#1: MARCELO JERVOSO & NORMA CLOSA vs. PEO & CA GR# 89306 September 13, 1990 J.

GRINO-AQUINO *petition for review FACTS: Petitioners Marcelo Jervoso was convicted of homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso and Norma Closa for slight physical injuries. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was appreciated in their favor. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court with modification, sentencing the accused the imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P30,000. ISSUE: W/N the order to indemnify the heirs of the deceased is proper despite the reservation made by said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action? RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA with modification, deleting the award of indemnity for damages. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of the said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. Having reserved and filed in the RTC of Manila a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice from the same criminal act of the accused.

#2: CARMEN MADEJA vs. HON. FELIX CARO & EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON GR# L-51183 December 21, 1983 J. ABAD SANTOS *petition FACTS: Dr. Eva A. Japzon was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The spouse of the deceased, Carmen Madeja, reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages. A civil case was then instituted while the criminal case was pending. The respondent judge dismissed the civil case upon Japzons Motion to Dismiss. ISSUE: W/N an instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action? RULING: The Supreme Court granted the petition and dismissed the Order appealed from. The civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal action against her.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision, to wit: Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Article 33: In case of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

#3: BAGUMBAYAN CORP. vs. IAC, LELISA SENA & ARTURO SENA GR# L-66274 September 30, 1984 J. AQUINO * FACTS: Private respondents Spouses Lelisa & Arturo Sena, with their 4 children, went to Tropical Palace Hotel to watch the performance of Reycard Duet. As the waiter, named Baez, was about to serve the drinks they had ordered, the tray containing it overturned and fell on her. She was drenched and, later on, felt some chill. She also sensed that some persons were laughing at or pitying her. When she was took by a waitress to the ladies room, she had to remove her dress and underwear but was not given any towel to cover herself nor able to sit as there was no chair. The Spouses filed an action to recover damages for the embarrassment and the fact that the management did not even offer an apology on that night, and to teach the management a lesson. The trial court awarded the Spouses P1,540 as actual damages, P50,000 as moral damages & P10,000 as exemplary damages. The IAC affirmed the judgment of the lower court with modification, reducing the amount of moral and exemplary damages to P15,000 and P5,000, respectively.

ISSUE: Is the award of damages proper? RULING: The Supreme Court modified the decision of the IAC, ordering the petitioner to pay Lelisa Sena the sum of P5,000 to cover her actual damages, litigation expenses and attorneys fees. The award of moral and exemplary damages were eliminated. The Civil Code provides: Article 2217: Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. Article 2219: Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delict causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named. Article 2220: Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The instant case is not specifically mentioned in Article 2219. The appellate court erred in considering it as analogous to the cases mentioned therein without indicating what specific case the instant case resembles or is analogous to.

What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong. Mental suffering means distress or serious pain as distinguished from annoyance, regret or vexation. Mental anguish is intense mental suffering. Generally, damages for mental anguish are limited to cases in which there has been a personal injury or where the defendant willfully, wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally caused the mental anguish. Nor will damages generally be awarded for mental anguish which is not accompanied by a physical injury, at least where maliciousness, wantonness, or intentional conduct is not involved.

#4 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. RUFUS RODRIGUEZ GR# 83768 February 28, 1990 J. GUTIERREZ, JR. *petition for review on certiorari FACTS: The private respondent, Rufus Rodriguez, President of the World Association of Law Students (WALS), sent 2 cablegrams overseas through RCPI. One is addressed to Taha in Sudan to advise of his arrival on the September 18, 1978; and the other to Merger in Athens to inform her of the scheduled conference in Sudan. However, when he arrived in Sudan, no one was there to meet him. Due to the lateness of the hour, he was forced to sleep at the airport. Also, Merger was not duly informed of the said conference. As a result, the said international conference had to be cancelled. Rodriguez, then, filed a complaint for compensatory damages for the failure of RCPI and GLOBE to deliver the said cablegrams. The trial court rendered judgment ordering RCPI and GLOBE to jointly and severally pay the sum of P213,148, included therein is the amount of P100,000 as moral damages. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. ISSUE: W/N, under the attendant facts and circumstances, the petitioner is liable for moral damages in the amount of P100,000?

RULING: The Supreme Court modified the appealed Decision by reducing the amount of moral damages to P10,000. The Court is convinced that Rodriguez suffered a certain degree of mental anguish, fear and anxiety considering his experience at the airport of a foreign country. His suffering was caused by the non-appearance of Taha who did not receive the telegram sent by the respondent due to the gross negligence of RCPI. There is, moreover, the dismay arising from the fact, that after so much preparation and travel on the part of Rodriguez, his pains were all nothing. Hence, RCPI is liable for moral damages. However, the award of P100,000 as moral damages is excessive and unconscionable. Although the amount of moral damages is a matter largely left to the sound discretion of a court, the same when found excessive should be reduced to a more reasonable amount. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. The award of moral damages must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Given that the private respondent is not entirely blameless for the cancellation of the international conference, for anyone has to know that a telegram is not an adequate preparation for such an international conference, P10,000 as award for moral damages would be reasonable considering the facts and circumstances surrounding the petitioners liability.

#5 PEO vs. NORBERTO MANERO, JR., ET. AL. GR#s 86883 to 85 January 29, 1993 (appellants: Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Plenago & Roger Bendano) J. BELLOSILLO * FACTS: The accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes murder, attempted murder (Fr. Rufino Robles), and arson (motorcycle). Aside from prison sentence, accused Norberto Manero, Jr., Edilberto Manero, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia, Efren Plenago and Roger Bedano were ordered to pay P100,000 as moral damages, among others.

ISSUE: W/N the award of moral damages is proper? RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from with modification, deleting the award of moral damages. Moral damages can not be awarded because the heirs never presented any evidence showing that they suffered mental anguish; much less did they take the witness stand. Moral damages and their causal relation to the defendants acts should be satisfactorily proved by the claimant. Before moral damages may be awarded, there must be proof of moral suffering.

#6 THE UNITED STATES vs. BUENAVENTURA SARMIENTO GR# L-9059 March 14, 1914 J. CARSON * FACTS: The accused, Buenaventura Sarmiento, and a Petronila Silverio, who are co-workers, met at an early hour on one morning. They entered a street vehicle and went to the house of one Jacinto Rodriguez, a friend of the accused. Rodriguez gave the 2 a room wherein they stayed for about an hour. After having breakfast, they went to work. The young woman, then, went home at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day and returned accompanied by some relatives and friends. They compelled the accused to marry the young woman, but the minister decline to marry the couple for it appears from the cedula of the accused that he was a married man. A complaint was then filed against the accused for inducing the young woman to have sexual intercourse with him by means of deceit, to wit, under promise of marriage. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of seduction and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 4 months, and to pay the sum of P500 as civil indemnification to the injury done to her.

ISSUE: W/N the accused is guilty of seduction? RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower and acquitted the accused of the offense charged against him. The Court does not think that a conviction of the crime of seduction can be sustained on the evidence. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement, and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. In the case at bar, no satisfactory explanation of the conduct of the young woman, in accompanying the accused in the street vehicle, was offered at the trial, nor does one suggest itself at this time, other than that she had already made up her mind to enter into illicit relations with the accused when she entered the vehicle. There is also evidence in the record to the effect that she knew the accused was a married man, long before they had their illicit relations.

#7 PEOPLE vs. CRISPIN IMAN GR# 42660 J. RECTO * FACTS:

September 12, 1935

The accused Crispin Iman, who was in relation with the 17-year old complainant (Corazon Arcadio), had been persistent with his repeated indecent proposal to the complainant. During these times, the complainant would refuse the accused and even intimidated of breaking up with him. But the accused would renew his protestations of love. One day, while the parents of the complainant were not at home, the accused once again avail the opportunity to convince the complainant with a renewal of his promise to marry her. The complainant, this time, gave in to the request of the accused. And since the complainant felt that she had already lost for granting that first favor, she yielded thereafter without restraint. Upon becoming aware of her pregnancy, the complainant once again asked the accused if he is ready to fulfill his promise to marry her. At first, he answered in affirmative but later on told her that he was engaged to another girl. However, after a month or so, the 2 lived together.

The parents of the complainant, reported the matter to the Chief of Police of Plaridel, and in his presence, the accused once again renewed his promise to marry the complainant. Despite of which, the accused failed to fulfill such promise. The trial court finds the accused guilty of seduction by means of the false promise of marriage under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in convicting the accused? RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision appealed from, sentencing the accused to 4 months to arresto mayor, to indemnify the complainant the sum of P500, to acknowledge the child had by him with her and to give the child a monthly support of P15 until the age of majority. Promise of marriage is one of the essential elements, recognized by the courts, constituting deceit in the crime of seduction and, inasmuch as such fact is established in the decision of the trial court, the appellants contention as to the necessity that said promise be reiterated under circumstances of strong probability, or that the same has been given before or after the woman has yielded to the importunities of the man carries no weight.

#8 ROGELIO ABERCA, ET. AL. vs. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, ET. AL. GR# L-69866 April 15, 1988 J. YAP *petition for certiorari FACTS: General Fabian Ver ordered Task Force Makabansa (TFM) to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist. In view thereof, TFM raided several places, employing most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. During these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts. They were also denied visits of relatives and lawyers. They were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, and the military men violated several Constitutional rights of the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs filed an action to recover damages. Upon Motion to Dismiss by the herein petitioners, the trial court dismissed the case. On Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court granted the same as regards Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo & Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba; and dismissed the case as regards the other respondents. ISSUE: W/N the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution? RULING: The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case to the respondent court for further proceedings. Article 32 of the Civil Code states: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) Freedom of religion; Freedom of speech; Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; Freedom of suffrage; The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; The right to the equal protection of the laws; The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; The liberty of abode and of changing the same; The privacy of communication and correspondence; The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances; The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; The right of the accused against excessive bail; The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial,

(17)

(18) (19)

to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf; Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness; Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendants act or omission constitutes a criminal offense the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and must be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. adjudicated. Exemplary damages may also be

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. This provides a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. Also, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. The doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case, which is generally limited in its application to principal and agent, or to master and servant relationship. But no such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. Also, Article 32 of the Civil Code speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.

Thus, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32. The person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

#10: INHELDER CORPORATION vs. CA, DANIEL PANGANIBAN & PAULA RAMIREZ PANGANIBAN GR# L-52358 May 30, 1983 J. MELENCIO-HERRERA * FACTS: The counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to the private respondents, Spouses Panganiban, requesting the settlement of an unpaid balance from the medicines they had purchased. Upon receiving a statement of account, the Spouses sent a check through mail. Meanwhile, the counsel of the petitioner prepared a complaint against the Spouses. A few days afterwhich, the petitioner sent a letter to the Spouses acknowledging the receipt of the check sent by the latter. The Spouses filed an action to recover damages due to the clearly unfounded case filed by the petitioner against them, for it is clear that even before the hearing filed by Inhelder Corporation the spouses had already sent the payment. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Panganibans, among the damages awarded is the sum of P100,000 for the nervous breakdown suffered by plaintiff Paula Panganiban and for the mental anguish, social humiliation, besmirched reputation and other injuries. On appeal, the appellate court reduced the damages, the moral damages awarded is reduced to P10,000. ISSUE: W/N the award of moral damages is proper? RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, and set aside the decision of the CFI.

Judicial discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of damages must always be exercised with balanced restraint and measured objectivity. It should be difficult to conclude that the first case was a clearly unfounded civil action. It is not clear that the account of the Panganibans had already been paid from the date the check has been received by the petitioner. Under Article 1249 of the Civil Code, payment should be held effective only when such check was actually cashed by, or credited to the account of, Inhelder Corporation. If that did not eventuate , then the account would still be unpaid, and the complaint in the Collection Case, technically, could not be considered as substantially unfounded. Although, the better procedure would have been to withhold a complaint pending determination of whether or not the check was good, such procedure was not followed because of the failure of the corresponding advice from the petitioners counsel. But the lack of such advice should not justify qualifying the said case as clearly unfounded. Neither may it be said that the collection case was malicious. Malicious prosecution, to be the basis of a suit, requires the elements of malice and want of probable cause. There must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and groundless.

#11 DR. PEDRO DANAO, ET. AL. vs. CA, ET. AL. GR# L-48276 September 30, 1987 J. PARAS *petition for review on certiorari FACTS: Spouses Pedro & Concepcion Danao applied for a commercial credit line of P20,000 with the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, which was granted. Given as a security for the credit line of P20,000 was a parcel of land in the City of Baguio, together with the buildings and improvements thereon. Antonio Co Kit and Pedro Danao signed a promissory note for P10,000. The 2 agreed to pay jointly and severally although the check for the proceeds of the note was issued in the name of Antonio Co Kit. Several years after that, the counsel for the bank sent a letter to Antonio Co Kit and Pedro Danao demanding payment of the unpaid balance from the said promissory note. Eventually, the bank filed a petition for foreclosure Danaos parcel of land located in Baguio

City, but later on executed a cancellation of the real estate mortgage, stating that that mortgagors had fully paid the obligation secured by the mortgage. Spouses Danao filed a complaint for damages against BPI, as successor to the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, alleging that the plaintiffs alleged indebtedness mentioned in the defendants petition for foreclosure and in the consequent notice of public auction sale was the balance due on a clean loan granted to Antonio Co Kit, and was a distinct and separate transaction from the plaintiffs credit line and therefore not covered nor secured by the plaintiffs properties mortgaged to the defendant bank. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to indemnify, among others in the amount of P100,000 as moral damages. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court with modification, reducing the award of moral damages to P30,000. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in reducing the moral damages awarded by the lower court? RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA with modification, by increasing the award of moral damages to P60,000. Moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of the case. As a general rule, the filing alone of the foreclosure application should not be a ground for an award of moral damages. However, in the case at bar, the main bone of contention is not only the filing of the petition for foreclosure proceedings but the manner in which the same was carried out, such as publication of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure and sale at public auction, instead of legal notices or classified ads, which allegedly bespoke the banks malicious intent to embarrass and harass the Danao spouses which actuations are contrary to the canons of conduct provided in Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. When the award of moral damages is far too excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the claimants the former may be reduced. Also, the reduction of moral damages is justified where the negligence of petitioner bank and its employees is not wanton and reckless. In view of the embarrassing circumstances attendant to the foreclosure notice, the Court increased the award of moral damages by the CA.