Propositions: On Their Modal and Temporal Properties Raleigh Miller Jeff King has argued ((2003) and (2008,

ch. 5)) that tense expressions have quantifiers as their semantic values.1 King thus problematizes traditional tense semantics, credited to A.N. Prior,2 according to which tense expressions have sentence operators as their semantic values. King's argument allows for modal expressions, unlike tense expressions, to have sentence operators as their semantic values. King makes it clear that he leaves open this possibility because he thinks it is correct; King thinks that modal expressions contribute modal operators to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they appear. Thus, Kings full view includes a commitment to the thesis that modal and tense expressions have formally, categorially different semantic values. Call this the Asymmetry Thesis or Asymmetry. Some of Kings reasons for endorsing asymmetry are linguistic. Operator and quantifiers have well defined formal features. The linguists choice between quantificational or operational semantics for tense and modal expressions yields predictions that can be empirically tested. If natural language patterns are more accurately predicted by a theory of tense and modal expressions according to which they are formally, categorially different, this amounts to a linguistic case for Asymmetry. Much of King's research is dedicated to making this case. But, as King argues in his (2008), Asymmetry is motivated by metaphysical considerations as well. Speculative metaphysicians have claimed that there are differences between the temporal and modal properties of propositions that justify Asymmetry. It is these latter metaphysical considerations that I take aim at. I will argue that metaphysical arguments for Asymmetry are unpersuasive. Though I will have to say a few things about language, I will try to avoid making controversial, empirical claims that are the proper purview of the linguist; I am in no position to assess Kings arguments for conclusions about the best way to model the semantic value of tense and modal

I focus almost exclusively on Kings 2008, since the views expressed therein have gone through some revisions since the reception of his 2003.
2

See, e.g. (Prior 1957)

expressions.3 The objects of interest in this paper are the modal and temporal properties of propositions, and the argument of this paper is that reflection on these properties will not lend support to the case for Asymmetry. Let me slow down a bit, and say a few things about propositions. Propositions are theoretical entities. They are functionally defined. Propositions, as traditionally conceived, play three theoretical roles. First, propositions are the objects of our intentional attitudes, such as belief or doubt. When I believe that p I stand in the belief relation to the proposition that p. Second, propositions are the semantic values of sentences. According to compositionality, a popular (though not unanimously endorsed) methodological assumption in linguistics, the semantic value of a sentence is composed of the semantic values of its parts. Some sentences are composed of smaller sentences. For instance, according to compositionality, a sentence of the form x is F and y is G is composed of the respective semantic values of the sentences x is F and y is G (and the semantic value of and, conjunction). Accordingly, the proposition expressed by a sentence s should be the contribution that s makes to a larger sentence in which s appears.4 Third, propositions are the bearers of alethic, modal, and temporal properties. Alethic properties include true and false. Modal properties include possible, actual, necessary, etc. Temporal properties include past, present, future, etc. All else being equal, the best theory of propositions would be one according to which it is plausible that propositions play all three roles. Much of the following discussion depends upon the difference between sentence operators and quantifiers. Ill now dedicate some discussion to this distinction. A proposition, p, is the contribution that a sentence s makes to the semantic value of a larger sentence s if s expresses p and s appears in s. s may also include an expression whose semantic value is a
3

Though my colleague, Eric Snyder, thinks that the linguistic case for Asymmetry is also unpersuasive. He [is writing/has written] separately in defense of that claim. This may be an appropriate time to remark that I have benefitted immensely from conversations with Mr. Snyder on subjects relevant to this paper. 4 This is not meant to include sentences where the words x is and F appear in that order, but where the sentence x is F is not plausibly a part of the larger sentence. For instance, the sentence Snow is white is not plausibly part of In arctic environments, the color that increases ones ability to survive while walking in the snow is white..

sentence operator. Sentence operators embed sentences, and they affect the context in which the proposition expressed by the embedded sentence is to be evaluated. For instance, we might introduce a sentence operator, B( ), where the sentence B(p) is true just in case p is true in Bahrain.5 By contrast, quantifiers do not operate upon otherwise independent sentences. Instead, a quantifier binds variables in a sentence whose semantic value is otherwise indeterminate. In a quantified sentence, if all variables are replaced with expressions whose semantic value(s) are entities, the resulting sentence would express a proposition with a determinate semantic value. A quantifier has as its semantic value the second order property being such that if were substituted for the variable the result would be a true proposition, where different quantifiers would correspond to different ranges that would appear as . For a standard weak quantifier, one would substitute at least one thing in the domain for . For a standard strong quantifier, one would substitute anything in the domain for . One way of understanding the scope of Kings investigation is as concerning perspectival propositions. A perspectival proposition is a proposition true from some perspective. A perspective is something from which some propositions are true. It is unclear whether a more substantive, non-circular definition of perspective is available, but at least this may serve rhetorically to gesture at the sorts of things were trying to talk about.6 Three examples of perspectives are times, worlds, and locations. that Miller is sitting is true at the present time, but false at some other times. that Miller lives in Ohio is true in the actual world, but its false on some merely possible worlds. that its snowing is true here (Ohio) but false elsewhere. If were trying to capture the truth conditions of discourse about whats true at some times, at some places, and on some worlds, quantifiers have more flexible expressive power then sentence operators. Using quantification, it is possible (with the help of such mechanisms
5

Of course, whether or not the semantics of In Bahrain its the case that is best captured by such an operator is not the point; nothing stops us from stipulating that there is such an operator. 6 Kit Fine (2005, 261), for instance, writes We make statements (or form judgments) about how things are from a given standpoint or perspectivethe statement has a certain aspect or perspectival character in virtue of which is truth is capable of varying from one standpoint to another.

as identity and domain restriction) to specify which object(s) in the domain the quantified expression is true of. So, concerning discourses in which some propositions are true from some perspectives and false from others, quantifying over perspectives allows the flexibility to say which perspectives the proposition is true from. This is something that cannot be done with sentence operators.7 So much, then, for a rather simplistic account of the distinction between sentence operators and quantifiers, and the relevance of such a distinction to our ability to model the semantics of perspectival discourses. Here are some theses. In what follows I will discuss what they amount to. Attitude: Propositions are the objects of attitudes. Value: propositions are the semantic values of sentences. Operator: All perspectival expressions (location, tense, modal) contribute sentence operators to the semantic values of the sentences in which they appear. T-Operator: Tense expressions contribute tense operators to the semantic values of sentences in which they appear. L-Operator: Location expressions contribute location operators to the semantic values of sentences in which they appear. M-Operator: Modal expressions contribute modal operators to the semantic values of sentences in which they appear. According to Attitude, my belief that snow is white has the proposition that snow is white as its object, and when I believe that snow is white I stand in the belief relation with the proposition that snow is white. According to Value, the proposition that snow is white is the semantic value of the sentence 'snow is white', and 'snow is white' contributes that snow is white to the semantic value of any larger sentence in which 'snow is white' appears.8 According to Operator, all perspectival propositions (propositions whose truth conditions essentially include somethings being true at some time, at some place, or on some world) have, as constituents, sentence operators that capture the perspectival component to the propositions truth

Not, that is,unless we expand beyond canonical weak and strong operators to include specific operators that shift the evaluation of the proposition to particular perspectives or sets of perspectives (our Bahrain operator would be such an additional operator). This, however, would have to get very messy before it would have anything like the expressive power of quantificational analyses.
8

See n.3.

conditions.9 And, of course, the division of Operator into L-Operator, T-Operator and MOperator merely shows that the wholesale nature of Operator is not obligatory. Indeed, Operator is incompatible with a defense of Asymmetry which takes the relevant difference between tense and modal expressions to be that tense expression have quantifiers as their semantic value and that modal expressions have operators as their semantic values. King argues that Attitude, Value, and Operator cannot all be true. Why? If Value and Operator are true, then "(at least some) propositions must vary in truth value across worlds, times and locations and be the objects of our attitudes" (2008, 166). In virtue of what must propositions vary across worlds, times and locations? Consider times. If T-Operator is true, then tense expressions have tense operators as their semantic value. So, the proposition expressed by 'Jim was sitting' has the past tense operator, It was the case and the proposition that Jim is sitting as constituents. Contrastingly, the proposition expressed by 'Jim will be sitting' has the future tense operator, It will be the case and the proposition that Jim is sitting as constituents. The past tense operator shifts the evaluation of the proposition to the domain of past times, and the proposition that Jim was sitting is true just in case the proposition that Jim is sitting is true at one of those times. The future tense operator does the same thing, except it shifts the evaluation of the proposition to the domain of all future times. Since the propositions that Jim was sitting and the that Jim will be sitting need not covary in truth value, the proposition that Jim is sitting must have the potential to be true at some time (e.g., if it is true at some past time) and false at other times (e.g. if it is not true at any future time, say if Jim is dead). So the proposition that Jim is sitting must have the potential to be true at some times and false at others. King discusses the analog thesis, L-Operator, and puts the same point a different way.
9

To put the point this way is to presume against a theory on which propositions just are truth conditions, but of course I have been presuming against such a theory all along by even talking about constituents of propositions. As King does, I am taking propositions to be structured entities which have truth conditions. King prefaces his argument for Asymmetry (which is part of his larger argument against T-Operator and L-Operator) by assuring proponents of nonstructured theories of propositions that his argument is relevant to them as well. I have not given any thought to whether my response to King suffers from a structured-proposition-centrism, or whether it could be translated without loss into a criticism of Kings argument for T-Operator and L-Operator as it would be formulated against the proponent of unstructured propositions.

[Consider the sentence In Carnelian Bay there is a boat launching ramp.] If there is a boat launching ramp expressed a proposition (relative to that context) that didnt vary its truth value over locations, the location operator In Carnelian Bay would be vacuous, and the sentence would feel like In Carnelian Bay arithmetic is incomplete. But it doesnt! In an exactly similar way if tense and modal operators operate on propositions and are not vacuous, propositions must vary their truth values across times and worlds. (166) Therefore, T-Operator and Value jointly entail that that Jim is sitting must change in truth value from time to time. Thus T-Operator, Value and Attitude jointly entail that at least some propositions vary in truth value across time, and are the objects of attitudes. The same argument could be run for locations and worlds as well. It may seem as though King has neglected an alternative here. Value and T-Operator entail that at least some propositions change in truth value from time to time, and Attitude does entail that at least some propositions are the objects of attitudes. But how does King then conclude that at least some propositions are both objects of attitudes and susceptible to variation in truth value over time? Might the two categories be disjoint? Call this possibility Disjoint. Though Disjoint is, strictly speaking, available, it will not be an attractive way to argue that no proposition is such that it both changes in truth value over time and is the object of a possible propositional attitude. King is working to preserve the intuition that the things expressed by sentences and the things that are believed are the same. Disjoint essentially allows that there are two things deserving of the name the proposition that Jim is sitting, one of which is an object of a propositional attitude, and the other is the semantic value of the sentence Jim is sitting. This invites the question: why call them both propositions? It appears that the two disjoint categories of entities have quite different properties and we might do well to divide them into two different kinds; this leads us to another possibility. Perhaps propositions, conceived of as objects of attitudes and semantic values of sentences, are not a single kind, and we should reserve proposition for the entity that plays one of these rolls, and call the other entity something else. Call this alternative Split. Split is the position of David Lewis and,

arguably, Michael Dummett10, and it amounts to denying Value in order to preserve Attitude and Operator. Kings objective is to argue against Split and rescue Value. It should be clear, then, that King ought not to embrace Disjoint, since to endorse Disjoint is essentially to endorse Split, but to insist on calling both disjoint categories propositions. First, this terminological conservatism seems to lack motivation. Second, it seems as though Disjoint is nothing but a nonsubstantive, notational variant of Split, and one that is less perspicuous because it codifies a significant ambiguity in the word proposition. Having disposed of a strategy according to which some propositions are constrained by Attitude and others are constrained by Value and Operator, it should be clear that from the conjunction of Value, Operator, and Attitude follows the thesis that some entities both change in their truth value over time and are the object of attitudes. But this implication is only a problem if Attitude is somehow in tension with propositions changing in truth value across perspectives. Why think that the objects of our attitudes cannot have different truth values at, for instance, times t and t? Kings argues that it is not plausible that propositions, qua objects of attitudes change in truth value over time and location: though it seems correct to hold that the things I believe, doubt, etc. can change truth value across worlds, (i.e. some of the things I believe are true though they would have been false had the world been different), it is hard to make sense of the idea that the things I believe may change truth value across time and location. What would it be e.g. to believe that the sun is shining, where what I believe is something that varies in truth value across times and locations in the actual world? It seems clear that when I believe that the sun is shining, I believe something about a particular time and location, so that what I believe precisely does not vary in truth value over times and locations. Right now I am in Santa Monica looking out the window. I believe the sun is shining. Is it really credible to think that my belief is not about Santa Monica now? If that is so, why do I take my current perceptual experience of Santa Monica as the basis of my belief? Further, powerful argument has been given against the view that the objects of belief are things that change truth value over time. So it appears that propositions must and must not change truth value over time and locations. Something has to give. (166) So Attitude states that propositions are the objects of attitudes. If what King says here is correct, this Attitude entails that propositions are invariant in truth value over time and location.

10

See (Dummett 1991) and (Lewis 1998).

The first sentence, of course, suggested that we ought not draw the same conclusion concerning a propositions truth value across worlds. Since this is the asymmetry I wish to consider, I suggest four potential theses that Attitude could imply. Stable: Propositions, qua objects of attitudes, are invariant in truth value over perspectives. T-Stable: Propositions, qua objects of attitudes, are invariant in truth value over times. L-Stable: Propositions, qua objects of attitudes, are invariant in truth value over locations. M-Stable: Propositions, qua objects of attitudes, are invariant in truth value over worlds. In the above passage, King argues that Attitude implies T-Stable and L-Stable. He suggests Attitude doesnt imply M-Stable, and later explicitly claims that M-Stable is surely false, even though Attitude, T-Stable, and L-Stable are all plausibly true. Kings solution is to preserve Attitude (along with T-Stable and L-Stable) and Value but to reject T-Operator and L-Operator. King doesnt think that Attitude implies M-Stable, so he is free to accept M-Operator. So, according to Kings all-things-considered view, propositions are the objects of attitudes and the semantic values of sentences. Propositions at which we can direct our attitudes are stable in truth value across times and locations, and tense and location expressions contribute quantifiers to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they appear. Propositions at which we can direct our attitudes vary in truth value across worlds, and modal expressions append operators to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they appear. Id like to recast our current dialectical position. As Ive configured things, I see King as guided by two views, and I think that both are wrong. The first is the view that the modal sensitivity of propositional attitude contents is drastically different from other forms of perspectival sensitivity. This grounds Kings confidence that M-Stable differs rather substantially in plausibility from L-Stable and T-Stable. I have called this thesis Asymmetry. To refute Asymmetry, is to show that whatever it is natural to say about propositional attitudes sensitivity to variation over time or location is natural to say about their variation over possible

worlds. The second is that the contents of our propositional attitudes are temporally and locationally stable; if, at t, I believe that p, the thing that I believe is true iff p is true at t, even when it is evaluated at times other than t. In other words, Attitude implies T-Stable and LStable. To refute this second thesis is to show that we can believe things that have different

truth values at different times or in different places. First I shall argue against this second thesis, by demonstrating that Attitude doesnt imply T-Stable or L-Stable. Second, I shall refute Asymmetry. Why does King think that Attitude implies T-Stable and L-Stable? The above quotes give us Kings reasons. Let us consider them. King insists that it seems clear that when he believes that the sun is shining he believes something about a particular time and location. Itd be hard to deny that this, in some sense is true. When I believe that it is sunny I believe something about some particular time. Therefore, the object of my belief is about that particular time even when it is evaluated from some future time, and so the content of my belief doesnt change in truth value from time to time. But this does not follow. There is a middle ground that can respect this data without the disruptive consequences of T-Stable. It might be that a belief can be about a particular time and place while being directed at a propositional content that is not rigidly indexed to any particular time. That is, it could be that many of our beliefs are about a particular time, but that we nonetheless direct propositional attitudes at contents that arent indexed to any particular times. So it does not follow from the fact that Kings belief that the sun is shining is somehow about a particular time that the thing King believes does not change in truth value over time. I can put it another way. Suppose that the data to be respected is that whenever I believe the sun is shining I invariably believe that the sun is shining at some time and in some place. There are (at least) two available analyses that respect this data. First, it could be that my belief has as its object p-at-t-and-l. If this were the correct analysis of belief, then King would be right. Second, it could be that my belief, with respect to t and l, is that p. If this is the correct

analysis, then the object of my belief that p, is believed of t and l, but that p itself is nonetheless a standalone content of my belief which can be the object of others beliefs about other times and other places. This respects the sense in which my beliefs are about particular times and places without entailing that the content of belief is stable in truth value across time. It also makes sense of the intuition that my belief that p at t and my belief that p at t are importantly continuous in content. So King cant claim that the only available analysis of belief contents is one according to which the object of my belief is indexed rigidly to a particular time; other analyses are available. But perhaps King doesnt need such a strong claim for his point to go through. Perhaps King could boast that his way of modeling the content of my belief is cleaner and simpler, and that I add theoretical apparatus that is profligate and superfluous. After all, King might say, My view simply has it that subjects have beliefs about times, which youd hardly deny. Your view has subjects attitudes being directed to time-indeterminate contents, but nonetheless amounting to time-indexed beliefs. Since my view is simpler, and theyre not otherwise substantively different, my view ought to be preferred. Fair enough. If there were no data to be explained by propositional attitude objects that change truth value over time, then it would be plausible my suggestion that subjects can adopt attitudes towards tensed contents (and simply believe that content to be true at a time, without the time being built into the content itself) would introduce unnecessary theoretical complexity. But I think there are in fact several data points left inexplicable by Kings position. Here I present four. First, King thinks that standards of precision belong in the same category as times and locations with respect to the relevant formal features. And yet, the following is a reasonable exchange. A: France is hexagonal. B:Strictly speaking, thats false, but loosely speaking thats true.

The only reasonable antecedent for that is the proposition that France is hexagonal, and yet the speaker remarks that that very proposition is true according to loose standards of precision and false according to strict standards of precision. Unless King thinks that standards of precision are a less comfortable bedfellow with times and locations than he lets on, he seems to want to say that As belief that France is hexagonal is about some particular standard of precision in the same way that his belief that the sun is rising is about some particular time and place. This is surely implausible. Even a charitably weakened claim seems unreasonable. Suppose that As belief being about a standard of precision really amounts to no more than it being determinately indexed to a standard of precision from which it is to be evaluated. Is it plausible that As belief is necessarily about a standard of precision in this sense? Still I think not. She may have a particular standard of precision in mind in asserting that France is hexagonal, but she very well may not. She may simply wish to assert that France is hexagonal, and that very thing she is asserting, I think, is true according to one standard and false according to another standard. Suppose Im wrong, and whenever someone asserts p, the object of the belief they are expressing is stable in truth value across standards of precision. Now imagine talking to a non-philosopher colleague, who says I know Im not a computer program. Maybe we bring our new friend into an epistemology classroom and make it clear that strictly speaking she knows no such thing. With her new insight, would we say that she knows two things, that loosely speaking she knows shes not a computer program and that strictly speaking she doesnt know shes not a computer program? Well, maybe, but it seems at least as reasonable to say that she has a belief which, that she knows shes not a computer program, and that this very belief is strictly speaking false and loosely speaking true. King doesnt say much about standards of precision, but where he mentions it he implies that it is of the same ilk as time and location in all the relevant formal respects. It should be noted, then, that the relevant intuitions on which Kings argument trade do not generalize to standards of precision as it would seem they should.

Second, my doxastic profile changes as the world changes. As things change, and as Im aware of their changing, my beliefs change accordingly. In 2001 I believed I was in high school. I stood in the belief relationship with the proposition that I am in high school. I no longer believe that Im in high school, and I no longer stand in that relation. Now, its true that corresponding to these doxastic facts about me, there are corresponding tenseless propositions which fit more comfortably with Kings account. In 2001 I believed that I am in high school in 2001 and I still believe that. I currently believe that I am not in high school in 2010 and I certainly anticipated that in 2001, even if its odd to say I believed it. This all fits Kings account nicely, but King does not assert merely that we stand in the belief relation to time-specific propositions that do not vary in their truth values over time. If that were his view, itd be beyond reproach, for surely we do believe such things. King makes the stronger claim that we dont stand in the belief relation with any propositions that do change their truth value over time. What would it even be, King enthusiastically asks, for us to believe such things? I think this question has a very simple answer. In 2001 I believed I was in high school. I dont believe that anymore, because that isnt true anymore. The world is different than it was in 2001, and to the extent that Ive kept good track of it my beliefs are different accordingly. The position King occupies has an available response to this line of argument. Disagreement is regarded as a test for sameness in content. If one person believes p and a different person seems to disbelieve p, but it doesnt seem right to say that they disagree over whether p then there must be some covert distinction between the contents of their respective beliefs.11 If there is a proposition p that my former self believes and that my present self disbelieves, then it ought to be natural to say that I disagree with my previous self. However, my 2001 self (call him Dork) and I do not disagree when he affirms that I am in high school and I deny it. Therefore we must have different propositions as the objects of our attitudes. But this is an unpersuasive response. Dork and I believe different things because the worlds we occupy
11

This test for sameness of content is particularly popular in the relativism literature. See, e.g. (Macfarlane, MS)

are different and we modify our beliefs to track the world. I am disinclined to call this difference in belief a disagreement because I try only to disagree with people when I think that they are wrong, and I dont think that Dork is wrong.12 Dorks beliefs track Dorks world, which is to say that they are about Dorks world, but it is not then false that Dork believes p, that I do not, and that there is accordingly a doxastic difference between us. Suppose that Dork knew as much about me as I know about him. It would be false that he and I disagree about where we live, what TV I watch, and who is president, but ridiculous to conclude that our doxastic profiles are, accordingly, the same. They are not. Dork and I have different beliefs. Since our beliefs about what is true at 2001 and at 2010 dont differ, they could only differ with respect to our respective belief and disbelief in propositions whose truth values have changed since 2001. My third response is continuous with the final few sentences of my second response. It is a simple response, and hardly a novel one, so I wont belabor the point. Dork believes that 2001 is present. I believe that 2001 is not present. We dont disagree on whether 2001 is present at 2001; Id be happy to concede him that. Accordingly Dork and I have different beliefs about the perspectives we occupy, and those beliefs will surely change in truth value over time. So long as we can have beliefs about our own perspective (de se beliefs, so to speak) I do not see how it could be at all plausible that we cannot direct our attitudes at propositions whose truth values change over time. Finally, I think King neglects the fact that belief is not the only attitude. Since propositions are objects of our propositional attitudes, Kings point, if correct, ought to generalize to all of our propositional attitudes. We ought never to adopt an attitude whose object is a proposition that changes in truth value over time. But we do. Consider hope. Hope is a propositional attitude. I hope that I have children someday. Is this plausibly a hope about some particular time? Surely not. Lets modify an early King quote to see how it holds up to this adjustment.
12

Not about this, at least. He is wrong about Ayn Rand. And hes wrong about how to make friends.

What would it be e.g. to hope that I have children, where what I hope is something that varies in truth value across times...in the actual world? Indeed, I think the correct reaction is now to send Kings incredulity back to him: What would it be for the proposition that is the object of my hope not to be something that varies in truth value across times? It seems that the most natural thing to say is that I hope the proposition becomes true! I believe that Stable is false, in all of its forms. The previous four arguments were intended to demonstrate that Stable is false. King thinks that M-Stable is false, but that LStable and T-Stable are true, and this is his reason for endorsing Asymmetry. If I am right about Stable, then all perspectival propositions are equally unstable, and Asymmetry is false. King thinks that the modal sensitivity of propositional attitude contents is drastically different from other forms of perspectival sensitivity, and the earlier quote made it clear that Kings main reason for thinking this is that it seems correct to hold that the things I believe, doubt, etc. can change truth value across worlds. Ive tried to demonstrate that the things I believe can also change truth value across times and locations, so of course I dont see this as, itself, a reason to posit an asymmetry between worlds, times and locations. But I think that there are independent reasons for rejecting Asymmetry, even if my arguments against T-Stable and L-Stable dont work. Why think that worlds are special? Why think that the way we choose to model modal perspectives ought to drastically different from the way we choose to model temporal and locational perspectives? There are some formal differences--times are linearly ordered and worlds are nonlinearly ordered--but these dont seem relevant to the perspectival stability of the contents of our propositional attitudes. Perhaps ontological differences motivate different treatments. Realism is popular concerning nonpresent times, but not so popular concerning nonactual worlds. This may well be part of the explanation of Kings differential treatment; King is an actualist, and may well seek to avoid taking worlds any more seriously then necessary, so

as to avoid putting too much strain on his actualistically acceptable account of the ontology of possible worlds. But this cant be the full explanation. Presumably any ontology of worlds or ersatz worlds will do equally well to accommodate our intuitions about trans-world variation in a propositions truth value, and since King admits possible worlds of some sort, on which propositions are sometimes true, sometimes false, there seems to be no further cost to accepting any particular theory about the truth value of the propositions towards which I adopt attitudes in nonfactual worlds. So why think that my belief that I live in Columbus true at future times, even those times after my having left Columbus, but that it is false in worlds where I moved to Chicago in 2009? Perhaps it is because I dont think about the actual world when I am forming beliefs. But nor do I think about the present time when I form beliefs about the sunshine. Not consciously at least. When I think that p is presently true this often takes the phenomenal character of simply thinking that p is true, no more about the present time than it is about the actual world. So the fact that I dont consciously take world-specific propositions as the objects of my beliefs does little to demonstrate that I take world-neutral propositions as the objects of my belief. The attraction of drawing such an asymmetry may be grounded in the antecedently popular idea that propositions are functions from worlds to truth values. Certainly this would seem to require that propositions could vary in truth value from world to world, or else we would lose contingency. But its hard to see how this could be independently motivating; if one was keen on rejecting T-Stable and L-Stable, what is to stop one from conceiving of propositions as functions from ordered time-location-world triplets to truth values? I think that propositions historical role of determining a function from worlds to truth values is sufficient to establish that there must be some perspectival variation in a propositions truth value, but it falls short of demonstrating that there is anything special or final about worlds. I wish that there was more from which I could attempt to discern Kings motivation for regarding possible worlds as having a special role to play in the perspectival variation of the

truth value of propositions. None of the motivations I can dream up to ascribe to him are very persuasive. I will finish by laying out why I think that King must be wrong about this, whatever his motivations are. I believe that I live in Columbus. There is a possible world, w*, where Raleigh* does not live in Columbus. What is true of me, that I live in Columbus, is not true of Raleigh*. Suppose Raleigh* believes he does not live in Columbus. Since, when I utter I, the w*-bound individual that I refer to is Raleigh*, w* is a world where I dont live in Columbus. And yet, Raleigh* is surely correct in believing that he doesnt live in Columbus. So, then, consider my belief that I live in Columbus. In 2020 I will probably not live in Columbus; lets stipulate that I dont. On w* I dont live in Columbus. Is my belief false in 2020? Is it false on w*? If it is false on w*, it certainly cant be because w* is a world on which I have a false belief. I dont exist on w*, and the closest available alternative, Raleigh*, has a true belief that he doesnt live in Columbus. If the shift of evaluation to w* is sufficient for my belief to become false, in spite of the fact its still the case that on w, where I actually have the belief, my belief is true, and in spite of the fact that my counterpart has his own true belief, and in spite of the fact that Ive no strong intuitions according to which my counterpart and I disagree as to whether I live in Columbus, then Ive lost my grip on any relevant formal differences between my relationship with w* and my relationship with 2020. It seems to me that any intuition I could unearth and rally in an argument for the content of my belief being false on w* can perfectly well be rallied in an argument for the content of my beliefs being false at 2020. Now imagine that I can be persuaded that my arguments against the time-sensitivity of propositional attitudes are bad, and that there are good metaphysical reasons for thinking that the contents of my propositional attitudes index rigidly to the present time and remain true even as the world changes in the relevant way. So, we are imagining, Im now convinced of L-Stable and T-Stable. I think the most reasonable conclusion is M-Stable. Consider two subjects, occupying different perspectives, who adopt incompatible doxastic attitudes towards p, where the truth value of p varies by perspective in a way that matches the subjects doxastic attitudes,

and suppose that weve no strong intuitions that those two subjects disagree. This, we recall, was treated as sufficient to defeat the suggestion, in the temporal case, that the first subjects belief is false at the second time. So far as I can see, all of the relevant formal features of times and worlds match perfectly well. If that line is sufficient to rule out variation in the truth value of a subjects belief over time, then it ought to be sufficient to rule out variation in the truth value of a subjects belief over worlds. If were tempted by this line of reasoning, we ought to supplement Kings argument with the modal claim that our beliefs are always, at some level, about the actual world. In conclusion, I dont think that there are good reasons to reject the possibility of our adopting attitudes towards propositions that change in truth value over time and location. That may be my own mistake, and maybe its important that we not adopt attitudes towards propositions that change in truth value over time. But if this is right, I do not see any good reason to suppose that our beliefs do vary in truth value over worlds. I will now explore the consequences that my arguments have for Kings broader view, if they succeed. First, insofar as we can direct our attitudes towards propositions whose truth values change, Attitude, Value and Operator are not inconsistent. There is no need for a Lewisian/Dummettian bifurcation between contents whose truth values stay constant and contents whose truth values vary. This also means that I reject the metaphysical case, based on the properties of propositions qua objects of attitudes, for rejecting a sentence-operator analysis of tense and location expressions. Insofar as perspectival sentence operators take, as their inputs, propositions whose truth values vary across times, worlds and locations, the propositions at which we direct our attitudes are capable of being the semantic values of sentences in a sentence-operator semantics. However, Kings argument for a quantifier analysis of tense and location expressions was not solely, or even primarily, metaphysically motivated. Rather, patterns of felicitous English usage (King thinks) recommend against a sentence-operator semantics for perspectival

expressions. I do not intend anything Ive said to be incompatible with this result.13 Of course, propositions whose truth value changes across perspectives are also amenable to analysis in a quantifier semantics; Nothing Ive said requires a sentence-operator analysis of perspectival expressions. All Ive sought to establish is that, for all metaphysics has to say, such an analysis is allowable. But if linguists beg to differ, then they ought to be deferred to. One advantage of quantifier semantics is that it has the flexibility to accommodate perspectival expressions whatever their trans-perspective properties really are. My argument against the unique perspective-sensitivity of the modal properties of the objects of propositional attitudes means that such metaphysical considerations do not lend credence to a sentence-operator semantics for modal expressions. If quantifiers best model the formal features of tense and location expressions, in spite of the fact that we can adopt attitudes towards propositions that change in truth value across times and locations, then the fact that we can adopt attitudes towards propositions that change in truth value across worlds will not show that modal expressions have sentence operators as their semantic values. However, again, if linguists beg to differ, then we should defer to them. King, of course, cites a good deal of linguistic evidence that modal expressions have sentence operators as their semantic values and tense and location expressions have quantifiers as their semantic values. Im sure there is a great deal to be said for and against Kings conclusions. However, I dont think that King can count on any help from the metaphysical considerations he cites. The disanalogies between times and possible worlds, where relevant are too small, and where considerable are not relevant. The formal parallels between times and worlds are very robust, and they allow for a great deal of theoretical isomorphism. In the debate over how to model tense and modal expressions, reflection upon the metaphysics of times and worlds themselves is unlikely to offer much guidance, or to lend too much credence to one strategy over another.
13

Though, I repeat, I would refer the reader to my colleague Mr. Snyder. See n.3.

Works Cited Dummett, Michael. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. London: Gerlad Duckworth and Company Ltd, 1991. Fine, Kit. "Tense and Reality." In Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers, by Kit Fine, 259320. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. King, Jeff. "Tense, Modality and Semantic Value." Philosophical Perspectives 17, no. 1 (2003): 195-246. . The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Lewis, David. "Index Context and Content ." In Papers in Philosophical Logic, by David Lewis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Prior, A. N. Time and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957. Macfarlane, John. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Implications. Manuscript.