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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 49, Number 2, April 2011,

pp. 135-159 (Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/hph.2011.0052
For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v049/49.2.brakas.html
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Aristotle’s “Is Said in Many Ways”
and Its Relationship to
His Homonyms
j u r g is ( g e o r g e ) b ra k as *
1. introduction
being, aristotle tells us, “is said in many ways” (levgetai pollacw`~). So are the
good and many other fundamental things. Fair enough, but what on earth does
this mean? What, to narrow the focus to the basic question, does Aristotle mean by
levgetai in phrases such as levgetai pollacw`~ and other constructions where levgetai is
used in the same sense? While scholars have presented us with an array of different
translations for this difficult term, not all of them are compatible and none seem
adequate. Yet it is crucial for us to have a precise and accurate understanding of
what Aristotle means by this term and the constructions in which it appears if we
are to have a clear grasp of many fundamental areas of his philosophy.
The main purpose of this essay is to identify the precise meaning of levgetai
and the meaning of the constructions in which it appears.1 My fundamental thesis
is that levgetai means “is uttered signifying something.” I will argue for this using
the following procedure. (1) I will consider some of the translations that other
scholars have offered for levgetai as it appears in the Nicomachean Ethics passage
and elsewhere. I will argue that these translations fall short, either because they
are too literal to be of much help or, more seriously, because they are misleading
or inaccurate. (2) I will consider the passages in the Categories and De Interpreta-
tione that provide the textual basis for the thesis offered here. (3) I will apply the
proposed translation of levgetai to other passages in Aristotle’s works, hoping to
Understanding the precise meaning of levgetai pollacw`~ and phrases like it is no less important
1
than understanding the precise meaning of levgetai katav and phrases like it (kathgorei` katav, for ex-
ample)—even more important, it could be argued. (I discuss levgetai katav and kathgorei` katav at length in
Aristotle’s Concept of the Universal [Aristotle’s Universal] [Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1988], chs. 6–8.)
* Jurgis (George) Brakas is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Marist College.
Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 49, no. 2 (2011) 135–160
[135]
136 j o u r n a l o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y 4 9 : 2 A p r i l 2 0 1 1
show that it may be applied widely in the corpus. (4) I will examine the relation-
ship between to; levgetai pollacw`~ and homonymy, since the two, although very
closely related, are not the same thing—as some scholars seem to think. Finally,
(5) I will attempt to define the meaning of to; levgetai oJmwnuvmw~, hoping to solve
the puzzle posed by Aristotle’s denial in several passages that what is levgetai pol-
lacw`~ is levgetai oJmwnuvmw~. If the meaning of to; levgetai pollacw`~ proposed here is
correct, one would think that the two phrases mean the same thing.
2. translations of legetai in nicomachean ethics,

a.6, 1096a23–29 and elsewhere
According to Ross, Nicomachean Ethics, A.6, 1096a23–29—notoriously resistant
to satisfactory interpretation—should be translated as follows: “Since ‘good’ has
as many senses as ‘being’ (for it is predicated both in the category of substance,
as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, . . . ),
clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then
it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only.”2 [e[ti d j
ejpei; tajgaqo;n ijsacw`~ levgetai tw/` o[nti (kai; ga;r ejn tw/` tiv levgetai, oi|on oJ qeo;~ kai; oJ
nou`~, kai; ejn tw/` poiw/` aiJ ajretaiv, kai; ejn tw/` posw/` . . . ), dh`lon wJ~ oujk a]n ei[h koinovn ti
kaqovlou kai; e{n: ouj ga;r a]n ejlevget j ejn pavsai~ tai`~ kathgorivai~, ajll j ejn mia/` movnh/.]
Although “‘good’ has as many senses as ‘being’” has the great virtue of making
good sense, we may wonder whether it is an accurate translation of the Greek.
Translated literally and stated in terms of fundamentals, the idea expressed in the
passage is: “tajgaqovn is said in as many ways as to; o[n, for it is said in all the categories.
It therefore cannot be one thing; for if it were, then it would not be said in all the
categories but in one only.” How does this warrant “‘good’ has as many senses
as ‘being’”? One wishes that the eminent Aristotelian had offered us grounds
for translating it as he does.3 As it is, this translation seems very loose, to say the
least. His translation of levgesqai at its second and third occurrences amounts to
‘is predicated of’: I take ‘is predicated in the category of substance, as of God’ (its
second occurrence) to mean “is predicated of God,” and I take ‘predicated in all
the categories’ (its third occurrence) to mean “predicated of things in all the cat-
egories.” This also seems off the mark. “Is predicated of” suggests the presence of
katav in the Greek and that Aristotle’s examples are in the genitive, but as a matter
of fact there is no katavv and the examples are in the nominative.4
In the recently revised Oxford translation, Barnes has, “Further, since things
are said to be good in as many ways as they are said to be5 (for things are called
2
W. D. Ross, trans., The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, vol. 9, Ethica Nicomachea. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1915).
3
That said, we could not reasonably require that he should have in that work, given the purposes
of The Works of Aristotle Translated into English.
4
Smith also believes that levgetai in the sense under discussion means “is said of.” See R. Smith,
trans., Aristotle: “Topics,” Books I and VIII [Aristotle: “Topics”] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 88, 89.
According to his interpretation, the meaning of ‘is said of’ comes down to “is applied to,” where ‘is
applied to’ simply means the converse of “is called.” That, however, is not the sense of levgetai under
discussion here.
5
This translation of ijsacw`~ levgetai implies that levgetai pollacw`~ should be translated by ‘[things]
are said to be ______ in many ways’—which is the same in every relevant respect to Owens’ “things
a r i s t o t l e ’ s “ i s s a i d i n m a n y wa y s ” 137
good both in the category of substance, as God and reason, and in quality, e.g. the
virtues . . . ), clearly the good cannot be something universally present in all cases
and single; for then it would not have been predicated in all the categories but in
one only.”6 To me, this revision is not an improvement upon the old translation.
It takes ‘things’ to be the understood but unexpressed subject of levgetai at its first
and second occurrences, thereby making a neuter plural subject—which is not
there—take a singular verb, inserts a ‘to be’ that is not there, uses ‘good’ to trans-
late tajgaqovn and ‘to be’ to translate tw/` o[nti. While all of this is possible, it stretches
credulity. The Greek simply does not say that “things are said to be good in as many
ways as they are said to be.” ‘[T]hings’ is not the subject, tajgaqovn is; nor are they
said to be anything, whether good or anything else. Similar considerations apply
to the translation in parentheses. “Predicated in” (that is, “predicated of things in”
all the categories), the translation of levgetai at its third occurrence, is of course
the same as Ross’s and is open to the same objections. Worst of all, this translation
of levgetai at its three occurrences reads a very problematic interpretation of the
passage into Aristotle—the same interpretation that underlies Ross’s translation
of levgesqai at its second and third occurrences.7
For the first part of the passage, Ackrill has, “Since good is spoken of in as many
ways as being (for it is said both in the category of substance, as god and reason,
and in quality—the virtues, and in quantity—the moderate . . . ).”8 He thus suggests
‘is spoken of’ and ‘is said as’ for levgetai at its first and second occurrences respec-
tively.9 The problem here is understanding what the English is supposed to mean.
Just what does it mean to say that ‘good’ is spoken of in as many ways as ‘being’?
What does it mean to say that it is said as god and as the virtues, and so on? “Good
is said as (or spoken of as) courage” cannot mean that ‘good’ is called courage
(nor does Ackrill say it does), for, if anything, it is rather the case that courage is
expressed in various ways” (J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian “Metaphysics” [“Being in the
Metaphysics”], 2nd ed. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1963], 115). To support
this interpretation, Owens first discusses Metaphysics, D.2, 1013b4–7 (see ibid., 112–13), using that ac-
count as support for his claim that “[t]he same holds true in general for the rest of Book D” (see ibid.,
113), and then goes on to use Aristotle’s discussion of contraries in Topics D.15 as further evidence
for his position (see ibid., 113–15). Although I cannot give Owens’s case the attention it deserves in
this essay (I will do that elsewhere), I submit that the text does not support his position. While it is
indeed implicit in the Metaphysics passage he discusses that levgetai pollacw`~ would mean “things called
[something] in many ways” (Owens’s ‘things expressed in various ways’), that is not the typical sense
of the phrase in Metaphysics D. To the contrary, the typical sense is illustrated by the opening section
of D.2 immediately following the passage Owens discusses, 1013a24–34—which is the sense argued
for in this essay. When he turns to the Topics for support, he appeals mainly to the second and third
paragraphs of A.15 (106a9–22 and 23–35). These passages are admittedly difficult to translate, but a
close examination of them reveals no additional support for his position.
6
J. Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
7
I have discussed this problem (as well as the entire Nicomachean Ethics passage) at great length
elsewhere. See J. Brakas, “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses of the Good” [“Irreducible Senses”],
Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse / Logical Analysis and the History of Philosophy 6 (2003): 23–73.
8
J. L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on ‘Good’ and the Categories” [“‘Good’ and the Categories”] in Articles
on Aristotle, vol. 2, Ethics and Politics, ed. J. Barnes et al. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 17.
9
Shields also uses ‘is spoken of’: see C. Shields, Order in Multiplicity (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1999), 10n2.
called good (or a good); nor does it seem to mean that uttering the word ‘good’ is
a “disguised” form of saying ‘courage,’ or uttering the word ‘courage,’ since Ack-
rill criticizes Kosman for claiming that the Nicomachean Ethics passage says this.10
Perhaps a better sense can be attached to Ackrill’s ‘is spoken of’ or ‘is said as’ (this
essay argues that there is), but one wishes that the great Oxford Aristotelian had
been more forthcoming on this point.11
Irwin, finally, has,
Further, good is spoken of in as many ways as being is spoken of. For it is spoken of
in [the category of] what-it-is, as god and mind; in quality, as the virtues. . . . Hence
it is clear that the good cannot be some common [nature of good things] that is
universal and single; for if it were, it would be spoken of in only one of the categories,
not in them all.12
The first part of this translation is much like Ackrill’s, giving us ‘is spoken of’ for
levgetai at its first occurrence. The second part gives us ‘is spoken of as’ for levgetai
at its second occurrence, a translation that seems equivalent to Ackrill’s ‘is said as.’
Irwin’s translation as a whole raises the same questions13 as Ackrill’s does.
We are thus presented with six different translations of levgetai in the Nico-
machean Ethics passage: (1) Ross’s ‘has the sense’ or ‘means’ (where the subject
would have to be a word or words) and (2) his ‘is predicated of’ or, equivalently,
‘is said of’ (where the subject seems to be a thing); (3) Barnes’s ‘are said to be,’
where that means “are called” (as in “a, b, . . . , n are said to be—are called —e”);
(4) Ackrill’s ‘is spoken of’ (where that is not the equivalent of the ‘is said of’ just
listed); and (5) his ‘is said as,’ as in ‘e is said as a, b, . . . , n’; and (6) Irwin’s ‘is
spoken of as’ (which seems equivalent to Ackrill’s ‘is said as’).
When levgetai in the sense under discussion appears in Aristotle’s other works,
many of the English translations we encounter conform to one or another of
these six. Not all, however. A brief survey of some of the volumes in the Claren-
don Aristotle Series reveals others. Although none of them, I submit, will stand
up to scrutiny,14 mentioning them will reveal how very wide the range of different
translations is.
Although levgetai in the sense under discussion does not appear often in the Cat-
egories and De Interpretatione (Aristotle there preferring the construction ‘a, b, . . . , n
are called [levgetai] e’ or ‘a, b, . . . , n are said to be [levgetai ei[nai] e’), Ackrill,
when it does occur, uses ‘is spoken of’ in his 1966 translation.15 This is in line
with his 1977 suggestion for the Nicomachean Ethics passage. Hamlyn, in his 1968
10
See Ackrill, “‘Good’ and the Categories,” 20.
11
The interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics passage that Ackrill proposes on the basis of his
translation presents its own problems. See, for example, S. MacDonald, “Aristotle and the Homonymy
of the Good,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 71 (1989): 150–74, 157–59. I also have a few things
to say on the subject: see “Irreducible Senses,” 34–35.
12
T. Irwin, trans., Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985).
13
Irwin does attempt to explain the meaning of ‘good is spoken of’ and ‘as god’: see Aristotle:
Nicomachean Ethics, notes on 1096a23 and 24.
14
The confines of this essay prevents including my case for this claim. It will appear elsewhere.
15
See his translations of Categories, 8, 8b25–26 and 15, 15b17–18 in J. L. Ackrill, trans., Aristotle
Categories and De Interpretatione [Categories and De Interpretatione] (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1966).
translation of De Anima II and III, uses a translation of levgetai we have not en-
countered so far: (7) ‘is so spoken of’—a translation that, although it builds on
Ackrill’s ‘is spoken of,’ is very different indeed.16 Charlton, in his 1970 translation
of Physics I and II, uses (3) ‘are called’ or ‘are said to be,’17 and so does Kirwan,
typically, in his 1971 translation of Metaphysics Γ, ∆, and Ε.18 Barnes, in his 1975
translation of the Posterior Analytics, will also use ‘is called.’19 Annas, in her 1976
translation of Metaphysics M and N, follows Ross, using translation (1).20 Williams,
in his 1982 translation of De Generatione et Corruptione, in effect has (8) ‘is used in
the sense’21—which is much like, but not the same as, Ross’s (1) ‘has the sense.’
Woods, in his 1982 translation of parts of the Eudemian Ethics (second edition,
1992) uses (9) ‘is [so] called,’22 which is much like, if not identical with, Hamlyn’s.
Hussey, in his 1983 translation of Physics III and IV, also uses ‘is [so] called,’23 as
well as ‘means’24 and ‘has the sense’ (1).25 Smith, finally, in his 1997 translation
of Topics I and VIII, uses the literal (10) ‘is said,’26 which is just like (4) ‘is spoken
of’ in every significant way. Since ‘is said’ is one of the more popular translations
today (perhaps the most popular),27 I have to go beyond merely listing it: what
on earth does it mean?
3. the meaning of legetai
The trouble with most of these translations, then, is the usual one with difficult
terms: some of them, although accurate, are so literal as to make little sense,28 while
16
See, for example, his translation of B.1, 412a22–23 and accompanying commentary in D. W.
Hamlyn, trans., Aristotle’s De Anima, Books II, III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
17
See W. Charlton, trans., Aristotle’s Physics, Books I and II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 54.
18
See his translation of ∆, for example, in C. Kirwan, trans., Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Books Γ, ∆, and
Ε [Aristotle’s Metaphysics] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
19
See his translation of Β.10, 94a14–16 in J. Barnes, trans., Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975).
20
See her translations of N.2, 1089a7–10 and 15–20 in J. Annas, trans., Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
Books M and N (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).
21
See his translation of B.10, 336b29–30 in C. J. F. Williams, trans., Aristotle’s De Generatione et
Corruptione (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
22
See his translation of A.8, 1217b25–26, 65 and the Glossary entry for levgesqai ______ w`~ on
206 in M. Woods, trans., Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics: Books I, II, and VIII, 2nd ed. Clarendon Aristotle
Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
23
See his translation of Γ.4, 204a2–3 in E. Hussey, trans., Aristotle’s Physics, Books III and IV (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
24
See his translation of Γ.6, 206a14–15, ibid.
25
See his translation of Γ.6, 206a21, ibid.
26
See, for example, his translation of 13, 105a23–24, of ch. 15, and his commentary on 105a23–24
(Aristotle: Topics). In addition to “is said,” Smith suggests that levgetai in the sense under discussion
may also mean “is said of” or “is predicated of,” in a sense different from the “is predicated of” that I
have listed as translation (2) (see ibid., 88–89).
27
It is also used by M. Furth, trans., Aristotle: Metaphysics, Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, Iota [Aristotle:
Metaphysics] (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985): see his translation of the opening lines
of Metaphysics Z; by J. Kung, “Aristotle on ‘Being Is Said in Many Ways,’” History of Philosophy Quarterly
3 (1986): see the title and 3–18; and by J. K. Ward, Aristotle on Homonymy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008): see 57, 59, 94, 105, and 115.
28
Although sometimes very useful, such translations are what Furth would call “‘rendering[s]
from Aristotle’s Greek, into a vernacular neither English nor Greek, called Eek’” (Aristotle: Metaphys-
ics, vi).
others, although idiomatic and natural, seem inaccurate. Even so, some translation
both accurate and idiomatic for this important term should be possible. I believe
that the problem of translating levgetai can be solved by going back to some of the
fundamentals of Aristotle’s view of language.
What, after all, is it that is said, for Aristotle, when something is said? On one
level, the answer is not hard to come by: words. To refer to words used in signifying
expressions, he typically uses the phrase ta; legovmena (“things said”).29 In the Cat-
egories, Aristotle talks of “things said in combination [ta; kata; sumplokh`~ legovmena]”
(‘man runs,’ ‘man wins,’ for example) and “things said without combination [ta;
a[neu sumplokh`~ legovmena]” (‘man,’ ‘ox,’ ‘runs,’ ‘wins’).30 De Interpretatione elaborates
on “things said without combination.” Things said without combination are of
two kinds: “names” (ojnovmata) and “verbs” (rJhvmata). A “name” “is a spoken sound
significant by convention [fwnh; shmantikhv kata; sumqhvkhn], without [reference to
time], no part of which is significant in separation. For in ‘Fairsteed,’ ‘steed’ by itself
does not signify [shmaivnei] anything, as it does in the phrase [lovgo~] ‘fair steed.’”31
A “verb,” 32 on the other hand, “is the [spoken sound] which in addition33 signi-
fies [prosshmai`non] time, of which a part separately signifies nothing. It is a sign
[shmeiòn] for things said of a different [thing]. . . . [F]or example, ‘health’ [uJgiveia]
is a ‘name,’ ‘is-healthy’ [uJgiaivnei] a ‘verb,’ for it signifies in addition belonging now
[to; nu`n uJpavrcein]. And always it is a sign for things belonging [to other things],
because [it is a sign] of the sort [that is] for things [said] of an underlyer.”34 In
other words, in ‘Fairsteed is-healthy’ [Kavllipo~ uJgiaivnei], ‘Fairsteed’ is a “name”
and signifies Fairsteed. ‘Is-healthy’ is a “verb” and also signifies health, a “name,”
but it does not signify just health: it signifies in addition that health belongs now
to—and there we must stop, because it does not signify the underlyer to which
it belongs, Fairsteed. In ‘Fairsteed is-healthy,’ health is said of Fairsteed—that is,
29
In taking ta; legovmena to signify words here, I follow Ackrill (see Categories and De Interpre-
tatione, including his commentary on chs. 2 and 4). Some might argue, however, that ta; legovmena
should not be understood as referring to words—to the utterances or expressions produced when
things are said—but to the things that are said, since it is quite natural to read the Categories as talking
about things that are said, it being only in the De Interpretatione that names and verbs are defined. Such
a charge would be partly true. It is true that the Categories should be read as talking about things and
the De Interpretatione as talking about words, but only if this means that the general focus of the Categories
is on things rather than words and that the general focus of the De Interpretatione is on words rather than
things. The Categories, for all that, also talks about names (see, for example, ch. 1 and 5, 2a19–34) and
affirmations (see, for example, 4, 2a4–10), just as the De Interpretatione also talks about things (see, for
example, 7, 17a38–b3). It is therefore quite possible for ta; legovmena to mean words in some passages
of the Categories. My claim is that the term is so used at 2, 1a16–19 and in ch. 4, passages which are
fundamental. (As added confirmation, note, in particular, the use of shmaivnei at 4, 1b26.) None of
this of course is to deny that for Aristotle sometimes it is things—as opposed to words—that are said.
The very passage where Aristotle defines the “verb” illustrates this sense of to; legovmenon. As always, the
context determines in which sense this ambiguous term is used—and it is not always either easy or
possible to determine for certain which sense that is.
30
See 2, 1a16–19; see also ch. 4.
31
2, 16a19–22.
32
“Predicate,” in the sense of “predicate-cum-copula,” might be a better—though still imprecise—
translation of rJhvma, given the definition that follows.
33
That is, in addition to a “name.”
34
3, 16b6–10; see also 16b19–25.
health is stated to belong to Fairsteed. ‘Fairsteed is-healthy’ means or reduces to,
“health belongs to Fairsteed.” The same analysis applies to statements where ‘is’
appears in the Greek: for example, Swkravth~ sofov~ ejstivn (‘Socrates is wise’) means
“wisdom [sofiva] belongs to Socrates.” On this analysis, there is no is, there is no
wise—there is only wisdom and its belonging to (or belonging in or being in or
being combined with) Socrates. The same analysis would apply to ‘Socrates is [a]
man’ (“Man belongs to Socrates”), ‘Socrates is three cubits tall’ (“Three cubits
of height belong to Socrates”), ‘Socrates runs’ (“Running belongs to Socrates”),
and so on.35 (In this way, Aristotle eliminates the need for his “paronymous” be-
ings36 and is able to explain the meaning of simple statements by reference to the
relatively simple ontology of universals and particulars and their relationship to
each other.)37
It seems evident from this account of the units of discourse38 that if a ‘thing
said’ is either a “name” or a “verb” (or certain “name” and “verb” phrases), then
to say such a thing—to utter such a sound—is the very same thing as to produce
a sound signifying something. This point is crucial. The ‘thing’ in the phrase ‘a
thing said’ is a sound, and to say such a thing is to utter a certain sound; if this ut-
tered sound is a “name” or a “verb” (or certain “name” and “verb” phrases), then
to utter such a sound is to produce a sound signifying something.39 If it signifies
nothing, then no word is uttered, nothing is said—the sounds made being merely
like the bellowing of an ox or the “talking” of a myna bird, without meaning or
significance.40 To put things more technically, if we let ‘e’ stand for a “name” or
a “verb,” then to say ‘e’ is to produce a certain sound signifying something—the
sound indicated by the substitution instance of ‘e.’41 To put it passively, if ‘e’ is
said, then the sound e is produced signifying something.42 That is, levgetai, in the
35
The Poetics supplements this account of “things said”: see chs. 20 and 21; see also Rhetoric Γ.3
and 12.
36
See Categories 1, 1a12–15 and 7, 6b11–14.
37
I argue for this interpretation of simple statements at length in Aristotle’s Universal, chs. 6–8.
38
For more on this subject, see M. Larkin, Language in the Philosophy of Aristotle (The Hague:
Mouton, 1971), 13–44.
39
In this connection, it is useful to recall the Categories 4 claim that every “thing said without
combination” signifies something—either a substance or a quality or a quantity or some other non-
substance.
40
Although the bellowings of an ox do “indicate something [dhlou`s i ti]” in the sense that they
“signify” something, they do not rise to the level of “names” since they are not symbols (suvmbola) of
anything (see De Interpretatione 2, 16a26–29).
41
It should be noted that Aristotle hardly ever uses the active voice of levgw in this sense. De
Generatione et Corruptione, B.10, 336b29–30 is one of the rare exceptions; literally translated, he there
says, “[I]n how many ways we say ‘being’ [to; d j ei\nai posacw`~ levgomen] has been stated elsewhere.”
42
Not surprisingly, the antecedents for this view of “names,” “verbs,” and statements—and for
this sense of levgetai—are to be found in Plato, especially at Sophist 261B6–62E2. A “verb” (rJh`ma), for
Plato, is “the [spoken sound] that is a means of signifying actions [to; me;n ejpi; tai`~ pravxesin o]n dhvlwma]”
(262a3), and a “name” (o[noma) is “the spoken sign applied to the things that perform those actions
[to; dev g j ejp j aujtoi`~ toi`~ ejkeivna~ pravttwsi shmeiòn th`~ fwnh`~ ejpiteqevn]” (262a6–7). “Things spoken
one after another [ta; ejfexh`~ legovmena]” (261d8), or “together [th/` suneceiva/]” (261e1), “and signifying
something [kai; dhlouvnta ti]” (261e1) constitute a “statement [lovgo~]” (262a10). Put another way,
statements are “the sounds produced [ta; fwnhqevnta]” when one “blends [keravsh/]” “verbs” together
with “names.” When that is done, this “elemental intertwining [prwvth sumplokhv]” straightaway has
become a statement and signifies [dhloi`] something (see 262c2–7). Thus, also for Plato, “names,”
contexts under discussion, is a technical expression meaning “is uttered signify-
ing something.”43
4. the proposed translation of legetai applied

to other passages
The translation of levgetai proposed seems to work nicely for the other passages
where Aristotle uses the term in the sense under consideration. When we look
at those passages, however, we find that he uses four different ways of expressing
himself when employing the term, four different patterns—three of which, at least,
are typical or recurring. Which pattern he uses is a function of how he combines
levgetai with three other elements: the adverb of manner modifying levgetai (pol-
lacw`~, for example), shmaivnei (“signifies”), and the things signified by the term
that is said, its significata. In the passages to be considered where he uses levgetai
in the sense under consideration, he always conjoins it with the significata, but he
may combine these two elements with the other two in different ways: (1) He may
combine them with both an adverb of manner and shmaivnei; (2) he may combine
them only with shmaivnei, omitting the adverb—or he might just as well have; (3)
he may combine them only with the adverb, omitting shmaivnei; and (4) he may
combine them with neither the adverb nor shmaivnei, omitting both.
The places where Aristotle explains why to; o[n [“being”] levgetai pollacw`~
illustrate the first pattern. Take Metaphysics, Z.1, 1028a10–18, the opening
statement of that Book: “‘Being’ is uttered signifying something in many ways,
just as we determined earlier44 in the works dealing with the number of ways in
which [things are uttered signifying something] [to; o]n levgetai pollacw`~ katavper
dieilovmeqa provteron ejn toi`~ peri; tou` posacw`~]; for, on the one hand, it signifies
[shmaivnei] what-it-is (that is, this), on the other, quality or quantity or any one of
the others asserted in this way45 [ou{tw kathgoroumevnwn].”46 Take Eudemian Ethics,
A.8, 1217b25–35, the passage corresponding to the Nicomachean Ethics passage
quoted earlier. Here Aristotle explains why both ‘being’ and ‘the good’ levgetai
pollacw`~ by conjoining levgetai and shmaivnei, a fact that is particularly significant
for translating this passage—and the corresponding Nicomachean Ethics passage
(at A.6, 1096a23–29)—accurately:
“verbs,” and statements are “things said,” statements “things said in combination,” and “names” and
“verbs” “things said without combination.” All are spoken sounds signifying something, and thus to
say any of them is to utter something signifying something. Put passively, if any of them ‘is said,’ that
means that a word or combination of words is uttered signifying something.
43
A version of this argument for the meaning of levgetai appeared in “Irreducible Senses,”
34–37.
44
The reference is to Metaphysics ∆.7, part of which is quoted below.
45
That is, asserted of (kathgorei`tai katav) some this. The subject of kathgorei`tai katav here is of course
a thing in each case, not a word.
46
Bonitz long ago observed this conjunction of levgetai and shmaivnei. See H. Bonitz, Index Aristo-
telicus, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1870; repr. Graz: Akademische Druck – u. Verlagsanstalt, 1955), 677a16–20;
note also 424b23–25. This conjunction of levgetai and shmaivnei was, for this investigator, the single most
helpful clue for sorting out and identifying the precise meaning of levgetai. I am very indebted to Bonitz
for the research he did about a century and a half ago in this area (and many others, as well).
‘The good’ is uttered signifying something in many ways, indeed in as many ways as
‘being’ [pollacw`~ ga;r levgetai kai; ijsacw`~ tw/` o[nti to; ajgaqovn]. For ‘being’ [to; o[n] . . .
signifies [shmaivnei] sometimes what-it-is, sometimes quality, sometimes quantity,
sometimes time, and, in addition to these, sometimes [things] in the [category of]
being-acted-upon, sometimes [things] in the [category of] action; and the good
is in each of these categories: in substance, mind—that is, god; in quality, the just;
in quantity, the moderate-amount; in time, the opportune-time; and teaching and
being-taught in the sphere of action. Therefore, just as being is not some one thing
with regard to the things mentioned, so neither is the good.47
The pattern we see emerging here is this:

(1) ‘e’ is uttered signifying something in many ways, for it signifies a, b, . . . , n.
That is, Aristotle explains the way a word signifies by identifying the things that it
signifies—how a word signifies by identifying what it signifies. Fundamentally,
therefore, “‘e’ levgetai pollacw`~” means “‘e’ is uttered signifying many things (a,
b, . . . , n).”
Metaphysics ∆.7, an admittedly difficult chapter, illustrates the second pattern.
Aristotle is here making a distinction between being [to; o[n or to; ei\nai] something
accidentally and being something in virtue of itself—as, for example, man is skilled-
in-music accidentally but an animal in virtue of himself. As I understand him, Aristo-
tle is here making a distinction, not between accidental and in-virtue-of-themselves
existents (o[nta), nor between accidental and in-virtue-of-themselves senses of the
copula taken by itself, but between accidental and in-virtue-of-themselves senses of
the copula-cum-predicate—being-skilled-in-music versus being-a-man, for example. At
1017a22–24, he says, “‘Being [certain things] in virtue of themselves’ is uttered
signifying just so many things as the types of category signify [kaq j auJta; de; ei\nai
levgetai o|saper shmaivnei ta; schvmata th``~ kathgoriva~], for in as many ways as [the
types of category] are uttered signifying something, in so many ways does ‘being
[certain things in virtue of themselves]’ signify [something] [o|sacw`~ ga;r levgetai,
tosautacw`~ to; ei|nai shmaivnei].”48 Here the pattern is this:
(2) ‘e’ is uttered signifying as many things as a, b, . . . , n signify, for the number of
ways in which ‘a,’ ‘b,’ . . . , ‘n’ are uttered signifying something is the same as the
number of ways in which ‘e’ signifies something.
It is true that Aristotle uses an adverb to modify levgetai in the second clause here
(just as he uses an adverb to modify shmaivnei). However, he does not use one in the
first, and it seems that he could just as easily have expressed himself in the same
manner in the second. The result would be ‘e’ is uttered signifying as many things
as a, b, . . . , n signify, for as many things as ‘a,’ ‘b,’ . . . , ‘n’ are uttered signifying,
so many things does ‘e’ signify.
See also the corresponding Nicomachean Ethics passage (translated, in part, below), De Anima,
47
A.5, 410a13–16 and (perhaps) Metaphysics, N.2, 1089a7–10.

48
I offer a complete translation and fuller discussion of 1017a7–30 in Aristotle’s Universal, 44–50.
Now, however, I would modify the translation given there along the lines indicated by the translation
just given.
Metaphysics, E.2, 1026a33–b1 illustrates the third pattern:
But since ‘being’ (‘being’ uttered signifying being in an unqualified manner) is
uttered signifying something in many ways [to; o[n to; aJplw``~ legovmenon levgetai pol-
lacw`~]—one of which was [determined to be] accidental being, another being as the
true and not-being as the false, and besides these there are the types of category [ta;
schvmata th`~ kathgoriva~] (for example, the ‘what,’ on the one hand, [and] quality,
quantity, place, time, and any other thing [‘being’] might signify in this way [ei[ ti
a[llo shmaivnei to;n trovpon tou`ton], on the other), further, besides all these, potential
being and actual being—since, then, ‘being’ is uttered signifying something in many
ways, first of all it must be said. . . .
Here the pattern is this:

(3) ‘e’ is uttered signifying something in many ways: a, b, . . . , n.49
Metaphysics, ∆.8, 1017b10–26 illustrates the fourth pattern. This passage is a par-
ticularly interesting case in point, on two counts. First, it illustrates not only the use
we are now considering but also the one just considered, suggesting that Aristotle
will employ these various constructions pretty much indiscriminately; second, it
uses levgesqai in two other, very different senses as well: ‘is called’ and ‘is said’ (as
in ‘is said of’). I translate the passage as follows:
‘Substance’ is uttered signifying [Oujs iva levgetai] both [1] the simple bodies, for ex-
ample earth and fire and water and all things of that sort, and [2] bodies in general,
and [3] the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings, as well as
their parts. Every one of these is called ‘[a] substance’ [a{panta tau`ta levgetai oujs iva]
because they are not said of an underlyer but all other things [are said] of them [ouj
kaq j uJpokeimevnou levgetai ajlla; kata; touvtwn ta; a[lla]. In another way [a[llon trovpon],
[‘substance’ is uttered signifying] [4] that which, being in those that are not said of
an underlyer, is the cause of their being—for example, the soul of the animal. Fur-
ther, [5] all the parts [o{sa movria] of these things. . . . Further, [6] the essence [to; tiv
h\n ei\nai], . . . also this is called the substance [oujs iva levgetai] of each thing. It follows,
then, that ‘substance’ is uttered signifying something in two ways [kata; duvo trovpou~
th;n oujs ivan levgesqai], [signifying] both the ultimate underlyer, [the underlyer] that
is no longer said of another thing, and that which, being a this, is also separable (the
shape of each thing—that is, [the] form—is such).
The second and third occurrences of levgetai in the Nicomachean Ethics passage
referred to at the beginning of this essay (A.6, 1096a23–29) also illustrate this
pattern: “Further, since ‘the good’ is uttered signifying something in as many ways
as ‘being’ [is]—for it is uttered signifying things50 in [the category of] the ‘what’
Metaphysics, ∆.18, 1022a24–36 is a particularly clear example of this use: “Accordingly also ‘the
49
in-virtue-of-itself’ must be uttered signifying something in many ways [pollacw`~ ajnavgkh levgesqai].
On the one hand, [1] the in-virtue-of-itself is the what-it-is-to-be for each thing. . . . On the other,
[2] any thing that belongs in [the formula of] the what-it-is. . . . Further, [3] [the thing another] has
received into itself. . . . Further, [4] the thing of which another cause does not exist. . . . Further, [5]
any thing that belongs to [a thing] alone as [it] alone.” For some other examples, see Prior Analytics,
A.13, 32b31–32 (ejndevcesqai uJpavrcein), B.21, 67b3–5 (ejpivstasqai), Metaphysics, ∆.1 (ajrchv), 1013a16
– 17, ∆.2 (ai[tion), 1013a24–29 and b23–34, and ∆.4 (fuvs i~), 1014b16–18. There are a great many
examples illustrating this pattern.
50
Note that Aristotle will sometimes use levgetai and shmaivnei almost indiscriminately: compare
the parallel clause in the Eudemian Ethics passage on the good, quoted earlier.
(for example, god—that is, mind) and in [the category of] quality (the virtues)
. . . —it is clear that it cannot be a certain common universal—that is, one thing;
for [then] it would not be uttered [signifying things] in all the categories but in
one only.”51 Here, finally, the pattern is this:
(4) ‘e’ is uttered signifying a, b, . . . , n.52
In fact, Aristotle seems to use levgetai in this sense with or without an adverbial
modifier indiscriminately.53
As this discussion applying the proposed translation of levgetai indicates, the
particular form that the translation would take in different passages would naturally
vary according to the different contexts involved. Sometimes it might be translated
as ‘is uttered signifying something’ (as in patterns [1] and [3]), sometimes as ‘is
uttered signifying’ (as in patterns [2] and [4]). Sometimes it might even be best
to translate it with the literal ‘is said,’54 if the specific meaning of this technical
expression is kept in mind.
5. to legesqai pollacws and homonymy

Homonymy lurks right beneath the surface of to; levgesqai pollacw`~, and I should
therefore say something about the relationship between them.55 The relation-
ship between the two is so close, in fact, that some scholars believe that the two
are one and the same thing. They are not. “‘e’ is uttered signifying something in
many ways”—which, as I have argued, means “‘e’ is uttered signifying many things
(that is, a, b, . . . , n)”—is not the same claim as “a, b, . . . , n are homonyms.” to;
levgesqai pollacw`~ is a feature of words or phrases, homonymy a relationship that
obtains among things.56
Although they are not the same, they come close to being so in Aristotle’s early
works. On the basis of the Categories, 1, 1a1–6 definition of homonyms, they are,
in fact, corollaries.
Those things are called homonyms [that have] only [a] common name, the defini-
tion of the being corresponding to the name [being] different [ JOmwvnuma levgetai
The opening clause of Metaphysics ∆.7 (1017a7–8) is another example of this use: “‘Being [some-
51
thing]’ is uttered signifying [being something] accidentally and [being something] in virtue of itself
[To; o]n levgetai to; me;n kata; sumbebhko;~ to; de; kaq j auJtov].” For some additional examples, see Metaphysics
D.3 (stoiceiòn) and D.5 (ajnagkaiòn). There are a great many examples illustrating this pattern as well.
52
He will also use the formula “by ‘e,’ I mean [levgei] a.” See, for example, Categories, 8, 8b25,
History of Animals, Γ.1, 509b17–20, and Posterior Analytics, B.13, 96a24–27.
53
See, for example, Metaphysics D.1 (ajrchv), D.4 (fuvs i~), and ∆.6 (e{n).
54
As in Topics, A.18, 108a18–26.
55
Homonymy in Aristotle is a topic that has attracted a large body of literature from ancient times
to the present. The confines of this essay, however, preclude a more detailed discussion than I am about
to give. For recent, comprehensive discussions with references to much of the relevant literature, see
Shields, Order in Multiplicity, and Ward, Aristotle on Homonomy.
56
Shields holds that the referents of to; levgesqai pollacw`~—which he calls “multivocity” or
“multivocality”—and homonymy are coextensive, and he also seems to believe that multivocity and
homonymy are identical (see Order in Multiplicity, 10n2). That cannot be true. If multivocity (to; levgetai
pollacw`~) is a feature of words or phrases (being uttered signifying several things) and homonymy (at
least in its basic sense) a relationship that obtains among things, then their referents are different—
multivocity referring to linguistic activities (“utterings” of a certain kind), homonymy to instances of
a certain relationship among things (being homonymous).
w|n o[noma movnon koinovn, oJ de; kata; tou[noma lovgo~ th`~ oujs iva~ e{tero~]. For example, ‘[an]
animal’ [is what] both the man and the picture [of the man are called]. That is [ga;r],
these57 [have] only [a] common name, the definition of the being corresponding to
the name [being] different; for if one were to formulate what it is to be [an] animal
for each of them, one will formulate a different definition of each [eja;n ga;r ajpodidw/`
ti~ tiv ejstin aujtw`n eJkatevrw/ to; zw/vw/ ei\nai, i[dion eJkatevrou ajpodwvsei].
In ‘[a] man is [an] animal’ and ‘the picture of a man is [an] animal,’ both the
man and the picture are called ‘[an] animal.’ Contrary to what many scholars
seem to think, it is the things signified by the predicates applied to both, ‘[an]
animal,’ that are the homonyms here, not the things signified by the subjects.58
The things signified by ‘[an] animal’ have the same name, not the things signi-
fied by the “names” for the subjects—‘the man’ and ‘the picture of the man.’ The
two animals therefore satisfy the first criterion for being homonyms. They also
satisfy the second, because the definitions of the two animals are different—one
being a living being of a certain sort, the other being a picture of a living being
of a certain sort.59 While the man and the picture do indeed stand in a certain
relationship to each other by virtue of being called the same thing, that does not
make them homonyms.60
57
That is, the different animals signified by ‘[an] animal’ in the two statements—as I argue
below.
58
This seems to be the orthodox interpretation of homonymy in Aristotle. See, for example,
Ackrill’s commentary on Categories 1 in Categories and De Interpretatione, and J. Barnes, “Homonymy
in Aristotle and Speusippus,” Classical Quarterly 21 (1971): 65–66. Two of the most recent commenta-
tors on homonymy are among those who hold it, Shields (see Order in Multiplicity, 11) and Ward (see
Aristotle on Homonomy, 12–13). It is not held, for the most part, by Lewis (see F. Lewis, “Aristotle on the
Homonymy of Being,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 [2004]: 1–36.
59
Aristotle’s accounts of synonymy and paronymy in Categories 1 are entirely consistent with this
interpretation of homonymy. His account of synonymy in fact supports it. “Those things are called
[levgetai] synonyms [that have] both [a] common name and also the same definition of the being
corresponding to the name. For example, ‘[an] animal’ [is what] both man and ox [are called]. That
is, each have the same name applied to them [touvtwn ga;r eJkavteron koinw/` ojnovmati prosagoreuvetai], ‘ani-
mal,’ and also the definition of the being [corresponding to the name] is the same; for if one were to
formulate the definition of each, the what-it-is-to-be-an-animal for each of them, one will formulate
the same definition” (1a6–12). As for his account of paronymy, nothing in it is inconsistent with the
interpretation of homonymy argued for here. “All those things are called [levgetai] paronyms that get
their label, corresponding to their name [th;n kata; tou[noma proshriàn], from a certain difference in
the form [of their name] [ajpov tino~ diafevronta th/` ptwvsei]. For example: the man-who-is-skilled-in-
grammar [oJ grammatikov~] [gets his label] from ‘grammar’ [th`~ grammatikh`~], and the man-who-is-manly
[oJ ajndgreiò~] from ‘manliness’ [th`~ ajndreiva~]” (1a12–15). Although the language here sounds odd
in translation, the idea expressed is simple enough. Certain things get their “label” (their name, re-
ally—in the sense that ‘Socrates’ is the name for Socrates and ‘man’ the name for man) from some
other word (o[noma, here), whose form has been modified. That is, the label—the name—is gotten by
means of changing the form of this primary word, and this modified form of the word then labels
or names the thing. Thus, the man-who-is-skilled-in-grammar [oJ grammatikov~] gets his name, ‘the
man-who-is-skilled-in-grammar,’ from the primary word ‘grammar’ [hJ grammatikhv]. Similarly, for the
man-who-is-manly and ‘manliness.’ (While all this is very tied up with language, the important point
here is not linguistic but ontological: there can be no man-who-is-skilled-in-grammar unless there is
such a thing as grammar. Grammar is ontologically primary. While I believe the ontological point is
true, the linguistic point is, in fact, false: usually the reverse is true.)
60
Generation of Animals, A.19, 726b22–24 does not contradict this point. movnon oJmwvnumon is an ad-
verbial accusative, and the last phrase should accordingly be translated “but only homonymously.” (So
also D. M. Balme, trans., Aristotle: De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione Animalium I [1972;
repr., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003].)
Although the things signified by the predicates—not those signified by the
subjects—are the homonyms in Categories 1, there is nothing in the criteria for
homonymy to prevent things signified by subjects from being homonyms in some
cases. Whether the things are signified by predicates or subjects is irrelevant. The
only two criteria that have to be met are the ones indicated earlier: (1) the “names”
must be the same, and (2) the definitions of the beings signified by the “names”
must be different. Whereas it is clearly the things signified by the predicates that
are the homonyms in ‘X [Socrates’ hand] is [a] hand’ and ‘Y [this bronze hand]
is [a] hand’ (not the things signified by the subjects, since they do not have the
same name or definite description), Aristotle would have no problem saying that
it is the things signified by the subjects that are the homonyms in ‘[a] hand [e.g.
Socrates’ hand] is a part of the human body’ and ‘[a] hand [e.g. a bronze hand]
is a part of a bronze statue of the human body.’
Lastly, I should stress that Aristotle’s definition of homonymy, also contrary
to what some scholars seem to think, does not at all require that two things may
have only the name in common and nothing else if they are to be homonyms—as
many of the examples we shall encounter clearly show. When Aristotle says that
homonyms have only the name in common, he means that, whereas synonyms
have both the name and the definition of the being corresponding to the name
in common, homonyms have only one of these two in common. This does not mean
that homonyms cannot have other things in common besides the name, however
little that may be, failing to qualify as true homonyms if they do.61 All Aristotle’s
doctrine requires is that “the definitions corresponding to the name” be different.
The very example he gives in the Categories passage to illustrate his definition of
homonymy puts this beyond doubt: the things referred to by the two predicates in
question (the two animals—the living creature and the picture of the living crea-
ture) are both substances, although “the definitions corresponding to their names”
are different. Moreover, the things referred to have something else in common,
something that should put the notion of zero-commonality to rest forever: the
definition corresponding to the one name is contained in the other. You cannot
know what it is to be a picture of a living being of a certain sort unless you know
what it is to be a living being of a certain sort (that is, a real animal). The definition
of an animal in the case of the man is contained in the definition of an animal in
the case of the picture. The second—and all other non-real animals—are all related
to the first, which is primary. That is, they are all “relative to one thing” [pro;~ e{n].
“Focal meaning” (to use Owen’s phrase) or pro;~ e{n signification (as I prefer to call
it) was imbedded in Aristotle’s thought from the very beginning.
If, therefore, several animals are homonyms, then ‘[an] animal,’ when used as a
“name” for these animals, is uttered signifying several things—that is, ‘[an] animal’
levgetai pollacw`~. Conversely, if ‘[an] animal’ is uttered signifying several animals
(that is, is uttered signifying animals that “have only [a] common name”), then
Irwin, for example, considers this a serious possibility (see T. Irwin, “Homonymy in Aristotle,”
61
Review of Metaphysics 34 [1981]: 524). So does Shields (see Order in Multiplicity, 1.1), although he argues
at length against that interpretation (see ibid., 1.2).
the several animals signified are homonyms. In general, if e’s are homonyms, then
‘e’ levgetai pollacw`~; and if ‘e’ levgetai pollacw`~, then the e’s are homonyms.
6. to legesqai pollacw ~ and to legesqai J mwnumw

o ~
So far, so good—perhaps. There is a problem, however. On this view of homonymy,
Aristotle makes a claim that seems inconsistent with the interpretation of levgetai
pollacw`~ proposed here. The main text in which he makes this claim (of which I
shall quote only the opening sentence here) is at Metaphysics, G.2, 1003a33–b19:
“‘Being’ is certainly62 uttered signifying many things, but [things that are] related
to one thing (that is, to a certain single nature), and not homonymously [To; de; o]n
levgetai me;n pollacw`~, ajlla; pro;~ e}n kai; mivan tina; fuvs in kai; oujc oJmwnuvmw~].”63 If
“‘e’ levgetai pollacw`~” means “‘e’ is uttered signifying many things (that is, is ut-
tered signifying several homonyms)” and—as I shall assume for the moment—“‘e’
levgetai oJmwnuvmw~” means “‘e’ is uttered signifying things homonymously (that is, is
uttered signifying several homonyms”), then something seems terribly wrong. On
the view of homonymy just presented, then Aristotle is saying that beings both are
and are not homonyms. That is a flat-out contradiction. What are we to make of
this? Is the interpretation of homonymy just presented wrong? The interpretation
of levgetai pollacw`~? Or the briefly sketched interpretation of levgetai oJmwnuvmw~?
All three cannot stand.
The answer, I submit, is that Aristotle successively modifies his view of homonyms
and, as a result, what he means by levgetai oJmwnuvmw~. In his earlier works, levgetai
pollacw`~ and levgetai oJmwnuvmw~ mean the same thing. Later, his views shift—until
he finally reaches the point where he will deny that ‘e’ levgetai pollacw`~ implies
‘e’ levgetai oJmwnuvmw~.
When discussing homonyms in his earlier works, Aristotle’s preferred way of
expressing himself is to use statements of the form “e is a homonym.” At Topics, A.15,
106a20–22, for example, he says, “Similarly, . . . ugly [is the contrary of] beautiful
in the case of a painting, whereas dilapidated is [the contrary] of beautiful in the
case of a house—so that the beautiful is a homonym [oJmwvnumon to; kalovn].”64 (Notice
that it is the beautiful that is a homonym, not that which is called beautiful.) Now,
if this homonym is uttered, then it is uttered signifying homonyms—or, Aristotle
might say, it is uttered signifying things homonymously (as opposed to “in the same
way” [wJsauvtw~]). What more natural way to express this than by saying to; kalovn
levgetai oJmwnuvmw~, especially if levgetai means ‘is uttered signifying [something]’?
Furthermore, if—to consider this matter from the other direction—we are given
only that the beautiful is a homonym and are then asked what to; kalovn levgetai
oJmwnuvmw~ is supposed to mean, it is difficult to see what else the answer could be.
If this is correct, then ‘e’ levgetai oJmwnuvmw~ means “‘e’ is uttered signifying things
I take “certainly” to be the force of mevn here.

62
63
I would like to thank an anonymous referee of this journal for pointing out the importance of
dealing with this passage for the thesis argued for in this paper.
64
Omitting the second tw/` in line 20. See also 15, 106b6–9, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 165b30–34
and Prior Analytics, B.17, 99a11–15. Less frequently, it seems, he will use statements of the form “e’s
are homonyms”: see, for example, De Interpretatione, 13, 23a5–11.
homonymously (that is, is uttered signifying several homonyms).” There is no
difference in meaning between this and ‘e’ levgetai pollacw`~.
At this stage, Aristotle sanctions statements of the form (1) ‘X and Y (powers,
for example65) are e’s homonymously’ (as opposed to ‘in the same way’ [wJsauvtw~])
and (2) ‘X and Y are called e’s homonymously [levgontai oJmwnuvmw~]’ (as opposed
to ‘are called so in the same way’—meaning ‘are called so signifying the same
thing’). De Interpretatione, 6, 17a33–35 puts this beyond doubt: “[L]et this be a
contradiction: an affirmation and a denial that are opposites [katavfasi~ kai;; ajpov-
fasi~ aiJ ajntikeivmenai]; and I call the [affirmation and denial] of the same thing
of the same thing opposite—not homonymously 66 [mh; oJmwnuvmw~].” If you can make
statements of the form, ‘X and Y are e not homonymously,’ then you can make
statements having forms (1) and (2). (At this stage, however, Aristotle almost
never makes statements having these forms. The only example I have been able
to find is the one just given.) It is hard to see what (1) could mean other than “X
and Y are e’s, where the e’s are homonyms”67 or what (2) could mean other than
“X and Y are called e, where ‘e’ signifies homonyms.”68 ‘Homonyms’ here means
what it means in the Categories.
In Parts of animals,69 Generation of Animals,70 and De Anima,71 Aristotle frequently
makes claims having forms similar to—but not the same as—‘X is e homonymously’
and ‘X and Y are e homonymously,’ as well as those where ‘called’ is added (for
the sake of simplicity, the rest of the discussion of this matter will often leave out
of consideration the cases where ‘called’ is added). For example, he claims that
“a dead man is not a man except homonymously,” that “a bronze or wooden hand
are not a hand except homonymously,” and that they are not called such except
homonymously. None of this contradicts any of the claims concerning the mean-
ing of oJmwnuvmw~ or levgetai oJmwnuvmw~ that I have made so far.
To show this, it will be sufficient for our purposes if we examine only the first
example. That is equivalent to ‘a dead man is a man only homonymously.’ This has
to mean “a dead man is a man, where the predicate signifies some homonym of man
(in this case, a dead man) other than the primary [prw`to~]72 man, or, that which is
man primarily [prwvtw~],”73 since Aristotle’s whole point in assertions such as these
65
See De Interpretatione, 13, 23a5–11.
66
My italics.
67
This would apply to attributive as well as subsumptive statements—though not as obviously.
In “this painting and this house are beautiful homonymously,” for example, it is not precisely being-
beautiful that is the homonym involved but the beautiful. This is clear if we keep Aristotle’s analysis of
the simple statement in mind. For him, the example given reduces to “the beautiful belongs to this
painting and this house.” Similar considerations apply to “this painting and this house are called beau-
tiful homonymously.” (For this interpretation of Aristotle’s simple statement, see my earlier account
of his discussion of “the verb” in De Interpretatione, as well as my earlier discussion of his synonyms and
paronyms. I defend this interpretation at length in Aristotle’s Universal, chs. 6–8.)
68
For Barnes’s interpretation of how Aristotle uses oJmwnuvmw~, see “Homonymy in Aristotle and
Speusippus,” 75–79.
69
See especially A.1, 640b30–41a6.
70
See A.19, 726b22–24, B.1, 734b24–27 and 735a6–8.
71
See B.1, 412b18–22.
72
For this use of prw`to~, see, Metaphysics, Z.1, 1028a14, G.2, 1003b16, and Eudemian Ethics H.2,
1236a18.
73
For this use of prwvtw~, see Metaphysics, Z.1, 1028a30 and Q.1, 1045b27.
is to deny that the thing referred to by the subject term is the primary homonym.
(Notice the nascent form of pro;~ e{n signification appearing here.) Even so, Aristotle
would still agree that a (living) man and a dead man are a man homonymously and
would therefore still say that a (living) man is a man homonymously—otherwise,
the conjunction just stated would not be true. Nevertheless, he would also say
that a (living) man is a man “simply” (aJplw`~). We therefore get the result that
a (living) man is a man both “simply” and homonymously. However, that is true
only for the primary man, any man other than the primary man being a man only
homonymously, never “simply.” So, in statements such as ‘a dead man is a man only
homonymously,’ Aristotle would mean just that—that a dead man is a man only
homonymously, never a man both homonymously and “simply.” Similarly, in ‘a dead
man is not a man except homonymously,’ he means that a dead man is not a man
“simply,” although he is a man homonymously—and, consequently, never a man
both homonymously and “simply.” As he implies, he is a man only homonymously.
The same considerations apply to the other cases such as these.
That being said, Aristotle does indeed modify the meaning of both homonyms
and ‘e’ levgetai oJmwnuvmw~ in other places in the corpus—which I take to be later.
The modifications are radical.
To understand how his thought on these matters progresses, it is important
to remember that he sees homonyms as “close together” or “far apart”—that is,
as located on a spectrum ranging from groups each of whose members are very
different from one another to groups whose members are so very much alike that
their homonymy is very difficult to notice. Consider Physics, H.4, 249a23–25:
[These] are homonyms [tw`n oJmwnumiw`n]: those that are very far apart [polu; ajpevcousai]
[from one another], those that have some resemblance [e[cousaiv tina oJmoiovthta] [to
one another], and those [that are] close [ejggu;~] [to one another] either in genus
or by analogy (for which reason they do not appear [ouj dokou`s in] to be homonyms,
[although] they are [ou\sai]).
He makes the same point at Nicomachean Ethics, E.1, 1129a26–31, giving us some
helpful examples:
‘Justice’ and ‘injustice’ seem to be uttered signifying several things [pleonacw`~
levgesqai], but, by virtue of their74 homonymy being close together [dia; to; suvneggu~
ei[nai th;n oJmwnumivan aujtw`n], it escapes our notice and is not comparatively obvious—as it
is in the case of the [homonyms] that are far apart [ejpi; tw`n povrrw], for the difference
in kind [in such cases] [hJ kata; th;n ijdevan] is great (for example, [it is comparatively
obvious] that both the [bar] below the neck of animals75 and the one by means of
which people lock their doors are called ‘[a] bar’ homonymously).
At a certain point, Aristotle realizes that some homonyms have the same
“underlyer,” making them homonyms that are “close together.” Metaphysics, Z.1,
1028a10–31 makes clear that beings constitute such a group.
That is, the things signified by ‘justice’ and ‘injustice.’

74
75
That is, the collar-bone.
‘Being’ is uttered signifying many things [to; o]n levgetai pollacw`~] . . . for on the one
hand it signifies [shmaivnei] the what-it-is and a certain this [tiv ejsti kai; tovde ti],76 and
on the other quality or quantity or each of the others asserted in this way. While ‘being’
is uttered signifying all these things, it is clear that of these the primary being [prw`to~
o]n] is the what-it-is, the very thing which indicates the substance [o[per shmaivnei th;n
oujs ivan]. . . . The others are called ‘beings’ because some are quantities of this being,
some qualities, some affections, some something else. . . . [Those things] are seen
to be beings [faivnetai o[nta] because there exists a definite underlyer [to; uJpokeivmenon
wJrismevnon] for them. This is the substance—that is, the [substance] for each [hJ ousiva
kai; to; kaq j e{kaston], the very thing that appears in the predicate of such a sort [o{per
ejmfaivnetai ejn th/` kathgoriva/ th/` toiauvth/]; for ‘good’ or ‘sitting’ is not uttered signifying some-
thing without this [oujk a[neu touvtou levgetai].77 Therefore, it is clear that because of this
also each of the others exists, so that the primary being—that is, not being qualified
but being without qualification [kai; ouj ti; o]n ajll j o]n aJplw`~]78—would be substance.
Aristotle’s main point here is familiar doctrine: substance is the primary being,
by virtue of which nonsubstances exist. What is revealing, however, is how it has
become clear to him that substance is primary (not why it is primary). The reason is
that a word or phrase signifying substance “appears in” (ejmfaivnetai) the “account”
(lovgo~)79 spelling out what the word for any nonsubstance signifies. ‘Walking,’ for
example, signifies a form of locomotion in which an animal advances by steps at
a moderate pace (let us say); ‘sitting’ a position of resting with the body supported
by the buttocks or thighs; ‘being-healthy’ the sound condition of a living being.80
The same applies to ‘the good,’ since ‘the good’ is merely a term for things falling
into some one of Aristotle’s categories but otherwise named.81 So, if you were to
take substance away from qualities or quantities or any of the other nonsubstances,
not only could these nonsubstances not exist, for Aristotle—they could not even be
conceived, since each is what it is of or in relation to some substance.82
Because Aristotle has realized that all beings are related in this way, he has
moved very close to where he will claim that it is correct to deny that beings are
beings homonymously, deny that they are called such homonymously (levgetai
oJmwnuvmw~), and deny that ‘being’ levgetai oJmwnuvmw~ (that is, is uttered signifying
homonyms).
At Z.4, 1030a27–b4, he is willing to say that we can now truly both assert and
deny that the-what-it-is-to-be [for things]—which are beings, for him—are beings
homonymously and are called such homonymously (levgetai oJmwnuvmw~)—although
I follow Ross here (see W. D. Ross, ed., Aristotle’s Metaphysics, vol. 2 [Oxford: Clarendon Press,
76
1953], commentary on 28a11), contra Bostock (see his commentary on the entire passage quoted, in
D. Bostock, trans., Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Books Z and H [Aristotle’s Metaphysics] [1994; repr., Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2003]). “[A] tiv ejsti is the tiv ejsti of something, the answer to the question ‘what is it?’
[where the ‘it’ may be a primary or secondary substance but the ‘what’ predicated of the ‘it’ must be a
universal]. . . . A tovde ti on the other hand is not the tovde ti of anything; it is simply an individual.”
77
Italics added.
78
See Ross’s Aristotle’s Metaphysics, commentary on lines 30–31.
79
See his word usage at 1028a32–36, right after the paragraph just quoted.
80
The same point applies to nonsubstance individuals.
81
I argue for this point at length in “Irreducible Senses.”
82
For a very different approach to this passage, see Bostock’s Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 45–57, and
65–68.
the claims will of course have different meanings when we assert it and when we
deny it.
So, while we must also consider how we should express ourselves [to; pw`~ dei` levgein]
about each [of these matters], we certainly need not do so more than [demanded by]
how the case stands [to; pw`~ e[cei]. Here, too, for that reason (since what was said is
clear [to; legovmenon fanerovn]), also the what-it-is-to-be [for something] [to; tiv h\n ei\nai]
similarly will belong primarily and in an unqualified way to [a] substance and sec-
ondarily [ei[ta kai;] to the others (just as also the what-it-is [does]), not what-it-is-to-be
in an unqualified way but what-it-is-to-be for a quality or a quantity. In fact, we must
say these things83 are beings either homonymously [dei` ga;r h] oJmwnuvmw~ tau`ta favnai ei[nai
o[nta] or by adding to and taking away from [what they are said to be] [prostiqevnta~ kai;
ajfairou`nta~]84 (just as [we] also [do when we say that] that-which-is-not-known is
known [to; mh; ejpisthtovn ejpisthtovn]),85 since86 it is certainly correct to say [that these things
are beings] neither homonymously nor in the same way [ejpei; tov ge ojrtovn mhvte oJmwnuvmw~
favnai mhvte wJsauvtw~] but just as that-which-is-surgical [is something] in the manner of being
relative to one and the same thing [to; ijatriko;n tw/` pro;~ to; aujto; me;n kai; e{n87]—not [be-
ing] one and the same thing and certainly not [being something] homonymously
[ouj mevntoi oujde; oJmwnuvmw~] (for a patient [sw`ma] and a procedure and an instrument
are called [levgetai] ‘surgical’ neither homonymously nor in one way [kaq j e]n] but
relative to one thing). In fact, however,88 in which of the two ways someone wishes
to express himself about these things makes no difference [ajlla; tau`ta me;n oJpwtevrw~
ti~ ejqevlei levgein diafevrei oujdevn].89
It is correct to say that the-what-it-is-to-be for things in all the categories are beings
homonymously because it is correct to say that the what-it-is-to-be for a substance
is a being, where ‘being’ signifies a substance, that the what-it-is-to-be for a qual-
ity is a being, where ‘being’ signifies a quality, and so on for the rest. It is correct
for the same reason that it is correct to say that that-which-is-surgical (a patient,
a procedure, and an instrument, for example) are surgical homonymously. It is
correct because ‘surgical’ signifies different things when applied to different in-
stances of that-which-is-surgical.90 However, it is also correct to say that that-which-
is-surgical is not surgical homonymously, saying instead that it is “[something]
relative to one and the same thing.” When you spell out what ‘surgical’ signifies
when applied to the patient, the procedure, and the instrument, “adding” what
you have spelled out to them and “taking away” ‘surgical,’ the result is that they
are called something relative to one and the same thing. They are not called the
83
‘These things’ refers to the-what-it-is-to-be for things in all the categories, as does—at least in
most cases—both ‘adding to’ and ‘taking away from.’
84
My italics.
85
I agree with Ross’s gloss: that which is not known is said to be known to be not known (see
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, vol. II). So also Furth (see Aristotle: Metaphysics, note on 1030a32–34) and
Bostock (see Aristotle’s Metaphysics, commentary on 1030a27–b7).
86
For this translation of ejpeiv, see H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1920), entry 2380.
87
My italics. Although, as Furth points out in Aristotle: Metaphysics, “The idea that being . . . is itself a
pros hen legomenon has already been introduced in the first two sentences of Zeta 1, . . . pros to auto kai hen
here . . . is the first use in Zeta of the actual technical term” (see his commentary on 1030a34–b3).
88
For this translation of ajlla; . . . mevn, see Smyth, Greek Grammar, entry 2902.
89
See also Metaphysics, Q.1, 1045b27–32.
90
See Metaphysics, G.2, 1003a33–b10, where these and similar examples are used.
same thing homonymously. You would get something like: the patient is ready for
or needs surgery, the procedure is used in surgery, and the instrument is made to
be used in surgery—where the predicates all make reference to one and the same
thing, with no homonomy being involved. The same would be true for the what-
it-is-to-be for things in all the categories. The what-it-is-to-be for a substance is a
certain substance (oujs iva), the what-it-is-to-be for a quality is a certain quality of a
substance, the what-it-is-to-be for a quantity a certain quantity of a substance, and
so on. The predicates in question all make reference to one and the same thing,
with no homonomy being involved. Therefore, it is true to say that the what-it-is-to-
be for things in all the categories are not beings homonymously and that they are
not called such homonymously. Furthermore, since the what-it-is-to-be for things
in all the categories are beings for Aristotle, this implies that it is true to say that
beings in all the categories are not beings homonymously and that they are not
called such homonymously. Finally, if beings are not beings homonymously, it is
difficult to see how they can be homonyms and, therefore, how ‘being’ can be
levgetai oJmwnuvmw~—that is, uttered signifying homonyms.
At a certain point, however, Aristotle hardens his position. He rejects the
idea that it “makes no difference” “in which of the two ways someone wishes to
express himself about these things,” rejecting the first alternative. He rejects the
idea that e’s are homonyms where the following conditions are met: (1) Two or
more things (X, Y, . . . , N) are called ‘e’ (or, to put it in more accurate and fun-
damental terms: e is stated to belong to two or more things); (2) the definitions
(oJrismoiv) or accounts (lovgoi) of the beings (oujs ivai) of the things signified by ‘e’ in
the different cases are different; and (3) the definitions or accounts are all related
to one and the same thing. (Similarly, of course, for the case where two or more
things are e, the fundamental case upon which the three conditions just stated
rests.) Take Eudemian Ethics,91 H.2, 1236a15–22 (of which I will quote only lines
15–18): “There must, then, be three kinds of friendship, neither all [to be called
‘friendship’] in virtue of [being] one thing or as kinds falling under one genus
[are], nor to be called [‘friendship’] at all homonymously,92 for they are called
[‘friendship’] relative to some one friendship, the primary one [ajnavgkh a[ra triva
filiva~ ei[dh ei\nai, kai; mhvte kaq j e}n aJpavsa~ mhd j wJ~ ei[dh eJno;~ gevnou~, mhvte pavmpan
levgesqai oJmwnuvmw~. pro;~ mivan gavr tina levgontai kai; prwvthn].”93 That is, the three
kinds of friendship are not called ‘friendship’ homonymously because they are all
called ‘friendship’ relative to the primary kind of friendship—implying that the
While I accept the generally held view that the Eudemian Ethics is a relatively early work, there
91
was of course nothing to prevent Aristotle from going back to that work later, after having discovered
the pro;~ e{n signification of some terms levgontai pollacw`~, and revising parts of it accordingly.
92
The claim made by Aristotle here is much stronger than that suggested by the translations of-
fered by Solomon (J. Solomon, trans., The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, vol. 9, Ethica Eudemia
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915]) and Shields (Order in Multiplicity, 67). The three kinds of friendship
are not at all called “friendship” homonymously—that is, they are not at all called something signifying
homonyms. When preceded by a negative, pavmpan means not at all, by no means (see H. G. Liddell and
R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed., rev. H. S. Jones, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968]).
93
“[T]he primary friendship [hJ prwvth filiva] is the affection and preference of good men for
one another.” (Eudemian Ethics, H.2, 1236b2–3)
things signified by the predicate ‘friendship’ are disqualified from being homonyms
because they are all related to one and the same thing. Take Eudemian Ethics, H.2,
1236b23–26, where Aristotle is talking about the three kinds of friends: “[I]t is
not possible [to call] all [of them a friend] in virtue of [‘friendship’ having] one
formula. Now, then, what thus remains [is] that, in one way, the primary friendship
is the only one, in another way, all are—neither as homonyms94 (that is, as being by
chance relative to one another) nor in virtue of [being] one kind [of friendship],
but rather [by being] relative to one thing [leivpetai toivnun ou{tw~, o[ti e[sti me;n wJ~
movnh <hJ> prwvth filiva, e[sti de; wJ~ pa`sai, ou[te wJ~ oJmwvnumoi kai; wJ~ e[tucon e[cousai
pro;~ eJautav~, ou[te kaq j e[n ei\do~, ajlla; ma`llon pro;~ e{n].” Here, too, the three kinds
of friendship are disqualified from being homonyms because they are all “relative
to one thing.” More generally, things having the same name that are relative to
the same thing are no longer homonyms for Aristotle. Lastly, take Metaphysics, K.3,
1060b31–36 (K.3 supposedly being a shorter form of Metaphysics G.1 and 2),95
where Aristotle implies that substance, quality, and the rest are not called ‘being’
homonymously—which, in turn, implies that ‘being’ (the ‘being’ just mentioned)
is not levgetai oJmwnuvmw~ (that is, uttered signifying homonyms).
Since the philosopher’s subject of study [hJ tou` filosovfou ejpisthvmh] is being qua
being as a whole, not a part [of it] [tou` o[nto~ h/| o]n kaqovlou kai; ouj kata; mevro~], and
‘being’ is uttered signifying many things, not one thing [to; o]n pollacw`~ kai; ouj kaq j
e{na levgetai trovpon], it follows that if, one the one hand, [beings are called ‘beings’]
homonymously in virtue of [there being] nothing common [to them all] [eij mevn
ou\n oJmwnuvmw~ kata; de; koino;n mhdevn], it is not possible [for beings] to be the subject of
one study [uJpo; mivan ejpisthvmhn] (for [there is] not one genus among things such as
these [tw`n toiouvtwn]); but if, on the other hand, [they are called ‘beings’] by virtue of
[there being] something common [to them all] [katav ti koinovn], then [beings] would
be [ei[h a]n] the subject of one study.
Aristotle then goes on to argue that “the reference” [hJ ajnagwghv] of every ‘being’—
just like the reference of every ‘surgical’ and ‘healthy’—“turns out to be relative
to some one thing, a thing that is common [to them all] [givgnetai pro;~ e{n ti kai;
koinovn].”96 Beings, therefore, are called ‘beings’ by virtue of there being something
common to them all, although this is not a genus; they therefore are the subject
of one study, and they are not called ‘beings’ homonymously.
The upshot is that if a term (‘e’) signifies things whose definitions or accounts
are all related to one and the same thing, then ‘e’ is not levgetai oJmwnuvmw~—that is,
not uttered signifying homonyms. Aristotle clearly says as much also at Generation
and Corruption, A.6, 322b29–23a1: “‘[C]ontact’ must be discussed first. So, just as,
practically speaking, also each of the other names is uttered signifying many things
(some [uttered] homonymously, others [uttered signifying] things [derived] from
different, prior things) [tw`n a[llwn ojnomavtwn e{kaston levgetai pollacw`~, kai; ta; me;n
oJmwnuvmw~ ta; de; qavtera ajpo; tw`n eJtevrwn kai; tw`n protevrwn], so also is it with ‘contact.’
My italics.
94
95
See W. D. Ross, trans., The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, vol. 8, Metaphysica. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1928), xiii.
96
See K.3, 1061a10–11.
Nevertheless, [‘contact’] uttered in the proper way [to; kurivw~ legovmenon] belongs to
things having position.” That is, while just about every “name” is “uttered signifying
many things,” some are “[uttered signifying] things [derived] from different, prior
things,” others—those that “[are uttered] homonymously”—are not. If all of this
is correct, then clearly it is not the case that ‘being’ levgetai oJmwnuvmw~.
Homonyms have now been relegated to those groups of things that are “by
chance relative to one another”—or, at least, to those groups of things having the
same name whose beings have different definitions or accounts without being related
to one and the same thing. One pair of examples that Aristotle uses to illustrate this
new view of homonyms is the bar used to lock one’s door and the collar-bone,
discussed earlier.97
We are now ready to tackle Metaphysics, G.2, 1003a33–b19,98 the full passage in
which Aristotle explicitly denies that ‘being’ levgetai oJmwnuvmw~.99
‘Being’ is certainly uttered signifying many things, but [things] related to one thing
(that is, to a certain single nature), and not homonymously [to; de; o[n levgetai me;n
pollacw`~, ajlla; pro;~ e}n kai; mivan tina; fuvs in kai; oujc oJmwnuvmw~]. Just as100 both every
thing-that-is-healthy [to; uJgieinovn] [is] related to health [pro;~ uJgiveian] . . . and also
[every] thing-that-is-surgical [to; ijatrikovn] [is] related to surgery [pro;~ ijatrikhvn] . . .
we shall discover other things also being called [something] in ways similar to these.
Thus, although also ‘being’ is certainly uttered signifying many things, every [being
I believe Metaphysics, Q.1, 1046a4–11 points to another pair of homonyms of this type. Accord-
97
ing to this passage, certain things in geometry are called “powers” because of a certain likeness to each
other. Following Ross, “A square is called a duvnami~ (‘[a] power’) because it is o} duvnatai hJ pleurav (the
[plane figure] that the side can [produce])” (see Aristotle’s Metaphysics, vol. 1, note on D.13, 1019b33,
referred to in his later comment on Metaphysics, Q.1, 1046a7). We still need a second thing called “[a]
power” homonymously for the same reason that a square is. Here Heath is helpful. While Aristotle
defines a sphere “as the figure which has all its radii (‘lines from the centre’) equal,” I do not think
he would have disagreed with “Euclid’s definition of it as the solid generated by the revolution of a
semicircle about its diameter.” If so, then a sphere would be called “[a] power” homonymously for the
same reason that a square is. See T. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics, vol. 1, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1921; repr., New York: Dover Publications, 1981), 341.
98
For Kirwan’s interpretation of this passage, very different from mine, see Aristotle’s Metaphys-
ics, 79–82.
99
Scholarly opinion is divided on how to interpret Aristotle’s denial. Ross gives us mixed mes-
sages. On the one hand, he says that Aristotle means that ‘being’ (the term) is “not merely equivo-
cal”—that is, it is equivocal (or “homonymous”), but also more than that (see Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
vol. 1, commentary on 1003a33, 254). On the other hand, he also says that Aristotle means that
‘being’ is “intermediate between sunwvnuma . . . and oJmwvnuma;” it falls into “the third class recognized
by the Categories . . . viz. parwvnuma.” Alexander also held this view, according to him. (See his com-
mentary on the same line, ibid., 256.) Owen implies that Aristotle’s denial amounts to saying that
the meanings of ‘being’ are a tertium quid between synonymy and homonymy. (See G. E. L. Owen,
“Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle,” in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth
Century, eds. I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen [Göteborg: 1960], 163–90.) According to Owens, Aristotle
only denies that being is a chance homonym (“totally equivocal” or “equivocal by chance,” to use
Owens’s terminology). Aristotle does not deny that it is a homonym: it is a pro;~ e{n homonym (or, an
“equivocal by reference,” as he would put it). (See Being in the Metaphysics, 122–23.) Matthews sees
no reason why we cannot take Aristotle to be denying that being is homonymous, period. (See G.
B. Matthews, “Aristotle on Existence,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies [1995]: 233–38; the
relevant passage is quoted in a note below.) Unfortunately, none of these scholars seem to argue for
their interpretation of Aristotle’s denial; they merely assert it.
100
Omitting ajll j in line 34, with Ab.
is] relative to one primary origin [ajrchvn]. . . . Therefore, just as there is one subject of
study [miva ejpisthvmh] for all things-that-are-healthy, this [is so] also in the case of the
others, similarly. For it is the task of one discipline to study [ejpisthvmh~ ejsti; qewrh`sai
mia`~] not only the things called [something] answering to one account [tw`n kaq j e}n
legomevnwn]101 but also the things called [something] relative to one nature [tw`n pro;~
mivan legomevnwn fuvs in], for also these things are called [something] answering to one account,
in a certain way102 [tau`ta trovpon tina; levgontai kaq j e{n]. Therefore, it is the task of one
[discipline] to study beings qua beings. However, in all cases a discipline properly
[investigates] that which is primary [kurivw~ tou` prwvtou]—that is, that to which the
others are tied [ejx ou| ta; a[lla h[rthtai] and because of which they are called [what they
are called] [di j o} levgontai]. If, then, this is substance [hJ oujs iva], it is of substances that
the philosopher would have to grasp the origins and causes [ta;~ ajrca;~ kai; ta;~ aijtiva~].
A complexion is healthy because it is symptomatic of health (“is symptomatic of

health”—or something like it—being what ‘is healthy’ means here), exercise is
healthy because it is necessary for health, and every other thing-that-is-healthy (to;
uJgieinovn) is healthy because it is in some way related to one and the same thing,
health. A patient is surgical because he needs or is ready for surgery, a procedure
is surgical because it is performed during surgery, and every other thing-that-is-
surgical (to; ijjatrikovn) is surgical because it is related to one and the same thing,
surgery. For this reason, every thing-that-is-healthy is the subject of one discipline,
as is every thing-that-is-surgical, “[f]or it is the task of one discipline to study not
only the things called [something] answering to one account” (as a man, an ox
and every other animal are) “but also the things called [something] relative to
one nature, for also these things are called [something] answering to one account,
in a certain way.” For the same reason, a substance, a quality, a quantity, and the
rest are subjects of one discipline, for a substance is called a “being” because it is
a substance, a quality because it is the quality of a substance, a quantity because it
is the quantity of a substance, and so on. That is the main point of the passage—
as well as the claim that every study, discipline or science (call it what you will)
studies that which is primary.
The important point for our purposes is narrower. On the one hand, the same
thing can be predicated of each group of things (“healthy,” “surgical,” “being,”
respectively), with the term predicated signifying different things in each case.
Each term is therefore uttered signifying many things (levgetai pollacw`~). On the
other hand, these terms are not levgetai oJmwnuvmw~—uttered signifying homonyms.
Why? There can be only one reason: the things signified by the predicate for each
group are all related to one and the same thing. That disqualifies them from be-
ing homonyms.
I submit that all of this evidence leaves no doubt that Aristotle, at this point
in his thinking, denies that ‘being’ is uttered signifying homonyms—that is, that
‘being’ levgetai oJmwnuvmw~.
See Liddell-Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, s. v. katav, B.IV.3.

101
102
My italics.
Two of the most recent commentators, Shields and Ward, would disagree
103 104
with this analysis. Having considered the Metaphysics passage under discussion,
Shields concludes that Aristotle is not denying that being, while “spoken of in many
ways,” is a homonym. He is merely denying that it is a certain kind of homonym,
a “discrete homonym” (one of a group of homonyms whose “definitions . . . do
not overlap in any way”105); it is still a homonym, a “comprehensive homonym”
(one of a group of homonyms whose “definitions do not completely overlap”106).
Contrary to Shields, I find nothing in the Metaphysics passage he considers here—or
in any he refers to (1003a34–b2, 1030a35–b3 and 1061a10–11)—that warrants
interpreting Aristotle as denying that being is one type of homonym while main-
taining that it is another. Aristotle here flatly denies that ‘being’ levgetai oJmwnuvmw~,
thereby denying that being is a homonym—any kind of homonym.
Ward gives three reasons why Aristotle does not deny that being is homonymous.
(1) “If being [italicized to indicate she is referring to a thing, not a term] were not
considered homonymous, it would make no sense to compare it with the class
of other core-related homonyms, such as the medical and the healthy.”107 True
enough, but the medical, the healthy and the other members of this class to which
Aristotle compares being here are not homonyms either. They, like being, are
equivocals (as I call them) whose definitions or accounts are pro;~ e{n. (2) “[T]here
is little textual basis for granting a third class of predicates falling between hom-
onymy and synonymy”108—which of course is another way of saying that there is
little textual basis for denying that being is a homonym. This is a puzzling claim
to make, since she herself cites three passages where Aristotle does just that: G.2,
1003a33–34, Z.4, 1030a34–35, and 1030b2–3.109 Finally, (3) “[i]n contrast, there
is good textual basis for arguing that being homonymous covers a wide range of
cases.” “[A]mong homOnyma [as she translates Aristotle], some are far removed
from one another, others have a certain similarity, and others are so near to one
another . . . that they are not thought to be homonymous.”110 “Since Aristotle ex-
plicitly states that homonymy covers a range of cases, . . . it is reasonable to infer
that when he describes things with related characteristics [beings, for example]
as ‘not homonymous’ in Meta. Gamma, he intends to say ‘not accidentally hom-
onymous.’”111 I fail to see why that is a reasonable inference. True, at the time of
the Physics passage she cites, Aristotle would not have denied that being levgetai
oJmwnuvmw~ or that being is oJmwvnumo~; that, however, does not imply that he does not
deny it in Metaphysics G.2 (and elsewhere).
103
See Order in Multiplicity, 23–24.
104
See Aristotle on Homonymy, at 105–8.
105
Ibid., 11.
106
Ibid.
107
Ibid., 106.
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid., 105.
110
Ibid., 106. She cites Physics, H.4, 248a23–25; that is a slip: it should be 249a23–25.
111
Ibid., 107.
From one point of view, it is puzzling why Aristotle should deny that being
levgetai oJmwnuvmw~. Having discovered that some terms, although not signifying
things having the same definition or account (that is, not signifying synonyms),
signify things whose accounts are relative to the same thing, he could simply have
classified them as terms signifying a certain kind of homonym—homonyms rela-
tive to one and the same thing. The remaining homonyms would simply be those
not so related—which would seem to be the “things that are related by chance.”
From another point of view, perhaps it is not so puzzling. Homonyms, for Aris-
totle, are—or were, at least—things that can be placed on a continuum, from
homonyms that are very “far apart” (like “bar” and “power”) to homonyms that
are very “close together” (like “justice”). Some, in fact, are so close together that
their homonymy “is not comparatively obvious”112 and “escapes our notice”—to
the point where they “do not appear to be homonyms.”113 The things signified by
terms such as ‘being,’ ‘surgical,’ and ‘healthy,’ once he had discovered and fully
absorbed the significance of pro;~ e{n signification, now seem to him to be so close
together that he is no longer willing to call them “homonyms”: all their accounts
are “tied to” one thing, they make explicit reference to the same genus114 (just as
synonyms do), and they do “[answer] to one account, in a certain way.” They might
therefore have seemed to him much more like synonyms. Nevertheless, since they
are not synonyms, he is not willing to call them that either.
We thus get the following schema. The main genus to be divided is things
having the same name. Since Aristotle does not have a name for them, let us call
them “univocals.” Univocals are divided into two groups, equivocals (again not
Aristotle’s term) and synonyms. Equivocals are univocals having different defini-
tions or accounts (things that Aristotle called “homonyms” in the Categories but
is no longer willing to call by that name), and synonyms are univocals having the
same definition or account. Equivocals are divided into those whose definitions
or accounts signify things that are all related to one and the same thing (pro;~ e{n
equivocals)115 and those whose beings do not have definitions or accounts signify-
ing things that are all related to one and the same thing (that is, those that are
not pro;~ e{n equivocals). Equivocals that are not pro;~ e{n equivocals seem to be
identical with those things that Aristotle now calls “homonyms” and used to call
“chance homonyms”—although there is nothing in principle to prevent him from
subdividing equivocals that are not pro;~ e{n equivocals into chance homonyms and
any number of other types.
On this modified view of homonymy, it is no longer true that if ‘e’ levgetai pol-
lacw`~ (that is, if ‘e’ is uttered signifying a, b, . . . , n), then a, b, . . . , n are homonyms,
See Nicomachean Ethics, E.1, 1129a28, quoted and discussed earlier.

112
113
See Physics, H.4, 249a25.
114
See Metaphysics, K.3, 1060b31–61a12, quoted in part and discussed in an earlier note.
115
pro;~ e{n equivocals can be related to one thing in several ways. For example, they can all be
derived from one thing or they can all contribute to one thing or they can all be related to one thing
by analogy (see Nicomachean Ethics, A.4, 1096b26–29).
and vice versa. The two are no longer corollaries. While it is indeed still true that
if a, b, . . . , n are homonyms (having the “name” ‘e’), then ‘e’ levgetai pollacw`~, it
is not necessarily true that if ‘e’ levgetai pollacw`~ (a, b, . . . , n), then a, b, . . . , n
are homonyms116 (they could be pro;~ e{n equivocals).117
This agrees closely with the position taken by Matthews: “It seems plausible to say that, according
116
to Aristotle, any word used homonymously is also said in more than one way. But we are not required
to make the reverse inference. We need not suppose, that is, that Aristotle supposes any term said in
many ways is therefore used homonymously” (“Aristotle on Existence,” 235).
117
Different versions of this paper were presented at various conferences over the years, and I am
very grateful to those attending for their comments, suggestions, and criticisms. Julius Moravcsik was
kind enough to chair one of them. Scott Carson and Julie Ward wrote detailed comments on recent
versions. My colleagues Pau-San Haruta and Gregory Machacek—specialists in linguistics and Greek
literature, respectively—were most generous to me in taking time out from their very busy teaching
schedules to comment on an early version. The sabbatical that Marist College granted me during the
spring of 2003 allowed me to devote part of the period during the spring and summer of that year to
this project. James G. Lennox kindly took the time to comment on a version of this paper at a time
when he was burdened with an unusual number of heavy commitments. My greatest debt, however, is
to the anonymous referees of this journal, whose comments and suggestion on later versions greatly
improved this paper.

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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 49, Number 2, April 2011,

For additional information about this article

Access provided by University of Birmingham (29 May 2015 09:30 GMT)

* Jurgis (George) Brakas is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Marist College.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 49, no. 2 (2011) 135–160

2. translations of legetai in nicomachean ethics,

3. the meaning of legetai

4. the proposed translation of legetai applied

The pattern we see emerging here is this:

A.5, 410a13–16 and (perhaps) Metaphysics, N.2, 1089a7–10.

Here the pattern is this:

5. to legesqai pollacws and homonymy

6. to legesqai pollacw ~ and to legesqai J mwnumw

I take “certainly” to be the force of mevn here.

That is, the things signified by ‘justice’ and ‘injustice.’

A complexion is healthy because it is symptomatic of health (“is symptomatic of

See Liddell-Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, s. v. katav, B.IV.3.

See Nicomachean Ethics, E.1, 1129a28, quoted and discussed earlier.

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