war by virtuc ol an attack or dcclaration ol war: Kimmel: !t did. ! had no authority to act until ! rcccivcd dc nitc word lrom my Govcrnmcnt. . . . Had thc Japancsc madc an attack on thc Kra Pcninsula, had thcy madc an attack on Java, 51 !bid. 52 !bid., p. 2867. Scc also cpartmcnt ol Statc, Japan, 19311941, ral Statc mcnt Handcd by Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt to thc Japancsc Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941, pp. 55657. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 691 ! would havc bccn unablc to do anything until ! got ordcrs to movc. 53
n Scptcmbcr 11, 1941, Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt had issucd a shootonsight ordcr to U.S. Navy ships aimcd at Gcrman ships and submarincs opcrating within arcas in thc Atlantic considcrcd vital to Amcrican dclcnsc. Kimmcl notcd that similar ordcrs had bccn issucd thc Southcast Pacic Forcc lor surface raidcrs cast ol 100 wcst, that is, about 700 milcs o thc wcstcrn coast ol South Amcrica. Kimmcl wrotc Stark on Scptcmbcr 12 asking whcthcr this shootonsight ordcr applicd also to thc rcst ol thc Pacic. 54
Tc thrcat ol Japancsc action, Kimmcl wrotc, couplcd with currcnt rumors ol U.S.Japancsc rapproachcmcnt |sic| and thc abscncc ol any spccic rclcrcncc to thc Pacic in thc prcsidcnts spccch, lcavcs mc in somc doubt as to just what my situation out hcrc is. Kimmcl askcd Stark spccically, Vhat ordcrs to shoot should bc issucd lor arcas othcr than Atlantic and Southcast Pacic subarcas: Tis is particularly pcrtincnt to our prcscnt cscorts lor ships procccding to thc Far ast. So lar, my ordcrs to thcm havc bccn to protcct thcir con voy lrom intcrlcrcncc, to avoid usc ol lorcc il possiblc, but to usc it il ncccssary. Tcsc ordcrs, at lcast by implication, prccludc taking thc ocnsivc. Shouldnt ! now changc thcm to dircct ocnsivc mcasurcs against Gcrman and !talian raidcrs: 53 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2866. 54 !bid., part 16, pp. 224849, Kimmcl Scptcmbcr 12, 1941, lcttcr to Stark. 692 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 8ccausc ol thc dclicatc naturc ol our prcscnt Pacic rclations, Kimmcl lclt Stark was thc only onc who can answcr this qucstion. 55
Kimmcl had also askcd what to do about submarinc contacts o Pcarl Harbor and thc vicinity. His ordcrs at that timc wcrc to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unlcss you arc in thc dclcn sivc sca arca. Should wc now bomb contacts, without waiting to bc attackcd: 56
!n his lcttcr Kimmcl cxprcsscd lcar that FRs cmphasis on thc Atlantic might lcad to a possiblc lurthcr wcakcning ol this Flcct. A strong Pacic Flcct is unqucstionably a dctcrrcnt to Japana wcakcr onc may bc an invitation to attack. 8clorc thc JCC Kimmcl tcsticd that hc bclicvcd thc maintcnancc ol thc status quo in thc Pacic was almost cntircly a mattcr ol thc strcngth ol this Flcct. !t must |not| bc rcduccd, and, in thc cvcnt ol actual hostilitics, must bc incrcascd il wc arc to undcrtakc a bold ocnsivc. . . . Until wc can kccp a lorcc hcrc strong cnough to mcct thc Japancsc Flcct wc arc not sccurc in thc Pacicand thc Pacic is still vcry much a part ol thc world situation. 57
Fcrguson askcd Kimmcl whcthcr hc had known that thc Japancsc ambassador to thc Unitcd Statcs, thc Japancsc lorcign ministcr, and Japancsc prcss had indicatcd that thcy cxpcctcd thc Unitcd Statcs to procccd in thc Pacic as it had in thc Atlantic with a shootonsight ordcr. Kimmcl said hc had ncvcr hcard anything to that ccct. As a mattcr ol lact, bccausc ol thc cor rcspondcncc hc had had to thc ccct that wc did not want to tacklc two wars at oncc, hc had gottcn thc imprcssion that thc 55 !bid. Scc also part 6, p. 2861, Kimmcl tcstimony. 56 !bid., part 16, pp. 224849, Kimmcl lcttcr to Stark. 57 !bid., part 6, pp. 282324. Scc also part 16, pp. 224849, Kimmcl lcttcr to Stark. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 693 govcrnmcnt wantcd to connc thc war to thc Atlantic, wc did not want to go into thc Pacic. Hc thought thc Unitcd Statcs was doing all it could to kccp out ol war in thc Pacic. Prior to cccmbcr 7 hc had not bclicvcd that war was immincnt. . . . or that wc wcrc in any way lorcing thc war. So hc had not consid crcd that thc Japancsc would cxpcct us to takc any such action in thc Pacic as had bccn takcn in thc Atlantic. 58
n Scptcmbcr 23, 1941, Stark rcplicd to Kimmcl. For thc prcscnt, hc wrotc, thc prcsidcnt has issucd shooting ordcrs only lor thc Atlantic and Southcast Pacic subarca. Tc situation in thc Pacic gcncrally, Stark said, is lar dicrcnt lrom what it is in thc Atlantic. Kimmcls cxisting ordcrs to cscorts arc appropriatc undcr thc prcscnt situation. Tcy arc also in accordancc with Art. 723 U.S. Navy Rcgulations: no ordcrs should bc givcn to shoot at thc Prcscnt Timc, othcr than thosc clcarly sct lorth in this articlc. . . . Art.723, U.S.N.R. rcads as lollows: Tc usc ol lorcc against a lorcign and lricndly statc or against anyonc within thc tcrritorics thcrcol, is illcgal. Tc right ol scllprcscrvation, howcvcr, is a right which bclongs to Statcs as wcll as to individuals, and in thc casc ol Statcs it includcs thc protcction ol thc Statc, its honor, and its posscs sions, and thc livcs and propcrty ol its citizcns against arbitrary violcncc, actual or impcnding. Stark talkcd with Hull bclorc scnding this lcttcr and addcd a postscript. Hull askcd that thc lcttcr bc hcld vcry sccrct. Stark summcd up Hulls commcnts by saying that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse, and Stark could scc no chancc lor a scttlcmcnt and pcacc in thc Far ast until and 58 !bid., part 6, pp. 288182. 694 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy unlcss thcrc is somc agrccmcnt bctwccn Japan and Chinaand just now that sccms rcmotc. 59
8y this timc, thc Japancsc wcrc rapidly complcting with drawal lrom world shipping routcs. 60 Tc Unitcd Statcs also issucd ordcrs to ships to avoid arcas whcrc thcy might cncountcr Japancsc ships. n ctobcr 16, 1941, all U.S. mcrchant ships, 61
and on ctobcr 17, 1941, all U.S.ag shipping 62 wcrc dircctcd to kccp to thc southward through thc Torrcs Straits bctwccn thc northcrn coast ol Australia and thc southcrn shorcs ol thc island ol Ncw Guinca, and to kccp wcll clcar ol rangc | Japancsc| mandatcs taking maximum advantagc ol utch and Australian patrollcd arcas. 8y ctobcr 23, ships carrying U.S. Army and Navy troops and military cargo wcrc bcing cscortcd both ways bctwccn Honolulu and Manila. 63
n Novcmbcr 5, 1941, Marshall and Stark had scnt a joint mcmorandum to thc prcsidcnt. Tcrc thcy admittcd that thc U.S. Flcct in thc Pacic was thcn inlcrior to thc Japancsc Flcct and cannot undcrtakc an unlimitcd stratcgic ocnsivc in thc Vcstcrn Pacic. To do so it would havc to bc strcngthcncd by withdrawing practically all naval vcsscls lrom thc Atlantic cxccpt thosc assigncd to local dclcnsc lorccs. . . . Tc rcsult ol withdrawals lrom thc Atlantic ol Naval and mcrchant strcngth might wcll causc thc Unitcd Kingdom to losc thc 8attlc ol thc Atlantic in thc ncar luturc. . . . Tc only currcnt plans lor war against Japan in thc Far ast arc to conduct dclcnsivc war, in coopcration with thc 59 !bid., part 16, pp. 221213, Starks Scptcmbcr 23, 1941, lcttcr to Kimmcl. 60 !bid., part 14, p. 1401, PNA\ August 14, 1941, ispatch #142155 to C!NCAF, C!NCPAC, C!NCLANT. 61 !bid., part 14, p. 1402, CN ctobcr 16, 1941, ispatch #162300. 62 !bid., p. 1403, PNA\ ctobcr 17, 1941, Mcssagc #162258 to thc Philip pincs, C!NCAF CM.12. 63 !bid., p. 1403, PNA\ ctobcr 23, 1941 Mcssagc #222250 to commandcrs ol Pcarl Harbor, Manila, and San Francisco Naval istricts. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 695 8ritish and utch, lor thc dclcnsc ol thc Philippincs and thc 8ritish and utch ast !ndics. Tc Philippincs arc now bcing rcinlorccd. Marshall and Stark rca rmcd that thc basic military pol icics and stratcgy agrccd to in thc Unitcd Statcs8ritish Sta Convcrsations rcmain sound. Tc primary objcctivc ol thc two nations is thc dclcat ol Gcrmany. !n this mcmorandum Marshall and Stark urgcd that war bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Japan should bc avoidcd whilc building up dclcnsivc lorccs in thc Far ast, until such timc as Japan attacks or dircctly thrcatcns tcrritorics whosc sccurity to thc Unitcd Statcs is ol vcry grcat importancc. Stark and Marshall closcd with a clcar and unmistakablc joint rccommcndation: Tat no ultimatum bc dclivcrcd to Japan. 64
n Novcmbcr 18 Kimmcl was adviscd that |u|ntil intcrna tional conditions on and subscqucnt to 25 Nov. bccomc dcncd and claricd . . . any lurthcr dircct or grcat circlc routing bctwccn Hawaii and Philippincs should not rcpcat not bc uscd. And hc was authorizcd to placc a utch ship, Bloemfontein, in a convoy with Amcricanag vcsscls. 65
Ferguson: o you know why thcy uscd thc datc thcrc subsc qucnt to Novcmbcr 25: . . . id you cvcr know that wc had a mcssagc that wc intcrccptcd lrom thc Japs showing that thc dcad linc |sic| datc |lor thc Japancsc ambassadors to complctc thcir ncgotiations with thc Unitcd Statcs| was thc 25th ol Novcmbcr: 64 !bid., part 16, pp. 222223, Marshall/Stark Novcmbcr 5, 1941, mcmorandum to FR. Copy scnt Kimmcl with Starks lcttcr ol Novcmbcr 14, 1941 (!bid., part 16, pp. 222021, scc also pp. 222223). 65 !bid., part 14, p. 1404, PNA\ Novcmbcr 18, 1941 Mcssagc #181705. 696 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kimmel: No, sir, ! ncvcr had anything likc that. . . . ! do not know what Novcmbcr 25 mcant, but ! was conccrncd . . . with thc ordcrs ! rcccivcd to put thc Bloemfontein in thc convoy with Amcricanag vcsscls. . . . Ferguson: o you think thc lact that wc put that ship into our convoy would indicatc that wc wcrc taking parallcl action: id you takc it as such: Kimmel: My mcmory is not cntircly clcar, but ! think wc had somc matricl, or pcrsonncl, or somcthing on this ship that wc wantcd to gct through, on thc Bloemfontein. . . . ! do not rccall . . . just what it was. n onc ol thcsc utch ships that wc uscd, wc had somc icrs that wcrc going out to China. 66
Ferguson: Vcll, now, what kind ol an ordcr do you intcrprct that |to put a utch ship in an Amcrican convoy| to bc: Kimmel: Tc way ! intcrprct that ordcr is that you would go in bctwixt an attacking lorcc and a Ncthcrlands ship and il thcy shot at you. . . . Vhy, ! would probably shoot back. Ferguson: Vcll, thcn, that would crcatc at lcast an incidcnt, would it not, an intcrnational incidcnt: Kimmel: Ycs, sir, it probably would. Ferguson: And thcrc would bc littlc usc thcn ol talking about thc rst ovcrt act, wouldnt thcrc: Kimmel: Vcll, thc Japs would havc shot rst. Ferguson: ! scc. vcn though you would havc run bctwccn thc mark that |thcy wcrc| shooting at and that wasnt our mark, that did not bclong to this country, you would considcr undcr thosc circumstanccs that thc Jap shot rst: 66 !bid., part 6, p. 2878. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 697 Kimmel: ! would havc to know all thc circumstanccs rst. 67
Fcrguson thcn askcd Kimmcl il hc had cvcr bccn adviscd what thc task ol thc Pacic Flcct should bc in thc cvcnt ol an outbrcak ol war in thc Pacic which did not involvc a Japancsc attack dircctly on Amcrican posscssions. 68 Tis was prcciscly what Kimmcl had bccn trying to nd out lor somc timcwith out succcss. Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you lully awarc on Novcmbcr thc 27th that thc Japancsc had conccntratcd lor an attack upon thc Malay barricr: Kimmel: ! was so inlormcd. . . . Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you awarc that such an attack, cvcn thc obvious prcparation lor it, was a dircct dcancc ol thc lormal and cxplicit warning against such movcmcnt givcn by thc Unitcd Statcs |August 17, altcr thc FRChurchill mccting at Argcntia|: Kimmel: ! did not know ol thc lormal and cxplicit warning givcn by thc Unitcd Statcs. 69
Ferguson: You wcrc adviscd by Admiral Stark |Stark lcttcr ol Novcmbcr 25| altcr hc had a conlcrcncc at thc Vhitc Housc that hc was damncd il hc kncw what thc Unitcd Statcs was going to do should Japan attack thc Malay 8arricr without at thc samc timc attacking posscssions ol thc Unitcd Statcs. . . . Now, bctwccn thc datc ol that lcttcr and its rcccipt you had bccn instructcd, had you not, to prcparc to attack thc Marshalls altcr Japan had committcd an ovcrt act against thc Unitcd Statcs. . . . Now, in thc manncr ol ordinary naval strat cgy, would thc Japancsc cxpcct an attack by thc Pacic Flcct on 67 !bid., pp. 287778. 68 !bid., p. 2877. Kimmcl tcstimony. 69 !bid., p. 2868. 698 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc Marshalls in thc cvcnt thc Unitcd Statcs should implcmcnt its dircct and spccic warning to opposc a Japancsc movcmcnt against thc Malay 8arricr: Kimmel: Ycs, ! think thcy probably would cxpcct attacks on thc Marshalls. 70 Ferguson: id you know thcn that thc prcscncc ol this Japancsc lorcc bclorc thc approachcs to Singaporc rcquircd thc rcspon siblc lcadcrship in Vashington to act immcdiatcly or to back down lrom thc lormcr position it had takcn with Japan as ol Sunday, August thc 17th, 1941: Kimmel: No, sir, ! did not. Ferguson: Vcll, il you had known that, would this lact that thcy wcrc moving toward thc Kra Pcninsula |havc| madc a dil lcrcncc with your action: . . . Vcll, . . . you had nothing bclorc you, had you, that thc Unitcd Statcs Govcrnmcnt intcndcd to back down lrom any stand or any policy that it had: Kimmel: No, sir, ! did not. Ferguson: Vcll, thcn, il thc policy was such that wc should havc anticipatcd that il thcy attackcd thc Kra Pcninsula it would mcan war with Amcrica, should wc not havc thcn at thc samc timc anticipatcd a coattack on Amcrica: Kimmel: Tat would appcar to bc rcasonablc, ycs, sir. Ferguson: Vcll, do you know why no onc sccms to havc antic ipatcd that il thcy attackcd thc Kra Pcninsula thcy would not also attack Amcrica at thc samc timc: Kimmel: No, sir, ! do not. 70 !bid., pp. 286970. For Starks Novcmbcr 25, 1941, lcttcr, scc part 16, pp. 222325. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 699 Ferguson: Vcll, at any timc altcr Novcmbcr thc 25th, 1941, did thc chicl ol naval opcrations, that is Admiral Stark, advisc you that instcad ol bcing damncd il hc kncw what thc Unitcd Statcs was going to do in thc cvcnt that Japan attackcd thc Malay barricr altcr bypassing Amcrican positions, hc did know what thc Unitcd Statcs was going to do: You scc, hc wrotc you that lcttcr on thc 25th. Kimmel: !l hc had inlormcd mc that hc kncw what thc Unitcd Statcs was going to do and what thcy wcrc going to do, it would havc bccn ol grcat assistancc to mc. 71
Ferguson: id you know that thc prcsidcnt by dircct ordcr |PNA\ mcssagc cccmbcr 2, 7 p.m. Vashington timc, to C!NCAF, Hart, CinC, Asiatic Flcct, Philippincs 72 | had ordcrcd thrcc ships to go into thc Gull ol Siam or o thc Coast ol China to watch lor this | Japancsc convoy| movcmcnt into thc Kra Pcninsula: Kimmel: No, sir, ! did not. 73
Kimmcl said hc had known that thc commandcr in chicl ol thc Asiatic |Flcct| had bccn ordcrcd to scnd somc plancs ovcr to scout, but hc had not known about thc ships. Howcvcr, Kimmcl thought that was a pcrlcctly natural thing to do il wc wantcd to know what thc Japancsc wcrc doing, . . . whcthcr thcy would comc to thc Philippincs or not. Fcrguson pointcd out that thc stations thc thrcc small vcsscls wcrc to assumc, as spccicd in thc mcssagc wcrc locatcd wcll to thc wcst ol thc Philippincs, almost dircctly in thc projcctcd paths ol thc southbound Japancsc convoys sightcd by our ovcrights. According to thc mcssagc, thcy wcrc to obscrvc and rcport by radio Japancsc movcmcnts in wcst China Sca and Gull ol Siam. 71 !bid., part 6, p. 2874. 72 !bid., part 14, p. 1407, PNA\ Mcssagc #012356 to C!NCAF. 73 !bid., p. 2872. 700 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy How would this tcll us, Fcrguson wantcd to know, whcthcr or not thc Japancsc wcrc coming to thc Philippincs: Fcrguson pointcd out also that thc mcssagc spccicd that thcsc thrcc small ships wcrc to comply with Minimum rcquirc mcnts to cstablish idcntity as U.S. mcnolwar. Tc prcsidcnt had cvcn givcn cxact instructions what that mcant: command by a naval o ccr and to mount a small gun and 1 machinc gun would su cc. Ferguson: Now, il you had known ol this mcssagc ol thc prcsi dcnt, lrom PNA\ to C!NCAF . . . would that havc indicatcd to you an answcr to that qucstion as to what wc wcrc going to do in casc ol an attack upon thc Malay Pcninsula: Kimmel: !t would havc bccn usclul inlormation. !t would havc still bccn short ol any authoritativc statcmcnt ol what our intcntions wcrc. 74
Altcr rccciving on cccmbcr 3 Starks Novcmbcr 25 lcttcr conccrning thc possibility ol a Japancsc surprisc attackon thc Philippincsor what was morc likcly, a Japancsc advancc against thc Tailand!ndochina8urmaRoad arca, 75 Kimmcl had ccr tainly not visualizcd U.S. naval action in thc Pacic likc that in thc Atlantic. Howcvcr, in his tcstimony Kimmcl had to admit that, judging lrom thc intcrccpts Fcrguson was showing him, that Japan might wcll havc cxpcctcd thc Unitcd Statcs to lollow its Atlantic stratcgy il thc Japancsc got into a war with ngland. 76
74 !bid., part 6, pp. 287273. Scc also part 5, pp. 219091 and 241617, Stark tcstimony rc FRs rolc in ordcring thc dispatch ol thc thrcc small vcsscls and thc cort to coordinatc with thc 8ritish and utch thc scarch to dctcrminc whcrc thc Japancsc wcrc aimingtoward thc Kra Pcninsula or thc utch ast !ndics. 75 !bid., part 16, pp. 222325. 76 !bid., part 6, p. 2882. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 701 Fcrguson callcd Kimmcls attcntion to a Statc cpartmcnt, Far astcrn aairs division, documcnt ol cccmbcr 4, 1941, which told ol thc 8ritish attcmpt to makc arrangcmcnts with thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt to withdraw or cxchangc 8ritish and Japancsc o cials and nationals in thc tcrritory ol thc othcr in thc cvcnt ol 8ritishJapancsc hostilitics. 77 nc scntcncc in this documcnt conccrncd whcthcr thc Unitcd Statcs should not also, whilc wc arc not at war with Japan, try to makc a similar agrcc mcnt with thc Japancsc. Fcrguson, rcading: Such attcmpt might, at this timc, bc advisablc also in that it would bc dcnitc indication to thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt ol thc rmncss ol thc Amcrican position in thc prcscnt cri sis and would bc onc mcans ol imprcssing upon thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt thc scriousncss with which wc vicw thc prcscnt situation. Ferguson: Now, that bcing truc, that coaction thcrc would indicatc to thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt that wc wcrc acting with 8ritain . . . shouldnt wc havc anticipatcd that il thcy attackcd onc thcy would attack both: Kimmel: ! think that is rcasonablc, ycs, sir. Ferguson: All right. Now wc go to thc cnd |ol thc documcnt| and it is signcd by M.M.H. who, ! undcrstand, is Maxwcll M. Hamilton |chicl, division ol Far astcrn aairs| . . . and thcy arc spcaking now about gctting |Amcrican| nationals out ol Japancsc tcrritory in China bclorc thc dcclaration ol war, bclorc thc shooting starts, and ! will rcad: As thc making ol such an approach would bc intcrprctcd by thc Amcrican public as a dcnitc indication that this govcrn mcnt cxpccts war bctwccn Japan and thc Unitcd Statcs, thc Sccrctary may wish to spcak to thc prcsidcnt in rcgard to thc 77 !bid., part 15, pp. 174143, xhibit 74A. 702 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy advisability ol this Govcrnmcnts making such an approach at this timc. Ferguson (continuing): Now, that is datcd on cccmbcr thc 4th, 1941. . . . Now, lrom all that you havc lcarncd, whcrcin thc mcssagcs wcrc intcrccptcd, and was known in Vashington, havc you any doubt that war was immincnt and that wc kncw wc wcrc going to war: Kimmel: ! havc no doubt, sir. Ferguson: Vcll, thcn, did you gct this mcssagc . . . |indicating| that wc did not want thc Amcrican public to know that wc wcrc going to war: Kimmel: ! rcccivcd no such mcssagc, no, sir. . . . Ferguson: Vcll, you wcrc told . . . you wcrc to do nothing that would arousc thc population ol Hawaii to indicatc that wc wcrc going to war: Kimmel: Tat was containcd in mcssagcs which camc to mc, ycs, sir. 78
Ferguson: Now, would it bc corrcct to say that your rst and your chicl objcctivc in thc cvcnt ol an AmcricanJapancsc war was an attack upon thc Marshall !slands to divcrt thc Japancsc lrom thc Malayan barricr which compriscd vital posscssions ol thc utch and thc 8ritish, who would bc our allics: Kimmel: Ycs, sir. . . . Tat was il and whcn wc got into thc war. Ferguson: Vcll, now, would thc attack on thc Marshalls accomplish thc chicl purposc ol thc Amcrican war plan that you thcn had, il that attack occurrcd altcr Singaporc had lallcn to thc Japancsc: 78 !bid., part 6, pp. 287576. Rcadings lrom Statc cpartmcnt cccmbcr 4, 1941, documcnt, part 15, pp. 174143, xhibit 74A. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 703 Kimmel: Tat would havc bccn a littlc latc. . . . Ferguson: Tat would havc also bccn latc altcr thc Japancsc had gonc into 8ornco and Java, would it not: Kimmel: Ycs, sir. Ferguson: Vcll, now, was thc Marshall opcration and its valuc contingcnt upon it bcing undcrtakcn bclorc thc Japancsc had brcachcd thc Malay 8arricr: Kimmel: Vcll, ccrtainly bclorc thcy had had a chancc to takc thosc land arcas which comprisc thc Malay 8arricr. !t had to draw thc lorccs away in timc, bclorc thcy had conqucrcd that country and bclorc thcy had gonc down thcrc rcally. Ferguson: Vcll, now, is that why you wcrc intcrcstcd in thc movcmcnt and why thc Unitcd Statcs was intcrcstcd in thc movcmcnt south: . . . And did you also want to know what you wcrc to do in casc you wcrc surc that thcy wcrc going south: Kimmel: Ycs, sir. Ferguson: And did you cvcr nd that out prior to thc attack on thc 7th: Kimmel: Vhat ! was to do: . . . No, sir, not dcnitcly. Ferguson: Vcll, now you comc back to thosc words Not dc nitcly. id you cvcr nd any inlormation on it: Kimmel: No. . . . ! wantcd to know what wc wcrc to do. ! did not nd out. 79
Fcrguson thcn showcd Kimmcl thc mcssagc lrom U.S. Ambassador John G. Vinant in London announcing thc prcs cncc ol two Japancsc convoys ol about 60 ships o Cambodia 79 !bid., part 6, pp. 286465. 704 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Point. Tis dispatch had bccn rcccivcd in thc Statc cpartmcnt on cccmbcr 6 at 10:40 ~.:. 80 Fcrguson askcd Kimmcl il anyonc in Vashington had adviscd him on cccmbcr 6 that a Japancsc invasion cct ol sixtysomc vcsscls had bccn sightcd and was within a day or 14 hours . . . ol striking distancc ol thc approachcs to Singaporc . . . thc socallcd Vinant mcssagc. Kimmcl said hc didnt think hc had rcccivcd that mcssagc, although hc had rcccivcd similar inlormation on cccmbcr 6, through a copy ol a mcssagc lrom Hart to PNA\ in Vashington. Tat mcssagc pointcd out that a 25ship convoy with cruiscr and dcstroycr cscorts had bccn sightcd hcading wcst toward Kohtron |Koh Rong:| on thc wcst coast ol !ndochina, not vcry lar lrom thc Tai bordcr. 8ccausc ol what thc Navy cpartmcnt had told Kimmcl, hc thought thc Japancsc wcrc probably conccntrating thcir lorccs ovcr thcrc to go into Tai. Tirty additional ships and onc largc cruiscr had bccn spottcd by Harts scouting lorcc in Camranh 8ay on thc cast coast ol !ndochina. 81
Fcrguson wantcd to know lrom Kimmcl why in thc world would thcy scnd you that mcssagc: Tat was anothcr powcr. Vc wcrc a scparatc and distinct nation. . . . Amcrica is an indcpcndcnt and sovcrcign powcr. Vhy wcrc wc conccrncd il wc did not havc a war plan in rclation to that attack: . . . ! rcalizc . . . you wcrc trying to nd out what wc wcrc going to do: . . . And you told us now that you ncvcr did nd out. . . . You wcrc positivc about that, that you ncvcr got an answcr as to what wc wcrc to do. 80 !bid., part 14, p. 1246, xhibit No. 21, cccmbcr 6, 1941, tclcgram lrom London to Statc cpartmcnt. 81 !bid., part 6, p. 2871. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 705 Kimmel: Tc last answcr ! had on that subjcct bclorc thc attack was . . . Admiral Starks lcttcr ol Novcmbcr 25, which ! rcccivcd on cccmbcr 3. 82
Fcrguson thcn askcd Kimmcl il hc had known that Hart in thc Philippincs had gottcn word lrom Singaporc on cccmbcr 6 to thc ccct that thc 8ritish had rcccivcd assurancc ol Amcrican armcd support undcr scvcral cvcntualiticsil thc Japancsc attackcd thcm, il thc Japancsc attackcd thc utch, or il thc Japancsc attackcd Siam or thc !sthmus ol Kra and thc 8ritish and utch wcnt to thcir dclcnsc. bviously this would mcan that thc Unitcd Statcss Asiatic Flcct would bc askcd to assist thc 8ritish in Singaporc. 83 Hart had bccn scnding out ying missions to obscrvc thc movcmcnts ol thc Japancsc convoys. Hc had con lcrrcd in Manila with 8ritish Admiral Tomas S.\. Phillips on how bcst to coordinatc U.S. and 8ritish corts and had rcportcd to Vashington thcir arrangcmcnts lor coopcrating. 84 Howcvcr, thc ncws lrom Singaporc that thc 8ritish had rcccivcd assurancc ol Amcrican armcd support was a surprisc to Hart. Hc wircd Vashington lor instructions. 85 Turncr prcparcd a rcply lor Hart. !t was still in thc proccss ol dralting at thc timc ol thc attack, Turncr said. Hc bclicvcd that it was prcparcd in thc lorcnoon ol thc 7th. 86
Ferguson: So somconc kncw hcrc in Vashington bclorc thc attack camc what was to bc scnt to Admiral Hart in rcply to his inquiry, whcrcas you had madc a similar inquiry and, as ! undcrstand it, you had no inlormation scnt to you, that you 82 !bid., pp. 287172. Scc part 16, pp. 222325, Starks Novcmbcr 25 lcttcr. 83 !bid., part 10, pp. 508283, cccmbcr 5, 1941, tclcgram lrom John M. Crcighton, (ALUSNA) naval attach in Singaporc, to Hart. 84 !bid., part 4, pp. 193335, HartPhillips vcpart rcport, cccmbcr 7, Phil ippinc timc, i.c., cccmbcr 6 in Vashington. 85 !bid., part 14, p. 1412, C!NCAF tclcgram 070645. 86 !bid., part 4, pp. 193536, Turncr tcstimony. 706 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy rcccivcd, or scnt to you that you did not rcccivc, prior to thc attack. . . . At lcast, Admiral, you didnt know ol this rcply to Admiral Hart: Kimmel: My rccollcction is that ! didnt know anything about that until altcr thc attack. 87 vcv:nvv :n L~s:Mixu:v Mvss~cv ibx: Rv~cn Ki::vi Ux:ii Av:vv :nv A::~cx Tc nc v.:. Mcssagc had bccn intcrccptcd and was avail ablc in Vashington bctwccn 7:00 and 9:00 ~.:. (1:303:30 ~.:. in Hawaii). Yct it was not until almost noon that Marshall draltcd and scnt his lastminutc mcssagc advising Kimmcl and Short ol thc dcadlinc. For sccurity rcasons it was not transmit tcd by scramblcr phonc, thc lastcst mcans thcn availablc, lcst it bc intcrccptcd by thc Japancsc. !t did not rcach Kimmcl or Short until hours altcr thc attack. Fcrguson rclcrrcd to this mcssagc whcn qucstioning Kimmcl. Ferguson: |H|ow could thc lact that Gcncral Marshall or Admiral Stark would havc alcrtcd you on Sunday morning, say bctwccn 7:00 and 9:00 |Vashington timc|, that that mcssagc was rcccivcd, how could thc intcrccpting ol that mcssagc by thc Japs havc changcd thc situation: . . . |S|upposc thc Japancsc cct had lcarncd at 7:00 in thc morning, that is 7:00 our timc, on Sunday, which was . . . 51/2 hours bclorc thcir ships camc in, thcir airplancs camc into Hawaii: . . . Supposc that thcy had ashcd to that cct thc lact that thc Hawaiian !slands wcrc lully alcrtcd and kncw that thcrc was somcthing going to hap pcn and our ships would havc gonc out, how would that havc intcrlcrcd with thc Japs othcr than probably to havc stoppcd thcm coming in: 87 !bid., part 6, p. 2883. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 707 Kimmel: ! dont undcrstand how it would havc intcrlcrcd in thc slightcst dcgrcc. . . . ! cannot undcrstand why ! did not gct . . . that inlormation. 88
n January 21, 1946, altcr tcstilying lor six days, Admiral Kimmcl was cxcuscd by thc committcc. Kimmcl agrccd with \icc Chairman Coopcr that hc had bccn givcn a lull, amplc, and complctc opportunity . . . to prcscnt my sidc ol thc mattcr. 89
Gvxvv~i V~i:vv C. Snov:: Tnv A::~cx Suvvvisvb Pv~vi H~vnovAiso V~snixc:ox Finally on January 22, Gcncral Short was givcn an opportunity to tcll his story. At thc timc ol thc attack, Short had bccn com manding gcncral, Hawaiian dcpartmcnt. Likc Kimmcl, hc had appcarcd bclorc thc Robcrts Commission and had to appcar thcrc alonc, without counscl. Also likc Kimmcl, hc had not bccn pcrmit tcd to hcar or crosscxaminc othcr commission witncsscs. 90 Short had not cvcn bccn allowcd to hcar or crosscxaminc witncsscs bclorc thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard (APH8), as Kimmcl had bclorc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry (NC!), thc Navys countcrpart. And hc was not allowcd to scc thc Japancsc MAG!C intcrccpts, copics ol which thc APH8 obtaincd on ctobcr 6, 1944, at thc vcry cnd ol its hcarings. 91 Shorts military counscl, 8rigadicr Gcncral Tomas H. Grccn, was cvcntually allowcd to scc thcm, although not to commcnt on thcm to Short, Grccns rolc was limitcd to giving Short advicc. 92 Tc APH8 did lurnish Short 88 !bid., p. 2876. 89 !bid., p. 2915. 90 !bid., part 7, p. 2921, Short tcstimony. 91 !bid., part 28, pp. 94647. 92 !bid., part 7, p. 3155, Short tcstimony. Scc also part 29, pp. 243538. 708 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy with a copy ol its hcarings, cxccpt lor thc TP SCRT parts conccrning MAG!C. 93 Short was not a Vcst Pointcr, hc had gonc into thc Army altcr graduating lrom thc Univcrsity ol !llinois in 1901. Hc scrvcd in thc Philippincs and Alaska. From March 1916 to Fcbruary 1917 hc was in Mcxico with thc Pcrshing cxpcdition, and hc scrvcd in Francc and Gcrmany lor two ycars during Vorld Var !. 8ack in thc Statcs, hc hcld various positionson thc Army gcncral sta and at Forts Lcavcnworth and 8cnning. Hc also hcld scvcral command positions, organizing and commanding Army brigadcs, divisions, and corps, and dirccting soldicrs and National Guard troops in mancuvcrs. Vhcn hc took ovcr as commanding gcncral ol thc Hawaiian dcpartmcnt on Fcbruary 7, 1941, hc was pro motcd to licutcnant gcncral. Hc scrvcd until altcr thc cccmbcr 7 attack, whcn hc was rclicvcd ol his command (cccmbcr 17). Vhcn hc rctircd on Fcbruary 28, 1942, hc was rcduccd to a major gcncral. 94
Likc Kimmcl, Short bcgan his tcstimony bclorc thc JCC with a lcngthy prcparcd statcmcnt. His rcmarks parallclcd Kimmcls to somc cxtcnt in that hc tcsticd that hc had rcccivcd ncithcr thc cquipmcnt hc had rcqucstcd nor thc inlormation to which hc, as commanding gcncral, lclt hc was cntitlcd. Short said hc had had only a bricl conlcrcncc with Marshall bclorc hc assumcd command ol thc Hawaiian dcpartmcnt. Marshall had not thcn told him ol any ol thc probablc dangcrs in thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt although hc had writtcn him a long lcttcr on thc day that ! assumcd command dctailing his idca ol my mission. 95 Marshall wrotc on Fcbruary 7, 1941: 93 !bid., part 7, pp. 292122, Short tcstimony. 94 !bid., pp. 296667, Short tcstimony. 95 !bid., p. 2967. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 709 Tc lullcst protcction lor thc Flcct is the rathcr than a major considcration lor us, thcrc can bc littlc qucstion about that. . . . Plcasc kccp clcarly in mind in all your ncgotiations that our mis sion is to protcct thc basc and thc Naval conccntrations at Hawaii. 96 !n this lcttcr, Marshall also discusscd thc pcrsonal charactcristics ol Kimmcl, who was thcn taking ovcr command ol thc cct. 97
Shorts primary rcsponsibility had bccn dicrcnt lrom Kimmcls. Kimmcls task had bccn to prcparc thc cct lor oen- sive action. Shorts principal task, hc tcsticd, was defensive, to dclcnd thc !sland ol ahu lrom surlacc attacks, air attacks, sabotagc, intcrnal disordcrs such as uprisings, with particular attcntion to thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor and ol thc cct whcn in harbor, always ol coursc with thc support and assistancc ol thc Navy. 98
uring his tour ol duty in Hawaii, hc and Marshall cxchangcd lcttcrs (26 pagcs in thc printcd hcarings), cablcs, tclcgrams, and radiograms (cight pagcs). 99 Tcir corrcspondcncc was rclativcly bricl, comparcd with that ol Kimmcl and Stark during thc samc pcriod113 pagcs ol lcttcrs in thc printcd hcarings and 14 pagcs ol cablcs, tclcgrams, and radiograms. 100 !n his communications Short rcportcd shortagcs ol mcn, 101 plancs, 817s, intcrccptors, 96 !bid., part 15, pp. 160102, xhibit 53, Marshalls Fcbruary 7, 1941, lcttcr to Short on his assumption ol command. Scc also part 7, p. 3083, Short tcsti mony. 97 !bid., part 15, p. 1601. 98 !bid., part 7, p. 2970. 99 !bid., part 14, pp. 132634, xhibit 32, part 15, pp. 160026, xhibit 53. 100 !bid., part 14, pp. 13951409, xhibit 37, part 16, pp. 214457, xhibit 106. 101 !bid., part 7, p. 2925. Short statcmcnt. 710 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ghtcrs, torpcdo bombcrs, antiaircralt guns, machinc guns, 102 and radar cquipmcnt. 103 Marshalls lcttcrs dcalt primarily with mili tary housckccping dctailsthc construction ol airclds, roads, trails, a rccrcation camp, antiaircralt artillcry, thc aircralt warning scrvicc (radar), prcparations lor air and ground dclcnsc, ctc, thcy containcd littlc inlormation conccrning thc intcrnational situa tion. !t was thc Var cpartmcnts rcsponsibility to kccp Short inlormcd, and hc said hc did rcccivc dcpartmcnt mcssagcs lrom timc to timc. 104 8ut thosc mcssagcs wcrc oltcn conicting and conlusing, cspccially comparcd with thosc scnt to Kimmcl by thc Navy during this pcriod and thcn rclaycd by Kimmcl to Short. 105
nc chargc madc against Short was that thc attack had takcn him by surprisc bccausc hc had not bccn prcparcd. Hc pointcd out that cvcn thc o cials in Vashington who had had acccss to thc Japancsc intcrccpts had not cxpcctcd thc attack, rathcr thcy had cxpcctcd thc Japancsc to aim at thc 8ritish and utch in thc southwcst Pacic. Vhcn thc ncws rcachcd Vashington, top o cials lrom FR, Hull, and Stimson on down all cxprcsscd surprisc. Army Judgc Advocatc Gcncral ( JAG) Myron C. Cramcr was lorccd to admit that Short had not bccn alonc in lailing to antici patc an attack. His nonlcasancc or omissions wcrc bascd on an cstimatc ol thc situation which, although provcd laulty by subscqucnt cvcnts, was . . . madc or concurrcd in by all thosc o ccrs in Hawaii bcst qualicd to lorm a sound military opinion. Tat cstimatc was that an attack by air was in thc highcst dcgrcc improbablc. 106
102 !bid., p. 2963. Short statcmcnt. 103 !bid., pp. 296970, 315758. Short tcstimony. 104 !bid., pp. 2958, 2971. 105 !bid., pp. 293135, 294546. Short tcstimony. 106 !bid., part 18, p. 3205, January 27, 1942, mcmorandum to Marshall. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 711 Short quotcd Cramcrs Novcmbcr 25, 1944, commcnts on thc APH8 rcport: |S|incc thc Var Plans ivision had rcccivcd substantial inlor mation lrom thc !ntclligcncc Scction, G2, thc 8oard argucs that had this additional inlormation bccn transmittcd to Short it might havc convinccd him not only that war was immincnt but that thcrc was a rcal possibility ol a surprisc air attack on Hawaii. 107
Tc JAG wcnt on to blamc Gcrow lor Failurc to apprcciatc thc signicancc ol thc intcrccpt mcssagcs which wcrc availablc in Vashington and lor a lack ol thc typc ol skill in anticipating and prcparing against cvcntualitics which wc havc a right to cxpcct in an o ccr at thc hcad ol thc Var Plans ivision. 108
From timc to timc G2 issucd spccial cstimatcs ol thc mili tary situation. Tc Far astcrn parts ol thcsc cstimatcs wcrc always prcparcd initially by 8ratton in thc Far astcrn scction ol thc military intclligcncc scrvicc. !nlormation lrom thc scrviccs othcr gcographic scctions was incorporatcd and discusscd. Tcn thc cstimatc was prcscntcd to Gcncral Milcs, chicl ol military intclligcncc scrvicc, lor approval or rcvision. 109
n Novcmbcr 29 thc intclligcncc branch prcparcd such an cstimatc (!.8.159), which thc wholc division, including Milcs himscll, considcrcd pcrhaps thc most important wc had cvcr gottcn out, not so much bccausc ol thc dangcr that wc saw lrom Japan, although dangcr in that cld was prctty thoroughly discusscd, but primarily bccausc 107 !bid., part 39, p. 265, mcmorandum. 108 !bid., also part 7, p. 2961. 109 !bid., part 34, p. 45, tcstimony ol 8rigadicr Gcncral Haycs A. Kroncr, chicl, intclligcncc branch, G2, bclorc Clarkc !nquiry. 712 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Gcn. Milcs wishcd to locus Var cpartmcnt thought on thc dclcat that could bc administcrcd to thc Nazi powcrs. 110
Tis cstimatc, Short tcsticd, containcd no mcntion ol Japans potcntial capability against Pcarl Harbor bccausc ncithcr Gcncral Haycs A. Kroncr, chicl ol thc intclligcncc branch, G2, who |according to Short| was rcsponsiblc lor maintaining inlormation and lor thc prcparation ol cstimatcs as to probablc action, 111 nor othcrs in his branch had any inlormation which would lcad |thcm| to bclicvc that thcy |thc Japancsc| wcrc capablc ol or planncd such an attack. 112 Apparcntly thc Armys military intclligcncc scrvicc (G2) did not cxpcct an attack on Hawaii any morc than had thc top Vashington o cials. !n othcr words, Pcarl Harbor was omittcd lrom G2s cstimatcs not bccausc it was too obvious to mcntion, as Milcs tcsticd bclorc thc committcc, 113
but bccausc, cvcn with all thc inlormation it had, it did not bclicvc Japan was capablc ol making such an attack. Kroncr, who had hclpcd prcparc this cstimatc, rcmcmbcrcd it distinctly bccausc whcn thc word camc through thc radio on that latclul Sunday, cccmbcr 7, that Japan had attackcd Pcarl Harbor, ! was sitting in my o cc in thc Munitions 8uilding rcading lrom this papcr. Hc lclt that Japans potcntial capability against Pcarl Harbor was lclt lrom this cstimatc bccausc ncithcr Col. 8ctts nor ! had any inlormation which would lcad us to bclicvc that thcy wcrc capablc ol or planncd such an attack. 114
Tc immincncc ol crisis was bccoming apparcnt in Vashington. Yct thc Var cpartmcnt, Short said, lailcd to rclay that scnsc ol urgcncy to him. And hc had rcccivcd no intimation 110 !bid., pp. 4748, tcstimony ol Gcncral Kroncr. 111 !bid., part 7, pp. 298889. 112 !bid., p. 2989. 113 !bid., part 2, pp. 90203. 114 !bid., part 7, p. 2989. Short tcstimony. Scc also part 34, pp. 4748, Kroncr tcstimony at Clarkc. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 713 lrom Vashington that Hawaii might bc attackcd. Hc cxplaincd that hc had bccn lcd to think that thc Japancsc wcrc not going to attack Hawaii in that hc had rcccivcd no warning such as had bccn scnt his prcdcccssor in Junc 1940. At that timc, Short cxplaincd in a statcmcnt, Marshall alcrtcd thcnCommandcr Gcncral Hcrron ol a possible transPacic raid scarc. 115 Hcrron had thcn takcn all ncccssary prccautions. Altcr a month Marshall authorizcd Hcrron to rclax thc alcrt provisions cxccpt insolar as thcy pcrtaincd to sabotagc and thc maintcnancc ol rcadincss. 116
Short said hc had cxpcctcd that il thc Chicl ol Sta oncc again had inlormation causing him to cxpcct a transPacic raid against ahu, hc would lollow thc coursc hc had prcviously sct as an cxamplc. 117
Snov:s A::vx:iox ivvc:vb Vvs:w~vb !t was obvious that Japans lorccs wcrc hcading south around !ndochina and toward southcast AsiaSingaporc, Malaya, and thc utch ast !ndics. Tc inlormation scnt Short by thc Var cpartmcnt, hc said, had always pointcd in that dircction, toward an attack to thc Southwcst Pacic, and including thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics. 118
Short had bccn told that thc Philippincs might bc thrcat cncd. Hc kncw thc Unitcd Statcs was doing its bcst to build up its Philippinc dclcnscs. 817s wcrc bcing own thcrc lrom thc Statcs via Hawaii. Tc plancs wcrc bcing outttcd in Hawaii, and crcws wcrc bcing traincd thcrc. Tcn guns and crcws, hc said, wcrc bcing scnt in thc 817s on thcir way to thc Philippincs. 119
At timcs, somc ol Hawaiis own Army 817s had cvcn bccn own 115 !bid., part 7, p. 2930. 116 !bid., part 15, pp. 15931600, xhibit 52, cspccially pp. 159758. 117 !bid., part 7, p. 2930. 118 !bid., p. 3176. 119 !bid., p. 3217. 714 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy out thcrc, thus dcplcting thc Armys cct ol plancs in Hawaii. Vc had 21 817s at onc timc, Short said, and 9 ol thosc wcrc scnt to thc Philippincs and wc wcrc down to 12, and had to rob 6 ol thosc ol parts to kccp thc othcrs going through. . . . Tcy wcrc lcrrying in thc last lcw months cvcrything to thc Philippincs thcy could. Still othcr typcs ol plancs wcrc shippcd through |to thc Philippincs| on transports. 120 8ut it was not only plancs that wcrc bcing scnt out thcrc. Short said that a lcw days bclorc cccmbcr 7, ! had a wirc lrom thc Var cpartmcnt asking mc il ! would bc willing to ship lortycight 75millimctcr guns and 120 30calibcr machinc guns to thc Philippincs. Short had agrccd. Tc Var cpartmcnt said thc plancs and guns would bc rcplaccd vcry soon. 121
Hc quotcd thc lcw tclcgrams or cablc warnings hc had rcccivcd lrom Vashington altcr assuming command. 122 A Var cpartmcnt dispatch on July 8 adviscd him that dcduction lrom inlormation lrom numcrous sourccs is that Japancsc Govt has dctcrmincd upon its luturc policy . . . onc ol watchlul waiting involving probablc aggrcssivc action against maritimc provinccs ol Russia. . . . pinion is that Jap activity in thc south will bc lor thc prcscnt conncd to scizurc and dcvcl opmcnt ol naval army and air bascs in !ndo China, although an advancc against thc 8ritish and utch cannot bc cntircly rulcd out. 123
120 !bid., p. 3203. 121 !bid., p. 3204. 122 !bid., pp. 293135, part 14, pp. 132634, xhibit No. 32. 123 !bid., part 14, p. 1326, Var cpartmcnt radio, July 8, 1941. Tis tclcgram, as transcribcd in Robcrts Commission Rcport (ibid., part 24, p. 2164, xhibit Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 715 Short thought that July 8 mcssagc, whcn thcy wcrc pointing out action ol thc Japancsc against Russia, was a rathcr dcnitc prc diction, and was thc only prcdiction that thc Var cpartmcnt cvcr madc dircct to mc. 124 Short said that at no timc altcr July 8 did ! cvcr havc an Army mcssagc that indicatcd any probablc linc ol action by thc Japancsc. 125
Hc said hc was adviscd on ctobcr 16, through a Navy mcs sagc to Kimmcl, that hostilitics bctwccn Japan and Russia arc a strong possibility. Sincc thc U.S. and 8ritain arc hcld rcsponsiblc by Japan lor hcr prcscnt dcspcratc situation thcrc is also a pos sibility that Japan may attack thcsc two powcrs. 126 n ctobcr 20 Short had a mcssagc lrom thc Var cpartmcnt that appcarcd to conict. Tcnsion bctwccn Unitcd Statcs and Japan rcmains straincd, it said, but according to thc Var cpartmcnts cstimatc ol thc Japancsc situation, no rcpcat no abrupt changc in Japancsc lorcign policy appcars immincnt. 127 Short also tcsticd that on ctobcr 17 onc ol Shorts intcl ligcncc o ccrs, Licutcnant Coloncl Gcorgc V. 8ickncll, had prcparcd a rcport on thc situation. Following thc principlcs ol dclcating onc opponcnt at a timc, hc had writtcn, it is bclicvcd that Japan, il laccd with ccrtain 8ritish military rcsistancc to hcr plans, will unhcsitatingly attack thc 8ritish, and do so without a simultancous attack on Amcrican posscs sions, bccausc ol no known binding agrccmcnt bctwccn thc 8ritish and Amcricans lor joint military action against Japan, 36), varics slightly in punctuation, ctc., and is datcd July 7 (not July 8), 1941. 124 !bid., part 7, p. 3180. 125 !bid., p. 3072. 126 !bid., p. 2933. Scc part 14, p. 1327, ctobcr 16, 1941, Navy Mcssagc 162203. 127 !bid., part 7, p. 2933. Scc part 14, p. 1327, Var cpartmcnt ctobcr 20, 1941, mcssagc. Tis tclcgram as transcribcd in Robcrts Commission Rcport (part 24, p. 2164, xhibit 36) is datcd ctobcr 18 (not 20), 1941. 716 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy and that thc Amcrican public is not yct lully prcparcd to sup port such action. Howcvcr, 8ickncll continucd, it must bc cvidcnt to thc Japancsc that in casc ol such an attack on thc 8ritish, thcy would most ccrtainly havc to ght thc Unitcd Statcs within a rclativcly short timc. 128
Vhat do you undcrstand by binding agrccmcnt: Fcrguson askcd. To bc binding, Short said, it should bc approvcd by thc Congrcss. Hc thought 8ickncll might havc mcant simply any agrccmcnt that had bccn madc and approvcd by thc prcsidcnt, and not madc public, somcthing that thc prcsidcnt cxpcctcd to sct lorth in thc Scnatc. 129
Fcrguson rccallcd that wc wcrcnt consultcd on thc qucstion ol thc shooting ordcrs in thc Atlantic. . . . Congrcss didnt say anything about that. 130 Short said hc kncw that thc Navy 8asic Var Plan, Rainbow No. 5, had bccn drawn up with thc idca apparcntly that whcn it wcnt into ccct wc would bc allicd with 8ritain and thc utch. 131 Howcvcr, Short said hc lclt at that timc that thc Amcrican public would not havc bccn willing to havc an agrccmcnt raticd that wc would go to war to dclcnd thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics or Singaporc. 132
n Novcmbcr 24 hc said hc rcccivcd, through Kimmcl, a Navy cpartmcnt mcssagc stating that a surprisc aggrcssivc movcmcnt in any dircction including attack on Philippincs or Guam is a possibility. 133
Tcn on Novcmbcr 27 Short said hc rcccivcd Var cpartmcnt radiogram No. 472 notilying him that Ncgotiations with thc 128 !bid., part 7, p. 3173. 129 !bid., p. 3174. 130 !bid., p. 3180. 131 !bid., p. 3175. 132 !bid., p. 3174. 133 !bid., part 7, p. 2934, part 14, p. 1328, Novcmbcr 24, 1941, Navy Mcssagc 242005. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 717 Japancsc appcar to bc tcrminatcd to all practical purposcs. . . . Japancsc luturc action unprcdictablc but hostilc action possiblc at any momcnt. Short was told that !l hostilitics cannot comma rcpcat cannot comma bc avoidcd thc Unitcd Statcs dcsircs that Japan commit thc rst ovcrt act. Short was to undcrtakc such rcconnaissancc and othcr mcasurcs as you dccm ncccssary . . . so as not comma rcpcat not comma to alarm thc civil population or disclosc intcnt. 134 !n rcsponsc, hc alcrtcd lor sabotagc and so noticd Vashington. thcrwisc hc rcccivcd no Army warning ol likcly Japancsc action or mcssagc giving diplomatic or military background that would havc cnablcd him to judgc thc situation in thc Pacic lor himscll. Snov: No: Abvisvb ov Av~ii~niv vibvxcv ov !::ixvx: Cvisis Short said hc was convinccd that thc Var cpartmcnt was awarc ol thc lact that ! did not havc this inlormation |rcgarding thc mounting U.S.Japancsc crisis| and had alrcady dccidcd that ! should not gct this inlormation. . . . A dcnitc dccision had bccn madc by thc Var cpartmcnt that ncithcr thc Japancsc intcrccpts nor thc substancc ol thcm should bc givcn to thc commanding gcncral in Hawaii. 135
Hc quotcd Milcss tcstimony bclorc thc committcc: Tcrc wcrc no stcps takcn to distributc thcsc mcssagcs to that Gcncral |Short|. Tis dccision was in linc with thc gcncral policy laid down by thc Chicl ol Sta that thcsc mcssagcs and thc lact ol thc cxistcncc ol thcsc mcssagcs or our ability to dccodc thcm should bc conncd to thc lcast possiblc 134 !bid., part 7, p. 2935, part 14, p. 1328, Novcmbcr 27, 1941, Army Mcssagc 472. 135 !bid., part 7 pp. 295354. Scc also part 29, p. 2403. 718 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy numbcr ol pcrsons, no distribution should bc madc outsidc ol Vashington. 136
Not only was Short dcnicd thc intclligcncc dcrivcd lrom MAG!C, but thc inlormation hc did rcccivc was conlusing. Navy mcssagcs wcrc habitually rathcr morc aggrcssivc than thc Army, Short said. n ctobcr 16 |Kimmcl| had a |Navy cpartmcnt| mcssagc in which thcy said Japan would attack. n ctobcr 20 ! had onc lrom thc Var cpartmcnt saying thcy didnt cxpcct any |attack|. My mcssagc said nothing about a war warning and |Kimmcls| did. Short thought thc Navy mcssagcs wcrc inclincd to bc morc positivc, possibly . . . morc alarming, in thc contcxt than thc Armys. 137
Tc Var cpartmcnt had scnt Short no inlormation con ccrning any U.S. military commitmcnts arising out ol thc Unitcd Statcs8ritish Sta Convcrsations and thc Joint CanadaUnitcd Statcs clcnsc Plan, which might havc lcd him to cxpcct U.S. involvcmcnt in thc Far ast. !l hc had known that Singaporc had bccn alcrtcd and that thc Govcrnor ol thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics had ordcrcd comprchcnsivc mobilization ol his armcd lorccs, Short tcsticd, hc would havc rcalizcd that thcy consid crcd war vcry immincnt out thcrc. . . . !t would havc mcant pos siblc hostilitics on Hawaii, but not ncccssarily an attack. 138
Hc was askcd about two cccmbcr 3 Navy mcssagcs scnt to Kimmcl. nc had announccd that Japancsc diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singaporc, 8atavia, Manila, Vashington, and London had bccn instructcd to dcstroy codcs, 136 !bid., part 7, p. 2954. Scc also part 2, p. 791, Milcs tcstimony. 137 !bid., part 7, p. 2983. Scc part 14, p. 1327, Navy ctobcr 16, 1941, Mcssagc 162203, and Var cpartmcnt ctobcr 20, 1941, Mcssagc 1234P. 138 !bid., part 7, p. 3176. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 719 ciphcrs, and sccrct documcnts. 139 Tc othcr rcportcd that Tokyo had ordcrcd London, Hong Kong, Singaporc, and Manila cach to dcstroy its Purplc machinc, thc 8atavia machinc, it said, had alrcady bccn rcturncd to Tokyo. 140 Short dcnicd having known about cithcr mcssagc. 141
Likc Kimmcl, Short did not cxpcct a brcak in U.S.Japancsc rclations as long as thc rcprcscntativcs ol thc two nations wcrc still talking in Vashington. Ncithcr man kncw, as Vashington o cials had lcarncd lrom thc intcrccpts, that thc Japancsc con sidcrcd thc ncgotiations de facto rupturcd and that thc Japancsc ambassadors wcrc only kccping up thc prctcnsc ol ncgotiat ing. From what Kimmcl and Short could glcan lrom ncwspapcr accounts, thc ncgotiations wcrc continuing, supposcdly in good laith. Short, again likc Kimmcl, had bccn lcd to bclicvc that an attack on Pcarl Harbor, although possiblc, was not probablc. !n vicw ol Hawaiis largc population ol Japancsc alicns, sabotagc and subvcrsion sccmcd much morc likcly than an attack lrom out sidc. Hc rcitcratcd that mcssagcs lrom thc Var cpartmcnt (scc abovc) had lcd him to thc vicw that thc primc dcsirc ol thc U.S. govcrnmcnt was to avoid war and to not lct any intcrnational incidcnt happcn in Hawaii that might bring on war. 142
Shorts task, as hc intcrprctcd No. 472, was to guard against hostilc action in thc lorm ol sabotagc and subvcrsion. Tus Short had rcspondcd by rcporting that hc had alcrtcd lor sabo tagc. Scvcral othcr mcssagcs lrom Vashington at about thc samc timc also adviscd him to guard against sabotagc, rcassuring him in his dccision. Hcaring nothing lurthcr lrom Vashington dur ing thc ninc days bctwccn his Novcmbcr 27 sabotagc alcrt rcport 139 !bid., part 14, p. 1407, PNA\ #031850. 140 !bid., p. 1408, PNA\ #031855. 141 !bid., part 7, p. 3105. 142 !bid., pp. 297879. 720 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy and thc attack, hc could only assumc that his action had bccn appropriatc. Short mcntioncd two mcssagcs in particular that had bccn availablc in Vashington and that would havc bccn morc impor tant than thosc that wcrc scnt to Pcarl Harborthc shipsin harbor bombingplan intcrccpts and thc cccmbcr 7 nc v.:. Mcssagc. 143 Hc said that had that mcssagc bccn rclaycd immc diatcly by scramblcr phoncboth hc and Marshall had such phoncs and it took only about tcn or 15 minutcs to gct a mcssagc throughit would havc rcachcd him lour hours bclorc, instcad ol scvcn hours altcr, thc attack. 144
Short said Marshalls lastminutc mcssagc, conccrning thc nc v.:. Mcssagc, was markcd: clay in dcciphcring duc to not bcing markcd Priority in Vashington. . . . !l this mcssagc had bccn scnt by scramblcr tclcphonc thcrc would havc bccn timc to warm up thc plancs and put thcm in thc air. . . . Tc lact that thc Var cpartmcnt scnt this mcssagc by radio in codc instcad ol tclcphoning it in thc clcar . . . indicatcs that thc Var cpartmcnt, cvcn as latc as 6:48 ~.:., cccmbcr 7th, Honolulu timc, did not considcr an attack on Honolulu as likcly cnough to warrant drastic action to prcparc thc islands lor thc sncak attack. 145
Short quotcd thc Var cpartmcnts Field Service Manual on thc importancc ol adcquatc and timcly military intclligcncc to cnablc thc commandcr to draw logical conclusions conccrning cncmy lincs ol action. Military intclligcncc is thus an csscntial lactor in thc cstimatc ol thc situation and in thc conduct ol sub scqucnt opcrations. 146 Askcd il hc was complaining bccausc hc 143 !bid., part 12, pp. 26163, 248. 144 !bid., part 7, pp. 3220, 3041. 145 !bid., pp. 2940, 3220322. 146 !bid., p. 2961. Scc Var cpartmcnt, FM 1005. Field Service Regulations: Operations, May 22, 1941, p. 40, paragraph 194. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 721 had madc an crror and Vashington hadnt corrcctcd him, Short rcplicd: |!|l you arc not lurnishcd inlormation you in all prob ability will makc an crroncous cstimatc. 147 Also in thc Var cpartmcnts Field Service Regulations: Tc bcst inlormation will bc ol no usc il it arrivcs too latc at thc hcadquartcrs lor which it is intcndcd. . . . !mportant and urgcnt inlormation . . . is scnt by thc most rapid mcans availablc to all hcadquartcrs acctcd, without rcgard to thc usual military channcls. 148
Committcc Chairman 8arklcy was skcptical that morc inlor mation would havc cnablcd Short to judgc thc situation any bct tcr than hc had. Barkley: vcrybody in Vashington, all thc high o ccrs in VashingtonNavy, Army, !ntclligcncc, Var Plans, Gcncral Staall saw thcsc intcrccptcd mcssagcs. . . . Tcy all havc tcs ticd that, notwithstanding thosc mcssagcs, thcy did not rcally cxpcct an attack at Pcarl Harbor and wcrc surpriscd whcn it camc. o you think that il you . . . or il thc admiral . . . or both ol you togcthcr had gottcn thcm, you would havc rcachcd any dicrcnt conclusion lrom that rcachcd by cvcrybody in Vashington: Short: ! think thcrc was a possibility bccausc Pcarl Harbor mcant a littlc morc to us. Vc wcrc a littlc closcr to thc situ ation and . . . would havc bccn inclincd to look at that Pcarl Harbor inlormation a littlc morc closcly. Vc might not havc madc thc corrcct dccision, but ! bclicvc thcrc was morc chancc that cithcr wc or somconc on our stas would havc had thc idca. . . . 147 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 7, p. 2986. 148 Var cpartmcnt, FM 1005. Field Service Regulations: Operations, May 22, 1941, pp. 4647, paragraphs 227 and 228. 722 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Barkley: !l that is truc, why did you rcly lor thc action you took upon somc dcnitc instruction lrom Vashington instcad ol cxcrcising grcatcr judgmcnt and discrction in doing what you could do with what you had: Short: 8ccausc thcy wcrc my only sourccs ol inlormation. ! had no sourcc ol inlormation outsidc Hawaii, cxccpt thc Var cpartmcnt. . . . |T|hc Var cpartmcnt had many sourccs ol inlormation. Tcy had military attachcs. Tcy got rcports lrom thc Statc cpartmcnt and thc Commcrcc cpartmcnt. Tcy had a ccrtain numbcr ol agcnts scattcrcd around in thc Far ast. !l thcy wcrc in a position to gct inlormation that ! had no acccss to at all, ! had cvcry rcason to bclicvc that thcir judgmcnt would bc bcttcr than my just . . . rcading thc ncwspapcrs. 149
Snov: vvvxbs Av:vs vvov:s uvixc A::~cx !mmcdiatcly altcr thc attack, Short said hc madc scvcral rcports by tclcphonc to Vashington. Tcn hc scnt a radiogram giving a succinct account ol thc cvcnt lrom thc Armys vicwpoint: Japancsc cncmy divc bombcrs cstimatcd numbcr sixty attackcd Hickam Ficld Vhcclcr Ficld Pcarl Harbor at cight am Stop xtcnsivc damagc to at lcast thrcc hangars Vhcclcr Ficld thrcc hangars Hickam Ficld and to plancs caught on thc ground Stop ctails not yct known Stop Raid lastcd ovcr onc hour Stop Unconrmcd rcport that thc ships in Pcarl Harbor badly damagcd Stop Marinc air cld VA also badly damagcd Stop ctails latcr. 150
8clorc thc last raid was complctcd, Short said, a total ol 14 U.S. plancs got in thc air. Tcy shot down 10 cncmy plancs. Scnator Lucas was imprcsscd: So it is a prctty salc assumption 149 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 7, pp. 301213. 150 !bid., p. 3096. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 723 that il thc plancs had bccn warmcd up and rcady to go that, con sidcring what you did with thc 14 plancs . . . thc damagc would havc bccn minimizcd considcrably: Short: No qucstion about that. ! think our pilots showcd that thcy wcrc supcrior to thc Japancsc pilots in individual combat that day. 151
Vhcn Navy Sccrctary Knox visitcd Pcarl Harbor immcdi atcly altcr thc attack, Short said, Hc wcnt complctcly through my cld hcadquartcrs and spcnt, ! would say, probably 2 hours, in which wc had o ccrs dctailcd lrom cvcry scction to cxplain cvcrything that had happcncd. Hc got a vcry complctc picturc not only ol our hcadquartcrs but how wc wcrc lunctioning and cxactly what happcncd, and at thc cnd ol thc timc hc was so imprcsscd with our hcadquartcrs that hc dircctcd thc Navy to makc arrangcmcnts to movc ovcr into an undcrground hcadquartcrs right alongsidc ol us. 152 Rcprcscntativc Kcclc said to Short, summarizing: |A|s commandcr at Pcarl Harbor prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941, and subscqucnt to your appointmcnt to that important posi tion, you did cvcrything within your powcr to providc thc physical things ncccssary to providc lor thc dclcnsc ol thc Hawaiian !slands. Yct, Kcclc said, Short had tcsticd as to many itcms ol physical propcrty, such as guns, installations, radar cquipmcnt, air strips, buildings, and so on, that hc had not rcccivcd but a small part ol thc matcrial that you had rcqucstcd prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941. 8ut according to Marshalls tcstimony, 151 !bid., pp. 3068, 306970. 152 !bid., p. 3165. 724 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc matcrial which you did havc at Pcarl Harbor on cccmbcr 7, il alcrtcd and ccctivcly uscd, would havc givcn a good account ol itscll and pcrhaps cnablcd you to rcpcl thc attack, or to scvcrcly minimizc thc damagc that was causcd. o you agrcc with that: Short said hc could havc givcn a bcttcr account ol himscll il hc had had morc cquipmcnt. For cxamplc, thc bcst antiaircralt dclcnsc against lowying plancs, thc armamcnts that had donc thc most damagc in thc attack, wcrc .50 calibcr machinc guns. At thc timc ol thc attack, hc had had only 109, although thc program at that timc had callcd lor 345. Tc numbcr ol .50 calibcr machinc guns in Hawaii had actually bccn incrcascd by cccmbcr 1, 1942, to 793, showing how many thc Var cpartmcnt considcrcd ncc cssary. |A|nd kccp in mind that that datc is altcr thc Japancsc had bccn scriously dclcatcd at Midway. Kcclc prcsscd on. Tc lact ol thc mattcr is, is it not, that cxccpt lor thc possibility ol gctting a lcw morc guns into action and possibly minimizing, to a small cxtcnt, thc damagc that was donc . . . this attack would havc comc in by surprisc, isnt that truc: Short: Vith thc inlormation . . . wc had lrom Vashington, it was bound to bc a surprisc. 153
Snov: Ci~i:s His Rv:ivv:vx: H~xbivb nv Gvxvv~i S:~vv, M~bv Hi: ~ Sc~vvco~:, Hv vvvxbs Hi:sviv Ac~ixs: Ronvv:s Co::issiox Cn~vcvs Altcr thc attack, Short had bccn rclicvcd ol his command. According to him, Marshalls tcstimony convcycd thc idca that 153 !bid., p. 3210. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 725 Shorts rctircmcnt had bccn handlcd cntircly by thc Sccrctary ol Var |Stimson| and that hc |Marshall| had had nothing to do with it, in lact hc was not cognizant ol what was bcing donc. Howcvcr, that apparcntly was not thc casc, thc corrcspondcncc, Short said, did not agrcc with that. 154
Fcrguson quotcd lrom Shorts prcparcd statcmcnt to thc ccct that hc did not lccl hc had bccn trcatcd lairly, or with justicc by thc Var cpartmcnt. !n that statcmcnt, hc said hc thought hc had bccn singlcd out as an cxamplc, as thc scapcgoat lor thc disastcr. 155
Ferguson: ! wish you would bc spccic and tcll mc whom you had in mind |by saying| thc Var cpartmcnt: Short: ! had in mind thc Gcncral Sta in particular |hcadcd by Marshall|, bccausc thcy wcrc primarily rcsponsiblc lor thc policics pursucd by thc Var cpartmcnt. . . . Gcncral Gcrow as hcad ol thc Var Plans ivision had thc dircct rcsponsibility lor kccping mc inlormcd. Gcncral Milcs, thc hcad ol G2, had a vcry dircct rcsponsibility. Ferguson: Vhat about thc Sccrctary ol Var: . . . Short: . . . ! would not havc cxpcctcd him to bc as lully awarc ol thc signicancc ol tcchnical things. ! would cxpcct him to bc lully awarc ol any policy. Ferguson: Now, whcn you usc thc word scapcgoat, will you givc us thc mcaning that you want to convcy to us in that word: Short: !t sccms to mc that may bc a slang cxprcssion, but it is a word in vcry common usagc, and ! mcant just cxactly what thc common usagc mcant, that it was somconc that thcy saddlcd 154 !bid., part 7, p. 3170. 155 !bid., p. 2964. 726 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc blamc on to gct it o ol thcmsclvcs. . . . Tat is cxactly what ! want to convcy. 156
Tc samc two basic accusations madc against Kimmcl by thc Robcrts Commission had also bccn madc against Short: dcrclic tion ol duty and crrors ol judgmcnt. Undcr datc ol April 20, 1942, thc Var cpartmcnt lormalizcd thc Robcrts Commission accusations against Short into 11 spccic chargcs, cach ol which was considcrcd a violation ol thc 96th Articlc ol Var. 157 Vhcn Fcrguson qucstioncd Short, hc plcadcd not guilty to cach ol thc 11 chargcs. 158 Hc cxplaincd that his actions in cvcry casc had bccn limitcd by cquipmcnt shortagcs and shapcd by thc limitcd inlormation supplicd him. Hc had donc thc bcst hc could, hc said, givcn thc rcsourccs and inlormation availablc. 1. Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol. Not guilty, Short said. Hc did havc an adcquatc patrol. Tc air pcoplc wcrc satiscd and had lull control. . . . |!|t was not dcsigncd lor air dclcnsc. Hc was using all thc cquipmcnt hc had. 2. Failure to provide adequate antiaircraft defenses. Not guilty. Vc would havc had an adcquatc antiaircralt dclcnsc il thc Var cpartmcnt had givcn us thc cquipmcnt and had givcn us thc inlormation which indicatcd immincnt attack. r, il thcy had rcplicd to my |sabotagc alcrt| rcport and indicatcd any dcsircd modication. 156 !bid., p. 3169. 157 !bid., part 18, pp. 321115, F. Granvillc Munson, Coloncl, J.A.G.., April 20, 1942, mcmorandum lor judgc advocatc gcncral. 158 !bid., part 7, pp. 319195. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 727 3. Failure to set up an Interceptor (radar) Command. Not guilty. Vc wcrc training pcrsonncl as last as wc could to opcratc an ccctivc intcrccptor command, and it was sct up and opcrating as ccctivcly as it could. Short told ol considcrablc dclay cncountcrcd not only in gct ting thc nccdcd cquipmcnt, but also in obtaining cpartmcnt ol !ntcrior pcrmission to crcct thc radar towcrs on national park land. 159
4. Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service. Not guilty. Vc wcrc training our pcrsonncl as last as wc could to sct up an ccctivc aircraltwarning scrvicc. !t was in opcration. 160
5. Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to interested agencies. Not guilty. Vc wcrc rcstrictcd by dircct ordcr lrom Marshall, lrom transmitting thc Novcmbcr 27 warning to any othcr than thc minimum csscntial o ccrs. . . . !l ! had sct up an aircraltwarning scrvicc and gottcn it to cvcrybody wc would havc had to givc it to all thc cnlistcd mcn. 6. Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy. Not guilty. Vc had lull, complctc plans lor dclcnsc by coop cration with thc Navy, which had bccn approvcd by Gcncral Marshall and Admiral Stark. . . . !t would havc bccn carricd out 100 pcrccnt il thcy would havc givcn us thc inlormation thcy had. 159 !bid., pp. 315758. 160 !bid., p. 3192. Scc also pp. 305758, 318284. 728 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 7. Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case of sudden attack. Not guilty. ! could not tcll subordinatcs to cxpcct a suddcn attack which ncithcr ! nor thc Var cpartmcnt nor anyonc clsc cxpcctcd. ur inlormation rcgarding impcnding hostilc action was, by dircction ol thc chicl ol sta, limitcd to thc min imum csscntial o ccrs. ur standard opcrating proccdurc ol 5 Novcmbcr 1941 prcscribcd lully thc dutics ol all pcrsonncl in cvcnt ol any suddcn attack. As to thc civilians, Vc had a numbcr ol alcrts and blackouts. Vc had had dcnitc training ol thc surgical tcams and ol thc rstaid pcoplc and ol thc ambulancc corps. . . . And ! think that thc civilian agcncics that had to act not only kncw but thcy pcrlormcd thcir dutics cxtrcmcly wcll on cccmbcr 7. 8. Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. Not guilty. ! took cvcry mcasurc ! thought ncccssary to protcct thc cct and naval basc against sabotagc. ! so rcportcd to thc Var cpartmcnt. Marshall tcsticd that ! was rcasonablc in assuming that ! was doing cxactly what hc wantcd, bccausc othcrwisc hc would havc noticd mc that hc wantcd morc mcasurcs takcn. 9. Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof. Not guilty. ! was ncvcr warncd ol any immincnt dangcr ol an air attack. Tc plancs wcrc thcrclorc groupcd lor morc adcquatc protcction against hostilc action in thc lorm ol sabotagc. 10. Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 729 Not guilty. My aircralt wcrc not in a statc ol rcadincss lor a sur prisc attack, but wcrc protcctcd against sabotagc as dircctcd by thc Var cpartmcnt in thc sabotagcalcrt mcssagcs ol 27th, ol 28th Novcmbcr 1941, and as rcportcd to thc Var cpartmcnt by mc. !l thcy had bccn cquippcd with ammunition, groupcd as thcy wcrc, and a sabotagc attack had bccn madc, thcrc would havc bccn much morc damagc by cxploding ammunition. 11. Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations. Vc madc a quitc claboratc plan lor cvacuating thc lamilics ol civilians on thc military rcscrvation. Vc askcd thc Var cpartmcnt lor moncy to cstablish a camp somc 4 milcs cast ol Schocld. ! wrotc a pcrsonal lcttcr to thc Chicl ol Sta and told him that wc wcrc asking lor thc moncy to cstablish thcsc camps on thc basis ol rccrcation camps. . . . |8|ut our rcal pur posc was to gct rcady lor a possiblc attack. . . . Hc answcrcd my lcttcr and statcd that guns wcrc nccdcd worsc lor othcr purposcs. Tus Short plcadcd not guilty to numbcr 11 also. 161
As thc committcc wound up its qucstioning ol Short, 8arklcy askcd him il hc wishcd to makc any lurthcr statcmcnt. Short said, As a mattcr ol thc intcrcsts ol thc country and as a loyal soldicr, ! maintaincd a stcadlast silcncc lor 4 ycars and ! borc thc load ol public ccnsurc during this timc and ! would havc continucd to bcar it so long as ! thought thc qucstion ol national sccurity was involvcd. Howcvcr, thc war is now cndcd. 161 !bid, pp. 319495. 730 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Hc said hc was vcry apprcciativc ol thc opportunity |! havc bccn givcn| to makc a lull and lrank statcmcnt ol my point ol vicw. Short thankcd thc committcc mcmbcrs lor thcir attitudc and assurcd thcm that hc had tricd to givc thcm lully and lrankly all thc inlormation hc could on thc subjcct. 162
162 !bid., p. 3231. 731 29. Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack November 15, 1945May 31, 1946: Part 3 T hc Joint Congrcssional Committcc still had many potcn tial witncsscs on its list whosc tcstimony was cxpcctcd to provc important. Among thcsc wcrc Admiral R.. !ngcrsoll, Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations, as wcll as scvcral mcn who had bccn closcly conccrncd with MAG!CCaptain L.F. Saord, who had bccn in chargc ol thc sccurity scction ol Naval Communications, Captain A.. Kramcr, Navy translator and couricr, and Coloncl Rulus S. 8ratton, Army couricr. Tc JCC mcmbcrs did not nd it casy to lcarn how much was known in Vashington bclorc thc attack about thc immincncc ol war, whcn it was known, and how much inlormation was rclaycd to thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. 732 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tov V~snixc:ox vvici~is Coxvvv ~iiv ox !:vvxbixc Cvisis Vhcn tcstilying bclorc thc Hart and Navy Court !nquirics, Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations !ngcrsoll had admittcd having sccn thc Vinds xccutc bclorc cccmbcr 7, 1941. 1 Howcvcr, in his JCC tcstimony hc bclittlcd its importancc as a war warning: |T|hc wording in that winds mcssagc did not say that wc arc going to bc in a statc ol war or that hostilitics now cxist. !t rclcrrcd to a rupturc ol diplomatic ncgotiations or that thc sit uation bctwccn thc countrics was bccoming critical. . . . !l you rupturc diplomatic ncgotiations you do not ncccssarily havc to burn your codcs. Tc diplomats go homc and thcy can pack up thcir codcs . . . and takc thcm homc. !ngcrsoll considcrcd thc dcstruction ol thc codc dispatchcs much morc important. |T|hcy not only told thcir diplomats in Vashington and London to burn thcir codcs but thcy told thcir consuls in Manila, in Hong Kong, Singaporc, and 8atavia to burn thcir codcs. And that did not mcan a rupturc ol diplomatic ncgotia tions, it mcant war, and that inlormation was scnt out to thc ccts as soon as wc got it. 2
|V|hcn wc rcccivcd thc original mcssagc which sct up thc winds codc that bccamc important thcn bccausc that would bc thc rst indication that wc would gct ol whcn thc Japancsc thought thcy would rupturc ncgotiations or bc at war il a broadcr intcrprctation wcrc placcd on it. . . . |8|ut oncc wc had 1 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 9, pp. 422324, portions ol Hart and NC! tcstimony rcproduccd. 2 !bid., p. 4226. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 733 lcarncd that thcy wcrc dcstroying thcir codcs thcn thc winds mcssagc lost its importancc. . . . |T|hc lact that thc consulatcs wcrc includcd cinchcd it in my opinion that it was war and not a rupturc ol diplomatic ncgotiations or diplomatic rclations. 3
!ngcrsoll did not rccall having sccn any ol thc scvcral ships inharbor intcrccpts, not cvcn thc onc that dividcd Pcarl Harbor into vc arcas to rcport cach shilting and visit ol ships lrom onc arca to anothcr. !l hc had, hc would havc wantcd to know why thcy wcrc intcrcstcd in thc actual location ol a ship within a har bor as distinguishcd lrom whcthcr or not thc ship just happcncd to bc in port. !l hc had sccn that dispatch, his suspicion would havc bccn arouscd. Hc thought Admiral Kimmcl should havc bccn inlormcd. 4
!ngcrsoll had known ol thc Novcmbcr 29 dcadlinc sct by thc Japancsc, altcr which things wcrc automatically going to hap pcn. !t was wcll known that Japancsc troops could rcach scvcral potcntial targcts in southcast Asia in a vcry short timc: China, !ndochina, Formosa. Tc situation was rcvicwcd almost daily, hc said, at conlcrcnccs in thc o cc ol Navy Sccrctary Knox. Yct day altcr day wcnt by altcr thc Novcmbcr 29 dcadlinc without a Japancsc strikc. Ingersoll: Tcrc was a conlcrcncc in Mr. Knox o cc cvcry morning in which thc ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc prcscntcd thc wholc situation . . . and thc possibilitics wcrc discusscd . . . by thc ircctor ol Var Plans, Admiral Turncr. . . . Tc situation was rcvicwcd cvcry morning. Gearhart: Vcrc thcrc in thosc mcctings altcr thc 29th dis cussions ol why that had occurrcd, altcr wc had rcad thc Jap intcrccpt that altcr thc 29th things wcrc going to happcn 3 !bid., pp. 423233. 4 !bid., pp. 423637. 734 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy automatically: . . . id anybody in thosc mcctings raisc thc qucstion that possibly thc Japancsc wcrc sailing to a distant point ol attack: Ingersoll: No: nonc that ! rccall. . . . Tc qucstion ol an attack on Pcarl Harbor, ol coursc, was always considcrcd as a possi bility. . . . |T|hc placcs in thc Far ast wcrc thc only placcs ol which wc had dcnitc inlormation towards which thc Japancsc wcrc moving. 5 . . . ! did not think that thc Japancsc would risk an air attack on Pcarl Harbor. . . . ||ur cstimatc was that thc Japancsc would not do that, that thcy wcrc lully occupicd with what thcy wcrc doing at that timc, and that thc risks wcrc too grcat. 6
!n vicw ol our knowlcdgc ol Japancsc military movcmcnts and our closc political tics with thc 8ritish and utch, Rcprcscntativc Gcarhart and Scnator Fcrguson tricd to dctcrminc what thc Unitcd Statcs would havc donc had thc Japancsc struck 8ritish and/or utch positions and not U.S. tcrritory. Ferguson: id you know what our policy was prior to Pcarl Harbor . . . il thcrc was an attack on thc Malay Pcninsula, what thc position would bc ol thc Unitcd Statcs ol Amcrica, as lar as thc Navy or thc Army wcrc conccrncd: Ingersoll: As lar as thc Navy and Army wcrc conccrncd, what wc would do was containcd in our war plans. . . . ! do not think thcrc was anybody in thc Navy cpartmcnt who kncw what would happcn il Japan wcnt into thc Malay Pcninsula, or into Siam, or Tailand. . . . Tc position ol thc Navy would havc bccn thc position takcn by thc Unitcd Statcs Govcrnmcnt, and what thc prcsidcnt would havc rccommcndcd to thc Congrcss 5 !bid., pp. 423536. 6 !bid., pp. 4237, 4239. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 735 about dcclaring war. Tc Navys position would havc bccn cxactly thc position ol thc Unitcd Statcs. 7
!ngcrsoll did not bclicvc thc Unitcd Statcs would go to war in thc Pacic without any rccommcndation to thc Congrcss, as thcy had in thc Atlantic. Tat was not a lcgal war. . . . |T|hc Gcrmans wcrc still hcrc in Vashington and thcy had not dcclarcd war on us lor all that wc had bccn doing to thcm in thc Atlantic. 8 Tc ncxt day !ngcrsoll hallapologizcd lor this rcmark. Hc had almost humorously callcd thc war in thc Atlantic as illcgal. !t was morc in thc naturc ol irrcgular. . . . !n thc Atlantic wc wcrc doing somc things which only a bclligcrcnt docs. Tcrc had bccn no dcclaration ol war. Vc had donc a grcat many things that undcr intcrnational law, as it was undcrstood bclorc thc last war, wcrc unncutral. . . . !t was apparcntly to hcr |Gcrmanys| advantagc to havc us as a nonbclligcrcnt rathcr than as a lull bclligcrcnt. 9
Pvvsibvx: vbvvs vvvxsivv !xvov:~:iox P~:voi ix Sou:n Cnix~ Sv~ Tc U.S. govcrnmcnt was rccciving inlormation on Japancsc ship movcmcnts in thc southwcst Pacic and China Sca lrom our daily ovcrights as wcll as lrom rcports lrom thc 8ritish. Yct at about 7 v.:. on cccmbcr 1, thc prcsidcnt dircct|cd| Admiral Tomas Hart, commandcrinchicl ol thc Asiatic Flcct in Manila, to chartcr 3 small vcsscls to lorm a dclcnsivc inlor mation patrol. 10 Tc thrcc small ships wcrc to bc manncd by a U.S. naval o ccr and cquippcd with onc small gun and a machinc 7 !bid., p. 4246. 8 !bid., pp. 424647. 9 !bid., p. 4249. 10 !bid., part 14, p. 1407, PNA\ ispatch #012356. 736 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy gun, thc |m|inimum rcquircmcnts to cstablish idcntity as U.S. mcnolwar. Tcy wcrc to bc stationcd in thc paths ol known Japancsc ship movcmcnts: (1) bctwccn Hainan !sland (China) and Huc on thc cast coast ol !ndochina, now \ictnam, (2) cast ol thc !ndochina coast bctwccn Camranh 8ay and Capc St. Jacqucs, and (3) o Pointc dc Camau on thc southcrn tip ol !ndochina. All thrcc vcsscls wcrc to obscrvc and rcport by radio Japancsc movcmcnts in wcst China Sca and Gull ol Siam. Fcrguson wantcd to know why Stark had ordcrcd thrcc small vcsscls to watch lor Japancsc movcmcnts on 8ritish posscssions. !ngcrsoll rcplicd simply thc dispatch had said, prcsidcnt dirccts. . . . Tat was our rcason lor doing it. Admiral Stark was told by thc prcsidcnt to do it. . . . Admiral Hart was alrcady conducting rcconnaissancc o that coast by plancs lrom Manila. . . . ! am surc Admiral Stark would not havc donc this unlcss hc had bccn told. . . . Vc did not initiatc this movc mcnt, sir, and wc wcrc gctting . . . su cicnt inlormation lrom Admiral Hart by thc scarchcs which his plancs wcrc making. 11
11 !bid., part 9, pp. 425253. l thcsc thrcc small vcsscls, only onc got to sca bclorc thc Japancsc attack. Tc Isabel lclt Manila on cccmbcr 3, with ordcrs to procccd to Camranh 8ay on thc !ndochina coast, ostcnsibly to scarch lor a lost Navy P8Y planc. n thc 5th, about 22 milcs lrom thc !ndochina coast, shc was sightcd by a Japancsc Navy planc, and ordcrcd to rcturn to Manila, whcrc shc arrivcd on cccmbcr 8 (Kcnt Tollcy, Cruise of the Lanikai |Annap olis, Md.: Naval !nstitutc, 1973|, pp. 26970). Tc sccond ship, thc Lanikai, skippcrcd by thcn Licutcnant Kcnt Tollcy, was prcparing to lcavc Manila whcn thc attack camc. Shc patrollcd thc coast ol thc Philippincs lor a couplc ol wccks, nally dcparting Manila on cccmbcr 26, and altcr somc advcnturcs rcachcd Australia (ibid., p.120). Tc third small ship sclcctcd, thc Molly Moore, was ncvcr commissioncd, whcn thc attack camc, hcr mission bccamc supcr uous (ibid., p. 272). Authors notc: Apparcntly Hart lookcd on thc mission ol thcsc thrcc small vcsscls as mission impossiblc. Vhcn ordcring thc Lanikai to thc coast ol !ndochina (ibid., p. 19), Hart said hc had lclt hc was scnding its skippcr on what lookcd likc a onc way mission. Tollcy thought FR may havc bccn ocring thcsc small ships and thc mcn aboard to bait an incidcnt, a casus bclli (ibid., p. 279). Hart wantcd to know why thc prcsidcnt had scnt Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 737 Had thc prcsidcnt pcrsonally givcn him, Stark, thc ordcr to scnd thc dispatch conccrning thcsc vcsscls: Stark said hc had discusscd with thc prcsidcnt whcrc this | Japancsc| cxpcdition going south was likcly to hit. His |thc prcsidcnts| thought was thc Kra Pcninsula. . . . Tc Philippincs was a possibility and . . . thc ast !ndics, and just whcrc it would go wc did not know and thcsc thrcc small vcsscls wcrc to assist in that dctcrmination. . . . |Y|ou will scc whcrc thc prcsidcnt put thcm thcy wcrc wcll placcd to gct inlorma tion cithcr positivc or ncgativc and it was lor that rcason and lor thc rcasons as statcd in thc dispatch, to gct inlormation, that hc dircctcd that bc donc. . . . Hc says to lorm a dclcnsivc inlormation patrol, to accomplish a purposc which is to obscrvc and rcport by radio Japancsc movcmcnts in thc Vcst China Sca and Gull ol Siam, and thcn hc himscll dcsignatcd whcrc thosc vcsscls wcrc to bc placcd and thcy wcrc wcll placcd lor thc purposcs lor which hc wantcd thcm. . . . ! simply think that hc thought that was additional prccautions. Hc was intcnscly intcrcstcd in cvcry movc at that timc, as wc all wcrc. 12
l coursc, onc cannot know what FR had in mind in issu ing this dircctivc, it may havc bccn out ol conccrn lor his com mitmcnts to thc 8ritish and utch, hc may havc bccn trying to do what Stimson had suggcstcd at FRs Var Cabinct mcct ing, Novcmbcr 25, to mancuvcr thcm |thc Japancsc| into thc position ol ring thc rst shot without allowing too much dangcr to oursclvcs. 13 Fcw would bc killcd or woundcd by a shot rcd on such a minimallycquippcd U.S. manolwar. Yct it might bc incidcnt cnough to call lor U.S. military intcrvcntion against thc Japancsc. thc mcssagc ordcring thcsc vcsscls to sca, hc lclt thc ordcr might havc bccn a rccction on his ovcright rcports. (PLG 1962 intcrvicw ol Hart.) 12 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, pp. 219091. 13 !bid., part 11, p. 5433, Stimsons diary cntry ol Novcmbcr 25, 1941. 738 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy M~ix:~ixixc :nv Svcvvcv ov :nv J~v~xvsv !x:vvcvv:s ~xb MAG!C !t was apparcnt throughout thc scvcral invcstigations that spc cial cort had bccn madc to kccp inlormation about thc Purplc machincs and thc MAG!C intcrccpts sccrct. Quitc undcrstand ably, cxtrcmc caution was ncccssary bclorc thc war to prcvcnt any sccurity lcak. And during thc war, whcn thc intcrccpts wcrc still yiclding intclligcncc valuablc in thc strugglc against thc Japancsc, it was ncccssary to continuc to maintain tight sccurity. Howcvcr, thc dctcrmination to maintain silcncc pcrsistcdcvcn altcr August 1945, whcn Japan surrcndcrcd, and cvcn altcr Prcsidcnt Truman, who had takcn o cc on thc dcath ol FR, had rcvcalcd thc cxistcncc ol MAG!C by rclcasing to thc public thc SCRT 1944 rcports ol thc Navy Court ol !nquiry and thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard. 14 Vhcn nally, in cccmbcr 1945, thc rcstric tions against rcvcaling MAG!C wcrc lurthcr rclaxcd to pcrmit witncsscs bclorc thc JCC to tcstily and givc inlormation rcgard ing cryptanalytic activitics which had to do with thc invcstiga tion ol thc Pcarl Harbor incidcnt, 15 many witncsscs rcviscd thcir storics. Saord, 8ratton, and Kramcr had bccn intimatcly involvcd in handling thc Japancsc intcrccpts and cach had bccn qucstioncd at lcngth during prcvious invcstigations whilc thc war contin ucd. ach had thcn laccd thc samc dilcmmahow to rcspond to prcssurcs placcd on thcm by wartimc patriotism and loyalty to thcir supcrior o ccrs, and how to tcstily undcr oath to thc truth as thcy saw it without rcvcaling military sccrcts. Tcn whcn qucs tioncd during thc JCC hcarings altcr thc war and altcr rcstric tions had bccn rclaxcd, thcy had to dccidc whcthcr to modily or to 14 !bid., part 8, pp. 373640. 15 !bid., Rcport, p. 498. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 739 dclcnd thcir prcvious tcstimony. As wc shall scc, cach rcspondcd dicrcntly. C~v:~ix L.F. S~vvovb, N~v~i Co::uxic~:ioxs Svcuvi:v, iscovvvs Ki::vi H~b No: 8vvx Svx: MAG!C !n 1941 Saord had bccn in chargc ol thc sccurity scction ol Naval Communications. Hc tcsticd that altcr thc attack, hc, likc millions ol othcr Amcricans, blamcd Kimmcl lor thc tcr riblc losscs at Pcarl Harbor. Hc assumcd Kimmcl had bccn scnt inlormation dcrivcd lrom MAG!C. Saord was bittcr, hc could not undcrstand why Kimmcl had not bccn rcady lor thc attack. Saord said hc thought that il Kimmcl had rcccivcd thc Vinds xccutc, which Saord had sccn on cccmbcr 4, Kimmcl surcly would havc rccognizcd its signicancc and would havc bccn complctcly rcady lor thc attack on Pcarl Harbor, in lact with his cct at sca, and Pcarl Harbor just an cmpty ncst. 16 Altcr Saord rcad thc Robcrts Commission rcport, hc cxpcctcd to bc callcd as a witncss lor thc prosccution against Kimmcl. So hc bcgan to rcvicw thc prcattack rccord. 17 To his dismay, Saord discovcrcd that important inlormation dcrivcd lrom thc MAG!C intcrccpts dccodcd bclorc thc attack, had not gonc to Kimmcl. 8y midJanuary 1944, Saord rcalizcd that thc Navy cpartmcnt had not scnt out thc war warning prcparcd by Captain McCollum, which Saord had rcad in Admiral Noycss o cc on thc altcrnoon ol cccmbcr 4, 1941. His scnsc ol jus ticc was arouscd, Kimmcl had bccn unlairly accuscd. Saord thcn shiltcd lrom siding with thc prosccution to siding with thc 16 !bid., part 8, p. 3859. 17 !bid., pp. 3715, 3877. 740 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy dclcnsc. 18 At that point, Saord sct thc whccls in motion that lcd in timc to rcvcaling Purplc and MAG!C inlormation. 19
n Fcbruary 21, 1944, Saord callcd on rctircd Kimmcl in Ncw York. 20 From notcs and mcmory, Saord rclatcd to Kimmcl inlormation that had bccn availablc bclorc thc attack in Vashington, inlormation which would havc bccn invalu ablc to thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. Saords rcvclations wcrc Kimmcls rst intimation that, in spitc ol his rcqucsts to bc kcpt lully inlormcd, Vashington had not scnt him prcattack U.S.Japancsc inlormation rclcvant to his situation as U.S. Flcct commandcrinchicl. Vhcn Saord rcturncd to Vashington and attcmptcd to documcnt his asscrtions to Kimmcl, howcvcr, hc lound to his amazcmcnt that prcattack MAG!C intcrccpts, which wcrc supposcd to havc bccn pcrmancntly rctaincd in lockcd Navy lcs, wcrc missing. Vhcn Saord camc bclorc thc JCC (Fcbruary 15, 1946), hc had alrcady appcarcd, whilc thc war was still going on, bclorc thc Hart inquiry, thc APH8, thc NC!, and thc Hcwitt inqui ry. 21 8oth thc APH8 and NC! had bccn authorizcd by Congrcss to conduct thorough invcstigations and to handlc supcrsccrct matcrials. Saord had told thcm thc truth about MAG!C and Purplc as bcst hc could, and hc continucd to stick to his story whcn appcaring at thc JCC. Saord dcscribcd to thc Congrcssional Committcc in consid crablc dctail thc proccdurc which had bccn lollowcd to prcvcnt knowlcdgc ol MAG!C and cspccially thc Vinds Codc xccutc lrom bccoming known. Tc pcrsonal or immcdiatc custodian was Licutcnant Commandcr Harrison, U.S. Naval Rcscrvc. Saord cxplaincd that thc only pcoplc who had acccss to thcn 18 !bid., p. 3715. 19 !bid., pp. 385759. 20 !bid., p. 3751. 21 !bid., part 8, pp. 3555813, 384293. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 741 Commandcr, now Captain, Kramcrs salc wcrc thosc on duty undcr Captain Kramcr. vcrything was normally clcarcd through Commandcr Harrison. Tcrc wcrc not morc than tcn pcoplc at thc most translators and thc ycomcn on duty in Kramcrs scc tion, thc hcad ol thc scction, Saord, or thc o ccr who rclicvcd Saord, or thc ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc might possibly havc callcd lor lcs at any timc. Any highcr authority would havc bccn givcn thc lcs without qucstion il hc had rcqucstcd thcm. 22 A copy ol thc winds cxccutc mcssagc should havc bccn in thc lcs ol Saords division, in thc lockcd salc ol Captain Kramcr. Saord: To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc thc combination to thc salc was hcld by Kramcr and Harrison alonc. Tcrc was a copy ol thc combination in a scalcd cnvclopc in my salc. Tcrc was anothcr copy ol thc combination in a scalcd cnvclopc in thc salc ol thc Aidc to thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations. Tat was rcquircd lor all salcs in naval opcrations, so in casc ol casualty to thc man who rcgularly opcncd thc salc thc salc could bc opcncd whcn wc had to. . . . ! know ol no occasion whcn wc cvcr had to opcn thosc scalcd cnvclopcs, and cntcr thc salc. ! might add, whcncvcr an o ccr was rclicvcd, wc changcd thc combination on his salc and substitutcd thc ncw cards, and that was thc only timc wc cvcr had to gct into thosc cnvclopcs. 23
Finally in 1944, Saord succccdcd in locating a singlc sct ol most ol thc missing intcrccpts, had copics madc, and placcd in thc lcs whcrc thcy bclongcd. 24 Howcvcr, onc mcssagc, Japans Vinds xccutc which Saord considcrcd cspccially crucial, was not lound. 22 !bid., part 8, pp. 367576. 23 !bid. 24 Saords convcrsations with thc author. Scc also chaptcr 21, pp. 43233. 742 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy S~vvovb Ci~i:vb Vixbs xvcu:v V~s Rvcvivvb nvvovv vcv:nvv . !v So, V~s Tn~: Sicxivic~x:- Vashington o cials wcrc wcll awarc ol thc impcnding cri sis, Saord said. n cccmbcr 3 thc U.S. military attach in thc Amcrican cmbassy in Tokyo had bccn ordcrcd to dcstroy his ciphcrs and codcs. 25 n cccmbcr 4, Grccnwich timc (cccmbcr 3, Vashington timc), thc U.S. naval attach in Tokyo was ordcrcd to do thc samc. 26 Also on cccmbcr 4 thc U.S. consular agcnts in thc Far ast had bccn told to dcstroy thcir codcs. 27
Vhcn Saord kncw hc would bc callcd to tcstily bclorc thc Congrcssional Committcc, hc prcparcd a writtcn statcmcnt. !t was primarily about thc Vinds Codc sctup. n Novcmbcr 26 and 28 Vashington had lcarncd lrom Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354 that Japan planncd to broadcast in thc coursc ol a routinc ncws program a lalsc wcathcr mcssagc with a hiddcn mcan ing. 28 !l thc Japancsc cmbassics and consulatcs worldwidc had to dcstroy thcir codcs and codc machincs and could no longcr dcciphcr cncodcd mcssagcs, this socallcd Vinds Codc sctup would cnablc Tokyo to communicatc sccrctly with hcr ovcrscas o cials and to advisc thcm whcn cvcnts lcading to war would automatically bcgin to happcn. 29
Saords prcparcd statcmcnt startcd: Tcrc was a Vinds Mcssagc. !t mcant Varand wc kncw it mcant Var. 30 8y wc 25 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1409, Sccrct radiogram No.40, cccmbcr 3, 1941. Scc also part 2, p. 841, Milcs tcstimony. 26 !bid., part 8, p. 3782, part 14, p. 1408, Mcssagc #040330. 27 !bid., part 8, p. 3770, part 14, p. 1408, Mcssagc #040343 to C MARTs, Pciping and Ticntsin. 28 !bid., part 12, xhibit 1, p. 154, Japancsc Circular #2353, translatcd Novcmbcr 28, 1941, and p. 155, Japancsc Circular #2354, translatcd Novcmbcr 26, 1941. 29 !bid., part 8, p. 3580. 30 !bid., p. 3579. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 743 Saord mcant thosc who had bccn working on MAG!C and with whom hc had bccn in closc contact, such as Kramcr, McCollum, Vilkinson, and Noycs. 31 Saord considcrcd that mcssagc clcar cvidcncc ol thc immincncc ol war. Tus hc was puzzlcd whcn Vashington o cials did not scnd out any truly urgcnt warnings. 32 !n Saords words, thc Vinds xccutc was thc unhccdcd warning ol war. 33 As soon as thcsc Japancsc Vinds Codc sctup mcssagcs wcrc intcrccptcd, Admiral Vilkinson, dircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc, dircctcd Saord through Admiral Noycs, dircctor ol Naval Communications, to alcrt all intcrccpt stations capablc ol monitoring Japancsc ncws broadcasts to listcn lor such a lalsc wcathcr announccmcnt. Saord dcscribcd lor thc committcc thc prcparations hc had madc lor intcrccpting this mcssagc. 34
Saord not only considcrcd thc Vinds Codc sctup cxtrcmcly important, 35 8ut hc bclicvcd that thc cagcrncss ol scnior U.S. o ccrs to havc Japancsc ncws programs lollowcd closcly on thc chancc ol intcrccpting such a lalsc wcathcr broadcast was cvi dcncc that thcy sharcd his vicw that it conccrncd somcthing much morc important than mcrcly a brcak in diplomatic ncgo tiations, that rcccipt ol a Vinds xccutc would cvcn portcnd thc actual outbrcak ol war. U.S. govcrnmcnt o cials rcalizcd that il thc Japancsc implcmcntcd thcir Vinds Codc and actually scnt such a lalsc wcathcr mcssagc, it would havc had still lurthcr signicancc as a dcnitc portcncc ol conict. Saord considcrcd thc implcmcntation ol thc Vinds Codc thc most important mcssagc wc had up to thc timc ol thc pilot mcssagc on cccmbcr 31 !bid., p. 3704. 32 !bid., p. 3655. 33 !bid. 34 !bid., p. 3584. 35 !bid., pp. 3678, 3683, 379697. 744 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 6, announcing that thc Japancsc rcply to our notc ol Novcmbcr 26 was on its way. 36
Tc signicancc ol thc Vinds xccutc, il rcccivcd, was rcinlorccd by intclligcncc availablc lrom othcr sourccs: (1) thc Japancsc cablc dcsignating Novcmbcr 29 thc dcadlinc lor tcr minating U.S.Japancsc ncgotiations, altcr which things arc automatically going to happcn, 37 (2) thc instructions to ovcrscas Japancsc nationals to dcstroy thcir codcs. 38 Tc Vinds xccutc gaincd lurthcr signicancc bccausc ol its indication that Japan wantcd to rcach its nationals all ovcr thc world altcr thcir codcs wcrc dcstroycd, 39 bccausc ol thc positivc cvidcncc it would givc that Japan dcnitcly intcndcd to actsoon, 40 and that war was about to start against thc country or countrics indicatcdng land: Russia: Unitcd Statcs: According to Saord, any coun try, or countrics, namcd in a Vinds xccutc would actually bc involvcd in thc war lrom thc vcry bcginning, and not just as a spcctator. 41 Tus thc intcrccption ol a Vinds xccutc would providc us with an announccmcnt ol thc intcntions and dccision ol thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt. 42 !n Saords words, it would bc a short rangc lorccast ol war. 43
Saord tcsticd that a Vinds xccutc was actually intcr ccptcd in Morsc codc, 44 and that Navy couricr Kramcr had 36 !bid., p. 3640. 37 !bid., p. 3770, part 12, p. 165, Tokyo Mcssagc #812. 38 !bid., part 8, p. 3770, part 12, various Tokyo Mcssagcs, pp. 209, 215, 216, 231. 39 !bid., part 8, p. 3770. 40 !bid., pp. 3711, 3770. 41 !bid., p. 3663. 42 !bid., p. 3664. 43 !bid., p. 3663. 44 !bid., p. 3579, Saord statcmcnt, and pp. 3642, 3708, 3769, 3843, 3848, Saord tcstimony. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 745 dclivcrcd it to him in his o cc on thc morning ol cccmbcr 4, 1941, typcd on ycllow tclctypc papcr. 45 !t had indicatcd war with ngland and with thc Unitcd Statcs. Kramcr had undcrscorcd thc thrcc codc words in thc mcssagc and had writtcn bclow in pcncil or colorcd crayon a rough translation: Var with ngland (including N!, ctc.) Var with thc U.S. Pcacc with Russia. Tis is it! Kramcr said as hc handcd thc papcr to Saord. Tis mcant that Japan would soon bc at war, not only with Grcat 8ritain but also with thc Unitcd Statcs. Tis was thc broadcast wc had straincd cvcry ncrvc to intcrccpt, Saord said. Tis was thc lcathcr in our cap. Tis was thc tipo which would prcvcnt thc U.S. Pacic Flcct bcing surpriscd at Pcarl Harbor thc way thc Russians had bccn surpriscd at Port Arthur. Tis was what thc Navy Communication !ntclligcncc had bccn prc paring lor sincc its cstablishmcnt in 1924War with Japan! 46
Saord had immcdiatcly scnt thc Vinds xccutc by spccial mcsscngcr to Noycs, Naval Communications. !l thc mcsscngcr could not nd Noycs in a rcasonablc timc, hc was to lct Saord know. !n a lcw minutcs, Saord rcccivcd word that thc mcssagc had bccn dclivcrcd. 47
Rcprcscntativc Clark wantcd to know il Saord had immc diatcly put it in thc proccss ol handling and distribution and dis posal just as in thc casc ol all othcr magic: Saord said hc had. Hc had chcckcd Kramcrs loldcr ol intcrccpts bclorc Kramcr had sct out to makc his daily routinc dclivcrics ol MAG!C intcrccpts 45 !bid., part 8, pp. 3580, 3586. 46 !bid., p. 3586. 47 !bid. 746 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy about noon that day, cccmbcr 4, thc Vinds xccutc had bccn includcd. 48 So prcsumably it was dclivcrcd that day to thc usual rccipicnts. Not only that, Saord said, but in addition, it was tclcphoncd around to various pcoplc by Admiral Noycs and so lar as ! know that was thc rst timc that had cvcr bccn donc. 49
About an hour latcr, Noycs callcd Saord on thc intcrphonc. Hc did not mcntion thc Vinds xccutc spccically, but told Saord that wc had bcttcr tcll Guam to dcstroy all thcir cxccss codcs and ciphcrs. 50 Saord thcn wcnt to Noycss o ccthat was at about 3:00 v.:.and thcrc Noycs showcd him a scvcral pagc mcssagc prcparcd in McCollums Far astcrn Scction ol Naval !ntclligcncc. 51 Tc nal paragraph ol McCollums long mcssagc, Saord tcsticd, closcly lollowcd thc Vinds xccutc giving cvcry indication . . . that Captain McCollum had rcad thc winds mcssagc, had apprcciatcd its importancc, and was trying to gct an urgcnt war warning out to thc Pacic Flcct. 52
Saord rccallcd that according to McCollums mcssagc: Japan was about to dcclarc war on thc Unitcd Statcs, about to dcclarc war on ngland, including thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, and so lorth, and would maintain pcacc with Russia. Tc last scntcncc addcd thc lorccast or cvaluation war is immincnt. 53
Altcr thc discussion ol McCollums mcssagc, Saord saw Vilkinson lcavc Noycss o cc with it in his hand, saying, ! am going to scnd this mcssagc il ! can gct thc lront o cc to rclcasc 48 !bid., p. 3690. 49 !bid., pp. 3587, 3683. 50 !bid., pp. 3587, 3690. 51 !bid., pp. 3667, 3761, 3811, 3812. 52 !bid., p. 3667. 53 !bid., pp. 3796, 381112. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 747 it. 54 Saord lcarncd much latcr that thc McCollum mcssagc had not bccn scnt. 55
S~vvovb Rvsvoxbs :o Vixbs xvcu:v ~s Cnivv, N~v~i Co::uxic~:ioxs Svcuvi:v 8cing in chargc ol thc sccurity scction ol Naval Communications, Saords jurisdiction and rcsponsibilitics wcrc limitcd to maintaining thc sccurity ol communications, hc was not pcrmittcd to scnd cvaluations or ordcrs to mcn in thc cld. 56
Any mcssagcs hc scnt had to dcal spccically with maintaining documcnt sccurity. !n lulllmcnt ol this obligation and as a rcsult ol thc rcccipt ol thc Vinds xccutc, hc lcd lour mcssagcs lor transmittal bctwccn 3:00 and 3:20 v.:. on thc altcrnoon ol cccmbcr 4. Hc instructcd thc naval attachs at Tokyo, Pciping, 8angkok, and Shanghai to dcstroy all sccrct and condcntial lcs cxccpt thosc csscntial lor currcnt purposcs. 57 Similar instructions wcrc scnt to thc commandcrinchicl Asiatic Flcct in Manila. 58
Saord also scnt a PR!R!TY mcssagc to Guam and Samoa at 8 v.:. ordcring a changc in codcs lrom thcir thcncurrcnt codc R!P 65 to a ncw codc, R!P 66. 59 Tis ordcr was promptly rcccivcd in Guam. Scvcntccn minutcs latcr, a SCRT mcssagc was rclcascd by !ngcrsoll to Guam, FRR prcccdcncc to allow timc lor thc ncw codc, R!P 66, to bc implcmcntcd, asking Guam to 54 !bid., p. 3812. 55 !bid., pp. 3701, 3715, 3812, 3878. Scc also pp. 376162, Saords January 22, 1944, lcttcr to Kramcr. 56 !bid., p. 3781. 57 !bid., pp. 3810, 3844, part 29, p. 2397, pNav. No. 042019, with an inlor mation copy to thc commandcrinchicl Asiatic Flcct (Hart) but not to thc CinC ol thc Pacic Flcct (Kimmcl). 58 !bid., part 29, p. 2397, #042018. No inlormation copy was scnt to Kimmcl. 59 !bid., p. 2397, #042000. 748 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy dcstroy all sccrct and condcntial publications. . . . rctaining minimum cryptographic channcls ncccssary lor csscntial com munications. . . . 8c prcparcd to dcstroy instantly in cvcnt ol cmcrgcncy all classicd mattcr you rctain. 60
Tcn in thc attcmpt to warn Vakc, Saord prcparcd a strong mcssagc that rcad in part: !n vicw ol immincncc ol war dcstroy all rcgistcrcd publications on Vakc !sland cxccpt this systcm and currcnt cditions ol aircralt codc and dircction ndcr codc. 61 !ngcrsoll rcluscd to scnd this strongly wordcd mcssagc as draltcd by Saord. Hc rclcascd instcad an ambiguous mcs sagc with Vakcs namc dclctcd lrom thc tcxt. 62 Morcovcr, it was hcld up until cccmbcr 6, whcn it was scnt dclcrrcd prcccdcncc which mcant dclivcry |in Pcarl Harbor lor rclay to Vakc| by 9:00 on Monday morning, cccmbcr 8, 1941. Saord didnt know whcn it got to Pcarl Harbor but, hc said, no action was takcn on it until long altcr thc attack on Pcarl Harbor, and thcn, bccausc wc had scnt an ambiguous mcs sagc, thc cct communication o ccr scnt anothcr ambiguous mcssagc. Tc nct rcsult was that whcn Vakc was capturcd, ! bclicvc thc 24th ol cccmbcr, somc ol thc cryptographic aids lcll into Japancsc hands, and it was rcportcd at thc timc by Commandant 14th Naval istrict, and latcr on somc ol thc alphabct strips wcrc capturcd at Kiska in somc ol thc aban doncd Japancsc dugouts. 63
Givcn thc limitations ol thcir rcsponsibilitics and thc Navys rcstrictions on thcir dutics, Saord and McCollum did all thcy 60 !bid., part 8, p. 3845, part 14, p. 1408, #042017, part 29, p. 2398, #042017. Saord tcstimony at APH8, part 33, pp. 117879. #042017, NC! xhibit 21. !nlormation copy to commandcrinchicl, Pacic Flcct. 61 !bid., part 29, p. 2399. 62 !bid., part 14, p. 1408, part 29, p. 2399. 63 !bid., part 29, p. 2399. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 749 could to notily thc cld commandcrs. 64 8ut thcir intcndcd warn ings wcrc watcrcd down, thcir urgcncy rcduccd by bcing scnt dclcrrcd priority, or withhcld. Tc Vinds xccutc sccmcd to bc virtually ignorcd. Saord could not undcrstand why anyonc would want to lail to makc usc ol a wind cxccutc mcssagc that mcant war. 65
Rvcviv: ov Vixbs xvcu:v Cox:vs:vb nv :nvv Vi:xvssvs Most ol thc qucstions addrcsscd to Saord by mcmbcrs ol thc JCC conccrncd thc Vinds Codc and its implcmcntation. Had wc, or hadnt wc, intcrccptcd a Vinds xccutc bclorc thc attack on Pcarl Harbor, as Saord maintaincd: ncc thc Navy intcr ccptcd and translatcd Japans Vinds Codc sctup on Novcmbcr 28, its codc clcrks had bccn alcrtcd to listcn to Japancsc ncws broadcasts. Saord insistcd thcir corts succccdcd and that thc broadcast in which thc crucial lalsc wcathcr mcssagc was cmbcd dcd was intcrccptcd on cccmbcr 4. Yct lcw pcoplc prolcsscd to bclicvc him. Tcy prclcrrcd to bclicvc that thc Japancsc gov crnmcnt rcally hadnt implcmcntcd thc sctup bclorc thc attack at all and that thcrclorc wc couldnt havc intcrccptcd a Vinds xccutc. Tc situation was complicatcd by thc lact that Saord could nd no copy ol it in thc Navy cpartmcnts lcs. |T|hosc lcs could not bc locatcd, hc said. All documcntary cvidcncc conccrning thc rcccipt ol a Vinds xccutc, togcthcr with all inlormation rclating to thc instructions to watch lor it, which had bccn scnt to Chcltcnham, Maryland, thc station Saord claimcd had intcrccptcd it, 66 had vanishcd. 64 !bid., p. 3668. 65 !bid., p. 3655. 66 !bid., pp. 375658. Rcgulations rcquircd thc rccciving stations, including Chcltcnham, to rctain onc copy ol cvcry intcrccpt only until noticd that thc othcr two copics lorwardcd to thc Navy cpartmcnt had bccn rcccivcd. Tcn 750 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Until thc August 1945 rclcasc to thc prcss ol thc SCRT Army and Navy Pcarl Harbor rcports, thc public had hcard littlc or nothing about Vinds Codc. Saord gavc Hart a list ol 15 rcliablc witncsscs hc bclicvcd had sccn thc Vinds xccutc. 67 !n a May 14, 1945, mcmorandum to Licutcnant Commandcr John F. Sonnctt, assistant attorncy gcncral in thc Navy who had scrvcd as counscl to thc Hcwitt invcstigation, Saord listcd 26 o ccrs who hc bclicvcd had known ol its intcrccption on cccmbcr 4, 1941. 68 8ut whcn qucstioncd, thcy dcnicd it. Most ol thc pco plc who had bccn in a position bclorc thc attack to know ol thc Vinds xccutc, il it had cxistcd, sworc thcy had ncvcr sccn it. 69 !n spitc ol thcir tcstimony, Saord bclicvcd that McCollum, Vilkinson, Hcwitt, and Noycs, among othcrs, kncw it had bccn intcrccptcd. 8y thc timc Saord appcarcd bclorc thc committcc, hc could not namc a singlc pcrson whom hc could condcntly cxpcct to corroboratc thc prcattack rcccipt ol thc mcssagc, hc would rathcr not attcmpt to cstimatc what any othcr witncss is going to say on thc stand. 70 Fcrguson thcn citcd thrcc or lour pcrsons involvcd in thc Pcarl Harbor invcstigations othcr than Saord who admittcd to having sccn a Vinds xccutc prior to thc attack. Hc quotcd spccically lrom thc tcstimony ol Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations Admiral !ngcrsoll bclorc thc Hart !nquiry and thc Naval Court ol !nquiry 71 Saord said this was thc rccciving stations wcrc lrcc to dcstroy thcir copics il thcy wishcd. r thcy could rctain thcm tcmporarily lor rclcrcncc. 67 !bid., p. 3727. 68 !bid., p. 3611, part 18, p. 3347, xhibit 151. 69 !bid., part 8, pp. 375960. 70 !bid., p. 3727. 71 !bid., pp. 378890, !ngcrsoll tcstimony bclorc thc Hart !nquiry. Conccrning othcrs who admittcd having sccn a Vinds cxccutc prior to thc attack, Fcrguson citcd an a davit by a Coloncl Moscs V. Pcttigrcw rclcrring to an implcmcn tation mcssagc which hc had sccn on or about thc 5th ol cccmbcr 1941. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 751 thc rst timc that ! did not know that ! was standing alonc against thc world in my tcstimony. 72
Svvxixc Covvonov~:iox ov His Mv:ovv S~vvovb Vvi:vs Kv~:vv ox u:v ix :nv P~civic Saord kncw that Kramcr was lamiliar with thc Vinds xccutc. Altcr all, it was Kramcr who had translatcd thc crucial passagcs and handcd thc tclctypcd intcrccpt to Saord on thc morning ol cccmbcr 4. Tcn a wcck or so latcr Kramcr and Saord togcthcr had gonc ovcr a spccial loldcr ol mcssagcs lcad ing up to Pcarl Harbor that Kramcr was asscmbling lor Acting Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal, in Sccrctary Knoxs abscncc lrom thc countryin Hawaii, thcn a tcrritory, not yct a statcto invcsti gatc thc attack. Saord bclicvcd a copy ol thc Vinds xccutc was includcd in that spccial loldcr. 73
Saord had discusscd thc Vinds intcrccpt with Kramcr in thc spring ol 1943, bclorc Kramcr lclt lor Pcarl Harbor and activc duty in thc Pacic. At that timc Kramcrs mcmory, Saord said, coincidcd with his own. Tcy had not thcn lookcd lor it, lor thcy had both cxpcctcd to nd cvcrything pcrtaining to that winds mcssagc in thc lcs. 74 !n any cvcnt, thc Vinds xccutc was not thcn in controvcrsy. 75
Fcrguson also quotcd lrom NC! Top Sccrct tcstimony by Admiral Turncr to thc ccct that hc had lcarncd on cccmbcr 6 that Tc Vinds mcssagc camc in and that it mcant at lcast a brcak in diplomatic rclations and probably war. Also a Lt. Col. Kcndall J. Ficldcr who had tcsticd bclorc thc Robcrts Commission to thrcc signal words . . . as an indication that thc codc had bccn lollowcd and that thc attack was planncd (ibid., part 8, pp. 379294). 72 !bid., p. 3793. 73 !bid., p. 3689. 74 !bid., pp. 3693, 3697. 75 !bid., pp. 3731, 377476. 752 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Altcr that, Saord had had no occasion to talk to anyonc about thc Vinds xccutc until latc 1943, whcn hc had bccn ordcrcd by thc ircctor ol Naval Communications to prcparc a history ol radio intclligcncc up to and including thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. 76 Hc thcn bcgan rcscarching thc prcPcarl Harbor rccord, including ol coursc thc Vinds Codc sctup and thc Vinds xccutc. At that point Saord startcd asking anyonc hc cncountcrcd who had bccn on duty in thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts, prior to Pcarl Harbor, and might havc bccn cxpcctcd to havc rst hand knowlcdgc ol thc winds mcssagc, what thcy could rcmcmbcr about cvcnts ol that pcriod. Tat was whcn Saord lcarncd lrom Commandcr Vcslcy A. Vright, 77
who had had it lrom McCollum, that McCollums long warning mcssagc ol cccmbcr 4 had not bccn scnt. 78 Hc also discovcrcd thcn that many intcrccpt lcs wcrc missing. 79
!n his rcscarch ol prcPcarl Harbor radio intclligcncc, Saord tcsticd, hc wantcd thc bcnct ol Kramcrs rccollcctions. So on cccmbcr 22, 1943, hc wrotc Kramcr, thcn in thc Pacic. 80 Hc askcd Kramcr primarily about his cccmbcr 67, 1941, dclivcrics ol thc Japancsc 14part rcply to Vashingtons top o cials. Tc war was still in progrcss, so Saord phrascd his qucstions vcry carclully, in thc cvcnt that my lcttcr might lall into unauthorizcd hands. Hc wrotc: Vc cant nd thc original Vcathcr Rcport . . . and its translation. Vhat bccamc ol it: 81 Vhcn Kramcr 76 !bid., pp. 3602, 3693. 77 Commandcr Vcslcy A. Vright. As ol cccmbcr 7, 1941, Vright was Assis tant Communications ccr, in Pcarl Harbor on thc Sta ol CinC. Scc Hcwitt !nquiry, Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 261. 78 !bid., part 8, p. 3701, Saord January 22, 1944, lcttcr to Kramcr. 79 !bid., p. 3706. 80 !bid., p. 3691. 81 !bid., p. 3698. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 753 rcplicd, cccmbcr 28, 1943, 82 hc answcrcd thc qucstions about thc cccmbcr 67 dclivcrics, but had misundcrstood Saords qucstion about thc Vcathcr Rcport. 83
Saord wrotc a sccond lcttcr January 22, 1944, asking many morc qucstions about thc Vinds xccutc. 84 Tis timc hc assigncd codc numbcrs to pcrsons, datcs, mcssagcs, placcs, ctc., so that Kramcr could answcr Saords qucstions by citing numbcrs. 85
Hc also askcd lor Kramcrs commcnt on Saords suspicions sincc Novcmbcr 15, 1943, which hc said had bccn conrmcd cccmbcr 2, 1943, and absolutcly provcd January 18, 1944, that Kimmcl, long considcrcd a scapcgoat, was actually thc victim ol a lramcup. Saord said hc had ovcrwhclming prool ol thc guilt ol pNav and thc gcncral sta. 86
Kramcr did not rcply to Saords sccond lcttcr. Vhcn Kramcr latcr turncd thc corrcspondcncc ovcr to thc JCC, Saords rcmarks about a lramcup, pNav, and thc gcncral sta rcturncd to haunt him. Vnv V~s S~vvovb Pvvssuvvb :o Cn~xcv nis Tvs:i:oxv Anou: :nv Vixbs xvcu:v- Saord kncw that whcn Kramcr tcsticd bclorc thc NC! in Pcarl Harbor during thc summcr ol 1944, hc had dcscribcd in somc dctail thc intcrccption ol thc Vinds xccutc and his rolc in its translation and disposition. 87 Saord lully cxpcctcd Kramcr to acknowlcdgc that a Vinds xccutc had bccn rcccivcd bclorc cccmbcr 7. !n lact, Saord said also that Kramcr had told him, 82 !bid., pp. 3699700. Kramcr to Saord, cccmbcr 28, 1943. 83 !bid. 84 !bid., pp. 370004. Saord to Kramcr, January 22, 1944. 85 !bid. 86 !bid., p. 3700. 87 !bid., pp. 380405, 380607. 754 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cvcn altcr thc start ol thc JCC hcarings as rcccntly as |j|ust bclorc Christmas 1945, that hc rcmcmbcrcd thc Vinds xccutc. 88 vcr and ovcr again thc JCC mcmbcrs askcd Saord about thc Vinds Codc sctup and whcthcr a Vinds xccutc had actually bccn rcccivcd bclorc thc attack. Vhy was no onc othcr than Saord willing to tcstily to having sccn thc Vinds xccutc bclorc cccmbcr 7: Saord: !n 1945, thcrc was a dctcrmincd cort madc to havc mc rcvcrsc my tcstimony bclorc prcvious invcstigations and to say ! had ncvcr sccn thc winds mcssagc. 89
Rclcntlcss cort was madc to pcrsuadc him that hc must bc mistakcn, that thcrc had ncvcr bccn a Vinds xccutc. Licutcnant Commandcr John Sonnctt, spccial rcprcscntativc ol thc sccrctary ol thc Navy and lcgal adviscr to Admiral Hcwitt, intcrvicwcd Saord scvcral timcs. Sonnctt had told Saord rcpcatcdly that hc thought his mcmory was playing him tricks, that hc might bc sucring lrom hallucinations. Sonnctt told Saord hc should changc |his| tcstimony to pcrmit rcconciling all prcvious dis crcpancics. . . . !n somc cascs thc idca was statcd outright, in somc cascs it was implicd, and in othcr cascs it was uncxprcsscd but obviously thc cnd in vicw. 90
!n all his cxpcricncc as a commissioncd o ccr ol thc Navy, Saord said, hc had ncvcr sccn anything likc it. Tc wholc pro ccdurc struck Saord as quitc unusual, and hc had prcparcd a mcmorandum on thc subjcct whilc thc cvcnts wcrc still lrcsh in 88 !bid., p. 3710. 89 !bid., p. 3606. 90 !bid., pp. 360809, From Saord July 14, 1945, Mcmorandum ol Convcrsa tions in Conncction Vith Admiral Hcwitts !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor isastcr. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 755 my mcmory. 91 Saord bclicvcd Sonnctt had cmploycd similar tactics on othcr witncsscs whosc tcstimony had lavorcd Admiral Kimmcl, particularly Rochclort and Kramcr. 92 Vhcn Sonnctt tcsticd bclorc thc JCC latcr, hc dcnicd that hc had tricd to inu cncc Saord in any way. 93
Many witncsscs mcntioncd a lalsc winds mcssagc that was at onc timc bclicvcd authcntic. Richardson: id it cvcr occur to you, that that |thc lalsc winds mcssagc| was thc only mcssagc that cvcr camc in thcrc on thc 4th, and that you wcrc mistakcn: Saord: Tis is only about thc 20th timc such suggcstion has bccn madc to mc, but ! saw thc winds mcssagc myscll. 94
To Saord it bcgan to look likc a conspiracy. A mcssagc had bccn intcrccptcdhc was surc ol thatthc socallcd Vinds xccutc, that hc considcrcd a short rangc lorccast ol war, posi tivc cvidcncc that thc Unitcd Statcs would bc involvcd lrom thc vcry bcginning in thc war that was looming with Japan. Yct thc Vashington o cials who, according to Saord, had rcccivcd thc mcssagc had rcally donc nothing to warn thc cld commandcrs about it. McCollums long warning mcssagc had not bccn scnt. Vhat sccmcd likc an orchcstratcd attcmpt had bccn madc to pcr suadc anyonc who might havc sccn, or who had cvcr admittcd scc ing, thc Vinds xccutc bclorc thc attack to dcny it. nc pcrson altcr anothcr namcd by Saord as possiblc witncsscs, including thosc who had admittcd during carlicr invcstigations that thcy had sccn it bclorc thc attack, changcd thcir storics, dccidcd thcy had bccn mistakcn, or dcnicd that thcy had sccn it at all. Saord 91 !bid., p. 3607. 92 !bid., p. 3610. 93 !bid., part 10, pp. 500912. 94 !bid., part 8, p. 3645. 756 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy himscll, who rcluscd to changc his story, was vilicd. 8lamc lor thc surprisc attack had bccn lcvicd by thc Robcrts Commission and by public opinion against thc two Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. And thcn thcrc was thc disappcarancc, not only ol thc Vinds xccutc mcssagc itscll, which should havc bccn rctaincd in thc lcs, but also any rclcrcncc to thc instructions to Chcltcnham station conccrning its intcrccption. 95 Morcovcr, othcr crucial prc attack MAG!C intcrccpts had turncd up missing as wcll. 96
Rcprcscntativc John V. Murphy qucstioncd Saord about his rcmarks in his lcttcr to Kramcr, to thc ccct that No onc in pNav can bc trustcd and that Kimmcl was victim ol a lramcup. Murphy: Tcll us who was in pnav who could not bc trustcd. . . . Plcasc givc us somc namcs. . . . Vho wcrc you saying could not bc trustcd: Namcs plcasc. Vho could not bc trustcd: . . . Namcs, plcasc. ! am still waiting. Vaiting. Vill you plcasc givc us thc namcs as to who could not bc trustcd in pnav: Plcasc, sir. . . . Saord: ! prclcr not to answcr. 97
Murphy also askcd Saord whom hc was accusing ol lram ing Kimmcl and Short. Framing somcbody, Murphy said, was onc ol thc mcancst and lowcst crimcs. Vhcn prcsscd to say whcthcr hc lclt that thc Gcncral Sta ol thc Unitcd Statcs Army undcr Gcncral Marshall, and thc Gcncral Sta ol thc Navy undcr Admiral Stark had lramcd Kimmcl and Short, Saord rcplicd, ! lclt that way. 98
95 !bid., part 8, p. 3652, Saord tcstimony. 96 !bid., p. 3686. 97 !bid., pp. 372122. 98 !bid., pp. 372324. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 757 Scnator Scott V. Lucas also qucstioncd Saord ruthlcssly about his lcttcr to Kramcr. Hc askcd cspccially why thc mcn whosc namcs Saord had mcntioncd, loyal and patriotic Amcricans all, would want to sccrctc or dcstroy or disturb an important mcssagc ol this kind. Saord nally said that hc rcally had no propcr basis lor suspicion against Stark and Marshall. Hc had no suspicion dircctcd against any individual who can bc namcd. 8ut thc lact rcmaincd. cial rccords havc disappcarcd lrom thc lcs ol thc Navy cpartmcnt, and that is a suspicious circumstancc. ! havc no idca how thcy disappcarcd. !t is a lact that thcy arc not prcscnt and cannot bc accountcd lor. Howcvcr, Saord said hc had no suspicion against any individual. Hc could namc nobody. 99
Rcprcscntativc J. 8ayard Clark was also rclcntlcss in qucstion ing Saord. Tc ccct ol Saords Vinds xccutc tcstimony il truc, Clark pointcd out, was to accusc thc most scnior Army and Navy o ccrsStark and Marshallnot only ol ncglcct ol duty but also ol violating thc criminal law ol thc land by sccrcting, rcmoving, dclacing or dcstroying public rccords. Saord admit tcd that his tcstimony was diamctrically opposcd to that ol othcr witncsscs. Howcvcr, hc said, thc lact rcmaincd that documcnts wcrc missing lrom thc lcs. 100
Murphy cvcn badgcrcd Saord about his bchavior at thc timc ol thc attack. Saord told thc committcc hc had intcrprctcd thc Vinds xccutc to mcan that war would commcncc within two or thrcc days in all probability, possibly Saturday, cccmbcr 6, possibly Sunday, cccmbcr 7. Tat was thc bcst cstimatc that could bc madc as to thc timing implicd by a mcssagc ol that naturc. 101
99 !bid., pp. 370406. 100 !bid., pp. 368486. 101 !bid., p. 3684. 758 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tc nc v.:. Mcssagc had comc in carly that Sunday morn ing. Yct, Murphy pointcd out, Saord had had no onc on duty to translatc that mcssagc promptly. Hc had lclt thc o cc Saturday at 4:30 v.:. and was at homc, in Murphys words, still in pajamas having brcaklast at 2:00. 102
Saord cxplaincd that hc had lulllcd his rcsponsibilitics as hcad ol thc sccurity scction ol Naval Communications bclorc hc lclt thc dcpartmcnt on Saturday. Hc had donc his bcst to alcrt thc mcn in thc cld by scnding out instructions conccrning thc nccd to dcstroy condcntial codcs and ciphcrs. Hc was not authorizcd to scnd out warnings to thc cld, and hc had no rcsponsibility to issuc ordcrs to thc translators. 103 Ncithcr thc Japancsc rcply to our notc ol Novcmbcr 26 nor thc nc v.:. Mcssagc had comc in bclorc Saords duty cndcd on Saturday. Morcovcr, Sunday was his rcgular day o. 104 vcn so, Murphy practically accuscd Saord ol not bcing intcrcstcd in protccting thc Amcrican navy. Murphy: o ! undcrstand you to say you wcrc not rcsponsiblc lor anything at all that might hclp with winning thc war: Keefe: Mr. Chairman, ! dont think that thc answcr bcars any such intcrprctation. ! think it is an unlair qucstion. Tc witncss didnt tcstily to any such thing. Tc witncss is cntitlcd to somc dcgrcc ol lairncss and lair play. . . . ! objcct bccausc thc witncss has tcsticd that undcr thc sctup hc had no rcsponsibility lor translators. You arc trying to makc it appcar that hc did havc and had no intcrcst in protccting thc wcllarc ol thc Nation. 105
Vhcn Kcclc had an opportunity to qucstion Saord, hc said hc was puzzlcd and assumcd othcr committcc mcmbcrs wcrc 102 !bid., pp. 371518. 103 !bid., p. 3746. 104 !bid., p. 3777. 105 !bid., p. 3746. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 759 too. Vhat possiblc intcrcst, pcrsonal intcrcst might Saord havc in this controvcrsy: You rcalizc, ol coursc, Kcclc said to Saord, that in vicw ol thc implications that havc bccn statcd in thc crosscxamination ol you, cspccially by thc gcntlcman lrom Pcnnsylvania |Murphy|, that you havc madc somc rathcr strong chargcs: . . . Tat may wcll militatc against your carccr as a naval o ccr. id you rcalizc that whcn you camc hcrc as a witncss: l coursc, Saord rcplicd, cvcry timc hc had tcsticd. Truc, hc had no pcrsonal intcrcst, cxccpt ! startcd it and ! havc got to scc it through. Keefe: And dcspitc thc lact that you havc nothing pcrsonally to gain, and cvcrything to losc, you havc pcrsistcd in this story cvcry timc you havc tcsticd: Saord: ! havc. 106 . . . ! bclicvc thc bcst dclcnsc is tclling thc truth. 107
Finally Saord complctcd vc days (Fcbruary 16) bclorc thc JCC, battcrcd and bruiscd pcrhaps, but unbowcd. His tcstimony rcmaincd consistcnt throughout thc invcstigations. Chicl Varrant ccr Ralph T. 8riggs, thc Chcltcnham codc clcrk who had intcrccptcd thc Vinds xccutc, had bowcd to thc command ol his supcrior o ccr and did not tcstily. Saord had rcspcctcd 8riggss rcqucst lor condcntiality, ncvcr mcntioncd his namc, and rcvcalcd nothing 8riggs had told him in condcncc. 108
(8ccausc ol pcrsonal problcmshis wilc was going blind 8riggs complicd with thc ordcr ol Captain Harpcr, his supcrior o ccr, out ol lcar hc would bc rcd il hc disobcycd. nly sincc his rctircmcnt in 1977 has hc acknowlcdgcd intcrccpting thc 106 !bid., pp. 380708. 107 !bid., p. 3717. 108 Scc Chaptcr 28, pp. 671. 760 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Vinds xccutc and locatcd rccords proving this. 109 Tc rcassur ancc Saord rcccivcd lrom 8riggs that a Vinds xccutc had actually bccn pickcd up on cccmbcr 4, 1941 must havc givcn him addcd condcncc in standing up to thc vigorous and grucl ing crosscxamination by somc ol JCCs cmocratic mcmbcrs. His dctcrmination to lcarn thc truth about Pcarl Harbor pcr sistcd lor thc rcst ol his lilc. Hc workcd closcly with this author in trying to lollow invcstigativc lcads and to cxplain discrcpancics in somc ol thc tcstimony. Saord latcr was rccognizcd lor somc ol his contributions to cryptography. n Fcbruary 11, 1946, thc Navy cpartmcnt awardcd him thc Lcgion ol Mcrit lor his work as a crypto graphic cxpcrt lrom March 1942 to Scptcmbcr 1945. 110 !n 1958 Congrcss rcwardcd him 8100,000 lor his corts in solving lorcign codcs and constructing our own codcs. 111 And in 1983, a dccadc altcr his dcath, hc was awardcd a dclaycd patcnt lor his invcntion that ovcrcomcs jamming ol radio communications. 112
Kv~:vv, U.S. N~vv Tv~xsi~:ov ~xb Couvivv, Tvs:ivivs n Fcbruary 6 Captain Alwin alton Kramcr took thc stand. Fortytwo ycars old and a 1925 graduatc ol thc Annapolis Naval Acadcmy, Kramcr had 21 ycars in thc Navy. Hc had bccn in chargc ol a scction ol thc ivision ol Naval Communications, 109 Scc John Tolands Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Ncw York: 8crklcy 8ooks, 1983), Postscript, scction 4, pp. 34647. Toland rcports thc rccol lcctions ol thc Japancsc naval attach in Vashington, Captain Yuzuru Sanc matsu, who pickcd up thc Vinds xccutc on cccmbcr 4, 1941, and thosc ol assistant attach, Licutcnant Commandcr. Yoshimori Tcrai. Scc chaptcr 10, pp. 22829. 110 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 9, p. 4344. 111 Washington Star, May 18, 1973. 112 Te New York Times, August 27, 1983. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 761 but at thc timc ol thc attack hc had actually bccn scrving undcr Saord in thc sccurity scction. uring thc crucial months bclorc cccmbcr 7, hc had bccn thc Navys couricr and Japancsc trans lator. A couplc ol ycars altcr thc attack, hc was scnt to thc Pacic whcrc hc scrvcd undcr Admiral Nimitz in Pcarl Harbor and thcn undcr Admiral Halscy in Noumca, Ncw Calcdonia. Hc had bccn promotcd during thc war lrom licutcnant commandcr to captain. 113
As Japancsc translator and Navy couricr, Kramcr had bccn a crucial playcr in thc prcattack situation. !t was hopcd that, with his intimatc knowlcdgc ol thc Japancsc intcrccpts, hc would bc ablc to shcd somc light on thc rcccipt ol thcsc intcrccpts and thc timing ol thcir dclivcry to thc various rccipicnts. Vhcn hc was sworn in by Chairman 8arklcy, thc old Scnatc Caucus Room was packcd, thc audicncc tcnsc in anticipation. Among thosc who had bccn attcnding thc hcarings rcgularly lor wccks was Alicc Rooscvclt Longworth, daughtcr ol thc latc Rcpublican prcsidcnt, Tcodorc Rooscvclt, and widow ol thc latc spcakcr ol thc Housc, Nicholas Longworth. Mrs. Longworth was in hcr usual scat on a bcnch bchind thc committcc mcmbcrs. At thc othcr cnd ol thc room, was Mrs. Kramcr, who was oltcn sccn, standing on hcr scat ncrvously biting hcr ngcrnails, during thc vc days hcr husband was a witncss. Kramcr said hc had bccn thoroughly lamiliar with thc Japancsc MAG!C intcrccpts, but !t was not csscntial lor thc activitics ol my scction that ! bc so lamiliar with thc ncgotiations, nor with thc status ol thc diplomatic arrangcmcnts and intcrcoursc bctwccn this country and Japan. 114 Howcvcr, his lamiliarity with thc intcrccpts clcarly madc him onc ol JCCs most important witncsscs. 113 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 389495, 3897. 114 !bid., part 36, p. 81. 762 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kramcr had not bccn callcd to tcstily bclorc thc Robcrts Commission or thc Hart inquiry. Howcvcr, in 194344, whcn stationcd in thc South Pacic, hc had had occasion to rcvicw thc prcattack situation. At that timc hc rcccivcd two lcttcrs lrom Saordonc datcd cccmbcr 22, 1943, 115 which hc had answcrcd, and a sccond datcd January 22, 1944, 116 which hc had not. 117 Tcn in midMay 1944, Kramcrs commanding o ccr, Halscy, rcccivcd a lcttcr lrom Kimmcl. 118 Kimmcl askcd Halscy to consult Kramcr about thc Vinds xccutc and thc cccmbcr 67 dclivcrics ol thc crucial lastminutc Japancsc intcrccpts to top Vashington o cials. Kramcr rcvicwcd thc situation in his mind at that timc and wrotc a mcmorandum For thc bcnct ol Halscy, answcring in ccct both Saords sccond lcttcr and Kimmcls lcttcr to Halscy. Halscy rcad Kramcrs mcmorandum and rcturncd it to him. 119
Kramcr did not scnd it to Saord. For rcasons ol sccurity, hc madc only a singlc copy, which hc rctaincd in his pcrsonal lcs in a scalcd cnvclopc. 120
!n Scptcmbcr 1944 Kramcr was issucd travcl ordcrs to go lrom Halscys hcadquartcrs in Ncw Calcdonia to Pcarl Harbor to tcstily bclorc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry. Vhcn hc appcarcd on Scptcmbcr 13 hc spokc quitc rcadily about thc arrangcmcnts madc to intcrccpt wcathcr broadcasts, about his having bccn 115 !bid., part 8, pp. 369899. 116 !bid., pp. 370004. 117 !bid., part 9, p. 4093. 118 !bid., p. 408081, also part 18, pp. 333334, xhibit 150, Kimmcl lcttcr to Halscy. 119 !bid., part 9, pp. 407984. Scc also pp. 4096124, Kramcr 1944 mcmo randum. 120 !bid., pp. 415356. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 763 shown thc Vinds xccutc whcn it was rcccivcd, and about his having hclpcd to intcrprct it. 121
Tc lollowing spring thc Hcwitt inquiry had bcgun. n May 22, 1945, whcn Kramcr appcarcd thcrc, hc was lcss positivc that thc Vinds xccutc had includcd thc words rclcrring to thc Unitcd Statcs, Higashi no kazc amc. 122
Vhcn rccallcd by Hcwitt a couplc ol months latcr, Kramcr was again qucstioncd about thc Vinds xccutc, this timc by Licutcnant Commandcr John F. Sonnctt, counscl to Hcwitt and spccial assistant to thc sccrctary ol Navy. His tcstimony this timc, on July 6, 1945, dicrcd in important rcspccts lrom his 1944 tcs timony bclorc thc NC!. !n rcplying to Sonnctt, Kramcr adoptcd Sonnctts phrascology, agrccing that thcrc was a winds mcssagc, but hc could not say with ccrtainty what thc contcnts wcrc. Nor could hc rccall thc cxact Japancsc nomcnclaturc uscd, but thc phrasc not in accordancc with cxpcctations. . . could havc thc impli cation ol our words rclations arc rcaching a crisis,. . . cithcr a minor crisis or a major crisis. !t could mcan simply that ncgotiations conccrning an undcr standing with thc Unitcd Statcs wcrc at an cnd or that rclations wcrc to bc brokcn or it could cvcn mcan that thc crisis was so scvcrc that war was immincnt. 123
!n his tcstimony bclorc thc JCC, Kramcr said that in mid or latc Scptcmbcr, bclorc thc committcc bcgan its work, hc was invitcd to Starks homc lor lunch. Also invitcd wcrc Schuirmann and McCollum. 124 Tc lunchcon was largcly and primarily a social aair and wc discusscd old timcs. 8ut Kramcr said somc 121 !bid., part 33, pp. 84776. 122 !bid., part 36, pp. 7985. 123 !bid., pp. 33950. 124 !bid., part 9, p. 4060. 764 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy aspccts ol Pcarl Harbor wcrc discusscd. |T|hc chicl point hc rcmcmbcrcd was as to what timc Admiral Stark got down |to his o cc Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7| and whcthcr thcrc was a conlcrcncc in his o cc. Tcrc wcrc no papcrs at thc lunchcon, and no mcntion was madc ol thc Vinds Codc mcssagc, thc Pilot Mcssagc, or thc 14part Japancsc rcply. 125
Tcn on Scptcmbcr 28 Kramcr was hospitalizcd. 126 (A month carlicr hc had gonc to thc Navy Mcdical Hospital at 8cthcsda lor a routinc physical chcckup.) Tc hospitalization ol thc most important witncss in thc |upcoming congrcssional| invcstigation attractcd prcss attcntion. 127 A Unitcd Prcss dispatch rcportcd Rcpublican chargcs, dcnicd by thc Navy, that hc had bccn bro kcn in mind and body and was bcing hcld incommunicado in a hospital psychopathic ward. 128 An Associatcd Prcss story also hcld, quoting an unidcnticd sourcc, that Kramcr was bcing badgcrcd to changc his original tcstimony. 129 According to thc New York Times, Kramcr had bccn bcsct and bclcagucrcd . . . badgcrcd and bcsct by an cort to brcakdown (sic) his tcstimony. Hc dcnicd thc chargc and asscrtcd that hc was lccling vcry wcll and would appcar bclorc thc committcc prcparcd to statc lully anything ! know that thcy may want to know. 130
Kramcr was visitcd in thc hospital by Saord and committcc mcmbcrs Gcarhart and Kcclc. Tcir convcrsation was vcry plcas ant in naturc, Kramcr said, thcy madc no attcmpt to bulldozc 125 !bid., pp. 4061, 4063. 126 !bid., pp. 3964, 4060. 127 !bid., pp. 396465. 128 !bid., p. 3966. 129 !bid. 130 !bid., p. 3965. Also C.P. Trusscl, New York Times, Novcmbcr 12, 1945. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 765 him into changing his opinion or anything ol that kind. 131
Kramcr was also intcrvicwcd at thc hospital by rcportcrs. 132
Kv~:vvs NC! Vixbs Cobv Tvs:i:oxv vs. nis Rvvvvsnvb JCC Tvs:i:oxv !n his cccmbcr 1943 and January 1944 lcttcrs, Saord had askcd Kramcr about his rccollcctions ol thc prcattack situation in Vashington, cspccially about thc Vinds xccutc and Kramcrs cccmbcr 67 intcrccpt dclivcrics. Vhcn Kramcr appcarcd bclorc thc JCC, Kcclc qucstioncd him about his 1944 mcmoran dum prcparcd lor Admiral Halscy. 133 !n that mcmorandum and again bclorc thc NC!, Kramcr had dctailcd his rolc in translat ing and dclivcring thc prcattack intcrccpts. Passagc by passagc, Kcclc wcnt ovcr thc mcmorandum with Kramcr. And passagc by passagc, Kramcr modicd his 1944 statcmcnts. 134
Tcrc wcrc scrious discrcpancics bctwccn Kramcrs carlicr (1944) NC! tcstimony and his latcr ncwly rclrcshcd JCC rcc ollcctions conccrning thc rcccipt, or nonrcccipt, ol a Vinds xccutc. At thc NC!, Kramcr had tcsticd quitc rcadily about thc Vinds xccutc, cvcn voluntccring dctails on his own: Higashi No Kazc Amc is ast Vind, Rain. . . . Tc scnsc ol that, howcvcr, mcant straincd rclations or a brcak in rclations, possi bly cvcn implying war with a nation to thc castward, thc Unitcd Statcs. 135 Howcvcr, whcn Kcclc qucstioncd Kramcr, hc wa cd: Keefe: Vas it thc truth: 131 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 9, p. 3964. 132 !bid., p. 4078. 133 !bid., part 9, pp. 408081. 134 !bid., pp. 4093. 135 !bid., p. 4128. 766 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kramer: !t was not, sir. . . . !t was thc truth as it camc to my mind at thc timc. . . . |T|hat occasion, namcly, thc Naval Court ol !nquiry, was thc rst timc that thc qucstion ol what country appcarcd in that piccc ol tclctypc cvcr camc up in any convcr sation in which ! was participating. . . . Keefe: So that wc now havc a situation whcrc you makc a statcmcnt on a vital issuc bclorc thc Naval Court ol !nquiry which you admit was not truc bccausc you claim that subsc qucnt cvcnts havc now convinccd you that thc answcr which you gavc was not |truc|, is that thc lact: . . . Kramer: ||cspitc thc lact that ! was caught cold |at thc NC!| on that point whcn thc qucstion was propoundcd my rcaction cvcn thcn was that only onc country was involvcd on that piccc ol tclctypc papcr. 136
Keefe: Now you want us to undcrstand whcn ! rcad your tcs timony bclorc thc naval court that according to your prcscnt rclrcshcd and currcnt rccollcction you wcrc mistakcn, that thcrc wcrc no such words in thc mcssagc that you saw: Kramer: No words rclcrring to thc Unitcd Statcs. . . . Keefe: You do not rcmcmbcr what words wcrc in thc mcssagc, is that your tcstimony, Captain: Kramer: Vhat ! mcan to imply by that! think it has bccn rcitcratcd many timcsis that ! do not now and havc ncvcr known sincc thc timc ! saw that piccc ol tclctypc cxactly what Japancsc phrascology was in it, sir. . . . Keefe: You prctcndcd to know what words wcrc in it whcn you tcsticd bclorc thc Naval Court ol !nquiry, did you not: Kramer: Tat was apparcntly thc imprcssion ! crcatcd, ycs, sir. 136 !bid., part 9, pp. 412829. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 767 Keefe: Ycs. Now, ! want to undcrstand what your tcstimony is today. Am ! corrcct in thc assumption that according to your prcscnt, or what you havc rclcrrcd to many timcs as your currcnt, rccollcction altcr bcing rclrcshcd, you arc not ablc to tcll this committcc what words wcrc in that codcd cxccutc mcssagc: Kramer: My prcscnt bclicl and conviction is that piccc ol tclc typc rclcrrcd to onc country and that country was ngland. . . . Nishi No Kazc Harc.. . . Keefe: ! askcd you thc simplc qucstion as to whcthcr thc statc mcnt which you madc, which ! havc rcad to you, thc answcrs that you gavc in rcsponsc to thosc qucstions was thc truth. Vas it or wasnt it: Kramer: |!|t was not thc wholc truth as ! scc it now, inasmuch as thcrc was no rclcrcncc in that answcr to any handwriting |on thc tclctypc mcssagc|. 137 Kcclc thcn turncd Kramcrs attcntion to his mid1945 tcsti mony bclorc Hcwitt. Conccrning thc Vinds xccutc, Kramcr had said at that timc: Kramer: !t may havc bccn Higashi no kazc amc, spccically rclcrring to thc Unitcd Statcs, as ! havc prcviously tcsticd at Pcarl Harbor, but ! am lcss positivc ol that now than ! bclicvc ! was at that timc. Tc rcason lor rcvision in my vicw on that is thc lact that in thinking it ovcr, ! havc a rathcr sharp rccol lcction in thc lattcr part ol that wcck ol lccling that thcrc was still no ovcrt mcntion or spccic mcntion ol thc Unitcd Statcs in any ol this tra c, which ! was sccing all ol and which also was thc only sourcc in gcncral ol my inlormation sincc ! did not scc, as a rulc, thc dispatchcs lrom thc cct commandcrs or going out to thcm lrom pcrations. 138
137 !bid., pp. 413132. 138 !bid., pp. 413335. 768 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Keefe: So as latc as thc timc you tcsticd bclorc Admiral Hcwitt you wcrc ol thc opinion that it may havc containcd thc words Higashi no kazc amc, but you wcrc bccoming unccr tain about it in thc light ol your lurthcr rclrcshing: Kramer: ! mcant to imply by that spccically that ! did not rccall, and still do not rccall, thc prccisc wording ol thc Japancsc on thc piccc ol tclctypc papcr. . . . Keefe: So wc now gct to thc point ol your tcstimony hcrc that thcrc was a mcssagc, it had somcthing on it, and must havc had somcthing on it to dcsignatc it as a wind codc cxccutc mcssagc: . . . Tcn ! am to undcrstand, Captain Kramcr, that this mcs sagc, which was considcrcd ol top importancc by cvcrybody, which cvcrybody was looking lor and on thc lookout lor, and lor which you havc tcsticd spccic arrangcmcnts had bccn sct up as in conncction with no othcr mcssagc, altcr this mcssagc comcs in you scc it, you rcad it, you dctcrminc that this is thc mcssagc you havc bccn looking lor, and you cant tcll us now what was on that mcssagc: . . . r what it said: . . . Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir. 139
Keefe: . . . . Tcn Mr. Sonnctt cxamincd you about a lot ol othcr mattcrs. Tcn, Captain Kramcr, at thc conclusion ol thc cxami nation ol Admiral Hcwitt, is it a lair assumption to concludc that as lar as your tcstimony discloscs, thcrc was a wind cxccutc codc mcssagc rcccivcd in thc middlc ol thc wcck, thc cxact datc ol which you wcrc thcn unccrtain, which may havc rclcrrcd to thc Unitcd Statcs, ngland, or possibly Russia, you wcrc not ccrtain: you wcrc not thcn ccrtain, and you arc not ccrtain what thc mcssagc spccically said but it may havc rclcrrcd to onc or both or all thrcc ol thc countrics in thc original codc sctup, is that what you mcant to tcll Admiral Hcwitt: Kramer: Tat is what ! mcant to tcll him at thc timc. . . . 139 !bid., pp. 413637. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 769 Keefe: Now, you, as thc man in chargc ol translations ol thcsc mcssagcs, with knowlcdgc that thc wholc Govcrnmcnt was sct up to pick up this vcry vital and important mcssagc, who handlcd that mcssagc, who saw it, who rcad it, who chcckcd thc intcrprctation ol thc watch o ccr on that mcssagc, sit hcrc bclorc us today, and say you cant tcll us what thc mcssagc said, you havc no collcction ol what it said at all, is that corrcct: Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir. Howcvcr, ! would likc to point out to you, Mr. Kcclc, that ! think that an cntircly unwarrantcd cmphasis and importancc is bcing attributcd to that mcssagc, not only in this hcaring but in past hcarings, and in thc prcss. Tcrc wcrc many othcr mcssagcs morc spccic as to Japancsc intcntions during this pcriod. . . . A wind mcssagc would havc bccn only onc lurthcr indication ol thc gcncral trcnd ol this tral c as wcll as thc gcncral trcnd ol thc intcrnational situation. Keefe: Vcll ! am vcry happy that you havc madc that statc mcnt, Captain, bccausc ! havc concludcd that, as onc mcmbcr ol this committcc, a long timc ago that thcrc wcrc plcnty ol mcs sagcs to havc warncd thosc who rcad thcm and saw thcm that war was immincnt and just about to brcak, without this winds cxccutc mcssagc. 8ut, Captain Kramcr, thc Navy cpartmcnt and all ol thc o cials in thc Navy cpartmcntand ! assumc thc Var cpartmcnt, tooconsidcrcd that that winds cxccutc mcssagc was ol suprcmc importancc, othcrwisc why did thcy sct up this grcat sctup ol cards and trcat it as thcy did, with complctc priority ovcr cvcry othcr mcssagc that was rcccivcd: . . . Vcll it did appcar, didnt it. . . . Now, this mcssagc camc in ovcr thc tclctypc, didnt it: . . . Kramer: Ycs, sir. Keefe: Ycs. You saw it: Kramer: ! saw it. 140
140 !bid., pp. 413839. 770 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Keefe: . . . . Tc thing that attractcd thc attcntion ol thc GY watch o ccr was that in this mcssagc appcarcd thc samc Japancsc languagc words that wcrc in thc original sctup, isnt that truc: . . . And you still want to say to us that you cant rccall what thosc words wcrc: Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir. Keefe: Tcy must havc bccn thc words ol thc original codc, othcrwisc you wouldnt havc paid any attcntion to it. . . . And it is bccausc thc words on this tclctypc tapc wcrc thc original Japancsc codc words in thc original codc sctup that you dctcr mincd that this was thc codcd cxccutc mcssagc at that timc, isnt that truc: Kramer: !t is not sir. . . . ! should likc to cxplain prcciscly what ! mcan by that. Tc dctcrmination was not madc by mc in thc casc ol this piccc ol tclctypc. n thc numbcr ol prcvious timcs whcn ! had bccn callcd down conccrning possiblc mcssagcs in this winds systcm, ! had cxamincd long shccts ol this tclctypc papcr, had lookcd lor thc point ol whcthcr or not thc cxprcs sion was rcpcatcd or appcarcd as it was supposcd to appcar in thc middlc or at thc cnd, or both. !n this particular casc my prcsumption was that thc GY watch o ccr had madc that dctcrmination inasmuch as thc piccc ol papcr ! saw was only a short piccc ol papcr, 3 or 4 inchcs in lcngth as ! rccollcct, and that prcsumably hc had idcnticd this mcssagc as bcing an authcntic winds mcssagc, not only lrom thc wording that actually appcarcd in it, but lrom its location in thc Japancsc plain languagc broadcast. Tat was a lunction ol thc GY watch o ccr not only as rcgards this winds systcm, but as rcgards all systcms to dctcrminc its authcnticity and to brcak it down. Tc only rcason lor having shown this piccc ol papcr to mc was in conncction with thc Japancsc words thcrcon, and that is all, sir. . . . Keefe: And you lookcd at thosc words and lookcd at thc intcr prctation which hc had givcn thcm. You may havc corrcctcd it Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 771 in somc particular, and you bccamc convinccd that thc Japancsc languagc words on that piccc ol tclctypc madc that mcssagc thc Japancsc codc cxccutc mcssagc and you so dctcrmincd at that timc and wcnt down to Captain Saords o cc and handcd it to him, or saw thc watch o ccr hand it to him and said, Hcrc it is. Tis is it. Tc thing that wc havc bccn straining our sclvcs lor and sctting up all this intcrccpting apparatus. Tat is truc, isnt it: Kramer: !t is, sir. 141
Keefe: . . . . So il thc words Higashi no kazc amc appcar on this winds cxccutc mcssagc thc intcrprctation would mcan ast wind rain, that is right, isnt it: . . . Tcn you say that is plain Japancsc languagc. Tc scnsc ol that, howcvcr, mcant straincd rclations or a brcak in rclations, possibly cvcn imply ing war with a nation on thc castward, thc Unitcd Statcs. Now that intcrprctation is thc samc today as it was whcn you tcsti cd out thcrc bclorc thc Naval Court ol !nquiry, isnt it: Kramer: xactly, sir. Keefe: So that il you had wantcd to you could havc indicatcd that thosc words mcant war with thc Unitcd Statcs, couldnt you, and bc within thc intcrprctation which you had givcn to thc Naval Court ol !nquiry: !t was onc ol thc thrcc altcrna tivcs, was it not: Kramer: nly, Mr. Kcclc, insolar as you would cvaluatc thc Japancsc instructions containcd in thc sctup ol this wind mcs sagc rclcrring to thc dcstruction ol codcs and classicd papcrs. An cvaluation which concludcd that that mcant war would thcn includc that intcrprctation, ycs, sir. 142
141 !bid., pp. 414142. 142 !bid., p. 4144. 772 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kcclc thcn askcd Kramcr about thc cards distributcd at thc dircction ol Noycs to pcrsons who wcrc to watch lor a plainlan guagc Japancsc Vinds xccutc. Kramcr had tcsticd bclorc thc NC! that thcsc cards had on thcm thc | Japancsc| cxprcssions containcd in this cxhibit, and thc mcaning. 143 Howcvcr, Kramcr told thc JCC that apparcntly my mcmory was laulty at that momcnt as to what was on thc cards. My prcscnt bclicl and con viction is that thc Japancsc cxprcssions did not appcar on thosc cards. Kcclc thought it pcrlcctly in linc with common scnsc lor Kramcr to havc listcd thc Japancsc words on thc card, togcthcr with thcir mcaning, so that thcsc topight pcoplc to whom thc cards wcrc dircctcd . . . would bc ablc to comparc it |a Vinds xccutc| with thc Japancsc words on thc card and thcn know thc mcaning. Howcvcr, Kramcr wantcd to changc that tcstimony. Hc insistcd that, according to his prcscnt, currcnt, rclrcsh|cd| rccollcction, thc only words hc had put on thc cards wcrc thc nglish translation and thc country rclcrrcd to and that was all. . . . ast VindrainUnitcd Statcs, wcst windclcarng land, north windcloudyRussia. 144
As Kcclcs qucstioning wound down, Kramcr admittcd that thcrc had bccn a Vinds xccutc, on that point hc and Saord wcrc in agrccmcnt. And hc had bclicvcd that it was an authcntic mcssagc ol that winds systcm . . . |u|ntil thc last lcw days whcn !. . . . had bccn making lurthcr studics, including thc rcading ol intcrrogations ol high Japancsc o cials by Gcncral MacArthur. 145
Vhcn Rcpublican Rcprcscntativc Kcclc nishcd qucstion ing Kramcr, cmocratic Scnator Lucas took ovcr. Hc pointcd out that Kramcr had had only a lcw bricl scconds ol contact, 143 !bid., part 9, p. 4126. 144 !bid., pp. 412627. 145 !bid., pp. 412324, part 18, pp. 332331, xhibit 142, lor Novcmbcr 7, 1945, rcport on intcrrogation ol Japancsc o cials rc Vinds. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 773 Not ovcr 30 scconds. Probably ncarcr 10 or 15 scconds with thc Vinds xccutc bclorc it was handcd to Saord. Hc had not bccn involvcd in its dccoding, translation, and dclivcry. !t was by mcrc chancc that hc had happcncd to bc in his o cc as thc GY watch o ccr passcd on his way to dclivcr it to Saord. Tus, Lucas implicd, Kramcrs contact with thc mcssagc was so bricl that it was not surprising his rccollcctions wcrc not too clcar. 146
Piio: Mvss~cv Rvcvivvb, Axxouxcixc J~v~xs Rvsvoxsv :o U.S. Novv:nvv :6 Ui:i:~:u: n Saturday morning, cccmbcr 6, 1941, U.S. intclligcncc pickcd up a Japancsc dispatch that bccamc known as thc Pilot Mcssagc bccausc it announccd to thc Japancsc ambassadors in Vashington thc impcnding arrival ol thcir govcrnmcnts 14part rcsponsc to thc U.S. notc ol Novcmbcr 26 rcjccting thcir latcst proposal lor compromisc. Tis Pilot Mcssagc told thc Japancsc ambassadors that thc timc lor its prcscntation to thc Unitcd Statcs would bc wircd scparatcly 147 in Purplccodcd nglish, it would nccd dccrypting but not translating. Tc timc shcct shows that thc Pilot Mcssagc was intcr ccptcd by a Navy station on thc wcst coast cccmbcr 6, 1941, bctwccn 7:15 to 7:20 ~.:. (castcoast timc) and thcn tclctypcd in Japancsc codc to thc Navy in Vashington. 148 !t was morc than lour hours latcr (12:05 v.:.) whcn thc Army, whosc day it was to dccodc, rcccivcd it lrom thc Navy. Tis abnormal dclay was ncvcr accountcd lor. !t was thcn dccodcd, typcd up by thc Armys Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc, and dclivcrcd to thc Army and Navy o ccr couricrs. 146 !bid., pp. 414546. 147 !bid., part 12, pp. 23839. 148 !bid., part 14, p. 1413, xhibit 41, mcssagc timc shcct. 774 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Vhcn Kramcr appcarcd bclorc thc JCC on Fcbruary 6, hc acknowlcdgcd that thc Navy had intcrccptcd thc Pilot Mcssagc bctwccn 7:15 and 7:20 ~.:. that Saturday morning and that it hadnt rcachcd thc Army, until 12:05 v.:. 149 !n any cvcnt, Kramcr was as ccrtain as hc could bc that thc rst knowlcdgc ! had that thc |14part| Japancsc notc was bcing scnt to thc Unitcd Statcs was around 3 or shortly altcr 3:00 v.:. Saturday, cccmbcr 6, 1941. Although thc Army might possibly havc dclivcrcd thc Pilot Mcssagc to Kramcrs scction carlicr in thc altcrnoon, hc had no rccollcction ol sccing that mcssagc until latcr in thc altcrnoon. 150
Two days latcr Kramcr changcd thc story hc was tclling thc JCC. Hc said hc didnt bclicvc thc Pilot Mcssagc had bccn dis scminatcd Saturday altcrnoon at all and listcd it (Navy #7149) as onc ol scvcral intcrccpts that wcrc dclivcrcd at 10:30 Sunday morning. 151
! nd as a rcsult ol my study last night |altcr rclcrring to a Navy cpartmcnt lc| that thc pilot mcssagc was not disscmi natcd, at lcast in thc Navy, until Sunday morning subscqucnt to 10:00, at thc timc whcn thc socallcd hiddcn word mcssagc and a numbcr ol othcr short mcssagcs, including thc 1:00 mcs sagc, wcrc disscminatcd. 152 Vhcn Scnator Fcrguson askcd Kramcr: !l you did not know what this pilot mcssagc was until 10:30 . . . on Sunday morning how did you know thcrc was going to bc a lourtccnth part: . . . How did you know without thc pilot mcs sagc that you wcrc going to gct an answcr to thc 26th notc: 149 !bid., part 9, pp. 410001. 150 !bid., part 8, p. 3898. 151 !bid., part 9, pp. 401718. 152 !bid., pp. 4015. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 775 Kramcr rcplicd that hc did not, at lcast, know positivcly but ccrtainly at thc timc and now prcsumcd lrom thc contcxt ol thc parts wc wcrc brcak ing down that that must bc thc rcply to Mr. Hulls notc ol 26 Novcmbcr. 153 Fcrguson tricd to nd out what thcrc was in thc rccords to show whcthcr thc Pilot Mcssagc had actually bccn rcccivcd in thc Navy cpartmcnt Saturday, cccmbcr 6, or Sunday morn ing, cccmbcr 7. Kramcr admittcd that Tcrc is nothing what socvcr in thc lc, Scnator, to show dcnitcly onc way or anothcr that point. 154
Kramcr rcpcatcd again thc ncxt day his account ol thc Sunday morning rcccipt and dclivcry ol thc Pilot Mcssagc. His prcscnt bclicl, hc told thc JCC, was that hc did not gct it in my scction lrom thc Army until thc ncxt morning, Sunday, cccmbcr 7. . . . Somctimc bctwccn 9 and 10:30 that morning. His mcmory had bccn rclrcshcd . . . sincc ! got to studying this on my arrival at Vashington. 155
As a mattcr ol lact, Kramcr told thc JCC two days latcr that hc did not bclicvc thc Pilot Mcssagc had cvcn bccn includcd with thc rst dclivcry carly on thc morning ol thc 7th, but that it had bccomc availablc only in timc lor thc sccond round ol dcliv crics. According to thc study ! madc . . . a lcw days ago, my bcst knowlcdgc and prcscnt conviction is that my scction in thc Navy cpartmcnt did not rcccivc it until approximatcly 10:25 or 10:30 Sunday morning. 156 His solc rcason lor saying this, hc told Fcrguson, was duc to thc lact that in thc Navy book it |thc Pilot Mcssagc| appcars after thc 14part mcssagc and after thc 1:00 153 !bid., p. 4019. 154 !bid., pp. 401920. 155 !bid., p. 4102. 156 !bid., p. 4188. 776 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy mcssagc (italics addcd). Tus hc had bccn lcd to thc conclusion that it must havc bccn dclivcrcd Sunday instcad ol Saturday. 157
Kv~:vv Tvs:ivivs Fuv:nvv ox J~v~xs Rvviv :o U.S. Novv:nvv :6 No:v ~xb :nvv M~::vvs Vhcn Rcpublican Scnator 8rcwstcr took ovcr thc qucstion ing ol Kramcr, hc said hc was amazcd that Kramcr had not rcrcad thc mcmorandum hc had writtcn at Halscys rcqucst in 1944, not cvcn whcn hc had shown it to othcrsLicutcnant Commandcr 8acchcr, Admiral Vilkinson, his longtimc pcr sonal lricnd Captain Rochclort, and Marinc Corps Coloncl 8alcs. 158 8rcwstcr could scc no rcason why Kramcr shouldnt havc rcvicwcd his mcmorandum prior to his appcarancc bclorc thc JCC. !t would havc bccn lar casicr to crcdit his story il hc had, rathcr than basing his cntirc prcscnt rccollcction on thc rclrcsh mcnt rcccivcd lrom consultation with o ccrs who cxamincd that documcnt. 159
Kramcr, likc Saord, had bccn cxamincd by Sonnctt, counscl in thc Hcwitt inquiry. Scnator Lucas askcd Kramcr il his cxpcri cncc with Sonnctt had bccn at all similar to Saords. Kramcr dcnicd that Sonnctt had badgcrcd or bcsct him at any timc or tricd to pcrsuadc him to changc his tcstimony. Hc kncw ol no onc in thc Navy, Army, Statc cpartmcnt, or chicl cxccutivcs o cc who had provokcd, angcrcd, or trickcd thosc pcaccloving and harmlcss Japs into attacking Pcarl Harbor or who had mancu vcrcd, conspircd, or attcmptcd to lay thc solc blamc lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr on Kimmcl and Short. 160
157 !bid., p. 4208. 158 !bid., p. 4153. 159 !bid., pp. 415556. 160 !bid., pp. 414849. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 777 Kramcr was also askcd why thcrc wcrc occasional gaps in thc numbcrcd intcrccpts. Somctimcs thc numbcring machinc would skip a numbcr, hc said. Army and Navy both oltcn workcd on dccryption ol thc samc intcrccpt, hc said, and both would assign it a numbcr. Vhcn it was discovcrcd latcr that thc samc mcssagc had bccn givcn two dicrcnt numbcrs, onc was cancclcd. 161
Vhcn askcd to cxplain thc missing Vinds xccutc tclc typc, Kramcr said hc bclicvcd thc purposc ol having duplicatcs lor any ol this tra c, whcthcr cncodcd or plain languagc, was to havc an cxtra copy lor sys tcms which wc wcrc not rcading so that morc than onc pcrson could work on that systcm in attcmpting to brcak it down. 162
As lor thc Vinds xccutc, Kramcr had not had anything spccically to do with it, it had gonc dircctly to Noycss o cc and had not bccn handlcd through Kramcrs o cc. 163
Rcprcscntativc Coopcr, vicc chairman ol thc committcc, qucstioncd Kramcr about how all thc documcnts rclating to thc Vinds xccutc could havc vanishcd lrom thc lcs. Hc could ocr no cxplanation. Givcn thc prccautions that had bccn takcn to conccal thc combination to thc salc in which thcsc papcrs wcrc kcpt, Kramcr couldnt undcrstand it. nly hc and two othcrs kncw thc combination, and il anyonc had brokcn into thc dou blcscalcd cnvclopc in thc Navy cpartmcnts lront o ccs whcrc thc combination was kcpt, somconc would surcly havc known. 164
Vice Chairman: ! undcrstand thcn, Captain that thcsc mcs sagcs, including thc numbcr 7001, wcrc in your custody. . . . And wcrc kcpt in your salc in your o cc: 161 !bid., p. 3931. 162 !bid., p. 4140. 163 !bid., p. 3978. 164 !bid., p. 3939. 778 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kramer: Ycs, sir. . . . Vice Chairman: And all ol thc lcs wcrc in thcir propcr ordcr and in thcir propcr placc and kcpt thcrc in your salc: Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir. ! might lurthcr amplily that answcr, sir, to this ccct, that thc socallcd numcrical lc, altcr a scrics ol mcssagcs wcrc numbcrcd lor disscmination, a copy was invariably and immcdiatcly inscrtcd in that numcrical lc. Mcssagcs wcrc ncvcr rcmovcd lrom that numcrical lc lor rcl crcncc or lor any othcr purposc. Tat numcrical lc had two primary purposcs, onc to havc a solid lc ol what had bccn translatcd and disscminatcd and, two, thc primary purposc was to havc somcthing to which thc translators could turn in casc ol rclcrcnccs to back tra c whcn luturc mcssagcs wcrc rcccivcd. Vc had a vcry complctc and involvcd crossindcx systcm on 3 by 5 cards, covcring cvcry originator in thc Japancsc diplomatic scrvicc. 8y that ! mcan cvcry consulatc, cvcry cmbassy, cvcry lcgation that originatcd mcssagcs had thcir own scrial numbcrs lor thcir scrics ol mcssagcs. . . . From this basic numcrical lc thcrc was no occasion that ! know ol whcrc anything was rcmovcd or dcstroycd lrom that lc with thc cxccption ol thc lact that il it was dctcrmincd latcr, probably a lcw days or a wcck latcr, that wc had two idcnti cal mcssagcs, onc ol which was a duplication ol anothcr, whcn that was discovcrcd thc latcst numcrical lc numbcr would bc cancclcd as a duplication ol thc carlicr onc. . . . Vice Chairman: Vcll, could anybody havc gonc in thcrc and lchcd or stolcn all ol thc mcssagcs rclating to thc winds cxc cutc mcssagc and you havc known nothing about it: Kramer: ! dont scc how that would bc possiblc, sir, with this possiblc cxccption, that thc combination ol thc salc in which thcsc wcrc kcpt, thcrc was a copy ol that combination in a dou blcscalcd cnvclopc in somc ol thc lront o ccs. !l that cnvc lopc had bccn opcncd somconc clsc would, ol coursc, bc ablc to Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 779 opcn my salc. thcrwisc, thc only pcoplc who kncw thc com bination ol thc salc in which that particular lc was kcpt wcrc thrcc pcoplc, Licutcnant Harrison, thc thcn Chicl Ycoman 8ryant, and myscll. . . . From an cxamination ol thc lcs last Saturday in thc Navy cpartmcnt and this study, cxhibit 142, ol about a wcck or so ago . . . ! am as positivc as ! can bc that that lc numbcr 7001 could not possibly havc bccn any winds mcssagc. Tat is in addition to thc lact that ! havc absolutcly no mattcr ol any kind, no rccollcction, no knowlcdgc that a winds mcssagc was cvcr writtcn up by my scction. 165
Kcclc qucstioncd Kramcr about thc Japancsc govcrnmcnts 14part rcply. According to Kramcrs 1944 mcmorandum, Kramcr rccallcd rccciving thc rst 13 parts during thc altcrnoon ol cccmbcr 6. Hc had tricd by phonc to locatc 8cardall, Turncr, Vilkinson, and 8ratton. Hc had tricd, unsucccsslully, to rcach Stark. Kramcr said hc had dclivcrcd thc 13 parts to 8cardalls aidc at thc Vhitc Housc that Saturday cvcning. 166 Hc also told thc JCC that hc dclivcrcd thc 13 parts about 9:45 v.:. to Knox at thc Vardman Park and had thcn gonc to Vilkinsons homc in Arlington, \irginia, whcrc hc was having a dinncr party. |Kramcr dclivcrcd to Vilkinsons homc and 8cardall was thcrc. Kramcr thought Vilkinson MAY havc phoncd Stark and Turncr that cvcning.| Admiral Vilkinson was prcscnt, also Captain 8cardall |FRs naval aidc|. Kramcr said his mcmory had bccn rclrcshcd only quitc rcccntly to thc ccct that Gcncral Milcs was also prcs cnt. Kramcr had thcn rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt, bclorc going homc. 167
Hc was positivc that hc had not dclivcrcd thc 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply that cvcning cithcr to !ngcrsoll, thc assistant chicl ol Naval pcrations, or Turncr, chicl ol thc Navy Var Plans 165 !bid., part 9, p. 3939. 166 !bid., pp. 409697. 167 !bid., part 8, pp. 390304, 4025. 780 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ivision. Yct apparcntly Turncr had sccn it that cvcning, hc tcsti cd bclorc thc NC! that a rathcr long dispatch had bccn brought to him somc timc during thc vcry latc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 or thc carly morning ol cccmbcr 7. . . . |T|hc o ccr who brought thc dispatch to thc housc statcd that thcrc was a part ol thc mcs sagc missing . . . thc lattcr part. 168 Still Kramcr maintaincd hc had ncithcr tclcphoncd !ngcrsoll nor dclivcrcd to him dircctly any ol thcsc intcrccpts that night. 169
Kramcr hcld also that hc had not dclivcrcd thc 13 parts to Turncr, although hc had tcsticd to thc contrary. 170 Fcrguson rcad an cxccrpt lrom Turncrs JCC tcstimony, and Kramcr had to agrcc that Admiral Turncr kncw what hc was talking about. Howcvcr, Kramcr continucd to maintain that hc had madc no dclivcry to Turncr that cvcning. Hc would admit only that Turncrs rccollcc tion obviously dicrs lrom my rccollcctions. 171
Fcrguson clicitcd lrom Kramcr that hc had draltcd lor Noycs a cccmbcr 1 mcssagc conccrning Japancsc movcmcnts in Tailand, thousands ol milcs lrom any U.S. posscssions. 172
Fcrguson wantcd to know why, cspccially il Kramcr kncw noth ing about our policy in casc ol an attack by thc Japancsc on thc 8ritish, 173 hc lclt that wc should insurc that thcy |C!NCAF and C!NCPAC| got that picturc, sir, cvcn though thcy may havc rcccivcd it and rcad it on thc Asiatic station, thc 8ritish also at Singaporc, and thc unit at Honolulu. 174
168 !bid., part 9, p. 4027. 169 !bid., p. 4026. 170 !bid., part 4, pp. 197071. 171 !bid., part 9, p. 4029. 172 !bid., pp. 417576 (cxtcnsion #2027). 173 !bid., p. 4176. 174 !bid., p. 4175. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 781 Vhy would hc, Kramcr, scnd a mcssagc that involvcd thc 8ritish and thc Japancsc a thousand milcs lrom any ol our posscssions dircctly to thc inlormation ol CincPac, which was Admiral Kimmcl, 175 whcn hc had not scnt to cithcr thc Pacic or Asiatic Flcct thc ship movcmcnt mcssagc, which sct up a plan ol Pcarl Harbor, indicating what thcy wantcd it lor was an attack latcr. 176
Kramcr said that vcry mcssagc bcaring on ship movcmcnts, cithcr ol our Navy, our mcrchant marinc, or lorcign navics, spc cically ngland, was givcn high priority in my scction and all wcrc translatcd and disscminatcd by my scction. 177 Hc admittcd that thc Japancsc had uscd |this grid bombing map| lor all ship movcmcnts subscqucntly to sctting up ol this abbrcviatcd systcm ol rcporting ships in Pcarl Harbor. 178 Howcvcr, cvaluation . . . was ncvcr at any timc a lunction ol his scction. 179 Morcovcr, Kramcr pointcd out, Pcarl Harbor was not thc only basc thc Japancsc had bccn watching: 8ack in 1940, during thc coursc ol ncgotiations with thc utch in Java . . . thc Japancsc conductcd rathcr rigorous rcconnaissancc ol all military cstablishmcnts, not only in Java but in othcr islands ol thc utch ast !ndics. Tcy had also rcqucstcd inlormation on thc military cstablishmcnts, air bascs, cct lacili tics, in Panama and in part ol thc Vcstcrn Hcmisphcrc undcr Unitcd Statcs jurisdiction. Tc Japancsc diplomatic scrvicc, as wcll as thcir military and naval attachcs abroad, Kramcr tcsticd, wcrc vcry conscicntious pcoplc and rcportcd in mcticulous dctail all lacts that thcy could lcarn. . . . Tcy likcwisc rcportcd in grcat dctail thc air bascs in thc vicinity ol Scattlc and 8rcmcrton Navy 175 !bid., p. 417677. 176 !bid., part 12, p. 261, xhibit 2, p. 12, Tokyo to Honolulu Mcssagc #83. 177 !bid., part 9, p. 4174. 178 !bid., p. 4177. 179 !bid., p. 4178. 782 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Yard, sir, similarly on thc San Francisco arca. 180 Ncvcrthclcss, Kramcr could not point to any rcqucsts lrom thc Japancsc in thc lattcr part ol Novcmbcr or cccmbcr |1941| in rclation to San Francisco and Scattlc lor bombing maps ol any locations othcr than Pcarl Harbor. 181
Kramcr was on thc witncss stand lor vc long days (Fcbruary 611, 1946, Fcbruary 10 was a Sunday). Altcr hc nishcd tcstily ing, hc rcturncd to thc hospital whcrc hc rcmaincd until altcr thc committccs rcports wcrc rclcascd lor thc Sunday papcrs ol July 21. Tc ncxt month at agc 46, hc was givcn a mcdical dischargc and an untaxcd pcnsion. Hc maintaincd his silcncc on Pcarl Harbor throughout his rcmaining 26 ycars. Hc dicd in 1972. 8v~::ox, Av:v Couvivv, ox viivvvv ov J~v~xs Rvviv :o U.S. No:v ov Novv:nvv Coloncl Rulus 8ratton was anothcr kcy gurc in thc cvcnts ol cccmbcr 67. As Army couricr, hc had bccn Kramcrs coun tcrpart, chargcd with thc dclivcry ol thc Japancsc MAG!C intcr ccpts to thc Armys list ol o cials cntitlcd to scc thcm. Tcsc includcd Hull, Stimson, Marshall, Gcrow, and Milcs. 8rattons chicl assistant had bccn Coloncl Carlislc C. uscnbury. vcry timc 8ratton tcsticd hc changcd his story slightly in somc rcspccts. n Scptcmbcr 15, 1944, hc had told Coloncl Clarkc, who was conducting a spccial invcstigation lor Marshall, that Japans 14part rcply startcd coming in on thc 6th ol cccmbcr. !t was thcn his rccollcction that hc had transmittcd a copy to thc Sccrctary ol Statc that night. 182 Hc madc no mcntion ol any othcr dclivcrics that cvcning. 180 !bid., p. 4179. 181 !bid. 182 !bid., part 34, p. 21. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 783 n Scptcmbcr 30, 1944, whcn appcaring bclorc thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 8ratton tcsticd that hc had had thc bulk ol it |thc Japancsc rcply| sincc thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. !t camc in lourtccn parts. . . . Tirtccn ol thosc parts wcrc rcccivcd thc altcrnoon and cvcning ol thc 6th. 183 Hc said hc had dcliv crcd thc rst 13 parts to thrcc rccipicnts that cvcning: thc o cc ol thc Chicl ol Sta |actually Marshalls sccrctary, Coloncl, latcr Gcncral, 8cdcll Smith|, thc A.C. ol S. G2 |actually Gcrows cxccutivc o ccr, Coloncl Gailcy|, thc o cc ol thc Sccrctary ol Statc. 184 n July 27, 1945, in an a davit lor Clauscn, who was touring thc Armys scvcral thcatcrs ol opcrations undcr ordcrs ol Stimson to intcrvicw and collcct sworn a davits lrom pcrsons involvcd in somc way with Pcarl Harbor, 8ratton had givcn a still dicr cnt account ol thc cvcnts ol cccmbcr 67. Clauscn had shown 8ratton scvcral sworn a davits submittcd by mcn 8ratton kncw, somc ol thcm 8rattons supcriors in thc Army. 8ratton had intcr prctcd somc ol thosc a davits as dicring lrom his prcvious tcs timony, although on cxamination it is apparcnt that thcy wcrc not actual contradictions so much as mcrcly carclully craltcd cvasions. Howcvcr, thcy inucnccd 8ratton to rcvisc his statcmcnt. 185
!n his a davit lor Clauscn, 8ratton had said that, altcr rccciving thc rst 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply and asccrtaining that thc 14th part would not bc coming in that cvcning, hc had dircctcd uscnbury to dclivcr thc sct lor thc Chicl ol Sta at his homc at Fort Mycr. Tc a davit statcd lurthcr, in contradiction to his APH8 tcstimony, that hc had dclivcrcd only onc sct ol thosc 13 parts that cvcning himscll, thc sct dcstincd lor thc sccrc tary ol statc, which hc had lclt bctwccn 10 and 11:00 v.:. with 183 !bid., part 29, p. 2349. 184 !bid., pp. 2349 (Scptcmbcr 30, 1944), 2419, 242122 (ctobcr 2, 1944), and 2455 (ctobcr 6, 1944). 185 !bid., part 10, p. 4616. 784 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc night duty o ccr at thc Statc cpartmcnt. Hc also said in his a davit that thc scts lor thc othcr o cials on 8rattons list wcrc dclivcrcd thc ncxt morning, 7 cccmbcr 1941, with thc lour tccnth part. 8ratton had said that whcn hc saw Marshall that morning, Marshall had on his dcsk thc 14part mcssagc, which hc had not givcn him. Hc could not cxplain how it had rcachcd Marshall. According to 8ratton, Any prior statcmcnts or tcstimony ol minc which may bc con trary to my statcmcnts hcrc |thc a davit lor Clauscn| . . . should bc modicd and considcrcd changcd in accordancc with my statcmcnts hcrcin. Tis a davit now rcprcscnts my bcst rccollcction . . . altcr having my mcmory rclrcshcd in scvcral ways and rcspccts. 186
8y thc timc 8ratton was nally callcd to thc witncss stand by thc Joint Congrcssional Committcc, hc had bccn listcning lor months to thc sworn tcstimony ol witncsscs, somc ol whom had contradictcd onc anothcr, somc had cvcn contradictcd thcir own carlicr tcstimony, and somc had ocrcd to shouldcr thc blamc lor Marshalls possiblc dclinqucncics. 187 As thc bcwildcrcd 8ratton took thc chair on Fcbruary 14, 1946, suspcnsc pcrvadcd thc packcd hcaring room. viivvvv :o Tov vvici~is vvxixc ov vcv:nvv 6 ov J~v~xvsv Rvviv :o U.S. Ui:i:~:u: Rcspccting thc rcccipt ol thc Pilot Mcssagc, 8ratton con tradictcd thc tcstimony ol his Navy oppositc, Kramcr. Kramcrs rclrcshcd tcstimony was that thc mcssagc had not rcachcd him, rcady lor dclivcry, until about 10 or 10:30 Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7. 188 Howcvcr, it was undoubtcdly availablc to Navy 186 !bid., part 35, pp. 9698, 8ratton a davit. 187 !bid., part 3, p. 1036. 188 !bid., part 9, pp. 4015, 401819, 4022, 410102. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 785 o cials in Vashington on Saturday altcrnoon, lor scvcral Navy o ccrs tcsticd that it had bccn phoncd or distributcd to thc usual Navy rccipicnts by thcn. 189
8ratton told thc JCC thc mcssagc had rst comc to his attcn tion at about 2:00 v.:. on Saturday, that it had bccn translatcd by thc Army, typcd, and dclivcrcd to him. Hc thcn had it distributcd that altcrnoon about 3:00 190 to thc lull list ol pcrsons lor whom hc was rcsponsiblc. 191 8ratton said hc cvcn rccallcd discussing its contcnts with both Gcrow and Milcs. 192
!l thc Pilot Mcssagc had bccn dccodcd and distributcd on Saturday, as 8ratton tcsticd, thcn Vashington o cials would havc bccn on noticc that Tokyos rcply to our Novcmbcr 26 notc was on its way. Tcy cxpcctcd this rcply to bc a rcjcction ol our proposal, so thcy would havc had rcason to anticipatc a nal brcak with Japan, possibly thc outbrcak ol war, and would havc had somc opportunity to think about how bcst to rcspond. !l it had not bccn availablc until Sunday morning, as Kramcr said, thc top pcrsonncl would not havc bccn cxpccting Japans rcsponsc and would havc had littlc timc to anticipatc and dccidc how to rcspond to thc Japancsc thrcat. When thc rst 13 parts ol Japans rcply, which had bccn intcr ccptcd, dccodcd, and typcd up by carly Saturday cvcning, wcrc actually placcd in thc hands ol thc top Vashington o cials was crucial lor dctcrmining what wc kncw ol Japans intcntions prior to thc attack. 8ratton had tcsticd variously about his dclivcrics ol this intcrccpt. JCC Associatc Gcncral Counscl Kaulman askcd him about thcsc scvcral discrcpancics. Now, bclorc answcring your qucstion, 8ratton bcgan, 189 !bid., part 3, p. 1874, part 4, pp. 1761, 1874, 1972, 2056, part 10, p. 4668. 190 !bid., part 9, pp. 450912. 191 !bid., p. 4513. 192 !bid., pp. 4513, 4536. 786 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ! would likc to statc that this is thc lth timc ! havc appcarcd as a witncss in this Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, ! hopc it will bc thc last timc, but it is also thc rst timc that ! havc had an opportunity to cxaminc lcs, rccords and documcnts in thc Var cpartmcnt to rclrcsh my mcmory as to thc dctails ol various cvcnts and it is thc rst timc that ! havc had an oppor tunity to talk to thc pcoplc ! workcd lor and with at that timc. !n conscqucncc my mcmory as to thc dctails ol ccrtain cvcnts havc |sic| bccn grcatly improvcd. As to thc dctails ol ccrtain othcr cvcnts it is loggicr than cvcr lor thc rcason that ! havc hcard and sccn so many conicting argumcnts and statcmcnts hcrc and clscwhcrc sincc my rcturn to Vashington. 193
Rcturning to thc 13 parts: Tcrc arc scvcral dctails . . . that stand out vcry clcarly in my mind. . . . First, ! callcd up thc S!S |Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc| . . . to ask il thcrc was any likclihood ol thc lourtccnth part coming in latcr that night |cccmbcr 6|. . . . Altcr somc dis cussion in thc S!S, this o ccr rcturncd to thc phonc and hc said No, thcrc is vcry littlc likclihood ol that part coming in this cvcning. 8ratton kncw Hull had a strong intcrcst in this mcssagc, so hc put thc 13 parts in thc pouch, lockcd it, and dclivcrcd it pcr sonally to thc Statc cpartmcnts night duty o ccr somc timc altcr 10:00 v.:. Hc adviscd thc night duty o ccr that this was a highly important mcssagc as lar as thc Sccrctary ol Statc was conccrncd and it should bc scnt out to his quartcrs immcdiatcly. 8ratton was assurcd it would bc. 194
Tcn at about 11:00 v.:. 8ratton had rcturncd to his quar tcrs. From thcrc hc phoncd Milcss homc and was told hc was out. Vhcn Milcs got homc and rcturncd 8rattons call, 8ratton 193 !bid., p. 4510. 194 !bid., pp. 451314. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 787 dcscribcd thc 13 parts in guardcd tcrms and addcd that thc 14th and most important part had not yct bccn rcccivcd. Milcs said hc had sccn thc 13 parts whcrc hc had bccn a dinncr gucst. 8ratton also told Milcs that hc, Milcs, had dclivcrcd thc rst 13 parts to Hull. 195 Kaulman askcd 8ratton il Milcs had told him it wasnt ncccssary to dclivcr thc 13 parts to Marshall that night. 8ratton rcmcmbcrcd no such instructions. Kaulman thcn rcad into thc rccord Milcss JCC tcstimony, in which hc took lull rcsponsibility lor that . . . mcssagc not going to thc Chicl ol Sta that night. . . . ! kncw its substancc. ! did not considcr that it was ncccssary to arousc thc Chicl ol Sta at that timc ol night lor that mcssagc. 196
Altcr having this tcstimony callcd to his attcntion, 8ratton addcd: ! would likc to say lurthcr at this point that il thcrc was any crror ol omission or commission with rcspcct to thc dclivcry ol thc 13 parts ol that mcssagc Saturday night ol thc 6th ol cccmbcr 1941 to Army pcrsonncl thc crror was minc, and ! acccpt lull rcsponsibility lor it. 197 !n this way, both Milcs and 8ratton addcd thcir namcs to thc list ol thosc willing to takc thc rcsponsibility lor a possiblc lailurc on thc part ol Marshall. vxi~is nv Tov vvici~is Lv~b 8v~::ox :o oun: His ~viivv Tvs:i:oxv Tc pcrsons in thc Army who customarily rcccivcd MAG!C, 8ratton said, wcrc Marshall, Gcrow, and Milcs. And do wc havc it now, Kaulman askcd, that no dclivcry was madc to any ol thosc pcrsons othcr than to thc Sccrctary ol Statc and cxccpting 195 !bid., p. 4514. 196 !bid., part 3, p. 1554. 197 !bid., part 9, p. 4515. 788 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Gcncral Milcs who had alrcady sccn it at Admiral Vilkinsons housc: Tis is thc point 8ratton said at which his mcmory bcgins to go bad, hc could not statc positivcly whcthcr thcrc was any dclivcry madc that night or not at this timc. Hc had tcsticd bclorc thc APH8 that hc had madc dclivcry to thc Sccrctary ol thc Gcncral Sta, to thc night duty o ccr, or to Gcncral Gcrow and to Gcncral Milcs. Tat, 8ratton said, was his normal pro ccdurc. Hc tricd to makc simultancous dclivcry to all thcsc pcoplc. Howcvcr, whcn hc madc that statcmcnt to thc APH8 hc had not rcmcmbcrcd . . . that Coloncl uscnbury was work ing with mc in thc o cc that night. 198 Also Clauscn had shown him a numbcr ol sworn a davits collcctcd lrom various o ccrs: 8cdcll Smith, Gcncral Ralph Smith, Gcrow, Gailcy, and othcrs to thc ccct that thcy did not rcccivc thc 13 parts ol this mcs sagc lrom mc or lrom anyonc clsc Saturday night. Now, ! know all thcsc mcn. ! do not doubt thc honcsty and intcgrity ol any onc ol thcm, and il thcy say that ! did not dclivcr thcsc pouchcs to thcm that night, thcn my mcmory must havc bccn at lault. 199
Askcd by Fcrguson why hc had changcd his tcstimony, 8ratton rcplicd: !t was a combination ol lacts, sir. . . . My subscqucnt rccollcc tion that Coloncl uscnbury was at work with mc in thc o cc that cvcning . . . and thc a davits ol various o ccrs stating that ! did not makc dclivcrics to thcm on Saturday cvcning, and my rccollcction ol thc tclcphonc convcrsation with Gcncral Milcs at about hallpast clcvcn Saturday night, my subscqucnt con vcrsations with Coloncl uscnbury, with whom ! havc talkcd hcrc in Vashington, my convcrsations with Gcncral Gcrow, 198 !bid., p. 4515. 199 !bid. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 789 with whom ! talkcd hcrc in Vashington, my convcrsations with Gcncral Milcs bclorc hc appcarcd bclorc thc Committcc, all ol thcsc havc combincd to lcad mc to thc bclicl that thc cvidcncc that ! havc givcn bclorc thc committcc today is my bcst rccollcction ol thc lacts. 200
Altcr thc lcngthy qucstioning ol Saord, Kramcr, 8ratton, and all thc othcr o ccrs conccrncd, it was di cult to know just what to bclicvc. Tcir tcstimony had oltcn bccn conlusing and contradictory. Kramcrs tcstimony did littlc to clcar up thc mys tcry ovcr whcthcr a Vinds xccutc had bccn intcrccptcd bclorc cccmbcr 7or il it had bccn, what it had mcant. His tcstimony about thc Pilot Mcssagc raiscd qucstions as to whcthcr it was actually rcccivcd bclorc or altcr thc 14part rcsponsc itscll. And 8rattons tcstimony on thc dclivcry ol thc Japancsc intcrccpts during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 hclpcd littlc in clarilying thc situation. !x:vvcvv:s !xbic~:ixc !::ixvxcv ov V~v viivvvvb :o :nv Vni:v Housv vvxixc, vcv:nvv 6 At my suggcstion, committcc mcmbcr rcqucstcd a list ol all pcrsons who had bccn on duty at thc Vhitc Housc on cccmbcr 6 and 7. nc namc on that list was Navy Commandcr Lcstcr R. Schulz. n Fcbruary 12, 1946, whilc at sca aboard thc Indiana, Schulz rcccivcd ordcrs to comc to Vashington. 201 Vhcn hc arrivcd at thc Capitol, Scnator Fcrguson and Licutcnant Commandcr 8acchcr, assistant counscl and thc Navys liaison to thc committcc, took him asidc in a room adjoining thc chambcr whcrc thc hcarings 200 !bid., part 9, pp. 4597, part 10, 461112. 201 !bid., pp. 466869. 790 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy wcrc bcing hcld. 202 Vhcn thc scnator rcturncd to thc committcc tablc, hc said to mc sotto voce, Tis is it! Schulz had told his story about thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 to no onc cxccpt whcn hc had spokcn bricy with 8acchcr thc prcvious cccmbcr. Tis was his rst timc to tcstily, hc said. 203 Hc had ncvcr writtcn his cxpcricnccs down and had no notcs. 204
!n 1941 Schulz had bccn a Navy licutcnant in thc cc ol Naval Communications lor communications intclligcncc. Hc had rst cntcrcd thc Vhitc Housc on cccmbcr 5, on a tcmporary assignmcnt lrom thc communications division. n thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 hc had bccn on tcmporary duty at thc Vhitc Housc as a communications assistant to Naval aidc Captain 8cardall. 205 At about 4 v.:. 8cardall told Schulz to rcmain in thc o cc to rcccivc a spccial mcssagc lor thc prcsidcnt. 206 ||uring thc cvcning Captain Kramcr would bring up somc magic matcrial and that ! was to takc it and givc it immcdiatcly to thc prcsidcnt, Schultz tcsticd. Tc matcrial would bc in a lockcd pouch, and 8cardall gavc Schultz thc kcy so hc could rcmovc thc matcrial. 207
8cardall told him it was ol such importancc that thc prcsidcnt was cxpccting it. 8cardall himscll lclt at about 5:30 to attcnd a dinncr party. 208
Tis was thc rst timc in his scvcn months as FRs naval aidc that hc had bccn askcd to makc spccial arrangcmcnts to dclivcr a mcssagc to thc prcsidcnt altcr 5:30 or 6:00 in thc cvcning, i.c., altcr thc closc ol thc ordinary workday. 209
202 !bid., pp. 4666, 4669. 203 !bid., p. 4669. 204 !bid., p. 4664. 205 !bid., p. 4660. 206 !bid., p. 4668. 207 !bid., p. 4661. 208 !bid., p. 4668. 209 !bid., part 11, p. 5278, 8cardall tcstimony. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 791 Tc rst 13 parts ol thc Japancsc rcply wcrc in thc Navy cpartmcnt and rcady lor distribution by 9:00 v.:. on cccmbcr 6. 8clorc dclivcring thc lockcd pouch with thcsc 13 parts to any onc clsc, Kramcr took thcm to thc Vhitc Housc. 210
Schulz had bccn givcn a small o cc, not in thc Vhitc Housc propcr, but in a corncr ol thc mailroom in thc Vhitc Housc o cc building. At about 9:30 v.:. Kramcr camc in with a lockcd pouch, which hc handcd to Schulz. Schulz immcdiatcly took thc pouch ovcr to thc Vhitc Housc and obtaincd pcrmission to go up to thc prcsidcnts study on thc sccond oor. Hc was accom panicd by somconc lrom thc ushcrs o cc who announccd him to thc prcsidcnt. Tcn Schulz wcnt into FRs study alonc. Tc prcsidcnt was thcrc scatcd at his dcsk, and Mr. |Harry| Hopkins was thcrc, Schulz said. Hc told FR that hc was dclivcring thc matcrial which Kramcr had brought. 211
Schulz unlockcd thc pouch, took out thc papcrs, pcrhaps 15 typcwrittcn pagcs . . . lastcncd togcthcr in a shcal, and handcd thcm to Rooscvclt pcrsonally. According to Schulz, Tc prcsidcnt rcad thc papcrs, which took pcrhaps 10 min utcs. Tcn hc handcd thcm to Mr. Hopkins. . . . Mr. Hopkins thcn rcad thc papcrs and handcd thcm back to thc prcsidcnt. Tc prcsidcnt thcn turncd toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substancc . . . Tis mcans war. Mr. Hopkins agrccd, and thcy discusscd thcn, lor pcrhaps 5 minutcs, thc situation ol thc Japancsc lorccs, that is, thcir dcploymcnt. 212
Schulz was a young graduatc ol Annapolis, dcccnt and upright in appcarancc, his manncr opcn and lorthright. Tcrc could bc no doubting thc truth ol what hc was saying. Tc spcctators in thc 210 !bid., part 9, p. 4025. 211 !bid., part 10, pp. 466061. 212 !bid., p. 4662. 792 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy packcd hcaring room listcncd in complctc silcncc, straining to catch his cvcry word. Counscl Richardson askcd Schulz il hc could rcmcmbcr anything spccic that FR or Hopkins had said. Schulz could rcmcmbcr only a lcw words, but hc could say dcnitcly that thc substancc ol it was that! bclicvc Mr. Hopkins mcn tioncd it rstthat sincc war was immincnt, that thc Japancsc intcndcd to strikc whcn thcy wcrc rcady, at a momcnt whcn all was most opportunc lor thcm. . . . Tat is, whcn thcir lorccs wcrc most propcrly dcploycd lor thcir advantagc. !ndochina in particular was mcntioncd, bccausc thc Japancsc lorccs had alrcady landcd thcrc and thcrc wcrc implications ol whcrc thcy would movc ncxt. 213
Tc prcsidcnt mcntioncd having scnt a mcssagc to thc Japancsc cmpcror conccrning thc prcscncc ol Japancsc troops in !ndochina and rcqucsting thcir withdrawal. 214 Schulz did not scc Rooscvclts mcssagc, but hc rccallcd thc prcsidcnt quoting lrom this mcssagc that hc draltcd to thc ccct that hc had told Hirohito that hc could not scc how it could bc hcld that thcrc was any dangcr to pcacc in thc Far ast as lar as thc Unitcd Statcs was conccrncd il thcrc wcrc no Japancsc lorccs in !ndochina. !n othcr words, wc wcrc not going to attack !ndochina, nor was anyonc clsc. Tcrclorc thc prcscncc ol Japancsc lorccs in !ndochina was lor an aggrcssivc purposc or lor ultcrior pur poscs on thc part ol thc Japancsc. Vc oursclvcs hcld no thrcat lor !ndochina. 215
213 !bid., pp. 466263. 214 !bid., p. 4663. 215 !bid., p. 4671. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 793 Schulz continucd: Mr. Hopkins thcn cxprcsscd a vicw that sincc war was undoubt cdly going to comc at thc convcnicncc ol thc Japancsc, it was too bad that wc could not strikc thc rst blow and prcvcnt any sort ol surprisc. Tc prcsidcnt noddcd and thcn said, in ccct, No, wc cant do that. Vc arc a dcmocracy and a pcacclul pcoplc. Tcn hc raiscd his voicc, and this much ! rcmcmbcr dcnitcly. Hc said, 8ut wc havc a good rccord. 216
Schulz got thc imprcssion that wc would havc to stand on that rccord, wc could not makc thc rst ovcrt movc. Vc would havc to wait until it camc. 217
Tc only gcographic namc Schulz rcmcmbcrcd was !ndochina. Tcrc was no mcntion ol Pcarl Harbor. Tc timc whcn war might bcgin was not discusscd. |T|hcrc was no indication that tomor row was ncccssarily thc day, hc said. Schulz carricd that imprcs sion away bccausc it contributcd to my pcrsonal surprisc whcn thc ncws did comc. According to Schulz, Tcrc was no mcntion madc ol scnding any lurthcr warning or alcrt. 218
Altcr thc discussion to thc ccct that thc war was going to bcgin at thc convcnicncc ol thc Japancsc, thc prcsidcnt said hc bclicvcd hc would talk to Admiral Stark. Hc startcd to gct Admiral Stark on thc tclcphonc. !t was thcn dctcrmincd! do not rccall cxactly, but ! bclicvc thc Vhitc Housc opcrator told thc prcsidcnt that Admiral Stark could bc rcachcd at thc National Tcatcr. Schulz could not hcar what thc opcrator said, but hc did hcar thc National Tcatcr mcntioncd. Tc prcsidcnt thcn wcnt on 216 !bid., p. 4663. 217 !bid. 218 !bid. 794 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy to statc, in substancc, that hc would rcach thc admiral latcr, that hc did not want to causc public alarm by having thc admi ral pagcd or othcrwisc whcn in thc thcatcr, whcrc, ! bclicvc, thc lact that hc had a box rcscrvcd was mcntioncd and that il hc had lclt suddcnly hc would surcly havc bccn sccn bccausc ol thc position which hc hcld and unduc alarm might bc causcd, and thc prcsidcnt did not wish that to happcn bccausc hc could gct him within pcrhaps anothcr hall an hour in any casc. 219
According to Schulz, nothing was said about tclcphoning anybody clsc. To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc that is all that was discusscd. Tc prcsidcnt rcturncd thc papcrs to mc and ! lclt thc study. Schulz had bccn thcrc about a hall hour, hc lclt about tcn. 220
Hc thcn wcnt back to thc o cc ovcr toward thc Statc cpartmcnt. . . . on thc bascmcnt lcvcl. Kramcr was waiting. According to Schulzs rccollcction, hc rcturncd thc lockcd pouch to Kramcr. Tc happcnings during that particular pcriod arc somcwhat hazy but ! know that ! did not havc thc papcrs thc ncxt day. Furthcr, ! hadnt too suitablc a placc to put thcm during thc night bccausc ol thcir high sccrccy classication. . . . ! would not havc kcpt thcm undcr any circumstanccs. 221
Schulz phoncd 8cardall to inlorm him that ! had rcccivcd thc papcrs, thc prcsidcnt had sccn thcm and ! had carricd out my instructions. Schulz was thcn lrcc to go homc. Hc lclt thc Vhitc Housc at about 10:30. 222
Schulzs tcstimony dcmolishcd thc administrations claim ol shockcd surprisc at thc Japancsc attack. Thc cmocratic 219 !bid. 220 !bid., p. 4664. 221 !bid., p. 4665. 222 !bid., p. 4666. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 795 mcmbcrs ol thc JCC wcrc stunncd, thcy did not attcmpt to rcbut. His appcarancc was a highlight ol thc congrcssional invcstigation. Gvxvv~i M~vsn~ii ovs No: Rvc~ii His Ac:ivi:ivs S~:uvb~v Nicn:, vcv:nvv 6 Tcrc is no cvidcncc in thc JCC hcarings that FR actu ally summoncd his closcst aidcs to thc Vhitc Housc thc night ol cccmbcr 67. 8ut lor FR to call a mccting to discuss thc growing crisis would havc bccn consistcnt with his opcrational stylc, hc likcd to talk things ovcr with his associatcs. Marshall and Stark wcrc thc only oncs askcd il thcrc might havc bccn such a mccting, and thcir answcrs wcrc not vcry hclplul. 223
Keefe: Can you statc dcnitcly whcthcr or not you havc a prcs cnt rccollcction as to whcthcr thc prcsidcnt did in lact contact you: Marshall: ! am quitc ccrtain that hc |thc prcsidcnt| did not |contact mc|. . . . Tcrc is no qucstion in my mind, no. Tat is a positivc answcr. Keefe: And you arc ccrtain that you did not attcnd any mcct ing thcn, at thc Vhitc Housc that night: Marshall: ! am absolutcly ccrtain ol that. . . . So, all thc cvi dcncc, in my own mind, short ol my absolutc knowlcdgc ol thc mattcr, is that ! was homc, as was customary. . . . Keefe: 8ut you arc ccrtain ol onc thing and that is that you rcccivcd no communication lrom thc prcsidcnt on thc cvcning ol thc 6th ol cccmbcr and that you didnt attcnd any mccting at thc Vhitc Housc that night: 223 !bid., Marshall tcstimony, part 11, pp. 519394, Stark tcstimony, part 5, pp. 229192. 796 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Marshall: Tat is corrcct. ! will add that thc rst inlormation ! had ol anything unusual was, as ! havc tcsticd, altcr ! got into my showcr, or was going into my showcr |cccmbcr 7, ~.:.| whcn this mcssagc was rclaycd to mc lrom Coloncl 8ratton that hc wantcd to comc out to thc housc with an important mattcr. 224
Gearhart questioning Stark: Vhcn you lclt thc o cc on Saturday night didnt you lcavc word thcrc as to whcrc you wcrc going to bc and whcrc you could bc rcachcd on cccmbcr 6, 1941: Stark: Ycs, whcn ! wcnt out ! always lclt word. ! do not rccall ol any timc whcn ! did not. . . . ! do not rccall bcing out that night but ! also do not rccall whcthcr ! was out or not, so thcrc it is. . . . |!|l ! wcrc going out at night my aidc would usually lcavc word with thc duty o ccr whcrc ! could bc lound, assum ing that my intcntions to go out wcrc bclorc ! lclt thc o cc. !l altcr ! got homc ! suddcnly dccidcd to go out somcwhcrc, ! would lcavc word with thc housc and usually call up thc duty o ccr in addition. Gearhart: Vcll, havc you scarchcd thc rccords in thc o cc ol thc chicl ol Naval pcrations to asccrtain whcrc you wcrc on Saturday night, thc 6th day ol cccmbcr 1941: Stark: Vc havc lound nothing as to whcrc ! was and it lollows my assumption that my thought was that ! was at homc. Tcrc is nothing ! havc bccn ablc to nd out which locatcs whcrc ! was that cvcning. Gearhart: !n vicw ol thc lact that thc Chicl ol Sta |Marshall| cannot rcmcmbcr whcrc hc was on that night is it possiblc that you and hc could havc bccn togcthcr: Stark: ! think wc had no such conspiracy at that timc, sir. 224 !bid., part 11, p. 1594. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 797 Gearhart: Vcll, do you shut it out as bcing an uttcr impossibil ity that you and hc could havc bccn in cach othcrs company that night: Stark: ! do not shut it out as an uttcr impossibility that wc could havc bccn in cach othcrs company, but ! think wc wcrc not. Gearhart: You do not rcmcmbcr that. Stark: No, but ! lccl that pcrhaps wc both would havc rcmcm bcrcd it il that had occurrcd. Gearhart: Vcll, you not rcmcmbcring whcrc you wcrc ccr tainly you cannot rcmcmbcr that you wcrc not with Gcncral Marshall on that night, can you: Stark: Vcll, ! think that may bc a rcasonablc assumption. Gearhart: You wcrc togcthcr a grcat dcal all thc timc, wcrc you not: Stark: Vc wcrc togcthcr cithcr talking by tclcphonc or intcrol cc visits a grcat dcal during o cc hours. Vc wcrc not togcthcr a grcat dcal in thc cvcning. . . . ! havc hcard that an cort was madc to locatc mc. Gearhart: And you also havc lcarncd that a couricr callcd at your quartcrs and you wcrc not thcrc: Stark: No, ! havc not hcard that. Gearhart: id you havc any tclcphonc call that cvcning lrom Coloncl Knox, thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy: Stark: Not that ! rccall. 225
225 !bid., part 5, pp. 229192. 798 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tirty two ycars altcr thc attack, cvidcncc ol just such a cccmbcr 67 Vhitc Housc mccting surlaccd. !t camc in a lct tcr lrom Jamcs G. Stahlman, a longtimc lricnd ol Knox, thcn on activc duty in thc Navy. n his rcturn lrom Pcarl Harbor immcdiatcly altcr thc attack, Knox condcd to Stahlman that hc, Stimson, Marshall, 8ctty Stark and Harry Hopkins had spcnt most ol thc night bclorc |thc attack| at thc Vhitc Housc with FR, all waiting lor what thcy kncw was coming altcr thosc intcrccpts. 226
!x:vvcvv: Hvv~ibixc Ac:u~i Avvvo~cn ov V~v viivvvvb :o :nv N~vv Suxb~v Movxixc, vcv:nvv Saturday cvcning, with thc dclivcry ol thc rst thirtccn parts ol Japans 14part rcply to our notc ol Novcmbcr 26, it was appar cnt that war with Japan was immincnt. !t was thc ncxt morning, Sunday, cccmbcr 7, 1941, that thc Japancsc intcrccpts that hcr aldcd thc nal approach ol war wcrc rcccivcd in Vashington. Most notablc among thcsc wcrc thc lourtccnth part ol Tokyos rcply and thc nc v.:. Mcssagc giving thc Japancsc ambassa dors in Vashington instructions as to prcciscly how and whcn to dclivcr that rcply to Sccrctary ol Statc Hull. JCC mcmbcrs dcvotcd considcrablc timc to asking Navy couricr Kramcr about his Sunday morning dclivcrics. Kramcr had said in his 1944 mcmorandum that on his rst trip Sunday morning hc had sccn Stark with othcrs in his o cc |a|bout 0900 whcn hc, Kramcr, had lclt nightbclorc mattcrs, 227
including all lourtccn parts ol Japans rcply to our notc ol 226 Jamcs G. Stahlman lcttcr ol Novcmbcr 26, 1973 to Admiral Kcmp Tollcy. 227 Tc scqucncc ol Kramcrs cccmbcr 7 morning dclivcrics varicd slightly lrom account to account: At thc NC! ( Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, pp. 85860), in mid1944, hc said hc had dclivcrcd thc 13 parts plus part 14 and othcr ncw matcrial to (1) Stark, (2) thc Vhitc Housc and (3) Knox Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 799 Novcmbcr 26. Howcvcr, altcr talking it ovcr with pcoplc upon at thc Statc cpartmcnt. Tcn upon his rcturn to thc Navy cpart mcnt at 10:20, hc lound thc nc v.:. Mcssagc had bccn rcccivcd. n Fcbruary 6, 1946 bclorc thc Joint Committcc, hc tcsticd (ibid., part 8, pp. 390408) that hc had dclivcrcd all 14 parts to (1) McCollum, (2) Vilkinson, (3) Stark, possibly through McCollum and Vilkinson, and (4) dircctly to Knox, whom hc saw pcrsonally, at Statc. Hc had thcn rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt whcrc hc had cncountcrcd thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Tis account madc no mcntion ol dclivcring thc 14 parts to thc Vhitc Housc ( Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 390408). Kramcr tcstimony Fcbruary 6, 1946 at thc JCC: Richardson: Now, how carly did you go to thc o cc thc ncxt morning: Kramer: My rccollcction is it was vcry shortly altcr 7:30. . . . Tc normal o cc hours commcnccd at 8 oclock . . . ! lurthcr wantcd to bc at thc o cc carlicr that morning |cccmbcr 7| than usual bccausc ol thc likclihood that ! would havc to makc carlicr disscminations that morning than usual |latc morning|. . . . ! had a spccic appointmcnt to bc at thc Statc cpartmcnt by 10 that morning, on instructions lrom Sccrctary Knox. ! gathcrcd lrom convcrsation with Admiral Vilkinson that Admiral Stark would vcry likcly bc in Sunday morning, which was not a usual practicc. . . . it was an unusual thing lor Admiral Stark to bc thcrc on Sunday morning |italics addcd|. n a numbcr ol occasions that lall on Sunday morning ! had dclivcrcd loldcrs to his homc and had bccn rcccivcd in his study on thc sccond dcck, hc bcing in pajamas and drcssing gown on onc occasion having brcaklast. ! rccollcct that bccausc ! was ocrcd somc cocc. . . . Richardson: Now you got in your o cc around 7 oclock on Sunday morning. Kramer: Shortly altcr 7:30, is my bcst rccollcction. . . . |M|y rccol lcction is that thc lourtccnth part was thcrc shortly altcr ! got in that morning, or possibly whcn ! got in that morning. . . . ! was on a 24hour basis, and my translators wcrc also. ! had on at lcast two dozcn occa sions, during thc coursc ol 1941, bccn callcd to my o cc at odd hours ol thc night, somctimcs 2 or 3 in thc morning. ! had standing instruc tions with thc GY watch o ccr to call mc any timc thcy lclt a trans lator was rcquircd. . . . ! was thc ncarcst translator to my o cc, only 5 minutcs away in Arlington ncar Fort Mycr. ! thcrclorc put myscll in 800 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy his arrival in Vashington and altcr having had his mcmory rclrcshcd as to thc cvcnts, Kramcr rcviscd his tcstimony slightly as to his dclivcry timcs, hc said thcn that |a|ctually |hc| did not thc status ol bcing thc rst onc callcd rathcr than onc ol thc translators whosc homcs wcrc in outlying districts. . . . Richardson: Vhcn thc dclivcry was madc on Sunday morning thcn thc cntirc 14part mcssagc was dclivcrcd as onc mcssagc: Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir. . . . Somc dctails ol dclivcry bctwccn 8 and 9 oclock ! havc only in thc last month or so had my mcmory rclrcshcd on, in convcrsations with othcr o ccrs. Tc rst dclivcry, to my prcscnt bcst rccollcction, was madc to Commandcr McCollum, hcad ol thc Far astcrn Scction, Navy !ntclligcncc. . . . !t was probably about 8 oclock or a lcw minutcs altcr. . . . Anothcr dclivcry was madc, ! bclicvc, about a quartcr ol 9 to Captain McCollum also, or Commandcr McCollum thcn, whcn ! was inlormcd that Admiral Vilkinson had arrivcd at his o cc, and ! thcrclorc automatically dclivcrcd anothcr copy to Admiral Vilkinson. !t was about that timc, or shortly altcr ward that anothcr copy was dclivcrcd to Admiral Starks o cc. . . . Tat rst dclivcry to Admiral Starks o cc, ! bclicvc, was donc by cithcr Admiral Vilkinson or Captain McCollum. . . . My rst positivc rccol lcction ol sccing Admiral Stark is whcn ! was on my way to thc Statc cpartmcnt to kccp my 10 oclock appointmcnt whcn ! lclt a copy ol somc ol thc othcr tra c that had comc in in Admiral Starks outcr o cc. Tat was probably 9:30 or 9:40. . . . ! was at thc Statc cpart mcnt almost cxactly 10 minutcs ol 10. Richardson: And to whom did you makc dclivcry actually: Kramer: Actually to Mr. Knox dircctly. Hc camc in, as ! rccollcct, about 5 minutcs ol 10, a lcw minutcs altcr ! got thcrc, and wcnt into thc conlcrcncc room, Mr. Hulls o cc. . . . Tcrc was a bricl discussion bctwccn myscll, thc Army couricr, and Mr. Hulls privatc sccrctary in Mr. Hulls outcr o cc. !t lastcd probably not morc than 3 or 4 minutcs, and thcn ! hcadcd back lor thc Navy cpartmcnt. Richardson: Vhat timc did you rcturn to thc Navy cpartmcnt: Kramer: My bcst rccollcction is about 10:20. . . . n my arrival thcrc at 10:20, thc most striking rccollcction ! havc is thc rst sighting ol that mcssagc lrom Tokyo dirccting thc dclivcry ol this notc lrom Tokyo at 1 oclock v. :., cccmbcr 7, Vashington timc. . . . ! immcdi atcly instructcd by chicl ycoman to prcparc anothcr sct ol loldcrs so ! could makc immcdiatc dclivcry ol thcm. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 801 go to Admiral Starks o cc until about 9:30, although hc admit tcd hc was still a littlc hazy on prccisc timcs. 228
Vhcn Kramcr rcachcd Starks o cc on Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, all ol thc highcr Navy cchclon, including, Stark, Vilkinson, and Turncr, wcrc thcrc. Kramcr agrccd with Congrcssman Kcclc who was qucstioning him that Sunday was not usually a day lor thc big boys in thc Navy to asscmblc at thcir o ccs 229 and that thc arrangcmcnts lor such a group ol top lcvcl o ccrs to mcct that Sunday morning must havc bccn madc thc night bclorc. 230 !t was no lormal conlcrcncc, but many o ccrs wcrc in Admiral Starks o cc, and going and coming. Kramcr said, !t was in a similar manncr that thc normal 11:00 conlcrcncc was hcld morc or lcss daily in Admiral Starks o cc, similarly asscmblcd. . . . Howcvcr, it was no lormal conlcrcncc but a con tinuing discussion that Sunday morning. 231 Altcr making his rst round ol dclivcrics that Sunday morning, Kramcr rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt. Tcrc hc had cncoun tcrcd thc nc v.:. Mcssagc plus scvcral othcr intcrccpts 232
with nal words ol advicc and thanks to thc Japancsc ambassa dors lor thcir corts. Kramcr rccognizcd thc importancc ol thc nc v.:.Mcssagc immcdiatcly and this addcd spccial urgcncy 228 Joint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 9, pp. 410203. Kramcr tcsti mony. 229 !bid., p. 4097. Kramcr Fcbruary 9, 1946 tcstimony. 230 !bid., p. 4098. Kramcr Fcbruary 9, 1946 tcstimony. 231 !bid., p. 4105. Kramcr tcstimony. 232 !bid., p. 3997. !ncluding also thc Pilot Mcssagc, il 8rattons rclrcshcd JCC tcstimony is bclicvcd, although 8ratton docsnt mcntion it in his tcsti mony conccrning his Sunday morning dclivcry rounds. 802 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy to his sccond round ol dclivcrics. 233 !n his 1944 mcmorandum lor Admiral Halscy, Kramcr had dcscribcd in prctty mcticulous dctail 234 his hastc to dclivcr thc nc v.:. Mcssagc that Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7. !n his tcstimony bclorc thc NC! in 1944 Kramcr said that on this, his sccond trip ol thc morning, hc had rst dclivcrcd thc nc v.:. Mcssagc to Starks o cc bctwccn 1030 and 1100, sccondly to thc Vhitc Housc and nally to Navy Sccrctary Knox who was still in a mccting at thc Statc cpartmcnt with Sccrctary Hull. 235
233 !bid., part 8, pp. 390809. Kramcr tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc: Kramer: n my arrival thcrc |back at thc Navy cpartmcnt| at 10:20, thc most striking rccollcction ! havc is thc rst sighting ol that mcssagc lrom Tokyo dirccting thc dclivcry ol this notc lrom Tokyo at 1:00 v.:., cccmbcr 7, Vashington timc . . . ! immcdiatcly instructcd my chicl ycoman to prcparc anothcr sct ol loldcrs so ! could makc immcdiatc dclivcry ol thcm. . . . Just as ! was about to lcavc thc o cc, a plain languagc Japancsc mcssagc was scnt in to my o cc by thc GY watch o ccr that carricd, ! bclicvc thc socallcd hiddcn word mcssagc. . . . ! rccognizcd it as such lrom an cxtcrnal indicator, namcly thc word Stop at thc cnd, and rccognizcd thc rst word as bcing onc ol thc codc words rclcrring to ngland. !n scanning thc rcst ol thc mcssagc, as ! rccollcct, thc sixth or scvcnth word had anothcr codc word, which, incidcntally, wcrc all propcr namcs. Tc word was Hattori which, although ! rccognizcd |it| as a codc word, ! did not immcdiatcly rccall thc mcaning ol, and hastily rclcrrcd to thc list ol such codc words . . . intcrprctcd as rclations bctwccn Japan and (blank) country, to bc inscrtcd, was not in accordancc with cxpcctations. ! dictatcd to my chicl ycoman thc scnsc ol that mcssagc. 234 !bid., part 9, p. 4110. Kcclcs dcscription ol Kramcrs 1944 account. 235 !bid., part 33, pp. 85960. Kramcr tcstimony rc nc v.:. Mcssagc at thc NC! in mid1944: At thc NC!, Kramcr said that hc had rcturncd to thc Navy cpart mcnt altcr his rst dclivcry on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Tcrc hc had discovcrcd thc nc v.:. Mcssagc along with scvcral othcrs. Vithin tcn or ltccn minutcs hc was at Admiral Starks o cc. From thcrc hc had gonc to thc Vhitc Housc and then |italics addcd| to Statc, whcrc Knox and Stimson wcrc mccting with Hull. Kramcr said hc had not sccn Knox pcrsonally, but hc had madc a point ol vcrbally inviting Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 803 At thc JCC, hc changcd thc scqucncc ol his dclivcrics slightly, saying that altcr dclivcring rst to CN Stark, hc had dclivcrcd it sccondly to Knox at thc Statc cpartmcnt and thcn nally to thc Vhitc Housc. 236
Vhcn Kramcr tcsticd bclorc thc JCC about dclivcring thc nc v.:. Mcssagc to Navy Sccrctary Knox at thc Statc cpartmcnt, whcrc Knox was still mccting with Sccrctary ol Statc Hull, hc said that bclorc thc loldcr was takcn in to Mr. Hull thcrc was a bricl convcrsation . . . pointing out thc ticup ol thc timc 1:00 Vashington, with thc situation in thc Southwcst Pacic. Kramcr had talkcd with onc ol Mr. Hulls privatc sccrc tarics about that, also with thc Army couricr, hc thought it could havc bccn 8ratton who was thcrc at thc timc making dclivcry to Sccrctarics Hull and Stimson. 237
Saord had told thc NC! that whcn Kramcr madc dclivcry to Knox at thc Statc cpartmcnt on Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, Kramcr had scnt a notc via Knoxs pcrsonal aidc, a lorcign scr vicc o ccr, saying in ccct, that this mcans a sunrisc attack on Pcarl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila. 238
thc attcntion ol Mr. Knox through a Statc cpartmcnt Forcign Scrvicc ccr who rcgularly handlcd this matcrial lor Mr. Hull thc implications ol thc timcs. 1300 Vashington timc was 7:30 at Pcarl Harbor and a lcw hours bclorc sunrisc at Kota 8haru, whcrc thc Japa ncsc appcarcd to bc hcading. 236 !bid., part 8, pp. 390912. Kramcr tcstimony: Kramcr told thc JCC (part 8, pp. 391012) that hc had dclivcrcd thc nc v.:. Mcssagc to (1) thc Statc cpartmcnt whcrc hc had most cmphatically not spokcn with Knox, (2) thc Vhitc Housc, and thcn (3) back to thc Navy cpartmcnt. 237 !bid., part 8, pp. 3910, 3912. Kramcr tcstimony. 238 !bid., part 9, p. 4180. xccrpt rcprintcd lrom Saord NC! tcstimony. !bid., part 9, p. 3909. Kramcr tcstimony: Kramer: ! stoppcd o at Admiral Starks o cc |Stark was in his o cc, it was bctwccn 10:30 and 10:35|. . . . Tc o cc door was closcd. . . . Vord was scnt in . . . that ! had somcthing lor him. My imprcssions 804 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kramcr said hc had not thcn sccn Knox pcrsonally, and hc had most cmphatically not scnt him a notc. Tcrc was only thc vcrbal cxplanation. 239 Kramcr had not said that thc timc, 1:00, had any signicancc in conncction with any attack at Pcarl Harbor. 240 !t had bccn Saords intcrprctation, Kramcr said latcr, that turncd that rcmark into a rclcrcncc to Pcarl Harbor. carlicr havc bccn that it was his Flag Sccrctary, thcn Commandcr Vcll born. Tat has only quitc rcccntly bccn corrcctcd on that scorc sincc ! am inlormcd that Vcllborn was not thcrc that morning at all. My rccollcctions wcrc lully rclrcshcd in a convcrsation only in thc last lcw days with Captain McCollum to thc ccct that hc was thc onc who camc to thc door. ! distinctly rccollcct that now. ! lurthcr rccollcct pointing out to Captain McCollum thc ticup ol thc timc, 1:00 Vash ington, with thc schcmc that had bccn dcvcloping lor thc past wcck or so in thc Southwcst Pacic with rclcrcncc to Malaya and thc Kra Pcninsula. Captain McCollum rcactcd instantancously to my pointing that out. His rcactions, ! bclicvc, wcrc idcntical with minc. ! do not bclicvc our convcrsation lastcd morc than 10 scconds or so, and thcn ! hcadcd lor thc Statc cpartmcnt. !bid., part 8, p. 3910: |Arriving at Statc at about 10:45, Kramcr madc dclivcry to| onc ol thc privatc sccrctarics ol Mr. Hull. . . . 8clorc that loldcr was takcn in to Mr. Hull thcrc was a bricl convcrsation ol thc idcntical naturc that ! had had with Captain McCollum at Admiral Starks door, pointing out thc ticup ol thc timc 1:00 Vashington, with thc situation in thc Southwcst Pacic. Richardson: nc oclock Vashington mcant dawn in Hawaii, did it not: Kramer: !t was 7:30 in Hawaii, ycs, sir. Richardson: And was that lact pointcd out in your convcrsation with McCollum, and at thc Statc cpartmcnt: Kramer: !t was mcntioncd in passing, ycs, sir. 239 !bid., p. 3911. Kramcr tcstimony. 240 !bid., pp. 390912. Kramcr tcstimony: Qucstioncd by Richardson, Kramcr said: Tc primary point ol that |thc 1:00 dclivcry timc| was thc conviction, at lcast in my mind, that thc Japancsc intcndcd to carry out thcir plans against Kota 8haru, with thc intcntion and purposc ol lorcing thc hand ol thc Tai Prcmicr, Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 805 |T|hc rclcrcncc to Pcarl Harbor was purcly a passing rclcrcncc lor thc bcnct ol nonnaval pcrsonncl, namcly, thcsc lorcign scrvicc o ccrs and thc Army o ccr prcscnt. . . . |Hc| ncvcr intcndcd in thc lcast to imply that thosc rcmarks . . . indicatcd an attack on Pcarl Harbor, or, in lact, any ovcrt intcntion on thc part ol thc Japancsc dircctcd toward thc Unitcd Statcs. 241
Hc had only intcndcd to commcnt on how thc hour |1:00 v.:. T| ticd with thc sun and movcs in progrcss clscwhcrc, 242
Pibul, who had bccn maintaining, lor somc timc past, thc position that his country was ncutral, that any lorcign nation that invadcd his quar tcrs would bc considcrcd an cncmy, and that thc momcnt such an inva sion took placc hc would call on thc othcr party lor assistancc. 8y othcr party ! rclcr to Japan or to 8ritain. !bid., part 9, pp. 4110, 4116. xccrpts ol Kramcrs 1944 mcmorandum rcprintcd. Kramcr cxplaincd thc signicancc ol thc nc v.:. Mcssagc lor Knoxs bcnct, as hc oltcn had cxplaincd othcr Japancsc intcrccpts to thc Navy pcrsonncl authorizcd to scc thcm: Tc implications wcrc so obvious in thc light ol what wc know, that it was not ncccssary to statc that invasion ol 8ritish tcrritory was undoubtcdly schcdulcd lor 1300 (T), and that at lcast a complctc brcak with thc U.S. was schcdulcd simultancously. . . . ! rccollcct convcrsation only lor Mr. Knox bcnct rcgarding thc implications ol thc 1300 hour. ! distinctly rcmcmbcr that thc ticup ol thcsc timcs would bc apparcnt to cxpcricnccd naval o ccrs, but that a civilian (Mr. Knox) might ovcrlook it. Hcncc thc pains ! took to point it out at thc Statc cpartmcnt. ! rcpcatcd this point at lcast hall a dozcn timcs that morning to othcrs, chicy subordinatcs, ! think, but including onc ol Mr. Hulls sccrctarics who handlcd this matcrial lor him, to onc or two ol my o cc workcrs, and ! bclicvc also to Coloncl 8ratton |thc Army couricr| in Mr. Hulls outcr o cc, probably to Commandcr Vcllborn, and Admirals ag sccrctary, possibly to McCollum, and probably to you |Saord| too. 241 !bid., part 9, pp. 418082. Kramcr tcstimony. 242 !bid., p. 4180. Kramcr quoting lrom 1944 mcmorandum prcparcd lor Halscy. 806 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Altcr dclivcring thc nc v.:. Mcssagc at Statc, Kramcr had gonc to thc Vhitc Housc to dclivcr thc samc sct ol tra c. 243
!x:vvcvv: !xbic~:ixc Ac:u~i Avvvo~cn ov V~v viivvvvb :o :nv Av:v Suxb~v Movxixc n or about cccmbcr 10, 1941 Milcs and 8ratton draltcd a mcmorandum lor thc rccord, ol |thcir| rccollcction ol what took placc in Gcncral Marshalls o cc that morning ol cccmbcr 7. 244 8ratton had rclcrrcd to this mcmorandum whcn appcaring bclorc both thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard and Clarkcs invcsti gation. 245 Most ol 8rattons tcstimony bclorc thc JCC conccrning thc cvcnts ol this morning wcrc also bascd on that mcmorandum. 8ratton told thc JCC that thc lourtccnth part ol thc | Japancsc| mcssagc was not dclivcrcd to mc until bctwccn 8 and 9:00, around 8:15 or 8:30 on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. !t had thcn bccn dclivcrcd immcdiatcly to thc Statc cpartmcnt. 8ratton didnt rcmcmbcr whcthcr hc had takcn it himscll. !t is cntircly possiblc that ! may havc gottcn a car and rushcd ovcr thcrc with thc 14th part so that thc Sccrctary ol Statcs book would bc complctc. n thc othcr hand, ! may havc givcn it to Coloncl uscnbury to dclivcr. !n any cvcnt 8ratton kncw that thc Sccrctary ol Statc had all 14 ol thc parts bclorc 10 oclock that morning. 246
Hc continucd: |A|t about 9:00 or shortly bclorc 9:00 thcrc was placcd in my hands thc socallcd 1:00 v.:. dclivcry mcssagc. Tis immcdiatcly 243 !bid., part 8, p. 3911. Kramcr tcstimony. 244 !bid., part 29, p. 2347, APH8. 245 !bid., part 34, p. 19, Clarkc invcstigation. 246 !bid., part 9, p. 4516. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 807 stunncd mc into lrcnzicd activity bccausc ol its implications and lrom that timc on ! was busily cngagcd trying to locatc various o ccrs ol thc Gcncral Sta and conlcrring with thcm on thc cxclusivc subjcct ol this mcssagc and its mcaning. 247
8ratton said hc washcd my hands ol all othcr mattcrs, turning thcm ovcr to my assistant, Coloncl uscnbury, and procccdcd to takc stcps with thc 1:00 v.:. dclivcry mcssagc. Vhcn hc discovcrcd that ncithcr thc Chicl ol Sta |Marshall|, Chicl ol Var Plans ivision |Gcrow|, or G2 |Milcs|, wcrc in thcir o ccs |!| immcdiatcly put in a phonc call lor Gcncral Marshall at his quartcrs at Fort Mycr. nc ol his ordcrlics answcrcd thc tclcphonc and inlormcd mc that thc Gcncral had gonc horsc back riding. 8ratton askcd thc ordcrly to nd Marshall and tcll him who ! am and tcll him to go to thc ncarcst tclcphonc, that it is vitally important that ! communicatc with him at thc carlicst practi cablc momcnt. Tc ordcrly assurcd 8ratton hc would do so. 248
Hc thcn phoncd Milcs at his homc and told him to comc to thc o cc. Milcs camc in about 10:00. 8ratton discusscd this wholc busincss with Gcncral Milcs in his o cc. . . . So that Gcncral Milcs was thoroughly convcrsant with thc cntirc mattcr bclorc hc and 8ratton wcnt togcthcr latcr into Marshalls o cc altcr hc had arrivcd. 8ratton or Milcs had thcn phoncd Gcrow, although 8ratton said hc didnt rcmcmbcr sccing Gcncral Gcrow that morning until hc joincd us in Gcncral Marshalls o cc at about 11:25. 249
8rattons lrantic call had rcachcd Marshalls ordcrly shortly altcr 9:00, probably bctwccn 9 and 9:15. From that timc until 247 !bid., p. 4517. 248 !bid., p. 4524. 249 !bid., p. 4525. 808 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Marshall arrivcd in his o cc, 8ratton kcpt |Marshalls| copy |ol thc nc v.:. Mcssagc| in my hands until ! gavc it to |Marshall| in his o cc. 250 Marshall had rcturncd 8rattons call in pcrson somctimc bctwccn 10 and 10:30. 8ratton cxplaincd to him that ! had a most important mcssagc that hc must scc at oncc, and that il hc would stay whcrc hc was, ! would gct a car and bring it to him. 251 8ratton thought hc could havc gottcn thcrc in 10 minutcs. 252 Marshall rcplicd, No, dont bothcr to do that. ! am coming down to my o cc. You can givc it to mc thcn. 253
Marshall nally arrivcd about an hour latcr, at 11:25 ~.:. 8ratton couldnt cxplain why it had apparcntly takcn Marshall an hour or morc to rcach thc Var cpartmcnt, whcn it was nor mally a tcnminutc trip lrom his quartcrs to his o cc. 254 !t took Marshall only tcn minutcs to makc that samc trip in thc altcr noon altcr hc had hcard thc ncws ol thc attack. 255
Altcr his phonc convcrsation with Marshall, 8ratton wcnt up towards Gcncral Marshalls o cc, and stood around thcrc in thc hall, or in thc o cc ol thc sccrctary ol thc Gcncral Sta, waiting lor Gcncral Marshall to arrivc. Vhcn Marshall nally arrivcd at 11:25, hc wcnt into his o cc lrom thc door that opcns into thc hall and Gcncral Milcs and ! . . . not morc than a minutc or 2 minutcs altcr that walkcd in through thc othcr door. 256
8ratton was positivc that whcn hc rcachcd Marshalls o cc at 11:25, thc chicl ol sta had on his dcsk all 14 parts ol thc mcs sagc that 8ratton had not dclivcrcd to him. 257 8ratton was waiting 250 !bid., p. 4524. 251 !bid., p. 4525. 252 !bid., p. 4546. 253 !bid., p. 4525. 254 !bid., pp. 454850. 255 !bid., part 14, p. 1411, xhibit 39. 256 !bid., part 9, pp. 4546, 4573. 257 !bid., p. 4544. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 809 lor him with thc nc v.:. Mcssagc in his hand. Gcncral, hc said, ! havc a vcry important mcssagc hcrc which ! think you should scc at oncc. 258 8ut Marshall did not look up, hc had thc 14part rcply and was rcading it. 8ratton and Milcs tricd to intcrrupt him with this 1:00 v.:. dclivcry busincss but hc would not bc intcrruptcd, and hc wcnt right ahcad with his rcading until hc got to thc cnd ol thc 14 parts. 259 Marshall hurricdly draltcd his lastminutc warning to thc cld commandcrs. 260
8ratton had takcn this mcssagc to Coloncl Frcnch, Signal Corps o ccr in chargc ol thc mcssagc ccntcr, and had cxplaincd to him that it was Gcncral Marshalls dcsirc that thc mcssagc bc transmittcd to thc addrcssccs by thc lastcst possiblc salc mcans, giving thc Philippincs rst priority. 8ratton tcsticd that hc rcportcd back to Marshall, who askcd him to rcturn to thc mcs sagc ccntcr and nd out how long it would takc lor thc mcssagcs to rcach thc addrcssccs. Frcnch said thc mcssagc would bc cncodcd in about thrcc minutcs, on thc air in about cight minutcs, and in thc hands ol thc addrcssccs in about thirty minutcs. 261 8ratton chcckcd his watch, it was thcn 11:50 ~.:. 262 Tc mcssagc should bc in thc hands ol thc Army Signal ccr in Hawaii, still in codc, by 12:30 T7:00 ~.:. in Hawaii. nc important qucstion still rcmaincd unanswcrcd whcn 8ratton nishcd tcstilying: !l hc hadnt dclivcrcd thc 14part rcply to Marshall, how was it on his dcsk whcn hc arrivcd at 11:25 ~.:.: Gcarhart askcd 8ratton whcrc Marshall could havc obtaincd it whcn thc only placcs that thc 14 parts had bccn dcliv crcd bclorc that mccting at 11:25 was at thc Vhitc Housc and 258 !bid., p. 4573. 259 !bid., p. 4547. 260 !bid., part 3, p. 1112. 261 !bid., part 9, p. 4554. 262 !bid., p. 4555. 810 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy thc Statc cpartmcnt and to Admiral Stark. 263 Had Marshall obtaincd a copy mcssagc lrom Stark or thc Vhitc Housc, whcrc Kramcr had madc dclivcrics that morning: 264 id 8rattons assis tant, uscnbury, dclivcr it to onc ol Marshalls sccrctarics, pos sibly Coloncl canc, carlicr that morning, as 8ratton said hc might havc: 265 r could hc havc gottcn a copy ol thc rst 13 parts at thc Vhitc Housc during thc night, possibly lrom Hull lor whom 8ratton had dclivcrcd thcm to thc Statc cpartmcnt, or lrom Knox to whom Kramcr had dclivcrcd in his Vardman Park apartmcnt: FR had not kcpt copics ol thc mcssagcs dclivcrcd to him Saturday cvcning. M~vsn~iis Suxb~v Movxixc Vnvvv~nou:s Anothcr unanswcrcd qucstion conccrns Marshalls whcrc abouts on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Hc was supposcdly on duty 24 hours a day. !l unavailablc lor somc rcason, an aidc or duty o ccr should havc bccn ablc to rcach him at any momcnt. Yct 8ratton told thc JCC that whcn hc callcd his quartcrs at about 9:00 Sunday morning in thc attcmpt to dclivcr thc urgcnt nc v.:. Mcssagc, hc was told Marshall was out horscback riding. 266
Vhcrc was Marshall during thc hour and a hall bctwccn 10 or 10:30 ~.:., whcn hc rcturncd 8rattons 9:00 call, and 11:25 whcn hc arrivcd in his o cc: Marshall may havc gonc horscback riding carlicr, but whcrc was hc whcn hc callcd 8ratton: 8ratton assumcd hc was still at his quartcrs at Fort Mycr. 8ut was hc: Pcrhaps hc was calling lrom somcwhcrc clsc and that was why hc had told 8ratton not to drivc out, but to wait in his o cc. id hc 263 !bid., p. 4547. 264 !bid., pp. 454445, 4547. 265 !bid., pp. 454748, 4573. 266 !bid., p. 4524. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 811 call lrom somcwhcrc in thc Var cpartmcnt: From Starks o cc in thc Navy cpartmcnt: Tc Vhitc Housc: nc rcport ol Marshalls whcrcabouts that morning comcs lrom thcn Coloncl (latcr Major Gcncral) John R. canc. n thc day ol thc attack, canc was onc ol thc sccrctarics ol thc gcn cral sta. Marshall had askcd him to comc in to thc o cc that Sunday morning to writc a oncpagc statcmcnt on thc numbcr ol plancs and antiaircralt guns in thc Unitcd Statcs. Marshall wantcd that inlormation to rclcr to during his schcdulcd appcar ancc bclorc a congrcssional committcc thc ncxt day. Latcr, in dcscribing thc cvcnts ol thc day, canc wrotc that Marshall had arrivcd at thc o cc at about 10:00 or shortly thcrcaltcr and had a scrics ol conlcrcnccs with sta o ccrs lrom G2 and thc Var Plans ivision. 267
So Marshall could havc phoncd 8ratton lrom thc Var cpartmcnt at 10:00. 8ut why would Marshall not want to tcll 8ratton whcrc hc was: Vhy would hc want to conccal his activi tics that morning: Vould thcy havc dcstroycd thc myth that thc Japancsc attack was uncxpcctcd: r was somc dcvious schcmc aloot that would havc ruincd thc nations rcputation as a pcacc loving nation il it had bccomc known: Somc ycars latcr in an intcrvicw (May 3, 1961), Captain Arthur H. McCollum, at thc timc ol thc attack chicl ol thc Far astcrn scction ol thc Navys communications division, told mc that hc kncw nothing about thc JCC tcstimony rcporting Marshall out horscback riding that Sunday morning, but hc was willing to swcar that hc had sccn Marshall coming out ol Starks o cc at around 9:30. 267 !bid., part 14, p. 1411, xhibit 39, canc Junc 8, 1942, mcmorandum about thc cvcnts ol thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, 1941. 812 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy S:~vx C~xxo: Rvc~ii His S~:uvb~v vvxixc Vnvvv~nou:s ov ~viv Suxb~v Movxixc Ac:ivi:ivs Likc Marshall, Stark was supposcd to bc availablc 24 hours a day, il hc was not homc or in his o cc, an aidc or duty o ccr should havc bccn ablc to locatc him at any timc. Yct Kramcr, who had phoncd Starks homc Saturday cvcning about thc 13 parts, had not bccn ablc to rcach him. Vilkinson tcsticd that hc had also tricd, unsucccsslully, to tclcphonc Stark at his homc that cvcning. 268
Askcd during thc JCC hcarings whcrc hc had bccn thc night bclorc thc attack, Stark rcplicd, Nobody rcachcd mc |that cvcning|. . . . ! thought ! was homc but il thcy had tricd to rcach mc ! should havc bccn thcrc. Also il ! wcrc not thcrc word would havc bccn lclt whcrc ! was. Also thc duty o ccr was gcncrally inlormcd ol my whcrcabouts. 269
Stark tcsticd that hc had tricd to chasc down scvcral lcads in thc attcmpt to discovcr whcrc hc had bccn that cvcning. Unlortunatcly, hc said, his wilc had dcstroycd hcr datc calcndar ol that timc. . . . Vc havc lound nothing as to whcrc ! was and it lollows my assumption that my thought was that ! was at homc. Tcrc is nothing ! havc bccn ablc to nd out which locatcs whcrc ! was that cvcning. 270
Gcarhart askcd Stark: !n vicw ol thc lact that thc Chicl ol Sta cannot rcmcmbcr whcrc hc was on that night is it possiblc 268 !bid., part 4, pp. 1762, 1874. 269 !bid., part 5, p. 2183. 270 !bid., p. 2291. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 813 that you and hc could havc bccn togcthcr: Stark thought thcy had no such conspiracy at that timc. Hc did not shut it out as an uttcr impossibility that wc could havc bccn in cach othcrs company, but ! think wc wcrc not. . . . Vc wcrc togcthcr cithcr talking by tclcphonc or intcro cc visits a grcat dcal during o cc hours. Vc wcrc not togcthcr a grcat dcal in thc cvcning. 271
JCC gcncral counscl Mitchcll told Stark that, according to thc rccord, Knox and Vilkinson had both rcccivcd Japans rst 13 parts during thc cvcning. As a rcsult, Knox had madc an appoint mcnt lor thc ncxt morning with Stimson and Hull. Yct Stark said hc had no rccollcction ol having sccn or hcard ol thc pilot mcssagc announcing that thc Japancsc rcply would soon bc cn routc, his rst inlormation on that scorc, hc said, was Sunday lorcnoon. 272 Stark also insistcd hc had not hcard anything at all that cvcning about thc 14part mcssagc. Hc was askcd by JCC mcmbcrs whcn hc had gonc to his o cc on Sunday morning. Hc didnt answcr dircctly. ! can only gucss on that. . . . ! usually got down to thc o cc Sunday mornings around 10:30 and ! just assumcd that ! had gottcn thcrc somcwhcrc around 10:30 or 11:00. ! was lazy on Sunday mornings unlcss thcrc was somc spccial rcason lor gct ting up carly. ! usually took a walk around thc grounds and grccnhousc at thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations quartcrs and didnt hurry about gctting down and my usual timc, as ! rccall, was about 10:30 or 11:00. Vhat timc it was on this particular Sunday morning ! couldnt go bcyond that. 273
271 !bid., pp. 229192. 272 !bid., p. 2183. 273 !bid. 814 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy According to Stark, thcrclorc, it was about 10:30 or 11altcr hc rcachcd his o cc that morningthat hc saw thc 14part Japancsc rcply. !t was thcn also, hc said, that hc had lcarncd that thc Japancsc ambassadors had bccn dircctcd to prcscnt his gov crnmcnts rcply to thc Sccrctary ol Statc at 1:00 v.:. that samc day. 274 Stark said hc had discusscd thc Japancsc rcply and thc timc ol its prcscntation with Navy Captain Schuirmann, Statc cpartmcnt liaison. 275 Howcvcr, scvcral othcr witncsscs told ol sccing Stark in his o cc much carlicr than 10:30 or 11:00. Kramcr told thc 1944 Naval Court ol !nquiry that hc madc thc hurricd dclivcry ol thc 14part Japancsc rcply to Stark in his o cc at about 9:00 ~.:. on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. 276 Stark had not bccn alonc, hc said, thcrc wcrc thcn about 12 or 15 o ccrs prcs cnt. Most ol thc hcads ol divisions in thc Navy cpartmcnt and thosc that attcndcd thc Admirals conlcrcncc wcrc thcrc. Kramcr was rclicvcd that Vilkinson was thcrc bccausc Kramcr could lct him carry thc ball with Admiral Stark as lar as any lurthcr cxpla nation ol rclcrcnccs wcrc conccrncd. 277
!n Fcbruary 1946 bclorc thc JCC, Kramcr changcd his story slightly. Hc tcsticd: As soon as this 14th part was typcd up . . . shortly altcr 8:00, dclivcry was madc to Captain McCollum along with thc othcr 13 parts. 278 Kramcrs 1946 rccollcction was that it was about 9:30 that all lourtccn parts wcrc dclivcrcd to Starks o cc. 279
Vilkinson also tcsticd bclorc thc JCC that Stark was in his o cc carlicr that Sunday morning than 10:30 or 11:00, Starks usual arrival timc. Vilkinson had rcachcd his own o cc shortly 274 !bid., p. 2184. 275 !bid. 276 !bid., part 33, p. 865. 277 !bid. 278 !bid., part 9, p. 4006. 279 !bid., part 9, p. 4038. Kramcr tcstimony bclorc thc Joint Committcc. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 815 altcr 8:00 on thc morning ol Sunday, thc 7th. Hc thought it was about 9:15 whcn hc and McCollum wcnt to thc o cc ol thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations |Stark|, whcrc, hc rccallcd, Admiral Stark, Admiral !ngcrsoll, and Admiral Turncr wcrc prcscnt. 280
!n any cvcnt, hc was quitc clcar that Stark had rcad thc 14part mcssagc in its cntircty by 9:15 or 9:30. Vilkinson was struck by thc ghting words in thc 14th part. Hc was morc imprcsscd by that languagc than by thc brcaking o ol ncgotiations and hc had pointcd out to Stark thc scriousncss ol that languagc. 281
Vilkinson bclicvcd thc Japancsc wcrc going to prcss on in thc dircction ol thc advancc which thcy wcrc thcn lollowing in thc South Sca and that somcthing might bc cxpcctcd in that or othcr dircctions. Hc was particularly conccrncd that, in vicw ol this strong languagc, thc cct should bc adviscd ol thc latcst dcvclopmcnt. According to Vilkinson, Stark had thc author ity to act. Vilkinson thought Stark should act. 8ut Stark did not act. 282
!t would ccrtainly appcar that Stark was in his o cc and had sccn thc 14part rcply and cvcn thc nc v.:. Mcssagc scvcral hours bclorc thc Japancsc ambassadors dclivcry dcadlinc. Yct, cxccpt lor thc asscmbly ol an unusual numbcr ol naval o ccrs, thc apparcnt lack ol any scnsc ol urgcncy in Starks o cc con trastcd sharply with thc lrantic activity in Marshalls o cc at thc last minutc, altcr hc nally arrivcd thcrc at 11:25. 283
Stark said that whcn Marshall phoncd him at about 11:40 and askcd what ! thought about scnding thc inlormation con ccrning thc timc ol prcscntation on to thc various commandcrs in thc Pacic, Starks rst rcsponsc was that wc had scnt thcm so much alrcady that ! hcsitatcd to scnd morc. A minutc or so latcr, 280 !bid., part 36, p. 236. 281 !bid., part 4, pp. 176667. 282 !bid., p. 1800. 283 !bid., part 5, pp. 213233. 816 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Stark callcd Marshall back and told him thcrc might bc somc pcculiar signicancc in thc Japancsc Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at 1:00 v.:. and askcd him to includc instructions to his Army pcoplc to inlorm thcir naval oppositcs. 284
Pv~vi H~vnov A::~cx No: ~ Co:viv:v Suvvvisv :o FR Furthcr cvidcncc that thc attack did not takc thc adminis tration by complctc surprisc is rcvcalcd in FRs lcttcr, dictatcd cccmbcr 5, to Vcndcll Villkic, dclcatcd 1940 Rcpublican prcs idcntial candidatc. !n that lcttcr, FR had suggcstcd that Villkic visit Australia and Ncw Zcaland as spccial rcprcscntativc ol thc prcsidcnt. !t would, ol coursc, bc ol rcal valuc to ccmcnt our rclations with Ncw Zcaland and Australia and would bc usclul not only now but in thc luturc. Tcrc is always thc Japancsc mattcr to considcr. Tc situation is dcnitcly scrious and thcrc might bc an armcd clash at any momcnt il thc Japancsc continucd thcir lorward progrcss against thc Philippincs, utch !ndics or Malays or 8urma. Pcrhaps thc ncxt lour or vc days will dccidc thc mattcr. Altcr thc attack, bclorc mailing, thc prcsidcnt had addcd in longhand: Tis was dictatcd Friday morninglong bclorc this vilc attack startcd. F..R. 285
Co::i::vv Abjouvxvb Tc committcc, crcatcd by a Scnatc Rcsolution ol Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, had hcld its rst opcn hcarings on Novcmbcr 15, 1945. 8y thc timc Commandcr Schulz appcarcd on Fcbruary 15, 1946, 284 !bid., part 5, p. 2133, Stark opcning statcmcnt. 285 !bid., part 17, p. 2457, xhibit 111, part 6, p. 2495. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 817 most ol thc principals involvcd in thc attack had bccn hcard lrom. Tc hcarings continucd a lcw morc days and a lcw morc pcrsons wcrc qucstioncd. Finally thc committcc mcmbcrs dccidcd it was timc to wind up thcir hcarings. !n closing Chairman 8arklcy con gratulatcd thc mcmbcrs: ||n thc wholc thc attcndancc ol this committcc and thc intcrcst it has manilcstcd in thc tcstimony ol all thc witncsscs has bccn cxtraordinary. Tc committcc adjourncd Fcbruary 20, 1946, subjcct to rccall by thc chairman. 286
Co::i::vv Rvcoxvvxvb :o Hv~v Tvs:i:oxv vv vcv:nvv 6 Vnvvv~nou:s ov S:~vx ~xb M~vsn~ii n April 9 8arklcy rcconvcncd thc committcc to qucs tion Stark and Marshall oncc morc as to thcir whcrcabouts on cccmbcr 67. 287
Marshall had bccn appointcd ambassador to China by Prcsidcnt Truman in Novcmbcr 1945, but was back in Vashington lor a bricl visit in April 1946. At that timc hc appcarcd oncc morc bclorc thc committcc. 8rcwstcr askcd Marshall, among othcr things, to cxplain why, in vicw ol all prcattack considcrations and lactors, hc had not cxpcctcd an attack on Pcarl Harbor. Marshall said hc had lclt that was a vital installation. . . . |T|hat was thc only installa tion wc had anywhcrc that was rcasonably wcll cquippcd. . . . !n our opinion, thc commandcrs had bccn alcrtcd. !n our opinion, thcrc was nothing morc wc could givc thcm at thc timc lor thc purposc ol dclcnsc. !n our opinion, that was onc placc that had cnough within itscll to put up a rcasonablc dclcnsc. 286 !bid., part 10, pp. 515051. 287 !bid., part 11, p. 5153. 818 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy MacArthur, in thc Philippincs, was just bcginning to gct somc thing. His position was pitiablc, and it was still in a statc ol complctc ux, with thc ships on thc occan cn routc out thcrc and thc plancs hall dclivcrcd and hall still to go. Tc Panama Canal was quitc inadcquatc at that pcriod, scri ously inadcquatc in plancs, and, ol coursc, ol vast importancc to anything in thc Pacic. Tc only placc wc had any assurancc about was Hawaii, and lor that rcason wc had lcss conccrn about Hawaii. . . . |V|c had workcd on it vcry industriously . . . and wc lclt rcasonably sccurc at that onc point. 288
Vhcn Marshall was in Vashington tcstilying, Fcrguson in thc mcns room in thc Capitol ovcrhcard him talking with 8arklcy. Fcrguson did not scc thc two mcn, but hc rccognizcd thcir voiccs and hcard Marshall tcll 8arklcy that il Marshall wcrc to say whcrc hc was on thc night ol cccmbcr 67, it would gct thc Chicl (FR) in troublc. 289
Tcsc rcmarks may also havc sparkcd thc lollowing linc ol qucstioning by Kcclc. Hc rcmindcd Marshall that on Saturday cvcning, altcr thc prcsidcnt had rcad thc rst 13 parts, hc had turncd to Hopkins saying, in substancc, Tis mcans war. Tc Prcsidcnt had thcn tricd to gct in touch with Stark. 288 !bid., part 11, pp. 518687. 289 Tis story, rclatcd to mc by Fcrguson, lcnds crcdcncc to Stahlmans asscr tion that Marshall and Stark along with Knox, Stimson, and Hopkins, had spcnt most ol thc night bclorc |thc attack| at thc Vhitc Housc with FR. Scc Jamcs G. Stahlmans Novcmbcr 26, 1973 lcttcr to Admiral Kcmp Tollcy (copy in authors lcs). Scvcral attcmpts wcrc madc in thc coursc ol thc JCC hcarings to dctcrminc il thcrc had bccn such a Vhitc Housc mccting. Scc lor instancc thc qucstioning ol Marshall. !bid., part 3, pp. 1110 and part 11, p. 5193. And thc intcrlocutory with Stark at part 11, p. 5549. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 819 Keefe: Can you statc dcnitcly whcthcr or not you havc a prcs cnt rccollcction as to whcthcr thc Prcsidcnt did in lact contact you: Marshall: ! am quitc ccrtain that hc did not. . . . Tcrc is no qucstion in my mind, no. Tat is a positivc answcr. Keefe: And you arc ccrtain that you did not attcnd any mcct ing thcn, at thc Vhitc Housc that night: Marshall: ! am absolutcly ccrtain ol that. . . . ! might say that . . . not only had ! no dinncr cngagcmcnts ol any kind bctwccn thc 1st ol Novcmbcr and thc 7th ol cccmbcr . . . but that Mrs. Marshall was convalcscing lrom having brokcn thrcc or lour ribs and wc didnt go out anywhcrc. . . . So all thc cvidcncc . . . is that ! was homc, as was customary. . . . Keefe: Tat is your prcscnt rccollcction: . . . Marshall: ! cant say that is my rccollcction. ! am ccrtain ! was at homc, but ! dont rccall anything about it. Keefe: 8ut you arc ccrtain ol onc thing and that is that you rcccivcd no communication lrom thc prcsidcnt on thc cvcning ol thc 6th ol cccmbcr and that you didnt attcnd any mccting at thc Vhitc Housc that night: Marshall: Tat is corrcct. 290
Vhcn askcd about thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, Marshall rcpcatcd his account ol his Sunday morning routinc. Hc said thc rst inlormation ! had ol anything unusual was . . . altcr ! got into my showcr, or was going into my showcr whcn 290 !bid., part 11, pp. 519394. 820 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy this mcssagc was rclaycd to mc lrom Coloncl 8ratton that hc wantcd to comc out to thc housc with an important mattcr. 291
Vhcn Stark appcarcd bclorc this rcconvcncd scssion ol thc JCC, his mind still drcw a blank as to whcrc hc had bccn or what hc had bccn doing Saturday cvcning. Hc rcmcmbcrcd vcry clcarly having sccn a rcvival ol Te Student Prince, but ! had not conncctcd it with that Saturday night. Nor did hc now. My rcc ollcction was it was in Philadclphia that hc had sccn thc rcvival and hc had contactcd my daughtcr and hcr husband who wcrc thcrc, and thcy said no. Tc ncxt ! hcard ol it was in conncction with Commandcr Schulzs tcstimony. 8ut cvcn that did not ring any bcll with him. Hc could only assumc, in vicw ol thc tcsti mony ol Commandcr Schulz and ol othcrs who tricd to contact mc . . . that ! probably was thcrc. 292 And Stark did not rcmcmbcr hcaring lrom thc prcsidcnt that cvcning. To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc and bclicl, thc prcsidcnt did not call mc that night. Nor did hc think hc had lcarncd thcn that thcrc was a dispatch down thcrc |at thc Vhitc Housc| which was clcarcut and which mcant war. 293 !n any cvcnt, hc was absolutcly ccrtain that hc did not go to thc Vhitc Housc that night, cccmbcr 6 and that hc did not scc thc rst 13parts ol thc Jap 14part mcssagc that night. 294
Stark pcrsistcd in saying that his visit to thc o cc Sunday morning had bccn routinc. 295 Hc did not rccall mccting thcrc that morning with various o ccrs, as Kramcr and Vilkinson had tcsticd that hc had. 296
291 !bid., pp. 5191, 5194. 292 !bid., p. 5154. 293 !bid., pp. 5157, 5159. 294 !bid., p. 5232. 295 !bid., p. 5155. 296 !bid., p. 5163. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 821
n April 11, 1946, altcr introducing additional matcrial on thc rccord, thc committcc stood adjourncd subjcct to thc call ol thc Chair. 297 Howcvcr, on May 23, it rcopcncd to acccpt a lcw morc documcnts. Among othcr matcrials, Fcrguson introduccd lor thc rccord writtcn statcmcnts lrom lormcr Sccrctary ol Statc Hull 298 and lormcr Sccrctary ol Var Stimson. 299 Stimsons notcs lor cccmbcr 7 dcscribcd a mccting with Hull and Knox that morning and told ol his position that thc main thing is to hold thc main pcoplc who arc intcrcstcd in thc Far ast togcthcrthc 8ritish, oursclvcs, thc utch, thc Australians, thc Chincsc. For thc rccord, Stimson attachcd copics ol thc statcmcnts cxprcssing similar scntimcnts hc had solicitcd that morning lrom Hull and Knox. 300
Vith thc introduction ol thcsc documcnts, thc hcarings wcrc o cially closcd and thc committcc stood adjourncd, subjcct to call by thc Chair. 301
JCC Hv~vixcs Rvovvxvb Ac~ix :o Hv~v ~x Accoux: ov S:~vxs vcv:nvv 6 vvxixc Although o cially closcd, thc committcc rcopcncd oncc morc on May 31, 1946, at thc spccial call ol 8arklcy. Stark had writtcn 8arklcy a lcttcr advising that hc had nally bccn rcmindcd ol his 297 !bid., part 11, p. 5364. 298 !bid., pp. 5367416, Rcplics to !ntcrrogatorics Propoundcd by thc Honor ablc Homcr Fcrguson. 299 !bid., pp. 541640, 544163, Sccrctary ol Var Stimsons Statcmcnt ol Facts as Shown by My Currcnt Notcs and My Rccollcction as Rclrcshcd Tcrcby. 300 !bid., pp. 543941. 301 !bid., p. 5542. 822 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy whcrcabouts on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. 302 8arklcy did not lccl hc should sit on Starks lcttcr. Nor did hc think hc should simply put it in thc rccord whcrc it would in ccct bc lost and buricd. Tc mattcr could not bc dclaycd as Stark was lcaving lor London that altcrnoon. 303
8arklcy hurricdly rcopcncd thc hcarings just to hcar lrom Stark and his inlormant. Somc ol thc tcn committcc mcmbcrs wcrc out ol town and unablc to attcnd on such short noticc. nly lour cmocrats appcarcd, and onc RcpublicanKcclcwho, having had only a lcw minutcs noticc by phonc, arrivcd latc. Stark had writtcn 8arklcy that Navy Captain Harold . Krick, a pcrsonal lricnd and Starks lormcr ag captain, had rcmindcd Stark that thc two mcn and thcir wivcs had spcnt that cvcning togcthcr. Tcy had attcndcd a pcrlormancc ol Te Student Prince at thc National Tcatcr in Vashington. Vhcn thcy rcturncd lrom thc thcatcr to Starks quartcrs, onc ol Starks scrvants told him that thc Vhitc Housc had callcd. Stark wcnt immcdiatcly upstairs to phonc FR lrom his study, whcrc a dircct linc to thc Vhitc Housc was locatcd. According to Krick, whcn Stark camc back downstairs, hc told him in substancc that thc situation with Japan was vcry scrious. 304
Vhcn thc two couplcs again mct socially on Saturday, May 25, 1946, Krick happcncd to rclatc thcsc cvcnts to Stark. Stark did not rcmcmbcr thc occasion, but hc rcalizcd that this mcant that his tcstimony that hc had not talkcd to FR that cvcning was incorrcct. Tc morc Stark thought about this, thc morc dis turbcd hc bccamc. Hc thought thc committcc should havc this, thc rccord should havc it straight. Hc got up around 2 or 3 in 302 !bid., pp. 554344. 303 !bid., pp. 5544, 5555. 304 !bid., p. 5544, quoting Starks lcttcr to 8arklcy. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 823 thc morning and wrotc thc lcttcr that hc had dclivcrcd to 8arklcy on May 27. 305
Counscl Richardson askcd Stark: Admiral, il thc prcsidcnt had told you in his talk with you that night . . . that this thirtccnthpart mcssagc mcant war, thcrcby imprcsscd you with his vcry scrious cstimatc ol it, what would havc bccn, in accordancc with your custom, thc action lor you to havc thcn takcn, with that inlormation: Stark thought that hc should havc gottcn in touch with !ngcrsoll |assistant CN| and with Turncr |chicl, Navy Var Plans|. Vc had had a conlcrcncc a lcw days prcviously, Stark said, going ovcr thc scriousncss ol thc situation, il thcrc was any thing morc wc could havc scnt, and, as ! say, wc practically rcpcatcd this lourtccnth point . . . somc days carlicr wc had scnt thc samc thing. Vc thought, and thc prcsidcnt kncw cvcry movc that wc had madc, that wc had scnt cvcrything possiblc, on that prcmisc, that war was in thc immcdiatc o ng. ! dont know that ! would havc donc anything. ! couldnt say. Richardson thcn took advantagc ol thc opportunity to ask Stark anothcr odd qucstion about a possiblc latcnight cccmbcr 67 mccting at thc Vhitc Housc. ! ncvcr hcard ol such a conlcrcncc. ! know ol nothing now rcgarding such a conlcrcncc, was not prcscnt at it, ! had ncvcr cvcn hcard anyonc suggcst such a thing until it was mcntioncd hcrc in prcvious hcarings. My honcst opinion is that nothing ol thc sort took placc. !t was a complctc surprisc to Marshall that cvcn thc qucstion camc up. !t was to mc. ! am ccrtain that ! didnt lcavc thc housc altcr thc Kricks lclt. ! just cant think ol any such thing as happcning. Ccrtainly ! was not prcscnt, and 305 !bid., p. 5548. 824 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Coloncl Knox ncvcr mcntioncd any such thing to mc. . . . |S|uch a conlcrcncc at thc Vhitc Housc, undcr thosc circumstanccs, Stark said, would havc bccn so cxtraordinarily unusual that it should unqucstionably havc stood out in his mcmory. 8ut hc didnt rcmcmbcr any such mccting. 306
!n spitc ol Kricks dctailcd account ol thc cvcnts ol thc cvc ning, Starks mcmory did not rcvivc. Hc rcmaincd consistcnt in saying that hc could rccall ncithcr attcnding thc thcatcr with thc Kricks nor phoning thc prcsidcnt whcn hc rcturncd homc. Hc did not rcmcmbcr that cvcning. 307
Kcclc had arrivcd at this spccial mccting only altcr Stark had givcn thc bulk ol his tcstimony. Hc lcarcd that by rcopcning thc hcarings lor this purposc thcy wcrc cstablishing a prcccdcnt now that may plaguc us in thc luturc and that its procccdings could go on and on. 308 Tc JCC nally acccptcd Richardsons suggcs tion to takc thc Captains |Kricks| tcstimony . . . and thcn il thc committcc latcr dccidcs not to usc any ol this tcstimony, all right, on thc othcr hand, il thcy allow it to go in, wc havc it. 309 Krick tcsticd that hc and his wilc had sccn thc Starks socially on May 25, 1946. Tc subjcct ol thcir cccmbcr 6 mccting camc up quitc casually in thc coursc ol thc convcrsation. Krick hadnt bccn lollowing thc JCC tcstimony closcly, and so hc hadnt rcal izcd what Stark had told thc committcc. 8ut thcn hc had sccn a hcadlinc to thc ccct that thc admiral couldnt rcmcmbcr whcrc hc had bccn that cvcning. 310 Hc told Stark that thcy all had attcndcd a pcrlormancc ol Te Student Prince at thc National Tcatcr on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Vhcn thcy rcturncd to thc admirals 306 !bid., p. 5549 (part 11). 307 !bid., pp. 555455. 308 !bid., p. 5550. 309 !bid., p. 5552. 310 !bid., p. 5558. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 825 quartcrs, onc ol thc scrvants had told Stark that thcrc had bccn a Vhitc Housc call during thc cvcning. Stark cxcuscd himscll and rctircd to his study on thc sccond oor. Vhcn hc rcturncd hc said only that thc conditions in thc Pacic wcrc scrious . . . in a critical statc, somcthing ol that sort. 311
Kricks rcmindcr ol thcir cccmbcr 6 thcatcr party madc Stark rcalizc that hc had givcn wronglul tcstimony to thc JCC and, according to Krick, hc was vcry disturbcd. Stark told him: You rcalizc that ! havc tcsticd to thc contrary, and hc implicd that this mattcr should bc laid bclorc thc committcc. 312 Askcd by Lucas how hc could rcmcmbcr this so vividly, Krick rcplicd that thc cvcnts ol thc cvcning wcrc strongly imprcsscd on his mind bccausc ! was a vcry small sh, and grcat things wcrc transpiring, and you dont lorgct that sort ol thing. !t is not likc looking down, whcn you look up at somcthing. Vhcn thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr struck thc lollowing day, thc cntirc cvcning was dcnitcly imprcsscd on him, and hc said it will bc thcrc lor a long timc to comc. 313
Tus by chancc thc committcc lcarncd ol Starks whcrcabouts on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Unlortunatcly, no witncss cvcr camc lorward to cnlightcn thc JCC similarly as to Marshalls doings during thcsc crucial hours. Finally, thc Committcc adjourncd subjcct to call. 314
311 !bid., p. 5557. 312 !bid., p. 5558. 313 !bid., p. 5560. 314 !bid. 827 30. Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports JCC Rvvov:, Juiv :o, +6 T hc committccs rcport was publishcd in a scparatc unnum bcrcd volumc and transmittcd to Congrcss undcr datc ol July 20, 1946. 1 Tc hcarings had continucd much longcr than anticipatcd, and thc dcadlinc lor thc rcport had bccn cxtcndcd. 8y thc timc thc committcc closcd down in May 1946, it had 1 79th Cong., 1st scss. Joint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe Together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), p. i. 828 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy hcld 70 days ol opcn hcarings, cxamincd 43 witncsscs, takcn 15,000 pagcs ol tcstimony, introduccd countlcss documcnts, and admittcd somc 183 cxhibits. 2 !ncorporatcd in thc volumcs ol thc hcarings wcrc thc ndings ol all prcvious Pcarl Harbor invcs tigations. Morcovcr, thc JCC had had acccss to a grcat dcal ol sccrct inlormation that had not bccn availablc bclorc, much ncw matcrial had bccn rcvcalcd. To organizc all this data, gathcrcd lrom various sourccs, to scparatc thc whcat lrom thc cha, thc rclcvant lrom thc irrclcvant, and to dctcrminc rcsponsibility was a lormidablc task. Tnv M~jovi:v Rvvov: Tc Majority Rcport itscll was a vcritablc book, 492 pagcs long. !t rcvicwcd in considcrablc dctail thc historical background ol thc attack, Japans Asiatic policy, thc JapancscU.S. ncgotia tions, U.S. diplomacy, and U.S. agrccmcnts to coopcratc with thc 8ritish and thc utch. !t dcscribcd thc attack itscll, including thc Japancsc plan lor making and cxccuting thc attack, thc dclcnscs ol U.S. lorccs in Hawaii, thc surprisc occasioncd in Pcarl Harbor by thc attack, and thc U.S. losscs that rcsultcd. Tc Majority Rcport was signcd by only cight ol thc com mittccs tcn mcmbcrs. nc ol thc signatorics, Kcclc, disscntcd in somc rcspccts and prcscntcd Additional \icws. 3
Tc conclusion ol thc Majority Rcport was that thc ulti matc rcsponsibility lor thc attack rcstcd with Japan, thc top Vashington o cials had donc nothing to provokc thc Japancsc into attack and had dischargcd thcir rcsponsibilitics with distinction, ability, and lorcsight . . . and had madc cvcry possiblc cort, without sacri 2 !bid., p. xiv. 3 !bid., pp. 266266V. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 829 cing our national honor and cndangcring our sccurity, to avcrt war with Japan. 4
Tc Majority Rcport did not lct Vashington military o cials gct o scotlrcc, howcvcr. !t chargcd thc war plans divi sion ol thc Var cpartmcnt with having lailcd to dischargc its dircct rcsponsibility to advisc thc commanding gcncral hc had not propcrly alcrtcd thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt. !t also hcld: Tc !ntclligcncc and Var Plans ivisions ol thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts lailcd: (a) To givc carclul and thought lul considcration to thc intcrccptcd mcssagcs lrom Tokyo to Honolulu ol Scptcmbcr 24, Novcmbcr 15, and Novcmbcr 20 (thc harbor bcrthing plan and rclatcd dispatchcs) and to raisc a qucstion as to thcir signicancc. . . . (b) To bc propcrly on thc qui vive to rcccivc thc onc oclock intcrccpt and to rccog nizc in thc mcssagc thc lact that somc Japancsc military action would vcry possibly occur somcwhcrc at 1 v.:. cccmbcr 7. . . . Notwithstanding thc lact that thcrc wcrc o ccrs on twcnty lour hour watch, thc Committcc bclicvcs that undcr all ol thc cvidcncc thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts wcrc not su cicntly alcrtcd on cccmbcr 6 and 7, 1941, in vicw ol thc immincncc ol war. 5 Tus thc Majority Rcport was somcwhat critical ol Gcrow (Var Plans) and Turncr (!ntclligcncc), lor not bcing morc alcrt, and it placcd somc blamc indircctly on Marshall and Stark lor not having rcactcd morc promptly on rccciving thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Howcvcr, it hcld Hulls diplomatic rolc justicd and praiscd Knox and Stimson. According to thc Majority Rcport, 4 !bid., pp. 25152. 5 !bid., p. 252. 830 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cvcryonc was surpriscd that Japan struck thc Flcct at Pcarl Harbor at thc timc that shc did. Yct o ccrs, both in Vashington and Hawaii, wcrc lully conscious ol thc dangcr lrom an attack, thcy rcalizcd this lorm ol attack on Pcarl Harbor by Japan was at lcast a possibility, and thcy wcrc adcquatcly inlormcd ol thc immincncc ol war. 6 Tc Rcport listcd scvcral lailurcs on thc part ol thc Hawaiian commandcrs and concludcd: Tc crrors madc by thc Hawaiian commands wcrc crrors ol judgmcnt and not ol dcrclictions ol duty. Tc principal rccommcndations wcrc to institutc unity ol command . . . at all military and naval outposts and to intc gratc Army and Navy intclligcncc agcncics in ordcr to avoid thc pitlalls ol dividcd rcsponsibility which cxpcricncc has madc so abundantly apparcnt. 7
Kvvvvs Abbi:iox~i \ivws !n his Additional \icws, Kcclc said that hc agrccd with most ol thc Majority Rcports conclusions and rccommcnda tions. For instancc, hc rccognizcd, as thc majority did, that both Vashington and Hawaii wcrc surpriscd. Apparcntly ncithcr bclicvcd that Pcarl Harbor would bc Japans initial targct, both cxpcctcd Japan to strikc rst in thc Asiatic arca. !l this bclicl was unjusticd, as Kcclc bclicvcd it was, thcn thc mistakc lics on thc Vashington doorstcp just as much as it docs upon that ol Hawaii. Troughout thc long and arduous scssions ol thc committcc in thc prcparation ol thc committcc rcport |! had| continuously insistcd that what cvcr yardstick was agrccd upon as a basis lor dctcrmining 6 !bid., p. 251. 7 !bid., pp. 25253. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 831 rcsponsibilitics in Hawaii should bc applicd to thc high com mand at Vashington. Tis was Kcclcs lundamcntal objcction to thc committcc rcport. !l thc high command in Hawaii was subjcct to criti cism lor concluding that Hawaii was not in dangcr, thcn Kcclc insistcd that thc samc criticism with thc samc lorcc and scopc should apply to thc high command in Vashington. 8
Kcclc pointcd out that it was FR who had madc thc dcci sion to rctain thc cct at Pcarl Harbor. Yct thc position ol thc Flcct in thc Hawaiian arca was inhcrcntly untcnablc and dangcrous. . . . ncc thc ships wcrc in Pcarl Harbor, with its singlc channcl, thcy wcrc a targct lor any suc ccsslully launchcd air attack lrom carricrbornc plancs. As thc cct lackcd su cicnt patrol plancs to conduct thc ncc cssary rcconnaissancc, out as lar as 800 milcs and lor 360 dcgrccs all around ahu, thc chancc ol discovcring such a hostilc carricr would bc only by lucky accidcnt. An inlcrior Flcct, undcr cncmy survcillancc in an cxposcd naval basc without rcsourccs to protcct it, Kcclc wrotc, could only avcrt disastcr by rccciving thc bcst possiblc cvidcncc ol thc intcntions ol its potcntial cncmy. Tc Commandcrin Chicl ol thc Flcct in 1941 rccognizcd that inlormation was csscntial to his making appropriatc disposition to mcct any cri sis. Hc lormally rcqucstcd thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations that hc bc immcdiatcly inlormcd ol all important dcvclopmcnts as thcy occur and by thc quickcst sccurc mcans availablc. 9
Yct Kimmcl was not kcpt so inlormcd. 8 !bid., p. 266A. 9 !bid., pp. 2668266C. 832 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kcclc rcvicwcd somc ol thc morc vital inlormation that had bccn availablc in Vashington but which had not bccn rclaycd to Pcarl Harborthc cvidcncc ol Japancsc intcntions, thc bomb plot or ships in harbor mcssagcs, FRs scvcral statcmcnts conccrning thc immincncc ol war, thc Pilot Mcssagc, thc thir tccn parts ol Japans rcply, ctc. All in all, Kcclcs objcctions to thc Majority Rcport wcrc so substantial that Scnators 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson wcrc surpriscd and disappointcd that hc did not join thcm in dralting thcir Minority Rcport. JCC Mixovi:v Rvvov: Tc two committcc mcmbcrs who rcluscd to sign thc Majority Rcport, 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson, submittcd thcir own Minority Rcport. 10 !n it thcy pointcd out that thc rst purposc ol thc invcstigation, according to 8arklcy, was that ol xing rcspon sibility lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr upon an individual, or a group ol individuals, or upon a systcm undcr which thcy opcratcd or coopcratcd or lailcd to do cithcr. 11 Tcy procccdcd to lay thc blamc dircctly at thc door ol thc Rooscvclt administration. !nasmuch as all dccisions and activitics conncctcd with this occurrcncc at Pcarl Harbor wcrc dccisions and activitics ol cxccutivc authoritics ol thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs, thc issuc ol rcsponsibility lor thc dcgrcc ol succcss attaincd by thc Japancsc attack involvcs at lcast onc gcncral qucstion and lour subsidiary and spccic qucstions: Tc gcncral qucstion is: id all thc civil, military and naval authoritics ol thc Unitcd Statcs chargcd with rcsponsibility lor thc conduct ol diplomatic ncgotiations with thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt and lor prcparcdncss and dclcnsc at Pcarl Harbor compctcntly, c cicntly, and with propcr rcgard lor thc trust 10 !bid., pp. 495573. 11 !bid., p. 495. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 833 imposcd in thcm lulll thc dutics ol thcir rcspcctivc o ccs undcr thc constitution and laws ol thc Unitcd Statcs: Tc subsidiary and spccic qucstions arc: 1. id thc high civil, military, and naval authoritics in Vashington sccurc in advancc ol 10:00 ~.:. (.S.T.) cccmbcr 7, 1941, inlormation rcspccting Japancsc dcsigns and intcn tions su cicnt to convincc thcm bcyond all rcasonablc doubt that war with Japan was immcdiatcly immincnt: 2. !l so, did thcy givc to Gcncral Valtcr C. Short and Admiral Husband . Kimmcl, thc commandcrs at Pcarl Harbor, clcar and dcnitc ordcrs, immcdiatcly prior to thc Japancsc attack, instructing thcm to bc lully alcrt lor dclcnsc against such an attack: 3. Vas Hawaii adcquatcly cquippcd lor its dclcnsc against a Japancsc attack in accordancc with thc known circumstanccs: 4. id thc commandcrs at Pcarl Harbor takc thc appro priatc mcasurcs rcquircd by thc ordcrs issucd to thcm lrom Vashington, by thc dutics ol thcir rcspcctivc o ccs, and by thc inlormation in thcir posscssion and thc rcsourccs at thcir dis posal, to maintain thc sccurity ol thc posscssions ol thc Unitcd Statcs as lar as that rcsponsibility was invcstcd in thcm: 12 Tc Minority Rcport objcctcd to thc troublc thc committcc had in obtaining documcnts. Tc proposal prcscntcd to Congrcss just bclorc thc dcath ol FR in April 1945, to prcvcnt all dis closurc ol U.S. cryptanalysis activitics, had lailcd to pass, thanks to thc chargcs ol ccnsorship raiscd by Fcrguson. 13 Howcvcr, thc mcmbcrs ol thc Joint Congrcssional Committcc still cncountcrcd obstaclcs to obtaining documcnts crucial to thcir invcstigation. 12 !bid., p. 496. 13 Scnatc 8ill S.805. Scc Congrcssional Rccord, April 9, 1945, p. 3196, and Congrcssional Rccord, April 11, 1945, p. 3267. 834 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Undcr datc ol August 28, 1945, Prcsidcnt Truman issucd an ordcr similar to thc April proposal. 14 Tis ordcr was rclaxcd somcwhat in ctobcr 1945, whcn its application was limitcd to thc statc, war, and navy dcpartmcnts, also thc sccrccy ol rccords was rclaxcd only so lar as thc Joint Committcc was conccrncd. Tc opportunity to scarch thc rccords was still dcnicd to indi vidual mcmbcrs ol thc committcc. Morcovcr, thc ordcr containcd thc unlortunatc phrasc any inlormation in thcir |thc govcrnmcnts| posscssion material to the investigation, which providcd a cloak lor thosc rcluctant to yicld inlormation rcqucstcd by mcmbcrs ol thc Committcc. !t was always pos siblc to conlront individual mcmbcrs with thc vicw that thc papcrs, data, and inlormation dcsircd was not matcrial to thc invcstigation. . . . !n an ordcr ol Novcmbcr 7, 1945, Prcsidcnt Truman rclaxcd rcstraints on cxccutivcs ol thc Govcrnmcnt in ordcr that thcy may spcak lrccly to individual members ol thc Committcc but thc ordcr closcd with thc dircction: Tis docs not includc any lcs or writtcn matcrial. 15
8rcwstcr and Fcrguson chargcd in thcir rcport that whcn thcy askcd to havc a scarch madc lor missing rccords, \igorous and public dcnial was madcprcsumably on xccutivc authority that any rccords wcrc missing. Yct whcn it dcvclopcd that somc rccords actually wcrc missing most inadcquatc cxplanations wcrc supplicd. How any public intcrcst could possibly havc bccn prcjudiccd by aording any 14 Joint Committcc, Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investiga- tion of the Pearl Harbor Attack and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe Together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster, p. 498. 15 !bid. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 835 opportunity to cxaminc thc manncr ol kccping rccords ol this charactcr has ncvcr bccn satislactorily cxplaincd. 16
Tc major criticism ol 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson was ol thc top authoritics in VashingtonRooscvclt, thc sccrctarics ol statc, war, and navy, thc Army chicl ol sta, and chicl ol naval opcr ations. 17 Hours, cvcn days, bclorc thc attack thcsc mcn all had acccss to dctailcd inlormation about Japans intcntions, inlorma tion that was not availablc to thc cld commandcrs. Tcy kncw that a Japancsc strikc was immincnt. Yct thcy did not act. Tcy just waitcd. Tcy waitcdlor Japan to strikc thc rst blow. Yct all this timc thcy lailcd to advisc thc military mcn in thc cld ol thc scriousncss ol thc thrcat. And thc warnings Vashington did scnd to thc cld wcrc couchcd in such conicting and imprccisc languagc that thcy lailcd to convcy to thc commandcrs dcnitc inlormation on thc statc ol diplomatic rclations with Japan and on Japancsc war dcsigns and positivc ordcrs rcspccting thc particular actions to bc takcnordcrs that wcrc bcyond all rcasonablc doubts as to thc nccd lor an allout alcrt. !n this rcgard, according to 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson, thc said high authoritics lailcd to dischargc thcir lull duty. 18
Tc Minority Rcport rcvicwcd somc ol thc crucial inlorma tion that had bccn availablc in Vashington, but which had not bccn transmittcd to Hawaii: !ntcrccpts ol Japancsc mcssagcs madc by thc Army and Navy intclligcncc scrviccs showcd high authoritics in Vashington that thc Japancsc Govcrnmcnt had ordcrcd its agcnts in Hawaii to rcport on Amcrican military and naval installations and ship 16 !bid., p. 500. 17 !bid., pp. 50306. 18 !bid., pp. 50405. 836 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy movcmcnts in that rcgion. Tcy also rcquircd rcports on lack ol movcmcnt. For cxamplc, Scptcmbcr 24, 1941, it ordcrcd an agcnt to subdividc thc watcrs ol Pcarl Harbor into vc sub arcas, as wcll as to rcport on ship movcmcnts thcrc. Prior to and altcr this datc Japancsc agcnts wcrc, up to thc Japancsc attack, rcporting on ship movcmcnts, installations, and othcr mattcrs ol military and naval signicancc to thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt. 19
Vitncsscs bclorc thc Committcc, it may bc notcd, in cxtcnu ation ol thcir lack ol cmphasis on thc probability ol an attack on Pcarl Harbor, callcd attcntion to thc lact that Japancsc agcnts wcrc also rcporting on thc military and naval installa tions ol thc Unitcd Statcs at Panama, thc Philippincs, thc wcst coast, and othcr points. 8ut to mcn, compctcnt, carclul, and watchlul, mcn alcrt on thcir allaround and indivisiblc rcspon sibility, this lact providcd no cxcusc whatcvcr lor minimizing thc probability ol an attack on Pcarl Harbor any morc than at any othcr Amcrican outpost. Nor docs it cxcusc thc lail urc ol Vashington authoritics to notc that lar grcatcr dctail was bcing askcd lor by thc Japancsc about Hawaii at a timc whcn Japancsc movcmcnts in thc Southcastcrn Pacic had to contcnd with thc stratcgic position ol Hawaii whcrc thc rcal Amcrican striking lorcc, thc cct, rcstcd. 20
8asically, 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson hcld Rooscvclt to blamc: Tc Prcsidcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs was rcsponsiblc lor thc lail urc to cnlorcc continuous, c cicnt, and appropriatc coopcra tion among thc Sccrctary ol Var, thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy, thc |Army| Chicl ol Sta, and thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations, in cvaluating inlormation and dispatching clcar and positivc ordcrs to thc Hawaiian commandcrs. . . . !n thc nal instancc ol cru cial signicancc lor alcrting Amcrican outpost commandcrs, on 19 !bid. 20 !bid., pp. 52324. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 837 Saturday night, cccmbcr 6, and Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, thc Prcsidcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs lailcd to takc that quick and instant cxccutivc action which was rcquircd by thc occa sion and by thc rcsponsibility lor watchlulncss and guardian ship rightly associatcd in law and practicc with his high o cc lrom thc cstablishmcnt ol thc Rcpublic to our own timcs. 21
vidcncc sct lorth in this rcport in dctail is amplc to show that in thc pcriod approximatcly lrom May 1940 to cccmbcr 7, 1941, thc high authoritics at Vashington assumcd so much ol thc dircction ol aairs at Hawaii as to rcmovc many ol thc basic rcsponsibilitics lrom thc commandcrs in thc cld. Tc rcsult was to rcducc thc discrction ol thc commandcrs in thc cld by thosc things which thcy wcrc ordcrcd to do by dircc tions lrom Vashington and not to do ccrtain things unlcss thcy wcrc so ordcrcd lrom Vashington. Anothcr rcsult ol this practicc was to lull thc commandcrs in thc cld into awaiting instructions lrom Vashington. 22
Admittcdly Marshall and Stark wcrc carrying hcavy burdcns in prcparing thc armcd lorccs ol thc Unitcd Statcs lor war, in making war plans, in building up an Army and Navy (which thcy kncw wcrc not yct rcady lor war), and in struggling lor a postponcmcnt ol thc war until thc Army and Navy wcrc bcttcr prcparcd to copc with thc loc. Vith rcgard to thc Prcsidcnt, thc Sccrctary ol Statc, thc Sccrctary ol Var, and thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy, it may bc said justly that thcy wcrc carrying hcavy burdcns also. 8ut all thcsc o cials, as Sccrctary Stimsons diary dcmonstratcs, spcnt many days bclorc cccmbcr 7 in gcncral discussions which lcd to no dccisions. Tis thcy did at a timc whcn thcy posscsscd spccial knowlcdgc ol Japancsc dcsigns and wcrc acquaintcd with thcir own intcn tions and rcsolvcs and ccrtainly had thc lcisurc to do thc onc 21 !bid., pp. 50506. 22 !bid., p. 553. 838 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy obvious duty dictatcd by common scnscthat isdraw up a bricl plan lor tclling thc outpost commandcrs just what to do in a ccrtain contingcncy |a Japancsc attack on Amcrican pos scssions somcwhcrc| on rcccipt ol ordcrs lrom Vashington. . . . Tcy had plans lor action or actions by thc armcd lorccs ol thc Unitcd Statcs if Congrcss dcclarcd war or if by somc proccss thc Unitcd Statcs got into or cntcrcd thc war. Var plans (lor cxamplc, Rainbow No. 5 which was VPL 46) wcrc to go into opcration only altcr war had bcgun and wcrc not intcndcd lor prcparation in mccting a surprisc attack. Tcy prcparcd no plan giving thc outpost commandcrs instruc tions about thc mcasurcs thcy wcrc to takc in prcparing lor and mccting a Japancsc attack on Amcrican posscssions whcn and il it camc. Tis plan could havc bccn drawn up in a lcw hours at most and sct down in two or thrcc typcwrittcn pagcs at most. 23
As to Kimmcl and Short, 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson said, Vhatcvcr crrors ol judgmcnt thc commandcrs at Hawaii com mittcd and whatcvcr mismanagcmcnt thcy displaycd in prc paring lor a Japancsc attack, attcntion to chain ol rcsponsibility in thc civil and military administration rcquircs taking notc ol thc lact that thcy wcrc dcsignatcd lor thcir posts by high authoritics in Vashington. . . . Tc dclcnsc ol Hawaii rcstcd upon two scts ol intcrdcpcndcnt rcsponsibilitics: (1) Tc rcsponsibility in Vashington in rcspcct ol its intimatc knowlcdgc ol diplomatic ncgotiations, widc sprcad intclligcncc inlormation, dircction ol aairs and consti tutional duty to plan thc dclcnsc ol thc Unitcd Statcs, (2) thc rcsponsibility cast upon thc commandcrs in thc cld in chargc ol a major naval basc and thc cct csscntial to thc dclcnsc ol thc tcrritory ol thc Unitcd Statcs to do thosc things appropriatc to 23 !bid., p. 558. Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 839 thc dclcnsc ol thc cct and outpost. Vashington authoritics lailcd in (1), and thc commanding o ccrs at Hawaii lailcd in (2). 24
Tc Minority Rcport acknowlcdgcd that, Tc qucstion ol thc wisdom ol thc lorcign policy pursucd by thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs |was| cxcludcd by thc tcrms ol thc committccs instructions. 25 Howcvcr, thc two Scnators did approach thc mat tcr as it rclatcd to military tactics. Tcy askcd why Japans rcqucst lor a modus vivendi had bccn rcjcctcd. Vholly apart lrom thc mcrits or dcmcrits ol . . . thc Japancsc proposal ol Novcmbcr 20, hcrc was an opportunity at lcast to prolong thc brcathing spcll lor which Gcncral Marshall and Admiral Stark wcrc plcading in thcir corts to strcngthcn thc armcd lorccs ol thc Unitcd Statcs lor war. Although Rooscvclt had at rst approvcd ol a thrccmonth modus vivendi, as opposcd to thc sixmonth vcrsion prcviously proposcd, Hull had rcjcctcd it altcr talking with FR. !n doing this, hc |Hull| gavc no advancc noticc to Gcncral Marshall and Admiral Stark, who wcrc thcn prcparing thcir sccond carclul mcmorandum to thc Prcsidcnt bcgging lor a postponcmcnt ol war with Japan until thc Army and Navy could makc bcttcr prcparation lor waging it. 26
As thcy closcd thcir Minority Rcport, 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson said, How to avoid war and how to turn waril it nally comcsto scrvc thc causc ol human progrcss is thc challcngc to diplomacy 24 !bid., p. 505. 25 !bid., p. 497. 26 !bid., pp. 561, 563. 840 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy today as ycstcrday. Hcrc, too, much cannot bc known rcgarding all thc pctty cpisodcs that nally add up to war. No war comcs in a momcnt. Var is thc sum ol many minor dccisions and somc that arc major. !n this diplomatic aspcct thc Pcarl Harbor invcstigation has sadly lailcd to livc up to thc lolty prospcctus with which it was launchcd. . . . !n our opinion, thc cvidcncc bclorc this Committcc indicatcs that thc tragcdy at Pcarl Harbor was primarily a lailurc ol mcn and not ol laws or powcrs to do thc ncccssary things, and carry out thc vcstcd rcsponsibilitics. No lcgislation could havc curcd such dclccts ol o cial judgmcnts, managcmcnt, coopcration, and action as wcrc displaycd by authoritics and agcnts ol thc Unitcd Statcs in conncction with thc cvcnts that culminatcd in thc catastrophc at Pcarl Harbor on cccmbcr 7, 1941. Tis dcmonstratcs thc wcakncss ol dcpcnding on thc political hcad ol thc Govcrnmcnt to bring about thc ncccssary coordi nation ol thc activitics ol thc military branchcs, particularly in thc arca ol intclligcncc, and unication ol command. Tc major lcsson to bc lcarncd is that this coordination should bc accomplishcd in advancc ol a crisis. . . . Tc lailurc to pcrlorm thc rcsponsibilitics indispcnsably csscn tial to thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor rcsts upon thc lollowing civil and military authoritics: Franklin D. Roosevelt Prcsidcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs and Commandcr in Chicl ol thc Army and Navy Henry L. Stimson Sccrctary ol Var Frank Knox Sccrctary ol thc Navy George C. Marshall Gcncral, Chicl ol Sta ol thc Army Harold R. Stark Admiral, Chicl ol Naval pcrations Leonard T. Gerow Major Gcncral, Assistant Chicl ol Sta ol Var Plans ivision Tc lailurc to pcrlorm thc rcsponsibilitics in Hawaii rcsts upon thc military commandcrs: Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 841 Walter C. Short Major Gcncral, Commanding Gcncral, Hawaiian cpartmcnt Husband E. Kimmel Rcar Admiral, Commandcr in Chicl ol thc Pacic Flcct 8oth in Vashington and in Hawaii thcrc wcrc numcrous and scrious lailurcs ol mcn in thc lowcr civil and military cchclons to pcrlorm thcir dutics and dischargc thcir rcsponsibilitics. Tcsc arc too numcrous to bc trcatcd in dctail and individually namcd. Sccrctary ol Statc, Cordcll Hull, who was at thc ccntcr ol JapancscAmcrican ncgotiations bcars a gravc rcsponsibility lor thc diplomatic conditions lcading up to thc cvcntuality ol Pcarl Harbor but hc had no dutics as a rclcvant link in thc mili tary chain ol rcsponsibility stcmming lrom thc Commandcr in Chicl to thc commandcrs at Hawaii lor thc dclcnsc at Pcarl Harbor. For this rcason and bccausc thc diplomatic phasc was not complctcly cxplorcd wc ocr no conclusions in his casc.
S/ Homcr Fcrguson S/ wcn 8rcwstcr 27 27 !bid., pp. 57273. 31. Epilogue W orld Var !! is now history. Tc gcncrally acccptcd vicw is that thc Unitcd Statcs was brought into that war as a rcsult ol Japans suddcn, uncxpcctcd and dastardly cccmbcr 7, 1941, attack on thc U.S. Flcct in Hawaii. As Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt pointcd out thc lollowing day in his mcssagc to Congrcss this attack had bccn planncd and undcrtakcn cvcn as U.S. and Japancsc diplomats wcrc still cngagcd in ncgotiations sccking to scttlc thcir dicrcnccs in pcacc. !n rcsponsc Congrcss dcclarcd war on Japan almost immcdiatcly. Although it is obvious that thc Japancsc lorccs must bcar thc dircct rcsponsibility lor thc attack, thc rcsponsibility lor thc lull cxtcnt ol thc disastcr is much broadcr. Tc Prcamblc ol thc U.S. Constitution providcd lor a govcrn mcnt to cstablish Justicc, insurc domcstic Tranquility, providc lor thc common dclcncc, promotc thc gcncral Vcllarc, and sccurc thc 8lcssings ol libcrty to oursclvcs and our Postcrity. xccpt as thosc goals rclicd on thc countrys bcing at pcacc, thcy did not dcal spccically with intcrnational rclations. Howcvcr, inhcr cnt in thc Prcamblc was thc idca that dclcnding this nation and salcguarding thc libcrty ol its citizcns calls lor protccting thcm lrom domcstic and lorcign aggrcssion. Tc ncw Unitcd Statcs should mind its own busincss, basc its policics and practiccs on 843 844 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy pcacclul social coopcration and pcrmit its citizcns to tradc and to travcl as thcy wishcd. Gcorgc Vashington, thc rst prcsidcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs, cxprcsscd this idca in his Farcwcll Addrcss (Scptcmbcr 1789): bscrvc good laith and justicc toward all nations, cultivatc pcacc and harmony with all. . . . Tc grcat rulc ol conduct lor us in rcgard to lorcign nations is, in cxtcnding our commcrcial rclations to havc with thcm as littlc political conncction as pos siblc. . . . !t is our truc policy to stccr clcar ol pcrmancnt alli anccs with any portion ol thc lorcign world. . . . And Tomas Jccrson in his rst inaugural addrcss (March 4, 1801) again rccommcndcd pcacc, commcrcc, and honcst lricnd ship with all nationscntangling allianccs with nonc. 8y thc timc ol thc Japancsc attack, thc Rooscvclt administration in Vashington had bccn violating thcsc principlcs lor months at lcast. As wc all know, thc dircct rcsponsibility lor thc U.S. cntry into Vorld Var was Japans catastrophic attack by hcr bombcrs and plancs on thc U.S. Flcct in Pcarl Harbor. Howcvcr, whcn considcrcd in thc light ol thc timcs, it sccms that thc attack might havc bccn anticipatcd as thc logical act ol a bclcagurcd nation hoping to prcvcnt thc disruption ol its military plans. Howcvcr, to dctcrminc rcsponsibility lor thc lull cxtcnt ol thc disastcr, onc must ask why thc Flcct was caught so complctcly by surprisc, unprcparcd and unwarncd. Franklin . Rooscvclt took o cc as prcsidcnt in 1933. From thcn on, in vicw ol his powcrs and dutics undcr thc Constitution, his position as CommandcrinChicl ol thc Army and Navy, and thc trust vcstcd in him by thc pcoplc as Chicl xccutivc ol thc Unitcd Statcs, hc must bcar rcsponsibility lor U.S. lorcign pol icy. A rcvicw ol thc historical rccord lrom thc Vashington point ol vicwas rcvcalcd in thc invcstigationsnow shows that thc Japancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor should not havc bccn a complctc Epilogue 845 surprisc to thc administration o cials. As a mattcr ol lact, it is now apparcnt also that thc prcsidcnt himscll, cvcn bclorc thc attack, had intcndcd to ordcr thc U.S. armcd lorccs to makc a prccmptivc strikc against thc Japancsc in thc southwcst Pacic in ordcr to assist thc 8ritish in southcast Asia. 8ut thc Japancsc jumpcd thc gun on him by bombing Pcarl Harbor on cccmbcr 7, 1941. Tus, thc attack was Prcsidcnt Rooscvclts excuse, not his reason, lor having thc Unitcd Statcs go to war with thc Japancsc. His:ovic~i Rvvivw 8y thc mid1930s, thc world was in turmoil. !n 1933, shortly altcr FR bccamc prcsidcnt, thc Unitcd Statcs rccognizcd and cstablishcd diplomatic rclations with thc Sovict Union. Hitlcr had comc to powcr in Gcrmany and was bccoming morc and morc militaristic, laying claim to tcrritory bcyond his countrys bordcrs. n ctobcr 3, 1935, !taly invadcd thiopia. A civil war opcncd in Spain in July 1936. !n July 1937 Japan was drawn into war with China. Howcvcr, thc pcoplc in this country did not want to bccomc involvcd in any ol thcsc conicts. !n 1935, Congrcss cnactcd and on August 31, thc prcsidcnt signcd thc rst Ncutrality Act which prohibitcd thc cxport ol arms, ammunition, and implcmcnts ol war to bclligcrcnt coun trics and thcir transportation in U.S. vcsscls. Rooscvclt had long sympathizcd with 8ritain pcrsonally and stcpbystcp hc abandoncd U.S. ncutrality. Two ycars bclorc thc war actually bcgan, hc startcd to cxplorc with thc 8ritish what wc could do il wc both lound oursclvcs involvcd in a war in thc Far ast with Japan. Hc pcrsonally instructcd U.S. Admiral Royal . !ngcrsoll whcn hc lclt in cccmbcr 1937 lor a con lcrcncc in London to discuss arrangcmcnts in casc ol a U.S. 8ritishutchRussianChincsc war against Japan. Tcn altcr thc war had startcd in uropc, Rooscvclt gavc instructions on 846 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy August 6, 1940, to thrcc top U.S. military o ccrs who wcrc going on anothcr sccrct mission to London. arly in thc morning on Scptcmbcr 1, 1939, Hitlcrs lorccs invadcd Poland. ngland and Francc dccidcd to honor thcir commitmcnts to go to thc dclcnsc ol Poland il shc wcrc attackcd. n Scptcmbcr 3, both countrics issucd ultimatums to Gcrmany which wcrc rcjcctcd. uropc was at war. n Scptcmbcr 3, 1939, FR rcconrmcd U.S. ncutrality and during thc months that lollowcd, hc continucd to strcss his dctcrmination to maintain U.S. ncutrality. Ncvcrthclcss, FR bcgan almost immcdiatcly to hclp thc 8ritish in thcir ght against Gcrmany. Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt institutcd a Ncutrality Patrol in thc Atlantic and instructcd thc U.S. Navy, to watch lor cncmy vcsscls, to rcport sightings in plain nglish, so as to allow 8ritish ships to invcstigatc and dcstroy. Vhcn latcr Churchill askcd lor 40 or 50 ol this countrys dcstroycrs, FR arrangcd lor thcir translcr to thc 8ritish. And as 8ritains war cxpcnditurcs mountcd and shc was running out ol gold to pay lor military supplics, Rooscvclt gavc thc grccn light lor hcr to ordcr 12,000 aircralt. Vhcn Hitlcr chargcd that such U.S. aid to thc U.K. was moral aggrcs sion, FR rcplicd that it was a dclcnsivc mcasurc. n thc othcr sidc ol thc world, Japan, an ally ol Gcrmany through thc 1939 Tripartitc Pact, was taking actions in southcast Asia that thc U.S. hcld could thrcatcn U.S. and 8ritish intcrcsts in that part ol thc world. !n January 1940, thc U.S. bcgan block ing cxports to Japan ol ccrtain commoditics that wcrc csscntial to Japans cconomy and military vcnturcsvarious chcmicals, munitions, iron and stccl scrap, and cspccially pctrolcum products. Upon thc dclcat ol Francc in Junc 1940, Japancsc troops wcrc admittcd into thc lormcrly Frcnch !ndochina. And in Scptcmbcr, Japan cstablishcd air bascs and stationcd troops thcrc. FR announccd that Pcarl Harbor would bc madc thc pcr mancnt basc ol thc U.S. Flcct. Tis was against thc advicc ol his Epilogue 847 naval adviscrs, who pointcd out that thc harbors narrow cntrancc, inadcquatc anchoragcs and airclds, and its limitcd lucl supplics would makc thc Flcct vulncrablc to attack. !t is quitc possiblc that FRs dccision was in rcsponsc to 8ritish Primc Ministcr Churchills suggcstion, madc carlicr that vcry samc day, May 15, 1940, that thc U.S. kccp that Japancsc dog quict in thc Pacic. 8y midsummcr 1940, U.S. cryptographcrs had succccdcd in dcciphcring thc vcry complcx Japancsc govcrnmcnts diplo matic codc and duplicating thc cxtrcmcly intricatc typcwritcr, codcnamcd Purplc, on which it was cncodcda trcmcndous accomplishmcnt. From thcn on, thc U.S. had acccss to most ol thc sccrct diplomatic mcssagcs thc Japancsc govcrnmcnt scnt on this machinc to its cmissarics throughout thc world. As FR campaigncd in 1940 lor a third tcrm as prcsidcnt, hc continucd to assurc thc public ol thc Unitcd Statcss ncutral ity, hc was doing all that hc could to kccp war away lrom thcsc shorcs. Hc assurcd thc votcrs that Your boys arc not going to bc scnt into any lorcign wars. + + Yct Rooscvclt continucd to ask Congrcss to hclp thc 8ritish who wcrc at war. At FRs urging, in carly 1941 Congrcss passcd LcndLcasc, which providcd many millions ol dollars worth ol war supplicsships, plancs, munitions, lood, ctc.to thc nations who wcrc ghting Gcrmany. Tc U.S. war plans, as Rooscvclt outlincd thcm at this timc, callcd on thc Unitcd Statcs to rcmain on thc dclcnsivc in thc Pacic, with thc cct bascd in Hawaii, but supportivc ol 8ritain in thc Atlantic. At thc timc, thc possibil ity ol Japans attacking in thc southwcst Pacic was discusscd in Vashington. Although it was lclt that public opinion would sup port U.S. action in thc Far ast il thc Japancsc go into Singaporc or thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, Gcrmany was considcrcd thc grcatcst thrcat. 848 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy !n Fcbruary and March 1941, U.S. military o cials mct sccrctly in Vashington with 8ritish o cials and drcw up a joint U.S.8ritish war plan cmbodying a 8cat Hitlcr rst principlc. Tc Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, bascd on this worldwidc Var Plan, was scnt out to U.S. military cld commandcrs. Undcr this ArmyNavy plan, Admiral Kimmcl in Pcarl Harbor was ordcrcd to prcparc thc Pacic Flcct to undcrtakc oensive opcra tions against thc Japancsc and to support thc 8ritish lorccs in thc Far ast south ol thc cquator. Howcvcr, at a Vhitc Housc conlcrcncc it was dccidcd that thc most urgcnt mattcr still was to go all out in thc Atlantic. As a rcsult, approximatcly onc lourth ol thc ghting ships ol thc U.S. Flcct, practically all thc traincd and cquippcd marincs on thc wcst coast, scvcral small transports, and somc othcr small cralt, wcrc translcrrcd lrom thc Pacic to thc Atlantic. Tis, ol coursc, rcduccd substantially thc strcngth ol thc Flcct in thc Pacic. !n thc spring ol 1941, thc Unitcd Statcs placcd in protcc tivc custody thc ships in U.S. ports ol Gcrmany, !taly, and Nazi occupicd cnmark. !n Junc, FR authorizcd thc acquisition ol all idlc lorcign mcrchant ships in our ports and ordcrcd Axis lunds in thc Unitcd Statcs lrozcn. Tc Unitcd Statcs also rcqucstcd withdrawal ol Gcrman and !talian consular stas by July 10. Gcrmany and Japan had hopcd thcir 1939 TriPartitc Pact alliancc would kccp thc Unitcd Statcs lrom intcrlcring in thc war in uropc. Howcvcr, thc U.S. startcd intcrlcring with thc war in uropc indircctlyby trying to kccp thc Japancsc lully occu picd in thc ongoing JapanChina war so thcy would not go to thc aid ol Gcrmany. Tc Unitcd Statcs assistcd Chiang Kai Shck in China nancially. And shc hclpcd to build thc 8urma Road and organizcd Chcnnaults Amcrican \oluntccr |Flying Tigcr| Group which cw supplics ovcr thc hump into China. Rcprcscntativcs ol thc Amcricans, utch, and 8ritish mct in Singaporc in thc spring ol 1941. Tcy drcw a linc bcyond which thc Japancsc armcd lorccs could not attack without cvoking rcsponscs Epilogue 849 lrom thc govcrnmcnts ol thc Unitcd Statcs, thc 8ritish, and thc utch. Tis linc was drawn wcst ol longitudc 100
ast and south ol latitudc 10
Norththat is south and wcst ol Frcnch
!ndoChina (currcntly \ictnam). Hitlcr attackcd Russia on Junc 22, 1941 and two days latcr, FR rclcascd Russian crcdits and promiscd Amcrican aid in linc with his |p|olicy ol giving matcrial assistancc to any country ghting Gcrmany. As thc war in thc Atlantic hcatcd up, Gcrman Uboats wcrc sinking 8ritish ships in largc numbcrs. FR cxtcndcd thc arca ol thc U.S. Ncutrality Patrol to covcr most ol thc Atlantic. !n July, wc occupicd !ccland and wc soon bcgan convoying 8ritish ships in thc North Atlantic. !t wasnt long bclorc U.S. ships wcrc shooting, bcing shot at, and cvcn sunk, with thc loss ol Amcrican livcs. !n August 1941, Rooscvclt and 8ritish P.M. Churchill mct pcr sonally lor thc rst timc in sccrccy o thc coast ol Ncwloundland. Churchill plcadcd with Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt to cntcr thc war. FR rcmindcd Churchill that in thc Unitcd Statcs, only Congrcss could dcclarc war: ! may ncvcr dcclarc war, ! may makc war. !l ! wcrc to ask Congrcss to dcclarc war, thcy might arguc about it lor thrcc months. Tc two mcn discusscd thc Japancsc situa tion also. Although FR said that, to strcngthcn Amcricas lorcc, hc must scck to dclay a brcak with Japan, hc agrccd to warn Japan that il shc cncroachcd lurthcr in thc southwcst Pacic, thc U.S. would bc compcllcd to takc countcrmcasurcs, cvcn though thcsc might lcad to war. Morcovcr, hc assurcd Churchill that thc Unitcd Statcs, cvcn il not hcrscll attackcd, would comc into a war in thc Far ast. . . . |and| that il Japan ran amok in thc Pacic, wc |thc 8ritish| should not ght alonc. !n thc spring ol 1941, thc U.S. and Japan had cmbarkcd upon diplomatic ncgotiations in Vashington in thc attcmpt to scttlc thc ChinaJapan conict and cstablish pcacc in thc Pacic arca. 850 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tcsc discussions conccrncd Japans war in China, hcr rolc on thc Asian mainland, thc TriPartitc Pact binding Japan to thc Axis and thc U.S. tradc cmbargo ol Japan. Tcsc ncgotiations con tinucd o and on through Novcmbcr. uring all this timc, wc wcrc rcading Japans sccrct diplomatic mcssagcs to hcr cmissarics throughout thc world. !n Scptcmbcr, FR issucd a shoot on sight ordcr to U.S. Navy ships in thc Atlantic. |V|hcn you scc a rattlcsnakc poiscd to strikc, you do not wait until hc has struck bclorc you crush him. Tcsc Nazi subma rincs and raidcrs arc thc rattlcsnakcs ol thc Atlantic. . . . ||ur patrolling vcsscls and plancs will protcct all mcrchant ships not only Amcrican ships but ships ol any agcngagcd in com mcrcc in our dclcnsivc watcrs. . . . From now on, il Gcrman or !talian vcsscls ol war cntcr thc watcrs thc protcction ol which is ncccssary lor Amcrican dclcnsc thcy do so at thcir own pcril. Tc Japancsc movcd lorccs into !ndoChina. Tc U.S. o cials rcmonstratcd. 8y mid1941 it bccamc apparcnt that as a rcsult ol Japans war in China and hcr military vcnturcs in S.. Asia hcr most scrious shortagc was ol oil. Rooscvclt told thc Japancsc ambassador: |!|l Japan attcmptcd to scizc oil supplics by lorcc in thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, thc utch would, without thc shadow ol a doubt rcsist, thc 8ritish would immcdiatcly comc to thcir assistancc, war would thcn rcsult bctwccn Japan, thc 8ritish and thc utch, and, in vicw ol our own policy ol assisting Grcat 8ritain, an cxcccdingly scrious situation would immc diatcly rcsult. FR said that Japan would do much bcttcr il shc tricd to obtain thc supplics shc nccdcd pcacclully rathcr than by occupying !ndochina. 8ut thc Unitcd Statcs continucd to cmbargo oil to Japan. And shc pcrsuadcd thc 8ritish and utch to do thc samc. Epilogue 851 !n July, Japan was adviscd that thc Unitcd Statcs considcrcd it sclldclcnsc to protcct thc 8ritish against aggrcssion in thc Atlanticalso in Singaporc. Tc Japancsc Ambassador spokc ol Japans dctcriorating cconomic situation, hcr objcctions to U.S. support ol China, improving thc 8urma Road and supply ing plancs and pilots to Chungking, also ol hcr, Japans, plans to occupy Frcnch !ndochina and hcr nccd to station troops in !nncr Mongolia to supprcss Chincsc Communist clcmcnts and hintcd that wcrc thc Unitcd Statcs to acccpt thcsc conditions, Japan would not bc particularly conccrncd about any action thc Unitcd Statcs might takc in thc Atlantic. !n rcsponsc, thc U.S. ircctor ol thc Navys Var Plans cquatcd protccting thc 8ritish lrom thc Nazis with dclcnding thc U.S.: |!|t is dccidcdly against thc military intcrcsts ol thc Unitcd Statcs to pcrmit thc Unitcd Kingdom to bc ovcrcomc by Gcrmany. . . . Furthcrmorc . . . |t|hc occupation ol !ndoChina by Japan is particularly important lor thc dclcnsc ol thc Unitcd Statcs sincc it might thrcatcn thc 8ritish position in Singaporc and thc utch position in thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics. Tc Joint 8oard ol thc Army and Navy was not cagcr lor thc Unitcd Statcs to bccomc involvcd in a war with Japan. A major war cort in thc Pacic would rcquirc an cnormous amount ol shipping . . . lrom thc Atlantic and othcr csscntial arcas, which would matcrially acct Unitcd Statcs aid to ngland. CN Stark warncd his Admirals: Sincc thc US and 8ritain arc hcld rcsponsiblc by Japan lor hcr prcscnt dcspcratc situation thcrc is also a possibility that Japan may attack thcsc two powcrs. Kimmcl in Pcarl Harbor had to rcly on Vashington lor intcl ligcncc. CN Stark assurcd Kimmcl that thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc rccognizcd its rcsponsibility on that scorc. !n mid ctobcr, Stark wrotc Kimmcl: 852 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Pcrsonally ! do not bclicvc thc Japs arc going to sail into us. . . . Pcrhaps ! am wrong, but ! hopc not. !n any casc altcr long powwows in thc Vhitc Housc, it was lclt wc should bc on guard, at lcast until somcthing indicatcs thc trcnd. !n carly Novcmbcr 1941, Army Chicl ol Sta Gcncral Marshall and Chicl ol Naval pcrations Admiral Stark adviscd FR that Unitcd Statcs policy in thc Far ast should bc bascd rst on thc dclcat ol Gcrmany. Var bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and Japan should bc avoidcd whilc thc U.S. built up hcr dclcn sivc lorccs in thc Far ast. Tcy told FR that it was all right to continuc to scnd U.S. armcd lorccs and othcr aid to China lor intcrvcntion against Japan. Howcvcr, Marshall and Stark wantcd timc bclorc thc cruption ol any conict and thcy rccommcndcd that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. |italics addcd| U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joscph Grcw warncd FR, Novcmbcr 3, 1941, that war bctwccn Japan and thc Unitcd Statcs may comc with dangerous and dramatic suddenness. At thc Cabincts wcckly Friday mccting at thc Vhitc Housc, Novcmbcr 7, 1941, FR took thc rst gcncral poll ol his Cabinct . . . on thc qucstion ol thc Far astwhcthcr thc pcoplc would back us up in casc wc struck at Japan down thcrc. . . . !t was unanimous in lccling thc country would support us. Sccrctary ol Var Stimson bclicvcd thc votc would havc bccn much strongcr il thc Cabinct mcmbcrs had known what thc Army was doing to rccnlorcc thc Philippincs and how rcady thc Army was to pitch in in casc ol an attack on thc 8ritish or utch in southcastcrn Asia. To lacilitatc thc U.S.Japancsc diplomatic ncgotiations in Vashington, Japan scnt a sccond ambassador, Kurusu, to Vashington in Novcmbcr. Vhcn Hull prcscntcd him to thc prcs idcnt, Hull rcmindcd Kurusu ol Japans alliancc with Gcrmany: Epilogue 853 |V|hcn Hitlcr starts on a march ol invasion across thc carth with tcn million soldicrs and thirty thousand airplancs, . . . this country lrom that timc was in dangcr. . . . |T|his country with no othcr motivc cxccpt sclldclcnsc has rccognizcd that dan gcr, and has procccdcd thus lar to dclcnd itscll bclorc it is too latc. Tc prcsidcnt and Hull madc it clcar that wc wcrc not thc aggrcssors in thc Pacic but that Japan was thc aggrcssor. Tc U.S. cryptographcrs intcrccptcd a mcssagc lrom Tokyo sctting a dcadlinc lor thc U.S.Japancsc diplomats to rcach agrcc mcnt in thcir ncgotiations: 8ccausc ol various circumstanccs, it is absolutcly ncccssary that all arrangcmcnts lor thc signing ol this agrccmcnt |bcing ncgotiatcd with thc Unitcd Statcs| bc complctcd by thc 25th ol this month |latcr cxtcndcd to thc 29th|. . . . n Novcmbcr 20, thc two Japancsc Ambassadors suggcstcd a modus vivendi, a tcmporary arrangcmcnt, to continuc thc status quo whilc ncgotiations continucd. 8oth Japan and thc Unitcd Statcs would makc somc conccssions. Tc Unitcd Statcs would supply Japan a rcquircd quantity ol oil. Chinas Chiang Kai shck bombardcd Vashington with dcmands that no lurthcr conccssions bc madc to Tokyo. Japancsc ship movcmcnts in Far ast grabbcd thc attcntion ol Vashingtons top o cials. At a Novcmbcr 25, 1941, mccting, FR said wc wcrc likcly to bc attackcd |by Japan| pcrhaps |as soon as| ncxt Monday, lor thc Japancsc arc notorious lor making an attack without warning. Stimson rcmarkcd: Tc qucstion was how wc should mancuvcr thcm into thc position ol ring thc rst shot without allowing too much dangcr to oursclvcs. Hull was askcd to prcparc an ultimatum to Japan likc that ol August, notilying hcr that il shc crosscd thc bordcr into Tailand shc was violating our salcty. 854 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Stark scnt a warning to Kimmcl. Ncithcr FR nor Hull would bc surpriscd ovcr a Japancsc surprisc attack. . . . |A|n attack on thc Philippincs would bc thc most cmbarrassing thing that could happcn to us. Stark didnt bclicvc thc Japancsc would procccd against Russia, hc considcrcd an advancc into Tailand, !ndoChina, 8urma Road arca as thc most likcly. Novcmbcr 26, 1941: Stimson told FR that a Japancsc cxpcdition ol vc divisions had gonc south lrom Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai, whcncc thcy had cmbarkcd on 30, 40, or 50 southbound ships. Novcmbcr 26, 1941: Tc modus vivendi was jcttisoncd. And a 10point ultimatum was issucd to Japan. Altcr this Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum had gonc out, Vashington o cials discusscd what to tcll MacArthur in thc Philippincs. !t was agrccd wc should scnd thc nal alcrt, namcly, that hc should bc on thc qui vive lor any attack. FR was particularly con ccrncd . . . by currcnt southward troop movcmcnts lrom Shanghai and Japan to thc Formosa arca, prcparing lor an carly aggrcssivc movcmcnt ol somc charactcr . . . dircctcd against thc 8urma Road, Tailand, Malay Pcninsula, Ncthcrlands ast !ndics or thc Philippincs. . . . |T|his ncxt Japancsc aggrcssion might causc an outbrcak ol hostilitics bctwccn thc U.S. and Japan. Novcmbcr 27, 1941: Vashington warncd (1) Manila, (2) Hawaii, (3) Atlantic cct that Japancsc southbound convoys wcrc hcading lor thc Philippincs, Tai, or Kra Pcninsula or possibly 8ornco. Novcmbcr 27, 1941: Marshall and Stark ask lor timc to prc parc U.S. dclcnscs. Tcy wcrc cspccially conccrncd about thc Philippincs: Tc most csscntial thing now, lrom thc Unitcd Statcs vicwpoint is to gain timc. !t is rccommcndcd that: mili tary countcraction bc considcrcd only il Japan attacks or dircctly Epilogue 855 thrcatcns Unitcd Statcs, 8ritish or utch tcrritory. And Japan should bc warncd that advancc bcyond thc lincs indicatcd . . . may lcad to war. Novcmbcr 28, 1941: Tc mcmbcrs ol FRs Var Cabinct all agrccd that il thc | Japancsc| cxpcdition wcrc pcrmittcd to land in thc Gull ol Siam it would placc a strong Japancsc lorcc in such a stra tcgic position as to bc a scvcrc blow at all thrcc ol thc powcrs in southcast Asiathc 8ritish at Singaporc, thc Ncthcrlands in thc !ndics, and oursclvcs in thc Philippincs. Vc all agrccd that it must not bc allowcd, that, il thc Japancsc got into thc !sthmus ol Kra, thc 8ritish would ght, and, il thc 8ritish lought, wc would havc to ght. According to Stimson, Te possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was not [then] discussed since our thoughts were all focused on this movement toward southeast Asia. Novcmbcr 28, 1941: Vc intcrccptcd Japans instructions to hcr ambassadors in Vashington conccrning our Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum. Tc !mpcrial Govcrnmcnt can by no mcans usc it as a basis lor ncgotiations. Tcrclorc . . . thc ncgotiations will bc dc lacto rupturcd. . . . Howcvcr . . . |dont| givc thc imprcssion that thc ncgotiations arc brokcn o. Mcrcly say . . . that you arc awaiting instructions. How should thc Unitcd Statcs rcspond il thc Japancsc attackcd 8ritish tcrritory in southcast Asia: Sccrctary ol Statc Hull proposcd that FR prcscnt a mcssagc to Congrcss con ccrning thc Japancsc aggrcssion. Hull, Stimson and Knox draltcd such a mcssagc. Tc suprcmc qucstion prcscntcd to this country along with many othcr countrics by thc Hitlcrdominatcd movcmcnt ol 856 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy world conqucst is that ol sclldclcnsc. . . . Vc do not want war with Japan, and Japan docs not want war with this country. !l, howcvcr, war should comc, thc lault and thc rcsponsibility will bc thosc ol Japan. Tc primary cause will havc bccn pursuit by Japan ol a policy ol aggrcssion. At a mccting on cccmbcr 1, 1941, thc Japancsc ambassa dors told Hull that thc U.S. ultimatums tcn points, had bccn communicatcd to thcir govcrnmcnt which was studying thc casc. Hull rcspondcd: Tc hcavy Japancsc troop movcmcnts into !ndochina. . . . crcatc an incrcasing mcnacc to Amcrica and hcr lricnds. . . . |V|c will not allow oursclvcs to bc kickcd out ol thc Pacic. Hull accuscd thc Japancsc ol using Hitlcrian mcthods in China. |V|c cannot losc sight ol thc movcmcnt by Hitlcr to scizc onchall ol thc world. Tc Japancsc militarists, Hull said, wcrc moving in a similar dircction to scizc thc othcr hall ol thc carth. . . . |T|his Govcrnmcnt cannot yicld to anything ol that kind. n cccmbcr 1, Rooscvclt dircctcd Admiral Hart in Manila to dispatch thrcc small ships |minimally armcd and cquippcd to bc classicd as mcn ol war| to takc up positions in thc path ol thc southbound Japancsc convoysto obscrvc and rcport by radio Japancsc movcmcnts. n cccmbcr 1, Japan ordcrcd hcr cmbassics worldwidc to dcstroy thcir codcs and codc machincs. n cccmbcr 3, 1941: Japan ordcrcd its cmbassy in Vashington to dcstroy all sccrct lcs, documcnts and codcs but thosc now bcing uscd with thcir codc machinc. A cccmbcr 1 Tokyo to 8crlin Purplc intcrccpt dccodcd and translatcd in Vashington rcad in part: war may suddcnly brcak out bctwccn thc AngloSaxon nations and Japan through somc clash ol arms . . . quickcr than anyonc drcams. A sccond Tokyo8crlin mcssagc intcrccptcd, dccodcd, and translatcd rcad: 8clorc rcjccting Japans modus vivendi, thc Unitcd Statcs Epilogue 857 conlcrrcd with ngland, Australia, thc Ncthcrlands, and China . . . . |!|t is clcar that thc Unitcd Statcs is now in collusion with thosc nations and has dccidcd to rcgard Japan, along with Gcrmany and !taly, as an cncmy. Tc Unitcd Statcs continucd to assurc 8ritish and utch ol Amcrican support. FR to 8ritish Ambassador Lord Halilax: !n thc casc ol a dircct attack on thc 8ritish or thc utch, wc should obviously all bc togcthcr. According to Halilax, thc prcsi dcnt said thc 8ritish could count on Amcrican support il wc |thc 8ritish| carricd out our movc to dclcnd thc Kra !sthmus |on Tai tcrritory| in thc cvcnt ol a Japancsc attack. n cccmbcr 2,Rooscvclt told thc Japancsc ambassadors that thc continuing troop movcmcnts to southcrn !ndochina portcnd Japancsc aggrcssion against thc Philippincs, N!, 8urma, Malaya, Tailand. Such ncw aggrcssion would, ol coursc, bc additional to thc acts ol aggrcssion alrcady undcrtakcn against China, our atti tudc towards which is wcll known. Tc ncxt day FR rcconrmcd his plcdgc ol armcd support to thc 8ritish and hc told Halilax that, whcn talking ol support, hc mcant armcd support, and that hc agrccd with thc 8ritish plan lor opcrations in thc Kra !sthmus il thc Japancsc attackcd Tailand. Tc U.S. and 8ritish talkcd about joint war plans, as to whcn and whcrc thc U.S. and Grcat 8ritain should strikc. n cccmbcr 4, Lord Halilax cxprcsscd his Govcrnmcnts vcry dccp apprcciation lor FRs promiscs ol armcd support. Hc thought thc warning thcy had talkcd about should apply to an attack by Japan on Tailand, Malaya, thc utch ast !ndics, or thc 8urma Road (through !ndoChina). Mr. Rooscvclt was doubtlul about including thc 8urma Road, but othcrwisc agrccd to thc warning. 858 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Tc Unitcd Statcs warncd its U.S. outposts in Asia ol thc immincncc ol war with Japan. Navy Captain McCollum, in chargc ol thc Far astcrn scction ol Naval !ntclligcnccs lorcign branch, draltcd a warning mcssagc (cccmbcr 3, 1941) to Admiral Hart (Manila), Admiral Kimmcl (Pcarl Harbor), and to commandants ol thc naval districts in Hawaii and thc Philippincs: |!|nstructions wcrc scnt ycstcrday to Japancsc diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong x Singaporc x 8atavia x Manila x Vashington and London to dcstroy most ol thcir codcs and ciphcrs at oncc and to burn all othcr important condcntial and sccrct documcnts. uring thc rst wcck ol cccmbcr 1941, scvcral warnings ol impcnding Japancsc aggrcssion wcrc rcccivcd in Vashington lrom Purplc codc MAG!C intcrccpts. Tc Japancsc consul was askcd to rcport to Tokyo, at irrcgular intcrvals but at a ratc ol twicc a wcck, on a systcm ol grids, thc location ol ships in |Pcarl| Harbor. A spccial Japancsc codc bascd on lalsc wcathcr rcports, thc Vinds Codc, had also bccn sct up so Tokyo could communicatc sccrctly with its cmbassics and consulatcs around thc world il, as, and whcn, it was no longcr possiblc to rcach thcm with codcd mcssagcs altcr thcir codc machincs had bccn dcstroycd. Tis codc was implcmcntcd cccmbcr 4, by a Vinds Codc xccutc indicating troublcd rclations with Grcat 8ritain, thc utch ast !ndics and thc U.S., but not with Russia. Tcsc crucial intcrccpts, indicating that U.S tcrritory, quitc possibly thc U.S. Flcct in Pcarl Harbor, was likcly to bc a targct ol Japans aggrcssion, wcrc scnt to all thc top brass in Vashington, but not to our commandcrs in Hawaiinot to Gcncral Short, who was rcsponsiblc lor thc salcty ol thc cct whilc in port, nor to Admiral Kimmcl, commandcrinchicl ol thc Pacic Flcct bascd in Pcarl Harbor. Upon rcccipt ol thc Vinds xccutc, Saord, Chicl ol Sccurity ol Naval Communications, alcrtcd U.S. outposts in thc Pacic to dcstroy classicd documcnts, but his alcrts wcrc dclaycd and didnt rcach thcir addrcssccs until altcr thc attack. Epilogue 859 Captain McCollum, Naval !ntclligcncc, Far astcrn 8ranch, draltcd a mcssagc bascd on thc Vinds xccutc to warn Pcarl Harbor, but hc lcarncd latcr that it had not bccn scnt. n cccmbcr 3, U. S. Army military intclligcncc cablcd thc U.S. military attach in Tokyo to dcstroy its codcs. n cccmbcr 4, thc Statc cpartmcnt suggcstcd that thc U.S. and 8ritish coor dinatc thcir withdrawal or cxchangc ol Amcricans lrom Japan, Manchuria, and Japancscoccupicd China in thc cvcnt ol 8ritish Japancsc hostilitics. Morc indications ol thc immincncc ol war wcrc intcrccptcd cccmbcr 6, 1941: Mcssagcs lrom !taly, thc Japancsc mbassy in Vashington, and Tokyo, indicatcd that war was immincnt. Japancsc o ccs worldwidc acknowlcdgcd Tokyos codcdcstruct ordcr. Tc 8ritish and utch wcrc on thc qui vive in Southcast Pacic. Admiral Hart in Manila rcportcd U.S. ovcrights had sightcd Japancsc convoys in South China Sca hcading toward Malaya and thc !sthmus ol Kra. n Saturday, cccmbcr 6, U.S. cryptographcrs startcd to pick up Japans scvcralpart rcsponsc to thc Unitcd Statcs Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum. A Pilot Mcssagc announccd that Japans 14part rcply was cn routc to hcr ambassadors in Vashington. Tc rst 13 parts wcrc rcccivcd, dcciphcrcd and dclivcrcd to top Vashington o cials and to FR about 9:30 v.:. Altcr rcading it, FR said to his aidc, Mr. Hopkins: Tis mcans war. Tc two mcn spccu latcd as to whcrc and whcn thc strikc would comc. Pcarl Harbor was not mcntioncd. Nor was thcrc any indication that tomorrow was thc day. No mcntion was madc ol scnding a lurthcr warning or alcrt. n cccmbcr 6, 1941, FR announccd to thc prcss and to thc world that hc had scnt Japancsc mpcror Hirohito a plca lorpcacc. Tc Statc cpartmcnt had complctcd on cccmbcr 5, its dralt ol a mcssagc lor thc prcsidcnt to prcscnt to Congrcss, possibly on cccmbcr 89, dcpcnding on Hirohitos rcsponsc to FRs plca lor pcacc. 860 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cccmbcr 67, 1941: A latc night mccting ol FRs inncr circlc was hcld in thc Vhitc Housc, thcy wcrc waiting lor what thcy cxpcctcd was cominga Japancsc strikc against 8ritish Malaya or Tailands !sthmus ol Kra, and possibly thc utch ast !ndics. Tcy had bccn agonizing ovcr this lor wccks and FRs Cabinct Sccrctarics had bccn askcd to dralt statcmcnts prcscnting thc rationalc lor our going to war against Japan to dclcnd thc 8ritish and utch. !n thc Philippincs, on thc othcr sidc ol thc datclinc (cccmbcr 7, 1941) Admiral Hart, altcr talking with thc top 8ritish admiral who had bccn visiting Manila lrom Singaporc, cablcd Vashington lor instructions conccrning U.S. commitmcnts to thc 8ritish in southcast Pacic, thousands ol milcs wcst ol Pcarl Harbor. !n thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, 1941, Hull and Knox, at thc rcqucst ol Sccrctary ol Var Stimson, cach draltcd a statcmcnt as to what thc Unitcd Statcs should do in thc cvcnt ol Japancsc action in southcast Asia. Hull: Tc Japancsc govcrnmcnt is dominatcd by military rccatcrs who wcrc aiming to acquirc military control ovcr onchall ol thc world with ncarly onchall its population. . . . |A|ll ol thc conqucrcd pcoplcs would bc govcrncd . . . militar ily, politically, cconomically, socially, and morally by thc worst possiblc military dcspotism such as that uscd by Japan in China and Hitlcr in uropc. |C|ontrol ol thc South Sca arca by Japan is thc kcy to thc con trol ol thc cntirc Pacic arca, and thcrclorc dclcnsc ol lilc and commcrcc and othcr invaluablc rights and intcrcsts . . . must bc commcnccd within thc South Sca arca. . . . Sclldclcnsc, thcrc lorc, is thc kcy point lor thc prcscrvation ol cach and all ol our civilizcd institutions. Epilogue 861 Knox: Vc arc ticd up incxtricably with thc 8ritish in thc prcscnt world situation. Tc lall ol Singaporc and thc loss to ngland ol Malaya will automatically not only wrcck hcr lar castcrn position but jcopardizc hcr cntirc cort. . . . !l thc 8ritish losc thcir position thc utch arc almost ccrtain to losc thcirs. . . . !l thc abovc bc acccptcd, thcn any scrious thrcat to thc 8ritish or thc utch is a scrious thrcat to thc Unitcd Statcs . . . |T|hc Japancsc should bc told that any movcmcnt in a dircction that thrcatcns thc Unitcd Statcs will bc mct by lorcc. Tc lourtccnth part ol Japans rcply to thc U.S. ultimatum was pickcd up and dclivcrcd to top U.S. Army and Navy o cials on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Also thc Japancsc govcrnmcnts mcssagc dirccting its Ambassadors in Vashington to dclivcr Tokyos 14part rcply to thc Unitcd Statcs at prcciscly nc v.:. Vashington timc. cccmbcr 7, 1941 (just bclorc noon): Marshall, with Starks approval, mcssagcd Manila, Panama, Pcarl Harbor: Japancsc arc prcscnting at onc v.:., astcrn Standard Timc today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also, thcy arc undcr ordcrs to dcstroy thcir codc machincs immcdiatcly. Just what signi cancc thc hour sct may havc wc do not know but bc on alcrt accordingly. !nlorm naval authoritics ol this communication. Tis mcssagc wcnt right through to Manila and Panama, but duc to atmosphcric conditions it did not rcach Hawaii until latc that altcrnoon. cccmbcr 7, 1941 (8 ~.:. , Hawaii timc, 1:30 v.:. Vashington timc): Japancsc plancs, launchcd lrom aircralt carricrs a lcw hun drcd milcs north, bombcd and torpcdocd thc U.S. Flcct at Pcarl Harbor. Kimmcl in Hawaii radiocd all U.S. stations that an air raid attack was on and that it was no drill. 862 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Pos: A::~cx So thc Unitcd Statcs had bccn attackcd. Morc than 2,500 soldicrs, sailors and marincs had bccn killcd at Pcarl Harbor on that cccmbcr 7, 1941. !n his addrcss to Congrcss thc lollowing day, Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt callcd immcdiatcly lor a dcclaration ol war against Japan. And Congrcss complicd. Tc pcoplc wcrc mad at thc Japancsc and cagcr to rcvcngc thc dastardly attack. Apparcntly Japans brilliantly planncd and brilliantly cxccutcd attack had caught thc U.S. lorccs at Pcarl Harbor complctcly unawarcs. Tc pcoplc wantcd to know who was rcsponsiblc. Tcy wantcd to know why thc U.S. lorccs at Pcarl Harbor had bccn caught o guardunwarncd, illcquippcd, and poorly prcparcd. !t was obvious that Japan was dircctly rcsponsiblc lor thc attack. Howcvcr, it is not so casy to dctcrminc rcsponsibility lor thc extent ol thc Pcarl Harbor disastcrthc clcmcnt ol surprisc, thc tragic loss ol lilc, and thc catastrophic dcvastation ol ships, plancs, ctc. Tc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs, Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short, wcrc hcld rcsponsiblc and publicly blamcd lor thc disastcr. Howcvcr, it is now apparcnt that in thc nal analysis it was Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt himscll, who was truly rcsponsiblc lor Pcarl Harbors lack ol prcparcdncss. !t was hc who dctcrmincd U.S. policy and who dircctcd thc Sccrctarics ol Statc, Var, and Navy how to implcmcnt that policy. Tc top Vashington o cials who wcrc privy to MAG!C also contributcd to thc cxtcnt ol thc disastcr by not adcquatcly warning Pcarl Harbor in a timcly man ncr. Tcir contributions, howcvcr, wcrc sins ol omission rathcr than sins ol commission. An Administration covcrup, undcr thc guidancc ol FR and with thc support ol his loyal licutcnants, was apparcntly aimcd at kccping thc public lrom lcarning ol thc Administrations rolc in lailing to kccp thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs adcquatcly cquippcd and inlormcd ol thc immincncc ol war with Japan, and Epilogue 863 ol thc likclihood that Pcarl Harbor could bc a targct. Morcovcr, it has ncvcr bccn cxplaincd how thc sccrct Japancsc intcrccpts, which had bccn rcccivcd, dccodcd, translatcd and distributcd bclorc thc attack, which had rcvcalcd a grcat dcalnot all ol Japans thinking to thosc in Vashington who wcrc privy to MAG!C, disappcarcd lrom both Army and Navy lcs whcrc thcy had bccn hcld undcr tight sccurity. Upon a rcvicw ol thc cvcnts that took placc ovcr thc months prcccding thc attackas rcvcalcd in thc scvcral invcstigations thc top Vashington o cials had amplc rcason to cxpcct that a Japancsc attack on U.S. tcrritory was immincnt. Yct thcy did not rclay that scnsc ol urgcncy to Kimmcl and Short. Morcovcr, thcir warnings dircctcd thc attcntion ol thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs to thc southcast Pacic. !t sccms in rctrospcct that thc U.S. diplomatic ncgotiations, which wcrc o cially still ongoing at thc timc ol thc attack, wcrc not always conductcd in complctcly good laith, timc and again U.S. o cials rcjcctcd compromiscs ocrcd by thc Japancsc. Tc U.S. cmbargocd thc salc to Japan ol oil and othcr commoditics shc nccdcd, and pcrsuadcd thc 8ritish and utch to lollow suit. U.S. o cials in Vashington apparcntly lailcd to rcalizc that Japan might considcr thc U.S. Flcct at Pcarl Harbor a thrcat to Japans plans lor military cxpansion in thc southwcst Pacic, and thus might try to put it out ol commission bclorc cmbarking on a war against thc U.S. Tcy not only lailcd to lurnish thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs with thc mcn, plancs, munitions and othcr matc ricl thcy rcqucstcd, but a substantial numbcr ol thc Flccts ships had bccn translcrrcd to thc Atlantic thus rcducing substantially thc U.S. dclcnsivc strcngth in thc Pacic. Morcovcr, Vashington o cials had rcmindcd Kimmcl and Short again and again that thc Unitcd Statcss principal cncmy was Hitlcr, and that thc war was in thc Atlantic. Top Vashington o cials lailcd rcpcatcdly to rclay important intclligcncc to thc commandcrs in thc cld. Tcy lailcd to advisc 864 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kimmcl and Short that Japan was rcporting rcgularly to Tokyo on a grid plot thc locations ol ships in Pcarl Harbor. Tcy lailcd to rccognizc thc importancc ol thc ast Vinds Rain mcssagc, intcrccptcd on cccmbcr 4, 1941, indicating that an attack on U.S. tcrritory, as wcll as thc 8ritish and utch, was a likcly rst targct. As a mattcr ol lact, no rccord has cvcr bccn lound ol what happcncd to thc ast Vinds Rain mcssagc altcr it was dclivcrcd to Naval Communications on thc morning ol cccmbcr 4, 1941. Tc top Vashington o cials warncd Kimmcl and Short ol Japans advanccs bcing madc thousands ol milcs wcst ol Pcarl Harbor, toward thc Philippincs and southcast AsiaTailand, 8ornco, thc utch ast !ndics and thc !sthmus ol Kra. U.S. intclligcncc o cials had lost track ol thc Japancsc aircralt carricrs. Apparcntly thcy did not drcam that thcy could bc stcaming across thc Pacic toward Hawaii with bombcrs and torpcdo plancs onboard, and that Novcmbcr 29 was thc Japancsc ambassadors dcadlinc lor complcting thcir diplomatic ncgotiations bccausc it might bc thc dcadlinc lor rccalling Japancsc lorccs lrom an intcndcd mission scvcral days away. Rooscvclt and his top Vashington adviscrs wcrc undoubtcdly conccrncd lcst blamc bc attachcd to thcm lor lailurc to lulll thcir rcsponsibilitics lor thc countrys dclcnsc. According to Rooscvclt condant and spccchwritcr Robcrt Shcrwood, thc Prcsidcnt may cvcn havc had qualms that his prcattack dcalings with thc 8ritish might bc considcrcd impcachablc ocnscs. Sccrctary ol Navy Knox apparcntly lclt guilty lor not having morc adcquatcly warncd thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. And Gcncral Marshall too, must havc had qualms about his dilatory tactics in warning thc arca commandcrs, lor hc bcgan his own invcstigation almost immcdiatcly into thc dclay in dclivcring his last minutc mcssagc to Pcarl Harbor. Tus, thc lcading principals in Vashington wcrc hcsitant to havc invcstigations that might rcvcal somc ol thcir own actions as dcrclictions in duty and/or crrors in judgmcnt. Epilogue 865 Morcovcr, FR was cspccially anxious to kccp thc world lrom lcarning that, all thc timc hc had bccn assuring votcrs that hc had no intcntion ol scnding thcir sons to ght in a lorcign war unlcss wc wcrc attackcdhc had bccn planning a prccmptivc strikc to scnd U.S. armcd lorccs to dclcnd thc 8ritish and utch lrom thc Japancsc thousands ol milcs lrom our shorcs. And that Admiral Kimmcl in Pcarl Harbor had bccn undcr ordcrs to prc parc thc Flcct to takc oensive action against thc Japancsc in thc southcast Pacic. Altcr thc wars cnd, Congrcss commissioncd thc ycarlong Joint |Congrcssional| Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Many ol thc lacts prcscntcd in this book wcrc rcvcalcd in its hcarings (Novcmbcr 15, 1945May 31, 1946).
Coxciusiox It must be said also that the evidence revealed in the course of the several investigations leads to the conclusion that the ultimate respon- sibility for the catastrophe inicted on the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, must rest on the shoulders of President Roosevelt, to whom the Constitution assigns authority as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and the responsibility to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. It is now evident that the stage was set for a Japanese attack on U.S. territory by President Roosevelts decisions and actions. He was responsible for squeezing the Japanese economically until they were forced to try to use force to seize the resources they needed and to prevent the U.S. Fleet from trying to stop them. It was thanks to Roosevelts decisions and actions that an unwarned, ill-equipped, and poorly prepared Fleet remained stationed far from the shores of continental United States, at a base recognized by his military advisers as indefensible and vulnerable to attack. Given 866 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy that situation, it is not strange that the Fleet was surprised by the attack of Japanese torpedo planes and bombers that fateful Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. And then when the extent of the damage was known, it was Roosevelt who orchestrated a cover-up to make Admiral Kimmel and General Short scapegoats and to conceal any negligence on the part of the administration. Tc rcvclation hcrcwith ol thc addrcss Rooscvclt would havc madc to Congrcss on cccmbcr 8 or 9, il thc cccmbcr 7 attack had not intcrvcncd, indicatcs that Rooscvclt would havc ordcrcd thc U.S. armcd lorccs to takc thc ocnsivc against thc Japancsc, without waiting for an attack on U.S. territory. Tus thc attack on Pcarl Harbor bccamc FRs cxcusc, not his rcason, lor calling lor thc Unitcd Statcss cntry into Vorld Var !!.
Appendix: Dramatis Personae 8vi:isn/Aus:v~ii~x 8rookc Popham, Sir Hcnry Robcrt Moorc Air Chicl Marshall in Command ol ntirc Far ast, 19401942, stationcd in Singaporc. 8urnctt, Sir Charlcs, Air Chicl Marshall Chicl ol Sta, Royal Australian Air Forcc. Cadogan, Sir Alcxandcr Undcr Sccrctary ol Forcign Aairs. Cascy, Richard G. Australian Ministcr to thc Unitcd Statcs. Chambcrlain, Ncvillc Primc Ministcr, 19371940. Churchill, Vinston First Lord ol thc Admiralty, 19111915, Primc Ministcr, 19401945, 19511955. Craigic, Sir Robcrt Ambassador to Japan. dcn, Anthony Sccrctary ol Statc lor Forcign Aairs (19401945, 19511955), Primc Ministcr (19551957). Halilax (dward Frcdcrick Lindlcy Vood), Lord Ambassador to thc Unitcd Statcs, 19411946. 867 868 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Hcwitt, Air Commodorc Royal Australian Air Forcc intclligcncc o ccr. Layton, Valtcr, Sir ircctor Gcncral, Programmcs in thc 8ritish Ministry ol Supply. Lothian (Philip Hcnry Kcrr), Lord Ambassador to thc U.S., 19391940 (dicd in o cc). arl ol Lytton. Phillips, Sir Frcdcrick Rcprcscntativc ol 8ritish Trcasury. Phillips, Sir Tom S.\. CommandcrinChicl, astcrn Flcct, lost at sca whcn his ship, thc Prince of Wales was sunk, cccmbcr 8 (:), 1941. Purvis, Arthur 8. Hcad, AngloFrcnch Purchasing Mission. Ramscy A.H.M., Captain Mcmbcr ol 8ritish Parliamcnt who saw and rcportcd mcssagcs Tylcr Kcnt had takcn lrom thc U.S. mbassy. Stcphcnson, Villiam, Sir 8ritish agcnt, !ntrcpid, Chicl, 8ritish Sccurity Coordination in thc U.S. u:cn Salm, Commandcr utch !ndics naval liaison o ccr to Australian govcrnmcnt. Fvvxcn Rcynaud, Paul. Frcnch Forcign Ministcr. Cnixvsv Chiang KaiShck Gcncralissimo in war against Japan, 19371941, appointcd suprcmc commandcr, allicd lorccs, Chincsc Var Tcatcr, January 1942, Prcsidcnt National Govcrnmcnt, 19431949, and on Taiwan, 19501975. Appendix: Dramatis Personae 869 Chiang KaiShck, Madamc Mciling Soong, sccond wilc ol thc Gcncralissimo. Hu Shih Ambassador in Vashington. Quo Taichi Chincsc Forcign Ministcr. Soong, T.\., r. Chiangs brothcrinlaw and pcrsonal cmissary in Vashington, China clcnsc Supplics, !nc. Gvv:~x ~xb !:~ii~x Ciano, Contc Galcazzi !talian Ministcr ol Forcign Aairs, 19361943, soninlaw ol Mussolini. Hitlcr, Adoll Gcrman Chanccllor, 19331945, dictator. Mussolini, 8cnito Prcmicr, ictator, altcr lall ol Francc lcd !taly into war, 1940, dcposcd 1943, imprisoncd, rcscucd by Gcrmans, Scpt. 1943, assassinatcd by !talian partisans April 28, 1945. Racdcr, rich, Admiral CommandcrinChicl, Gcrman Navy. Ribbcntrop, Joachim von Gcrman Forcign Ministcr, convictcd ol war crimcs and hangcd, 1946. J~v~xvsv Ando mbassy, Vashington, associatc ol Tcrasaki, ordcrcd by Tokyo prcattack to lcavc thc U.S. Hirohito. mpcror (19261989). Konoyc, Princc Primc Ministcr, Junc 4, 1937ctobcr 18, 1941. 870 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kurusu, Saburo Sccond ambassador to thc Unitcd Statcs (arrivcd in Vashington, Novcmbcr 15, 1941). Nomura, Kichisaburo, Admiral Ambassador to thc Unitcd Statcs (appointcd January 1941). gimoto Pctty ccr, intclligcncc o ccr posing as a codc clcrk, Japancsc cmbassy in Vashington. hashi, Chiuchi \icc Ministcr lor Forcign Aairs. Sancmatsu, Yuzuru Assistant Naval Attachc, Japancsc mbassy in Vashington. Shigcmitsu Japancsc Ambassador to London. Takagi mbassy, Vashington, associatc ol Tcrasaki, ordcrcd by Tokyo prcattack to lcavc thc U.S. Tcrasaki, Hidcnari First Sccrctary, Japancsc mbassy, Vashington, hcad ol Japancsc cspio nagc in Vcstcrn Hcmispcrc. Tojo, Hidcki, Licutcnant Gcncral Primc Ministcr, 19411944, convictcd as war criminal and hangcd, 1948. Yamamoto Chicl, Amcrican 8urcau ol Japancsc Forcign cc. Yamamoto, !soroku, Admiral Commandcr in chicl ol Combincd Flcct, shot down in air action, 1943. Uxi:vb S:~:vs PvvFv~xxiix . Roosvvvi: Ab:ixis:v~:iox Castlc, Villiam R., Jr. Formcr Ambassador to Japan, Undcrsccrctary ol Statc undcr Hoovcr. Coolidgc, Calvin U.S. Prcsidcnt, 19231929. Appendix: Dramatis Personae 871 Hoovcr, Hcrbcrt U.S. Prcsidcnt, 19291933. Hurlcy, Patrick Sccrctary ol Var, 19291933, Ambassador to China, 19441945. Kcnt, Tylcr U.S. codc clcrk (London) who smugglcd sccrct mcssagcs out ol thc U.S. mbassy and was tricd and imprisoncd in ngland lor thc duration ol thc war. Pcrshing, John J., Gcncral Commandcr in Chicl, Amcrican xpcditionary Forcc 19171919. Rooscvclt Tcodorc U.S. Prcsidcnt, 19011909. Talt, Howard U.S. Prcsidcnt, 19091913. Yardlcy, Hcrbcrt . Vorld Var ! Var and Statc cpartmcnt cryptographcr, author ol Te American Black Chamber (1931). V~snixc:ox (++)Civiii~x, Poii:ic~i Austin, Varrcn R., U.S. Scnator (R) \crmont. 8allantinc, Joscph V. Forcign Scrvicc ccr, U.S. Statc cpartmcnt. 8arklcy, Albcn V., U.S. Scnator () Kcntucky. 8iddlc, Francis Attorncy Gcncral. 8loom, Sol, U.S. Rcprcscntativc () Ncw York. Chairman Forcign Aairs Committcc. 8ullitt, Villiam C. First U.S. Ambassador to U.S.S.R., 19331936. Ambassador to Francc, 19361940. 872 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 8yrd, Harry Flood, U.S. Scnator () \irginia. Cartcr, dward C. Formcr Sccrctary Gcncral ol thc !nstitutc ol Pacic Rclations, Ncw York. Connally, Tom, U.S. Scnator () Tcxas, Chairman, Scnatc Forcign Rclations Committcc. Curric, Lauchlin Administrativc Assistant to Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt. ooman, ugcnc H. Counsclor, U.S. mbassy in Tokyo. arly, Stcphcn Sccrctary to thc Prcsidcnt. aton, Charlcs A., U.S. Rcprcscntativc (R) Ncw Jcrscy. dison, Charlcs Sccrctary ol Var, 19331940. Gauss, C.. U.S. Ambassador to China. Grcw, Joscph C. U.S. Ambassador to Japan prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941. Hackworth, Grccn H. Lcgal Advisor, Statc cpartmcnt. Hamilton, Maxwcll M. Chicl ol ivision ol Far astcrn Aairs in Statc cpartmcnt. Harriman, Avcrcll Spccial Rcprcscntativc ol thc Prcsidcnt, with ambassadorial rank. Hcndcrson, Lcon Hcad ol cc ol Pricc Administration and Civilian Supply. Hillman, Sidncy Labor union lcadcr, codircctor (with Villiam S. Knudscn) ol cc ol Production Managcmcnt. Appendix: Dramatis Personae 873 Hopkins, Harry Pcrsonal adviscr to FR, Sccrctary ol Commcrcc (19381940), hcad ol LcndLcasc Administration (1942), mcmbcr Var Production 8oard (1942), spccial assistant to Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt (19421945). Hornbcck, Stanlcy K. Spccial Assistant to Sccrctary ol Statc, Advisor on Political Rclations. Hull, Cordcll Sccrctary ol Statc, 19331944. !ckcs, Harold Sccrctary ol thc !ntcrior, 19331946, Pctrolcum Coordinator lor National clcnsc, 1941. Johnson, Hiram,V., U.S. Scnator (R) Calilornia. Kcnncdy, Joscph P. U.S. Ambassador to ngland (19331940), lathcr ol John F. Kcnncdy, U.S. Prcsidcnt (19611963). Knox, Frank Rcpublican candidatc lor \icc Prcsidcnt, 1936, Sccrctary ol Navy, 19401944. Knudscn, Villiam S. Commissioncr ol Council ol National clcnsc (1940), codircctor (with Hillman) ol cc ol Production Managcmcnt (1941), dircctor ol pro duction, Var cpartmcnt (19421945). Krock, Arthur Columnist, New York Times. LaGuardia, Fiorcllo H. Mayor ol Ncw York City, 19351943, chicl, U.S. cc ol Civilian clcnsc. Landon, Allrcd M. Rcpublican prcsidcntial candidatc, 1936. Lattimorc, wcn U.S. political adviscr to Chiang in China. 874 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Martin, Joscph V., Jr., U.S. Rcprcscntativc (R) Massachusctts, Housc Minority Floor Lcadcr. McCormack, John V., U.S. Rcprcscntativc () Massachusctts, Housc Majority Floor Lcadcr. McCoy, Frank, Major Longtimc aidc to Hcnry L. Stimson. Mc!ntirc, Ross, r. Rooscvclts pcrsonal physician. McNary, Charlcs L., U.S. Scnator (R) rcgon. McrlcSmith, \an S., Coloncl U.S. Military Attachc, Mclbournc, Australia. Morgcnthau, Hcnry J., Jr. Sccrctary ol Trcasury, 19341945. Nclson, onald M. xccutivc ircctor ol Supply Prioritics, cc ol Production and Managcmcnt (1941), Chairman, Var Production 8oard (19421944). Pcrkins, Franccs Sccrctary ol Labor. Powcll, Joscph V. \icc Prcsidcnt ol 8cthlchcm Shipbuilding Co., Spccial Assistant to Knox, accompanicd him to Pcarl Harbor, cccmbcr 814. Rayburn, Sam, U.S. Rcprcscntativc () Tcxas. Rooscvclt, lcanor, Mrs. Vilc ol Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt. Rooscvclt, Franklin . (FR) U.S. Prcsidcnt, 19331945. Sayrc, Francis 8. U.S. High Commissioncr in thc Philippincs Stimson, Hcnry L. Sccrctary ol Var, 19401945. Appendix: Dramatis Personae 875 Truman, Harry S., U.S. Scnator () Missouri, U.S. Prcsidcnt, 19451953. \inson, Carl, U.S. Rcprcscntativc () Gcorgia, Chairman, Housc Naval Aairs Committcc. Valkcr, Frank C. Postmastcr Gcncral, 19401945. Vallacc, Hcnry A. Sccrctary ol Agriculturc (19331940), \icc Prcsidcnt during Rooscvclts 2nd tcrm (19411945). Valsh, avid L., U.S. Scnator () Massachusctts, prcwar critic ol FRs lorcign policy, Chairman, Scnatc Naval Aairs Committcc. Vatson, dwin Martin (Pa), Major Gcncral Prcsidcnt Rooscvclts appointmcnt sccrctary. Vcllcs, Sumncr Undcr Sccrctary ol Statc (19331943). Vhitc, Harry cxtcr Adviscr to Trcasury Sccrctary Morgcnthau. Vinant, John G. U.S. Ambassador in London (19411946). Voodring, Harry Hincs Sccrctary ol Var (19331940). V~snixc:ox (++)N~vv 8adt, Harry A. Captain, Tuscaloosa. 8cardall, John R., Rcar Admiral Naval Aidc to Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt. 8catty, Frank ., Captain (latcr \icc Admiral) Aidc to Knox, accompanicd him to Pcarl Harbor, cccmbcr 814. 876 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 8rainard, Roland M., \icc Admiral ircctor ol Ship Movcmcnts, CN cc, Vashington. 8riggs, Ralph T. Radioman stationcd at Chcltcnham, Maryland. 8rothcrhood, Francis M., Licutcnant Commandcr Vatch ccr in p20G, Naval Communications. Crcighton, John M., Captain U.S. Naval bscrvcr, Singaporc. aston, Licutcnant Air Corps Pilot who cw Navy Sccrctary Knox to Pcarl Harbor cccmbcr 814. dgcrs, Mrs. orothy Rcscarch Analyst, N!. Halscy, Villiam F., \icc Admiral Commandcr Aircralt Patrol Forcc, Commandcr, Task Forcc Two. Hart, Tomas C., Admiral CommandcrinChicl, Asiatic Flcct, thc Philippincs (Manila). Hcadcd Hart !nquiry into Pcarl Harbor Attack (MarchJunc, 1944). Haycs, Licutcnant Commandcr Formcr court stcnographcr, typcd Knoxs rcport on rcturn ight lrom Pcarl Harbor. Hcard, V.A., Captain !n chargc ol Forcign 8ranch, N!. Hindmarsh, Albcrt ., Licutcnant Naval !ntclligcncc, Far astcrn Scction, cconomic analyst. !ngcrsoll, Royal ., Admiral Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations. King, rncst J., Admiral CommandcrinChicl, Atlantic Flcct. Appendix: Dramatis Personae 877 Kramcr, A.., Commandcr p20G, Navy Communications, Hcad ol translation scction ol com munication sccurity. Krick, H.., Captain Fricnd and thcatcr companion cccmbcr 6, 1941, ol Admiral Stark. Lcahy, Villiam Admiral Chicl ol Naval pcrations Lynn, G.V., Lt. Commandcr Scnior Vatch ccr, p20G, dccoding Japancsc diplomatic cryptographs. McCollum, Arthur H., Captain, USN !n chargc ol Far astcrn Scction, Forcign 8ranch, cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc. McrlcSmith U.S. Naval Attachc, Australia. Morccll, 8cn, Admiral Chicl, 8urcau ol Yards and ocks (Scabccs). Nimitz, Chcstcr V., Admiral Chicl ol 8urcau ol Navigation. Noycs, Lcigh, Rcar Admiral ircctor ol Naval Communications. Pcring, Allrcd F., Lt. Commandcr n duty in p20G, Naval Communications. Rcdman, Joscph R., Admiral Assistant ircctor ol Naval Communications. Richardson, J.., Admiral CincUS prior to Admiral Kimmcl. Saord, Laurcncc F., Captain !n chargc ol Sccurity Scction ol Naval Communications, intcrccpts. Schuirmann, R.., Captain (latcr Rcar Admiral) ircctor Ccntral ivision, Liaison with Statc cpartmcnt lor CN. 878 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Schulz, Lcstcr Robcrt, Licutcnant Communication Vatch ccr, on tcmporary duty at thc Vhitc Housc, cccmbcr 6, 1941. Smith, Lconard 8. nsign, U.S. Navy, adviscr aboard 8ritish planc who spottcd thc Gcrman Bismarck. SmithHutton, H.H., Captain Naval Attachc in Tokyo prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941. Stark, Harold R., Admiral Chicl ol Naval pcrations (CN). Tollcy, Kcmp, Licutcnant (latcr Rcar Admiral) Commandcr, Lanikai. Torpc, lliott R. ALUSNA, Naval Attachc in 8atavia, Ncthcrlands ast !ndics. Turncr, Richmond Kclly, \icc Admiral ircctor ol Navys Var Plans ivision, CN. Viglc, aryl Chicl, Station M, Chcltcnham, Maryland. Vilkinson, Tcodorc S., Rcar Admiral, USN ircctor ol thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc. V~snixc:ox (++)Av:v Arnold, H. (Hap) H., Gcncral Commanding Gcncral, Army Air Corps. 8ratton, Rulus S., Coloncl Chicl, Far astcrn Scction, Military ivision. canc, John R., Coloncl Aidc to Army Chicl ol Sta Gcncral Marshall. uscnbcrry, Carlislc Clydc, Coloncl Assistant to Army couricr 8rattton. Appendix: Dramatis Personae 879 Frcnch, dward F., Coloncl Signal ccr, Army Mcssagc Ccntcr. Gailcy, Charlcs K., Jr., Gcncral xccutivc ccr to Gcncral Gcrow. Gcrow, Lconard T., Gcncral Army Chicl ol Var Plans. Gullion, Gcncral Provost Marshall. Harrison, Gcorgc L., Major Aidc to Hcnry L. Stimson, Var cpartmcnt. MacArthur, ouglas, Licutcnant Gcncral Commandcr, U.S. Forccs Far ast in Manila, Allicd Suprcmc Commandcr, S.V. Pacic (1942), Gcncral ol thc Army (1944). Marshall, Gcorgc C., Gcncral Army Chicl ol Sta (19351945). Milcs, Shcrman, Major Gcncral ircctor ol Military !ntclligcncc, G2. cll, Robcrt H. Assistant Military Attachc, Australia. Rooscvclt, lliott FRs 2nd son. Rooscvclt, Jamcs, Captain FRs cldcst son, Marinc Corps Rcscrvc, liaison bctwccn Marinc Corps HQ and cc ol Coordinator ol !nlomation. Smith, 8cdcll, Coloncl Sccrctary to Army Chicl ol Sta, Gcncral Marshall. Vcdcmcycr, V.C., Major (latcr Licutcnant Gcncral) Var Plans ivision, Var cpartmcnt (latcr Commandcr ol thc Amcrican troops in thc China Tcatcr). 880 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Pv~vi H~vnov (++)N~vv 8cllingcr, Patrick Nclson L., \icc Admiral Comdr. Hawaiian 8ascd Patrol Vings and Comdr. Patrol Ving Two, Comdr. Task Forcc Ninc, Comdr. Flcct Air ctachmcnt, Pcarl Harbor, Liaison with Com14, Comdr. Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc. 8loch, Claudc C. Com14, Comdr. Local clcnsc Forccs, Comdr. Hawaiian Sca Fronticr, Comdt. Navy Yard Pcarl Harbor, Naval 8asc clcnsc ccr undcr 2CL 4, Comdr. Task Forcc Four. 8rown, Vilson, Rcar Admiral Commandcr, Scouting Forcc, Task Forcc 3, Pacic Flcct. Calhoun, V.L., \icc Admiral Commandcr 8asc Forcc, U.S. Flcct. Colcman, H.M., Licutcnant. CinCPACs sta. cLancy, V.S., Rcar Admiral Assistant Chicl ol Sta lor pcrations (lor Admiral Kimmcl). Ghormlcy, Robcrt L., Rcar Admiral Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations, participant in U.S.8ritish convcr sations (London), August 1940. Halscy, Villiam F., Admiral Commandcr ol thc carricr, Enterprise; Cmdr., U.S. 3rd Flcct in Pacic ( Junc 1944Nov. 1945), Admiral ol thc Flcct, 1945. Kimmcl, Husband ., Rcar Admiral CincPac and CincUS. Kingman, Howard F., Rcar Admiral istrict !ntclligcncc ccr ol 14th Naval istrict. Kitts, !!!, V.A., Rcar Admiral Flcct Gunncry ccr (on Admiral Kimmcls sta). Layton, .T. Captain Flcct !ntclligcncc ccr and Combat !ntclligcncc ccr, U.S. Pacic Flcct. Appendix: Dramatis Personae 881 Maycld, !rving H., Captain istrict !ntclligcncc ccr 14th Naval istrict. McCormick, L.., Rcar Admiral Assistant Chicl ol Sta and pcrations ccr lor CincPac. McMorris, C.H., Rcar Admiral pcrations ccr on sta ol Commandcr Scouting Forcc, Var Plans ccr lor CincPac. Ncwton, J.H., Admiral Commandcr ol thc carricr Lexington. utcrbridgc, Villiam Voodward, Licutcnant Commanding ccr, USS Ward. Pyc, V.S., \icc Admiral Comdr. 8attlc Forcc, Comdr. Task Forcc nc, Scnior ccr in Pcarl Harbor. Ramscy, L.C., Captain pcrations o ccr to Adm. 8cllingcr (Adm. 8cllingcr in command ol Pat. Ving 2 and Pat. Vings Hawaiian Arca), Comdr. Task Forcc Ninc, avia tion liaison o ccr to coopcratc with Com14, Comdr. Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc. Rochclort, Joscph J., Commandcr Assistant pcrations ccr, Forcc !ntclligcncc ccr lor Scouting Forcc Commandcr, ccr in chargc ol combat intclligcncc 14th Naval istrict. Vithcrs, Tomas, Rcar Admiral Commandcr Submarincs, Pacic. Pv~vi H~vnov (++)Av:v lliott, Gcorgc ., Scrgcant pana radar station. mmons, clos C., Major Gcncral Commanding Gcncral, GHQ Air Forcc, participant in U.S.8ritish con vcrsations (London) August 1940, Chicl ol Armys Var Plans ivision, participant in U.S.8ritish convcrsation (London) August 1940. 882 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Fricdman, Villiam Hcad ol Armys Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc, loundcd 1930. Lockard, Joscph. L., Privatc (latcr Licutcnant) pana radar station. Phillips, V.C., Coloncl Chicl ol Sta (lor Gcncral Short). Short, Valtcr C., Major Gcncral Commanding Gcncral, Hawaiian cpartmcnt. Smith, Villiam V., Rcar Admiral Chicl ol Sta to CincPac. Strong, Gcorgc \., Major Gcncral Chicl ol Armys Var Plans ivision, participant in U.S.8ritish convcr sations (London) August 1940. Taylor, V.G., Commandcr Adviscr to Army on radar. 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Te American Black Chamber. !ndianapolis: 8obbsMcrrill, 1931. 895 Subject Index agcnts, sccrct, 35, 56, 165 aircralt rcconnaissancc APH8 tcstimony rcgarding, 445, 459, 490 APH8 tcstimony rcgarding di cultics ol, 45253 di cultics ol lor Pcarl Harbor commandcrs, 16869 Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding, 59193 JCC invcstigation tcstimony rcgarding di cultics ol, 669, 67679, 682, 831 tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc troops, 736 tcstimony war warning and, 633, 656, 664 Knoxs rcport rcgarding di cultics ol, 360 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 502, 544 obscrvation ol Japancsc troops, 166, 17576, 200, 25657, 312, 316 Robcrts Commission tcstimony rcgarding, 37981, 386, 39599 war plan and, 163 Amcrica First Committcc, 11213 Amcrican xpcditionary Forcc (AF), 221 Amcrican8ritishConvcrsations (A8C) dcvclopmcnt ol war plans, 16163, 66162 locus on war in Atlantic and, 115, 43031 !ngcrsolls talks with 8ritish Admiralty, 13n14, 61 outlinc ol agrccmcnts, 6062 translcr ol ships lrom Pacic to Atlantic, 9293 Amcricanutch8ritish (A8) Convcrsations ccct on Japancsc advanccmcnt, 191 mobilization ol war plan, 265 obscrvation ol Japancsc convoys, 257 outlinc ol agrccmcnt, 9092, 84849 rcsponsibilitics ol U.S. cct, 19798 AngloFrcnch Purchasing Mission, 23, 37 antiwar scntimcnt, 11214 896 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Argcntina, 39, 48 Arizona (U.S. battlcship), 353 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard (APH8) appointmcnt ol board, 44142 Hawaiian military pcrsonncl, tcstimony ol, 46162 Japancsc intcrccpts, tcstimony rcgarding, 47187, 673, 707, 73960 military intclligcncc, tcstimony rcgarding, 44851, 45461, 46366 rclcasc ol rcport, 61718, 65253, 738 rcport, 48892 sabotagc alcrt, tcstimony rcgarding, 44447 U.S. cct, dclay in strcngthcning, 45153, 46366 U.S.Japan rclations, 44244, 44748, 46263, 46671 Atlantic Chartcr, 69, 100 Augusta (U.S. cruiscr), 67 Australia, 272 dcclaration ol war by Japan, 350, 681 cvacuation ol Japancsc rcsidcnts, 189 FRs addrcss to Hirohito, 272 FRs lcttcr to Villkic, 816 Modus Vivendi, 135, 137, 143, 196 U.S. alliancc with ngland and, 90, 26566, 334, 681, 821 U.S.Japancsc rclations and, 159, 681, 857 Vhitcs nly policy, 6 Axis Powcrs alliancc with Japan, 258 8attlc ol thc Atlantic, U.S. uno cial participation and, 7073 cconomic sanctions, 65 Japancsc alliancc with, 26 scizurc ol ships by U.S., 70 See also Gcrmany, !taly, Japan bascs, cxchangc ol dcstroycrs lor, 4144, 660 Bismark (Gcrman battlcship), 6465 bomb plot mcssagc, 10810 See also Ships in Harbor mcssagc bonds, wartimc, 21112 8ornco, 864 8oxcr Rcbcllion (18991901), 5 8urma, Japancsc thrcat to, 189, 204 8urma Road building ol, 15, 848 Chincsc objcctions to Modus Vivendi, 147 closing ol, 25 Japancsc thrcat to, 138, 158, 164, 166, 172, 854 Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding war plans, 700 rcopcning ol, 46 U.S. dclcnsc ol, 234 Calypso (U.S. Coast Guard cuttcr), 67 Canada, 189 carding ol Japancsc in Unitcd Statcs, 8 Carolinc !slands, 163 Ccntral Aircralt manulacturing Company ol China, 59 Chcnnaults Amcrican \oluntccr Group, 59, 848 China Allicd support ol, 26 conict with Japan, 57, 1017, 15660, 845 Japancsc attcmpts to ncgotiatc with, 95 Subject Index 897 objcction to Modus Vivendi, 144 45, 14951, 180, 853 U.S. ultimatum to Japan, 114, 306 China, U.S. support lor altcrnativc to Modus Vivendi, 135 building ol 8urma Road. See 8urma Road communism and, 66, 27879, 339 nancial aid, 59 Marshall/Stark rccommcndations, 119 military aid, 191, 852 objcction to Modus Vivendi, 13738 rcasons lor, 126 Chincsc Currcncy Stabilization Fund, 26 City of Rayville (U.S. mcrchant vcsscl), 54 Civil Acronautics 8oard, 210 Civilian Conscrvation Corps, 7879 Clark !nvcstigation Japancsc intcrccpts, tcstimony rcgarding, 56873, 596606, 782 rcasons lor, 419, 56768 rcopcning ol, 588 summary and conclusions, 60406 Clauscn !nvcstigation Japancsc intcrccpts, tcstimony rcgarding, 483, 57483 rcasons lor, 419, 56768 codcs Amcrican dcstruction ol codc machincs and mcssagcs, 21719, 229 32, 26163, 85859 JCC tcstimony rcgarding dcstruction ol codcs, 74748 Clark !nvcstigation tcstimony rcgarding, 56873, 596606, 782 Clauscn !nvcstigation tcstimony rcgarding, 57483 dccryption ol, xv, 4041, 24953 dcscription, 13033 dcstruction ol codc machincs, 148, 19697, 21317, 23233, 732, 85658 Fourtccn Part rcply. See Fourtccn Part rcply Hart !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding, 43136, 673, 740 Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding, 58390, 740 immincnt brcak in JapancscU.S. rclations, 11718, 126 indications ol impcnding attack, 339 Japancsc, viii APH8 tcstimony rcgarding, 47187, 673, 707, 73960 Japancsc cconomic conditions, mcssagc rcgarding, 9899 JCC invcstigation 8rattons tcstimony, 78289, 80610 Kramcrs tcstimony, 76182, 798806 navy codcs, 108 NC! tcstimony conccrning, 49496, 50619, 53343, 673, 740, 76266 nc p.m. Mcssagc. See nc p.m. Mcssagc Pilot Mcssagc. See Pilot Mcssagc prcsidcntial clcction ol 1944 and, 55154 sccrccy surrounding, x, 36567, 40911, 61116, 73839 sccurity lcak in Vashington, 8990 See Ships in Harbor mcssagc systcm ol codcwords, 208 898 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy translcr ol intcrccpts to Forrcstal, 35152 unavailability to Pcarl Harbor commandcrs, 671 See Vinds Codc mcssagc See also military intclligcncc Colorado (U.S. battlcship), 353 Columbus (Gcrman occan lincr), 2021 Comintcrn, 910, 14 communism goals ol, 910 Japancsc opposition to, 7, 1415, 5960, 96, 141, 339 U.S. attitudc toward, 4, 151 U.S. support lor, 66, 278 Communist !ntcrnational, 910 compulsory military scrvicc, 35, 122 conccntration camps, 8, 263 Congrcss dcclaration ol war, 307 dclivcry ol, 33234 invcstigation ol cccmbcr 4th lcak to prcss, 294 notication ol possiblc war with Japan, 173, 206 See also Joint Congrcssional Committcc ( JCC) on Pcarl Harbor invcstigation dcclaration ol national cmcrgcncy, 209 dcclaration ol war Churchills hopc lor, 6869 Congrcss and, 307 on Japan, 32829, 34750, 843 against Japan, 862 public opposition to, 11214 cnmark, 63 dcprcssion, cconomic, 3, 6, 36, 338 dcstroycrs lor bascs agrccmcnt, 4144, 660 dctcntion ol Japancsc nationals, 348 diplomatic codc, dcciphcring. See codcs, Japancsc octrinc ol Nonrccognition, 153 dralt, military, 35, 122, 210, 338 utch, 141 utch ast !ndics Japancsc thrcat to, 77, 158, 164, 166, 860 pcrccivcd thrcat to, 864 U.S. dclcnsc ol, 234 ast Vinds Rain mcssagc. See Vinds Codc mcssagc cconomic conditions ol ngland, 3639, 4849 ol Japan, 1617, 98, 11112, 125, 19293. See also cconomic sanctions toward Japan ol Unitcd Statcs, 3, 6, 24, 36, 209, 338 cconomic sanctions Axis powcrs, 65, 848 lrcczing ol asscts, 9798 Grcws warning rcgarding, 111 12, 339, 852 Japancsc ambassadors attcmpts to ncgotiatc, 125, 18586 Japan as act ol war, 20406, 850 Japans rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 28283 proposcd withdrawal ol, 143 shortagc ol stratcgic matcrials, 10607, 19293 tcrmination ol tradc trcaty, 1617, 22 clcctions, prcsidcntial. See prcsidcntial clcctions cmbargocs toward Japan. See cconomic sanctions toward Japan cncryption ol codcs. See codcs, Japancsc Subject Index 899 ngland alliancc with USSR, 96 attitudc toward Japan undcr Chambcrlain, 16 8attlc ol 8ritain, 25 8urma Road, 15, 25, 46 cccts on U.S. ncgotiations with Japan, 18081 Franccs lall to Gcrmany and, 3133 sccrct agcnts in U.S., 35, 165 See also Churchill, Vinston ngland, U.S. support lor dcstroycrs lor bascs agrccmcnt, 4145 cscorts lor 8ritish ships, 6667, 7073 FRs corrcspondcncc with Churchill, 17, 2939, 52, 6769, 849 !ngcrsolls talks with 8ritish Admiralty, 13, 845 JCC invcstigation Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding, 68495, 705 Shorts tcstimony rcgarding, 71516 tcstimony rcgarding, 65762, 67778 joint warning to Japan, 23437 military procurcmcnt, 2225, 3639, 4849, 5358 military sta convcrsations, 39, 6062 mobilization ol U.S. troops, 10304 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 530 ocnsivc action toward Japancsc, 16163, 19798 promisc ol armcd support, 26667, 28487, 33234, 339, 85761 public opinion and, 11214 rcjcction ol Modus Vivendi, 149, 15556 summary ol involvcmcnt, 84552 ultimatum to Japan, 10001, 306 Enterprise (U.S. carricr), 176 thiopia, 845 xclusion Act, 6 Fcdcral 8urcau ol !nvcstigation (F8!), 35 cct ol thc Unitcd Statcs. See U.S. cct Flying Tigcrs, 59 Formosa, 158 Fourtccn Part rcply APH8 tcstimony rcgarding, 469, 479 Clark !nvcstigation, 56870 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 578 dclivcry ol, 274, 27677, 28789, 305 Hcwitt !nquiry, 588 Hulls knowlcdgc ol, 324 intcrccption and dccoding ol, 27072, 28284 JCC invcstigation 8rattons tcstimony rcgarding, 78284, 78789, 80610 Gcrows tcstimony rcgarding, 635 Kramcrs tcstimony rcgarding, 77375, 789, 798806 Marshalls tcstimony rcgarding, 627, 63738, 642 Milcss tcstimony rcgarding, 631 Saords tcstimony rcgarding, 752 Starks rcccipt ol, 81216 tcstimony rcgarding, 77980, 78289 900 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Turncrs tcstimony rcgarding, 659 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 514, 518, 52021, 52829, 537 Pilot Mcssagc and, 25556 rcccipt ol intcrccpt, 859 sccrccy surrounding, 259 Francc dclcat by Nazis, 26 dclcnsc ol Poland, 846 Gcrman occupation ol, 3133 See also \ichy govcrnmcnt Frcnch !ndochina Japancsc occupation ol, 26, 76, 97, 135, 846 Japancsc ocr to rcmovc troops, 137 obscrvation ol Japancsc convoys, 257 proposcd withdrawal ol Japancsc troops, 14243 See also !ndochina Gallup poll, 112n1 GcrmanJapancsc AntiComintcrn Pact, 10 Gcrmany alliancc with Japan, 126, 135, 148, 186, 19596, 85253 Allicd progrcss against, 611 attack on Russia, 65 8attlc ol 8ritain, 25 considcration ol U.S. dcclaration ol war, 328, 735 dclcat ol Francc, 26 GcrmanJapancsc Anti Comintcrn Pact, 10 Hitlcrs coming to powcr, 845 invasion ol Poland, 17, 846 invasion ol USSR, 9697, 222, 849 JCC invcstigation tcstimony rcgarding alliancc with Japan, 68081 opposition to, 65859 U.S. opposition to, 57, 62, 190 93, 848, 850 See also Hitlcr, Adoll Grcat cprcssion, 3, 6, 36 Grcat Var. See Vorld Var ! Grccnland, 63 Greer (U.S. dcstroycr), 70 Gruncrt 8oard. See Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard (APH8) Guam APH8 tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to, 450 Hart !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to, 431 Japancsc attack, 347, 349 survcillancc ol, 188 thrcat to, 139, 170, 313, 394 JCC invcstigation tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to, 643, 716 tcstimony rcgarding ordcrs to dcstroy codcs, 74748 NC! tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to, 516, 531 tcstimony rcgarding ordcrs to dcstroy codcs, 53435 ordcrs to dcstroy codcs, 218, 22930, 261 rcinlorccmcnts scnt to, 261 Hart !nquiry Hawaiian military pcrsonncl, tcstimony ol, 42331 Japancsc codcs, tcstimony rcgarding, 673, 740 rcasons lor, 419, 42123 Saords tcstimony, 43136 Subject Index 901 Hcwitt !nquiry conclusions, 59396 Japancsc codcs, tcstimony rcgarding, 58390, 740 rcasons lor, 419, 56768 war warning, tcstimony rcgarding, 585, 593 Hong Kong, 189, 349 Hood (8ritish battlc cruiscr), 64 hot linc tclcphonc, 29 Hyperion (8ritish dcstroycr), 20 !ccland, 66, 70 !ndia, 189 Indianapolis (U.S. carricr), 176 !ndochina Japancsc occupation ol, 135, 846, 85051 ocr to rcmovc troops, 137 prcscncc in, 18489, 20304, 23335 thrcat to, 126, 147, 15860, 85455 Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding war plans, 700, 704 obscrvation ol Japancsc convoys, 257, 264 Schulzs tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to, 79293 Shorts tcstimony rcgarding war plans, 714 intcrnmcnt ol Japancsc, 263 !taly, 195, 258, 845 Japan ambassadors lrom. See Kurusu, Saburo, Nomura, Kichisaburo Amcricanutch8ritish (A8) Convcrsations. See Amcrican utch8ritish (A8) Convcrsations anticipatcd war with, 191201, 21011, 23236, 23943, 30609 APH8 tcstimony rcgarding rclations with U.S., 46671 attack on Pcarl Harbor, 31626, 84345 attcmpts to ncgotiatc with U.S., 9496, 99100, 12227, 181, 84950, 85253 brcakdown ol diplomatic rclations with thc U.S., 17987, 24445 considcrations ol war with Unitcd Statcs, 15660 dcclaration ol war, 862 dcstruction ol codc machincs, 21317, 590 dctcrioration ol rclations with U.S., 1017, 7578, 9798, 11112, 11720, 17677 diplomatic codcs ol. See codcs, Japancsc cxpiration ol trcaty with Unitcd Statcs, 40 Fourtccn Part rcply. See Fourtccn Part rcply GcrmanJapancsc Anti Comintcrn Pact, 10 Grcws tcstimony rcgarding, 62324 inammatory spccch by Primc Ministcr Tojo, 18183 intcrnational rclations bclorc VV!!, 47 military buildup in !ndochina. See !ndochina occupation ol Frcnch !ndochina. See Frcnch !ndochina occupation ol Manchuria, 45 nc p.m. Mcssagc. See nc p.m. Mcssagc 902 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy opposition to antagonizing, 8488 proposal ol Modus Vivendi. See Modus Vivendi rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 26979, 28284, 50708, 856 rcply to U.S. ultimatum, Starks tcstimony rcgarding, 665 risc to powcr ol military party, 10406 surrcndcr ol, 617 thrcat to !ndochina. See !ndochina thrcat to U.S. intcrcsts in Philippincs, 16573 Tripartitc Pact. See Tripartitc Pact U.S. alliancc with ngland. See ngland, U.S. support lor U.S. dcclaration ol war, 32829, 34850 U.S. cconomic sanctions toward. See cconomic sanctions toward Japan U.S. ultimatum rcgarding cncroachmcnt in Pacic, 68, 10001, 11420, 849, 853 U.S. warning rc: Ncthcrlands !ndics, 2425 Japancsc consular codcs. See codcs, Japancsc Japancsc navy codcs, 108 JapancscChincsc Var, bcginning, 11 JCC on Pcarl Harbor invcstigation. See Joint Congrcssional Committcc ( JCC) on Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Joint Congrcssional Committcc ( JCC) on Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, viii 8rattons tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc intcrccpts, 78289, 80610 cccmbcr 6 mccting with FR, tcstimony rcgarding, 79598 dclcnsivc inlormation patrol, tcstimony rcgarding, 73537 cstablishmcnt and commission ol, xiii, 61923 Gcrows rccollcction ol cvcnts surrounding thc attack, 65657 Gcrows tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc intcrccpts, 63435 Grcavcss attcndancc ol, 64952 !ngcrsolls tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to Pcarl Harbor, 73235 Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding cct rcadincss, 67678 military intclligcncc, 67881, 70607 war plans, 681706 Knoxs rcport ol thc attack, tcstimony rcgarding, 66869 Kramcrs tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc bombing maps, 78082 Kramcrs tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc intcrccpts, 76182, 798806 Majority Rcport, 82832 Marshalls command structurc, 64041 Marshalls rccollcction ol cvcnts surrounding thc attack, 63540, 64249 Marshalls whcrcabouts cccmbcr 7, 81011, 81720 military intclligcncc, tcstimony rcgarding, 62429, 67881, 70713 Minority Rcport, 83241 ncws covcragc ol, xvixvii Subject Index 903 Saords tcstimony rcgarding thc Vinds Codc mcssagc, 73960 Schulzs tcstimony rcgarding Fourtccn part rcply, 78995 Shorts dclcnsc against Robcrts Commission chargcs, 72429 Shorts tcstimony rcgarding attack on Pcarl Harbor, 72224 Shorts tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to Pcarl Harbor, 71322 Shorts tcstimony rcgarding lack ol military intclligcncc, 70713, 72022 Starks whcrcabouts cccmbcr 7, 81216, 82025 U.S. support lor Allics, tcstimony rcgarding, 65762 war warning, tcstimony conccrning, 68384, 746 war warning, tcstimony rcgarding, 62934, 66364 Kearny (U.S. dcstroycr), 72 Kcllogg8riand pact, 4, 12 Kra !sthmus, 236, 533 Kra Pcninsula anticipatcd attack on, 860 dclcnsivc inlormation patrol, tcstimony rcgarding, 737 Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding war plans, 69799 pcrccivcd thrcat to, 864 war warning, 85455 KuomintangCommunist agrccmcnt, 7 labor, prcsidcntial control ol, 209 Lcaguc ol Nations invcstigation ol Japancsc occupation ol Manchuria, 7 production ol, 4 lcndlcasc plan cccts on strcngthcning cct, 84 ngland, U.S. support lor, 5658, 64, 847 cscorts lor 8ritish ships and, 67 promisc to U.S.S.R., 65 Lexington (U.S. carricr), 176 MAG!C attcmpts to kccp sccrct, 36567, 40911, 61116, 73839 Clauscn !nvcstigation tcstimony rcgarding, 57483 dcscription, 249 dcvclopmcnt ol, 41, 132 Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding, 58390 immincnt brcak in JapancscU.S. rclations, 11718, 15960 indications ol impcnding attack, 339 JCC invcstigation Kramcrs tcstimony, 76182 qucstions rcgarding, 623 Saords tcstimony, 73960 Shorts tcstimony, 718 tcstimony rcgarding disscmination, 62429 mcssagc rcgarding Japans cconomic conditions, 9899 missing intcrccpt, 8990 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 50619 Pilot Mcssagc, 25455 prcsidcntial clcction ol 1944 and, 55154 translcr ol intcrccpts to Forrcstal, 35152 unavailability to Pcarl Harbor commandcrs, 311, 626, 671, 70708 See also codcs, Japancsc, military intclligcncc, Purplc (diplomatic codc) 904 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Malaysia anticipatcd attack on, 164, 189, 207, 257, 860 dclcnsc ol rubbcr supplics lrom, 148 ccct ol A8 agrccmcnt on Japancsc advanccmcnt on, 19091 !ngcrsolls tcstimony rcgarding war plans, 73435 Japancsc attack, 347, 349 Japancsc thrcat to, 158, 204 Kimmcls tcstimony to JCC rcgarding war plans, 682, 687 90, 69799, 70203 obscrvation ol Japancsc convoys, 264 U.S. war plans rcgarding, 61 warning to Japan rcgarding, 234 Manchukuo. See Manchuria Manchuria Japancsc ncutrality pact with Russia, 60n20 Japancsc occupation ol, 47 Modus Vivendi and, 135 Ncw rdcr and, 1415 participation in war, 510, 859 Russian invasion ol, 5, 278 Marco Polo 8ridgc incidcnt, 1011 Marshall !slands Japancsc bascs, 163, 175, 390 U.S. war plans rcgarding, 313, 384, 684, 702 Maryland (U.S. battlcship), 353 mcrchant ships, scizurc ol, 65 mcssagcs, Japancsc cncodcd. See codcs, Japancsc Midway aircralt rcconnaissancc and, 317, 380 APH8 tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to, 455 dclcat ol Japancsc at, 724 dclcnsc ol, 38486 Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding war warning, 592 Japancsc attack, 347, 349 JCC invcstigation, tcstimony rcgarding translcr ol troops, 663, 682 Robcrts Commission tcstimony rcgarding war warning, 395 troop placcmcnt at, 171, 17576 war warning and, 313 military intclligcncc dcciphcring Japancsc codcs. See codcs, Japancsc dcscription, 12930, 24953 corts to salcguard, 61116 missing intcrccpt, 8889 shilts in rcsponsibility lor, 107 10, 624 sourccs givcn to 8ritish govcrnmcnt, 39 military intclligcncc, abscncc ol lor Pcarl Harbor commandcrs APH8 tcstimony rcgarding, 44851, 45461, 46366 dcpcndcncc on Vashington to supply, 85152, 86364 JCC invcstigation Kimmcls tcstimony, 67881 qucstions rcgarding, 623 Shorts tcstimony, 70713 tcstimony rcgarding disscmination, 62429 lack ol ability to dccodc consular mcssagcs, 21213, 31112 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 496 99, 52030, 53343 nc p.m. Mcssagc and, 35355 U.S.Japan rclations and, 194 volumc ol intcrccpts and, 237 military scrvicc, compulsory, 35, 122 Subject Index 905 Minority Rcport on Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, viii Modus Vivendi Chinas objcctions to, 13741, 14447, 14951, 180, 853 proposal ol, 13336, 853 rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 26979, 28284 U.S. countcrproposal, 14247 U.S. rcjcction ol, 14956 U.S. rcply, 15960, 17677, 184 Monroc octrinc, 14 Mukdcn cxplosion, 6 National clcnsc Mcdiation 8oard, 209 Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc pcration Plan, 591 Naval Limitation and Non Fortication Trcaty, 56 Navy Court ol !nquiry (NC!) appointccs to court, 49394 attcmpts to conccal ndings, 55466 ndings and conscqucnccs ol, 54647 Japancsc intcrccpts, introduction ol, 49496 Japancsc intcrccpts, tcstimony rcgarding, 50630, 673, 740, 76266 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, tcstimony rcgarding, 52129, 537 military intclligcncc, tcstimony rcgarding, 49698, 52030 rclcasc ol rcport, 61718, 738 vulncrability ol cct, tcstimony rcgarding, 50206, 519, 54145 war warning, tcstimony rcgarding, 499502, 53134 Nazis. See Gcrmany Ncthcrlands ast !ndics cvacuation ol Japancsc rcsidcnts, 189 Japancsc thrcat to, 158, 164, 166, 198, 847, 85455 U.S. dclcnsc ol, 193, 207, 234 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 246 ncutrality ol Unitcd Statcs, 36, 45 cash and carry purchascs, 3639 Congrcssional position in 1935, 8 continucd movcmcnt toward participation in thc war, 193, 22123 JapancscChincsc Var, 11, 1516 Morgcnthaus opposition to, 23 Ncutrality Act, cnactmcnt ol, 89, 845 opposition to, 23, 34 Patrol Forcc, 1821, 45, 70, 846, 849 Rooscvclts assurancc ol, 17, 21, 4952 Rooscvclts campaign against, 20 violations ol, 56, 62, 65, 9697 Nevada (U.S. battlcship), 353 Ncw cal, 24, 36, 78, 338 Ncw rdcr agrccmcnt, 1415, 22, 141 ncws covcragc APH8 and NC! rcports, 618 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 56266 ol Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard rcports, 65253 ol Grcavcss attcndancc at JCC invcstigation, 651 ol Knoxs rcport, 35859 ol Scnatc 8ill S.805, 61415 ol Tojos spccch, 18283 Niblack (U.S. dcstroycr), 63 Ninc Powcr Trcaty ol 1922, 12 NonFortication Trcaty, 56 Nonrccognition doctrinc, 6 906 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cc ol Civilian clcnsc, 209 cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc (N!), 8, 107 cc ol Production Managcmcnt, 209 Oklahoma (U.S. battlcship), 353 nc p.m. Mcssagc Clark !nvcstigation tcstimony rcgarding, 569 dclay in action rcgarding, 37172 dclivcry ol, 287301, 305 Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding, 58890 intcrccption ol, 284, 287301, 861 JCC invcstigation 8rattons tcstimony, 80610 Kimmcls tcstimony, 70607 Kramcrs tcstimony, 798806 Marshalls tcstimony, 63739 Shorts tcstimony, 720 Starks tcstimony, 66668 Turncrs tcstimony, 65960 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 537 N! ( cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc). See cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc (N!) pcn oor agrccmcnt, 6 Panaman (nonbclligcrcnt ship), 70 Panay (U.S. gunboat), 13 Patrol Forcc (Ncutrality Patrol), 1821, 45, 70, 846, 849 Pcarl Harbor abscncc ol military intclligcncc. See military intclligcncc, abscncc ol lor Pcarl Harbor commandcrs aircralt rcconnaissancc. See aircralt rcconnaissancc appointmcnt ol Kimmcl as commandcrinchicl, 8081 attcmpts to strcngthcn cct, 101 03, 45152. See also U.S. cct: attcmpts to strcngthcn bcrthing plan mcssagc, 10810, 21213 commandcrs. See Kimmcl, Husband ., Short, Valtcr C. dcstruction ol codc machincs, 26163 invcstigations. See spccic invcstigations, c.g., Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard Japancsc attack, 31626, 861 Knoxs invcstigation ol thc attack, 35161, 66869 sabotagc alcrt. See sabotagc alcrt Ships in Harbor mcssagc. See Ships in Harbor mcssagc stationing ol U.S. cct, 2728, 84647 translcr ol ships lrom Pacic to Atlantic, 17576 vulncrability ol cct, 863 vulncrability ol cct, JCC tcstimony rcgarding, 67678 vulncrability ol cct, NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 50206 warning to commandcrs, 17475, 31316, 854 Vashingtons ncgligcncc, 33940 Pcarl Harbor invcstigations. See spccic invcstigations, c.g., Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard Pennsylvania (U.S. battlcship), 353 Philippincs asscssmcnt ol strcngth ol U.S. cct, 118 basc lor 8ritish battlc cct, 285 dclcnsivc inlormation patrol, tcstimony rcgarding, 737 cvacuation ol Japancsc rcsidcnts, 189 Subject Index 907 Hcwitt !nquiry, tcstimony rcgarding thrcat, 58890 Japancsc attack, 347, 349 Japancsc thrcat to, 148, 15860, 16471, 204, 31316 Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding war plans, 68687, 699700 Kimmcls tcstimony to JCC rcgarding war plans, 682 MacArthurs advanccmcnt, 611 obscrvation ol Japancsc convoys, 257 pcrccivcd thrcat to, 864 prcscncc ol U.S. Flcct in, 8588 Purplc (diplomatic codc) machinc, 131 war warning, 85455 Pilot Mcssagc intcrccption and disscmination ol, 25356, 26970, 859 JCC invcstigation 8rattons tcstimony, 78486 Kramcrs tcstimony, 77376 Starks tcstimony, 664 tcstimony, 63435, 654, 657, 659 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 514, 518, 528 Poland, 17, 29 prcsidcntial clcctions ol 1932, 34 ol 1940, 22, 3335, 38, 4952, 847 ol 1944, 54954 prcsidcntial rcaction to attack, 32123, 32932, 33435, 33739, 34750, 84345 prcss covcragc. See ncws covcragc Prince of Wales (8ritish battlcship), 67, 264 Purplc (diplomatic codc) attcmpts to kccp intcrccptions sccrct, 36567, 40911, 61116 bcrthing plan mcssagc, 21213 dccryption ol, 41 dcstruction ol codc machincs, 23233, 25961 Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding, 584 immincnt brcak in Japancsc U.S. rclations, 11718, 15960, 19496 Japancsc attcmpts to ncgotiatc, 123 JCC invcstigation, qucstions rcgarding, 623 mcssagc rcgarding Japans cconomic conditions, 9899 missing intcrccpt, 8990 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 506 19, 53738 prcsidcntial clcction ol 1944 and, 55154 unavailability to Pcarl Harbor commandcrs, 311 U.S. ability to dccodc, 13132, 847 See also codcs, Japancsc, MAG!C, military intclligcncc Quakcrs, 113 Rainbow war plans. See war plans rationing, 210 Rcconstruction Financc Corporation, 49 Rcpublican National committcc, viii Repulse (8ritish battlc cruiscr), 264 Reuben James (U.S. dcstroycr), 7273 Robcrts Commission appointmcnt ol board, 37374 ndings and conscqucnccs ol, 396406, 444, 618 Hawaiian commandcrs, tcstimony ol, 37692 908 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Japancsc consulatc, F.8.! ndings ol, 39293 Saords rcaction to, 739 Vashington o cials, tcstimony ol, 37476, 39396 Robin Moor (U.S. lrcightcr), 65 Rooscvcltcwcy prcsidcntial clcction campaign ol 1944, viii Russia. See USSR (Union ol Sovict Socialist Rcpublics) Russian Maritimc Provinccs, 164, 68586, 714 RussoJapancsc Var ol 1904, 5 sabotagc alcrt APH8 tcstimony rcgarding, 482, 48890 Clark !nvcstigation tcstimony rcgarding, 570 JCC invcstigation Shorts tcstimony, 71920, 728 tcstimony conccrning, 63334, 656 as rcsponsc to war warning, 167 69, 17475, 312 Robcrts Commission tcstimony rcgarding, 387, 389, 394, 397, 402 Shorts rcasons, 355, 44447 Samoa, 74748 sanctions, by U.S. against Japan. See cconomic sanctions toward Japan sccrct agcnts, 35, 56, 165 Sclcctivc Scrvicc, 35, 122, 210, 338 Scnatc 8ill S.805, 61216 Scnatc Naval Aairs Committcc, 36465 Sessa (Panamanian ship), 70 Shanghai !ntcrnational Scttlcmcnt, 7 Ships in Harbor mcssagc intcrccption and dccoding ol, 10809, 213, 232 JCC invcstigation !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 733 Kimmcls tcstimony, 680 Shorts tcstimony, 720 Starks tcstimony, 664 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 527, 53941 war warning and, 858 Singaporc Amcricanutch8ritish (A8) Convcrsations, 9092, 84849 8urma Road and, 25 cvacuation ol Japancsc rcsidcnts, 189 intcrnmcnt ol Japancsc, 263 Japancsc attack, 347 Japancsc thrcat to, 77, 121, 166, 847, 85455 Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding war plans, 702 Kimmcls tcstimony to JCC rcgarding war plans, 682 Purplc (diplomatic codc) machinc, 131 stationing ol 8ritish commandcr inchicl, 236 U.S. acccss to, 30 SinoJapancsc Var ol 1895, xiv, 5 South Amcrica, 189 Sovict Union. See USSR (Union ol Sovict Socialist Rcpublics) Spain, 845 Steel Seafarer (nonbclligcrcnt ship), 70 Stimsons cial Rcport, 60610 stock markct crash ol 1929, 34 Supply Prioritics and Allocations 8oard, 210 tclcphonc hot linc, 29 Tennessee (U.S. battlcship), 353 Tailand, Japancsc thrcat to advanccmcnt ol Japancsc lorccs, 166, 191, 204 Subject Index 909 attack on Kra Pcninsula and, 19899 Japancsc rcinlorccmcnt ol Mandatcs, 158 Japancsc thrcat to, 85455 Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding war plans, 700, 704 promisc ol armcd support by U.S., 266, 287, 860 U.S. warning to Japan rcgarding, 164, 234 war warning and, 189, 864 See also Kra !sthmus Tripartitc Pact immincnt brcak in JapancscU.S. rclations, 19495 inucncc on Japancsc ncgotiations, 850 initiation ol, 26, 846 JCC invcstigation, tcstimony rcgarding, 68081, 685 U.S. involvcmcnt in war and, 186, 848 Tuscaloosa (U.S. hcavy cruiscr), 2021, 56 uncmploymcnt, 24, 36, 338 Union ol Sovict Socialist Rcpublics. See USSR U.S. Constitution, 92, 199, 287, 307, 843 U.S. xclusion Act ol 1924, 6 U.S. cct attcmpts to strcngthcn, 8084, 10103, 45152 cscorts lor 8ritish ships, 6667, 7073 invcntory ol, 27273 Japancsc obscrvation ol, 10810, 23233, 260, 590. See also Ships in Harbor mcssagc JCC invcstigation tcstimony rcgarding attcmpts to strcngthcn, 66061 tcstimony rcgarding dclcnsivc patrols in thc Pacic, 73537 tcstimony rcgarding cscorts lor 8ritish ships, 69596 obscrvation ol Japancsc convoys, 199200, 25658, 853, 856 ocnsivc action toward Japancsc, 16263 placcmcnt in Hawaii, 2728, 4548 prcscncc in Midway and Vakc, 313 prcscncc in Philippincs, 8588 ships movcd to Atlantic, 64 translcr ol ships lrom Pacic to Atlantic, 9293, 17576, 451 52, 67778, 848 U.S.8ritish military agrccmcnts and, 68791, 705. See also Amcrican8ritish Convcrsations (A8C) vulncrability ol cct, 84647, 863 vulncrability ol cct, JCC tcstimony rcgarding, 67678, 682 vulncrability ol cct, NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 50206, 54145 U.S. Housc committcc on Forcign Aairs, 10 USSR (Union ol Sovict Socialist Rcpublics) aid to China, 45 aim ol Comintcrn, 910 Allicd support ol, 68586, 849 cstablishmcnt ol rclations by U.S., 845 Gcrman invasion ol, 9697 910 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Japancsc thrcat to, 71415. See also Russian Maritimc Provinccs support ol China, 1011 \crsaillcs Trcaty, 4 \ichy govcrnmcnt, 26, 76, 97, 203 \ictory Program, 97, 10304, 12122, 222 Vakc aircralt rcconnaissancc, 317 APH8 tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to, 455 Japancsc attack, 347, 349 Japancsc thrcat to, 390, 395 JCC invcstigation tcstimony rcgarding Japancsc thrcat to, 643 tcstimony rcgarding translcr ol troops, 663, 682 NC! tcstimony rcgarding placcmcnt ol troops and plancs, 502 ordcrs to dcstroy codcs, 263, 74748 placcmcnt ol troops and plancs, 17576, 261, 313, 38385 war plans A8C agrccmcnt and, 62, 16263 Clark !nvcstigation tcstimony, 573 Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony, 592 JCC invcstigation Kimmcls tcstimony, 67778, 68184 rc: military intclligcncc and, 62425 tcstimony rcgarding support lor ngland, 65763 Kimmcls rcsponsc, 17576 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 530 prcparation lor ocnsivc action, 170, 285, 84748 sabotagc alcrt and, 16769, 17475 war warning to Hart and Kimmcl, 858 Hcwitt !nquiry, tcstimony rcgarding, 585, 593 JCC invcstigation tcstimony rcgarding, 63335, 68384, 746 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 499 502, 53134 Shorts sabotagc alcrt and, 167 69, 17475, 312, 355, 444 wartimc bonds, 21112 wartimc matcricl cstimation ol, 10304. See also \ictory Program production ol, 94, 9697, 209, 22123 Vashington Naval Conlcrcncc, 56 Vinds Codc mcssagc, xvii Clark !nvcstigation tcstimony, 570, 572, 596606 Clauscn !nvcstigation tcstimony, 57879 Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony, 58388 intcrccption and disscmination ol, 85859 intcrccption ol, 17778, 246 JCC invcstigation !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 732 Kimmcls tcstimony, 680 Kramcrs tcstimony, 76273 Saords tcstimony, 73957 Starks tcstimony, 664 tcstimony rcgarding, 65354 NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 507, 51114, 517, 520, 52326, 53539, 543 Saords attcmpts to nd, 67176 Vinds xccutc, 22332 Vorld Var !, x, 56, 19, 78 Yangtzc Rivcr, 13 911 Name Index Bold numbers dcnotc photographs Abbazia, Patrick, 67 Mr. Roosevelts Navy: Te Private War of the Atlantic Fleet, 19391942, 18n27, 19n29, 21n3233, 43n30, 44n35, 6364nn2931, 65n33, 6667nn3839, 70nn4647, 72n50, 73n52 Adams, Hcnry M. Harry Hopkins: A Biography, 234n3739, 322n44 Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Furcr), 42n29, 43n30, 83n16 Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Standlcy and Agcton), 374n4, 376n14 Admiral Kimmel s Story (Kimmcl), 4056nn13336, 416n20, 419n2627, 495n7, 495n10, 558n30, 613n8, 614n11, 616n15 Aectionately, FDR: A Sons Story of a Lonely Man (Rooscvclt and Shalctt), 330n66, 550n4 Agcton, Arthur A., 374n4 Admiral Ambassador to Russia, 376n14 Albion, Robcrt Grccnhalgh Forrestal and the Navy, 84n17 America First: Te Battle Against Intervention, 19401941 (Colc), 113n3 American Foreign Policy in the Making, 19321940 (8card), 9n6, 50nn4849 And I Was Tere: Pearl Harbor and MidwayBreaking the Secrets (Layton, Pincau, Costcllo), 316n19, 414n13 Andcrson, Valtcr S., 426 Ando, 259 Andrcws, Adolphus, 493 Arnold, Hcnry Harlcy Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 446n20, 447, 45455 dclcnsc ol U.S. intcrcsts in thc Pacic, 166 Rooscvclts Var Cabinct, 142 U.S. aid to ngland, 2324 Arsenal of Democracy: Te Story of American War Production (Nclson), 21011nn1819 Austin, Varrcn R., 335 Back Door to War: Te Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 19331941 (Tansill), 10n9, 11n11 912 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 8adt, Harry A., 21 8acchcr, John Ford, 583, 776, 78990 8alcs, 776 8allantinc, Joscph V., 183, 302, 324 8ard, Ralph A., 480 8arklcy, Albcn JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 816 Kramcrs tcstimony, 761 Marshalls tcstimony, 818 Pcrcy Grcavcs incidcnt, 64953 Shorts tcstimony, 72122, 729 Starks tcstimony, 82122 rolc as Scnatc Majority Lcadcr, 335, 61820 8arncs, Harrry lmcr, xiii, 330n64, 353nn23, 35658nn1417, 373n2, 410n1 8atchclor, C.., 653 Battle Report: Te Atlantic War (Karig), 4344nn3233, 314 15nn1112, 317n25, 318nn2728 8card, Charlcs A., 92n31 American Foreign Policy in the Making, 19321940, 9n6, 50 51nn4852 8cardall, John R. anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 433 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 58081 dcstruction ol Japancsc codcs, 260 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 276, 289, 305 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Kramcrs tcstimony, 779 Schulzs tcstimony, 790, 794 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 293 Pilot Mcssagc, 25556, 271 8catty, Frank, 352 8cllingcr, Patrick Nclson L. Hcwitt !nquiry, 59192 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 505 o cial notication ol thc attack, 32021 rcconnaissancc to guard Hawaii, 168, 31617, 42728 Robcrts Commission rc: air patrols, 379 8cntlcy, lizabcth, 151n44 8ctts, 712 8ickncll, Gcorgc V., 464n87, 582, 627, 71516 8iddlc, Francis, 405 8icscmcicr, Harold, 49395, 49798, 50607, 53436 8irkcnhcad, arl ol, 197n27, 198n30, 306n100 8isscll, John T. Clarkc !nvcstigation, 571, 597, 60006 Hcwitt !nquiry, Saords tcstimony, 587 Marshalls lcttcr to Tomas cwcy, 553 8loch, Claudc C. accusations against, 366 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 451 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 493 Navy Court ol !nquiry, Saords tcstimony, 514 Richardsons rcplaccmcnt ol as C!NCUS, 21 Robcrts Commission rc air patrols, 37980 cct prcparcdncss, 383, 38586 rcsponsibility lor dclcnsc, 37677 Starks war warning, 170 8loom, Sol, 335 Name Index 913 8lum, John Morton From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 19381941, 2324nn3742, 37n1719, 38n21, 58n16, 140n18, 144n28, 150n40, 212n20 8rainard, Roland M., 288 8ratton, Rulus S. anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 433 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 47175 Marshalls tcstimony, 46869, 48384 Saords tcstimony, 478 tcstimony bclorc, 48487 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 56873, 59798, 600 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 57479, 582 dcstruction ol Japancsc codcs, 260 Hcwitt !nquiry, 589 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 276, 288 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 731, 738, 78289, 80611 Gcrows tcstimony, 634, 657 Kramcrs tcstimony, 779, 803 Marshalls tcstimony, 63739, 820 Milcss tcstimony, 629 Shorts tcstimony, 711 o cial notication ol thc attack, 32628 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 29398, 30001, 371 Stimsons o cial rcport, 610 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 178n38 8rcwstcr, wcn JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, appointmcnt to, 620 Kcclcs additional vicws, 832 Kramcrs tcstimony, 776 Marshalls tcstimony, 817 Minority Rcport, 83241 Pcrcy Grcavcs incidcnt, 64952 8riggs, Ralph T. JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, Saords tcstimony, 67376, 75960 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 22526 British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (Voodward), 198 99nn3031, 23536nn4043, 266nn4546 8rookcPopham, Robcrt, 236, 263, 26667, 286 8rough, Jamcs A Rendezvous with Destiny: Te Roosevelts of the White House, 330n67 8rown, Vilson, 176, 429 8ryant, 779 8rydcn, Villiam, 641 8ullitt, Villiam C., 4, 3132, 52 How Vc Von thc Var and Lost thc Pcacc, 57n12 8undy, McGcorgc, 639 On Active Service in Peace and War, 7n2, 3435nn1314, 635n68 8urnctt, Charlcs, 265 8urns, Jamcs MacGrcgor Roosevelt: Te Soldier of Freedom, 550n1 8yrd, Harry Flood, 364 Cadogan, Alcxandcr, 257 Cartcr, dward C., 150, 151 Cascy, Richard G., 272 Chiang KaiShck Allicd support ol, 26, 117 FRs addrcss to Hirohito, 279 914 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy inucncc on U.S. rclations with Japan, 114, 182, 853 Japans Ncw rdcr and, 1415 KuomintangCommunist agrccmcnt, 7 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 144 47, 14951, 153, 155, 18081 U. S. aid to China, 59, 848 Chambcrlain, John, xvii Chambcrlain, Ncvillc, 16 Chambcrs, Vhittakcr, 151n44 Chcnnault, Clairc, 59 Churchill, Vinston, 341 appointmcnt as First Lord ol thc Admiralty, 1718 corrcspondcncc with Rooscvclt, 2933 Grand Alliance, Te, 68n42, 323n45 on Japancsc cncroachmcnt in Far ast, 6769, 266 o cial notication ol thc attack, 322 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 143 44, 149, 155 rcqucsts lor aid, 3033, 4145 ultimatum to Japan and, 10001 U.S. aid to ngland, 55, 6367, 84647, 849. See also ngland, U.S. support lor Ciano, Count Galcazzi, 195 Clark, Grcnvillc, 328 Clark, J. 8ayard, 620, 629, 745, 757 Clarkc, Cartcr Clarkc !nvcstigation, 561, 568 73, 596, 60206 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 8rattons tcstimony, 782 Marshalls lcttcr to Tomas cwcy, xvi, 55253 Clauscn, Hcnry C. Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, appointmcnt to, 441 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 561, 57383 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 8rattons tcstimony, 783, 788 Gcrows tcstimony, 657 Marshalls tcstimony, 626 Milcss tcstimony, 628 sccrccy ol Japancsc codcs, 410n1 Stimsons o cial rcport, 607 Codebreakers: Te Story of Secret Writing, Te (Kahn), 41n27, 131n1, 132n4 Colc, Vaync S. America First: Te Battle Against Intervention, 19401941, 113n3 Colcman, H.M., 216 Conict of Duty: Te U.S. Navys Intelligence Dilemma, 19191945 (orwart), 8n45 Congressional Record, 613n7, 618nn34, 619n7, 621n13 Connally, Tom, 335, 369 Conncry, Robcrt Howc Forrestal and the Navy, 84n17 Consent of the Governed, and Other Deceits (Krock), 58n15 Coolidgc, Calvin, 620 Coopcr, Jcrc, 620, 642, 707, 77779 Cordell Hull: American Secretaries of State and Teir Diplomacy (Pratt), 203n1, 302n87, 635n67 Costcllo, John And I Was Tere: Pearl Harbor and MidwayBreaking the Secrets, 316n19 Craigic, Robcrt, 77 Cramcr, Myron C., 40203, 487n171, 55759, 71011 Crcighton, John M., 26364, 266, 286, 33233, 659 Cruise of the Lanikai (Tollcy), 736n11 Name Index 915 Cryptolog (Saord), 674n4 Curric, Lauchlin, 145, 151 anicls, Jonathan White House Witness, 550n2 avis, Arthur C., 424 canc, John R. Clauscn !nvcstigation, 577, 578 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 8rattons tcstimony, 81011, 811 Marshalls tcstimony, 639 o cial notication ol thc attack, 323, 32628 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 29394, 302 cpartmcnt ol Statc Diplomatic Papers, 1940, 33n10 Te Far East, 138n14, 141n2021, 144n2627, 14547nn3034, 149n39, 155n48, 198b29, 279n36 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Te Far East, 1938, 11n10, 7778nn45, 101n55, 136n10, 17980nn12, 24041nn35, 277nn2931 Japan, 19311941, 15n19, 17n23, 137n12, 148n36, 155n47, 183n7, 183n9, 187n11, 205n8, 279n35, 690n52 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941, 14n1516, 9596nn3640, 12526nn25 27, 13335nn68, 182n4, 2045nn37, 24143nn68, 27778nn3233, 325n51, 658n141, 689n49 Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941, 12n1213, 16n21, 17n24, 21n34, 25n45, 44n34, 58n14, 63n27, 69n45, 70n49, 10001nn5254, 114n5, 123n20, 325n51, 350n4, 454n46 cwcy, Tomas . Japancsc intcrccpts, xii, xvxvi, 55254, 565, 612 prcsidcntial clcction ol 1944, 547, 54950 ickinson, dward, 405 illon, John H., 321n41 Diplomatic Papers, 1940 (cpartmcnt ol Statc), 33n10 ooman, ugcnc H., 77 orwart, Jcrcy M. Conict of Duty: Te U.S. Navys Intelligence Dilemma, 1919 1945, 8n45 uscnbury, Carlislc C., 29597 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 57475, 578, 582 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 8rattons tcstimony, 78283, 788, 80607 arl ol 8irkcnhcad Halifax, 197n27, 198n30, 306n100 arly, Stcvc, 330, 334 aton, Charlcs A., 335 dcn, Anthony, 68, 77, 240, 341 dison, Charlcs, 34 iscnhowcr, wight, 151n44 lliot, Gcorgc ., 31920, 505 mmons, clos C., 39, 411n4 Events Leading up to World War II (U.S. Housc Committcc on Forcign Aairs), 10n8, 16n22, 17n25, 18n28, 20n31, 24n43, 44n34, 57n13, 69n43, 70n48, 141n19 916 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Far East, Te (cpartmcnt ol Statc), 138n14, 141n2021, 144n2627, 14547nn3034, 149n39, 155n48, 198n29, 279n36 Farlcy, Jim Jim Farleys Story, 34n12 F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928 1945 (Rooscvclt), 42n28, 77n3 Fcis, Hcrbcrt Te Road to Pearl Harbor, 307n102 Fcllcrs, 8onncr, 367, 410n1 Fcrguson, Homcr (Scnator), 344 Japancsc intcrccpts, xii JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation appointmcnt to, 61920 8rattons tcstimony, 788 Gcrows tcstimony, 65657 !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 734 Kcclcs additional vicws, 832 Kimmcls tcstimony, 68890, 692, 695707 Kramcrs tcstimony, xvii, 774 75, 780 Marshalls tcstimony, 641, 64648, 818 Milcss tcstimony, 64951, 654 Minority Rcport, 83241 Saords tcstimony, 750 Schulzs tcstimony, 789 Shorts tcstimony, 716 Starks tcstimony, 662, 668, 821 Navy Court ol !nquiry and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings, 618 Prcsidcntial clcction ol 1944, 554 Scnatc 8ill S.805, 613, 615 Field Service Regulations: Operations, 720n146, 721n148 Ficldcr, Kcndall J., 751n71 Final Sccrct ol Pcarl Harbor, Tc (Flynn), 646n101 Financial Policy, 19391945 (Saycrs), 39n24 Flynn, John T., 112, 646n101 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Te Far East, 1938 (cpartmcnt ol Statc), 11n10, 7778nn45, 101n55, 136n10, 17980nn12, 240 41nn35, 277nn2931 Forrcstal, Jamcs V. Hcwitt !nquiry, 56768, 583, 58687, 594 Japancsc intcrccpts, 480 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, Saords tcstimony, 751 Knoxs invcstigation ol damagc to Pcarl Harbor, 35152, 43637 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 49395, 496, 547 and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings, 55464 Forrestal and the Navy (Albion and Conncry), 84n17 Forrestal Diaries, Te (Millis), 436n4950 Frank, Valtcr H., 441, 483 Frcnch, dward F., 30001, 37172, 569, 809 Fricdman, Villiam, 130, 572, 587 88, 596600, 604 From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 19381941 (8lum), 2324nn3742, 37n1719, 38n21, 58n16, 140n18, 144n28, 150n40, 212n20 Furcr, Julius A. Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 42n29, 43n30, 83n16 Gailcy, Charlcs K., 575, 578 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 8rattons tcstimony, 788 Name Index 917 Gatch, T.L., 557, 559, 59496 Gauss, C.., 155 Gcarhart, 8crtrand V. JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation appointmcnt to, 620 8rattons tcstimony, 809 !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 73334 Kimmcls tcstimony, 67980, 687 Kramcrs tcstimony, 764 Marshalls tcstimony, 644, 646 Milcss tcstimony, 62931 Starks tcstimony, 79697, 81213 Gcorgc, Valtcr F., 344, 620 George C. Marshall: Education of a General: 18301939 (Poguc), 79n7, 308n105 George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 19391942 (Poguc), 160n53 Gcrow, Lconard T., 342 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 447, 449 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 8rattons tcstimony, 474, 48586 ndings, 556, 573 Marshalls tcstimony, 469 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 56970, 600 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 575, 577, 578, 580 dclcnsc ol U.S. intcrcsts in thc Pacic, 16667, 207 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 277 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 63135, 65657 8rattons tcstimony, 782, 785, 78788, 788, 807 Majority Rcport, 829 Marshalls tcstimony, 639, 641, 644, 646 Minority Rcport, 840 Shorts tcstimony, 711, 725 Navy Court ol !nquiry and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings, 618 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 294, 300 Pilot Mcssagc, 255 Robcrts Commission rc: cct prcparcdncss, 39496 Stimsons o cial rcport, 610 Gcscll, Gcrhard A., 620 Ghormlcy, Robcrt L., 39 Gibson, .V., 599600, 60206 Gish, Lillian, 113 Glcason, S. vcrctt Te Undeclared War, 65n34, 67n40, 93n34 Grand Alliance, Te (Churchill), 68n42, 323n45 Grcavcs, 8cttina 8icn, xvii Grcavcs, Pcrcy, 344 background, viiix, xvii JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 64952, 668 Tc Pcarl Harbor !nvcstigations, 131n1 Grccn, Tomas H., 465, 707 Grcw, Joscph C. Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 46263 FRs addrcss to Hirohito, 279 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 62324 on Marco Polo 8ridgc incidcnt, 11 military intclligcncc, 45354 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 155 Ten Years in Japan, 200n34, 201n36 Tojos spccch, 182 918 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy tradc bctwccn thc U.S. and Japan, 40, 76, 9798, 11112 U.S. dccision to cnd ncgotiations with Japan, 20001 on U.S. shipping on Yangtzc Rivcr, 15 warning to Rooscvclt, 852 Gromyko, Andrci, 140 Gruncrt, Gcorgc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 441 8rattons tcstimony, 475 Kimmcls tcstimony, 46061 Marshalls tcstimony, 450, 457, 466, 470 Pycs tcstimony, 45253 Saords tcstimony, 478, 480 Gullion, Gcncral, 328 Hackworth, Grccn H., 324 Halifax (arl ol 8irkcnhcad), 197n27, 198n30, 306n100 Halilax, Lord (dward Frcdcrick Lindlcy Vood) anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 17980, 24041, 306 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 15556 U.S. aid to ngland, 19799, 234, 857 Hall, H. uncan North American Supply, 24n4344, 25n46, 36n16, 38n2223, 48 49nn4347, 53n1, 55nn78 Halscy, Villiam F. dclcnsc ol U.S. intcrcsts in thc Pacic, 176, 385 Hart !nvcstigation, 313n8, 426, 428 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, Kramcrs tcstimony, 761, 765, 776, 802 Hamilton, Maxwcll M., 302, 701 Hanily, dward 8., 419, 438, 495, 523 Hannalord, Julc M., 620 Hanncgan, Robcrt ., 550 Harpcr, John S., 67475, 759 Harriman, Avcrcll, 322 Harris, Frcdcrick R., 414 Harrison, Gcorgc L., 272, 672, 74041, 779 Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (Rccs), 140n17, 150n41, 151n44 Harry Hopkins: A Biography (Adams), 322n44 Hart, Tomas C. aid to ngland, 26467, 28487 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 158, 16566, 313 dcstruction ol Japancsc codcs, 215, 21719 ol U.S. classicd documcnts, 231 invcstigation ol attack, 42139 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 735, 736 Kimmcls tcstimony, 70406 Saords tcstimony, 740, 750 Starks tcstimony, 66263 Turncrs tcstimony, 659 Vilkinsons tcstimony, 626 military aid to ngland, 33233 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 497 obscrvation ol Japancsc convoys, 199200, 25657, 856, 859 postattack promotion, 411 Robcrts Commission rc: warnings lrom Vashington, 376 Starks war warning, 16971 Haycs, dward A., 352, 357 Hcard, Villiam A., 25354 Hcndcrson, Lcon, 209 Hcwitt, Air Commodorc, 265 Name Index 919 Hcwitt, Kcnt H. invcstigation ol attack on Pcarl Harbor, 561, 58396 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Kramcrs tcstimony, 763, 768, 776 Saords tcstimony, 750, 754 Hillman, Sidncy, 209 Hindmarsh, Albcrt ., 75n1, 98n47, 106 Hirohito, mpcror ol Japan dcclaration ol war on thc Unitcd Statcs, 350 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, Schulzs tcstimony, 792 Rooscvclts addrcss to, 272, 277 79, 30607, 859 surrcndcr ol Japancsc lorccs, 617 Hitlcr, Adoll alliancc with Japan, 148, 18586, 195, 242, 331, 853 attcmpts to avoid clash with Unitcd Statcs, 64 locus as U.S. main cncmy, 863 Gcrman invasion ol Poland, 17, 20, 29, 79, 660 ol Russia, 9697, 222 risc to powcr, 4, 856 U.S. aid to ngland, 57, 212, 846 Honolulu Advertiser, 424n10 Hoovcr, Hcrbcrt, 3, 67, 153, 620 Hoovcr, J. dgar, 151n44 Hopkins, Harry, 341, 344 acquaintancc with Marshall, 79 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 27475, 27980, 305, 859 appointmcnt to Production Planning 8oard, 209 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Marshalls tcstimony, 818 Schulzs tcstimony, 79194 mccting with 8ritish Ambassador Lord Halilax, 197 o cial notication ol thc attack, 322, 331 rcaction ol FR to attack, 33738 sinking ol thc Robin Moor, 65 Stahlmans lcttcr, 798 Hopkins: A Biography (Adams), 234n3739 Hornbcck, Stanlcy, 46, 141, 302, 514 How Vc Von thc Var and Lost thc Pcacc (8ullitt), 52n53, 57n12 Hu Shih, 141, 14647, 306, 309 Hull, Cordcll, 341 aid to ngland, 308 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 207, 23941, 30205, 433, 85556, 860 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard 8rattons tcstimony, 486 ndings, 55556 Marshalls tcstimony, 482 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 568 FRs addrcss to Hirohito, 27779 Hcwitt !nquiry, 588 Japancsc prcscncc in !ndochina, 17273 rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 289 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 629, 821 8rattons tcstimony, 782, 786 Kimmcls tcstimony, 686, 694 Kramcrs tcstimony, 798, 80203 Majority Rcport, 829 Marshalls tcstimony, 635, 642 Minority Rcport, 841 Shorts tcstimony, 710 Starks tcstimony, 663, 668, 920 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 813, 816 Turncrs tcstimony, 659 Marco Polo 8ridgc incidcnt, 11 mcctings with Japancsc ambassadors, 12427, 158, 18087, 194, 210, 24143, 314, 85253 Navy Court ol !nquiry and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings, 618 Kramcrs tcstimony, 524 Marshalls tcstimony, 520, 522 Ncthcrlands !ndics, warning to Japan conccrning, 2425 o cial notication ol thc attack, 32325, 33435 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 292 Pilot Mcssagc, 255 prcattack intclligcncc, 132 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 133 47, 15051, 15456 rclations with Japan and, 96, 10405, 114, 337 Richardsons opposition to cct placcmcnt in Hawaii, 45 Robcrts Commission, 375 Stimsons o cial rcport, 607, 610 tradc bctwccn thc U.S. and Japan, 1617, 99100, 11112 ultimatum to Japan and, 101, 121, 457 !ckcs, Harold, 209 Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Toland), 59n19, 227n17, 438n57, 49596nn1213, 495n9, 760n109 !ngcrsoll, Royal . aid to ngland, 13, 845 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, Saords tcstimony, 477 attcmpts to strcngthcn cct, 11417 dcstruction ol Japancsc codcs, 214 Hart !nvcstigation, 429, 43031, 435 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 276, 288 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 73136 Kramcrs tcstimony, 77980 Saords tcstimony, 750 Starks tcstimony, 666, 815, 823 Turncrs tcstimony, 659 Navy Court ol !nquiry, Saords tcstimony, 512, 516 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 246 !nglis, T.8., 344 !rving, . astmcn, 210n17 Japan, 19311941 (cpartmcnt ol Statc), 15n19, 17n23, 137n12, 148n36, 155n47, 183n7, 183n9, 187n11, 205n8, 279n35, 690n52 Japanese Trust, Te (Vigmorc), 236n44, 263n37, 265n40 Jccrson, Tomas, 844 Jim Farleys Story (Farlcy), 34n12 Johnson, Hiram V., 335 Joncs, . Stanlcy, 113 Kahn, avid Te Codebreakers: Te Story of Secret Writing, 41n27, 131n1, 132n4 KaiShck, Chiang. See Chiang Kai Shck Kalblus, dward C., 493 Karig, Valtcr Battle Report: Te Atlantic War, 4344nn3233, 31415nn11 12, 317n25, 318nn2728 Kaulman, Samucl H., 669, 785 Name Index 921 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 8rattons tcstimony, 787 Kcclc, Frank 8. JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Additional \icws, 83032 appointmcnt to, 620 Kramcrs tcstimony, 76472, 779 Marshalls tcstimony, 653, 79596, 81819 Saords tcstimony, 75859 Shorts tcstimony, 72324 Starks tcstimony, 664, 822, 824 Kccr, Archibald Clark, 344 Kcnncdy, Joscph P., 33 Kichisaburo Nomura. See Nomura, Kichisaburo Kimmcl, Husband . (Admiral), 343 accusations against, viii, xi, 366, 369, 373, 618, 86266 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 313, 316 appointmcnt ol as commandcr inchicl ol thc U.S. Flcct, 8081 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 443 44, 449, 45861, 46869, 471 ndings, 488 Saords tcstimony, 480 attcmpts to strcngthcn cct, 8384, 10103 cartoon by C.. 8atchclor, 653 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 573 dclcnsc ol Philippincs and, 8788 U.S. intcrcsts in thc Pacic, 163, 17576, 28687, 333, 848 dcstruction ol U.S. classicd documcnts, 230, 26163, 858 Hart !nvcstigation, 42128, 438 Hcwitt !nquiry, 584, 59396 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 624, 676707 !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 733 Kcclcs additional vicws, 831 Kramcrs tcstimony, 776, 781 Marshalls tcstimony, 645, 647 Minority Rcport, 833, 83839, 841 Saords tcstimony, 671, 739 40, 75556 Shorts tcstimony, 70710, 715, 716, 71819, 726 Starks tcstimony, 66164, 66869 Vilkinsons tcstimony, 626 Knoxs invcstigation ol damagc to Pcarl Harbor, 35354, 359 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 493502, 504, 505, 54147 ndings, 555, 55759, 56266 Marshalls tcstimony, 522 Saords tcstimony, 514 o cial notication ol thc attack, 321 opposition to Scnatc bill S.805, 61314 prcparations lor courtmartial, 40911, 41320 problcms with military intclligcncc, 194, 213, 215, 218, 858, 863. See also military intclligcncc, abscncc ol lor Pcarl Harbor commandcrs rcaction to thc attack, 370 rcqucsts lor intclligcncc, 8889, 10405, 107, 85152 rctircmcnt ol, 40407 Robcrts Commission ndings, 396401 air patrols, 379, 381 cct prcparcdncss, 38289, 395 military intclligcncc, 39193 rcsponsibility lor dclcnsc, 922 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy 37677 warnings lrom Vashington, 37576 Starks war warning and, 16971, 854 Stimsons o cial rcport, 610 survcillancc ol ships in Pcarl Harbor, 110 translcr ol ships lrom Pacic to Atlantic, 9293 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 246 King, rncst J. analyscs ol APH8 and NC! rcports, 55760 appointmcnt as Chicl ol Naval pcrations, 411 Hcwitt !nquiry, 59496 Japancsc intcrccpts, 495, 552, 556 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, Starks tcstimony, 663 Starks war warning, 170 Kirby, S. Voodburn Te War Against Japan: Te Loss of Singapore, 26n4748, 59nn17 18, 60nn2021, 236n45 Kirk, Alan G., 107, 624 Kita Mcssagc: No Longcr a Mystcry, Tc (Saord), 438n56 Kitts, Villard A., 427 Knox, Frank, 343 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 166, 17273, 211, 27980, 302 4, 305, 30809, 433, 85556, 86061 appointmcnt as Sccrctary ol thc Navy, 34 ol Robcrts Commission, 373 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 454 Marshalls tcstimony, 482 courtmartial ol Kimmcl, 41516 dcath ol, 436 dcclaration ol war, 32931 dclay ol invcstigation ol attack, 439 Hart !nvcstigation, 422 Hcwitt !nquiry, 587, 589 invcstigation ol damagc to Pcarl Harbor, 35161, 36971 Japancsc prcscncc in !ndochina, 20607 rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 276, 28889 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 821 8rattons tcstimony, 810 !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 733 Kramcrs tcstimony, 80204 Marshalls tcstimony, 635, 642, 647 Minority Rcport, 840 Saords tcstimony, 751 Shorts tcstimony, 723 Starks tcstimony, 66869, 813, 824 Turncrs tcstimony, 659 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 495 Kramcrs tcstimony, 52829 ncwspapcr articlc about U.S. Navy, 28182 cc ol Managcmcnt Production, 209 o cial notication ol thc attack, 32122, 331 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 29293 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 14244 rcaction to thc attack, 864 Richardsons opposition to cct placcmcnt in Hawaii, 4546 on Richardsons rcmoval as commandcrinchicl ol thc U.S. Flcct, 81 Name Index 923 Robcrts Commission, 375 air patrols, 378 ndings, 397 Stahlmans lcttcr, 798, 818n289 Knudscn, Villiam S., 37, 209 Konoyc, Fuminaro, 99, 10405, 112, 141, 447 Konoyc, Princc Fuminaro, 14 Kramcr, Alwyn . anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 271 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 8rattons tcstimony, 474 Hart !nvcstigation, Saords tcstimony, 43334 Hcwitt !nquiry, 58587, 589 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 27377, 28384, 28789 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, xvii, 731, 738, 76082, 798805 8rattons tcstimony, 78485, 789 Saords tcstimony, 672, 741, 74345, 75153, 75657 Schulzs tcstimony, 791, 794 Starks tcstimony, 812, 814, 820 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 52229 Noycs tcstimony, 536 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 28997 Pilot Mcssagc, 255, 270 prcattack intclligcncc, 414 problcms with military intclligcncc, 21517 Saords scarch lor missing intcrccpts and, 437 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 178n39, 227, 246 Krick, Harold ., 82225 Krock, Arthur, 58, 56466 Kroncr, Haycs A., 571, 711n109, 712 Kurusu, Saburo attcmpts to ncgotiatc with Unitcd Statcs, 12327, 18287, 210, 235, 314, 85253 Japancsc prcscncc in !ndochina, 20306, 24143 Navy Court ol !nquiry, Noycs tcstimony, 534, 535 o cial notication ol thc attack, 325 nc P.M. appointmcnt with Hull, 30405 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 133 40, 15155, 17677 LaGuardia, Fiorcllo H., 209 Landon, Allrcd M., 34, 53 Lanc, Logan J., 669 Langcr, Villiam L. Te Undeclared War, 65n34, 67n40, 93n34 Lash, Joscph P. Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939 1941: Te Partnership Tat Saved the West, 33n9, 55n6, 56n9, 57n12, 135n9, 165n10 Lattimorc, wcn, 14546, 151 Lavcndcr, Robcrt A., 416, 423, 480, 49597, 523 Layton, dwin Tomas disappcarancc ol Japancsc carricrs, 31516 Hcwitt !nquiry, 590 And I Was Tere, 414n13 military intclligcncc, 413, 425 Robcrts Commission, 39091 Layton, Sir Valtcr, 49, 55 Lcahy, Villiam . (chicl ol Naval pcrations Admiral), 8, 293 Lcc, Raymond, 601 Lcvinc, !ssac on, xv 924 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Libby, 8ill My Parents: A Diering View, 330n66 Life, xvi Lindbcrgh, Charlcs A., 113 Te Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh, 364nn34 Lockard, Joscph L., 31920, 505 Lombard, Hclcn While Tey Fought: Behind the Scenes in Washington, 1941 1946, 306n101 Longworth, Alicc Rooscvclt, 112, 761 Longworth, Nicholas, 761 Loomis, Richard T. Tc Vhitc Housc Tclcphonc and Crisis Managcmcnt, 29n2 Lothian, (Philip Hcnry Kcrr), Lord, 36, 39, 4849, 55 Lovctt (Aidc to army gcncral), 328 Lucas, Scott, 344 acquaintancc with Marshall, 79 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation appointmcnt to, 620 Kramcrs tcstimony, 77273 Marshalls tcstimony, 653 Pcrcy Grcavcs incidcnt, 64952 Saords tcstimony, 757 Shorts tcstimony, 72223 Starks tcstimony, 825 Lucc, Hcnry, xvi MacArthur, ouglas acquaintancc with Marshall, 78 advanccmcnt in thc Philippincs, 611, 854 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 158, 16567, 258, 331 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Gcrows tcstimony, 633 Kramcrs tcstimony, 772 Marshalls tcstimony, 818 Starks tcstimony, 663 military intclligcncc, 458 sccrccy ol Japancsc codcs, 410n1 Magrudcr, John, 114 Man Called Intrepid: Te Secret War, A (Stcvcnson), 35n15, 56n11, 165n10 Marshall, Gcorgc C. (Gcncral), 342, 344 aid to ngland, 333 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 16673, 190, 207, 27980, 305 appointmcnt as Army Chicl ol Sta, 7880 ol Robcrts Commission, 373 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 44151, 454, 45657, 46671, 48184 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard 8rattons tcstimony, 47374, 48687 ndings, 488, 55556, 55861 attcmpts to conccal wartimc sccrcts, 367, 410 attcmpts to strcngthcn armcd lorccs, 16365, 85455 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 56770, 573, 596, 599, 601, 606 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 57374, 57576, 58083 dcclaration ol war, 328 invcntory ol supplics and nccds lor armcd lorccs, 94, 97 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 63548, 65354, 79596, 81720 8rattons tcstimony, 782, 784, 787, 80611 Gcrows tcstimony, 63135 Kimmcls tcstimony, 686, 695, 706 Name Index 925 Majority Rcport, 829 Milcss tcstimony, 629 Minority Rcport, 83738 Pcrcy Grcavcs incidcnt, 649 Saords tcstimony, 75657 Shorts tcstimony, 70710, 713, 720, 72325, 72728 Starks tcstimony, 661, 664, 667, 812, 81516, 823, 825 Turncrs tcstimony, 660 Vilkinsons tcstimony, 62629 last minutc warning, 320, 861 lcttcr to Tomas cwcy, xii, xvi, 55254 military aid to ngland, 852 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 500, 51922 Navy Court ol !nquiry and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings, 618 o cial notication ol thc attack, 322, 32628, 331 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 292, 294 302, 371 opposition to antagonizing Japan, 11621 Pilot Mcssagc, 255 postattack promotion, 412 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 14244 rclations with Japan and, 864 rcsponsibility lor U.S. Flcct, 8182, 160 rctircmcnt ol Gcncral Short, 40104 Richardsons opposition to cct placcmcnt in Hawaii, 45 Robcrts Commission ndings, 399 cct prcparcdncss, 388, 39396 warnings to Short and Kimmcl, 375 Stahlmans lcttcr, 798 Stimsons o cial rcport, 607, 60910 \ictory Program, 12122, 222 Marshall, Kathcrinc Tuppcr Together, Annals of an Army Wife, 78n6 Marshall Story, Te (Paync), 160n53 Martin, F.L., 379 Martin, Joscph V., 336, 348 Mastcn John ., 620, 669 Matsuoka, Yosukc ( Japans Forcign Ministcr), 1415 McCollum, Arthur H. anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 18789, 193, 21417 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 8rattons tcstimony, 474, 485 Hcwitt !nquiry, 58485, 587, 58990 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 28788 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation 8rattons tcstimony, 811 Kramcrs tcstimony, 763, 804n238 Saords tcstimony, 739, 746 47, 750, 752, 755 Starks tcstimony, 666, 81415 Navy Court ol !nquiry, Saords tcstimony, 515 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 29192, 371 postattack promotion, 41213 prcattack intclligcncc, 415, 858, 859 Saords scarch lor missing intcrccpts and, 437 McCormack, John V., 336, 621 McCoy, Frank, 79, 328 Mc!ntirc, Ross T., 30506 White House Physician, 616n14 McMorris, Charlcs H., 385, 590, 592 926 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy McNarncy, Joscph, 49596 McNary, Charlcs L., 335 Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Te (Hull), 302n87, 305n97, 32425nn4752, 325n52 McrlcSmith, \an S., 258, 265, 334 Milcs, Shcrman Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 446 48, 454 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 8rattons tcstimony, 474, 48586 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, Marshalls tcstimony, 469, 483 asscssmcnt ol Atlantic and Pacic thcatcrs ol war, 18993, 207 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 57071, 596, 60001 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 579, 57981, 583 dcclaration ol war, 328 dcstruction ol Japancsc codcs, 21719 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 62931, 649, 654 8rattons tcstimony, 782, 785 89, 80609 Kramcrs tcstimony, 779, 804n238 Shorts tcstimony, 71112, 717, 725 Vilkinsons tcstimony, 62629 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 294, 295 Stimsons o cial rcport, 610 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 178 Millis, Valtcr Te Forrestal Diaries, 436n4950 Mitchcll, Villiam . JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation appointmcnt to, 620 Gcrows tcstimony, 632, 635 Marshalls tcstimony, 63637, 64042 Starks tcstimony, 667, 813 rcsignation as counscl lor JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 65455 Molotov, 344 Morccll, 8cn, 43, 83, 330n64 Morgan, dward P., 669 Morgcnthau, Hcnry J. proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 140, 144, 14950 U.S. aid to ngland, 2225, 3639, 4849, 55, 58 U.S. bond salc, 21112 Morison, Samucl liot Te Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War, 72n52 Mr. Roosevelts Navy: Te Private War of the Atlantic Fleet, 19391942 (Abbazia), 18n27, 19n29, 21n32 33, 43n30, 44n35, 6364nn2931, 65n33, 6667nn3839, 70nn4647, 72n50, 73n52 Munson, F. Granvillc, 726n157 Murata, Toshio, xx, 229n23 Murn, rin G., 493, 556 Murphy, John V., 620, 62930, 643, 75658 Mussolini, 8cnito, 195, 258 My Parents: A Diering View (Rooscvclt and Libby), 330n66 Nakano, Kcntaro, xx, 229n23 Nclson, onald M., 21011 Arsenal of Democracy: Te Story of American War Production, 21011nn1819 New York Times, Te, 21n35, 240n2, 243n9, 244n11, 348nn23, 358n18, 361n24, 364n1, 365nn5 6, 373n1, 4067nn13741, 43839nn5859, 492nn18384, 493n1, 547n198, 556nn2021, Name Index 927 557n23, 56366nn4751, 615n13, 61718nn12, 619nn56, 621n14, 760n112, 764n130 Ncwton, J.H., 176, 313n9, 386 Nimitz, Chcstcr V., 45, 411n4, 67778 Nomura, Kichisaburo, 343 attcmpts to ncgotiatc with Unitcd Statcs, 9496, 12227, 18287, 210, 314 codc mcssagcs and, 90 Japancsc prcscncc in !ndochina, 20306, 24143 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Starks tcstimony, 668 Turncrs tcstimony, 658 knowlcdgc ol Pcarl Harbor, 463 Navy Court ol !nquiry, Noycs tcstimony, 534, 535 Novcmbcr 29 dcadlinc, 509 o cial notication ol thc attack, 32325 nc P.M. appointmcnt with Hull, 30405, 354 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 133 40, 15155 rcply to Hull at 1:00, 359. See also nc P.M. Mcssagc tradc bctwccn thc U.S. and Japan, 99 North American Supply (Hall), 24n4344, 36n16, 38n2223, 4849nn4347, 55nn78 Noycs, Lcigh Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, Saords tcstimony, 477 attcmpts to conccal inlormation about attack, 36566 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 572, 597 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 579 dcstruction ol U.S. classicd documcnts, 26263 Hcwitt !nquiry, 58586 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 288 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Kramcrs tcstimony, 772, 777 Saords tcstimony, 739, 743, 74547, 750 Starks tcstimony, 666 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 52930, 53339 Kramcrs tcstimony, 525, 526 Saords tcstimony, 512, 515 Saords scarch lor missing intcrccpts and, 437 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 178, 22830, 246 cll, Robcrt H., 265 gimoto, 22829 hashi, Chiuchi, 77 On Active Service in Peace and War (Stimson and 8undy), 7n2, 34 35nn1314, 635n68 On Te Treadmill to Pearl Harbor (Richardson), 2728nn4952, 31n5, 4648nn3842, 8081nn10 11 smun, 580 utcrbridgc, Villiam Voodward, 31718 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan (cpartmcnt ol Statc), 19311941, 14n1516, 123n20, 12526nn2527, 13335nn68, 182n4, 2045nn37, 24143nn68, 277nn2931, 325n51, 658n141, 689n49 Pattcrson, 328 Paync, Robcrt Te Marshall Story, 160n53 928 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy (cpartmcnt ol Statc), 19311941, 12n1213, 16n21, 17n24, 44n34, 58n14, 63n27, 69n45, 70n49, 114n5, 123n20, 325n51, 350n4, 454n46 Pearl Harbor Attack ( Joint Congrcssional Committcc), 13n14, 46n37, 6062nn2226, 72n51, 7980nn89, 8283nn1215, 8491nn1829, 93n3233, 9899nn4851, 1023nn5660, 1056nn6466, 10710nn6874, 11421nn617, 12324nn2124, 132n2, 132n5, 135n9, 136n11, 137n13, 140n16, 142n22, 148n35, 149nn3738, 150nn4243, 15759nn5052, 16162nn12, 162nn48, 16671nn1322, 17378nn2539, 181n3, 182nn56, 183n8, 18790nn1218, 190nn19 21, 19496nn2226, 198n28, 200n33, 201n35, 2068nn915, 21218nn2141, 22325nn616, 22728nn1822, 22931nn24 29, 23234nn3139, 239n1, 24447nn1217, 25261nn232, 26263nn3436, 26566nn4144, 267nn4748, 27077nn128, 279n34, 28385nn18, 294 301nn4585, 30204nn8898, 3089nn1078, 31214nn210, 31517nn1323, 31617nn2023, 318n29, 319nn3133, 320 22nn3543, 323n46, 32627nn53 54, 327n57, 32829nn5961, 329n63, 33234nn7073, 33435nn7576, 336n81, 347n1, 352n1, 35456nn414, 359 60nn2023, 364n2, 36668nn721, 36768nn1721, 370n24, 374n3, 37576nn713, 377405nn15 133, 411n23, 41214nn812, 417n22, 418n2425, 422n2, 423n9, 42435nn1148, 437nn5255, 44192nn1182, 49395nn26, 496523nn14111, 52347nn113 97, 55254nn59, 55556nn1619, 55759nn2531, 56162nn4044, 567610nn1126, 61112nn16, 61935nn566, 63646nn69 100, 64656nn10229, 656 58nn13140, 65970nn142190, 67273nn12, 676721nn6147, 72230nn149162, 73241nn123, 74260nn25108, 760n110, 761 97nn113225, 798825nn227314, 82733nn112 Pcarl Harbor !nvcstigations, Tc (Grcavcs), 131n1 Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal (Vallin), 317n21, 319n20, 320n34 Pcarson, rcw, 566 Pcring, Allrcd F., 284n6, 287n13 Pcrkins, Franccs, 336 Te Roosevelt I Knew, 334n74, 335nn7778 Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, 131n1 (8arncs, cd.) Pcrry, Matthcw C. (U.S. Navy Commandcr), 5 Pcrshing, John J., 78 Phillips, Sir Frcdcrick, 3738, 4849 Phillips, Sir Tom S.\., 26465, 28587, 640 Phillips, V.C., 640 Pincau, Rogcr And I Was Tere: Pearl Harbor and MidwayBreaking the Secrets, 316n19 Poguc, Forrcst George C. Marshall: Education of a General: 18301939, 79n7, 294n42, 308n105 Name Index 929 George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 19391942, 160n53 Powcll, Joscph V., 352 Pratt, Julius V. Cordell Hull: American Secretaries of State and Teir Diplomacy, 203n1, 302n87, 635n67 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Te (Rooscvclt), 4n1, 8n3, 9n7, 20n30, 50nn4849 Purvis, Arthur, 37, 49, 53 Pyc, Villiam S., 411n4, 426, 45154 Quo, Taichi, 146 Racdcr, rich, 64 Ramscy, Logan C., 168 Rayburn, Sam, 335, 348 Rcdman, Joscph R., 216, 366, 54041 Rccs, avid Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox, 140n17, 144n28, 150n41, 151n44 Rendezvous with Destiny:Te Roosevelts of the White House (Rooscvclt and 8rough), 330n67 Rcynaud, Paul, 3233 Ribbcntrop, Joachim von, 195, 510 Richardson, J.. appointmcnt as commandcrin chicl ol thc U.S. Flcct, 21 cct placcmcnt in Hawaii, 2728, 4548 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Kimmcls tcstimony, 679 Marshalls tcstimony, 648 Starks tcstimony, 660 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 50204 opposition to cct placcmcnt in Hawaii, 83, 102, 360 ordcrs to rcmain in Pcarl Harbor, 31 rcmoval as commandcrinchicl ol thc U.S. Flcct, 8081 Robcrts Commission rc: cct prcparcdncss, 382 On Te Treadmill to Pearl Harbor, 45n36, 8081nn1011 Richardson, Scth V. appointmcnt as gcncral counscl lor JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 669 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Kramcrs tcstimony, 799 800n227, 804n238 Saords tcstimony, 755 Schulzs tcstimony, 792 Starks tcstimony, 823 Rickcnbackcr, dward, 113 Rising Sun: Te Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 19361945, Te (Toland), 1415nn1718, 15n20 Road to Pearl Harbor, Te (Fcis), 307n102 Robcrts, wcn J., 373, 391 Rochclort, Joscph John Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 8rattons tcstimony, 48586 disappcarancc ol Japancsc carricrs, 315 Hcwitt !nquiry, 58990 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Kramcrs tcstimony, 776 Saords tcstimony, 755 prcattack intclligcncc, 389, 41315, 438 Rooscvclt, lcanor, 7677, 33031 Rooscvclt, lliot, 330 Rooscvclt, Franklin clano, 341 accusations against, 621 addrcss to Hirohito, 272, 27779, 859 930 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy aid to ngland, 4144, 5458, 6367, 19799, 234, 84550, 857. See also ngland, U.S. support lor anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 14849, 158, 17173, 27980, 3058 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 446 attcmpts to conccal inlormation about attack, 364 strcngthcn cct and, 8384 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 568 corrcspondcncc bctwccn ngland and thc U.S., 2933, 165 dcath ol, 616, 617 dcclaration ol war, 32832, 86266 dclay ol invcstigation ol attack, 439 cconomic conditions in Japan, 106 clcction ol 1933, 34 1940, 22, 3335, 38, 4752, 53 1944, 420, 547, 55052 F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 19281945, 42n28, 77n3 rst rcsponsc to attack, 34750 rst ultimatum to Japan, 121 involvcmcnt in Far ast, 6769 Japancsc prcscncc in !ndochina, 203, 20607, 233, 85054 on JapancscChincsc Var, 1112 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation 8rattons tcstimony, 810 !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 73637 Kcclcs additional vicws, 83132 Kimmcls tcstimony, 67677, 686, 69192, 694, 699 Marshalls tcstimony, 635, 641, 795, 81819 Minority Rcport, 83233, 83537, 83940 Schulzs tcstimony, 79195 Shorts tcstimony, 710, 716 Starks tcstimony, 66062, 820, 822, 824 Turncrs tcstimony, 659 lcttcr to Vcndcll Villkic, 816 Marshalls dcvotion to, 7880 mcctings with Japancsc ambassadors, 12427 Navy Court ol !nquiry and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings, 55455, 56164 Kramcrs tcstimony, 525 ncutrality ol Unitcd Statcs, attitudc towards, 8, 1516 ncwspapcr lcak ol U.S. war plans, 24344 o cial notication ol thc attack, 322, 32526, 327 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 133 40, 14047, 14951 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Te, 4n1, 8n3, 9n7, 20n30, 5051nn4852 rcaction to thc attack, 33439, 84345 rclations with Japan and, 46, 8588, 96, 10405 Richardsons distrust ol, 80 Robcrts Commission, appointmcnt ol, 373 Tojos spccch and, 182 tradc bctwccn thc U.S. and Japan, 7678, 9799, 112 ultimatum to Japan and, 10001, 27475 undcclarcd battlc ol Atlantic and, 7073 Name Index 931 U.S. bond salc, 21112 \ictory Program, 222 Rooscvclt, Jamcs, 165, 330 Aectionately, FDR: A Sons Story of a Lonely Man, 550n4 Rooscvclt, Tcodorc, 113 Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941: Te Partnership Tat Saved the West (Lash), 33n9, 55n6, 56n9, 57n12, 135n9, 165n10 Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspondence (Locwcnhcim, Langlcy, and Joncs, cds.), 18n26, 29n1, 3031nn34, 55n5, 56n10, 63n28 Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (Shcrwood), 92n3031, 322n44, 338n85 Roosevelt I Knew, Te (Pcrkins), 33435nn7576, 335nn7778 Roosevelt: Te Soldier of Freedom (8urns), 550n1 Rugg, Charlcs 8., 41617, 438, 495, 613 Russcll, Hcnry ., 441, 468, 47576, 483 Sadtlcr, tis K., 474 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 572, 597 600, 60406 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 577, 57980 Hcwitt !nquiry, 588 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, Gcrows tcstimony, 657 Saord, Laurcncc F., 41, 343 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 47580 ndings, 488 attcmpts to conccal wartimc sccrcts, 367, 411 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 572, 596 97, 599600 communication sccurity and, 8990 dcstruction ol Japancsc codcs, 21517 U.S. classicd documcnts, 22932, 26162 Hart !nvcstigation, 43136 Hcwitt !nquiry, 58589 intcrvicw with author, 131n1, 132n3 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 67176, 731, 73860 8rattons tcstimony, 789 Kramcrs tcstimony, 76465, 77173, 804 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 49495, 50816 Kramcrs tcstimony, 52526 Navy intclligcncc occ, 130, 193 postattack promotion, 412 prcattack intclligcncc, 41819 rcmoval ol top burcau chicls, 107 scarch lor missing intcrccpts, 43637 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 22324, 22732, 246, 858 Salm, Commandcr, 265 Sancmatsu, Yuzuru, 229 Saycrs, R.S. Financial Policy, 19391945, 39n24 Sayrc, Francis 8., 158, 165 Glad Adventure, 166n11 Schuirmann, R.. JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Kramcrs tcstimony, 763 Starks tcstimony, 666, 814 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 49899, 50708 warnings to Japan, 114 Schulz, Lcstcr Robcrt, 256, 27377, 78995, 816, 820 932 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Shalctt, Sidncy Aectionately, FDR: A Sons Story of a Lonely Man, 550n4 Shcrwood, Robcrt ., 92, 864 Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, 322n44, 338n85 Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, 322n44, 329n62, 331n69, 336n80, 33738nn84 85 Shigcmitsu, Mamoru, 77 Short, Valtcr C. (Gcncral), 342 accusations against, viii, xi, 369, 373, 86266 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 17475, 313 appointmcnt as commanding gcncral ol thc Hawiian dcpartmcnt, 8182 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 441 51, 45861, 482 ndings, 48889, 55559, 56466 cartoon by C.. 8atchclor, 653 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 569 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 57374, 577, 58182 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 70730 Gcrows tcstimony, 63134, 65657 Kimmcls tcstimony, 677, 682, 706 Kramcrs tcstimony, 776 Marshalls tcstimony, 640, 641, 64446, 653 Minority Rcport, 833, 83839, 841 Saords tcstimony, 756 Starks tcstimony, 66869 Vilkinsons tcstimony, 62627, 629 Knoxs invcstigation ol damagc to Pcarl Harbor, 35355 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 496, 499502 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 372 prcparations lor courtmartial, 40911, 415, 417, 420 problcms with military intclligcncc, 110, 194, 213, 858, 863. See also military intclligcncc, abscncc ol lor Pcarl Harbor commandcrs rctircmcnt ol, 40104, 406 Robcrts Commission ndings, 396401 cct prcparcdncss, 38289 military intclligcncc, 39293 rcsponsibility lor dclcnsc, 37677 sabotagc alcrt, 39495 warnings lrom Vashington, 37576 sabotagc alcrt, 16769, 312 Stimsons o cial rcport, 60710 Signal Corps: Te Test (Tompson), 319n33 Smith, Lconard 8., 64 Smith, Ralph C., 60204, 604, 788 Smith, (Valtcr) 8cdcll, 342 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 600 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 57678, 580 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 27677 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 8rattons tcstimony, 783, 788 Smith, Villiam.V., 424, 426, 591 Smuts, Jan Christian, 69n43 Sonnctt, John F. Hcwitt !nquiry, 583 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation Kramcrs tcstimony, 763, 768, 776 Name Index 933 Saords tcstimony, 750, 75455 Soong, T.\., 144, 14950 Spalding, !saac, 600, 60406 Sta O cers Field Manual: Te Sta and Combat Orders (Var cpartmcnt), 656n130 Stahlman, Jamcs G., 279n38, 798, 818n289 Stalin, Joscl, 65, 341, 344 Standlcy, Villiam H., 371, 37374, 396 Admiral Ambassador to Russia, 376n14 Stark, 8ctty, 798 Stark, Harold R., 343 aid to ngland, 4144, 54, 6667, 33233 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 16671, 17273, 27980, 305, 30809, 433 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 442 43, 477 attcmpts to conccal wartimc sccrcts, 367, 41011 strcngthcn cct and, 83, 101 03, 16365, 85455 Columbus incidcnt, 21 dcclaration ol war, 329 Hcwitt !nquiry, 585, 58889, 59396 inlormation givcn to Scnators about attack, 36364 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 275, 288 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 62426, 66070, 79697, 812 16, 817, 82025 8rattons tcstimony, 81011, 811 Gcrows tcstimony, 632 !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 73637 Kimmcls tcstimony, 67677, 681, 68486, 690, 69295, 697, 699700 Kramcrs tcstimony, 76364, 798, 80102 Majority Rcport, 829 Marshalls tcstimony, 635, 818 Minority Rcport, 83738, 839 40, 840 Saords tcstimony, 75657 Schulzs tcstimony, 79394 Shorts tcstimony, 709 Turncrs tcstimony, 65859 Vilkinsons tcstimony, 626 Kimmcls rcqucsts lor intclligcncc, 8889, 107, 85152 last minutc warning, 861 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 493, 496 507, 500, 51619, 539, 546 Kimmcls tcstimony, 54142 Kramcrs tcstimony, 52729 Marshalls tcstimony, 51920, 521 Saords tcstimony, 512 Navy Court ol !nquiry and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings, 618 o cial notication ol thc attack, 32122, 331 nc P.M. Mcssagc, 29192, 29899, 371 opposition to antagonizing Japan, 76, 8588, 11721, 467 postattack promotion, 41112 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 142 rctircmcnt ol Admiral Kimmcl, 40406 Richardsons conccrns, 27, 4546 Robcrts Commission, 37576, 382, 393, 395 934 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Stimsons o cial rcport, 610 tradc bctwccn thc U.S. and Japan, 98 undcclarcd battlc ol Atlantic and, 72, 93 war warning to Kimmcl, 16971, 189, 854 Vinds Codc mcssagc, 246 Stcphcnson, Sir Villiam, 35, 56, 165 Stcvcnson, Villiam A Man Called Intrepid:Te Secret War, 35n15, 56n11, 165n10 Stimson, Hcnry L., 341 anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 14749, 16667, 17173, 27980, 30204, 305, 30809, 85556, 860 appointmcnt as Sccrctary ol Var, 3435 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 442 Marshalls tcstimony, 482 Clarkc !nvcstigation, 601 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 56768, 57374, 579 dcclaration ol war, 32829 dclay ol invcstigation ol attack, 439 octrinc ol Nonrccognition and, 153 invcntory ol supplics and nccds lor armcd lorccs, 97, 27273 Japancsc intcrvcntion in Manchuria, 6 Japancsc prcscncc in !ndochina, 20607 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 821 8rattons tcstimony, 78283 Gcrows tcstimony, 63233 Kramcrs tcstimony, 803 Majority Rcport, 829 Marshalls tcstimony, 64142, 647 Minority Rcport, 83738, 840 Shorts tcstimony, 710 Starks tcstimony, 813 military aid to ngland, 33233 Navy Court ol !nquiry and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings, 55464, 618 Navy Court ol !nquiry, Kramcrs tcstimony, 529 ncwspapcr lcak ol U.S. war plans, 24344 cc ol Managcmcnt Production, 209 o cial notication ol thc attack, 322, 32526, 331, 33435 cial Rcport Rcgarding thc Pcarl Harbor isastcr, 60610 Pilot Mcssagc, 255 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 142 44, 16465 rctircmcnt ol Gcncral Short, 403 Richardsons opposition to cct placcmcnt in Hawaii, 46 Robcrts Commission, 375 Robcrts Commission ndings, 397 rc: air patrols, 378 Shorts scarch lor codcd mcssagcs and, 465 Stahlmans lcttcr, 798, 818n289 ultimatum to Japan and, 101, 12021, 289 U.S. support lor war, 852 Stimson, Hcnry L., works by On Active Service in Peace and War, 7n2, 3435nn1314 Stimson iary, 55455nn1013, 556n22, 55960nn3339, 564n46, 566n52 Name Index 935 Strong, Gcorgc \., 39 Sun Yatscn, 7 Takagi, 259 Tansill, Charlcs Callan Back Door to War: Te Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 19331941, 10n9, 11n11 Taylor, Villiam .G., 504 Ten Years in Japan (Grcw), 200n34, 201n36 Tcrasaki, Hidcnari, 183, 25859 Navy Court ol !nquiry, Kramcrs tcstimony, 524 Tcobald, Admiral, 381 Tis I Remember (lcanor Rooscvclt), 331n68 Tomas, lbcrt, 612, 614 Tomas, Norman, 113 Tompson, Gcorgc Raynor Te Signal Corps: Te Test, 319n33 Together, Annals of an Army Wife (Marshall), 78n6 Togo, Forcign Ministcr, 463 Tojo, Hidcki, 105, 18184, 447, 653 Toland, John, 41617nn2021, 419n28, 523n112 Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, 59n19, 227n17, 438n57, 495n9, 760n109 Rising Sun: Te Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 19361945, Te, 1415nn1718, 15n20 Tollcy, Kcmp, 279n38, 798n226 Cruise of the Lanikai, 736n11 Toulmin, Harry A., 441 Truman, Harry appointmcnt ol Marshall as ambassador to China, 631, 648, 653, 817 as chairman ol thc Scnatc clcnsc !nvcstigating Committcc, 365 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, sccrccy ol rccords, 834 Navy Court ol !nquiry and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings, 61718 notication ol communist sympathizcrs, 151n44 Rooscvclts dcath, x Truth About Pcarl Harbor, Tc (Flynn), 646n101 Turncr, Richmond Kclly anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 433 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 454 Saords tcstimony, 477 Hart !nvcstigation, 16162nn12, 42930, 435 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 276, 288 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 624, 65760, 751n71 !ngcrsolls tcstimony, 733 Kimmcls tcstimony, 688, 690 Kramcrs tcstimony, 77980 Majority Rcport, 829 Starks tcstimony, 666, 815, 823 Vilkinsons tcstimony, 626 military intclligcncc, 107 Navy Court ol !nquiry, 24647, 52934 Saords tcstimony, 512 o cial notication ol thc attack, 32122 Robcrts Commission rc: cct prcparcdncss, 393, 395 U.S. aid to ngland, 6162 Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War, Te (Morison), 73n52 Tylcr, Kcrmit A., 31920 Undeclared War, Te (Langcr and Glcason), 65n34, 67n40, 93n34 936 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Union ol Sovict Socialist Rcpublics. See USSR (Union ol Sovict Socialist Rcpublics) United States Naval Chronology, World War II, 44n34, 54, 64n32, 6566nn3537, 73n52, 411 12nn56 U.S. Committcc on Forcign Aairs Events Leading up to World War II, 57n13 U.S. Congrcss Events, 16n22, 17n25, 18n28, 20n31, 24n43, 69n43, 70n48 See Pearl Harbor Attack ( Joint Congrcssional Committcc) U.S. cpartmcnt ol Navy United States Naval Chronology, World War II, 54, 64n32, 65 66nn3537, 73n52, 411n5 U.S. Housc Committcc on Forcign Aairs, 10n8 Events Leading up to World War II, 141n19 U.S. News & World Report, 374n6 \ictims ol thc Kita Mcssagc, Tc (Saord), 412n8, 413n10, 414n14 \inson, Carl, 363 \ovoshilov, 344 Valkcr, Frank, 336 Vallacc, Hcnry A., 211, 335 Vallin, Homcr N. Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, 317n21, 320n34, Valsh, avid !., 348, 36365, 620 War Against Japan: Te Loss of Singapore, Te (Kirby), 26n4748, 59nn1718, 60nn2021, 236n45 Var cpartmcnt Field Service Regulations: Operations, 720n146, 721n148 Sta O cers Field Manual: Te Sta and Combat Orders, 656n130 War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations, Te (Vatson), 39n2526, 94n35, 122n1819, 162n3, 190n19, 221 22nn13, 222n5, 244n10, 251n1 Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh (Lindbcrgh), 364nn34 Vashington, Gcorgc, 844 Washington Post, 615n12 Washington Star, 41516nn1617, 417n23, 760n111 Vatson, dwin Martin (Pa), 210 Vatson, Mark Skinncr Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and Preparations, 39n2526, 54n34, 94n35, 103 4nn6163, 122n1819, 162n3, 190n19, 22122nn13, 222n5, 244n10, 251n1 Vcdcmcycr, A.C., 94, 97, 10304, 222, 367, 410n1 Vcllborn, 804n238 Vcllcs, Sumncr anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 179 Japancsc prcscncc in !ndochina, 97, 20306, 20607 proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 15556 U.S. bond salc, 21112 Vcst, Charlcs V., 441 While Tey Fought: Behind the Scenes in Washington, 19411946 (Lombard), 306n101 Vhitc, Harry cxtcr, 140, 14950, 151 White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, Te (Shcrwood), 322n44, 329n62, 331n69, 336n80, 337 38nn8485 Name Index 937 White House Physician (Mc!ntirc), 305n98, 616n14 Vhitc Housc Tclcphonc and Crisis Managcmcnt, Tc (Loomis), 29n2 White House Witness (anicls), 550n2 Viglc, aryl, 22526 Vigmorc, Lioncl Te Japanese Trust, 236n44, 263n37, 265n40 Vilkinson, Tcodorc S. anticipatcd attack lrom Japan, 18889, 253, 271, 433 appointmcnt as chicl ol N! ( cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc), 108, 25152 Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, Saords tcstimony, 477 Clauscn !nvcstigation, 58081 dcstruction ol Japancsc codcs, 214 Hart !nvcstigation, 42930 Hcwitt !nquiry, 585, 58889 Japancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 276, 284, 288 JCC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, 62526 8rattons tcstimony, 788 Kramcrs tcstimony, 776, 779, 801 Saords tcstimony, 743, 746, 750 Starks tcstimony, 66566, 666, 81215, 820 Turncrs tcstimony, 659 Navy Court ol !nquiry, Kramcrs tcstimony, 528 Saords tcstimony, 512, 51516 Turncrs tcstimony, 533 Pilot Mcssagc, 256 Villkic, Vcndcll, 53, 816 Vilson, Voodrow, 328 Vinant, John G., 257, 322, 70304 Vood, Robcrt ., 112 Voodring, Harry Hincs, 23, 34 Voodward, Llcwcllyn British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 19899nn3031, 23536nn4043, 266nn4546 World Almanac, Te, 113n4, 210n17 Vright, Vcslcy A., 751 Yamamoto, 18283