The Constructive Hilbert Program and the Limits of Martin-Lf Type Theory Author(s): Michael Rathjen Source: Synthese,

Vol. 147, No. 1, Reflections on Frege and Hilbert (Oct., 2005), pp. 81-120 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118649 Accessed: 19/07/2010 09:13
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MICHAEL RATHJEN

THE CONSTRUCTIVE HILBERT PROGRAM AND THE LIMITS OF MARTIN-L?F TYPE THEORY

1. INTRODUCTION

Hilbert's

program is one of the truly magnificent projects in the philosophy To carry out this program he founded a new discipline of mathematics. of mathematics, called which was to perform the task iiBeweistheorie,\ once of laying to rest all worries about the foundations of mathematics and for all1 by securing mathematics finitist tency. The failure of Hubert's via an absolute reduction proof of consis program on account of

G?del's

results is often gleefully trumpeted. Modern logic, incompleteness are remarkably has shown that modifications of Hubert's program though, can concern different parts of Hubert's two resilient. These modifications

step program2 to validate infinitistic mathematics. The first kind maintains the goal of a finitistic consistency proof. Here, of course, G?del's second incompleteness theorem is of utmost relevance can be shown to be in that only a fragment of infinitistic mathematics consistent. results in mathematical logic have led to the con Fortunately, a substantial chunk of scientifically that this fragment encompasses mathematics 1998; Simpson (cf. Feferman 1988). This work applicable bears on the question of the indispensability of set-theoretic foundations clusion for mathematics. kind of modification gives more leeway to the methods in the consistency in the Such a step is already presaged proof. or work of the Hilbert school. Notably Bernays has called for a broadened a finistic con extended of finitism form 1967). Rather than (cf. Bernays The second allowed sistency proof consistency tistic mathematics fruitfully the objective here proof for a classical is to give a constructive and predicative T in which theory large parts of infini can be developed. In order to undertake such a study

to point to a particular formalization of constructive to P is sufficient P, and then investigate whether predicative reasoning the consistency I shall be concerned of T. The particular framework prove one needs Synthese (2005) 147: 81-120 DOI 10.1007/sl 1229-004-6208-4 ? Springer 2005

82 with was in this paper developed

MICHAEL RATHJEN is an intuitionistic and predicative his developed theory of types which type theory "with the

He by Martin-L?f. motive of clarifying the syntax and semantics of intuitionistic (Martin-L?f 1982). It is intended to be a full scale system to research for formalizing mathematics. in mathe intuitionistic Owing over the last 30 years -the program of reverse mathematics matical logic work have been especially here - one can and Feferman's instrumental to be the system T. It take a certain fragment of second order arithmetic philosophical mathematics" to prove the 's type theory P is strong enough and proving a of T, thereby validating infinitistic mathematics consistency to be feasible. constructive Hilbert program Indeed, the system T alluded to above is so capacious that we do not even know of any result in ordinary that Martin-L?f mathematics in T. Of course, this is a claim regard is not provable only; highly set-theoretic topics in mathematics ing ordinary mathematics are not amenable to a constructive consistency proof, or, more cautiously which do not know how to give constructive consistency proofs for such topics. The main turns out

put, we

type goal of this paper is to find the limits of Martin-L?f A demarcation in determining of the latter is important the ulti theory. mate boundaries of a constructive Hilbert program. The aim is to single out a fragment of second order arithmetic or classical set theory which type theory. of this paper will actually be concerned with some words of ex the limits of Martin-L?f type theory, perhaps exploring from planation are in order. The paper is intended for a variety of audiences and mathematical logic, and not solely aimed at philosophy, mathematics, the small group of researchers who are familiar with all the diverse fields the fields broached here are the areas touched upon in this paper. Among reverse mathe of arithmetic, of proof theory, constructivism, subsystems set theory, Martin-L?f of language matics, type theory, and the philosophy them more accessible. and mathematics, ab initio with the aim of making The cognoscenti, though, should skim over the first couple of sections and 5 and 6. then proceed directly to Sections how the paper is organized: The following adumbrates are introduced and of second order arithmetic fragments various parts of ordinary mathematics formalizing Section 3 surveys different forms of constructivism. mal introduction with relates to the ideas underlying Martin-L?f them to the Dummett-Prawitz meaning-as-use In Section their role 2, for all possible encompasses Since only a quarter formalizations of Martin-L?f

is discussed. 4 provides

Section an infor

type theory and also theory. Section 5 is

concerned

to be consistent

of second order arithmetic which can be shown subsystems to the within Martin-L?f type theory. Section 6 is devoted

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE limits of Martin-L?f Hilbert matical

83

type theory and thus to the limits of a constructive program based on it. The final section briefly touches on mathe on the higher infinite statements whose proof depends essentially set theory and beyond.

in Zermelo-Fraenkel

2. A

SYSTEMS FOR FORMALIZING MATHEMATICS of Hubert's to finitary more consists by in broadening reduction allowing of the to

natural modification of reduction methods Hilbert

requirement constructive constructive but also absolute

program methods

conception one proves a 'real' statement in a suffi that, whenever guarantee ciently strong classical theory T, say, a fragment of second order arithmetic or set theory, there would be an interpretation to of the proof according

the demand

program for a constructive

The objective generally.3 is not merely the absence

our modified

of inconsistency for which there is an

which

one would true. Moreover, the theorem is constructively like the T to be such as tomake the process of fnormalization of mathematics theory in T almost trivial, in particular T should be sufficiently strong for all This is a very Hilbertian attitude: show once and for all practical purposes. that non-constructive methods do not lead to false constructive non-constructive constructive methods. program that require upon which of a constructive Hilbert conclusions and then proceed happily There are several aspects clarification. a coherent One system on with

is to find some basic of constructive

framework point to a particular The latter task will be addressed

principles is to reasoning may be built. Another for formalizing infinitistic mathematics. in this section. It was already observed

(1938) that classical analysis can be formalized within by Hilbert-Bernays second order arithmetic. Further scrutiny revealed that a small fragment a research program is sufficient. Under the rubric of Reverse Mathematics has been some thirty years ago. The idea is initiated by Harvey Friedman a theorem, one can prove its equivalence to ask whether, to some given re axiomatic with the aim of determining what proof-theoretical system, sources are necessary of mathematics. More for the theorems precisely, the objective tence axioms follows:
Given in order a specific theorem to prove r? r of ordinary mathematics, which set existence axioms are needed

of reverse mathematics in ordinary mathematics.

is to investigate the role of set exis The main question can be stated as

Central mathematics'.

to the above This concept,

is the

reference

to what have

is called a precise

of course,

doesn't

'ordinary definition.

84

MICHAEL RATHJEN non make

we mean main-stream, speaking, by ordinary mathematics Roughly core areas of mathematics i.e. the which set-theoretic mathematics, no essential

use of the concepts and methods of set theory and do not essen on the theory of uncountable In particular, cardinal numbers. tially depend number theory, calculus, dif mathematics geometry, comprises ordinary real and complex analysis, countable algebra, classical ferential equations, combinatorics, (1930), countable algebra in the style of van der Waerden the topology of complete and the theory of sepa metric spaces, separable rable Banach and Frechet spaces. By contrast, the theory of non-separable set vector and general combinatorics, spaces, uncountable topological are not part of ordinary mathematics. Those parts of theoretic topology on which set-theoretic have a strong bearing will mathematics assumptions in the last section of this paper. be addressed It is well Fraenkel known that mathematics the axiom can be of choice. formalized The in Zermelo chosen set theory with set existence for studying framework

in reverse mathematics, though, is second or der arithmetic order arithmetic, rather than set theory. Second Z2, is a two-sorted formal system with one sort of variables ranging over natural numbers and the other advantage to proof-theoretic of this framework sort ranging over sets of natural numbers. One over set theory is that it is more amenable

at least in my opinion, the However, investigations. is not pivotal for the program. choice of framework particular For many mathematical natural subsys theorems t , there is a weakest tem S(z ) of Z2 such that S(r ) proves r. Very often, if a theorem of ordinary mathematics the statement those axioms to a small set existence is proved from the weakest axioms, possible to turn out to be provably of that theorem will equivalent over a still weaker base theory. This theme is referred to as

it has turned out that S(t) often belongs Moreover, , of Z2 dubbed RCAo, WKLo, WKL^ list of specific subsystems ? are enumerated The systems in ACAo, ATR0 and (nj CA)o, respectively. The main set existence axioms of RCAo ACAo, ATRo, increasing strength. are recursive comprehension, arithmetic and comprehension, (n{?CA)o arithmetical transfinite recursion and respectively. De n}-comprehension, finitions of these systems will be given in the next section. For their role in Reverse Mathematics. reverse mathematics see Simpson (1999).

The theoriesWKLo

andWKL^

(defined in Section 2.1) are partic

a partial realization of the original Hilbert in pursuing ularly interesting Both theories are of the same proof-theoretic program. strength as prim a system which to is often considered itive recursive arithmetic, PRA, set exis Tait 1981). The principal with finitism be co-extensive (cf. as weak tence axiom of WKLo known is a non-constructive principle

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE K?nig zeros n? asserts that any infinite 's lemma which ones has an infinite path. Friedman and is conservative theoretic methods that WKLo sentences. The tree of finite

85

of sequences (1977) proved via model over PRA with respect to

as to which parts of mathematics have applications in question Feferman has also been studied intensively science, (cf. 1998a, b). by Over the years he has developed several systems for formalizing math ematics. The system Wf Feferman is 1998b, in honor of H. Weyl) (cf. streamlined. W/r has flexible finite types (over the nat perhaps the most and allows for very natural reconstructions of the real and ural numbers) and functional (as sets) and much of classical complex numbers analysis. one accepts the completed InWf infinite set of natural numbers as well as classical logic. Though, over Peano conservative impredicative arithmetic. set comprehension is taboo. Wf is

2.1. The

Subsystems

of Second

Order Arithmetic

the formal system of second purpose of this section is to introduce so as to be able to delineate order arithmetic and several of its subsystems its constructively Another is to give purpose parts. precisely justifiable definitions
above.

of the subsystems basic

figuring

in reverse mathematics

mentioned

system we shall be concerned with is primitive recursive which is a theory about the natural numbers which has arithmetic, PRA, for all primitive function recursive functions but in contrast to symbols Peano arithmetic, PA, allows for induction only quantifier free formulae. The most The
natural variables

language
number A,

?2

of second-order
a,b,c,... X,Y, Z,...,

arithmetic
,x,y,z,..., the constant

contains
(free 0,

(free and bound)

and function bound) symbols set

variables B,C,...,

-, and Sue, +, function. Terms

relation

symbols

=,

<, e.

Sue

stands

for

the successor

are built up as usual. For neN, let ? be the canonical term denot n. Formulae are built from the prime formulae s = t, s < t, and s e A ing ,Vx, 3x, WX and 3X where s, t are terms. using A, V, Note that equality in X2 is a relation only on numbers. However, a defined notion, namely of sets will be considered equality A = BiffVx[xeA The basic axioms axioms in all theories <+ xeB]. of second-order arithmetic are the defining

of 0, Sue, +, VX(0 eX

-, < and the induction a Wx(x ?X^x +

axiom leX)-* Vx(jc e X)),

86 where x +

MICHAEL RATHJEN With regard to a collection consists of the formulae of ?2 formulae

1 stands for Suc(x). !F, the schema of !F-induction

INDF
where mulae implies The (p belongs we denote

+ (p(0)A Vx(<p(x) -> cp{x 1)) -> Vx^(jc),

to !F. ??^-formula. If T is the collection of all ?2 for the schema by IND rather than IND^r. Note that INDAo the induction axiom. of systems of second order arithmetic is largely owed to schemes, which assert, roughly speaking, that if we specify of numbers by a formula cp of a particular type then X the axiom schema of G-comprehension for formula is given by

strength

comprehension a collection X is a set. We classes C which

consider

e - CA
for all formulae The theoretical

3XWu(u e X ?* <p(u))
is to gauge the proof how much

(p e G in which X does not occur. idea of reverse mathematics fundamental of a mathematical theorem

by classifying strength to establish is needed the existence to of the sets needed comprehension we "reverse" the theorem to derive some sort prove the theorem. That is, of comprehension scheme. The gauging measure is that of the allowable of the <p's. Typically, this complexity "logical complexity" might be the allowable quantifier depth of cp. are called bounded Numerical if they occur in the context quantifiers ? for a term s which does not contain x. Wx(x < s ...) or 3x(x < s A...) are those formulae are bounded The A^-formulae in which all quantifiers quantifiers. For instance, the formula asserting that "x is a prime < x + Wu < x + \{u-v = is a Ag-formula, =Vw number" i.e., Prime{x) = lV? = jt->M 1 is Suc(0). l), where ... are formulae of the form 3x\ix2 For k > 0, Qxk?), S^-formulae ... are those of the form V*i3x2 while where (p is A[j Qxk?>, n^-formulae and the numerical alternate in each of the prefixes. The union quantifiers numerical of all or for all k e N is the class of arithmetical S^-formulae "0" refers to the fact that there are no The superscript U^-formulae. set quantifiers. We obtain a similar hierarchy if we allow set quantifica "1" and counting tion by putting a superscript the number of alterations njj!and -formulae (Il| S? ... Qx^ip) (resp. VXi3X2 alternate in each of the The

of

over an arithmetical set quantifiers matrix. ... are the formulae 3Z1VZ2 formulae) QX^(p the set quantifiers for arithmetical cp, where axiom schema Ax we axioms,

prefixes. For each of the basic

arithmetical

denote by (Ax) the theory consisting the schema of induction IND, and the

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE schema Ax.

87

we denote

If we replace the schema of induction by the induction axiom, the resulting theory by (Ax) \ . ? An example for these notations is the theory CA) which contains (n} ? the induction schema, whereas contains only the induction CA) \ (?j axiom in addition to the comprehension schema for n}-formulae. In the framework of these theories one can introduce defined symbols In particular, for all primitive let (, > :N x N ?> N recursive functions.

be a primitive recursive and bijective pairing function. := {y : (x, y)eU}. The xth section of U is defined by Ux Observe a set U is uniquely on account of (, )'s that determined by its sections bijectivity. Any (y,x)eR. Using formulae the latter coding, cp in G by G A AC we can formulate the axiom of choice for set R gives rise to a binary relation <R defined by y ^r x :=

Vx3Y(p(x,

Y) ->

3YWx(p(x,

Yx). that is

special

form of comprehension

is A ?-comprehension,

Aj

- CA

Wu[(p(u)

^>

tf(n)]

-> 3XVu(ueX *> <p(u))

is defined by for all n^-formula ??. A ^-comprehension <pand E?-formula are H?-formulae and ^-formulae, respectively. requiring that (p and i? In set theory one has the principle of set induction which says that whenever itself, arithmetic induction a property propagates from the elements of any set to the set In the context of second order then all sets have the property. the equivalent of set induction is the schema of transfinite

TI
for all formulae

VX[WF(^X)

-> -+ cp{u)) Vu(Vv <x u(p{v) Vu(p(u)]

that <x is well-founded, cp,where WF(^x) expresses are no infinite descending i.e., that there sequences with respect to <x to is equivalent Classically WF(^x) Vy We have now [Vm(Vd <x introduced uveY -> ueY) -+ VuueY.] for defining the preferred systems

the the schemes

of reversemathematics. RCA0 is the theory (AC? CA) \ +IND2o. ACA0 denotes the system (?^ - CA) \ and ATR0 is ACA0 augmented by a
schema which asserts that n^-comprehension (or the Turing jump) may

88

MICHAEL RATHJEN

be iterated along any well-ordering. denotes \. The (n}-CA)0 (U\?CA) an extension set existence axiom of WKLo is of RCA0 by weak principal asserts that any infinite tree of finite sequences 's lemma which of K?nig zeros and one has an infinite path. The mathematically stronger system

was defined by Brown (1987) and Brown and Simpson (1986). WKL<J"
of zeros and ones. The axioms Let 2<N denote the set of finite sequences a scheme which amounts are those of WKLo to a strong of plus WKL?" theorem for the Cantor formal version of the Baire category space 2N. More the additional scheme expresses that, given a sequence of formally, is arithmetically of 2<N which definable from a given dense subcollections each set, there exists an infinite sequence of zeros and ones which meets

over WKLo The advantage of of the given dense subcollections. WKL?" several important theorems of functional is that analysis WKL(J" proves are apparently not provable inWKLo. Brown and Simpson used which over PRA. to prove that is still H2 conservative forcing WKL?" 2.2. More How Much of Second Order Arithmetic isNeeded?

the foregoing asks which part of second order question precisely out ordinary mathematics. is needed for carrying The program arithmetic as well as Feferman's have amassed of reverse mathematics investigations a large body of detailed results which allows one to draw the conclusion "that at least or or WKL?" respect to n^ that the overwhelming sentences". Feferman part Similarly, conjectures can be formalized in systems (like of scientifically applicable mathematics that a little bit goes a long way. Simpson (1988) estimates can be formalized inWKLo of existing mathematics 85% are conservative over PRA with stronger systems which

W/r)

which The

are conservative of

over Peano

arithmetic.

focus

spectrum, where sulate consistency

is rather on the other end of the this section, however, one is interested in mathematical theorems which encap PRA and Peano arithmetic. Since 1931, strength beyond

Theorems were published, the year G?del's logicians have Incompleteness in been looking for a strictly mathematical example of an incompleteness ismathematically and inter first-order Peano arithmetic, one which simple esting and does not require the numerical coding of notions from logic. The first such examples were found early in 1977. The most elegant of these due to Paris and Har of the Finite Ramsey Theorem is a strengthening of combinatorial The original proofs of the independence rington (1977). statements metic. were Only found, from PA all used of arith techniques from non-standard models later on alternative techniques using proof-theoretic proofs proof theory turned out though results from ordinal-theoretic in providing independence results for theories stronger than

to be pivotal

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE

89

statement. The stronger theo PA, and even led to a new combinatorial ries referred to are Friedman's system ATRo of arithmetical transfinite ? The recursion and the system (n} \ based on n{-comprehension. CA) statements have their origin in certain embed combinatorial independent in the theory of finite graphs. The first is a famous dability questions theorem finitely of Kruskal many in ATRo provable that every infinite set of finite trees has only asserting It turned that Kruskal's theorem is not minimal elements.

1985). An even more striking example of (see Simpson this independence is provided by the graph minor theorem, phenomenon of Robertson is one of the most and Seymour which GMT, important theorems of graph theory (see Diestel

et al. (1987) that the GMT

the original Friedman's

is not provable in (n{ - CA)

of bounded

1997).

It was

shown by Friedman

\. Actually,
used

the "gap con theorem with from the proof-theoretic ordinal analysis of dition", which was gleaned ? to construct \ and specifically stronger incomplete CA) designed (n} nesses in Peano arithmetic as part of the reverse mathematical program, so had a considerable mathematical that the metamathematical considerations spin-off.

for graphs proof of the GMT extended version of Kruskal's

tree width

? for an upper bound, it has turned out that the system (nj the graph minor suffices for proving theorem. Indeed, up till now no statements of everyday mathematics have been found that require ? more than means available in CA) + TI.4 (n} Looking CA) + TI

3. FORMS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM In the foregoing sufficient for the needs section we presented a framework a suitable system for formal of ordinary infinitistic mathematics. Finding presents a more difficult task. Historically izing constructive mathematics some of which are "schools" of constructivism differing at least inmy opinion, Martin-L?f 's the However, mutually incompatible. is the most thoroughly worked out system and, I think, philosophically ory some history of construc the most convincing candidate. After recalling there have been in this section, the next section will provide an informal introduction to the ideas underlying Martin-L?f type theory. One of the first facts that has to be taken into account is that 'construc tivism tive mathematics' Indeed, several different is not a single, clearly defined body of mathematics. can be discerned: brands of constructivism Russell, Weyl, et al.) Lorenzen)

1. Predicativism 2. Intuitionism

(Poincar?,

(Brouwer, Heyting,

90 3. Russian 4. Bishop's Predicativism constructivism constructive

MICHAEL RATHJEN (Markov, mathematics Shanin)

took shape in the writings of Poincar? and Russell to the paradoxes. Russell discerned the common sponse underlying as follows: for the paradoxes
we suppose to be the totality on pain which, for of propositions, of contradiction, enlarges statements must about this

in re root

Whatever erate useless new

propositions to enlarge the totality,

lie outside of

that equaly

the scope

totality gen the totality. It is statements the about

totality. (Russell 1908, 224) Thus R?ssel chimes in with An of so-called im anathemizing of an object refers definition impredicative of which the object being defined is itself to be to define a set of natural numbers X as X = Poincar?'s

predicative definitions. to a presumed totality a member. For : VF

example, the quan since it involves ? N F(n, Y)} is impredicative {neN over arbitrary subsets of the natural numbers T' tified variable ranging the set X being defined is one member. Determining whether N, of which VF ? N F(n, Y)} holds involves an apparent circle since we know in particular whether F(n, X) holds but that cannot be set definitions X itself is determined. permeate Impredicative set theory in the guise of the separation and Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms as well shall have

to

settled until the fabric of

replacement as the powerset of impredicative axiom. The avoidance This principle definitions has also been called the Vicious Circle Principle. was taken very seriously by Hermann Weyl:
The a field of possibilities root of the trouble lies elsewhere: open into infinity has deepest As Brouwer in themselves. for a closed realm of things existing been mistaken out, pointed result from it. this is a fallacy, the Fall and Original Sin of set theory, even if no paradoxes

(Weyl 1949, 243) In his book Das the real numbers to the initiated a predicative Kontinuum, Weyl approach chunk of and gave a viable account of a substantial view" "predicative difference is a fundamental that his

are the ideas and principles analysis. What in? A central tenet is that there is grounded between

our understanding of the concept of natural numbers and our un of the set concept. As the French predicativists, accepts derstanding Weyl infinite system of natural numbers as a point of departure. the completed also accepts in Russell's logic but just works with sets that are of level in other words only with the principle hierarchy, such as Wang, definitions. Sch?tte, Lorenzen, Logicians a foundation of mathematics then proposed using layered classical ramified on the idea of predicativity which ventured The idea of an autonomous hierarchy. into higher progression

He one

of arithmetical and Feferman formalisms levels

based

of the ramified

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE

91

was first pre in an ascending ladder of systems RA0, RA\,..., RAa,... to sented in Kreisel (1960) and than taken up by Sch?tte and Feferman therein is determine The notion of autonomy the limits of predicativity. based on condition. departure and should perhaps be viewed introspection One takes the structure of natural numbers as a 'boot-strap' as one's point of reflection what is body of

and then explores through a process of active a growing this structure, thereby developing implicit in accepting ever higher layers of the ramified hierarchy. Brouwer regarded intuitionistic mathematics as

the only legitimate viz. the only kind of mathematics form of mathematics, which subjectively as "indubitable". Mathematics, in his view, consists of could be described in free action. In the performed by the individual is a languageless and solitary activity, where words main, mathematical "constructions accompany originating by the self merely In Brouwerian of the primordial intuition ..." (Brouwer 1933). unfolding mental constructions, mathematics intuitionism, much attention finite proceeding sequences are introduced. Consideration by the ideal mathematician from N to N is continuous. is given to the structure of the continuum. In as choice sequences and other concepts, such of the nature of these sequences as perceived leads one to the conclusion The latter is known that every operation of BPo principle is that all as Brouwer's

(for natural numbers), BPq. The pivotal consequence functions from the reals to the reals are continuous. As in Brouwer's mathematics. The form of constructivism at theorems which

a result, one arrives contradict classical

to the of algorithm or recursive function is fundamental to Brouwer, Russian of Markov and Shanin. Contrary this school takes the viewpoint that mathematical objects must be concrete, or at least as a word in an alphabet, or equivalently, have a constructive description, concept schools as an integer, for only on such objects do recursive functions operate. Fur thermore, Markov thesis, CT, which asserts adopts what he calls Church's we see a quantifier combination that whenever "in e N 3m e N A(n, m), we can find a recursive function / which produces m from n, i.e. Wn e N A(n, On the other hand, f(n)). Brouwer's intuitionistic augments MP, which may as far as pure logic is concerned he is known as Markov's what logic by as be expressed a -VneN-A(rc) -> 3neNA(rc),

principle,

WneN[A(n)v--A(n)] with

A containing natural number parameters only. The rationale for ac MP may be phrased as follows. Suppose A is a predicate of natural cepting numbers which can be decided for each number; and we also know by in direct arguments that there should be an n such that A{n). Then a computer

92 with memory number n such that A(n) find one. As an example <0 -> unbounded

MICHAEL RATHJEN could and we to search through N for a be programmed should be convinced that itwill eventually of MP to the reals one obtains

for an application

K(-a in In 1967 Bishop published his Foundations of Constructive Analysis out an informal development of constructive which he carried analysis went substantially further mathematically than anything done before was a confirmed constructivist, as was Brouwer. constructivists. Bishop by work that it could be read as a what was novel about Bishop's However, as well. Bishop works with informal notions piece of classical mathematics which of constructive uses function the fewest and set. Among the constructivists in the mathematics. one may assumptions standpoint BC stand for Bishop-style constructivism, roughly as follows: philosophies Russian constructivism intuitionism schools, his In fact, letting characterize the other

Vx

x > 0).

Brouwerian where BI is bar

= BC + MP + CT = BC + BPo + BI, is a form logic, BI of transfinite induction on

well-founded TI defined Several been

induction, which trees. With classical 2.1.5

is equivalent

to the principle

in Section frameworks

for constructivism like ZFC

tive mathematics

as theories

relate

proposed by Myhill, Martin-L?f, set theory with his constructive of what conception underlying Bishop's veloped he wanted

to Bishop's construc to Cantorian set theory have and Feferman. Myhill (1975) de that relate

"these principles tion completely case" (1975, 347). Indeed, trivial, as it is in the classical the notion in his set theory CST besides while he uses other primitives as a subsystem of ZF. The advantage of this is of set, it can be viewed and practise of the set theoretical presentation that the ideas, conventions can be used in the set theoretical development of of ordinary mathematics too. Feferman's is a the Mathematics constructive mathematics, Explicit is suitable and classes 1975, 1979), To, which (Feferman ory of operations as well as gener constructive mathematics for representing Bishop-style of structural concepts which alized recursion, direct expression including admit self-application. as developed The intuitionistic by Martin-L?f theory of types MLTT intu (1975), his (1982) is also intended to be a system for formalizing far deeper in several itionistic mathematics. However, Martin-L?f probes a formal system MLTT but also a respects. Not only has he developed which is encapsulated of constructivism philosophical underpinning The for MLTT, informal semantics called "meaning explanation". in his latter

the aim of isolating the principles sets and functions are. Moreover, to be such as tomake the process of formaliza

THE CONSTRUCTIVE HILBERTPROGRAM is a systematic which enables method

93

to the assertions of assigning meaning of MLTT to justify the rules of MLTT him by showing their validity with respect to that semantics. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that Martin-L?f 's theory gives rise to a full scale philosophy of constructivism. within which the Type theory is a logic free theory of constructions logical notions and constructive reason his I consider can be defined systems of explicit mathematics set theory leave the logical notions unanalyzed. For this more fundamental.6 type theory philosophically whereas of Martin-L?f laws, of judgement1 and proposition. 's theory of types, notably an awareness is of the distinction

Integral between

to an understanding of the logical justification the notions

The point of view he adopts is that logical operations (constants) operate on propositions whereas the logical laws (rules of inference) operate on judgements. Per v leads from propositions A and B to a new forming the logical operation A v B. By contrast, the premises and conclusion of a logi proposition are always judgements. In the order of conceptual priority comes before the notion of proposition of judgement since the assertion A is a proposition is a judgement. The notion of proposition is a semantic notion. In a first approach, a proposition as a meaningful could be construed statement describing a state of affairs. Traditionally, a proposition is something that is either true or false. In the case of mathematical statements involving quantifiers cal inference the notion infinite domains, such a view one is however, by adopting to postulate a trancendent realm of mathematical compelled objects which determines their meaning and truth value. Like Brouwer, Martin-L?f re such an account as a myth. He explains that the meaning of a pudiates statement is not independent mathematical of our cognitive activity, that it is subject related, relative to the knowing subject in Kantian terminology. ranging that the laws of the intuitionisic observed cal Kolmogorov propositional culus become evident upon conceiving variables as ranging propositional over problems or tasks.8 In a similar vein, Martin-L?f the notion explains as follows: of proposition
Returning tion which now to the form of judgement it is this, 'A is a proposition I am using ', the semantical explana theoretical by problem, fulfillment,

over

a proposition, which may formulation, or intention, you must know what counts expectation or realization of it. (Martin-L?f 1996, 34)

goes together that to know

with

and here

be replaced, as a verification,

the knowledge if you want, solution,

of the judgement 'A is a explanation 'A is true' you must have knowledge proposition', how to verify A, and for a mathematical A a method to verify proposition a proof of A. A is nothing else but to make

In keeping

with

the above meaning the judgement

94 The most notion will forceful

MICHAEL RATHJEN criticism of the idea of a knowledge transcendent been put forward by Dummett. His 4.3.

of mathematical be related

truth has

arguments

in Subsection

4. MARTIN-L?F'S When we talk about Martin-L?f

THEORY OF TYPES

than just a type theory we refer to more as the meaning for the rules form an essential system explanations here is ingredient of it. The language with which we will be concerned a full scale system which accounts one does in for essentially everything formal The

mathematics. duction

origins of this system can be traced to the natural de of Gentzen, taken in conjunction with Prawitz's reduction systems and to G?del's Dial?ctica MLTT is an open system. Moreover, procedures, ended framework in that one may always add new types and rules provid

to a meaning which validates them. In ing they are amenable explanation of fact, a particular powerful way of going beyond an existing for point T of MLTT malization is by reflection about T. This is formally mirrored of universes by the introduction features of MLTT Distinctive into MLTT. are the following:

for rules meaning explanations use of the propositions-as-types 1. the full

paradigm are obtained and expressiveness strength through data types and reflection, i.e. type universes. features will A First Glimpse 's formal be addressed one by one in what

to represent logic the use of inductive

These 4.1.

follows.

of Type Theory

Martin-L?f ments. This

for deriving ments is essential

language has a system of rules for deriving judge involve rules in contrast to the standard formal systems which The distinction between propositions and judge propositions. for Martin-L?f. What

we combine of the by means and hold true are propositions. When (?>, A, v, --, V, 3) logical operations we hold a proposition to be true, we make a judgement. The fundamental notions of type theory are introduced in the four forms of judgement: 1. A is a type (abbr. A type), 2. A and B are equal types (abbr. A ? B), 3. a is an element of type A (abbr. a :A), 4. a, b are equal elements of type A (abbr. a ? There

b :A).

is a qualitative distinction between of a type arbitrary elements and canonical elements of a type. A type A is defined by stating what

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE we what have to do in order need to construct to be satisfied a canonical element

95 of the type and to be elements program arbitrary to equal the same

conditions

for such canonical

or equal. By contrast, an arbitrary element of type A is a method which when executed yields a canonical element of type A. Two a and b evaluate elements a, b of A are equal if, when executed, canonical elements of A. Equality between canonical elements of

and transitive. For each type there are type should be reflexive, symmetric, formation rules for that type and introduction rules to construct canonical elements of that type. These are best illustrated by means of a concrete example. equality. we will neglect all rules dealing with For ease of presentation The type of natural number is introduced by the following rules: (N-formation) (N-introduction) The introduction N type -0 a :N Sa elements :N :N of N are generated. On of type N as well,

rules state how canonical

of type N. But obviously 2+ 2 : the given rules, viz. the judgement N is not derivable via N-introduction. Martin-L?f the expression, regards "2 + 2" as a program, which gives instructions In for its own evaluation. 2+ 2 is not obtainable from its evaluated Therefore one before we to derive form (in his theories) itwill be the canonical element SSSSO. shall need further rules, called elimination rules, which allow of the form t : A for non-canonical t. However, judgements

since we

the other hand, 2 + 2 should be regarded can evaluate it to a canonical element

as an element

rules let us study some further forms of stating any elimination called canonical elements henceforth. elements, types and their canonical

Ax B
A canonical be written element as (a,b),

A->

(ILt :A)B(x)

A+ B

(Ex : A)B(x).

of the Cartesian where a

product type A x B is a pair, and can : A and b : A. The pertaining rules are: a: -A b :B a = a' :A b= V :B

(x-introduction) A canonical element

(a,b):

Ax B

(a, b) = (a', b') : A x B

of A ?> B is an expression which (in (?x)t(x) a function given by a term t(x) such that t(a), the result formally) denotes a for x, is an element of B for each a : A. In the natural of substituting deduction takes the forms calculus, (-^-introduction)

[x :A] t(x) : (?x)t(x) :A ^

[x : A] = t(x) s(x) : B (?x)t(x) = (Ax)s(x) :A -? #' B

96 where
inference.

MICHAEL RATHJEN [x : A] indicates an assumption which the

gets

discharged

by

is a type for each a : A. Then we can Suppose A is a type and B(a) : A)B whose are of the form form a new type (Hx canonical elements where t(a) is an element of B for each a : A. (Ax)t(x) The a canonical elements of A + B are of the forms / (a) and j (b), where : A and b : B, respectively. If B(a) is a type for each a elements

: A, then (Ex : A)B(x) is a type whose are pairs (a, b) with a : A and ? : 5(a). canonical There is a certain pattern for forming canonical in all the elements in canonical above cases. Each element form is built from its components N has the constructors 0 and S; A ?> B has the using special constructors. constructor A + B has the constructors / and j; and so forth. A; The dual of the introduction rules for obtaining canonical elements of a type are its elimination rules. The elimination rules for a type A are, as it were, natural consequences of its introduction rules. They amount to are generated by exactly the means saying that all canonical elements of A laid down canonical in the introduction elements. Martin-L?f rules, viz. there are no other ways is expanding here on Gentzen's to form ideas of

to and elimination rules. Referring dividing logical rules into introduction the harmony between the logical constants, Gentzen these (1935) explains two kinds of rules as follows: "an introduction rule gives, as it were, a " in question while "an elimination rule is only definition of the constant a consequence the corresponding introduction which may be ex rule, of when making an inference by an elimination pressed somewhat as follows: ' to 'use only what the principal rule, we are allowed sign of the major to the introduction 'means' according rule for this sign". premiss In the case amount The of to familiar the type of natural numbers N the elimination rules over N. and recursion rules for structural induction

rules for an arbitrary type requires formal rendering of elimination a new constant. Associated with each type will be a selector (dual to the as an implicitly defined constant, notion of a constructor, above), given rules for the type. As the whose defining equations express the elimination let rules for N are rather involved (but see Section 4.4 below) elimination us study the much simpler case of the type A ? B. Here the rules are:9 c : A -> B App(c, c= d a) a :B a = :A

(^

-elimination)

: A ?> B

b :A

App(c, a)

App(d, b) :B

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE

97

[x: A] t(x) : B App((Ax)t(x),a)

c: c= A-*

a :A = t(a) : B
B x) : A ?> B

(Ax)App(c,

the meaning of the selector App To explain suppose c : A ?> B and a canonical a : A. Then App(c, is a method element of for obtaining a) c is a method which yields a canonical as follows, B which is executed ? a for x leads to t (a) : B. Thus, 5. Substituting element (2x)i (x) of A we finally arrive at a canonical element of B. t(a) through evaluating 4.2. 77i? Proposition-as-Types Interpretation

be treated

are to the question how standard logical operations in type theory. It turns out that the first glimpse of type theory to given above suffices for that task. The point of view to be adhered on propositions are types and that logical operations is that propositions So far we have avoided correspond to the appropriate type forming operations in line with the of the

interpretation (BHK-interpretation) Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov each proposition is of the logical constants, whereby constructive meaning identified with the type of its proofs.10 For example the constructive mean in saying that a proof of A D B is a ing of an implication A D B consists that transforms each proof of A into a proof of B. constructive procedure It seems that the notion of constructive procedure used here must be taken as a primitive logical notion. The table below gives a dictionary for translating operations Logical into type theory. notion Type-theoretic type element of A notion

proposition proof of A A is true

A has an element

AA?
AD B

Ax B
A-> B

AvB (VxgA)B(x) (3xeA)B(x)

Note defined that the treatment

A+B (ILc : A)B(x) (Ex : A)B(x)

in MLTT to strictly adheres should range only over already

Brouwer's

dictum sets/types

of quantifiers that quantified variables A.

98

MICHAEL RATHJEN

as types, the elements of a proposition In rendering propositions are to as proofs and thus its canonical be understood elements could be termed canonical proofs. The inductive nature of the canonical proofs can be made more explicit by the following table:

a canonical

proof

of

has

the form where a is a proof of A

A A B (?,b),

and b is a proof of B

A d B (Ax)t(x), where t (a) is a proof

of B whenever Av B i (a), where a is a proof of A a is a proof of A, of B

or j (b), where

b is a proof

(VxeA)#(x)

(Ax)t(x), where t(a) is a proof

of B{a) whenever a is an element

of A
(3xe A)B(x) (a, b), where a is an element of B(a) of A and b is a proof

4.3.

The Dummett-Prawitz

Meaning-as-Use

Theory

and MLTT

Dummett (1973, 1977) has brought Inspired by ideas of Wittgenstein, forward philosophical arguments against a platonistic theory of meaning, to a rejection of classical amounting logic in favour of intuitionistic logic. on Dummett's mental In order for such a rejection to be conclusive, Prawitz (1977) has expanded that a theory of meaning ideas who suggested formulated in terms of proofs or rules also ought to take note of Gentzen's funda the rules from it.

or duality obtains between insight that a correspondence for asserting a sentence and the rules for drawing consequences In many aspects the Dummett-Prawitz theory of meaning-as-use related toMartin-L?f 's understanding it useful

ators and thus I consider theory here. On an understanding On the other Dummett-Prawitz of certain

is closely of the meaning of the logical oper a brief account of their to intersperse be instructive and illuminating for

the one hand

this might

hand,

'smeaning aspects of Martin-L?f explanations. a deficiency overcomes it seems that MLTT of the which is due to the latter's rather narrow focus

semantics

on logical reasoning. In mathematics, logic retreats into the background and mathematical occupy center stage. The in objects and constructions inferences and mathematical constructions between terrelationship logical connects together logic and mathematics. Logic gets intertwined with

THE CONSTRUCTIVE

HILBERT

PROGRAM

99

mathematical

and it appears that its role therein and operations, constructions. cannot be separated from mathematical Indeed, not only ' can swork demonstrate that a coherent theory of meaning does Martin-L?f objects the lines of Dummett-Prawitz but also for a rich and elaborate

can be construed as that logical operators cases of more general mathematical operations. special I shall not undertake any detailed analysis of all the facets of of Below to a rough sketch and Prawitz's Dummett's arguments and confine myself of the main 4.3.1. The points. Thesis of a math holds that the meaning in the (abstract) its truth conditions by of us. This view, existing independently

be developed along part of mathematics

The Meaning-as-Use

classical/platonist statement is determined ematical realm of mathematical

mathematician

objects from mathematical If we however, appears to be very detached practice. is actually taught, it seems that what look back at the way that mathematics we learn is not to establish in a transcendent of sentences truth-conditions world And but rather what is to be counted that is to say, we it therefore are trained seems as establishing the truth of sentences, sentences. in the art of proving mathematical of this transcendence serves of to the elucidation

that the invocation

as an ?berbau which fails to add anything merely to know a mathematical statement. what it is Dummett argues be recognizable fully manifest

covering that two expressions which are always used in the same way The main lines of support for Dummett's the same meaning. following:

cannot be separated from use and must that meaning us. His tenet is that the meaning of a sentence must be by in its use, where use is to be taken in a very broad sense in the sense all its aspects. Use exhaustively determines meaning ought to have thesis are the

1. "... has

that meaning has to be observable:

to be communicable to assume that there

and

that communication in the ingredient in the use made

is some

meaning of a sentence which cannot become manifest cannot be communicated. it is to assume that part of the meaning of This part of the meaning would then be irrelevant when the statement was used in communication. Such no importance for mathematics can cooperate which many people other". (Prawitz 1977, 14) 2. When lation we learn a language into another language,

a meaning would therefore be of as a social enterprise understood in and exchange results with each

in a primordial way, all we learn is how

i.e., not by trans to use expressions

100

MICHAEL RATHJEN

of a sentence in such a language correctly. The grasp of the meaning our ability to use it correctly. must therefore consists in can sometimes be demon of the meaning of an expression 3. Knowledge it in terms of of Socrates by explicitly strated in the manner defining of which is already known. However, if other expressions the meaning of a statement cannot regress, the meaning of explicit verbalizable and thus knowledge solely knowledge Im of meaning must ultimately be traced back to implicit knowledge. of the meaning of a sentence A can only manifest plicit knowledge itself in the ability to use it or to respond to its use by others in a certain consist such knowledge is by way. Thus the only way of acquiring of a sentence and learning its use. Therefore the meaning observing cannot transcend its total use. In short: We know the meaning of A if observable we know under what conditions A may be correctly asserted. there is not to be an infinite

to the case of mathematics, the above views on the meaning Specialized amount to agreeing with in of a sentence the intuitionists that meaning to be understood in terms of proofs. has somehow mathematics Versus Holistic Views on Meaning 4.3.2. Molecular that use determines meaning does not rule out the possibility The principle with re that the meaning of a single statement can only be understood as a whole. An extreme holistic view gard to the framework of language the "that nothing less than the total use of the language determines sentence" of an individual 1977, 7). On such a view, it (Prawitz meaning to develop a meaning is not possible of theory which explains the meaning or even to adhere to a sentences in terms of their constituent parts single claims milder which form of holism where are amenable to other one singles to such a molecular sentences out a privileged class of sentences and which meaning explanation their deductive by relationships with the drastic form of holism on the grounds that

rejects situations by us through use in particular meaning must be recognizable and 'total use of language' blatantly escapes recognizability. in mathematics A prominent is, example of a restricted form of holism of course, are called standpoint one distinguishes between theoretical sentences. The latter are, by and large, endowed with a as of the former is understood the meaning in isolation whereas of science. Here by their role in deducing and refuting privileged observational Hubert's the privileged program, where underlying Partial holism is also a common 'real sentences'. sentences

then gives meaning this class. Dummett

in the philosophy and observational meaning determined

sentences.

THE CONSTRUCTIVE HILBERTPROGRAM Dummett, and maintains a sentence stituent

101

all kinds of holistic meaning theories however, repudiates a molecular sees the meaning view. Following of Frege, he as being determined the way it is built up from its con by an individual (having is which meaning immediate meaning) via

carries parts. Thus a sentence from its atomic components generated logical operations.

4.3.3. Meaning-as-Use and the BHK-Interpretation The meaning-as-use thesis asserts that the meaning of a statement is de termined by the conditions under which it may be correctly asserted. to a mathematical statement A, its meaning could be explained Turning counts as a proof of above provides a precise rendering what counts as a proof of amathematical It also adheres to proposition. molecular semantical view in that the proofs of a complex proposition explained the notion to give a proof by what it means The BHK-interpretation mentioned of A or what A. of the are

in terms of proof conditions for its components. To distinguish of proof supported by the BHK-interpretation from others, let us call them canonical proof s or direct proofs. A first attempt at a meaning theory for mathematical {MT\) To know statements A could be framed as follows: for assert of

the meaning

of A is to know A

the conditions a canonical

ing A. The condition A. Under

for asserting

is to know

proof

the proposition-as-types view, the canonical are precisely the ones generated by the introduction a direct proof (pA, pB) type. To give an example, is obtained

proofs of a proposition rules for the pertaining of a proposition A A B

from a direct proof pa of A and a direct proof pB of B. In the case of a conditional A D B a direct proof consists of a construction / which when fed a direct proof of A returns a direct proof of B. However, proof is too restrictive. Even from an intuitionistic are perfectly cannot be ob point of view there legitimate proofs which tained in this direct way. For instance, in arithmetic we frequently infer a statement F(n,m) for large numbers n, m from a proof of the universal statement (VxeN)(V;yeN)F(x, y) by instantiation. Or, taking an example the notion from Prawitz A(n) v B(n) it would B(n); an intuitionistic to obtain that (1977, p. 21), "we may assert even intuitionistically a proof of A(n) or for some numeral n without knowing be sufficient, e.g., if we know a proof of A(0) v B(0) and a point proof of view but it is sufficient that we know a procedure proof be of a direct

proof of (VxgN)([A(x) v B(x)] -> [A(x + 1) v B(x + 1)])". Thus from

a direct it is not necessary that such a direct

102
actually constructed. remedied by saying: (MT2) To know As

MICHAEL RATHJEN a result, the problems met with can be

(MT\)

the meaning

of A is to know

the conditions

for assert

ing A. The condition proof

for asserting A is that we either know a canonical for obtaining of A or know a procedure such a proof.

4.3.4.

On

the Harmony

between

the Rules for Making

Assertions

and

Drawing Consequences in (MT2) may be somewhat Dummett points out that the view expressed an important aspect of the use of an assertive immature in that it neglects In the case of mathematics, the ability only comprises in the commitments made by asserting it. the full grasp of the meaning of a statement not a proof of itwhen one is presented to recognize to draw consequences to us but also our capacity from it. He therefore a harmony the that in a theory of meaning should obtain between suggests a sentence and the rules for drawing consequences from rules for asserting which manifests itself sentence

to the molecular in addition it. Thus, view, there is an important strand of ideas originating with Gentzen, theory of running through Dummett's elimination rules are rules for inferring consequences Gentzen's meaning. from a sentence elimination of the following (MT3) and run parallel rules into account we form: the meaning of A is to know the conditions for assert to the introduction arrive at an enriched rules. Hence, taking concept of meaning

To know

for asserting A is that we either know a canonical for obtaining such a proof, and, of A or know a procedure proof that we know the rules for drawing moreover, consequences from A. conse the exact nature of the rules for drawing specify of inferring further from A. In a sense, there are many ways quences the elimination rules pertain sentences from a given one. Nonetheless, in that they flow naturally to A seem to occupy a privileged position ing rules. Such a view seems to prevail elimination from the corresponding (M3) doesn't inMLTT notion also enters reasonable, where of meaning at full scale. Prawitz embraces the this idea is developed as developed in (M3) as the most desirable candidate but the caveat that "in order for such a meaning theory to appear it seems that one has to argue for the unique position of the

ing A. The condition

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE elimination rules"

103

that what distin 1977, 33). He conjectures (Prawitz rules from other possible candidates might be that the elimination guishes in some sense the strongest rules for drawing consequences constitute they
from an assertion.

of the elimination the question of the position To my mind one views propositions in a wider context where best discussed and in addition interpretation These so-called section. enable to the central one takes to the type forming operations pertaining also mathematically types important inductive data

rules

is

as types to the BHK

into account.

In the case of inductive

in the next sub types will be discussed rules amount data types, the elimination

on them. They tools for performing mathematical operations to prove assertions about all the elements of the type by struc tural induction and at the same time allow one to define functions on the of theoretic research systems to in-depths proof the type by structural recursion. Owing it is known of elimination rules in that the omission featuring inductive types gives rise to theories of weak rules results the inclusion of elimination strength. The latter clearly cor are pivotal in determining the as e.g. the natural mathematical types rules

elements formal

strength whereas proof-theoretic in theories of considerable proof-theoretic roborates meaning

numbers.

the view of

that elimination involving

statements

4.4. Thus

Inductive Data far I have

Types addressed a small of MLTT which is fragment an inductive data type is concept of

only

sufficient central G?del

for developing logic. The s constructivism. to Martin-L?f It was very succinctly stated by text for an invited lecture which he delivered in in a handwritten he described constructive mathematics by the following two

1933. Therein characteristics:

1. The totalities (as we

application for which

of we

the notion can give

"all" a finite

can, e.g., for the totality of of integers). e.g., for the totality of all properties integer and as we cannot, must not be applied to propositions 2. Negation that something holds stating this would exact: because Or to be more elements, give existence propositions. tives of general (i.e., existence propositions system only in the sense that we have found not state it explicitly. I.e., they serve merely if we wished. with dispensed From the fact that we have discarded are it, it follows that we left with

or "any" is to be restricted to those infinite for generating all their elements procedure of forming the next greater integers by the process for all Nega in our

are to have meaning propositions) an example do but, for the sake of brevity, as an abbreviation and could be entirely of existence only and the rules logical for proving

the notion

concerning

essentially

one method

104
general of our

MICHAEL RATHJEN
induction say that our to the generating is based exclusively

namely, complete propositions, elements. [...] and so we may

applied system

process on the

method of complete induction in its definitions as well as its proofs. (G?del 1995, 51) The paradigm of an inductive data type is that of the type of natural num to the principles rules for N correspond of induction bers. The elimination nation over N. Likewise, for an arbitrary inductive type A the elimi rules encapsulate the principles of structural induction and recursion over A. The induction principle for A tells one how to prove properties for of a type by induction on the build-up of its canonical all elements ele and recursion and, correspondingly, a function on all canonical the recursion elements tells one how to define principle of the type by recursion on their build rules explain how non-canonical elements

ments

up. More formally, elimination are formed via the selector, and the equation rules explain how the selector to the type N elements. The selector pertaining operates on the canonical rules is the following: is R^. The elimination

(N-ehmination)

c:N -

[x :N, y : C{x)] e(x,y) :C(Sx) RN(c, d, (x, y)e(x, y)) :C(c) d: C(0)

Rn(c, d, canonical

as follows: first execute c, getting a y)) is explained : N. In of N, which is either 0 or Sa for some a element the first case, continue by executing d, which yields a canonical = 0 : N in this case, : C(0); is also a canonical but, since c / / = second case, substitute a for x and of C(c) In the element C(0). value) for y in e(x, y) so Rn(<z, d, (x, y)e(x, y)) (namely, the preceding (x, y)e(x, element as to get e(a, Rn(^? d, (x, y)e(x, it, we get a canonical y)). Executing is in C(Sa) the first case. Otherwise, the right premiss, by / which, by reach the value 0. This continue as in the second case, until we eventually explanation of the above (N-equality I) elimination rule also explains the equality rules.

d: C(0)

[x :A, y : C(x)] e(x,y) :C(Sx) C(c)

RN(0,d,(x,y)e(x,y))=d: (N-equality II)

[x :N, y : C(x)] d :C(0) e(x, y) :C(Sx) = e(a, RN(a, d, (x, y)e(x, y))) :C(Sa) RN(Sa, d, (x, y)e(x, y)) a :N

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE An

105

inMartin-L?f type theory example of an inductive definition built over a family of types. A special case of the latter is trees over N which may be ordinals or well-founded the type of Brouwer version of the second number class of ordinals. The taken as a constructive infinitary is the W-type inductive generation proceeds by the following introduction rules:

0:

-O

a: & a' :0

:N^ sup(/)

0 :O
as formation of well-founded trees

The

last two clauses may

be depicted

as follows: 1. if a is in 0, then so is the successor

(a)

2.

if ao, ai,...

is a sequence

of ordinals

in 0,

then

(ao)

(oil)

(On)

is in 0. An inductive definition often involves the characterization certain of a collection conditions.

of objects as the smallest collection satisfying set theory the inductively In classical defined

closure

that satisfy of all collections the intersection an explicit definition is thoroughly impredicative over all collections. defined using quantification that if one wants to make

as set is usually obtained Such the closure conditions. in that the collection It would seem therefore is

sense of infinitary inductive definitions it is nec This definitions. essary at some point to make use of some impredicative are accounted is certainly the way that inductive definitions for in classical set theory. But there is something unsatisfying about this conclusion. Many can be intuitively in their own inductive definitions understood directly terms and impredicative them within a particular definitions frame are only required in order set theory. such as classical to represent

106
4.5. The Reflection via Universes

MICHAEL RATHJEN

of Martin-L?f in type theory is particularly manifest openendedness of so-called universes. the introduction the universes Type encapsulate as follows. role may be explained informal notion of reflection whose

a particular formalization the course of developing of type theory, During the type theorist may look back over the rules for types, say G, which the step of recognizing have been introduced hitherto and perform that of meaning informal semantics aware of is an attempt to become 'introspection' in the past. It gives the conceptions which have governed our constructions " which roughly speaking says whatever we rise to a reflection principle " are used to doing with types can be done inside a universe (Martin-L?f of the existing 1975, 83). On the formal level, this leads to an extension of type theory in that the type forming capacities formalization of G be come enshrined in a type universe Ue mirroring G. If, e.g., G consists of the type forming the rules: operations N, +, II and their rules, then this gives rise to they are valid according This act of explanation. to Martin-L?f's

(Ue-formation)

Ue

: type

:Ue

Te(fl)

: type

(Ue-introduction) a :Ue a+b b :Uc :Ue

:Ue

Te(N) = N a :Ue ?(a, [x :Te (a)] t(x) :Ue (Ax)t(x)) :Ue

a :UG b :UG Tc(a+b) = Te(a) + TG(b)

Tc(U(a,
x :Ue

[x :Te (a)] a :Ue t(x) :Ue = (Ux : (Ax)t(x))) Te(a))Te(t(x))

are defined by a simultaneous induction. The elements and Te(*) or G?del numbers of types generated from N via the of type Ue are codes + and IT. Each time an element of Ue is generated type forming operation function Te, of the type there is a declaration, of the decoding by means for which it stands. are not that different from inductive seem that type universes It might data as opposed to inductive data types their elements types. However, are not simply defined by a positive inductive definition. They incorporate function defined the extra feature of being equipped with a type-valued on them, and, moreover, is defined decoding function this simultaneously to occur negatively in its introduction rules as, e.g., in those for IT. allowed

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE As in the case of inductive

107

universes

give rise the elements of Ue

rules for type data types, the introduction to their dual, the elimination entail that rules, which are exactly generated by the forms of type that Ue is

reflecting.11 4.6. inHigher Order Universes to aim at higher degrees in universes containing introspection. codes for types operations. Martin-L?f of

Reflection

It is the nature The which first level reflect

of reflection is encapsulated

type forming accepted previously an infinite, externally indexed tower of universes considered (1975, 1984) g ... G Un G ... all of which are closed under the same standard Uo gUi The next natural step was to imple of set forming operations. ensemble ment a universe operator into type theory which takes a family of sets and constructs a universe while above it. Such a universe operator was formalized by Palmgren logical framework working with an infinite on a domain-theoretic of the interpretation of universes (cf. Palmgren

sequence at extensions of type theory with more powerful axioms, 1993). Aiming Martin-L?f then suggested finding axioms for a universe V which itself is closed under the universe operator. The type-theoretic formalization of the (1998), where the universe pertinent rules is due to Palmgren to as a superuniverse for intuitionistic type theory. After consists was referred

one can go to a new level of abstraction which the superuniverse are obtained. in gaining into how type forming operations insight the introduction in a One can, e.g., internalize of new universe operators : Fam -> Fam formal system of type theory wherein each operator F from families of types to families of types gives rise to a new universe : Fam ?> Fam. When S(F) applied to a family of sets, S(F) a universe in addition to the standard set con above it which, produces structors, is closed under F. Such a system, denoted MLF, was presented operator

inRathjen (2000).
gives rise to types having codes for such which may be called universes of type two. Such a operations introduces (1998) which step has, e.g., been taken in Rathjen and Palmgren a formal type theory MLQ. are a universe M and a uni Central toMLQ verse of codes for type constructors Q which are defined simultaneously. In more generality, this idea has been developed (1998) who by Palmgren level of abstraction as elements of arbitrary finite levels. universe constructions stronger Essentially require new ideas and their seems to be limited by creativity in Rathjen potential only. However, I have stated a conjecture about the proof-theoretic (2000) strength of universe constructions based on higher types which predicts that they can introduced type universes A further

108
always be mimicked to formalize

MICHAEL RATHJEN in a classical

set theory called KPM. KPM was de segments L^ of the constructible hierarchy L, where signed ordinal (cf. Rathjen 1991). ju is a recursively Mahlo Another constructive type theory has been important step in advancing of a Mahlo universe in type taken by Setzer who gave a formalization set Zermelo-Fraenkel theory (cf. Setzer 2000), dubbed TTM. Constructive set can the existence of aMahlo with an axiom asserting theory conjoined

be

as has been shown in Rathjen in TTM Setzer's (2003b). interpreted It provides is stronger than those based on higher type universes. theory an important step for expanding the realm of Martin-L?f type theory. The between TTM a new construction and the systems above is that TTM introduces 's in Martin-L?f which is not foreshadowed principle

difference

for Setzer's is witnessed by the fact that models original papers. This inductive definition Mahlo universe are generated by a non-monotonic (see an observation due to Palmgren which Section furthermore, 6) and, by In a rules for the universe. with elimination shows it to be incompatible a paradigm shift to a new Martin-L?f sense, TTM means of a type are no the elements that the rules for forming to be monotonie. universes L?f type theory in longer required rules for elimination

yield to respond and that such rules may be rather alien to the idea of a universe. From the (cf. Hinman theory of inductive definitions point of view of the classical no surprise. The 1978) though, Palmgren's inconsistency proof presents usual defined elimination rules for universes are tailored for monotone inductive definitions

proof that the usual Palmgren's an inconsistency when applied to TTM prompted Martin rules that universes need not be equipped with elimination

that the inductively and thus spring from the crucial property is the least fixed point of the corresponding operator. type (or set) over a inductive definition in set theory a monotone To be more precise, set A is derived from a mapping given <S>:pow(A) -> pow(A) A.Herepow(A) defined by O, O00, to the monotonicity of d> the pertinent point, hence inductive

whenever X eye that ismonotone, i.e., <D(X) ? 0(F) denotes the class of all subsets of A. The set inductively is the smallest such a set exists. set Z such that ?(Z) ? In the case of Setzer's and does The classical defined Z. Due

operator is non-monotone arises. the inconsistency definitions atively

type TTM, however, a least fixed not possess view on non-monotone set is obtained

is that the inductively the corresponding applying

previous stages along way. More precisely,

operator to what in this the ordinals until no new objects are generated -> pow(A) : pow(A) is an arbitrary mapping if <D

in stages by iter at has been generated

HILBERTPROGRAM 109 THE CONSTRUCTIVE then the the set-theoretic given by definition of the set inductively defined by <I>is

O00 :=

(J<Da, a

0? :=0((j Q?) u y ^
?<a ?<a

where

a ranges over

the ordinals.

correct type-theoretic elimination have yet to be found. Furthermore, rules can be found by viewing non-monotone elimination inductive types as being equipped with a W-type which provides the (or well-ordering) stages of its inductive generation.

I agree with Setzer (2000, 157) that the rules for non-monotone type universes I'd like to conjecture that the "correct"

5. WHICH

FRAGMENTS

OF SECOND ORDER ARITHMETIC

ARE

SECURED BY MLTT?

The

central will

notions be used

strength a brief account assumed

and proof-theoretic of proof-theoretic reducibility I shall insert below. For the readers convenience theories T considered Arithmetic of arithmetic. Recursive For definiteness are in the following let this mean is contained in T,

of them. All amodicum

to contain

that the system PRA of Primitive either directly or by translation. DEFINIITION and ?2, formulae closed We T\ <o 5.1. Let

Tu T2 be a pair of theories with languages and let O be a (primitive collection recursive) respectively, common to both languages. Furthermore, O should contain ^-reducible function /

?x of the

equations of the language of PRA. then say that T\ is proof-theoretically recursive T2, if there exists a primitive

to T2, written such that

(1)

PRA hV^GOVx

[Proofs (jc,0) -> Proofs(/(*),

<?-equivalent, written

</>)].
T\ =0

T\ and T2 are said to be proof-theoretically 72, if T\ <o T2 and T2 <o T\. The appropriate class Q> is revealed self, so that in the statement of proof-theoretically reducible

in the process of reduction it we say that T\ is simply to T2 (written T\ < T2) and T\ and T2 are theorems

110

MICHAEL

RATHJEN

= (written T\ T2), respectively. proof-theoretically equivalent we shall say that T\ and T2 have the same proof-theoretic tively, when T\ = T2. Proof-theoretic of <

Alterna strength

in the late 1970s theory

undertaken Pohlers and Sieg investigations by Buchholz, et al. 1981) showed that the intuitionistic Buchholz (see tree classes, is of the same ID1 inductive 60-iterated (0),

the help of one type universe strength as (E^-AC). With proof-theoretic one can interpret in type theory thereby the WMype reflecting ID'<6o(0) a considerably to type theory. However, stronger the reducing (X^-AC) can be proven consistent inMLTT. than (S2-AC) ory J?ger and Pohlers bar induction in terms of an (1982) gave an ordinal analysis (E^-AC) plus the pertaining ordinal representa ordinal representation system. Utilizing tion system the following result was obtained independently by Rathjen

(2003a) and Setzer (1998):

THEOREM L?f 5.2. The consistency s 1984 type theory. of (X^-AQ+TI is provable inMartin

the following the part of the intuitionists/constructivists, objection of consistency the significance could be raised against proofs: even if it that the classical demonstrated had been constructively theory T cannot On lead to mutually results, the theorems of T would neverthe contradictory sense and their investigation therefore an idle without less be propositions it turns out that the constructive well-ordering proof of pastime.12 Well, the representation system used in the analysis of (L^j-AQ+TI yields more of the latter system. For the important class of than the mere consistency statements one obtains a conservativity result. n^

THEOREM 5.3 (Rathjen 2003a; Setzer 1998)

The soundness of the negative arithmetic fragment of (X^-AQ+TI inMartin is provable Every n!j inMartin-L?f's statement (1984) type theory. in provable (S^-AQ+TI

has a proof

L?f 's (1984) type theory.

the strongest result of its kind. The paper a theory of second order arithmetic which by Rathjen is based on \ but in addition has axioms stating that there exist (E^-AC) is a model with respect to which many /^-models of (E^-AC). A /?-model let T be the is absolute. More precisely, the notion of well-foundedness statement is the scheme asserting that every true \ plus theory (I^-AC) n^ Theorem 5.2 is by no means (1996) introduces

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE reflected in a y?-model of (E^-AC). orem 5.15 that the type theory MLF strength. It also follows proves theory MLQ It follows

111

from Rathjen (1996), The same proof-theoretic and T have the 5.15 of T. that the type

from Rathjen (1996), Theorem and soundness the consistency n^

6.

THE LIMITS OF MARTIN-L?F

TYPE THEORY

Above

seen that ordinary mathematics is demonstrably relative toMLTT. Thus from the point of view of justifying ical practice in a Hilbertian the existing formalizations way

we have

consistent mathemat of MLTT

are already powerful enough. Notwithstanding to ponder where the limits of MLTT lie. This

it is still of great interest is a somewhat ambiguous

toMartin-L?f 's outlook that though. It is, of course, fundamental question, to apply reflection to any particular formalization it is possible of MLTT, Martin-L?f and thus obtain a stronger system. Consequently, type theory as cannot be captured by a formal system. More undertaking seem to be possible to single out a particular fragment TM over, it doesn't is equiconsistent of ZFC and argue thatMLTT exhausts and furthermore with TM since drawing such an exact limit toMLTT appears to entail that from within Martin-L?f this limit could be approached type theory and a foundational therefore be overcome. to transcend the type theorists it appears to be possible Nonetheless, as it were, a hypothetical realm by adopting, 'eagles' point of view as in an advanced position on all pos set theory and reflect from such classical sible moves the type theorist can ever perform. This thought experiment one to delineate the type bounds for the realm which never be leaving, or, more precisely, it should enable the Can torian set theorist to draw a line in his set-theoretic world beyond which the type theorist will never be able to reach. An intellectual in difficulty should then allow theorist will this project is to become aware of the conceptions which govern pursuing all possible of aMartin-L?f theorist. A first and rather coarse type thinking of Martin-L?f reflection suggests three basic principles type theory.

(AO) (Predicativism) The realm of types is built in stages (by the idealized
type theorist). It is not a completed totality. elements of a particular type it is disallowed In declaring what are the tomake reference to all

types. how a canonical of element (Al) A type A is defined by describing A is formed as well as the conditions two canonical under which elements of A are equal.

112
(A2) The canonical

MICHAEL RATHJEN of a type must be namable, that is to say, as a word in a for a symbolic representation, in addition to countably many basic sym language whose alphabet, introduced of previously bols, consists of the elements types. Here elements they must allow "previously" refers back to the stages of (AO).

Principles (AO), (Al), and (A2) are liable to different readings and perhaps
are in need I consider it more fruitful though, to of further rumination. a rigorous formal model of these principles within set theory. In investigate let us adopt a classical Cantorian point of view and analyze the following, on this basis. Firstly, the foregoing types are to be interpreted principles

as sets. By G?del numbering, has the consequence that (A2) hereditarily will be lost by considering all types to be surjective images of nothing an encoding that with such subsets of N. In combination (Al), yields A can be emulated by an inductive definition O over the natural every type numbers together with a decoding function D, where

O :pow(N) -> pow(N)

is a (class) function set inductively from the class of all subsets defined to pow(N). of N, pow(N), has the set-theoretic definition by O, O00,

The

:= <D??

(Jo?, a

<D? :=<D([J^)
?<a

(JO^,
?<a

where

sidered

a ranges over the ordinals. The elements of type A are then con to be represented the elements of O00. Thus the type A will be by identified with the set : x G <D??}.

{D(x)

The vast majority of inductively defined types of MLTT

monotone operators13 O whose iterations satisfy Oa = i>( since Setzer's not generated

is given by
|J <D^). But
?<a

monotonicity consists in describing A further step in delineating MLTT <I> functions Da- A common way and decoding operators inductive definitions by their syntactic complexity. proceeds

(cf. Setzer 2000) features a type which type theory TTM a monotone operator, I shall not impose the restriction by on operators.

is of

the allowable of classifying To find such

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE

113

a syntactic bound it is in order to recall that the type theorists develop their universe of types in stages. Introducing a new type A consists in describing a method its elements. Taking into account that the type for generating is always in a state of expansion it becomes clear that theoretic universe for of A is formed by the method of generation can only refer to types that have been built up hitherto. A, this method of generation of elements should also obey a the method Furthermore, form: If at a certain stage an object condition of the following persistency as an element of A then an expansion t is recognized of the type-theoretic each universe should applicable same vein, type-valued the validity should not nullify this fact, i.e. the method and yield t : A in the expanded universe if A should as well. remain And to be in the time a new element

is a type of codes of types which comes endowed with a function D (like in the case of type universes), then decoding = B with x : A of equations between types of the form D(x)

true under expansions of the universe of types. to saying that terms amounts the foregoing in set-theoretic Framing ? t e O(X) the truth of formulas describing and D(t) b, respectively, universe. In ought to be persistent under adding more sets to a set-theoretic remain more that whenever M and P are transitive language this means t G <D(X), such that t, X e M, M ? P and (M, gm) h then (P, Gp) |= t G O(X)14 should obtain as well. The same persistency = V. property should hold for formulas of the form 'D(x) are can be characterized The formulas which by the latter property technical sets of sets of set-theoretic in set theory as the E-formulas. the collection They are exactly formulas generated from the atomic and negated atomic formulas by closing off under A, v, bounded quantifiers (Wxea), (3xea) and unbounded existential 3x (cf. Barwise 1975,1.8). quantification In view of the complexity follows. one thus is led to impose restrictions the preceding, of inductive definitions for generating types inMLTT on as

known

-> pow(N) for generating (A3) Every inductive definition O : pow(N) the elements of a type A inMLTT and its pertinent decoding func tion are definable by set-theoretic E-formulas. These formulas may contain previously further sets as parameters, types. where these sets correspond to defined

To avoid misunderstandings, I'd like to emphasize that (A3) is not meant to say that every such E inductive definition gives rise to a type acceptable inMLTT. allows This (A3) is intended only us to draw a limit for MLTT of an upper bound. It a small fragment of ZF. in the guise of on the ubiquitous Kripke-Platek set theory, KP. subsystem of ZF. Though as a delineation

fragment,

Kripke-Platek

T, is based set theory is a truly remarkable

114

MICHAEL RATHJEN

weaker than ZF, a great deal of set theory requires only the considerably the power set axioms of this subsystem. KP arises from ZF by omitting to bounded formulas, and collection axiom and restricting that separation is formulas interaction
sets.

without between

book by Barwise To describe the foundation an G-least scheme

site of quantifiers. KP has been a major see the branches of logic (for more information many of KP are called admissible 1975). The transitive models unbounded

the axioms of KP is T, we have to alter KP slightly. Among scheme which says that every non-empty definable class has the foundation element. Let KPr result from KP by restricting In addition universe to KPr, V T has an axiom is a Ei <\ asserting in a transitive set which (written M elementary V). To be more that every substructure precise, let

to sets.

set is contained of the set-theoretic M <\V

stand for the scheme

VaeM
for all bounded is the theory

[3x(p(x,a)

-> 3x GM<f(x, a)\

all free variables exhibited. Then T

formulas

(?>(x,y) with

KPr +Wx3M(xeM
The following 6.1. theorem

M<iV).
in T. is definable pow(N) then <D?? g M. by a E formula

is provable -> V,

THEOREM with The

parameters

If <t> : pow(N) inM and M <\

a Martin-L?f above theorem supports the claim that everything type in T or, to put itmore pictorially, theorist can ever develop can be emulated of the type theorist world are to be drawn inside M, that the boundaries satisfies M elaborating Before <\V. further

where M

on this question, to it might be interesting an equivalent of T which is couched in terms of characterization give of second order arithmetic. subsystems the question of the type theorist's limit, I shall now argue on the Resuming of MLTT, i.e. it contains all basis of T that every set M <\ V is a model inMLTT. The argument may run the types that may ever be constructed Types are interpreted as sets. At a certain stage the idealized type theorist, called ITT, has a certain repertoire of type forming opera to a collection G set of E-definable tions, say G. The operations correspond on sets. Further, assume that ITT introduces a new type A by operations in this way:

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE

115

utilizing G. Inductively we may assume that any set M with M <\ V is a model of /TT's up to this point. Thus any such M reasoning as developed to (A3), the generation of the elements of is closed under G set- According H M and a de H M -? pow(N) A gives rise to an operator (?>M '. pow(N) on M whenever M <\V. function DM which are both E-definable coding on all M <\ V, that is definable and DM are uniformly Moreover, <S>M = Y to say, there are E-formulas y/(x, y) and S(u, v) such that (?>M(X)

iff (M, ?m) \= ^(X, Y) and DM{u, v) iff (M, Gm) 1=?(u, v) whenever
X, Y g pow(N) n M, u, v GM, and M <\ V. Now define

O :pow(N) -> pow(N)

= <3>M(X), where X e M and M <\ V. <Ddefines a by letting <S>(X) and for every X?N there exists function since the <DM are E definable M <i V such that X e M. Thus T proves that O is a E-definable operator,
i.e.,

ThVX

cN3FO(X)

= Y.
as

that <D?? is a set. Moreover, Theorem 6.1, one can deduce Employing O00 is E definable too, one can infer that <?}??eM and thus

= A = {D(u) : u G <D??} {DM(u) : u e O^} g M

for every M -q V.

7. THE HIGHER At

INFINITE AND NEW AXIOMS

in order to point out that there the end of this article it is, perhaps, are parts of mathematics which are permeated by set theory and thus are not capable of a constructive the structure consistency proof. In particular of sets of reals is affected by set-theoretic axioms. Examples of results iterations many uncountably theorem that all Borel games theorem. diagonalization set existence axioms considered are of the power set operation are determined and Friedman's in modern so-called set theory go way be large cardinal axioms

that require D. Martin's Borel The

possess a winning PD, strategy. Perhaps, most notably, projective determinacy, are definable asserts that all games which in the language of Z2 have a is that PD is a conse strategy. The relation to large cardinals winning of infinitely many Woodin of the existence cardinals. PD leads to a quence

set theory. These yond Zermelo-Fraenkel that certain infinite games played imply

on sets of reals always

116
very satisfying structure

MICHAEL RATHJEN

sets of reals in that under PD theory for projective set A of reals is Lebesgue has the property measurable, every projective of Baire, and if A is uncountable, then A has a perfect subset (see Woodin

1994).
The ASL 2000 et al. the question: Does (see Feferman and John Steel, maintained 2000). Two of the panelists, Harvey Friedman not already provable needs new axioms, i.e. principles that mathematics set theory ema in ZFC. Steel's line of argument was that the descriptive is a reason why mathematicians should adopt nating from large cardinals recent held that his most these large cardinal axioms. Harvey Friedman reasons for relation theory (BT), provides called Boolean strong discovery, for the core of mathematics adopting new axioms as BT has consequences are hard to dismiss. Roughly which speaking, BT is concerned with the sets and their images under multivar?ate between functions. relationship What is most striking about Friedman's results in BT is that they encapsu the proof-theoretic late strength of certain large cardinals. Only the future can tell whether BT is ever going to play a role in the dealings of everyday mathematics. annual meeting also saw a panel mathematics need new axioms? discussion devoted to

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS for reading an earlier version of this paper, to my attention, and suggesting several inaccuracies bringing improve ments. Notwithstanding that we hold differing views on the foundations our discussions of mathematics, of the paper atMonk Fryston Hall (while in a cream tea) were most enjoyable. indulging I wish to thank John Derrick

Notes
"... die Grundlagenfragen 2 The first step being and main step consists aus der Welt zu schaffen ". system T. The

einfUrallemal the whole

to formalize

of mathematics of T.

in a formal

second

3 Such a shift from the original program is implicit inHilbert-Bernays'

acceptance des bisherigen of Gentzen's methodischen consistency proof for PA under Standpunktes

in proving

the consistency

(1938) apparent

the heading "?berschreitung der Beweistheorie". The need for a modified

Hilbert program has clearly been recognized by Gentzen (1936) and Bernays (1967): It thus
became apparent and of reasoning of proof it was to classical is not the only alternative that the "finite Standpunkt" ways is not necessarily theory. An enlarging of the by the idea of proof implied instead of reduction therefore of theory was tofinitist methods suggested: be of a constructive character, allowing only that the arguments required general forms of inferences.

methods reasoning us to deal

with more

HILBERTPROGRAM 117 THE CONSTRUCTIVE

4 However, there of are certain mathematical This statements topic will be whose the in the con

last briefly strength large sistency section. 5 to as bar induction. TI is often referred This is the reason why the principle 6 I have become Since completing this paper this view was shared by Myhill: Incidentally, .... While some recent unpublished the complexity work of Martin-L?f, with of familiar cardinals. Martin-L?f's ization as a definitive its general system makes extremely unlikely formal adoption In it pushes its analysis than we do, ? mathematics, far deeper of constructive s with Martin-L?f in this area without familiarity work should be done any case no further we anticipate with pleasure whose work, (Myhill 1975, p. 355). speedy publication 7 to the German the word "Urteil". Urteil was is closely related The word "judgement" In his transcendental which forms part of logic in Kant's central notion logic, philosophy. of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant arrives at his categories by discerning the various forms He 9 of judgements. used the German word breaks Aufgabe. up the rules which we rules, via collectively respectively. the selector, call His and elimination elimination the equation was rules, rules rules

requires proof touched upon

Martin-L?f

into

actually two groups dubbed how how non-canonical the selector level,

elimination elements operates on

explain explain 10 On

and equality are formed the canonical between

elements. and types discovered by

the formal

the analogy

propositions

Curry and Feys (1958) and further developed by Howard (1969).

Martin-L?f any additional to keep that it is natural the view the type U^ open to reflect expressed not to incorporate forms of type that can arise in the future and therefore In my view is a mere convenience lest one rules for universes. such a decision has of universes. bon mot that not in an everything be false. inconsistent theory

elimination

to specify forms be forced different 2 This is reminiscent of Russell's can be 14 Gm true but that every axiom

of a consistent

13O is said to be monotone ifX ? Y implies O(X) ? O(T).

stands for the elementhood relation restricted to sets inM.

theory may

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