BOOK REVIEW PROJECT

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Prof. Dr. Margana, M.Hum, M.A
Dr. Sukarno, S.Pd, M.Hum

Group Name:
1. Natasya Veronika (23021340071)
2. Hilda Asrina (23021340062)
3. Lela Alawiyah (23021340065)

ENGLISH EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

FACULTY OF LANGUAGE AND CULTURE
YOGYAKARTA STATE UNIVERSITY

Title : PRINCETON FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

Author : Scott Soames
Category : Philosophy of Language
Page : 187
ISBN : 978-0-691-13866-4
Publication : 2010

CHAPTER 1

The first section of the book explains how specific methods for comprehending the
languages of logic and mathematics were developed by philosophers ranging from Frege,
Russell, Tarski, and Carnap to Kripke, Kaplan, and Montague. It also describes how these
methods have been improved upon and applied to the study of natural human languages.
Philosophy of Language, by one of the field's most well-known modern practitioners,
provides an excellent summary of "where we have been, where we stand today, and where we
are, or should be, going in the philosophy of language" (p. ix). It is a volume in the Princeton
Foundations of Contemporary Philosophy series. It is split into two sections. The first covers
a century's work in the philosophy of language in four chapters, starting with the foundational
works of Frege and moving through Russell, Tarski, Carnap, Davidson, Stalnaker, Lewis,
Montague, Kripke, and Kaplan. The second, which is divided into three chapters, addresses
the difficulties in expanding on this heritage to arrive at a suitable understanding of language
and meaning. It examines propositions and possible worlds critically, drawing negative
conclusions about both as the basis for semantics. However, it also proposes a novel way of
thinking about propositions that try to avoid the problems with the traditional conception.
Additionally, it considers possible world-states as propositions that can be used to explain a
range of necessity and contingency-related epistemic phenomena.
In Chapter 1, the fundamental contributions of Frege are briefly discussed, together
with a nuanced overview of the alternatives and the issue of attitude settings (particularly the
potential danger of an infinite hierarchy of senses). Russell's account of propositions, the
circularity of his account of quantifiers, his achievement in analyzing definite descriptions,
his emphasis on thought rather than the social institution of language, and the way his
consideration of the need for us to be familiar with the elements of propositions to entertain
them all influenced his account of ordinary proper names are all explained in a surprisingly
brief discussion of Russell.
 CHAPTER 2

To avoid the semantic paradoxes, Chapter 2 discusses various forms of truth-theoretic

semantics. It starts with a review of Traski's seminal work on constructing a truth predicate
for a formal language in a metalanguage. Soames meticulously differentiates between an
absolute truth theory and a model's example of defining truth. (The definition of "Self-
Application y,x" on page 36 contains a potentially perplexing typographical error where an
existential quantifier is used to bind "y" where none should be.)

Truth-theoretic semantics does not have much appeal for Soames. He looks quickly at
the methods of Carnap and Davidson. I offer a few quick observations regarding several
facets of the Davidson debate. Davidson, according to Soames, "could do all the work for
which we need a notion of meaning," and he should "embrace Quine’s rejection of
analyticity, synonymy, and our ordinary notion of meaning, substituting knowledge of truth
and reference whenever there was something genuine to be captured" (p. 45). This
interpretation of Davidson's endeavor is what I've referred to it as elsewhere (Lepore and
Ludwig 2011). In my opinion, it is false, and Soames provides evidence to support this. He
notes that, in "Radical Interpretation" (Davidson 2001a), Davidson introduced a new
constraint: it must be confirmed from the perspective of a radical interpreter. This was after
Davidson realized that his initial suggestion—that an extensionally adequate truth theory for
a language with demonstratives and indexicals would not be sufficient for it to have theorems
that satisfy Convention T (suitably modified for context-sensitive languages)—would not be
sufficient. However, this makes sense only if he had been aiming at a different target.
Furthermore, in "Reply to Foster" (Davidson 2001b), he expressly refuted the notion that he
associated the meaning theory with a truth theory, and he defined what information he
believed one needed to have about a truth theory to apply it for interpretation.
Ultimately, Soames believes that the different improvements that can be made will
not be enough to support the assertion that a truth theory can be applied to provide a
language's meaning theory. The last criticism is that it becomes clear that the truth theory by
itself is not completing the job if we include the requirements that we must know a
translational truth theory, recognize that one exists, and understand a canonical proof process
for selecting the theorems to be utilized for interpretation. It is merely a mechanical process
that matches statements in the object language with sentences in the metalanguage that we
can comprehend and interpret. The truth predicate could be replaced with any other predicate
in the axioms and do similar work.
It's important to remember that the purpose of canonical theorem proofs is to provide
insights into the compositional semantic structure of sentences in the object language. Proofs
indicate how the components systematically contribute to fixing interpretative truth
conditions if we know the theory is a truth theory and the axioms provide satisfaction
requirements using expressions that interpret the primitive expressions. If we knew the other
predicate was coextensive with the truth predicate and the axioms satisfied the
aforementioned criterion, then substituting it would not do that (for more on this, see Lepore
and Ludwig 2011 and Ludwig 2012).

CHAPTER 3

Meaning, Modality, and Possible

Worlds Semantics

3.1 Kripke-Style Possible Worlds Semantics

Kripke-Style Possible Worlds Semantics is pivotal in analyzing modal logic's

connection to natural language. It introduces the 'Ƒ' operator to denote logical, analytic, or
necessary truths within predicate calculus languages. Yet, defining these truths remains
challenging. Models in this framework feature 'possible worlds'—essential elements
determining truth conditions for modal statements. These models comprise various
components like worlds, relations, an actual world, possible individuals, and a valuation
function. Truth at a world and logical truth are gauged based on these components. Modal
statement truth hinges on possible worlds and their relations. This method systematically
analyzes modal expressions, encapsulating necessity and possibility in natural language.
Ultimately, Kripke-Style Semantics provides a structured foundation for understanding modal
expressions, delving into logical and necessary truths within language.

3.2 Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis on

Counterfactuals

Point 3.2 in Chapter Three discusses the perspectives of Robert Stalnaker and David
Lewis on counterfactuals. Both Stalnaker and Lewis have made significant contributions to
the account of counterfactual conditionals using possible world semantics. They address the
challenge of understanding counterfactual conditionals, which involve statements about what
would have been the case under different circumstances. Robert Stalnaker's work emphasizes
the importance of evaluating counterfactual conditionals relative to possible world-states. He
introduces the concept of similarity between possible world-states and argues that the
standards of similarity used in evaluating counterfactuals may vary across different contexts.
Stalnaker's approach provides insights into the contextual sensitivity of counterfactual
conditionals and their evaluation based on the similarity of possible world-states.

On the other hand, David Lewis offers a distinct perspective on counterfactuals. He

focuses on the concept of possible worlds and their role in evaluating counterfactual
conditionals. Lewis's work delves into the idea of selecting a unique world-state that is most
similar to the actual world, providing a basis for determining the truth value of counterfactual
conditionals. Both Stalnaker and Lewis contribute to the development of possible world
semantics in the context of counterfactual conditionals, offering valuable insights into the
evaluation and interpretation of statements about alternative possibilities. Their work enriches
the understanding of counterfactual reasoning and its relationship to possible worlds,
shedding light on the complexities of counterfactual conditionals within philosophical and
linguistic contexts.

3.3 The Montagovian Vision

Point 3.3 in Chapter Three discusses the Montagovian Vision, which is a significant
aspect of possible world semantics. This vision represents a research program in
philosophical logic that aims to enrich the system by adding operators and constructions
reflecting philosophically significant features of natural language. The Montagovian Vision
extends the application of possible world semantics to incorporate modal operators,
counterfactual conditionals, temporal operators, indexicals, and demonstratives. By
integrating these linguistic features into the semantic framework, the Montagovian Vision
seeks to capture the complexities of natural language expressions and their modal, temporal,
and contextual aspects. This approach serves as a prototype for well-understood languages
with precise truth-theoretic semantic rules, contributing to the understanding of English and
other natural languages within a formalized and systematic framework.
 CHAPTER 4

Rigid Designation, Direct Reference,

and Indexicality

4.1 Background

Point 4.1 in Chapter Four provides a background for the subsequent discussions on
the semantics of natural language indexicals. It introduces the key themes and challenges that
will be addressed in the chapter, setting the stage for an in-depth analysis of Kaplan's system
and its implications for natural language semantics. The background encompasses the context
in which Kaplan's system operates, including the tradition of philosophical logic and the
challenges posed by natural language semantics. The chapter highlights the tensions arising
from the departure of Kaplan's system from certain aspects of natural language semantics,
such as the semantics of demonstratives and indexicals. These tensions are significant
because they raise questions about the extent to which Kaplan's system can be applied to
natural language expressions.

The section also introduces the central themes of the chapter, including rigid
designation, direct reference, and indexicality. These themes are essential for understanding
the semantics of natural language indexicals and their relationship to Kaplan's system. The
chapter explores the contributions of Saul Kripke and David Kaplan to the study of natural
language semantics, highlighting the significant changes that their work brought to the field
of analytic philosophy. Overall, Point 4.1 provides a comprehensive background for the
subsequent discussions, laying the foundation for an in-depth analysis of Kaplan's system and
its implications for natural language semantics. The section highlights the challenges and
tensions that arise when applying formalized systems to natural language expressions,
emphasizing the importance of understanding the complexities of natural language semantics.

4.2 Kripke on Names, Natural Kind Terms, and Necessity

 Point 4.2 in Chapter Four discusses the contributions of Saul Kripke to the study of
names, natural kind terms, and necessity. Kripke's work challenged the traditional view that
the meaning of a term is a descriptive sense that provides necessary and sufficient conditions
for determining reference. Instead, Kripke argued that the reference of a name is determined
by a causal chain of reference, which is not reducible to any descriptive content.

Kripke's work on natural kind terms also challenged the traditional view that essential
properties of objects are determined by how they are described. Instead, Kripke argued that
essential properties are determined by the objects themselves, independently of how they are
described. This view has significant implications for the study of necessity, as it suggests that
there are necessary truths that are not knowable a priori. Overall, Kripke's contributions to the
study of names, natural kind terms, and necessity have had a significant impact on the field of
analytic philosophy. His work challenged traditional views and opened up new avenues for
exploring the relationship between language, reference, and necessity. The section highlights
the importance of Kripke's work for understanding the complexities of natural language
semantics and its relationship to philosophical inquiry.

4.3 Kaplan on Direct Reference and Indexicality

Point 4.3 in Chapter Four discusses David Kaplan's contributions to the study of
direct reference and indexicality. Kaplan's work introduced a system of logic that
accommodates terms with interpretations varying across different contexts of utterance. This
development is significant in the logical tradition, as it addresses the challenges posed by
natural language indexicals. Kaplan's system sheds light on the meaning and use of natural
language indexicals, despite some departures from the semantics of natural language. The
section emphasizes the value of Kaplan's work in understanding the complexities of natural
language semantics and its implications for logical formalization. Overall, Kaplan's
contributions have significantly influenced the study of indexicals and have provided
valuable insights into the relationship between logic and natural language semantics.

In Chapter 7, the traditional idea that asserting a phrase in an assertive manner (i.e.,
without using implicatures to negate its standard force) asserts its content in the context (as
well as maybe certain relevant consequences and presuppositions) is addressed. In contrast,
Soames contends that to produce a proposition, many utterances need to be pragmatically
enhanced since they lack sufficient semantic content. According to the alternate conception
he promotes, normal, literal uses of a sentence are constrained by its meaning; when a
sentence S is semantically incomplete, the meaning is pragmatically supplemented to express
a thought rather than determining a proposition itself; and when a sentence S is semantically
complete, normal, literal uses of the sentence assert both its content and pragmatic
enrichments of it. Putting aside the details of the book, to which I have by no means done
them justice, this is a very valuable (though by no means introductory) overview of the
trajectory of the philosophy of language from Frege to the present, from the perspective of
the Philosophia Author's copy, to be sure. Not every significant advancement is covered, and
not everyone will agree that propositions play such a crucial part in shedding light on
meaning. However, it covers a surprising lot of ground in a brief length of time, presenting
and adding to a significant network of ideas that have influenced the analytic tradition's
philosophical study of language.

Chapter 5

The book's section on new directions starts with Chapter 5. It covers two primary
subjects. A fresh theory of propositions is one. The alternative is a fresh take on a potential
world semantics model for modal claims. I have already talked about this book in (Ludwig
2012), and Soames (2010) goes into more detail about the new theory of propositions, so I
won't go into that here. The Frege-Russell approach, which holds that propositions have
representational contents independent of ourselves and are what they are because of which
our cognitive states and sentences have representational qualities, is rejected as the driving
force behind this theory. In natural language, propositions are still required for functions such
as referents in complement clauses of attitudes reports and other terms. However, based on
their relationship to our "inherently representational cognitive states," they are to obtain their
representational substance (p. 116). In favour of a "Cognitive-realist" perspective, Soames
examines and rejects a deflationary one, asking instead, "Since propositions are needed to
track cognitive acts, why not take them to be event-types instances of which involve those
very acts?" Page 121. Next, the concept is that "any possible prediction that tokens it to do so
is for a proposition to represent the world as being a certain way" (p. 123).
The event categories are mental acts of prediction, and it is from these acts that
complicated propositions are built. Therefore, stating that John thinks Mary is awake is
essentially stating that John instantiates an act-type—or even state-type, depending on the
context—of the kind that is implied by the statement "that Mary is awake" in what is known
as the belief manner. Though more work needs to be done, this is an elegant and clever
solution to the design problem as developed by Soames. One might question the
psychological reality of the proposal, i.e., whether or not such act-types really figure in our
thinking about others' thoughts, but on this score, it is unquestionably an improvement over
the deflationary account and traditional accounts. As was already mentioned, Soames favours
substituting potential worlds with potential world states. As “helpful tools for regimenting
modal reasoning, investigating modal claims, and formulating systematic theories of the truth
conditions of modal sentences and propositions,” Soames describes hypothetical world-states
(p. 130). However, he disputes the idea that the meanings of sentences containing common
modal expressions are determined by plausible world specifications. World-states are
characteristics that define possible worlds. They can describe specific things as well as
qualitative attributes. As mentioned, they can include world-states that are metaphysically
impossible.
The world that the world instantiates is a maximal world-describing attribute, which is
the real world. Thus, the world is what instantiates the real world rather than the reality itself.
Since the gathering of items won't prove anything, does this mean that "everything that is the
case" exists in the world? World-states that "could have been instantiated" are considered
metaphysically viable, while those that "one cannot know apriori not to be instantiated" are
considered epistemically possible (p. 124). Similar to Carnap's state descriptions in Meaning
and Necessity are world-states. Atomic propositions expressed by atomic formulae and their
negations take the place of atomic sentences.
A collection of atomic statements or their denials makes up a world description. If
each atomic proposition or its negation is included, it is complete; if the propositions cannot
be known to be false apriori, they are consistent. A global government The property of
making the propositions in a world description true is called w. It is instantiated when all the
members of the description are true (as well as their apriori consequences) and only the
objects required by the description are present in the universe. The world-state that has been
actualized is the real world. Anything is required (or feasible) if any (or all) of the world-
states are metaphysically feasible from w. To include causal and explanatory statements as
well as attitude contexts, more must be added. Consequently, we add enough to address any
question pertaining to a complete world state, or at the very least, to address the topic at hand.
According to this theory, people, relationships, and properties are the building blocks of
world-states. This removes the requirement for simple possibilities of any kind when creating
a semantic model for claims pertaining to necessity and possibility. This appears to be a more
appealing option than potential worlds because it is more obvious what we are measuring.
However, if these methods limit objects to those that already exist, then there may have been
contingent existents that exist (and more than do).
We could admit mere possibilia into our domain, but this undermines the appeal of
the technique as a substitute for measuring over possible worlds, aside from the mystery
around what these are. The idea that we can refer to and quantify over only things that exist
is, I believe, an unfounded philosophical prejudice at variance with our ordinary thought and
talk. Soames addresses this issue by stating that we must quantify over objects and world-
states that do not exist (p. 128). Soames points out that we can quantify over hypothetical
objects, and he recommends that, given this model, we shouldn't be reluctant to embrace
quantifying over hypothetical objects. The problem with the parallel is that we don't reject the
reality of past times; rather, we interpret quantifying over things that don't exist today as a
matter of quantifying over things that exist at those earlier eras. However, since those people
are going to make up a portion of the world-states, we are denying the existence of the people
needed to understand them. Therefore, the parallel falls short if we deny the existence of such
constituents, which requires us to deny the existence of such world states. (Of course, one
could argue that there are times other than the present, but from this perspective, it is difficult
to see how we can properly measure things at "times" other than the present.)

Chapter 6

Using the study of world-states in chapter five to expand on the consideration of their
relations in chapter four, chapter six examines the relationships between modal claims and
apriority. It appears that the claim that p is true at w, if p is true at w, is apriori as a result of
the methodology presented in chapter five. If p is true at w, then it is either one of the
assertions or an apriori consequence of them, since the attribute w is that of making a given
collection of propositions true. Furthermore, these claims hold true in every world. This
seems to present a conundrum. The logic (in my interpretation) goes like this: (where we use
'a' to refer to the real world).
1. For any p, it is a priori that p is true iff p is true in the real world.
2. For any given p, it follows apriori that p is true iff p is true at a (from 1).
3. It is apriori that p is true at the world that is the property of making true {p1, p2,
…} for any p, propositions q1 … qn, if p is true at the world state that is the
property of making true {q1, q2, …}.
4. As a result, if p is true at w for every p, w, then p is true at w apriori (from 3).
5. As a result, if p is true at a for every given p, then it follows apriori that p is true at
a (from 4).
6. If p is an apriori consequence of a set of propositions Q and all of the propositions
in Q are apriori, then p is apriori for any statement p.
7. An apriori consequence of the propositions that q is true at a and that for any p, p is
true iff p is true at a is that q is true for any q.
8. Thus, if q is true for all q, then q is apriori (from 2, 5, 6, 7).
Evidently, though, not every true statement is apriori. The way Soames resolves this issue is
to refute (6), which holds that every apriori implication of an apriori statement is also apriori.
As a result, we can know the statement that p is true at a apriori as well as the proposition that
p is true at a and (2) apriori as a consequence of the former. However, it is compatible with
this that we are unable to determine p's truth value apriori.
How is it possible? According to Soames, a proposition p is apriori if there is a
method of considering it that allows one to learn about it without the need for empirical data.
(An obvious question to ask about this is whether we should consider the proposition itself to
be apriori instead of considering a proposition to be apriori in relation to a presentation style;
more on this idea later.) This principle can be used in the following way to explain why (6)
might not be true. One can consider the possibility that p is true at a, which allows one to
know it apriori, by presenting 'a' as the characteristic that lends validity to a certain collection
of propositions. The problem is that, even while one knows that the real world is instantiated,
one may know that a thus presented is instantiated without realising it (we shall address this
in a moment).
 Since identifying the real world as the real world (the attribute that the world
instantiates) does so (according to this perspective) in an indexical manner, it is not evident
what propositions it renders true. This is a more direct manner of summarising the main
points. Let a be the world proposition, the statement from which all other truths about the
world flow. It appears that I am aware of the apriori that, for each p, p is true if p is implied
by a. It appears apriori that a implies p. However, this does not put me in a position to deduce
any contingent truth apriori. I am not because, although I have introduced a term pertaining to
the global proposition, I have not done it in a manner that makes sense to me. Furthermore,
even if I manage to grasp it, I'm not sure that I'm holding onto the referent of "a." Therefore,
even if it isn't stated that way, a implies that p is apriori, and even if it were, I wouldn't know
if it is instantiated. However, if we frame it this way, we might question whether the claim
that a implies p is correct a priori. This is because, according to the definition of apriori
provided above, a proposition is considered to be apriori only if it is the same as the
proposition that could be expressed as "the proposition that A and B and... entails p," where a
conjunction follows "the proposition that" to express P. And it doesn't seem very obvious.
Denying this will allow us to reject the a priori claim that a implies p is true. Regarding the
puzzle's original version, the same query can be asked. To obtain the outcome, two moves are
required. To go from (1) to (2), we must first be able to replace "the actual world-state" salva
veritate with "a."
Secondly, in order to go from (3) to (4), we must be able to replace "the world state
that is the property of making true {p1, p2,...}" with the term "w," where they identify the
same world state, salva veritate. Regarding the second, is it evident that the contributions
made by "a" and "the property of making true {p1, p2, …" to propositions expressed by
sentences including them are equivalent? At first glance, this seems implausible. As a matter
of fact, Soames disputes in a footnote (n2, p. 133) that they make the same contribution,
citing the distinction between Millian and an articulated term. He asserts, however, that if one
is aware of the statement denoted by "S(the world-state that...)" and a = the world-state
that........, then one is also aware of the assertion denoted by "S(a)" (though not the other way
around, which is why they don't represent the same notion). In a strict sense, Soames has to
argue that salva veritate can be used in place of both "knows" and "knows apriori." However,
since that S(a is not the same proposition as that S(the world-state that...), the idea that you
know a proposition apriori iff there is some way in which it is presented to you on which you
might know it nonempirically cannot be applied here to get the conclusion. Let's concede that
one believes in logic if, for example, they think the claim that arithmetic can be reduced to
logic is true.
However, it is unclear what justifies the equivalent principle in terms of apriori
knowledge if the propositions believed are distinct. The correct conclusion, then, would seem
to be that even if one can be credited with believing or even knowing that S(a) given that one
believes or knows S(the world state), where is that world state? It does not follow from
knowing S(the world state) apriori that one knows S(a) apriori if, in fact, the proposition that
p is true at a is not something that one can come to know apriori in any way that proposition
is presented to one. But maybe this is going too fast. To understand if it is possible to know
that p is true at that point (the world-state that... There seems to be a way to present a
proposition so that it can be known apriori. In this case, it is possible to know apriori that p is
true at w, if p is true at w, and, consequently, it is possible to know apriori that p is true at a,
if p is true at a. This suggests that it is possible to know this apriori if the proposition is
simply that p is true at w, where w is the world-state that... The same is true for the world-
notion "a" which now stands for the proposition that A and B... one can know apriori that a
entails p by using "a" to denote the world-proposition.
Furthermore, if it is apriori that p is true at the world that is the property of making
true {p1, p2, …}, then it is apriori that p is true at dthat (the world that is the property of
making true {p1, p2, …}), according to premise 3 plus the assertion that for each p,
propositions q1 … qn. and the rule that states that every proposition p is apriori if there is a
method to deliver it to a person on which it is apriori, meaning that apriori knowledge of its
truth may be obtained. Following the subconclusion 4, it follows that if p is true at w for
every p, w, then p is true at w apriori, and so on. The idea that a statement is apriori if there is
a means to communicate it that puts one in a position to know it is true a priori is obviously
what makes the trick work. But how a proposal is presented to you will determine what you
can learn about its entailment potential. When a proposition (p) is expressed as dthat, or the
proposition that..., it is presented in a manner that facilitates understanding of its substance.
Now think about the real-world proposal @. Assume that this can be expressed as either that
(the proposition that describes the real world) or that (the proposition that...).
The problem lies in the fact that while the second case's presentation allows one to
understand the content (at least in theory), the first case's presentation does not, and it is
impossible to conclude from either way that the other approach chooses the same proposition.
We can therefore say that we know apriori both that p and that q iff p, even though we may
know apriori that p is entailed by dthat (the proposition that...) and that p is true iff p is
entailed by dthat (the actual world proposition). However, we are unable to infer that q from
this, as our knowledge of each apriori really comes from the ways in which the propositions
they are about are presented to us, and those methods aren't connected apriori. Going back to
the first transition, what makes the move from (1) to (2) justified? If we consider "the actual
world" to be a true description, then terms like "the instantiated world-state" are not justified.
It is necessary to interpret it as introducing an object right into a proposition that is expressed
in a sentence that contains it. Considering it as an indexical necessitates considering worlds
as aspects of contexts; nevertheless, unless one adopts a Lewisian perspective, conceivable
worlds are not elements of speech contexts in the literal sense. However, all that is required is
a method of comprehending "the actual world" that incorporates the instantiated world state
into a claim (this need not be the case for the argument's purpose). Kaplan's "dthat(..)" gadget
will be useful in this situation. We can assume that "the actual world" operates similarly to
"that" (the instantiated world-state). Then, "S(the actual world)" expresses the same idea as
"S(a)," where "a" denotes the instantiated world-state specifically. Is it possible for us to
determine the proposition "p is true iff p is true at dthat (the world-state that is instantiated)" a
priori? Sure, as long as nothing aposteriori is involved.
The transition from (1) to (2) is hence guaranteed if we accept that a claim is apriori if
there is a method of presenting it on which one can learn it is true without conducting
empirical research. Regarding the relationship between apriority and epistemic possibility,
Soames argues that while it is easy to assume that apriori statements hold true in all worlds
where epistemically viable, this isn't the case. Instead, a claim is apriori if it is true in every
epistemically feasible world, but not the other way around. Why? According to Soames, the
statement "p is true iff p is true at a" for a contingent fact p is a priori rather than contingent.
If contingent, it is false at some metaphysically conceivable point. According to Soames,
since it is coherent and epistemically possible, it may have been instantiated since it is
metaphysically possible. Thus, a claim may be known apriori even when it is false in every
epistemically conceivable situation. Previously, Soames defines "those one cannot know
apriori not to be instantiated" (p. 124) as epistemically feasible situations. Assume that P is a
contingent statement. If P is true at a, then (E) is the proposition that P is true. Epistemically,
a world where ~ (E) is true can only exist if it is impossible to know beforehand that w is not
instantiated. (E) is contingent apriori and can be known apriori (let's grant). Thus, it would
appear that it is possible to determine beforehand that, for every world w, w is not a if ~ (E) is
true at w. However, this does not mean that we can be aware of any specific world w* that is
not real. In order to do this, we would need to be aware of a certain world w* where (~E) is
true at w*. It seems that the only way we seem to be able to distinguish between conceivable
worlds and the real world is by identifying them as the attribute that makes a certain set of
propositions true. We could grant that we could know apriori that w* is the property that
makes {p1, p2, …} true.
However, if we were to know that ~ (E) was true at w*, we would also need to know
that P is true or false at w* in addition to the proposition that P is false or true at a. This
would mean that w* is true at a and P is false or true at a P's truth value cannot be determined
at a apriori. Therefore, it follows that (E) is epistemically plausible but apriori unknown since
we cannot know apriori that ~ (E) is true at w*. However, if P is true or false at a, then it
follows apriori that P is true or false at a, as stated in (5) above. It follows apriori that ~ (E) is
true at w* from the apriori assertion that P is false/true at w* and the (as we are thinking)
apriori claim that P is true/false at a is true at w*. As we've seen, Soames denies (6) in order
to prevent any negative outcomes. Now, let's take a step back and investigate the cause of
these unexpected outcomes. The source is the idea that when a proposition's truth value
depends only on the identities of specific objects—whether they be particulars or abstract
objects like propositions—their presentation can provide the information that fills in the gaps.
Singular propositions are thus stripped of the content necessary to determine their
truth value (in the sense of what is epistemically required minimally to entertain them). The
claim that Mark Twain is Mark Twain concerns a single person, presuming for the purposes
of argument that proper names are terms that link directly to one another. However, the way
the sentence is expressed (in relation to the language) indicates that it refers to a single
person; that is, the fact that the same name is used twice and that it was formerly used to refer
to the same person. The sentence that states the proposition is the only way that we have
"access" to it. We are in a position to declare a statement true without conducting actual
research because of the manner it is put forward. The same idea could be stated in a different
way, as this: "Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens." We are not in a position to know that the
sentence is true because of this "access." And what about the proposal? Is the proposal
considered apriori in its entirety? We can either reject the traditional view that aprioricity
attaches to propositions per se (at least in all cases) and say that a proposition as accessed in a
particular way is true, or we can say that it is true if some mode of "access" to it puts us in a
position to see it is true without empirical investigation (the approach Soames takes, which
then requires denying (6)). If p is apriori relative to υ and p relative to υ apriori entails q
relative to φ, then q is apriori relative to φ. This latter approach necessitates relativizing the
premise that what is apriori entailed by what is apriori to linguistic "modes of presentation."
As a result, rather than completely rejecting (6) on this view, we provide an improved version
that considers the things the tradition ignored. Reinterpreted in this context, the following
results don't seem as startling.
Propositions that incorporate propositions as objects, or in what is known as a "object
position," can present the proposition as an object in a variety of ways, much like a person,
and especially in varied language guises. Even when they only present the proposition as an
object, some help us understand the notion that is being discussed, while others do not. As in
the proposition that p is entailed by dthat (the proposition that ), when '…' can be proved to
entail p, we may be able to say that the containing proposition is true nonempirically after we
have a firm understanding of the proposition being discussed. Do we know the proposition
that p is implied by the real world statement a priori if dthat (the proposition that.. ) = the
actual world proposition? The answer is that the issue is not specific enough since it does not
explain what linguistic vehicle we are to consider when we claim that apriority in this case
must be relativized to a means of presenting a proposition included as object in another
proposition. It is entirely unmysterious given what it amounts to, and at most we may state
that the assertion that p is implied by the actual world statement is a priori with respect to one
presentation of it and not so with respect to another. In this case, choosing between the two
paths—both of which acknowledge the same facts—may ultimately come down to language.
However, I believe it is less likely to be deceptive to relativize the apriori to the presentation
of a notion, specifically to its language vehicle, as this clarifies the mechanism at play and
highlights a weakness in the traditional perspective. The question of whether individual
thoughts provide instances of the contingent apriori is also subtly discussed in Chapter 6,
which I will skip over.