‭Abstract Entities in Realism, Nominalism and Metalinguistic Nominalism‬

‭In his work‬‭“On What Is”, W.V Quine‬‭examines arguments‬‭relating to the existence of‬

‭abstract entities from both realist and nominalist view points. Quine concludes this investigation‬

‭by defining the fundamental ontological commitments which differentiate realists from‬

‭nominalists. This paper will outline how realists are committed to the existence of abstract‬

‭entities and how nominalists are able to refute their existence. Additionally, this paper will‬

‭include a brief explanation of a metalinguistic nominalist approach towards the existence of‬

‭abstract entities, specifically through an examination of‬‭Sellars’ arguments regarding the‬

‭structure of language and how abstract entities cannot exist within it.‬

‭A central question in metaphysics is ‘what exists’? A more apt question would be: ‘what‬

‭things do we determine as having being/existence’? We can assume that we agree upon the‬

‭existence of physical objects (particulars) but what about properties, relations, fictional beings or‬

‭possibilities? These are abstract entities. Abstract entities as linguistic elements are the cause of‬

‭the fundamental disagreement between Realism and Nominalism.‬

‭Quine asserts that what creates this fundamental disagreement between Realism and‬

‭Nominalism are the ontological commitments that each viewpoint holds (Quine, 2011, p.9). To‬

‭find what each ontology commits to, Quine focuses on their use of quantifiers and bound‬

‭variables, as well as the value of said variables. The domain of quantification establishes the‬

‭scope over which statements hold true. This domain is denoted with quantifiers like “all”,‬

‭“some”, “none” etc. Bound variables are bound by these quantifiers. Let us illustrate this using‬

‭logical notation. A realist ontology would hold that: ∀‬‭𝑎‭‬‬(‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬))‭. Where‬‭𝑎‬‭is a variable for a given‬

‭entity,‬‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬) ‭is the predicate that asserts the existence of‬‭𝑎‭,‬ and the universal quantifier ∀ asserts‬
‭that the predicate‬‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬)‭‬‭ranges over‬‭all‬‭elements within the domain of quantification. This can be‬

‭translated to, “for all‬‭𝑎‬‭,‬‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬) ‭is true.” This‬‭suggests that the properties described by the predicate‬

‭are not limited to particular instances, but are universal and apply across the entire domain. A‬

‭nominalist ontology would hold that‬‭∃‬‭𝑎‬(‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎)‬ )‭.‬‭𝑎‬‭and‬‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬) ‭represent the same things as they do‬

‭in the previous equation. The existential quantifier‬‭∃‬‭asserts that the predicate‬‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬) ‭indicates that‬

‭there is at least one entity (‬‭𝑎‬‭) within the domain‬‭of quantification that satisfies the predicate‬

‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬). ‭This can be translated to, “there exists‬‭such an‬‭𝑎‬‭such that‬‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬) ‭is true.” This asserts‬‭the‬

‭existence of only‬‭specific‬‭entities that relate to‬‭a given predicate. What differentiates these two‬

‭types of statements are the variables that the domains of quantification are allowed to range over‬

‭(p.9).‬

‭To analyze this, for a realist,‬‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬) ‭is true for‬‭all‬‭𝑎‬‭’s. Therefore, the value of‬‭𝑎‬‭must be a‬

‭universal (property, relation, etc.) for the statement to be true. For a nominalist‬‭𝑃(‬ ‭𝑎‬) ‭is true for at‬

‭least one‬‭𝑎‬‭in the domain. Here, the domain of quantification‬‭only encompasses concrete,‬

‭particular entities. To conclude, realists are ontologically committed to the existence of abstract‬

‭entities because they accept that all entities are bound by predicates that apply universally.‬

‭Nominalists are not ontologically committed to the existence of abstract entities because they‬

‭accept that variables are bound by predicates in specific, separate instances. Ultimately, realists‬

‭claim that non-linguistic, abstract entities exist, whereas nominalists claim that words that seem‬

‭like abstract entities are simply linguistic features that allow us to classify particulars into kinds‬

‭and categories.‬

‭Metalinguistic nominalism and nominalism are both motivated by the same core‬

‭ontology: the only objects that exist are particulars and predicates are linguistic features that exist‬

‭to categorize such particulars (Loux, 2004, p.62). Metalinguistic nominalism challenges‬
‭nominalism’s claim that abstract entities are merely convenient labels and posits that they play a‬

‭fundamental role in language and thought. Wilfred Sellars, a prominent metalinguistic‬

‭nominalist, in his work “Naming and Saying”, develops his theory through an analysis of the‬

‭Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein. In this work, Wittgenstein attempts to‬

‭develop a perfect logical structure of language (as Sellars describes it a perspicuous language.) It‬

‭should be noted that, ultimately, Wittgenstein dismisses the theories he sets forth in the Tractatus‬

‭as nonsense. However, Sellars interprets the Tractatus through a traditional lens in which‬

‭Wittgenstein’s structure of object language is able to be applied to metaphysics.‬

‭To provide some context, Wittgenstein states that the fundamental building blocks of the‬

‭world are atomic facts and these atomic facts are what make up objects. Objects are entities that‬

‭exist in the world (particulars) and names are words that are given to these objects. Objects and‬

‭names are then configured in a way such that one can make statements about the state of affairs‬

‭in the world (ex.“The apple is green.”) The following will focus on Sellars’ interpretation of‬

‭Wittgenstein’s objects and how they relate to the function of abstract entities in language.‬

‭To illustrate, let us use the statement, “the apple is on the tree”, as an example. This could‬

‭be written as “‬‭𝑎𝑅𝑏‬‭” or “‬‭𝑎‬‭stands in a certain‬‭relation to‬‭𝑏‬‭such that‬‭𝑎𝑅𝑏‬‭” (Sellars, 2007, p.104).‬

‭Sellars posits that this could be written even more clearly. In a perspicuous language, you would‬

‭not need a third expression,‬‭𝑅‭,‬ to represent that‬‭𝑎‬‭and‬‭𝑏‬‭are related to one another. This would‬

‭look like “‬‭a‬‭b‬‭”. The configuration of these variables‬‭(names) can signify that they are related to‬

‭one another without adding another expression. Similarly, properties of these names could be‬

‭signified using a different style or thickness of font. For example, “‬‭a‬‭” could signify that “a is‬

‭green.” In the perspicuous language that Sellars is outlining here, relational words (abstract‬

‭entities) are not translatable, they are ineffable (p.109). Abstract entities in this perspicuous‬
‭language are the manner in which names are combined, not names themselves. So for‬

‭Wittgenstein and, therefore, Sellars, abstract entities (universals) are fundamental, ineffable‬

‭features of language, not universal features of the world. This ontology allows one to make‬

‭statements using words that seemingly refer to an abstract entity without accepting the existence‬

‭of such abstract entities.‬

‭Taking all this into account, can we answer the question, “what is?” No, we cannot‬

‭concretely answer this question. Abstract entities remain a central question in metaphysics. This‬

‭is where Quine’s ontological test comes in. Although one cannot positively say what is, one can‬

‭concretely define ontologies that attempt to answer this question.‬