(Ancient Commentators On Aristotle v. 1, 14-22) Ian Mueller - Alexander of Aphrodisias - On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.14-22-Bristol Classical Press (1999) PDF

Alexander of Aphrodisias
On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.14-22

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Alexander
of Aphrodisias
On Aristotle
Prior Analytics 1.14-22
Translated by Ian Mueller with

Josiah Gould
Introduction, Notes and

Appendices by
Ian Mueller
LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

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First published in 1999 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

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© 2013 Ian Mueller
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1988, to be identified as Author of this work.
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can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author.
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A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
The present translations have been made possible by generous

and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National
Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs,
an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust;
the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal
Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello
Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University;
the Leventis Foundation; the Humanities Research Board of
the British Academy; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable rust;
the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; The Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/GW). The editor
wishes to thank Jonathan Barnes, Tad Brennan, Kevin Flannery,
Pamela Huby, Michael B. Papazian, Richard Patterson and Donald
Russell for their comments on the volume, and Han Baltussen
for preparing the volume for press.
Typeset by Ray Davies

Printed and bound in Great Britain
Contents
Editor’s Note vii

Preface viii
Introduction
I. Assertoric syllogistic 4
II. Modal syllogistic without contingency 9
II.A. Conversion of necessary propositions 9
II.B. NN-combinations 11
II.C. N+U combinations 13
III. Modal syllogistic with contingent propositions 19
III.A. Strict contingency and its transformation rules 19
III.B. Alexander and the temporal interpretation of
modality 23
III.C. Conversion of necessary propositions 25
III.D. Conversion of contingent propositions 28
III.D.1. Conversion of affirmative contingent
propositions 28
III.D.2. Non-convertibility of negative contingent
propositions 31
III.E. Syllogistic and non-syllogistic combinations 35
III.E.1. CC premiss combinations 35
III.E.2. U+C premiss combinations 37
III.E.3. N+C premiss combinations 44
IV. Theophrastus and modal logic 52
Notes 54
Summary (overview of symbols and rules) 59
Translation: The commentary

Textual Emendations 73
1.14-16 The first figure 75
1.14 Combinations with two contingent premisses 75
1.15 Combinations with an unqualified and a contingent
premiss 83
vi Contents
1.16 Combinations with a necessary and a contingent
premiss 118
1.17-19 The second figure 134
premiss 149
premiss 155
1.20-2 The third figure 166
premiss 170
premiss 175
Notes 185
Appendix 1. The expression ‘by necessity’ (ex anankês) 229

Appendix 2. Affirmation and negation 231
Appendix 3. Conditional necessity 232
Appendix 4. On Interpretation, chapters 12 and 13 237
Appendix 5. Weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency 239
Appendix 6. Textual notes on Aristotle’s text 243
Bibliography 246
English-Greek Glossary 248
Greek-English Index 251
Subject Index 266
Index Locorum 269
Editor’s Note
This text, translated in two volumes, is a very important one because

Alexander’s is the main commentary on the chapters in which Aristotle
invented modal logic, i.e. the logic of necessary and contingent (possible)
propositions. Because it is more technical than the other texts in this
series, Ian Mueller explains the modal logic in his masterly introduc-
tion, which takes an exceptional form, being couched in logical symbols
partly of his own devising. All symbols are explained on first occurrence.
Symbols are entirely excluded from the translation itself, and this can
be consulted freely by those who do not wish to master the entire modal
system.
Aristotle also invented the theory of the syllogism, and in this volume
he extends this theory to include syllogisms containing contingent
propositions, the contingent being what may or may not happen.
December 1998 R.R.K.S.

Preface
This translation has been literally decades (two) in the making. Josiah
Gould, acting on a suggestion of Ian Mueller, prepared a first draft of
the translation. Mueller produced a second draft and, then, in consult-
ation with Gould, a third and final version with introduction, notes,
appendices, and indices. We are certain that errors remain, but know
that there would have been many more without the advice of Tad
Brennan, Glenn Most, Richard Patterson, Robin Smith, and several
anonymous readers whose friendly but stern admonitions turned us
from some paths. We take full responsibility for remaining on other
paths despite their counsel.
December 1998 I.M.

J.G.
Introduction
We offer here a translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on

chapters 14-22 of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, in which Aristotle presents
what we call his modal logic as applied to contingent as well as necessary
and what we call unqualified propositions. In a separate volume we
have translated Alexander’s commentary on chapters 8-12, in which
Aristotle treats arguments not involving contingent propositions, and
also chapter 13, in which Aristotle discusses contingency in general, and
part of chapter 17 in which he treats the conversion of contingent
propositions. Chapters 1, 2 and 4-7 of the Prior Analytics constitute a
self-contained presentation of what we will call non-modal or assertoric
syllogistic. Alexander’s commentary on this material (and on chapter 3)
has been admirably translated and discussed by Barnes et al. We refer
the reader to their introduction for information about Alexander,
ancient commentaries, and the general character of Alexander’s com-
mentary on the whole of Prior Analytics.
In making choices for how to deal with our task, we have always
begun by consulting Barnes et al. for guidance, and in many cases have
followed their practices. But the greater difficulty of the material we
have to present here has led us to diverge from them in some significant
ways. First of all, in our notes and discussions we have relied on a
quasi-formal symbolism. We hope that the symbolism is enlightening;
we are confident that a full exposition of our text not using some
formalism would run to much greater length. To put this another way,
if one used a formal symbolism one could encapsulate the full content
of Alexander’s commentary in many fewer pages than Alexander has
used.
We have, however, not thought it a good idea to introduce formal
symbolism into the translation itself. Our major departure from Alex-
ander’s text is that we have used considerably more variables than
Alexander uses; we have sometimes done the same thing in our trans-
lations of Aristotle. To give one example, at 121,4-6, where Alexander
writes,
In both cases the conclusion proved is a particular negative necessary

proposition of which the opposite is ‘It is contingent of all’ (endekhetai
panti).
2 Introduction
we have translated,
In both cases the conclusion proved is a particular negative necessary

proposition of which the opposite is ‘It is contingent that X holds of all Y’.
There is in general no way for a reader to tell whether, e.g., the

translation ‘A holds of all B’ is literal or corresponds to something like
‘holds of all’ or ‘universal affirmative’ without consulting the Greek
text.1
The modern literature on Aristotle’s modal logic is substantial and
itself difficult. The interpretations offered have been quite diverse, and
a number of them have connected the modal logic with Aristotelian
metaphysics. We did not see any way to enter into these various
interpretations, and we have thought it best to focus on what we would
call logical content, which seems to us also to be the focus of Alexander’s
commentary. In fact, it seems to us that Alexander’s frequently ex-
pressed perplexities about what Aristotle says are a more accurate
reflection of Aristotle’s presentation of modal logic than is the work of
many subsequent interpreters who have attempted to turn the modal
logic into a coherent system. In our notes and discussions we have
primarily tried to extract the logical content of Alexander’s tortured
prose. Just as we have not devoted much attention to modern interpre-
tations of Aristotle’s logic, so we have not devoted much to parallel
passages in other ancient texts. In both cases limitations of time, of
knowledge, and of space have constrained us.
We have included a complete translation of the text of Aristotle as
read by Alexander (insofar as we can infer that) in the lemmas; we have
inserted texts as lemmas in places where there is no lemma in the
edition of Wallies, on which our translation is based; and we have
sometimes produced a stretch of Aristotelian text more than once. The
reader can identify the exact extent of the lemmas in Wallies’ text,
because any material added by us is put between square brackets. Our
own judgment is that the lemmas are matters of convenience; they tell
us more about the practice of scribes and later teachers than about the
practices of ancient commentators.
In our translation we have adopted the unusual practice of placing
note references at the beginning of paragraphs which we judge to be
especially difficult to follow. We believe that some readers will find it
useful to have an account of what Alexander is going to say before trying
to follow his own words. Those who prefer to make their own way
through the text can simply ignore those notes initially and recur to
them as they deem necessary.
In section I of this introduction we give a brief and schematic
presentation of non-modal syllogistic to familiarize the reader with
terminology and with some of our apparatus for representing Alexan-
Introduction 3
der’s discussions. In section II we try to give at least a partial overview
of chapters 8-12 and the part of chapter 3 relevant to it. But we shall
postpone the discussion of some of that material because it presupposes
the discussion of contingency, which we take up in section III, where we
also deal with chapters 13-22. Finally in a brief fourth section we
discuss the treatment of modality by Theophrastus, the associate of
Aristotle. On occasion the reader may find it useful to refer to the formal
Summary which follows this introduction.
Here is an outline of the contents of the first 22 chapters of the Prior
Analytics:
1.1-3 Introductory material

1.1 Preliminary definitions
1.2 Conversion of unqualified propositions
1.3 Conversion of necessary and contingent propositions
1.4-7 Combinations with only unqualified premisses
1.4-7 Combinations with two unqualified premisses
1.4 First figure
1.5 Second figure
1.6 Third figure
1.7 Further remarks
1.8-12 Combinations with at least one necessary but no contingent
premiss
1.8 Combinations with two necessary premisses
1.9-11 Combinations with one necessary and one unqualified premiss
1.9 First Figure
1.10 Second Figure
1.11 Third Figure
1.12 Summarizing remarks on necessity
1.13-22 Combinations with a contingent premiss
1.13 Discussion of contingency
1.14-16 The first figure
1.14 Both premisses contingent
1.15 One premiss unqualified
1.16 One premiss necessary
1.17-19 The second figure
1.20-2 The third figure
4 Introduction
I. Assertoric syllogistic (1.1, 2, 4-7)

For the most part it suffices for understanding Aristotelian modal
syllogistic to have only a schematic understanding of the non-modal or
assertoric syllogistic as it is developed in the first six chapters of the
Prior Analytics. We present such a schematic representation here in
quasi-formal terms which we will also rely on in our commentary.
Qualifications of this schematic representation will be introduced only
as they are needed.
A. Terms are capital letters from the beginning of the alphabet: A, B, C,

D, ..., (standing for general terms such as human or animal).
B. Propositions. There are four types of propositions:
XaY (read X holds of all Y or All Y are X)

XeY (read X holds of no Y or No Y are X)
XiY (read X holds of some Y or Some Y are X)
XoY (read X does not hold of some Y or Some Y are not X)
where X and Y are terms (called respectively the predicate and the
subject of the proposition).2 These propositions are sometimes referred
to as a-propositions, e-propositions, etc. Propositions of the first two
kinds are called universal, those of the last two particular; a- and
i-propositions are called affirmative, e- and o- negative. Universality
and particularity are called quantity, affirmativeness and negativeness
quality. When we wish to represent a proposition in abstraction from
its quantity and quality we write, e.g., XY.
C. Pairs of propositions with one common term are called combinations,

and assigned to one of three figures:
First figure XZ ZY
Second figure ZX ZY
Third figure XZ YZ
As members of combinations propositions are called premisses. In the

schemata given, Z is called the middle term of the combination, and X
and Y are called extremes or extreme terms. In addition X is called the
major term, Y the minor term; and the premiss containing the major
term is called the major premiss, the one containing the minor term the
minor premiss.
D. The major problem for Aristotle is to determine which combina-
tions are syllogistic, that is imply a proposition (called the conclusion)
with the major term as predicate and the minor as subject.3 Aristotle
Introduction 5
restricts himself to considering the strongest conclusion implied by a
syllogistic combination. In the first figure he recognizes the following
syllogistic combinations:4
1. AaB BaC AaC (1.4, 25b37-40)

2. AeB BaC AeC (1.4, 25b40-26a2)
3. AaB BiC AiC (1.4, 26a23-5)
4. AeB BiC AoC (1.4, 26a25-7)
As a preliminary notation for these syllogisms (which will be compli-

cated when we take up modal syllogistic) we introduce
1. AAA1
2. EAE1
3. AII1
4. EIO1
where the letters give the quality and quantity of the propositions
involved and the subscripted number gives the figure. When we wish to
represent just a pair of premisses we write such things as
EE_1
to represent the pair
AeB BeC
We will, in fact, use something like this notation for pairs of pre-
misses, but after some hesitation, we have decided also to use the
medieval names for the categorical syllogisms in the belief that most
people who work on syllogistic will find them easier to read than the
more abstract symbolism. Those unfamiliar with the names need only
remember that the sequence of vowels in the medieval names repro-
duces the sequence of letters in the symbolism we have introduced; for
further clarity we will add to the names numerical subscripts indicating
the figure.5 Thus we will refer to the four first-figure syllogisms as
1. Barbara1
2. Celarent1
3. Darii1
4. Ferio1.
Aristotle calls these four syllogisms complete (teleios, rendered ‘perfect’

by Barnes et al). Aristotle says that a syllogism is complete if it ‘needs
nothing apart from the assumptions in order for the necessity <of the
6 Introduction
conclusion> to be evident’ (1.1, 24b22-4). Modern scholars have disputed
what Aristotle means here,6 but Alexander clearly thinks that the
complete syllogisms receive a kind of justification from the so-called
dictum de omni et nullo, which he takes to give an account of the
relations expressed by ‘a’ and ‘e’:7
For one thing to be in another as in a whole and for the other to be

predicated of all of the one are the same thing. We say that one thing is
predicated of all of another when it is not possible to take any of it of
which the other is not said. And similarly for of none. (1.1, 24b26-30)
Alexander understands this passage to be saying something like:
XaY if and only if it is not possible to take any Y which is not an X;

XeY if and only if it is not possible to take any Y which is an X.
Alexander’s treatment of Barbara1 and Ferio1 show how he invokes the

dictum in the treatment of complete syllogisms:
Let A be the major extreme, B the middle term, and C the minor extreme.
If C is in B as in a whole, B is said of every C. ... Therefore, it is not possible
to take any C of which B is not said. Again, if B is in A as in a whole, A is
said of every B. Hence it is not possible to take any of B of which A is not
said. Now, if nothing of B can be taken of which A is not said, and C is
something of B, then by necessity A will be said of C too. (54,12-18)
If something of C is in B as in a whole,8 and B is in no A, then A will not

hold of some C. For something of C is under B; but nothing of B can be
taken of which A is said. Hence A will not be said of that item of C which
is something of B. (60,27- 61,1)
Whether one thinks that for Aristotle complete assertoric syllogisms are
simply self-evident or – in agreement with Alexander – that their
validity depends on the dictum de omni et nullo affects one’s under-
standing of Aristotle’s conception of logic, but it does not affect one’s
understanding of which assertoric combinations are syllogistic. In the
case of modal syllogistic the situation changes. At least in antiquity the
dictum played a role in disputes about whether certain combinations
are syllogistic. We will say more about the issue in section II.C.
E. At this point it is convenient to describe the principal procedure by

which Aristotle shows that a combination is non-syllogistic. We would
normally show that a given first-figure combination XY, YZ does not
yield a specific conclusion XZ by specifying concrete terms which, when
substituted for X, Y, and Z, make XY and YZ true and XZ false. Thus to
show that AaB and BeC do not imply AeC we can point out that although
‘All humans are animals’ and ‘No cows are humans’ are true, ‘No cows
Introduction 7
are animals’ is false. Aristotle shows that a first-figure combination of
specific premisses XY and YZ yield no conclusion (of the relevant kind
with X as predicate and Z as subject) by giving two interpretations, one
which makes XY, YZ, and XaZ true, the other of which makes XY, YZ,
and XeY true. This procedure works because of the following relations
among propositions:
a. XaY and XoY are contradictories, i.e.,

XaY if and only if  (XoY) (so that also XoY if and only if  (XaY));
b. XeY and XiY are contradictories, i.e.,
XeY if and only if  (XiY) (so that also XiY if and only if  (XeY));
c. XaY and XeY are contraries, i.e., they cannot be true together
(although they might both be false).9
Given these relationships, an interpretation making XaZ true rules out

any negative conclusion XZ and an interpretation making XeZ true rules
out any affirmative conclusion.
On pp. 12-14 Barnes et al. discuss Alexander’s understanding of this
method of rejecting non-syllogistic pairs and say, ‘He always misunder-
stands it.’ In a footnote they add, ‘He may seem to get it right at in An.
Pr. 101,14-16 and 328,10-20; but in these passages it seems reasonable
to think that he has succeeded by mistake.’ We agree with this assess-
ment of Alexander. He consistently treats the method of rejection as a
matter of showing that both XaY and XeY (or their analogues in modal
syllogistic, ‘X holds of all Y by necessity’ and ‘X holds of no Y by
necessity’) follow from a pair of premisses. We have signalled Alexan-
der’s misapprehension in cases where – if we have understood him
correctly – it has led him to express a false opinion or made his
discussion less cogent than it might be, and sometimes we have done so
in the many more numerous passages where Alexander’s misdescrip-
tion of what is going on is harmless. But we have frequently left it to
the reader to realize that in a given passage Alexander speaks about,
e.g., P3 following from P1 and P2 when he should be speaking about all
three propositions being true.10
F. Aristotle shows that second- and third-figure assertoric combinations

are syllogistic by completing them or reducing them to first-figure
syllogisms. Reductions are either direct or indirect. Direct reductions
make use of the following rules of conversion enunciated and discussed
by Aristotle in the second chapter of the Prior Analytics:
EE-conversion: XeY  YeX (25a14-17)

AI-conversion: XaY  YiX (25a17-19)
II-conversion: XiY  YiX (25a20-2)
8 Introduction
Aristotle uses terms to reject the possibility of any kind of O_-conversion
at 25a22-6.
The second-figure syllogisms are:
1. Cesare2 AeB AaC BeC (1.5, 27a5-9)

2. Camestres2 AaB AeC BeC (1.5, 27a9-15)
3. Festino2 AeB AiC BoC (1.5, 27a32-6)
4. Baroco2 AaB AoC BoC (1.5, 27a36-b3)
The first three of these are completed directly. We indicate the way in
which we will describe their reductions or proofs (deixeis), as Alexander
most frequently calls them, in the Summary. Baroco2 is justified indi-
rectly by reductio ad absurdum: from the contradictory of the conclusion
and one of the premisses, one uses a first-figure syllogism to infer the
contradictory of the other premiss. For our representation of the argu-
ment see the Summary, which gives similar representations for the
third figure. These derivations for modally unqualified propositions are
worth learning since in general Aristotle tries to adapt them to modally
qualified propositions. In the directly derivable cases he faces few
problems so that many of the main issues for them arise already in
connection with the first figure. However, the addition of the modal
operators causes special problems in the indirect cases.
G. Aristotle seems to assume the completeness of his reduction proce-

dures, that is, he assumes that any combination can either be refuted
by a counterinterpretation or reduced to a first-figure syllogism. He also
assumes that the system is consistent in the sense that one cannot give
both a counterinterpretation and a reduction for a given syllogism.
These assumptions are correct for assertoric syllogistic, and they make
possible another method of showing a combination non-syllogistic: show
that the rules do not allow the combination to be reduced to a first-figure
syllogism.11 Aristotle does not use this method in assertoric syllogistic,
but he does apply it in modal syllogistic (e.g. at 1.17, 37a32-6), and
Alexander does it even more frequently. The applications of this method
are not up to the standards of modern proof theory, but they are
generally corrrect.
A more important point is that the modal syllogistic is not consistent,
so that a derivation does not suffice to show that a counterinterpreta-
tion is impossible, and a counterinterpretation does not suffice to show
that a derivation is impossible. Alexander is aware of some of the cases
in which this is true,12 but – as is frequently the case in the commentary
– he does not seem to be aware of either the depth of the problem created
by this situation or its devastating effect on Aristotle’s modal syllogistic.
Introduction 9
II. Modal syllogistic without contingency

(1.3, 25a27-36 and 8-12)
As a first approximation modal syllogistic can be understood as an
extension of assertoric syllogistic brought about by adding for every
proposition P of assertoric syllogistic the propositions ‘It is necessary
that P’ and ‘It is contingent that P’. The issues which arise in connection
with the notion of contingency are considerably more complex than
those which arise in connection with necessity. Unfortunately some of
the issues which arise in connection with necessity are inextricably
bound up with contingency. We are going to try to abstract from those
issues here, and return to them after we have discussed contingency.
We shall adopt the abbreviation NEC(P) for various Greek expressions
which we take to have the sense of ‘It is necessary that P’. Ultimately
we will use abbreviation CON(P) for ‘It is contingent (usually endekh-
etai) that P’, using the word ‘possible’ informally (and in the translation
of such expressions as dunaton, dunatai, enkhôrei, hoion, estai). We
shall call a proposition NEC(P) a necessary proposition, CON(P) a
contingent proposition; if NEC(P) (CON(P)) is true we will say that P is
necessary (contingent). To be explicit we shall call a proposition of
assertoric syllogistic an unqualified proposition.13 We will define various
formal notions in the same way as before, but we will extend our
representation of syllogisms and combinations. Assertoric Barbara1
now becomes:
Barbara1(UUU)
and the assertoric combination AE_1 becomes:
AE_1(UU_)
The following examples should make the notation to be employed clear:
Barbara1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BaC NEC(AaC)

Bocardo3(NCU) NEC(AoC) CON(BaC) AoB
EA_2(CU_) CON(AeB) AaC
II.A. Conversion of necessary propositions (1.3, 25a27-36)

Aristotle accepts the same conversion laws for necessary propositions
as for unqualified ones, that is, he accepts:
EE-conversionn: NEC(XeY)  NEC(YeX) (25a29-31)

AI-conversionn: NEC(XaY)  NEC(YiX) (25a32-4)
II-conversionn: NEC(XiY)  NEC(YiX) (25a32-4)
10 Introduction
To justify EE-conversionn Aristotle writes,
If it is necessary that A holds of no B, it is necessary that B holds of no A;

for if it is contingent that B holds of some, it will be contingent that A
holds of some B. (25a29-32)
Aristotle here appears to reduce EE-conversionn to:
II-conversionc: CON(XiY)  CON(YiX)
a law which he does not take up until 25a40-b3, and which he appears
to justify by citing EE-conversionn. For AI-conversionn and II-conver-
sionn Aristotle writes,
If A holds of all or some B by necessity, it is necessary that B holds of some

A. For if it is not necessary, A will not hold of some B by necessity.
(25a32-4)
apparently taking for granted that
 NEC(BiA)   NEC(AiB)
which, if it is not just another formulation of II-conversionn itself, would

seem to involve some such reasoning as the following. Assume
NEC(AiB) and  NEC(BiA). Then since:
(i)  NEC(P)  CON( P) ( N  C )
CON(BeA). But:
(ii) CON(XeY)  CON(YeX) (EE-conversionc)
So CON(AeB), and since:
(iii) CON(P)   NEC( P) (C   N )
 NEC(AiB), contradicting NEC(AiB)
The problem with this reconstruction is not simply that Aristotle relies
on laws concerning contingency which he has not yet discussed, but (i)
and (ii) are laws which Aristotle rejects at 1.17, 36b35-37a31. In the
course of doing so he denies that an indirect argument works by denying
an instance of:
 CON(P)  NEC( P) ( C  N )
Introduction 11
which is equivalent to (i). Aristotle is, however, committed to C   N
and its equivalent:
NEC(P)   CON( P) (N   C ).
Since we cannot hope to clarify this situation without looking at Aris-

totle’s treatment of contingency and Alexander’s understanding of it, we
shall for now simply take for granted the conversion laws for necessary
propositions and turn to Aristotle’s application of them. However, before
doing so we mention one other law assumed by Aristotle:
P   NEC( P) (U   N )
that is, if a proposition holds, its contradictory is not necessary.
II.B. NN-combinations (1.8)

The perfect parallelism between the conversion laws for unqualified and
necessary propositions greatly simplifies the treatment of NN combina-
tions in chapter 8, and Aristotle’s discussion is very succinct. The
principal value of Alexander’s commentary on chapter 8 is its scholas-
ticism, the concrete filling out of what Aristotle describes in outline. We
here follow Alexander’s account. Aristotle assumes that an NN combi-
nation is syllogistic if the corresponding UU combination is, and that
the former will yield the conclusion NEC(P) if the latter yields the
conclusion P. The argument that the converses of these assumptions
holds has three steps. The first two are stated briefly in the following
passage:
For, if the terms are posited in the same way in the case of holding and in
that of holding by necessity – or in the case of not holding – there either
will or there won’t be a syllogism <in both cases>, except that they will
differ by the addition of holding or not holding by necessity to the terms.
For the privative converts in the same way, and we will give the same
account of ‘being in as a whole’ and ‘said of all’. (29b37-30a3)
Alexander points out that Aristotle means to include all conversion rules
in this remark (120,20-5), and he applies the reference to the dictum de
omni et nullo to the first figure (120,13-15), a sure sign that he takes
Aristotle to be treating the first-figure NNN syllogisms as complete.
Thus the argument is that the parallel first-figure combinations are
syllogistic of parallel conclusions and that conversion will generate the
parallel directly verified syllogisms in the second and third figures. The
only remaining problem concerns:
12 Introduction
Baroco2(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(AoC) NEC(BoC)
Bocardo3(NNN) NEC(AoC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AoB)
the UUU analogues of which were established indirectly.

This whole way of looking at modal syllogistic is basic to Aristotle.
Roughly, one can say that for Aristotle the fundamental question is to
decide which modal analogues of the complete first-figure assertoric
syllogisms are syllogistic14 and then to ask whether the second- and
third-figure analogues of syllogisms can be derived in ways analogous
to those in which the first-figure ones were. Only when a derivation
cannot be provided does Aristotle look for counterinterpretations. In
other words, Aristotle does not appear to first raise the question
whether a second- or third-figure combination is syllogistic, but first
asks what, if any conclusion can be derived from the combination by a
derivation of the type used with the analogous assertoric combination.
If that analogous derivation fails he looks for a counterinterpretation.
If he can’t find one and decides there isn’t one, he looks for an alterna-
tive derivation.
If we try to copy the indirect derivations of Baroco2(UUU) and
Bocardo3(UUU) for the corresponding NNN cases we run into the same
kind of problems we encountered with Aristotle’s indirect arguments
for the conversion laws for necessary propositions. We here give the
indirect arguments which we would seem to need, first for:
Assume NEC(AaB), NEC(AoC), and  NEC(BoC). Then ( N  C )

CON(BaC). Now, if we had Barbara1(NCC), we could infer CON(AaC),
which implies (C   N )  NEC(AoC), contradicting NEC(AoC).
The argument for
is quite analogous. Assume NEC(AoC), NEC(BaC), and  NEC(AoB).

Then ( N  C ) CON(AaB). So, if we had Barbara1(CNC), we could
infer CON(AaC), which implies (C   N )  NEC(AoC), contradict-
ing NEC(AoC).
One obvious difficulty with these arguments is the use of  N 
C, which, as we have said, Aristotle rejects. However, it is also true
that Aristotle sometimes uses the equivalent of this rule, namely  C
 N. Indeed, he uses it without acknowledgement in arguing that
Barbara1(NC_) yields a contingent conclusion.15 Alexander is quite clear
that because of the use of  C  N the conclusion is of the form 
NEC (AaC), and that this is not equivalent to CON(AaC); it involves
what we will call Theophrastean contingency because it was the notion
Introduction 13
of contingency highlighted by Theophrastus.16 The situation is suffi-
ciently fluid that we might choose to allow Aristotle the use of  N 
C in arguing for Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN). By itself this
would take care of Bocardo3(NNN), since Aristotle takes Bar-
bara1(CNC) to be complete at 1.16, 36a2-7. However, Barbara1(NC‘C’)17
is not complete for Aristotle and requires an argument which invokes
the notion of contingency.
In any case it is quite clear that Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN)
are valid. Aristotle chooses to verify them with what he calls an ekthesis.
The ekthesis works on the premiss NEC(AoC), and involves taking a
part D of C of which A does not hold by necessity. Substituting
NEC(AeD) for NEC(AoC), we have in the case of Baroco2(NNN) an
instance of Camestres2(NNN) with the conclusion NEC(BeD); but D is
part of C, so NEC(BoC). For Bocardo3(NNN), one changes the second
premiss to NEC(BaD) to get an instance of Felapton3(NNN). (In both
cases Alexander carries out the reduction to the first figure.) Alexander
discusses the character of the ekthetic arguments starting at 123,3-24,
drawing a contrast between them and the ekthesis arguments of asser-
toric syllogistic. At 123,18-24 he provides the important historical
information that Theophrastus preferred to postpone the treatment of
Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN) until he could establish them indi-
rectly, that is, use some version of the argument we have just sketched.
We discuss the question of how Theophrastus might have done this in
section IV of the introduction.
II.C. N+U combinations (1.9-11)

In chapters 9-11 Aristotle takes up the N+U cases, devoting a chapter
to each of the three figures. In 9 he takes as complete all the NUN and
UNU analogues of the complete UUU first-figure syllogisms. Given
these syllogisms, the direct derivations for the second- and third-figure
N+U combinations are straightforward. The indirect cases are again
problematic. Aristotle decides that each of the four N+U cases of Baroco2
and Bocardo3 yields only an unqualified conclusion. He gives no positive
argument for any of the four, but only uses terms to show that none of
the four combinations yield a necessary conclusion. We shall discuss his
use of terms to show that certain N+U combinations yield an unqualified
conclusion in a moment. For now we simply remark that all four cases
accepted by Aristotle have simple indirect derivations. Alexander points
out at 144,23-145,20 and 151,22-30 that the kind of ekthesis argument
which Aristotle used to establish Baroco2(NNN) could be used for
Baroco2(UNN) and Bocardo3(NUN). Unfortunately, Alexander’s discus-
sion of the implications of this situation in which a proof and a
counterinterpretation conflict (145,4-20 and 151,22-30) is very indeci-
sive, to say the least.
14 Introduction
We shall approach Aristotle’s treatment of the complete combina-
tions in terms of the two cases of Barbara1. For Barbara1(UNU)
Aristotle takes for granted that Barbara1(UN_) yields either an un-
qualified or a necessary conclusion and offers two kinds of arguments
to show that the conclusion cannot be necessary. One is a specification
of terms, which, indeed, work if one assumes the truth of the following
propositions:
(a) All animals are in motion;

(b) It is necessary that all humans are animals;
(c) It is not necessary that all humans are in motion.18
Unfortunately the use of these terms seems to cast doubt on Bar-

bara1(NUN) since – to use an example of Theophrastus mentioned by
Alexander at 124,24-5 – it would seem to be just as much true that:
(b) It is necessary that all humans are animals;

(a’) Everything in motion is a human;
(c’) It is not necessary that everything in motion is an animal.
‘All humans are animals’ is, of course, a standard example of a

necessary truth. (a) and (a’) are typical problematic examples of an
unqualified truth: they are not, in fact, true, but they are taken to be
true for the sake of making an argument, in Alexander’s terminology,
they are ‘hypotheses’.19 Unfortunately, this way of interpreting unquali-
fied statements makes it very difficult to see that there is any difference
between unqualified and contingent propositions. Alexander raises this
issue in connection with Aristotle’s remarks at 1.15, 34b7-18 in the
context of an apparent counterinterpretation to Barbara1(UC‘C’), and
so we postpone considering it until our discussion of the U+C first-
figure cases in section III.E.2.a.
A modern way of making a distinction between (c) and (c’) invokes
the distinction between what are called de re and de dicto necessity. To
say that NEC(XaY) is true de dicto is to say that there is some lawlike
connection between the notion of being a Y and the notion of being an
X, so that just knowing that something is a Y is enough to know it is an
X. Both (c) and (c’) are true de dicto because there is no such connection
between being an animal and being in motion or between the latter and
being a human; knowing that something is an animal does not suffice
to tell us that it is in motion and knowing that something is in motion
does not suffice to tell us it is a human. We find the notion of de re
necessity hard to grasp, but perhaps the following will do. We must
imagine that individuals have necessary properties, that, for example,
Socrates is necessarily a human being and an animal. Socrates has
those properties no matter how he is described, e.g., as the anathema
Introduction 15
of the politicians. Now we say that NEC(XaY) is true de re if each of the
Y’s has the property of being necessarily X. If (a’) is true, then each of
the things in motion is necessarily an animal, even though there is no
lawlike connection between being in motion and being an animal. Thus,
if (a’) is true, (c’) is in fact false on the de re interpretation. On the other
hand, (c) is true de re because no individual human being is necessarily
in motion.
The issues surrounding the de re/de dicto distinction and the inter-
pretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic have received a great deal of
discussion, which we cannot recapitulate here.20 We shall occasionally
invoke the distinction in our notes, but on the whole we shall leave it
out of account since it does not come to the surface in Alexander’s
remarks. In the Appendix on conditional necessity we discuss another
distinction which he does sometimes invoke, namely the distinction
between what is necessary without qualification and what is necessary
on a condition.
Aristotle’s brief remarks about the validity of Barbara1(NUN) have
been taken as an expression of the notion of de re necessity. He says:
if A has been taken to hold ... of B by necessity and B just to hold of C ...,
A will hold ... of C by necessity. For since A is assumed21 to hold ... of all
B by necessity and C is some of the B’s, it is evident that [A will hold] of
C by necessity. (30a17-23)
Alexander’s paraphrase of this passage shows that he takes it to involve

an application of the dictum de omni et nullo and hence to be an
argument for completeness:
For since A is said of all B by necessity, and C is under B and is some of

B, A is also said of C by necessity. For what is said of all B by necessity
will also be predicated of what is under B by necessity – at least if being
said of all is ‘when nothing of the subject can be taken of which the
predicate will not be said’.22 But C is some of the B’s. For being said of all
by necessity is taken in the same way <as unqualified being said of all>,
as he said before in the case of necessary things: ‘For the privative
converts in the same way, and we will give the same account of “to be in
as a whole” and “said of all” ’ <1.8, 30a2-3>. (126,1-8)
For Alexander, then, the validity of Barbara1(NUN) depends on inter-

preting NEC(AaB) as saying that no B can be taken of which A does not
hold by necessity (to which we might add, ‘no matter how the B is
described’). Alexander explicitly refrains from committing himself on
the correctness of Aristotle’s position, but it is clear that he is quite
impressed by the arguments of Theophrastus and Eudemus,23 who, as
Alexander tells us, rejected Barbara1(NUN) in favour of Bar-
bara1(NUU), and adopted what Bochenski (1947, p. 79) called ‘la règle
du peiorem’ and we will call the peiorem rule, according to which the
16 Introduction
conclusion of a combination can be no stronger than its strongest
premiss.24 Throughout the commentary Alexander signals when a move
of Aristotle’s depends or appears to depend on his acceptance of first-
figure NUN syllogisms, a clear indication that he thinks the move is
problematic.25 It may be that his ultimate position is that the notion of
necessity is ambiguous. Commenting on a passage (1.13, 32b25-32) in
which Aristotle says that contingency can be taken in two ways, Alex-
ander writes:
But if ‘It is contingent that A holds of that of which B is said’ has two
meanings, so will ‘By necessity A holds of that of which B is said’ have two
meanings; for it will mean either ‘A holds by necessity of all of that of
which B is said unqualifiedly’ or ‘A holds by necessity of all of that of
which B is said by necessity’. But if this is true, it will not be the case that
‘A is said of all B by necessity’ is equivalent to ‘A is said by necessity of all
of that of which B is said’, as is said by some of those <defenders of
Aristotle> who show that it is true that the conclusion of a necessary
major and an unqualified minor <in the first figure> is necessary.
(166,19-25)
Before he gives terms for rejecting Barbara1(UNN), Aristotle offers the

following argument against it:
But if the proposition AB is not necessary, but BC is necessary, the

conclusion will not be necessary. For, if it is, it will result that A holds of
some B by necessity – through the first and through the third figure. But
this is false. But it is possible that B is such that A can hold of none of it.
(30a23-8)
After giving terms Aristotle says that the proof that Celarent1(UNN)
fails will be the same. Later, having affirmed Darii1(NUN) and
Ferio1(NUN), Aristotle rejects Darii1(UNN) and Ferio1(UNN):
But if the particular premiss is necessary, the conclusion will not be

necessary; for nothing impossible results, just as in the universal syllo-
gisms. Similarly in the case of privatives. Terms: motion, animal, white.
(30b2-6)
It seems reasonably clear that Alexander is right to interpret Aristotle’s

first rejection of Barbara1(UNN) as something like the following correct
argument:
Assume that AaB and NEC(BaC) yield NEC(AaC). But NEC(AaC) and
NEC(BaC) yield (Darapti3(NNN)) NEC(AiB). However, we ought to be
able to make AaB true while making NEC(AiB) false. Hence, the assump-
tion that Barbara1(UNN) holds is wrong.
We prefer the following paraphrase of this argument:

Introduction 17
Assume, as is possible, that AaB,  NEC(AiB), NEC(BaC), and assume
that Barbara1(UNN) is valid. Then NEC(AaC), which with NEC(BaC)
implies (Darapti3(NNN)) NEC(AiB), contradicting  NEC(AiB). Hence
Barbara1(UNN) is not valid.
We shall call such an argument against a rule of inference an incom-

patibility rejection argument, meaning an argument which shows that
acceptance of a proposed rule of inference would allow one to derive an
inconsistency from a set of compatible premisses, and we shall call an
argument against the possibility of an incompatibility rejection argu-
ment an incompatibility acceptance argument. In his remarks on
Darii1(UN_) and Ferio1(UN_) Aristotle claims that he has incompatibil-
ity acceptance arguments for all four first-figure UNU cases as well as
incompatibility rejection arguments for the UNN cases. The former
claim is incorrect in the case of Barbara1(UNU), since – once the
complete Darii1(NUN) (or Darapti3(UNN)) is available – the argument
we have given above could be formulated as a rejection of Bar-
bara1(UNU).26 On the other hand, the claim is correct for the other three
cases. We do the arguments. For:
Celarent3(UNU) AeB NEC(BaC) AeC
the two negative propositions entail nothing, and AeC and NEC(BaC)
entail (Felapton3(UNU)) AoB which is certainly not incompatible with
AeB.27 For:
Darii1(UNU) AaB NEC(BiC) AiC
and
Ferio1(UNU) AeB NEC(BiC) AoC
the conclusion and either premiss entail nothing. However, in the case
of these two the situation is exactly the same if the conclusion is taken
to be NEC(AiC) or NEC(AoC), as Alexander points out at 134,32-135,6
and 135,12-19. Hence Aristotle cannot give incompatibility rejection
arguments for either Darii1(UNN) or Ferio1(UNN).
At 129,9-22 Alexander more or less shows that there is no incompati-
bility rejection argument for Barbara1(NUN). The same is true for the
other first-figure NUN cases.28 In commenting on the rejection of Bar-
bara1(UNN) (128,3-129,7) and Celarent1(UNN) (130,27-131,4)
Alexander contents himself with showing that incompatibility argu-
ments work for rejecting these. However, as we have seen, when he gets
to Aristotle’s specification of terms, he points out (129,23-130,24) that
very similar terms would suffice for the rejection of Barbara1(NUN),
18 Introduction
and offers essentially Theophrastean considerations against Aristotle’s
position. He subsequently (131,8-21) tries to explain the difference
between incompatibility rejection arguments and reductios, and then
says that Aristotle doesn’t seem to be entirely confident about these
rejection arguments. This remark might seem out of place, given what
Alexander has said up to this point, but it is not if we realize the
complications which we have already outlined. Alexander goes on to
give his own method (132,5-7), which involves the attempt to produce a
reductio on the denial of a purported conclusion; if one is produced the
purported conclusion follows, if it isn’t, the purported conclusion does
not. Application of the method requires Alexander to look ahead not
only to third-figure N+U (and UU) combinations, which is all right since
these combinations reduce to first-figure ones, but – because the denial
of a necessary proposition is a ‘contingent’ one – also to N+C (and U+C)
combinations. The method appears to work for accepting Bar-
bara1(UNU) and rejecting Barbara1(UNN), but it would commit
Aristotle to acceptance of Celarent1(UNN).29
Alexander is obviously in difficulty when he gets to Aristotle’s rejec-
tion of Darii1(UNN) and Ferio1(UNN), since what Aristotle says or
clearly implies is false: we cannot give incompatibility rejection argu-
ments for these cases. Essentially Alexander considers various
alternatives without clearly espousing any one of them. We describe the
text, since it offers some difficulty. Alexander considers three alterna-
tive interpretations. He first suggests (133,20-9) that Aristotle is
intending to apply his method of incompatibility argumentation to
Darii1(UNN) and Darii1(NUN). But now he claims that the method
would not generate a contradiction if applied to Barbara1(NUN). This
claim is, of course, false, and in trying to defend it Alexander uses
Darapti3(UNU) rather than the stronger Darapti3(UNN) which is ac-
cepted by Aristotle.30 In any case, as we have seen, he subsequently
(134,32-135,6 and 135,12-19) asserts correctly that Aristotle’s incom-
patibility arguments will not work to reject either Darii1(UNN) or
Ferio1(UNN).
Alexander’s second alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s words
(133,29-134,20) is his own method. He shows – more or less – that it will
suffice to confirm Darii1(NUU) but not Darii1(UNN). He does not point
out that it also confirms Darii1(NUN). Nor does he say anything about
Ferio1. In fact his method confirms both Ferio1(UNN) and Ferio1(NUN),
hardly a satisfactory result from Aristotle’s point of view.31
Alexander’s third alternative is that Aristotle has in mind concrete
counterinterpretations. This has the benefit of putting Aristotle on
logically sound ground, but it is hard to believe that this is what the text
means.
Introduction 19
III. Modal syllogistic with contingent

propositions (1.13-22)
We have seen that full treatment of Aristotle’s discussion of the conver-
sion of necessary propositions requires reference to his treatment of
conversion for contingent propositions. In III.A we say something about
Alexander’s understanding of the notion of contingency and the rules
for converting contingent propositions. In III.B we go into more detail
on Alexander’s interpretation of the three modal notions, and in III.C
and D we look in more detail at his treatment of conversion for necessity
and contingency. Finally, in III.E.1-3 we consider the various combina-
tions involving contingent propositions.
III.A. Strict contingency and its transformation

rules (1.13, 32a18-32b1)
At the beginning of his discussion of the transformation rules for
contingency in 1.3 Aristotle says that ‘to be contingent is said in many
ways, since we say that the necessary and the non-necessary and the
possible are contingent’ (25a37-9). Commenting on this remark, Alex-
ander writes:
He (sc. Aristotle) showed us the homonymy of ‘contingent’ in On Interpre-

tation <13,23a7-20> too. For we apply ‘It is contingent’ to what is neces-
sary when we say that it is contingent that animal holds of every human;
and to what holds if we say of what holds of something that it is contin-
gent that it holds. Here he indicates what holds with the words ‘the non-
necessary’; for what holds differs in this way from what is necessary while
sharing with it the fact of holding at the present time. (Note the expres-
sion: what holds contingently is the same as what is signified by an
unqualified proposition.) ‘Contingent’ is also applied to what is possible.
He will explain what this means a little later on when he says <25b14-15>
‘Those which are said to be contingent inasmuch as they hold for the most
part and by nature – this is the way in which we determine the contin-
gent ...’. (37,28-38,10)
We discuss the reference to On Interpretation in Appendix 4 (On Inter-

pretation, chapters 12 and 13). At this point what is important is that
Alexander understands Aristotle to hold that we use ‘It is contingent
that’ in three different senses when we apply it to a proposition express-
ing a necessary truth, a proposition expressing something which holds
but is not necessary, and a proposition which expresses a mere possibil-
ity. For Alexander it is only the third sense which gives the strict
meaning of contingency, the one which is central to Aristotle’s syllogis-
tic. We also wish to signal the curious sentence in parenthesis calling
attention to the notion of holding contingently (endekhomenôs). In the
20 Introduction
next sections we shall emphasize occurrences of this word by including
the transliterated Greek.
In his comment on 25b14, Alexander says:
He set down only this sort of contingency – what holds for the most part
and is by nature (for what is by nature is for the most part), since only
this sort is useful in the employment of syllogisms. The possible also
covers what holds in equal part and what holds infrequently, but syllo-
gisms with material terms of this kind are of no use. (39,19-23)
In other words, holding for the most part is not the defining feature of
contingency. Aristotle specifies the defining feature toward the begin-
ning of chapter 13 when he announces what Alexander calls (on the
basis of 1.14, 33b21-3, 1.15, 33b25-31, and 1.15, 34b27-9) the diorismos
of contingency:
I call P contingent or say it is contingent that P if P is not necessary and

if, when P is posited to hold, nothing impossible will be because of it. For
we call what is necessary contingent homonymously. (32a18-21)
It seems reasonably clear that Aristotle intends a biconditional here:
CON(P) iff (i)  NEC(P) and (ii) no impossibility follows from P
The only clear and explicit use Aristotle makes of clause (ii) is in his
specious justifications of certain first-figure UC and NC syllogisms,
notably Barbara1(UC_) and Celarent1(UC_).32 Commenting on the
diorismos Alexander argues that for Aristotle CON(P) rules out P as
well as NEC(P):
Since he is going to discuss syllogisms from contingent premisses, he first

defines the contingent. He does not define it in its homonymous use since
it is not possible to define something as it is used homonymously. Rather
he isolates contingency as said of the necessary and the unqualified from
the contingent. For he showed that the contingent is also predicated of
these things.
By saying ‘when P is posited to hold’ he indicates that, in addition to
not being necessary, the contingent is not unqualified either. For what is
contingent according to the third adjunct33 is of this kind and it differs
from what is necessary and what is unqualified because if P is said to be
possible (dunasthai), P is not yet (mêdepô) the case. So, P would be
contingent in the strict sense if P is not the case and if when P is posited
to be the case it has nothing impossible as a consequent. And he would
have spoken more strictly about the contingent if he said ‘P is not the case
and when P is posited to hold’. For although what is not the case is not
necessary, what is not necessary is not ipso facto not the case. (156,11-
22)34
Introduction 21
Thus we may state ‘Alexander’s diorismos’ as:
CON(P) iff (i)  P, and (ii) no impossibility follows from P35
Alexander frequently refers to this strict sense of contingency as contin-

gency in the way specified (kata ton diorismon).
At 32a29-35 Aristotle announces rules of transformation for contin-
gent propositions:
It results that all contingent propositions convert with one another. I do

not mean that the affirmative converts with the negative, but rather that
whatever has an affirmative form converts with respect to its antithesis,
e.g., that ‘It is contingent that X holds’ converts with ‘It is contingent that
X does not hold’, and ‘It is contingent that A holds of all B’ converts with
‘It is contingent that A holds of no B’ and with ‘It is contingent that A does
not hold of all B’, and ‘It is contingent that A holds of some B’ converts
with ‘It is contingent that A does not hold of some B’, and the same way
in the other cases.
If one understands ‘ “It is contingent that X holds” converts with “It is

contingent that X does not hold” ’ to mean that CON(P) is equivalent to
CON( P) and applies that understanding to modal syllogistic, the
result, taken in conjunction with other equivalences accepted by Aris-
totle, is to make all contingent statements involving two terms A and B
equivalent and so to render syllogistic with contingency more or less
bankrupt. It seems certain that Aristotle does not intend this, and the
thought that he might doesn’t even enter Alexander’s head.36 He takes
Aristotle’s point to apply only to so-called indeterminate propositions,
that is, propositions which are ambiguous with respect to quantity.37
This means that the relevant transformations for syllogistic are simply:
AE-transformationc:38 CON(AaB)  CON(AeB)

EA-transformationc: CON(AeB)  CON(AaB)
IO-transformationc: CON(AiB)  CON(AoB)
OI-transformationc: CON(AoB)  CON(AiB)
Unfortunately, Aristotle does not offer any argument for any of these
rules, but simply says,
For since the contingent is not necessary, and what is not necessary may
(enkhôrei) not hold, it is evident that, if it is contingent that A holds of B,
it is also contingent that it does not hold of B, and if it is contingent that
it holds of all, it is also contingent that it does not hold of all. And similarly
in the case of particular affirmations. (32a36-40)
Alexander does not choose to expand significantly on these remarks,

22 Introduction
telling us only that this position is ‘reasonable’ (eikotôs) given the
diorismos of contingency.
When we add to these transformation rules the conversion rules
announced at 1.3, 25a37-b3:
AI-conversionc: CON(AaB)  CON(BiA)

II-conversionc: CON(AiB)  CON(BiA)
the result is still the equivalence of:
(ia) CON(AaB)
(ib) CON(AeB)
and of all of:
(iia) CON(AiB)
(iib) CON(AoB)
(iic) CON(BiA)
(iid) CON(BoA)
as well as the implication of any of (iia)-(iid) by either of (ia) or (ib). On

the other hand, as we have already mentioned, Aristotle denies EE-con-
versionc at 1.17, 36b35-37a31.
The equivalences Aristotle does accept have the effect of generating
what we will call waste cases of syllogistic validity. For example, since
Aristotle accepts:
Barbara1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BaC) CON(AaC)
the equivalence of (ia) and (ib) would also commit him to
EAA1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BaC) CON(AaC)

AEA1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BeC) CON(AaC)
EEA1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BeC) CON(AaC)
to give only examples with an a-conclusion. Aristotle’s handling of the

waste cases is not always perspicuous. He mentions some and not
others, and, for example, he chooses to endorse Celarent1(CCC) without
mentioning EAA1(CCC). For the most part the waste cases are of no
interest, and we shall not worry about them. But in some places,
particularly after Aristotle loses sight of – or perhaps interest in – the
various notions of contingency which he has brought into play, Alexan-
der addresses difficulties implicit in determining exactly what waste
case Aristotle is espousing.
Introduction 23
The diorismos of contingency appears to commit Aristotle to the
following instances of CON(P)   NEC(P) (C   N):
(i) CON(AaB)   NEC(AaB)

(ii) CON(AeB)   NEC(AeB)
(iii) CON(AiB)   NEC(AiB)
(iv) CON(AoB)   NEC(AoB)
The first two of these propositions are clearly Aristotelian, but the last
two cause some difficulty. One can see in a rough way that if sense could
be made of a de dicto reading of particular propositions these two would
be true de dicto, but false de re, since, for example, there might be some
animals, e.g., humans, for which it is contingent that they are white and
other animals, e.g., swans for which it is necessary that they are white.
We are not confident about Aristotle’s view of (iii) and (iv), but we note
that at 1.14, 33b3-8 (cf. 1.15, 35a20-4) he takes CON(Animal i White)
and CON(Animal o White) to be true, whereas at 1.16, 36b3-7 (cf. 1.9,
30b5-6) he takes NEC(Animal i White) and NEC(Animal o White) to be
true. The last pair seems reasonable enough on a de re reading, but the
first pair seems to be false on such a reading.
Whatever Aristotle may have thought about (iii) and (iv), Alexander
is uneasy with violations of them. Thus, when Aristotle takes CON
(Animal i White) and CON(Animal o White) as true, Alexander says
(171,30-172,5) that a ‘truer’ choice of terms would involve taking
CON(White i Walking) and CON(White o Walking) to be true. This
choice is equally problematic on the intuitive de re reading which lies
behind Alexander’s acceptance of NEC(Animal i White) and NEC
(Animal o White), but it allows him to preserve (iii) and (iv).
III.B. Alexander and the temporal interpretation of

modality: preliminary remarks
At the beginning of chapter 2 Aristotle announces that ‘every proposi-
tion says either that something holds or that it holds by necessity or
that it is contingent that it holds’ (25a1- 2). Alexander’s comment on this
passage helps to fill out our understanding of his conception of the three
modalities:
It is necessary to understand the word ‘categorical’ added to the words

‘every proposition’, since he is now talking about such propositions and
syllogisms <as opposed to hypothetical ones>. ... Now in every categorical
proposition one term is predicated of another either affirmatively or
negatively, i.e., as holding or not holding of the subject; and if X holds of
Y, it either holds always or holds at some time and doesn’t hold at
another. If what is said to hold holds always and is taken to hold always,
the proposition saying this is necessary true affirmative; but a necessary
24 Introduction
negative true proposition is one which takes what by nature never holds
of something as never holding of it. But if X does not always hold of Y, if
it holds at the present moment, the proposition which indicates this is an
unqualified true affirmative; and similarly a proposition which says that
what does not now hold does not now hold is an unqualified true negative.
But if X does not hold of Y at the present time but can (dunamenon) hold
of it and is taken in this way – i.e., as being able to hold – the proposition
is a true contingent (endekhomenon) affirmative; and a proposition which
says of what holds or does not hold but can (hoion) both hold and not hold
that it is contingent that it does not hold is a true contingent negative.
(25,26-26,14)39
In this passage, as in many others, it is not entirely clear whether

Alexander is speaking about (in our formulations) the assertion that
‘Animal a Human’ is a (true) necessary proposition, the assertion that
NEC(Human a Animal) or just the expression ‘NEC(Human a Animal)’.
Let us begin by talking about the simple categorical propositions, AaB,
AeB, AiB, AoB, which we represent by P. In this paragraph Alexander
commits himself to at least a partial temporal interpretation of neces-
sity, contingency, and unqualified holding. Part of the difficulty in
construing what Alexander has in mind here arises from his attempt to
distinguish between affirmative propositions, which we shall temporar-
ily represent as XaffY, and negative ones, which we shall represent as
XnegY. We can construe Alexander’s account of the modalities as
follows:
XaffY is necessary iff X holds of Y always;

XaffY is unqualified iff X holds of Y now but not always;
XaffY is contingent iff X does not hold of Y now but can hold of Y.
XnegY is necessary iff X never holds of Y;
XnegY is unqualified iff X does not hold of Y now (but does hold at
some time);
XnegY is contingent iff X can hold of Y and can not hold of Y.
One problem here is the obvious asymmetry between the definitions of

contingency for affirmative and negative statements. We can see Alex-
ander’s difficulty by considering the two possible ways of making the
definitions symmetrical:
(i) XaffY is contingent iff X does not hold of Y now but can hold of Y;
XnegY is contingent iff X holds of Y now, but can not hold of Y.
(ii) XaffY is contingent iff X can not hold of Y and can hold of Y.
XnegY is contingent iff X can hold of Y and can not hold of Y;
Of these two alternatives (ii) might seem to be preferable since Aristotle

is committed to AE-, EA-, IO- and OI-transformationc. However, it is
Introduction 25
relatively certain that Alexander thinks of (ii) as something like a
feature of contingency, whereas (i) is closer to a genuine analysis of it.
For we have seen that for him the primary account of contingency is
given by the diorismos, which he takes to imply that what is contingent
does not hold. For this reason we take (i) instead of (ii) as the relevant
account of contingency. We can then drop the distinction between aff
and neg, and write the three accounts as
(Nt) P is necessary iff P is always true;

(Ut) P is unqualified iff P is true now and not always true;
(C*) P is contingent iff P is not true now, but P can be true.
The assertion that ‘P can be true’ is ultimately of no more help in

unpacking the notion of contingency than the assertion that nothing
impossible follows from the assumption that P. In both cases we are
using the notion of possibility to explain the notion of possibility.
Unfortunately, Alexander does not seem to have any non-circular way
of explaining what ‘can be true’ means. However, it is useful to have in
mind a strictly temporal version of (C*), since Alexander sometimes
seems to flirt with the following idea:40
(Ct) P is contingent iff P is not true now, but P will be true at some
time.41
It is clear that Nt allows one to give simple justifications of the conver-

sion laws for necessary propositions and that Ct allows one to do the
same for not only AI-conversionc and II-conversionc, but also EE-conver-
sionc. In order to indicate Alexander’s apparent flirtation with Ct we
shall look at his account of Aristotle’s justification of the conversion laws
for necessary propositions, which as we explained in section II.A, seem
to rely on claims about contingency which Aristotle hasn’t proved or –
worse yet – ultimately decides are false. However, before doing so, we
should mention that, insofar as Alexander equates contingency with
possibility, he explicitly assigns C* rather than Ct to Aristotle at
184,9-11.
III.C. Conversion of necessary propositions (1.3, 25a27-36)

The laws in question are:
EE-conversionn: NEC(AeB)  NEC(BeA)

AI-conversionn: NEC(AaB)  NEC(BiA)
II-conversionn: NEC(AiB)  NEC(BiA)
We recall Aristotle’s justification of EE-conversionn:

26 Introduction
If it is necessary that A holds of no B, it is necessary that B holds of no A;
for if it is contingent that B holds of some, it will be contingent that A
holds of some B. (25a29-32)
Here is Alexander’s comment:
Here again he seems to have used the conversion of particular contingent

affirmative propositions in his proof for necessary universal negative
ones, even though he has not yet discussed conversions of contingent
propositions. Or should we rather say this? He holds it to be agreed that
(i) particular affirmative contingent propositions are opposite to univer-
sal necessary negative ones since they are contradictories, and therefore
assumes this. Having assumed it, then, (ii) since if B holds of some A but
not by necessity, it is said that it is contingent that B holds of some A and
that it holds contingently (endekhomenôs) of some A, and (iii) since he has
proved that particular unqualified <affirmative> propositions convert
with themselves, he makes use of propositions of this kind. Thus he does
away with the necessity by saying that it is contingent that A holds of
some B because (iv) what holds of some – when it holds – converts.42 (v)
But if it is contingent that B holds of some A, then either it already holds
of A or it is possible (hoion) that it will hold of it at some time. (vi) In this
way what holds of no B by necessity will at some time hold of some of it,
which is impossible. (vii) He says a little later when he distinguishes
kinds of contingency that what holds but not by necessity is said to be
contingent. (viii) For he says that contingency signifies both what is
necessary and also what is not necessary but holds – and he now uses it
in application to the latter case. (ix) And what holds contingently (endek-
homenôs) of some or will hold of some is the opposite of what holds of none
by necessity. (36,7-25)
We propose the following interpretation of Alexander’s argument:
Aristotle takes for granted that  NEC(XeY) is equivalent to ‘It is contin-

gent that XiY’ (i). Hence (ii) he assumes  NEC(BeA) and infers ‘It is
contingent that (BiA)’ and so (v) either BiA or it is contingent that B will
hold of A at some time. But (iv) at the time BiA holds, AiB holds by
II-conversionu. But this conflicts with the assumption NEC(AeB) (vi and
ix). Hence we see that Aristotle uses only II-conversionu. When in his
argument he seems to invoke II-conversionc he is using ‘contingent’ in the
sense in which applies to what holds; he could just as well have written
‘if B holds of some A, A holds of some B.’ (iii; vii-viii)
Alexander underlines this last point in a subsequent reference back to

this argument:
It is clear from this that in the previous proof too he used ‘It is contingent
that B holds of some A’ in connection with something unqualified; for
there ‘for if it is contingent that B holds of some’ should be understood to
mean ‘For if B holds contingently (endekhomenôs) of some A’. (37,17-21;
cf. 149,5-7)
Introduction 27
Clearly (vi) and (ix) presuppose Nt, but Alexander’s vocabulary shows
the same wavering between (C*) and (Ct) to which we have already
called attention. There is a perhaps more serious problem raised by (i).
Alexander offers no justification for how Aristotle can take this for
granted when he himself holds that CON(XiY) does not follow from
 NEC(XeY), since  NEC(XeY) is compatible with NEC(XaY), which
is incompatible with CON(XiY). Perhaps when Alexander says that
Aristotle takes (i) to be something agreed, he means that Aristotle is
taking (i) as an endoxon, albeit one which he does not accept.
Alexander’s discussion of AI- and II-conversionn, to which we now
turn, throws some further light on his treatment of EE-conversionn.
Alexander’s summary of the argument involves another (to us approxi-
mate) use of temporal considerations and the same assertion of the
equivalence of  NEC(P) and ‘It is contingent that  P’.
He proves that particular affirmative necessary propositions convert

from both universal affirmative necessary and particular affirmative
necessary ones in the same way as he did in the case of privative universal
ones. For if A holds of all or some B by necessity, but B does not hold of
some A by necessity, it will be contingent that B hold of no A at some time;
for the negation of ‘It is necessary that B holds of some A’ is ‘It is not
necessary that B holds of some A’, which is equivalent to ‘It is contingent
that B holds of no A’, since ‘It is not necessary that B holds of some A’ and
‘It is contingent43 that B holds of no A’ are the same. But when B holds of
no A, A will hold of no B (for this has been proved). Hence, A will not hold
of all or some B by necessity. (37,3-13)
Insofar as there is anything new in Alexander’s discussion of AI- and

II-conversionn, it comes when he tries to defend Aristotle against the
charge of using EE-conversionc:
It is clear that he has not conducted the proof with contingent negative
propositions; for he thinks that they do not convert. Rather he reduces
<the contingent negative proposition> to an unqualified one, subtracting
necessity from it.44 He makes this clear by no longer using the word
‘contingent’ but simply saying ‘For if it is not necessary’. For he is
assuming that unqualified propositions convert. (37,14-17)
Here Alexander lights on the fact that in the justification of AI- and
II-conversionn Aristotle does not say something like ‘if  NEC(BiA),
then it is contingent that B holds of no A, and so it is contingent that A
holds of no B and so  NEC(AiB)’, but simply ‘if  NEC(BiA) then 
NEC(AiB)’.
28 Introduction
III.D. Conversion of contingent propositions

III.D.1 Conversion of affirmative contingent propositions (1.3,
25a37-b3); more on Alexander and the temporal interpretation of
modality
Aristotle argues for AI- and II-conversionc simultaneously. We wish to
consider what he says as an alternative to a simple argument
which one might have expected him to use. Suppose  CON(YiX).
Then ( C  N) NEC(YeX). But (EE-conversionn) NEC(XeY), con-
tradicting CON(XaY) or CON(XiY). Aristotle avoids such an argument
because of the use of  C   N; he later (1.17, 37a9-31) rejects the
analogous argument for EE- conversionc: assume  CON(YeX); then
( C   ) NEC(YiX), so that (II-conversionn) NEC(XiY), contradict-
ing CON(XeY). But Aristotle’s own argument for AI- and II-conversionc
is very problematic:
Since to be contingent is said in many ways (since we say that the

necessary and the non-necessary and the possible are contingent) in the
case of contingent propositions, the situation with respect to conversion
will be the same in all cases of affirmative propositions. For if it is
contingent that A holds of all or of some B, then it will be contingent that
B holds of some A. For if of none, then A of no B; this has been proved
earlier. (25a37-b3)
Alexander takes for granted that Aristotle’s argument must turn on the
three ways in which contingency is said, and that it will proceed
indirectly by moving from:
(i) ‘It is not contingent that B holds of some A’
to:
(ii) a universal negative statement in which B is the predicate and

A is the subject
and then to:
(iii) a universal negative statement in which A is the predicate and

B is the subject
which contradicts:
(iv) ‘It is contingent that A holds of some B’

Introduction 29
To try to work out an interpretation satisfying these conditions Alexan-
der takes it that there are three cases of (i):
(ia) possibility:  CON(BiA)

(ib) holding:  (BiA)
(ic) necessity:  NEC(BiA)
and three corresponding antecedents of the conditional from which to

find an inconsistency:
(iva) CON(AiB)
(ivb) AiB
(ivc) NEC(AiB)
Case (b) is easy since  (BiA), i.e., BeA, yields (EE-conversionu) AeB,
contradicting AiB. Similarly, given  C  N  , which Alexander pre-
sumably again takes as ‘agreed’, case (c) reduces to EE-conversionn. For
case (a) Alexander takes for granted  N   and gives his most
straightforward temporal argument: if  NEC(BiA) then ( N  C )
CON(BeA), so that (Ct) at some time BeA, so that at that time AeB, so
CON(AeB), contradicting NEC(AiB). He does not seem to notice that if
this argument were correct it would establish EE-conversionc.
Alexander preserves for us something like such an argument of
Theophrastus and Eudemus for a version of EE-conversion for contin-
gent propositions, although it too shows an unclear handling of
temporal considerations:
If it is contingent that A holds of no B, it is also contingent that B holds

of no A. For since it is contingent that A holds of no B, when it is
contingent that it holds of none, it is then contingent that A is disjoined
from all the things of B. But if this is so, B will then also have been
disjoined from A, and, if this is so, it is also contingent that B holds of no
A. (220,12-16)
Alexander defends Aristotle against this argument:
It seems that Aristotle expresses a better view than they do when he says
that a universal negative which is contingent in the way specified does
not convert with itself. For if X is disjoined from Y it is not thereby
contingently (endekhomenôs) disjoined from it. Consequently it is not
sufficient to show that when it is contingent that A is disjoined from B,
then B is also disjoined from A; in addition <one must show> that B is
contingently disjoined from A. But if this is not shown, then it has not
been shown that a contingent proposition converts, since what is sepa-
rated from something by necessity is also disjoined from it, but not
contingently. (220,16-23; cf. 221,1-2)
30 Introduction
Alexander here seems to concede that if CON(AeB), then at some time
AeB and therefore BeA. But he insists that one cannot infer CON(BeA)
because one doesn’t know that BeA holds contingently if we have
inferred BeA from AeB, where AeB holds contingently.45 It seems clear
that Alexander is invoking a distinction between the ways in which
things hold. We cannot infer CON(P) from P unless we know that P
holds contingently.
Alexander uses the words ‘necessarily’ (anankaiôs) and ‘unquali-
fiedly’ (huparkhontôs) as well as ‘contingently’ in the commentary.46
Although Aristotle never uses any of these words in a logical context,
they are also found in the other commentaries on his logical works. For
the most part they are simply variants of expressions such as ‘It is
contingent that’, but we are convinced that Alexander wishes to put
special weight on the ideas of holding contingently and of holding but
not holding necessarily. By insisting on the latter notion Alexander is
able to maintain the position that unqualified propositions for Aristotle
do not signify holding necessarily or eternally. But he has much more
difficulty with what the difference is between a contingent and an
unqualified proposition. Indeed, his assertion at 38,5-7 that holding
contingently correlates with ‘what is signified by an unqualified propo-
sition’ is probably intended to justify the application of II-conversionu
which Alexander detects in Aristotle’s justification of AI-conversionc.
Similarly in his account of the justification of EE-conversionn Alexander
wants to stress that  NEC(BeA) implies that BiA holds contingently
to justify the alleged application of the same rule. If Alexander were
willing to use the temporal reading of the modal operators straightfor-
wardly, he would have no difficulty, but, as we have seen, he instead
mixes the temporal reading with the idea of something holding contin-
gently. But using that idea depends on blurring the distinction between
what holds now and what holds at some time. To put this point another
way, for Alexander’s reasoning to work, one has to assume that Aris-
totle proves II-conversionu not just for propositions which hold now, but
for propositions which hold at some time. But, on the temporal reading
of the modalities, that is to say that II-conversionu is or includes
II-conversionc.
Although Alexander makes no such claim, it seems to us that his
handling of the modal conversion rules more or less commits him to
some such idea. Moreover the lumping together of unqualified and
contingent propositions is quite in keeping with Aristotle’s use of false
but possible truths, e.g., ‘All animals are moving’ to interpret un-
qualified propositions, and with his willingness to use the same
terms to verify corresponding contingent and unqualified proposi-
tions.47 As Alexander explains in connection with the proposition ‘No
horse is white’:
Introduction 31
For if someone requires that we take as universal what holds always but
not what holds at some time, he will be requiring nothing else than that
the unqualified be necessary, since the necessary does always hold.
Furthermore, he himself, when he is considering an unqualified proposi-
tion with respect to terms does not ever consider it with respect to terms
of this kind. (232,32-6; cf. 130,23-4)
If Alexander adhered to a strict temporal interpretation of contingency

what he says here would implicitly commit him to the identification of
unqualified truths with propositions true at some time, that is, with
contingent propositions. He, of course, never makes this identification.
If he had, he might have seen problems which face any interpreter trying
to understand why Aristotle accepts certain U+C combinations while
rejecting their CC analogues. There are many reasons why Alexander
never offers a strict temporal interpretation. Perhaps the most impor-
tant is that for him the meaning of contingency is determined by the
diorismos, not by any temporal account.
III.D.2. Non-convertibility of negative contingent propositions

(1.3, 25b3-19; 1.17, 36b35-37a32)
Aristotle’s denial of EE-conversionc is controversial. Alexander’s discus-
sion of it is dense, but is largely a scholastic defence of Aristotle’s
position. We will mention a few points in it, but we will mainly content
ourselves with describing Aristotle’s text.
In the case of negative propositions, it is not the same. With those which
are said to be contingent inasmuch as they do not hold by necessity or they
hold but not by necessity, the case is similar, e.g., if someone were to say
that it is contingent that what is human is not a horse or that white holds
of no cloak. For of these examples the former does not hold by necessity,
and it is not necessary that the latter hold – and the proposition converts
in the same way; for, if it is contingent that horse holds of no human, it
will be possible (enkhôrei) that human holds of no horse, and if it is
possible that white holds of no cloak, it is possible that cloak holds of
nothing white – for if it is necessary that it holds of some, then white will
also hold of some cloak by necessity (for this was proved earlier). And
similarly in the case of particular negatives. (25b3-14)48
Alexander understands Aristotle to be dealing here with the situation

in which an unqualified or necessary proposition is said to be contingent,
and to be conceding that EE-conversion does hold in those cases.
According to Alexander, Aristotle illustrates necessity with the propo-
sition ‘It is contingent that horse holds of no human’ and unqualified
holding with ‘It is possible that white holds of no cloak’. Aristotle’s
argument that the latter converts seems to be a straightforward indirect
argument moving from ‘It is not possible that cloak holds of nothing
32 Introduction
white’ to ( C    ) NEC(Cloak i White) to (II- conversionn)
NEC(White i Cloak). Alexander insists on reparsing what Aristotle says
to make it fit the case of contingency as holding:
He says ‘for if it is necessary that it holds of some, then white will also
hold of some cloak by necessity’ since a particular affirmative necessary
proposition must be the opposite of a contingent universal negative one,
and the unqualified proposition was assumed as contingent in its verbal
formulation. And the verbal opposite will contain necessity, although
what is signified by it will be particular affirmative unqualified. For this
is the opposite of a universal negative unqualified proposition. (39,4-11,
our italics)
That is to say, according to Alexander, Aristotle uses the vocabulary of

necessity although he expects us to understand that he is talking about
unqualified propositions. Aristotle has little to say about the third case.
He remarks that EE-conversionc fails and OO-conversionc works, but
defers discussion until chapter 17:
But those things which are said to be contingent inasmuch as they are for
the most part and by nature – and this is the way we specify contingency
– will not be similar in the case of negative conversions. Rather a
universal negative proposition does not convert, and the particular does
convert. This will be evident when we discuss contingency. (25b14-19)49
Aristotle’s actual argument for rejecting EE-conversionc is confusing for

a number of reasons, one of which is his tacit reliance on the equivalence
of CON(XaY) and CON(XeY). He begins the rejection, which is what we
have called an incompatibility rejection argument, as follows:
It should first be shown that a privative contingent proposition does not

convert; that is, if it is contingent that A holds of no B, it is not necessary
that it is also contingent that B holds of no A. For let this be assumed and
let it be contingent that B holds of no A. Then, since contingent affirma-
tions convert with negations – both contraries and opposites – and it is
contingent that B holds of no A, it is evident that it will also be contingent
that B holds of all A. But this is false. For it is not the case that if it is
contingent that X holds of all Y, it is necessary that it be contingent that
Y holds of all X. So the privative does not convert. (36b35-37a3)
Here Aristotle takes for granted the equivalence of CON(XeY) and

CON(XaY) and the compatibility of CON(XaY) (or equivalently
CON(XeY)) and  CON(YaX). We may represent his argument as
follows. Assume that EE-conversionc holds and that CON(AeB) (or
equivalently CON(AaB)) and, what is possible,  CON(BaA). Then
(EE-conversionc) CON(BeA) and (EA-transformationc) CON(BaA), con-
tradicting  CON(BaA). Therefore EE-conversionc cannot be correct.50
Aristotle goes on to give terms for rejecting EE-conversionc:51
Introduction 33
Furthermore nothing prevents it being contingent that A holds of no B,
although B does not hold of some A by necessity. For example, it is
contingent that white does not hold of any human being – for it is also
contingent that it holds of every human being –, but it is not true to say
that it is contingent that human holds of nothing white. For it does not
hold of many white things by necessity, but what is necessary is not
contingent. (37a4-9)
Using our symbols we represent what Aristotle says as follows: further-

more, in some cases, CON(AeB) and NEC(BoA) (i.e., NEC (BaA)). For
example, CON(White e Human), since CON(White a Human), but
 CON(Human e White), since NEC(Human o White) (since, e.g.,
swans are not human by necessity) and nothing necessary is contingent.
We turn now to perhaps the most difficult part of Aristotle’s rejection
of EE-conversionc, his rejection of the following indirect argument for it:
Suppose CON(AeB) and  CON(BeA). Then NEC (BeA), i.e.,

NEC(BiA). But then (II-conversionn) NEC(AiB), contradicting
CON(AeB).
Aristotle rejects the transition from  CON(BeA) to NEC  (BeA) or,

equivalently, NEC(BiA). Underlying his rejection is the idea that, even
if  NEC(BiA), one might have  CON(BeA) because NEC(BoA). That
is, although it is true that:
(NCe) NEC(BiA) v NEC(BoA)   CON(BeA)
it is not true that:
*  CON(BeA)  NEC(BiA)
since one might have NEC(BoA) and  NEC(BiA). For this discussion
it is also useful to have the analogue of (NCe) for a-propositions:
(NCa) NEC(BiA) v NEC(BoA)   CON(BaA)
What does not emerge clearly from Aristotle’s text is whether or not he
accepts the converses of (NCe) and (NCa), that is
( CeN)  CON(BeA)  NEC(BiA) v NEC(BoA)

( CaN)  CON(BaA)  NEC(BiA) v NEC(BoA)
We discuss Alexander’s view of these two propositions in Appendix 5 on

weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency. We now look at Aristotle’s
rejection of *. It begins at 37a14:
34 Introduction
It is not the case that if it is not contingent that B holds of no A, it is
necessary that B holds of some A. For ‘It is not contingent that B holds of
no A’ is said in two ways; it is said if B holds of some A by necessity and
if it does not hold of some by necessity. (37a14-17)
We take Aristotle to here be asserting (NCe) and not ( CeN). He goes

on to assert a consequence of (NCe) and its analogue for (NCa):
For if B does not hold of some A by necessity, it is not true to say that it
is contingent that it does not hold of all, just as if B does hold of some A
by necessity, it is not true to say that it is contingent that it holds of all.
(37a17-20)
That is,
(NCe’) NEC(BoA)   CON(BeA)

(NCa’) NEC(BiA)   CON(BaA)
He now goes on to deny the analogue of * for a- and o- propositions, and

insist that we might have  CON(BaA),  NEC(BoA) and NEC(BiA):
So, if someone were to maintain that, since it is not contingent that B

holds of all A,52 it does not hold of some by necessity, he would take things
falsely. For it holds of all,53 but we say that it is not contingent that it
holds of all because it holds of certain of them by necessity. (37a20-4)
Aristotle now says:
Consequently both ‘X holds of some Y by necessity’ and ‘X does not hold

of some Y by necessity’ are opposite to ‘It is contingent that X holds of all
Y’. And similarly in the case of ‘It is contingent that X holds of no Y’.
(37a24-6)
Clearly Aristotle is asserting the same thing about CON(BaA) and

CON(BeA). What is not clear is whether he is simply asserting (NCa)
and (NCe) or also ( CaN) and ( CeN). That he intends to make the
stronger assertion is suggested by what he goes on to say about the
alleged indirect proof of EE-conversionc:
It is clear then that with respect to things which are contingent and not
contingent in the way which we have specified initially it is necessary to
take ‘B does not hold of some A by necessity’ and not ‘B holds of some A
by necessity’. But if this is taken, nothing impossible results, so there is
no syllogism. (37a26-30)
We are inclined to think that Aristotle should say simply that we have
no right to infer NEC(BiA) from  CON(BeA). But instead he says that
we must infer NEC(BoA). Alexander54 understands Aristotle’s claim to
Introduction 35
be based on the idea that NEC(BiA), i.e., NEC(AiB), is incompatible
with the assumed CON(AeB). This interpretation seems to presup-
pose the truth of ( CeN). That is, the interpretation assumes that if
 CON(BeA), then either NEC(BiA) or NEC(BoA) and rules out the
former option. If this interpretation is correct, then Aristotle presum-
ably also accepts ( CaN).
III.E. Syllogistic and non-syllogistic combinations

In chapters 14-22 Aristotle deals with CC, U+C, and N+C combinations,
treating the first figure in chapters 14-16, the second in 17-19, and the
third in 20-2. Alexander, of course, follows this order. However, the
order does not seem to serve any clear purpose and it obscures the logical
connections established by Aristotle’s practice of reducing second- and
third-figure combinations to corresponding first-figure ones. We shall,
therefore, discuss the CC combinations together in section III.E.1, then
the U+C combinations in III.E.2, and then the N+C combinations in
III.E.3.
III.E.1. CC premiss combinations (1.14, 17, 20)

The CC combinations are the least interesting ones involving contin-
gency. Aristotle has at his disposal terms to show that none of these
combinations are syllogistic, but his sense of what is complete and his
transformation rules commit him to a large number being syllogistic
(e.g., any first- or third-figure CC combination with two universal
premisses). We have not found any evidence concerning Theophrastus’
attitude toward the CC combinations, but it is unclear how he could
have possibly accepted any if CON is interpreted as  NEC . For any
valid syllogism:
 NEC( P1)  NEC( P2)  NEC( P3)
could be used to justify, e.g.:
NEC( P3)  NEC( P2) NEC( P1)
an apparent violation of the peiorem rule. The same difficulty would

arise for any  N + U syllogisms; for if they do not violate the peiorem
and have a contingent conclusion they can be transformed into  N +
N syllogisms with an unqualified conclusion or N+U syllogisms with a
necessary conclusion.
III.E.1.a. The first figure (1.14)

Aristotle accepts as complete all the CCC analogues of the first-figure
36 Introduction
UUU syllogisms plus four waste cases which they generate. At 33a34ff.
he rejects all other first-figure CC combinations. He first uses an
abstract argument which Alexander explicates at 170,24-171,13, and
then gives terms which take for granted the truth of the following
propositions:
(i) CON(Animal i White)

CON(Animal o White)
(ii) CON(White a Human) CON(White a Cloak)
CON(White e Human) CON(White e Cloak)
(iii) NEC(Animal a Human) NEC(Animal e Cloak)
Although there are undoubtedly ways of arguing that Aristotle might

accept the propositions of (i) without accepting their universal ana-
logues, we are inclined to think that he is rather stuck with
(i’) CON(Animal a White) CON(Animal e White)
and thus with terms which rule out the combinations he has already
accepted. As we mentioned at the end of section III.A, Alexander is
inclined to think that the propositions of (i) are made false by the (de re)
truth of NEC(Animal i White) and NEC(Animal o White). He offers the
following improvement to Aristotle’s terms in the present case:
(i) CON(White i Walking)

CON(White o Walking)
(ii) CON(Walking a Swan) CON(Walking a Crow)
CON(Walking e Swan) CON(Walking e Crow)
(iii) NEC(White a Swan) NEC(White e Crow)
It seems even clearer in the case of these terms that if one accepts the
sentences under (i) as true one will also have to accept:
(i’) CON(White a Walking) CON(White e Walking)
III.E.1.b. The second figure (1.17)

We have discussed Aristotle’s rejection of EE-conversionc in section
III.D.2. It takes up much of chapter 17, in which Aristotle rejects all
second-figure CC-combinations. Aristotle used EE-conversionu to justify
three of the four syllogistic UU combinations in the second figure,
proving the fourth, Baroco2, by reductio. Aristotle uses the failure of
EE-conversionc to argue (37a32-5) against the possibility of reducing
Cesare2(CC_) to Celarent1(CCC) in the way Cesare2(UUU) was reduced
to Celarent1(UUU). The argument obviously generalizes to Cames-
tres2(CC_) and Festino2(CC_). Aristotle also argues (37a35-7) against
Introduction 37
the possibility of any indirect reduction. Although his text is obscure, it
is clear that no indirect reduction of a CC combination is possible; for
one of the premisses of the reducing argument will be contingent, so the
conclusion will not be necessary, and so will not contradict the other
contingent premiss. Aristotle concludes the chapter (37a38-b18) by
giving terms to show that no contingent conclusion with B as predicate
and C as subject follows from contingent premisses having those terms
as subject and a term A as predicate.
III.E.1.c The third figure (1.20)

Aristotle’s rules commit him to the position that every third-figure CC
combination with a universal premiss is syllogistic. He explicitly men-
tions AA_3 (Darapti3; 39a14-19) and its consequence EE_3 (39a26-8), but
not its consequence AE_3; he also mentions EA_3 (Felapton3; 39a19-23).
As for the cases with one particular premiss he mentions AI_3 (Datisi1;
39a31-5), but not its consequence AO_3; IA_3 (Disamis3; 39a35-6) and its
consequence OE_3 (39a38-b2), but not its consequences OA_3;55 and IE_3,
and EI_3 (Ferison3; 39a36-8) and its consequence EO_3 (39a38-b2).
Alexander does not mention any of the cases, not mentioned by Aristotle.
Aristotle rejects all the CC combinations with particular premisses
taking as true, e.g., CON(Animal i White) and CON(Human i White).
Alexander raises no doubt about Aristotle’s taking these premisses
to be true, even though, as we have just mentioned, he did find
CON(Animal i White) problematic in the rejection of certain first-
figure CC combinations, and if the whiteness of swans falsifies
CON(Animal i White), it presumably also falsifies CON(Human i
White) by verifying NEC(Human o White) and thus falsifying
CON(Human o White).
III.E.2. U+C premiss combinations (1.15, 18, and 21)

Given the apparent impossibility of distinguishing between permitted
interpretations of contingent and unqualified propositions, it seems
clear that Aristotle’s syllogistic is in as much difficulty over the U+C
cases as it is over the CC cases. Aristotle’s discussion of the U+C cases
is, however, much more difficult.

As one expects, Aristotle focuses on the analogues of the complete UUU
cases. He takes the CU analogues to be complete, but thinks that the
UC analogues need to be proved to be syllogistic. Aristotle gives two
rather complicated illegitimate indirect arguments for Barbara1(UC_)
and Celarent1(UC_), which, he says, can also be used for Darii1(UC_)
and Ferio1(UC_). The arguments are, in fact, essentially the same, but
for reasons which are never specified, Aristotle apparently holds (33b25-
38 Introduction
33) that Celarent1(UC_) and Ferio1(UC_) yield a  NEC conclusion,
which is not contingent in the way specified, whereas Barbara1(UC_)
and Darii1(UC_) yield a standard contingent conclusion. Alexander
points out very explicitly at 198,5-199,15 that the conclusion of Bar-
bara1(UC_) is  NEC (AaC) rather than CON(AaC),56 but in the
sequel of the commentary he continues to speak as if the conclusion were
CON(AaC). His (and our difficulties) are only increased by Aristotle’s
parallel, but importantly different treatment of the NC cases and by
Aristotle’s later willingness to forget the distinction he drew between
the affirmative and negative first-figure UC cases. We represent the
four standard first-figure cases as follows:
Barbara1(UC‘C’) AaB CON(BaC)  NEC (AaC)

Celarent1(UCN) AeB CON(BaC)  NEC (AeC)
Darii1(UC‘C’) AaB CON(BiC)  NEC (AiC)
Ferio1(UCN) AeB CON(BiC)  NEC (AoC)
For Barbara1 57 Aristotle assumes  CON(AaC), infers NEC (AaC),

i.e., NEC(AoC), and purports to derive an inconsistency. In the case of
Celarent1 Aristotle assumes  CON(AeC), infers NEC (AeC), i.e.,
NEC(AiC), and purports to derive an inconsistency. In connection with
Celarent1 Aristotle points out that he has not really established
CON(AeC), but only  NEC(AiC) (i.e.,  NEC (AeC)), the negation of
the assumption he made for the reductio argument:
Thus the conclusion of this syllogism is not a proposition which is contin-

gent in the way specified, but is ‘of none by necessity’;58 for this is the
contradictory of the hypothesis which was made, since it was posited that
A holds of some C by necessity, and the conclusion of a syllogism by means
of the impossible is the opposite of the hypothesis. (34b27-31)
Obviously the same point can be made about the indirect derivation of
Barbara1(UC_): the conclusion which is shown to follow is, if anything,
NEC(AoC), i.e., NEC (AaC).59
On the basis of what we have said up to now one might suppose that
all that the treatment of the CU combinations involves is a certain
incongruity in Aristotle’s treatment of contingency, insofar as it some-
times corresponds to the notion we represent by CON and sometimes
to the notion we represent by  NEC. But Aristotle’s attempts to
justify Barbara1(UC‘C’) and Celarent1(UC N) are not just incongru-
ous; they are fallacious. It will suffice to focus on Barbara1. Before
trying to establish its validity, Aristotle’s argues (34a5-24) for some-
thing like the following true proposition:
If P implies Q and it is possible that P, it is possible that Q.

Introduction 39
Alexander’s discussion of this material is somewhat vitiated by a
failure to distinguish clearly between the assertion that P implies Q and
the conditional ‘If P then Q’, but it includes important material relating
to Hellenistic treatments of the conditional and implication. (See espe-
cially 177,25-182,8 and 183,34-185,18.) Alexander takes the upshot of
his discussion to be the corollary which Aristotle announces sloppily at
34a25, but which Alexander understands correctly as:
If P implies Q and it is possible that P, then Q may be false but it

cannot be impossible.
Aristotle argues for the validity of Barbara1(UC‘C’) as follows:
Assume  CON(AaC), ‘i.e.’, NEC (AaC), i.e., NEC(AoC); and

assume BaC; then (Bocardo3(NUU)) AoB, contradicting AaB, the
major premiss.
The obvious problem with this argument is the assumption of BaC,

when the given premiss is CON(BaC). Aristotle apparently tries to
justify this move – which we shall call U-for-C substitution – on the
grounds that if CON(BaC), no impossibility should result from the
assumption that BaC, or more generally that no impossibility follows
from the assumption that a contingency holds, although a falsehood
may. The problem is that, even if CON(BaC), an impossibility may
result from BaC and other assumptions, in this case AaB and
NEC(AoC). We may take AaB as unproblematic because it is given as
a premiss. The issue, then, is this: given the assumption that
CON(BaC), is the fact that NEC(AoC) and BaC are inconsistent with
AaB to be ‘blamed’ on NEC(AoC) or on BaC? Alexander does his best to
justify putting the blame on the former, but he is not really able to do
so.60
At 34b7-12 Aristotle mentions interpretations which show that the
premisses of Barbara1(UC_) are not syllogistic, interpretations which
take the following assertions to be true:
Animal a Moving Human a Moving

CON(Moving a Horse) CON(Moving a Horse)
NEC(Animal a Horse) NEC(Human e Horse)
Aristotle dismisses these interpretations by saying the unqualified

premiss shouldn’t be taken as true at a time, that is, one shouldn’t
interpret the unqualified premiss to make it true at one time false at
another. As we have indicated in section III.D.1, Alexander realizes that
Aristotle violates this restriction relatively often, and so he chooses to
interpret Aristotle’s statement by developing the point that ‘All moving
40 Introduction
things are humans’ cannot be true at a time when ‘All horses are moving’
is true,61 connecting it with the U-for-C substitution in the justification
of Barbara1(UC N ). Indeed, he insists that this is all Aristotle has
in mind in ruling out the above interpretation:
For he does not call a proposition which is always <true> unqualified –

since what is always true is ipso facto necessary – but rather he calls
unqualified a proposition which can remain unqualified universal affirm-
ative and true even when the contingent affirmative universal premiss
which has been taken along with it is transformed into an unqualified
premiss. For in this way the proof by impossibility which he uses to show
that this combination is syllogistic is preserved. He might say either that
it is necessary that the universal unqualified premiss not be taken in such
a way that it is possible for its truth to be restricted temporally by the
contingent premiss added to it or rather that the contingent premiss
added to it must not be such as to restrict temporally the truth of the
unqualified premiss taken before it. (189,33-190,6)
It is clear that Alexander’s interpretation is unfortunate both as a piece

of hermeneutics – Aristotle does not mean what Alexander claims he
does – and as logic – to relativize the truth of CON(P) to other proposi-
tions taken as unqualifiedly true is to totally change the notion of
contingency.
At 191,14 Alexander finally raises the queston whether Aristotle’s
interpretations don’t show that Barbara1(UC_) yields no conclusion, but
again he backs off:
It should be asked whether perhaps the setting down of terms and proof
that with true premisses the first term holds of all of the last by necessity
and holds of none by necessity does not rather show that the combination
is non-syllogistic. I have also discussed this elsewhere. (191,14-18)
In fact, the terms do show that Barbara1(UC_) is not syllogistic, and it

is clear enough that they can be applied to any first-figure UC combi-
nation since it seems that if one can take ‘Animal a Moving’, ‘Human a
Moving’ and ‘CON(Moving a Horse)’ as true, one can also take the
corresponding e-, i-, and o-propositions as true. Given the apparent
indistinguishability of contingent and unqualified propositions, the
same terms would suffice to show that there are no syllogistic first-
figure CU or CC combinations either.
Each of the syllogistic UC cases generates its own waste case, in
order, AEA1(UC‘C’), EEE1(UC N ), AOI1(UC‘C’), and EOO1(UC N
). Thus Aristotle is committed to six of the eight U+C combinations with
universal premisses being syllogistic. At 35a20-4 Aristotle gives terms
for rejecting the remaining two combinations AE_1(CU_) and
EE_1(CU_). Alexander recognizes that the terms are problematic and is
unable to offer fully satisfactory ones, but he insists that the combina-
Introduction 41
tions are not syllogistic (201,3-24). Aristotle uses terms to reject all of
the remaining cases with one universal and one particular premiss and
all the other cases at 35b8-19.

Aristotle’s treatment of these cases is a source of considerable difficulty
for Alexander, partly because Aristotle begins to lose sight of the
distinction between kinds of contingency and partly because Alexander
produces justifications of syllogisms which Aristotle rejects. We begin
with the first issue. Aristotle accepts:
Cesare2(UC‘C’) AeB CON(AaC)  NEC (BeC) (37b23-8)
and describes its simple reduction to Celarent1(UC N ) when the

negative premiss is converted. He then says that the situation is the
same with:
Camestres2(CU‘C’) CON(AaB) AeC  NEC (BeC) (37b29)
Alexander points out that the situation in this case is not exactly ‘the
same’. For after converting AeC to CeA and invoking Celarent1(UC
N ) to get  NEC (CeB), one must do a further conversion to get
 NEC (BeC). This is, of course, a perfectly legitimate step, but Alex-
ander is quite right to wonder (231,29-232,9) why Aristotle doesn’t
remark that the step is all right because the conclusion is not contingent
in the way specified.
Another passage in which distinction between  NEC and CON
arises is 38a3-4, where Aristotle apparently accepts:
IEO2(CU‘C’) CON(AiB) AeC  NEC (BoC)
which he would presumably justify by converting AeC to CeA and

invoking Ferio1(UC N ) to get  NEC (CoB). If the conclusion here
were CON(CoB), this could be transformed to CON(BoC), but no corre-
sponding transformation is possible for  NEC (CoB). Alexander
discusses the issues involved here at 233,34-234,12; he concludes by
suggesting that Aristotle may not have intended to accept IE_2(CU_).
This problem with OO-conversion‘c’ arises again in connection with
third-figure U+C combinations, but by the time Alexander gets to
discussing those he has quite rightly abandoned any hope of under-
standing what Aristotle is up to with contingency.62 It seems best to
consider some of the relevant material on those combinations at this
point.
At the beginning of chapter 21 Aristotle says of first-figure U+C
syllogisms, ‘in the first figure when one of the premisses signified
42 Introduction
contingency, the conclusion was also contingent’ (39b14-16). In his
comment Alexander quotes Aristotle’s introductory remark on U+C
first-figure cases in chapter 15:
If one premiss is taken to be unqualified and the other contingent, when

the premiss relating to the major extreme signifies contingency, all
syllogisms will be complete and their conclusion will be contingent in the
way specified which has been described; but when the premiss relating to
the minor extreme signifies contingency, all of them are incomplete, and
the conclusions of the privative syllogisms will not be contingent in the
way specified but rather their conclusions will be that something holds of
none by necessity or does not hold of all by necessity. For if something
holds of none by necessity or does not hold of all by necessity, we say that
it is contingent that it holds of none or not of all. (33b25-33)
And he remarks:
So perhaps what he says in the present passage concerns affirmative

premisses <only>. Or perhaps he was being extremely precise when he
said that the conclusion, which he said was of none by necessity, is not
contingent, since ‘of none by necessity’ is different from ‘by necessity of
none’, as he showed then. Nevertheless, thereafter he also classifies a
negative proposition of this kind among contingent negative propositions
because it is not directly unqualified. For in the case of a mixture in the
second figure of a negative unqualified major and a contingent minor he
already said63 that the conclusion is contingent in the way specified.
(245,28-35)
Thus Alexander’s conclusion is that although originally Aristotle distin-

guished between, e.g.,  NEC(AiC) and CON(AeC), and only considered
the latter to be a truly contingent proposition, he later started calling
 NEC( P) contingent because it doesn’t imply P. But, of course, this
does nothing to solve the formal problems. We refer the reader to the
commentary on chapter 21 for details of how Alexander tries to cope,
and return to his discussion of second-figure U+C cases.
We have seen that Aristotle accepts Cesare2(UC‘C’) and Cames-
tres2(CU‘C’). On the other hand, he rejects:
Cesare2(CU_) CON(AeB) AaC (37b19-23)

Camestres2(UC_) AaB CON(AeC) (37b19-23)
All he says in rejecting these is that ‘the demonstration will be the same
and use the same terms’. Alexander first cites the failure of EE-conver-
sionc and the impossibility of a reductio argument. He takes Aristotle’s
‘same terms’ to be the ones used at 1.17, 37b3-10 in the rejection of
Cesare2(CC_). These verify:
Introduction 43
CON(White e Horse) White a Horse
White a Human CON(White e Human)
NEC(Horse e Human)
and so – according to Alexander – rule out any contingent or unqualified

conclusion. Since it is not clear that they rule out a necessary negative
conclusion, Alexander adds terms verifying NEC(BaC), taking as true
CON(White e Human) White a Human

White a Literate CON(White e Literate)
NEC(Human a Literate)
Once again it seems that these two sets of terms can be used against
any second-figure U+C combination. Alexander has an at least partial
realization of this point, since after his discussion of Aristotle’s justifi-
cation of Cesare2(UC‘C’)and Camestres2(CU‘C’), he raises the question
(232,10ff.) whether the terms used to reject Camestres2(UC_) and Ce-
sare2(CU_) won’t do just as well for rejecting the two whose validity
Aristotle has just affirmed. He defends the terms against certain objec-
tions and then says:
It seems that he posits these combinations as syllogistic by only paying

attention to the conversion of the unqualified negative premiss and by not
investigating them using terms. (232,30-2)
But, using terms, Alexander is in a position to reject all the second-figure

U+C syllogisms accepted by Aristotle.
We refer the reader to the Summary for the other material in chapter
18, which is of less interest.
III.E.2.c. Third-figure U+C combinations (1.21)

We shall pass over most of the material on U+C third-figure combina-
tions and concentrate on one important passage. At 31b31-9 Aristotle
offers a justification of:
Bocardo3(CU‘C’) CON(AoC) BaC  NEC (AoB)
assuming  CON(AoB), ‘i.e.’, NEC(AaB). But since BaC, by the non-

Theophrastean Barbara1(NUN), NEC(AaC), contradicting CON(AoC).
Alexander repeats Aristotle’s proof (247,10-20), and then raises the
question why Aristotle didn’t try for a direct derivation for the combi-
nation OA_3(CU_). He mentions two possibilities. The first appears to
be illegitimate. In the second Alexander apparently justifies the conclu-
sion  NEC (AiB), essentially making use of the fact that OAI3(CU‘C’) is
a waste case of Disamis3(CU‘C’). ‘And this proof,’ he says, ‘was thought
44 Introduction
more acceptable. For the reductio ad impossibile is objectionable.’
(247,29-30). Presumably Alexander has in mind Aristotle’s use of the
non-Theophrastean Barbara1(NUN). For, after correctly denying the
possibility of establishing Bocardo3(UC‘C’), he points out that Aristotle’s
proof depends on Barbara1(NUN), which is unacceptable to Theophras-
tus. He then says that people use Bocardo3 (‘C’U‘C’) to justify:
Barbara1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BaC NEC(AaC)
For, if  NEC(AaC), i.e.,  NEC (AoC) then (Bocardo3(‘C’U‘C’))

 NEC (AoB), i.e.,  NEC(AaB), contradicting NEC(AaB). It is hard
to see how Theophrastus could possibly accept Bocardo3( N ,U,  N
) and reject Barbara1(NUN), and both are equally violations of the
peiorem rule. However, Alexander proceeds to give us Theophrastus’
U-for-C proof for Bocardo3(‘C’U‘C’). He changes CON(AoC) into AoC,
assumes NEC(AaB) and infers (Baroco2(NUU)) BoC, contradicting BaC.
We do not know how to make sense out of Theophrastus’ position – if he
had one –, but it seems clear that he was willing to use illegitimate
U-for-C argumentation.
III.E.3. N+C premiss combinations (1.16, 19, 22)

Both Aristotle and Alexander stress the parallels between the N+C and
U+C cases. They are helpful sometimes as a mnemonic, but overstress-
ing them can cause one to lose sight of important differences in
Aristotle’s handling of them.

The obvious parallel and the source of many of the others is that
Aristotle treats the standard CNC first-figure cases as complete, and
says that the NC_ cases need to be justified. Aristotle never actually
discusses Darii3(CNC). He asserts the completeness of Barbara1(CNC)
at 36a2-7, and Alexander simply affirms Aristotle’s words in his own
terms. But when Aristotle affirms the completeness of Celarent1(CNC),
he also denies that one could establish Celarent1(CNU) by reductio. For
difficulties with this claim and Alexander’s treatment of it see 209,32-
211,17. At 36a39-b1 Aristotle asserts that Ferio1(CNU) is not valid,
and Alexander confirms (213,6-11) that it cannot be established by a
reductio.
The NC cases are much more difficult. As we have seen, Aristotle,
believes he has established all of Barbara1(UC‘C’), Celarent1(UC N
), Darii1(UC‘C’), and Ferio1(UC N ), where, in fact, all the conclusions
are at best all of the  N variety, and are established by logically
disastrous U-for-C substitutions. Aristotle also thinks mistakenly that
he can justify:
Introduction 45
Barbara1(NC‘C’) NEC(AaB) CON(BaC) ‘CON’(AaC)
and
Darii1(NC‘C’) NEC(AaB) CON(BiC) ‘CON’(AiC)
In the case of Barbara1(NC‘C’), Aristotle says only that ‘it will be proved
in the same way as in the preceding cases’ (36a1-2). Alexander first gives
a U-for-C argument for Barbara1(NC N ), making clear at 207,3-18
that the conclusion established is not contingent in the way specified.
The argument uses Bocardo3(NUU). At 207,19 he points out that, if
Bocardo3(NC‘C’) were available, one could establish Barbara1(NC N
) by reductio without changing the contingent premiss into an unquali-
fied one. Alexander remarks that Aristotle does not yet have
Bocardo3(NC_) available to him, but unfortunately he does not discuss
the status of the mood itself, and its status is very unclear; see 252,3-
254,35 with the notes. Here we remark only that there would seem to
be no way in which one could hope to establish Bocardo3(N, N , N
) independently of Barbara1(N, N , N ).
After pointing out that Bocardo3(NC_) is not available to Aristotle,
Alexander makes the devastating remark that ‘it is necessary to under-
stand that insofar as it involves a reductio ad impossibile using the
third figure, in the case of a mixture having a universal necessary major
premiss (either affirmative or negative) and a contingent minor it can
be proved that there is a necessary and an unqualified and a contingent
conclusion; and the conclusions are affirmative if the necessary premiss
is affirmative and negative if it is negative. But he himself has said
<35b34-5>, “But there will not be a syllogism of by necessity not
holding” ’ (207,29-34). We understand Alexander to be saying that if one
accepts certain third-figure syllogisms, presumably acceptable ones,
but ones not yet treated by Aristotle, one can show that each of Bar-
bara1(NC_), Celarent1(NC_), Darii1(NC_), and Ferio1(NC_) yields a
contingent, an unqualified, or a necessary conclusion. We shall call such
arguments circle arguments because they make use of things not yet
established. The arguments for necessary and contingent conclusions
make heavy use of Theophrastean contingency, and we have judged it
most perspicuous to introduce CONt and Ct as abbreviations for 
NEC and  N . (The arguments in the middle column go through
without this change.)64
Barbara1(N,Ct,_) NEC(AaB) CONt(BaC)
Assume  NEC(AaC)  (AaC) NEC (AaC)

i.e., CONt(AoC) AoC NEC(AoC)
But CONt(BaC) CONt(BaC) CONt(BaC)
46 Introduction
Therefore, by Bocardo3(Ct,Ct,Ct) Bocardo3(U,Ct,Ct) Bocardo3(N,Ct,Ct)
CONt(AoB) CONt(AoB) CONt(AoB)
i.e.,  NEC(AaB)  NEC(AaB)  NEC(AaB)
contradicting NEC(AaB) NEC(AaB) NEC(AaB)
Celarent1(N,Ct,_) NEC(AeB) CONt(BaC)
Assume  NEC(AeC)  (AeC) NEC (AeC)

i.e., CONt(AiC) AiC NEC(AiC)
But CONt(BaC) CONt(BaC) CONt(BaC)
Therefore, by Disamis3(Ct,Ct,Ct) Disamis3(U,Ct,Ct) Disamis3(N,Ct,Ct)
CONt(AiB) CONt(AiB) CONt(AiB)
i.e.,  NEC(AeB)  NEC(AeB)  NEC(AeB)
contradicting NEC(AeB) NEC(AeB) NEC(AeB)
Darii1(N,Ct,_) NEC(AaB) CONt(BiC)
Assume  NEC(AiC)  (AiC) NEC (AiC)

i.e., CONt(AeC) AeC NEC(AeC)
But CONt(BiC) CONt(BiC) CONt(BiC)
Therefore, by Ferison3(Ct,Ct,Ct) Ferison3(U,C ,C ) Ferison3(N,Ct,Ct)
t t
CONt(AoB) CONt(AoB) CONt(AoB)

i.e.,  NEC(AaB)  NEC(AaB)  NEC(AaB)
contradicting NEC(AaB) NEC(AaB) NEC(AaB)
Ferio1(N,Ct,_) NEC(AeB) CONt(BiC)
Assume  NEC(AoC)  (AoC) NEC (AoC)

i.e., CONt(AaC) AaC NEC(AaC)
But CONt(BiC) CONt(BiC) CONt(BiC)
Therefore, by Datisi3(Ct,Ct,Ct) Datisi3(U,Ct,Ct) Datisi3(N,Ct,Ct)
CONt(AiB) CONt(AiB) CONt(AiB)
i.e.,  NEC(AeB)  NEC(AeB)  NEC(AeB)
contradicting NEC(AeB) NEC(AeB) NEC(AeB)
Aristotle’s wavering treatment of contingency makes it difficult to

evaluate the force of these arguments against him. The status of all
three versions of Bocardo3 with a contingent minor premiss in Aristotle’s
syllogistic is uncertain, but he is committed to versions of all of the other
third-figure syllogisms used in these arguments. Alexander does not
give the arguments for Barbara1(NCtN) or Barbara1(NCtU) in his dis-
cussion of chapter 16, but gives the arguments for Celarent1(NCtN) at
213,11-19 and again at 249,20-5 (where he proceeds to give an argument
for Cesare2(NCtN)), and for Celarent1(N,Ct,U) at 216,34-217,2. He gives
a similar argument for Ferio1(N,Ct,N) at 213,19-25, for Darii1(NCCt) at
Introduction 47
213,36-214,12, and for Darii1(NCtU) at 214,12-18. Obviously this is a
devastating situation for syllogistic, even if the problematic Barbara1
cases are left out of account. Unfortunately, Alexander leaves us once
again with references to another work for fuller discussion (207,35-6,
213,25-7).
The reductions for the first-figure NC cases discussed thus far all
argue indirectly from the denial of the conclusion and the contingent
premiss. We wish now to look at reductions using the denial of the
conclusion and the necessary premiss, focusing on Aristotle’s and Alex-
ander’s treatment of Celarent1(NC_), which proceeds in this way, but
with certain complications which we leave out of account in this intro-
duction.65 We begin from the opening statement of chapter 16, which
relies on the parallelism between U+C and N+C combinations:
But when one premiss signifies holding or not holding by necessity and
the other contingency, there will be a syllogism if the terms are related in
the same way; and it will be complete when necessity is posited in relation
to the minor extreme. If the terms are affirmative, whether they are
posited universally or not universally, the conclusion will be contingent
and not of holding. But if one is affirmative and the other privative, when
the affirmative is necessary, the conclusion will be contingent and not of
not holding; but when the privative is necessary, the conclusion will be
that it is contingent that something does not hold and that it does not
hold, whether the terms are universal or not universal. And one should
take its being contingent that something does not hold in the conclusion
in the same way as in the preceding. But there will not be a syllogism of
by necessity not holding, since not holding by necessity is distinct from by
necessity not holding. (35b23-34)66
Alexander understands this last line to say that the conclusion of a

first-figure N+C case will be contingent in the same way as the corre-
sponding U+C case. But the contrast Aristotle has made in the
preceding lines amounts to saying that the NC cases other than Celar-
ent1(NC_) and Ferio1(NC_) have a contingent conclusion and do not have
an unqualified one, whereas those two have both an unqualified and a
contingent conclusion. And this is borne out by Aristotle’s handling of
Celarent1(NC_). He first (36a7-15) offers an argument for
Celarent1(NCU) NEC(AeB) CON(BaC) AeC
and then asserts (36a15-17), ‘And it is evident that there is also a

syllogism which concludes that it is contingent that A does not hold since
there is one which concludes that A does not hold’, that is, he infers ‘It
is contingent that AeC’ from AeC. We shall introduce a new symbol
CONu to indicate this kind of case,67 and represent Celarent1(NC_) as
follows:
48 Introduction
Celarent1(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(BaC) CONu(AeC)
It seems reasonably clear that Aristotle suspects something is wrong

with his apparent ability to justify inferences to unqualified proposi-
tions when his assumptions include a contingent one,68 and is
attempting to paper this over by weakening the conclusion from an
unqualified one to a contingent one. What is more important for us is
that because of what Aristotle says at the beginning of chapter 16
Alexander frequently lumps together CONu(P) and  NEC( P) as
cases of contingency not in the way specified,69 although he does distin-
guish them when Aristotle gives the following summary comparison of
the first-figure U+C and N+C cases:
It is clear from what has been said that when the terms are related in the
same way there is or is not a syllogism with an unqualified premiss and
with necessary ones except that if the privative premiss is posited as
unqualified the conclusion of the syllogism is contingent, but if it is
posited as necessary the conclusion is both of contingency and of not
holding. (36b19-24)
Here Aristotle implies that the conclusion of Celarent1(UC N ) is

contingent, but Alexander knows perfectly well that he has denied that
it is contingent in the way specified. Alexander writes:
But how can this assertion be sound? For he also showed that in the
combinations in which the negative premiss is unqualified the conclusion
is not contingent in the way specified but is ‘A holds by necessity of no C’
or ‘A does not hold by necessity of all C’. Or <is the assertion all right>
because the conclusion is still contingent in a way even if it isn’t straight-
forwardly contingent in the way specified? ‘A holds by necessity of no C’
is contingent in this sense. But in the case in which the premiss is
necessary negative, it was proved that the conclusion is straightforwardly
unqualified ... . (216,7-13)
Aristotle’s derivation of:
is confusing but essentially sound. He assumes  AeC, i.e., AiC, con-

verts NEC(AeB) to NEC(BeA), and infers (Ferio1(NUN)) NEC(BeC),
contradicting CON(BaC). At 209,4-18 Alexander points to the use of a
first- figure NUN case and gives a derivation of Celarent1(NC N )
using Ferio1(NNN). At 209,22-32, he gives a U-for-C derivation for
Celarent1(NCU). Aristotle’s treatment of Ferio1(NCU) at 36a34-9 is
completely analogous, and so is Alexander’s commentary (212,4-28),
although he does not mention the possibility of a U-for-C derivation.
Alexander also gives U-for-C justifications of Barbara1(NC‘C’) at 206,22-
Introduction 49
207,3 and of Darii1(NC‘C’) at 213,27- 214,12, but he does not point out
that there are straightforward ‘uncontroversial’ indirect derivations of
Barbara1(NC N ) (using Baroco2(NNN)) and Darii1(NC N ) (using
Celarent2(NNN)).
Alexander recurs to the difference between Celarent1(UC_) and
Celarent1(NC_) in connection with Aristotle’s concluding remark at
36b19-24, which we have just quoted. He first argues that one cannot
establish Celarent1(UCU) by a reductio, analogous to the one used for
Celarent1(NCU), although one could give a U-for-C justification of it. He
points out again that Aristotle’s justification of Celarent1(NCU) de-
pends on his acceptance of first-figure NUN cases. He offers the circle
argument for Celarent1(NCU) which we have already given, but then
points out that no such argument can be given for Celarent1(UCU)
unless one uses U-for-C substitution. This leaves him with the question
of why such a substitution argument doesn’t suffice. He concludes by
applying his interpretation of 1.15, 34b7-18 to the present case. The
major premiss AeB of Celarent1(UC_) is true only at a time, and ceases
to be true when AiC holds and the contingent premiss CON(BaC) is
transformed into BaC. If this remark has any force, it is equally
devastating against Aristotle’s justification of Celarent1(UC N ).
The upshot of this discussion of Celarent1(NC_) should be clear.
Aristotle’s acceptance of Celarent1(NCU) violates the peiorem rule. But
Alexander has at his disposal a legitimate Theophrastean argument for
Celarent1(NC N ), so that when Aristotle uses Celarent1(NCU) to
draw unqualified conclusions from N+C combinations in the second and
third figure, Alexander is in a position to substitute a justification for a
 NEC conclusion. Moreover, he has made clear that the only kind of
derivation which Aristotle could use for Celarent1(UCCu) requires the
questionable U-for-C substitution. Thus, he is in a position to maintain
the peiorem rule, but at the cost of disallowing U-for-C justifications, on
which Aristotle’s treatment of the first-figure UC combinations turned.

There is no reason to doubt that Aristotle intends a perfect parallelism
between the second-figure U+C and N+C combinations. He is in general
more explicit about the character of the contingency of the conclusion in
the latter case than he was in the former. The most interesting combi-
nations are:
Cesare2(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(AaC) CONu(BeC)

Camestres2(CNCu) CON(AaB) NEC(AeC) CONu(BeC)
Since each is proved by reduction to Celarent1(NC_), Alexander is in a

position to give a justification of a Cu or a  N conclusion in each case.
50 Introduction
But the text of Aristotle forces him into more elaborate procedures. For
Cesare2(NC_) Aristotle proceeds by acting as if the reduction to Celar-
ent1(NC_) yielded the conclusion ‘It is contingent that BeC’. He then
adds an indirect derivation that the premisses of Cesare2(NC_) imply
BeC.70 Alexander points out (235,21-30) that this derivation depends on
Aristotle’s acceptance of Ferio1(NUN), effectively leaving the reader
with a Theophrastean justification of Cesare2(NC N ).
Aristotle says that Camestres2(CN_) will be handled in the same
way. Alexander is concerned about the extra conversion of the conclu-
sion required by Camestres2. He points out (235,33-236,6) that this is
all right for Aristotle since he takes the conclusion of Celarent1(NC_) to
be CONu(AeC) and that does convert to CONu(CeA). But he also points
out (236,11-14) that the conversion is acceptable for those who take the
conclusion of Celarent1(NC_) to be  NEC (AeC).
Aristotle’s rejections raise even more interesting questions. He offers
a very elaborate rejection of Cesare2(CN_)71 and says that there will be
a similar rejection of Camestres2(NC_). Alexander describes simple
derivations for Cesare2(CN N ) (at 238,29-34) and of Camestres2
(NC N ) (at 238,24-9). Since Aristotle never mentions Festino2(CN_),
Alexander doesn’t either. But he obviously can justify Festino2(CN N
) as well. Thus Alexander has derivations for three combinations actu-
ally or presumably rejected by Aristotle. His conclusion is the usual
disappointing reference to another work:
If this is the way things are, then either reductio ad impossibile should be
rejected as insufficient to show that a combination is syllogistic, or, if this
cannot be rejected, it would seem that material terms are not sufficient
to reject a combination as non-syllogistic. I have also said what the
solution of this difficulty is in my book on mixtures. (238,34-8)
Our delights, however, do not stop here. For Aristotle also rejects
AA_2(NC_) and AA2(CN_) at 38b13-23, but Alexander shows (240,4-10)
that he is committed to AAE2(NC N ); and he could also verify
AAE2(CN N ). Thus Alexander is in a position to show that Aristotle
is committed to saying that every second-figure U+C combination with
two universal premisses is syllogistic. There are further similar prob-
lems with the combinations involving a particular premiss, but we shall
not deal with them here.
III.E.3.c. The third figure (1.22)

At the beginning of chapter 22 Aristotle gives a general description of
the situation with third-figure N+C universal combinations, distin-
guishing between those that yield a ‘contingent’ conclusion only and
those that also yield an unqualified one, and remarks that there will be
no necessary conclusions ‘just as there wasn’t in the other figures’. We
Introduction 51
have already seen in section III.E.3.a. that Alexander is in possession
of derivations for at least Celarent1(NCtN) and Ferio1(NCtN). He repeats
his derivation of the former and adds one for Cesare2(NCtN), presum-
ably to suggest that Aristotle was wrong about both of the other figures.
Unfortunately he again leaves us dangling as to what he thinks of this
matter:
It is worth asking why he says that in a mixture of a necessary negative

universal premiss and a contingent affirmative one there is no necessary
negative conclusion that X holds of no Y by necessity in any of the figures.
For <there are three alternatives:> either (i) it is necessary that reductio
ad impossibile be rejected; or (ii) the combinations <of two contingent
premisses> in the third figure through which I produced the reductio ad
impossibile must be non-syllogistic; or (iii) it follows <in these cases> that
X holds of no Y by necessity. [250,1] As I have said already, I have
investigated this and spoken about it at greater length in On the disagree-
ment of Aristotle and his associates concerning mixtures. And I have
discussed it at greater length in my notes on logic. (249,32-250,2)
Aristotle accepts Darapti3(NC‘C’) at 40a12 and its waste case

AEI3(NC‘C’) at 40a33. He accepts Darapti3(CNC) at 40a16, Felap-
ton3(CNC) at 40a18, and Felapton3(NCCu) at 40a25. Neither Aristotle
nor Alexander mentions the EE cases, but EE_3(NC_) would be reduc-
ible to Felapton3(NC_), and EE_3(CN_) would stand or fall with:
AE_3(CN_) CON(AaC) NEC(BeC)
which Aristotle rejects at 40a35. The terms he gives assume the truth
of the following propositions:
CON(Sleeping a Human)
NEC(Sleeping-horse e Human) NEC(Horse-that-is-awake e Human)
NEC(Sleeping a Sleeping-horse) NEC(Sleep e Horse-that-is-awake)
Alexander treats Aristotle’s two ‘conclusions’ as what he calls necessary

on a condition:72
All horses which are in fact sleeping must be asleep

All horses which are in fact awake must not be asleep
Since Alexander treats such assertions as unqualified, he takes Aris-

totle’s interpretations to rule out only an unqualified or necessary
conclusion, but not a contingent one. Alexander considers the possibility
of proving AEO3(CN‘C’). His discussion is affected by his uncertainty
over the status of  NEC propositions and whether they are contingent
in the way specified. Alexander first converts CON(AaC) to CON(CiA)
52 Introduction
producing the premisses of Ferio1(NC_). For Aristotle the conclusion is
then CONu(BoA), which does not convert to CONu(AoB). Alexander
continues:
However, if not ‘B does not hold of some A’ but ‘It is contingent that B does
<not> hold of some A’ were to follow in the case of the mixture under
consideration, a syllogism would seem to result because a particular
contingent negative proposition converts. (251,35-7)
However, what Alexander has shown to follow in this case (see section
III.E.3.a) is  NEC (BoA), and that, too, does not convert.
Aristotle’s discussion of the universal/particular combinations is
very unclear, and so is Alexander’s treatment of it. We refer the reader
to the notes on 252,3-254,9 for an account.
IV. Theophrastus and modal logic73

It is clear from Alexander’s commentary that Theophrastus made some
suggestions for improving Aristotle’s logic. However, it does not seem
possible to extract from the commentary a satisfactory Theophrastean
modal logic. We are inclined to think that Theophrastus never worked
one out, but merely put forward some criticisms and suggestions. We
here try to explain the problem by indicating how one might go about
extracting a system from Alexander’s remarks.
It is generally agreed that Theophrastus’ modal syllogistic involved
three major departures from Aristotle’s: (i) restriction of the relevant
notion of contingency to CONt, i.e.,  NEC ; (ii) adoption of the
peiorem rule; (iii) rejection of the use of ekthesis to justify
Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN). Logically, the peiorem rule dis-
qualifies as non-syllogistic all CtCt and U+Ct combinations because of
the following equivalences:
CONt(P1) and CONt(P2) yield CONt(P3) to NEC(3) and CONt(P2) yield NEC(1)
CONt(P1) and P2 yield CONt(P3) to CONt(P1) and NEC( P3) yield P2
P1 and CONt(P2) yield CONt(P3) to NEC( P3) and CONt(P2) yield P1
If Theophrastus agreed with Aristotle on non-modal syllogistic, then,

he might have developed a system satisfying the following conditions:
(i) P1 and P2 yield P3 if and only if

NEC(P1) and P2 yield P3 and also P1 and NEC(P2) yield P3
and
(ii) NEC(P1) and NEC(P2) yield NEC(P3) if and only if

Introduction 53
NEC(P1) and CONt(P2) yield CONt(P3)
if and only if
CONt(P1) and NEC(P2) yield CONt(P3)
Aristotle treats all the first-figure N+U syllogisms as complete and

reduces the second- and third-figure syllogisms to them, although his
handling of the indirect reductions is unsatisfactory. Theophrastus
could have done the same thing unproblematically, although he could
also give indirect reductions of all the first-figure N+U syllogisms to UU
syllogisms, reducing NEC(P1), P2, P3 to3, P2 P1 (so that 
NEC(P1)), and P1, NEC(P2), P3 to  P3, P1,  P2 (so that  NEC(P2)).
So the real problem lies with (ii). As we mentioned in section II.B,
Alexander says that Theophrastus chose to postpone the justifications
of:
and:
until he had the materials for an indirect justification of them. It seems

clear that the syllogisms needed are:
Barbara1(NCtCt) NEC(AaB) CONt(BaC) CONt(AaC)
for Baroco2(NNN), and:
Barbara1(CtNCt) CONt(AaB) NEC(BaC) CONt(AaC)
for Bocardo3(NNN). Aristotle treats Barbara1(CNC) as complete. Theo-

phrastus could have done likewise for Barbara1(CtNCt). That would take
care of Bocardo3(NNN). We have seen in section III.E.3.a that Aristotle
does not deal very explicitly with Barbara1(NC_), but seems to have had
in mind an illegitimate U-for-C justification of what could perhaps be
written as Barbara1(NCtCt). The only other option we can see for
Theophrastus would be to declare Barbara1(NCtCt) complete. If he did
so, it is somewhat surprising that Alexander never mentions the possi-
bility of proceeding in this way.74
As we have mentioned in section III.E.2.c, Alexander does tell us that
Theophrastus gave a U-for-C justification of what we will now write as:
Bocardo3(CtUCt) CONt(AoC) BaC CONt(AoB)
This information is disconcerting since any CtUCt syllogism violates the

54 Introduction
peiorem rule,75 and Bocardo3(CtUCt) obviously could be used to justify
Barbara1(NUN). The violation of the peiorem rule is not surprising since
U-for-C argumentation involves strengthening a contingent premiss
into an unqualified one.
If we ignore Alexander’s remark about Theophrastus’ justification of
Bocardo3(CtUCt), we can imagine a lovely Theophrastean system in
which the only syllogistic patterns are the standard ones of nonmodal
syllogistic, the modal syllogisms all obey the peiorem rule, and the
syllogistic combinations are all NN, N+U, or N+Ct. This system could
be developed by taking the first-figure N+Ct combinations as complete
and reducing the second- and third- figure combinations to them,
following the pattern of the nonmodal reductions. One could then
reduce the NNN combinations to the N+Ct combinations or follow the
Aristotelian pattern except for the reductions of Baroco2(NNN) to Bar-
bara1(NCtCt) and of Bocardo3(NNN) to Barbara1(CtNCt). One could
follow the same procedure for the N+U combinations or they could be
reduced to UUU combinations. We are very doubtful that Theophrastus
worked out such a system. We believe that if he had done so, Alexan-
der’s commentary on Aristotle’s modal syllogistic would have been
much clearer.
Notes
1. The reader can be sure that any variable letter other than ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’
and ‘E’ has no correspondent in the Greek original.
2. In the Introduction and Summary we ignore Aristotle’s treatment of
so-called indeterminate propositions, ‘X holds of Y’ and ‘X does not hold of Y’.
3. We also use the word ‘syllogism’ to mean roughly ‘valid inference’. If the
premisses P1 and P2 are syllogistic, Alexander says things such as ‘There is (or
will be) a syllogism’, and if the conclusion yielded is P3, he often says there is a
syllogism of P3. We frequently render the former words as ‘The result is a
syllogism’ and the latter ‘There is a syllogism with the conclusion P3’.
4. We adopt the convention of writing the conclusions of syllogistic combina-
tions after the premisses.
5. We will also frequently write out the propositions involved in a combina-
tion or syllogism. The order in which we list the syllogisms correponds to the
way Alexander orders them. He occasionally refers to, e.g., the third syllogism
in the first figure, meaning Darii1. See, for example 120,25-7.
6. For discussion see Patzig (1968), pp. 43-87.
7. See the note on 32,11 in Barnes et al., p. 87.
8. On this understanding of BiC see the notes on 49,22 (p. 111) and 32,20 (p.
88) of Barnes et al.
9. On Alexander’s terminology for contradictories and contraries, see Barnes
et al., pp. 26-7. We have followed them in rendering antikeimenon ‘opposite’ and
enantios ‘contrary’, saving antiphasis and antiphatikos for ‘contradictory’. In
some passages (e.g. 195,18-22, 237,29-32) Alexander uses antikeimenon as a
general term of which contraries and contradictories are species. But most often,
Notes to pp. 7-15 55
e.g., in representations of reductio proofs, he uses antikeimenon to refer to the
contradictory of a proposition.
The reader is well advised to learn the equivalences expressed by a and b,
since both Alexander and Aristotle by and large take them for granted.
10. We remark here that in the introduction and summary we pay virtually
no attention to Aristotle’s uniform rejection of combinations which do not
include a universal premiss.
11. Generally speaking it is not feasible to show that a combination is
syllogistic by showing directly that it admits no counterinterpretation because
it is not feasible to survey all possible interpretations.
12. See especially 238,22-38.
13. We do not, however, say that if P is an unqualified proposition and true,
P is unqualified, because if NEC(P), then P, but P is necessary, not unqualified.
The notation we have adopted represents necessity and contingency as
operators on sentences. Many interpreters prefer to represent them as operators
on predicates or the copula joining predicate to subject. See, e.g., Patterson
(1995). Our view is that no uniform representation, i.e., one in which the same
words of Aristole are always or almost always represented by the same formula,
is fully satisfactory, and that the notation we have adopted is simple and by and
large adequate to capture Alexander’s perspective. For the most part, notation
becomes significant when one is concerned with the question of truth, e.g.,
whether or not it is the case that a certain combination is syllogistic or a
conversion rule correct. When one is concerned, as Alexander for the most part
is, with the overall coherence of what Aristotle says, the interpretation of a
formalism is much less significant: roughly speaking one can interpret the
formalism however one wants as long as one interprets it consistently.
14. And also – except in the UC and NC cases – complete. The situation
changes somewhat when contingent premisses are introduced because the
conversion rules allow for the justification of syllogisms with no analogue among
combinations not containing a contingent premiss.
15. More precisely, Aristotle uses the equivalent in his argument at 1.15,
34a34-b2 that Barbara1(UC_) yields a contingent conclusion and claims at 1.16,
35b37-36a2 that the fact that Barbara1(NC_) also yields such a conclusion ‘will
be proved in the same way as in the preceding cases’.
16. See, e.g., 174,13-19.
17. We here begin a practice of writing ‘C’ or ‘CON’ where there is some
unclarity about the specific character of an allegedly contingent propostion.
18. Aristotle’s formulation at 30a30-2 is slightly different.
19. It appears that some people tried to reject (a’) by saying that Aristotle
does not interpret unqualified propositions as hypotheses. Alexander shows the
untenability of this position; see 126,9-22 and 130,23-4.
20. See Patterson (1995).
21. See the textual note on 30a21-2 (Appendix 6).
22. This is the way Alexander expresses 1.1, 24b29-30. When applied to the
notion of holding of all by necessity it provides one of the clearest expressions
of the idea of de re necessity: A holds of all B by necessity if A holds by necessity
of whatever is under B. Cf. 129,34-130,1 and 167,14-18.
23. Alexander most frequently refers to Theophrastus and Eudemus with
some such phrase as ‘his [i.e., Aristotle’s] associates’; sometimes he names them
both, and sometimes he names only Theophrastus. At no point does he distin-
guish between their views, and we see no basis for trying to do so. We shall
follow most modern scholarship by talking only about Theophrastus.
56 Notes to pp. 16-25
24. Alexander’s fullest discussion is at 123,28-127,16; cf. 129,21-130,24 and
132,23-34. The crucial applications of the rule come in connection with the
first-figure NUN cases (and their consequences) and first-figure NC_ cases
which Aristotle says imply unqualified conclusions. See, e.g., 1.16, 36a7-17 with
Alexander’s discussion at 208,8-209,32.
25. See, e.g., 247,39-248,3.
26. Assume, as is possible, that AaB,  NEC(AiB), NEC(BaC), and assume
that Barbara1(UNU) is valid. Then AaC, which with NEC(BaC) implies
(Darapti3(UNN)) NEC(AiB), contradicting  NEC(AiB). Hence Barbara1(UNU)
is not valid. This argument is a demonstration of the incoherence of Aristotle’s
treatment of combinations with a necessary and an unqualified premiss.
27. Alexander gives the incompatibility rejection argument for Celar-
ent1(UNN) at 130,25-131,4.
28. We give the arguments. For
Celarent1(NUN) NEC(AeB) BaC NEC(AeC)
NEC(AeC) and NEC(AeB) entail nothing, and NEC(AeC) and BaC entail
(Ferison3(NUN)) NEC(AoC), which is implied by NEC(AeC). In the case of:
Darii1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BiC NEC(AiC)
and:
Ferio1(NUN) NEC(AeB) BiC NEC(AoC)
nothing is entailed by the conclusion and either of the other premisses.
29. See the notes on 132,8 and 17.
30. See the note on 133,20.
31. For discussion see the note on 132,29.
32. See section III.E.2a below.
33. The third adjunct (prosrhêsis) is ‘It is contingent that’. See 1.2, 25a2-3
with Alexander’s explanation at 26,29-27,1.
34. At 156,26 Alexander mentions a second consideration: that an unquali-
fied proposition is ‘necessary on a condition’ and so ruled out by the words ‘if P
is not necessary’. For discussion see Appendix 3 on conditional necessity.
35. Alexander’s interpretation is very problematic. For, as we will see shortly,
Aristotle is committed to the idea that, e.g., CON(AaB) implies CON(AoB). But
then, if CON(AaB) is true, so is CON(AoB), and hence so are  (AaB) and 
(AoB), i.e., AoB and  (AoB). Alexander attempts unsuccessfully to wriggle out
of these difficulties at 161,3-26; see also 222,16-35.
36. We note that this means that, at least within the context of syllogistic,
neither of them is committed to two-sided contingency, if that means the
equivalence of CON(P) and CON( P) for any proposition P.
37. See 159,22-4.
38. Here and elsewhere Aristotle speaks of conversion. Modern scholars
sometimes speak of complementary conversion. In our discussion we use the
word ‘transformation’ to bring out that the order of terms is preserved when the
rule is applied.
39. For an incisive account of the difficulties involved in what Alexander says
here see Barnes et al., pp. 79-80, n. 157. Although we do not claim to be able to
eliminate these difficulties, we hope to give some sense of what Alexander has
in mind.
40. See especially 38,23-6.
41. We use the future tense ‘will be’ because Alexander says things such as
that a contingent proposition does ‘not yet’ (mêdepô) hold (e.g. at 156,18).
Alexander never considers the possibility of a proposition which held at some
time in the past but never thereafter, but it does not seem unreasonable for
logical purposes to take his references to the future in such contexts to include
the past, so that a contingent proposition is understood to be one that holds at
some time but not at the present. For a discussion of this whole topic see
Hintikka (1973). For a discussion of Alexander’s conception of possibility see
Sharples (1982).
42. Here we depart significantly from the translation of Barnes et al. And
this is one of the many places in which we have inserted variables where
Alexander has none. In the present case the insertion requires interpretation
of the text. One might choose to interchange the B’s and A’s in sentence (v).
43. Accepting the reading endekhetai of some manuscripts adopted by Barnes
et al.
44. Here we follow the manuscripts rather than accepting the emendation of
Barnes et al.; see their note 51 on 37,16 (p. 94); nothing significant turns on this
difference.
45. We note that in Alexander’s argument for EE-conversionn, the question
of how AiB holds is irrelevant since, no matter how it holds, AiB contradicts
NEC(AeB).
46. See the Greek-English Index.
47. Compare, e.g., 1.14, 33b3-8 with 1.15, 35b11-19.
48. For deviations of Alexander’s text of this passage from Ross’s see Barnes
et al., pp. 200-1.
49. Most of Alexander’s discussion of this passage (39,17-40,4) is devoted to
explaining that, although what is contingent may not hold for the most part,
Aristotle mentions only what holds for the most part – which, according to
Alexander, is the same as what holds by nature – because there is no scientific
value in arguments about what holds no more often than it fails to hold. Aristotle
has something further to say on this subject at 1.13, 32b4-22, and in connection
with this material Alexander discusses the subject in more detail (161,29-
165,14).
50. As always, Aristotle and so Alexander present these arguments in
what we think is a less satisfactory way. They assume EE-conversionc and
CON(AeB), infer CON(BaA) and then point out that CON(AeB) is compatible
with  CON(BaA).
51. Alexander (221,7-13) shows uncertainty about whether what follows is
an independent argument.
52. Aristotle’s text actually says ‘C holds of all D’, but the change in letters
is irrelevant.
53. Aristotle does not need BaA only  NEC(BoA), i.e.,  NEC (BaA); see
the note on 225,21.
54. See especially 226,13-31. Immediately after this passage at 226,32-227,9
Alexander gives the correct explanation of the illegitimacy of the inference.
55. It is true that at 39a36-8 Aristotle says, ‘Similarly <there will be a
syllogism> if AC is negative and BC affirmative, since again the first figure will
result by conversion’, a description which fits both Ferison3 and Bocardo3. But
Aristotle says nothing to show how one might reduce Bocardo3(CCC) to the first
figure. Alexander does the reduction for Ferison3(CCC), and says nothing about
Bocardo3.
56. For similar misgivings about the conclusion of Barbara1(NC_) see 207,3-
18.
57. For textual difficulties in Aristotle’s argument for Barbara1(UC‘C’) see
the note on 185,32. The argument we present here is perhaps more like what
Aristotle ought to say than what he literally says, but we think it must be what
he has in mind. See also the note on 187,9 for the special difficulties caused by
34b2-6 (now generally thought to be interpolated, but not questioned by Alex-
ander).
58. mêdeni ex anankês, i.e.,  NEC(AiC). See Appendix 1 on the expression
‘by necessity’.
59. Alexander’s treatment of Darii1(UC‘C’) and Ferio1(UC N ) in his com-
mentary on chapter 15 (202,7-203,1) implies by its silence that the conclusions
are contingent in the way specified, but at the beginning of the next chapter
(205,26-206,11) he makes clear that this is not so for Ferio1(UC N ).
60. For a suggestion of some misgivings see 188,7-17, where, however,
Alexander ends by referring us to another work for fuller discussion.
61. Alexander recognizes that the interpretation rendering NEC(AaC) true
does not produce this conflict; see 190,26-191,1.
62. See 246,15-35
63. At 1.18, 37b28 Aristotle describes the conclusion of Cesare2(UC‘C’) as ‘It
is contingent that B holds of no C’, but he doesn’t say anything about the nature
of the contingency.
64. We note that the arguments given in the text will not go through for UCt
combinations because the  NEC statements in the next-to-last lines would not
contradict the unqualified premiss.
66. For various textual matters see the textual notes on 35b23, 35b32-3,
35b34, and 35b35 (Appendix 6).
67. Formally this new symbol is totally redundant since CONu(P) is equiva-
lent to P.
68. If there is something wrong, it lies in the acceptance of the first-figure
NUN cases, which enable one to give indirect proofs for both Celarent1(NCU)
and Ferio1(NCU).
69. See, e.g., 231,35-6 and 232,36-233,12. Alexander’s mistake is due to
Aristotle’s misleading assertion at 35b32-4 that ‘one should take contingency
in the conclusion in the same way as in the preceding’.
70. For further complications in Aristotle’s treatment of Cesare2(NC_) see
the note on 235,3.
71. For the details see 236,15-238,10 with the notes.
72. See Appendix 3 on conditional necessity.
73. On Theophrastus’ modal logic see Bochenski (1947), pp. 67-102 and
Repici (1977), pp. 103-31.
74. Further possible evidence against Theophrastus having done this is the
reduction of Celarent1(NCtCt) to Darii1(CtNCt) which Philoponus (in An. Pr.
205,13-27, Theophrastus 109A FHSG) ascribes to ‘those around Theophrastus’.
However, it is interesting to note that apparently Theophrastus did not reduce
Celarent1(NCtCt) to Ferio1(NNN), as Alexander does at 209,9-18. Darii1(NCtCt)
and Ferio1(NCtCt) can only be reduced to Celarent1(NNN).
75. That Theophrastus did allow CtUCt or UCtCt combinations is confirmed
by 173,32-174,2, which tells us that Theophrastus and Eudemus said that the
conclusion of a mixture of a contingent and an unqualified premiss will be
contingent.
Summary
Symbols and rules
Our symbols are all explained in the introduction. We here give brief
explications of the less usual ones. NEC(P) is read ‘It is necessary that
P’. CON(P) is read ‘It is contingent that P’. In the introduction we have
tried to ‘unfold’ our understanding of the relevant notion of contingency.
Because Aristotle wavers in his understanding we sometimes write
‘CON’(P) to indicate that the notion of contingency is uncertain in one
way or another. We frequently write  NEC  (P) to stand for ‘It is
contingent (in another sense) that P’; this sense is so-called Theo-
phrastean contingency; we sometimes use CONt(P) as an abbreviation
for  NEC  (P). Finally, Aristotle sometimes infers ‘It is contingent
that P’ from P; in these cases we write CONu(P). We also recall the
following abbreviations:
XaY for ‘X holds of all Y’ or ‘All Y are X’

XeY for ‘X holds of no Y’ or ‘No Y are X’
XiY for ‘X holds of some Y’ or ‘Some Y are X’
XoY for ‘X does not hold of some Y’ or ‘There are some Y which are
not X’
The following three equivalences are frequently taken for granted:
  P if and only if P
XaY if and only if  (XoY) (so that also XoY if and only if  (XaY))
XeY if and only if  (XiY) (so that also XiY if and only if  (XeY))
The relations among the different modal notions are given by the
following rules:
U   N P   NEC (P)
C   N CON(P)   NEC (P)
P  CONu(P)
Aristotle accepts the following transformation rules:
EE-conversionu: XeY  YeX (1.2, 25a14-17)

AI-conversionu: XaY  YiX (1.2, 25a17-19)
II-conversionu: XiY  YiX (1.2, 25a20-2)
60 Summary
EE-conversionn: NEC(XeY)  NEC(YeX) (1.3, 25a29-31)

AI-conversionn: NEC(XaY)  NEC(YiX) (1.3, 25a32-4)
II-conversionn: NEC(XiY)  NEC(YiX) (1.3, 25a32-4)
AI-conversionc: CON(XaY)  CON(YiX) (1.3, 25a37-b3)
II-conversionc: CON(XiY)  CON(YiX) (1.3, 25a37-b3)
EA-transformationc: CON(XeY)  CON(XaY) (1.13, 32a34)
AE-transformationc: CON(XaY)  CON(XeY) (1.13, 32a34)
IO-transformationc: CON(XiY)  CON(XoY) (1.13, 32a35)
OI-transformationc: CON(XoY)  CON(XiY) (1.13, 32a35)
He rejects:
OO-conversionu: XoY  YoX (1.2, 25a22-6)

OO-conversionn: NEC(XoY)  NEC(YoX) (1.3, 25a34-6)
*EE-conversionc: CON(XeY)  CON(YeX).1 (1.17, 36b35-37a31).
Theophrastus apparently followed Aristotle on the conversion of un-

qualified and necessary propositions, but he accepted analogues of the
same rules for Ct propositions, i.e.,
AI-conversionCt: CONt(XaY)  CONt(YiX)

II-conversionCt: CONt(XiY)  CONt(YiX)
EE-conversionCt: CONt(XeY)  CONt(YeX)
but not
OO-conversionCt: CONt(XoY)  CONt(YoX)
These principles are consequences of Aristotelian assumptions about

NEC and the definition of CONt as  NEC  .
Assertoric Syllogistic (Chapters 4-6)

First figure (Chapter 4)
Complete
Barbara1(UUU) AaB BaC AaC (25b37-40)
Celarent1(UUU) AeB BaC AeC (25b40-26a2)
Darii1(UUU) AaB BiC AiC (26a23-5)
Ferio1(UUU) AeB BiC AoC (26a25-7)
Summary 61
Second figure (Chapter 5)
Direct reductions
Cesare2(UUU) AeB AaC BeC (27a5-9)
Since AeB (EE-conversionu) BeA. So (Celarent1(UUU)) BeC.
Camestres2(UUU) AaB AeC BeC (27a9-15)
Since AeC (EE-conversionu) CeA. So (Celarent1(UUU)) CeB, and so
(EE-conversionu) BeC.
Festino2(UUU) AeB AiC BoC (27a32-6)
Since AeB (EE-conversionu) BeA. So (Ferio1(UUU)) BoC.
Indirect reduction
Baroco2(UUU) AaB AoC BoC (27a36-b3)
Assume  (BoC), i.e., BaC. So (Barbara1(UUU)) AaC, contradicting AoC.
Third figure (Chapter 6)

Direct reductions
Darapti3(UUU) AaC BaC AiB (28a26-30)
Since BaC (AI-conversionu) CiB. So (Darii1(UUU)) AiB.
Felapton3(UUU) AeC BaC AoB (28a17-26)
Since BaC (AI-conversionu) CiB. So (Ferio1(UUU)) AoB.
Datisi3(UUU) AaC BiC AiB (28b7-11)
Since BiC (II-conversionu) CiB. So (Darii1(UUU)) AiB.
Disamis3(UUU) AiC BaC AiB (28b11-15)
Since AiC (II-conversionu) CiA. So (Darii1(UUU)) BiA, and
(II-conversionu) AiB.
Ferison3(UUU) AeC BiC AoB (28b33-5)
Since BiC (II-conversionu) CiB. So (Ferio1(UUU)) AoB.
Indirect reduction
Bocardo3(UUU) AoC BaC AoB (28b17-21)
Assume  (AoB), i.e., AaB. So Barbara1(UUU)) AaC, contradicting AoC.
All other premiss combinations rejected.
Modal syllogistic without contingency

NNN (Chapter 8)
First figure
Complete
Barbara1(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(BaC) NEC(AaC)
Celarent1(NNN) NEC(AeB) NEC(BaC) NEC(AeC)
62 Summary
Darii1(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(BiC) NEC(AiC)
Ferio1(NNN) NEC(AeB) NEC(BiC) NEC(AoC)
Second figure
Direct reductions (cf. the corresponding UUU cases)
Cesare2(NNN) NEC(AeB) NEC(AaC) NEC(BeC)
Camestres2(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(AeC) NEC(BeC)
Festino2(NNN) NEC(AeB) NEC(AiC) NEC(BoC)
Proof by ekthesis (not accepted by Theophrastus)

*Baroco2(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(AoC) NEC(BoC) (30a6-14)
Take D to be a part of C such that NEC(AeD). Then (Camestres2(NNN))
NEC(BeD). But D is part of C. So NEC(BoC).
Third figure
Darapti3(NNN) NEC(AaC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AiB)
Felapton3(NNN) NEC(AeC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AoB)
Datisi3(NNN) NEC(AaC) NEC(BiC) NEC(AiB)
Disamis3(NNN) NEC(AiC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AiB)
Ferison3(NNN) NEC(AeC) NEC(BiC) NEC(AoB)
Proof by ekthesis (not accepted by Theophrastus)

*Bocardo3(NNN) NEC(AoC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AoB) (30a6-14)
Take D to be a part of C such that NEC(AeD). Then, since by necessity
all C are B and D is a part of B, NEC(BaD) and (Felapton3(NNN))
NEC(AoB).
All other NN combinations (tacitly) rejected.
N+U (Chapters 9-11)

Complete
NUN (held to be NUU by Theophrastus)2

*Barbara1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BaC NEC(AaC) (30a17-23)
*Celarent1(NUN) NEC(AeB) BaC NEC(AeC) (30a17-23)
*Darii1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BiC NEC(AiC) (30a37-b2)
*Ferio1(NUN) NEC(AeB) BiC NEC(AoC) (30a37-b2)
Summary 63
UNU
Barbara1(UNU) AaB NEC(BaC) AaC (30a23-33)
Celarent1(UNU) AeB NEC(BaC) AeC (30a23-33)
Darii1(UNU) AaB NEC(BiC) AiC (30b2-6)
Ferio1(UNU) AeB NEC(BiC) AoC (30b2-6)

Cesare2(NUN) NEC(AeB) AaC NEC(BeC) (30b9-13)
Cesare2(UNU) AeB NEC(AaC) BeC (30b18-19)
Camestres2(UNN) AaB NEC(AeC) NEC(BeC) (30b14-18)
Camestres2(NUU) NEC(AaB) AeC BeC (30b18-40)
Festino2(NUN) NEC(AeB) AiC NEC(BoC) (31a5-10)
Festino2(UNU) AeB NEC(AiC) BoC absent
Indirect reductions
*Baroco2(NUU) NEC(AaB) AoC BoC (31a10-15)
*Baroco2(UNU) AaB NEC(AoC) BoC (31a15-17)

Darapti3(NUN) NEC(AaC) BaC NEC(AiB) (31a24-30)
Darapti3(UNN) AaC NEC(BaC) NEC(AiB) (31a31-3)
Felapton3(NUN) NEC(AeC) BaC NEC(AoB) (31a33-7)
Felapton3(UNU) AeC NEC(BaC) AoB (31a37-b10)
Datisi3(NUN) NEC(AaC) BiC NEC(AiB) (31b19-20)
Datisi3(UNU) AaC NEC(BiC) AiB (31b20-31)
Disamis3(UNN) AiC NEC(BaC) NEC(AiB) (31b12-19)
Disamis3(NUU) NEC(AiC) BaC AiB (31b31-3)
Ferison3(NUN) NEC(AeC) BiC NEC(AoB) (31b35-7)
Ferison3(UNU) AeC NEC(BiC) AoB (32a1-4)
Indirect reductions
*Bocardo3(UNU) AoC NEC(BaC) AoB (31b40-32a1)
*Bocardo3(NUU) NEC(AoC) BaC AoB (32a4-5)
All other N+U combinations (tacitly) rejected.

64 Summary
Syllogistic with contingency (Chapters 13-22)

CCC (Chapters 14, 17, 20)
Complete
Barbara1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BaC) CON(AaC) (32b38-33a1)
Celarent1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BaC) CON(AeC) (33a1-5)
Darii1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BiC) CON(AiC) (33a23-5)
Ferio1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BiC) CON(AoC) (33a25-7)
Waste cases justifiable by transformationc rules

(but not by Theophrastus’ transformationCt rules)
AEA1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BeC) CON(AaC) (33a5-12)
EEA1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BeC) CON(AaC) (33a12-20)
AOI1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BoC) CON(AiC) (33a27-34)
EOO1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BoC) CON(AoC) (included in
general statement
at 33a21-3)
Aristotle rejects all forms with a particular major and either a universal
or a particular minor premiss at 33a34-b17.

*Aristotle rejects all second-figure CC combinations.

Darapti3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (39a14-19)
Felapton3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BaC) CON(AoB) (39a19-23)
Datisi3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BiC) CON(AiB) (39a31-5)
Disamis3(CCC) CON(AiC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (39a35-6)
Ferison3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BiC) CON(AoB) (39a36-8)

EEI3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB) (39a26-8)
AEI3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB) (not mentioned)
AOI3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BoC) CON(AiB) (not mentioned)
OAI3(CCC) CON(AoC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (39a36-8?)
OEO3(CCC) CON(AoC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB) (39a38-b2)
EOO3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BoC) CON(AiB) (39a38-b2)
IEO3(CCC) CON(AiC) CON(BeC) CON(AoB) (not mentioned)
Summary 65
Aristotle rejects CC combinations with no universal premisses at
39b2-6.
U+C (Chapters 15, 18, 21)

Complete (CUC)
Barbara1(CUC) CON(AaB) BaC CON(AaC) (33b33-6)
Celarent1(CUC) CON(AeB) BaC CON(AeC) (33b36-40)
Darii1(CUC) CON(AaB) BiC CON(AiC) (35a30-5)
Ferio1(CUC) CON(AeB) BiC CON(AoC) (35a30-5)
Incomplete (UC‘C’)3
*Barbara1(UC‘C’) AaB CON(BaC)  NEC  (AaC) (34a34-b2)
*Celarent1(UC  N  ) AeB CON(BaC)  NEC  (AeC) (34b19-
35a2)
Darii1(UC‘C’) AaB CON(BiC)  NEC  (AiC) (35a35-b8)
Ferio1(UC  N  ) AeB CON(BiC)  NEC  (AoC) (35a35-b8)

AEA1(UC‘C’) AaB CON(BeC)  NEC  (AaC) (35a3-11)
EEE1(UC  N  ) AeB CON(BeC)  NEC  (AeC) (35a11-18)
AOI1(UC‘C’) AaB CON(BoC)  NEC  (AiC) (35a35-b8)
EOO1(UC  N  ) AeB CON(BoC)  NEC  (AoC) (35a35-b8)
Aristotle rejects EE_1(CU_) and AE_1(CU_) at 35a20-4, AO_1(CU_) and

EO_1(CU_) at 35b8-11, all forms with a particular major and either a
universal or a particular minor premiss at 35b11-19.

Cesare2(UC‘C’) AeB CON(AaC)  NEC  (BeC) (37b23-8)
*Camestres2(CU‘C’) CON(AaB) AeC  NEC  (BeC) (37b29)
Festino2(UC‘C’) AeB CON(AiC)  NEC  (BoC) (38a3-4)
*IEO2(CU?) CON(AiB) AeC  NEC  (CoB)? (38a3-4?)

EEE2(UC‘C’) AeB CON(AeC)  NEC  (BeC) (37b29-35)
EEE2(CU‘C’) CON(AeB) AeC  NEC  (BeC) (37b29-35)
EOO2(UC‘C’) AeB CON(AoC)  NEC  (BoC) (38a4-7)
OEO2(CU?) CON(AoB) AeC  NEC  (CoB)? (38a4-7?)
66 Summary
Rejected standard cases

Cesare2(CU_) CON(AeB) AaC (37b19-23)
Camestres2(UC_) AaB CON(AeC) (37b19-23)
Festino2(CU_) CON(AeB) AiC (37b39-38a2)
Baroco2(UC_) AaB CON(AoC) (37b39-38a2)
Baroco2(CU_) CON(AaB) AoC (38a8-10)
Aristotle rejects the waste cases AA_2(CU_) and AA_2(UC_) at 37b35-8,

and he rejects OA_2(UC_), OE_2(UC_), and EO_2(CU_) at 38a8-10. He
apparently rejects IE_2(UC_) and OA_2(CU_) at 37b39, and he rejects
cases without a universal premiss at 38a10-12. He does not mention the
waste cases AI_2(CU_), AI_2(UC_), IA_2(UC_), and IA_2(CU_), which are
presumably rejected.

Darapti3(UC‘C’) AaC CON(BaC)  NEC  (AiB) (39b10-16)
Darapti3(CUC) CON(AaC) BaC CON(AiB) (39b16-22)
Felapton3(CUC) CON(AeC) BaC CON(AoB) (39b16-22)
Felapton3(UC‘C’) AeC CON(BaC)  NEC  (AoB) (39b16-22)
*AE?3(CU?) CON(AaC) BeC  NEC  (AoB)? (39b22-5)
*EE?3(CU?) CON(AeC) BeC  NEC  (AoB)? (39b22-5)
Datisi3(CUC) CON(AaC) BiC CON(AiB) (39b26-31)
Datisi3(UC‘C’) AaC CON(BiC)  NEC  (AiB) (39b26-31)
Disamis3(UCC) AiC CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (39b26-31)
Disamis3(CU‘C’) CON(AiC) BaC  NEC  (AiB) (39b26-31)
Ferison3(CUC) CON(AeC) BiC CON(AoB) (39b26-31)
Ferison3(UC‘C’) AeC CON(BiC)  NEC  (AoB) (39b26-31)
IEO3(UCC) AiC CON(BeC) CON(AoB) (39b26-31)
IE?3(CU?) CON(AiC) BeC  NEC  (AoB)? (39b26-31)

AEI3(UC‘C’) AaC CON(BeC)  NEC  (AiB) (39b22-5)
EEO3(UC‘C’) AeC CON(BeC)  NEC  (AoB) (39b22-5)
EOO3(UC‘C’) AeC CON(BoC)  NEC  (AoB) (not mentioned)
OE?3(CU?) CON(AiC) BeC  NEC  (AoB)? (not men-
tioned)
Indirect reductions
*Bocardo3(CU‘C’) CON(AoC) BaC  NEC  (AoB) (39b31-9)
AO?3(UC?) AaC CON(BoC) ? (39b31-9?)
Summary 67
AO?3(CU?) CON(AaC) BoC ? (39b31-9?)

OA?3(UC?) AoC CON(BaC) ? (39b31-9?)
Further waste cases

EO?3(CU?) AeC CON(BoC) ? (not mentioned)
OA?3(CU?) CON(AoC) BaC ? (not mentioned)
These are all the third-figure U+C combinations.
N+C (Chapters 16, 19, 22)

Complete (CNC)
Barbara1(CNC) CON(AaB) NEC(BaC) CON(AaC) (36a2-7)
Celarent1(CNC) CON(AeB) NEC(BaC) CON(AeC) (36a17-24)
Darii1(CNC) CON(AaB) NEC(BiC) CON(AiC) (not mentioned)
Ferio1(CNC) CON(AeB) NEC(BiC) CON(AoC) (36a39-b2)
Incomplete (NC‘C’)4
*Barbara1(NC‘C’) NEC(AaB) CON(BaC)  NEC (AaC) (35b37-
36a2)
*Celarent1(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(BaC) CONu(AeC) (36a7-17)
*Darii1(NC‘C’) NEC(AaB) CON(BiC)  NEC  (AiC) (36a39-b2)
Ferio1(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(BiC) CONu(AoC) (36a34-9)
AEA1(NC‘C’) NEC(AaB) CON(BeC)  NEC  (AaC) (36a25-27)
EEE1(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(BeC) CONu(AeC) (not mentioned)
AOI1(NC‘C’) NEC(AaB) CON(BoC)  NEC  (AiC) (35b28-30?)
EOO1(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(BoC) CONu(AoC) (35b30-31?)
Aristotle rejects AE_1(CN_) and EE_1(CN_) at 36a27-31, IA_1(NC_),

OA_1(NC_), IE_1(NC_), and OE_1(NC_) at 36b3-7, IE_1(CN_),
OE_1(CN_), IA_1(CN_), and OA_1(CN_) at 36b7-12, and all combinations
with two particular premisses at 36b12-18. He tacitly rejects AO_1(CN_)
and EO_1(CN_).

Cesare2(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(AaC) CONu(BeC) (38a16-25)
Camestres2(CNCu) CON(AaB) NEC(AeC) CONu(BeC) (38a25-6)
Festino2(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(AiC) CONu(BoC) (38b24-7)
68 Summary
IEO2(CN?) CON(AiB) NEC(AeC) CONu(CoB)? (38b24-7?)
EEE2(NCC ) u
NEC(AeB) CON(AeC) CONu(BoC) (38b6-12)
EEE2(CNCu) CON(AeB) NEC(AeC) CONu(BoC) (38b12-13)
EOO2(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(AoC) CONu(BoC) (38b31-5)
OEO2(CN?) CON(AoB) NEC(AeC) CONu(CoB)? (38b31-5?)
Rejected standard cases

*Cesare2(CN_) CON(AeB) NEC(AaC) (38a26-b4)
*Camestres2(NC_) NEC(AaB) CON(AeC) (38b4-5)
Festino2(CN_) CON(AeB) NEC(AiC) (not mentioned)
*Baroco2(NC_) NEC(AaB) CON(AoC) (38b27-9)
Baroco2(CN_) CON(AaB) NEC(AoC) (not mentioned)
The rejected standard cases generate the following equally problematic

waste cases: AA_2(CN_) and AA_2(NC) (both rejected at 38b13-23),
AI_2(CN_) and AI_2(NC_) (both rejected at 38b29-31, where Aristotle
also rejects IA_2(CN_) and IA_2(NC_)) and EO_2(CN_), which Aristotle
does not discuss. Aristotle also rejects OA_2(CN_) at 38b27-29, and the
rejection of IA_2(NC_) carries with it the rejection of IE_2(NC_). He
rejects all forms with two particulars at 38b35-7. He tacitly rejects
OA_2(NC_) and OE_2(NC_).
Third-figure (Chapter 22)

Darapti3(NC‘C’) NEC(AaC) CON(BaC)  NEC  (AiB) (40a12-
16)
Darapti3(CNC) CON(AaC) NEC(BaC) CON(AiB) (40a16-18)
Felapton3(CNC) CON(AeC) NEC(BaC) CON(AoB) (40a18-25)
Felapton3(NCCu) NEC(AeC) CON(BaC) CONu(AoB) (40a25-32)
Datisi3(CNC) CON(AaC) NEC(BiC) CON(AiB) (40a40-b2)
Datisi3(NC‘C’) NEC(AaC) CON(BiC)  NEC  (AiB) (40a40-b2)
Disamis3(NCC) NEC(AiC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (40a40-b2)
Disamis3(CN‘C’) CON(AiC) NEC(BaC)  NEC  (AiB) (40a40-
b2)
Ferison3(CNC) CON(AeC) NEC(BiC) CON(AoB) (40b2-3)
Ferison3(NCCu) NEC(AeC) CON(BiC) CONu(AoB) (40b3-4)
*Bocardo3(CN‘C’) CON(AoC) NEC(BaC)  NEC  (AoB) (40b2-3)5
Bocardo3(NCCu) NEC(AoC) CON(BaC) CONu(AoB) (40b3-4?)

Summary 69
AE_3(NC‘C’) NEC(AaC) CON(BeC)  NEC  (AiB)? (40a33-5)
EEO3(NCCu) NEC(AeC) CON(BeC) CONu(AoB) (not discussed)
AOI3(NC‘C’) NEC(AaC) CON(BoC)  NEC  (AiB) (40b2-3?)
IEO3(NCC) NEC(AiC) CON(BeC) CON(AoB) (40b8-12)6
EOO3(NCCu) CON(AeC) NEC(BoC) CONu(AoB) (not discussed)
OEO3(NCCu) NEC(AeC) CON(BiC) CONu(AoB) (not discussed)
Rejected Cases
*AE_3(CN_) CON(AaC) NEC(BeC) (40a35-8)
*IE_3(CN_) CON(AiC) NEC(BeC) (40b8-12)
These two rejections imply rejection of their equivalents, EE_3(CN_) and

OE_3(CN_). Aristotle tacitly rejects AO_3(CN_), EO_3(CN_), and all
third-figure N+C combinations with two particular premisses.
Notes
1. Asterisks indicate places of difficulty in the modal syllogistic on which
Alexander has an interesting discussion.
2. The controversy concerning these four syllogisms transfers to any N+U
combination held by Aristotle to have a necessary conclusion.
3. These cases are very problematic, especially Barbara and Celarent; their
problematic nature transmits itself to combinations reduced to them.
4. The difficulties attaching to Barbara1(UC‘C’) transfer to Barbara1(NC‘C’).
New difficulties arise with Celarent1(NCCu).
5. Alexander wavers between thinking Aristotle espouses Bocardo3(CN‘C’)
and OAI3(CN‘C’), the waste case of Disamis3(CN‘C’).
6. The waste case (of Disamis3(NCC)) would actually be:
IEI3(NCC) NEC(AiC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB)
but Aristotle implies a derivation of the syllogism we have given, and Alexander
carries it out at 253,23-7, perhaps in order to keep the conclusion of a syllogism
with a negative premiss negative.
Alexander of Aphrodisias
On Aristotle
Prior Analytics 1.14-22
Translation
Textual Emendations
74 Textual Emendations
1.14-16 The first figure
1.14 Combinations with two contingent premisses1
<32b38-33a20 Two universal premisses>
32b382 When it is contingent that A holds of all B and B of all C, 167,8

[there will be a complete syllogism that it is contingent that A
holds of all C. This is evident from the definition. For we explain3
‘It is contingent that X holds of all Y’ in this way.
33a1 Similarly, too, if it is contingent that A holds of no B and B
of all C, there will be a complete syllogism that it is contingent that
A holds of no C. For ‘It is contingent that A holds4 of that of which
it is contingent that B is said’ was for none of the things of which
it is contingent that they are under B to be left out.]
It is clear that <Aristotle means> it is contingent <that B holds of all 10
C>, since he has just said this.5 He says that the conclusion will be
universal affirmative contingent when the premisses are taken in this
way as universal affirmative contingent in the first figure. (It is neces-
sary to discuss this figure and the combinations in it first because the
combinations in the other figures are proved through them.) The words
‘This is evident from the definition’ indicate that the fact that a universal 15
contingent affirmative conclusion follows in the combination under
consideration is clear from the definition of ‘said of all’. For ‘X is said of
all Y’ was ‘it is not possible to take anything in Y of which X will not be
said’.6 So when A is taken to be said of all B contingently, there will be
nothing of B of which it will not be contingent that A is said. But C is
under B, so that it is also contingent that A is said of all of C. 20
(33a1) The proof is the same if it is contingent that A holds of no B
and it is contingent that B holds of all C. For it follows again that A
holds of no C contingently. And this is again clear because of the
definition of ‘X is said of no Y’.7 For it is not possible to take any of B of
which it will not be contingent that A does not hold. For the inferences 25
in the first figure come about because of these things.
8
Having said that what follows in the case of the first-figure combi-
nation consisting of two universal affirmative contingent premisses is
evident from the definition – ‘For we explain9 “It is contingent that X
holds of all Y” in this way’ – he first posited the next combination, the
one which has the major premiss universal negative contingent and the
minor universal affirmative contingent, and he then has given the
76 Translation
30 definition of ‘X is said of all Y’, because of which he says the conclusion
of the previous combination10 is clear. Consequently what is said seems
to be rather obscure. Or is it necessary to understand as added that ‘X
is said of no Y’ <is defined> in a similar way? For if it is contingent that
A holds of no B, it will not be possible to take any of B of which it is not
168,1 contingent that A does not hold. And it is possible that he has referred
to the definitions of both the affirmative and the negative with the
words ‘For “It is contingent that A holds of that of which it is contingent
that B is said” ’, and that along with <‘it is contingent that A holds’> it
is necessary to understand ‘or it is contingent that A does not hold’.
5 33a511 When it is contingent that A holds of all B and it is

contingent that B holds of no C, [there is no syllogism based on the
premisses taken. But if BC is converted in the way appropriate to
contingency, the same syllogism as before results. For since it is
contingent that B holds of no C, it is also contingent that B holds
of all C; this was said previously.12 Thus if B holds of all C and A
of all B, the same syllogism results again. Similarly, too, if the
negative proposition is posited along with ‘it is contingent’ in
relation to both premisses. I mean if it is contingent that A holds
of no B and B of no C. There is again no syllogism based on the
premisses taken, but again, if the premisses are converted, there
will be the same syllogism as before. It is evident then that if the
negative is posited in relation to the minor extreme or in relation
to both premisses, either there is no syllogism, or there is one but
it is not complete since necessity is reached from the conversion.]
He now takes combinations in the first figure, one having the major
premiss universal affirmative and the minor universal negative, with
both contingent, the other having both premisses universal negative
10 contingent. Both of these combinations were non-syllogistic in the case
of unqualified and of necessary premisses. He says that also in the case
of contingent premisses nothing will follow syllogistically either if they
are of this sort and are held fixed. However, if negatives are transformed
into affirmatives (this can be done since it has been shown that they
convert with one another; for ‘It is contingent that X holds of all Y’
15 converts with ‘it is contingent that X holds of no Y’, as was shown), when
the negative contingent premisses are transformed into affirmative
contingent ones, he says the combinations will be syllogistic, since they
will then consist of two contingent universal affirmative premisses: in
the case of the first combination described <this will happen> if the
minor is transformed since it was negative, in the case of the second <it
20 will happen> if both are transformed into affirmatives, since both are
assumed negative. 13But in fact, <in the case of the second combination>
if only the minor premiss is transformed there will be a syllogism having
Translation 77
its major premiss universal negative contingent, its minor universal
affirmative contingent, and having its conclusion universal negative
contingent. It is then clear that the combinations previously mentioned
imply no conclusion <just> on the basis of the premisses assumed. 25
However, the combinations do become syllogistic when negative propo-
sitions are converted into affirmative ones on the grounds that the latter
are true together with the premisses assumed. This is a peculiar feature
of contingent propositions, since it is also only in their case that things
said negatively are true together with the affirmations. (It should be
noted that he left out the proof that the combination consisting of two
universal negative contingent premisses is syllogistic even if only the 30
minor premiss is transformed into an affirmative.)
It is necessary to understand that when the negative premisses are
transformed into affirmative ones the resulting syllogisms do not pre-
serve the notion of the contingent as what is usual, at least not if the
negative premisses were originally taken to be contingent in the sense 169,1
of being usual. For an affirmative which is infrequent converts with a
negative which is contingent in the sense of usual. Consequently, when
the negative premisses assumed in the combinations are transformed
into contingent affirmative ones, what is contingent in the sense of
infrequent and the indefinite will be posited. But when the indefinite is 5
assumed there will indeed be a syllogism, but not one having any use,
as he himself said before.14 Consequently we, too, will say that these
combinations are without qualification syllogistic with respect to their
formal validity,15 but they are useless and non-syllogistic in relation to
contingency in the sense of what is usually true. (Some syllogisms in
certain arts and in certain counsels, choices, and activities proceed on 10
the basis of this notion of contingency.) Perhaps he was considering this
fact when he said ‘either there is no syllogism’. For there is no syllogism
for a person with an eye on usefulness – or if someone only looks at the
premisses.16
<He says> ‘or there is one but it is not complete’ because the syllo-
gism does not result from the premisses assumed but from their
transformation and conversion (or together with their conversions).
<33a21-33b17 At most one universal premiss>

33a2117 If18 one of the premisses is taken to be universal, the other 15
particular, [and universality is assumed with respect to the major
extreme, there will be a syllogism.
33a2319 For if it is contingent that A holds of all B and B of some
C, it is contingent that A holds of some C. This is evident from the
definition of ‘It is contingent’.
33a2520 Again, if it is contingent that A holds of no B and it is
contingent that B holds of some C, it is necessary that it be
78 Translation
contingent that A not hold of some of the C’s. The demonstration
is the same.
33a2721 If the particular premiss is taken as privative, the
universal as affirmative, and they are related similarly by position
– i.e., if it is contingent that A holds of all B and it is contingent
that B does not hold of some C – there is no evident syllogism
based on the premisses taken; but if the particular premiss is
converted and it is posited that it is contingent that B holds of
some C, the conclusion will be the same as before (as in the first
cases).]
Having spoken about combinations of two universal and contingent
premisses, he has turned to those having only one universal premiss;
and he says that there will be a syllogism if the major is universal, the
20 minor particular, no matter how the premisses are taken to be with
respect to being affirmative or negative. However, when the major
premiss is universal and affirmative or negative, and the minor is
particular affirmative, the conclusions will be directly from the pre-
misses assumed and because of them.
And he says this is evident ‘from the definition of “It is contingent” ’.
Perhaps he means from the definition of ‘It is contingent that X holds
25 of all Y’ since holding of all was ‘it is not possible to take any of Y of
which X will not be said’.22 (And if he meant this, the words ‘of all’ would
be missing in what is said since he should say ‘This is evident from the
definition of “It is contingent that X holds of all Y” ’.) For if it is
contingent that A holds of all B, there will be nothing of B of which it is
not contingent that A is said. But something of C is under B, so that it
is also contingent that A holds of some C.
30 Or23 does he mean ‘the definition of contingency itself’? The definition
of contingency was <that P is contingent if> ‘P is not necessary and if,
when P is posited to hold, nothing impossible follows.’ For, in the case
of this combination, nothing impossible follows if it is posited that it is
contingent that A holds of some C. This is because no syllogistic
170,1 combination at all results when it is assumed that it is contingent that
A holds of some C. For if the contingent particular affirmative premiss
BC is converted two particular contingent premisses in the first figure
5 result; and if BC, which is also itself particular affirmative contingent,
is added to the conclusion, which is particular affirmative contingent,
there results two particular premisses in the third figure; and if the
premiss ‘it is contingent that A holds of all B’ is added to the conclusion,
two affirmative premisses in the second figure result.
But even if we hypothesize the opposite24 of ‘It is contingent that A
holds of some C’ and use reductio ad impossibile, nothing impossible
10 turns out. For let the opposite of ‘It is contingent that A holds of some
C’ be taken, i.e., ‘A holds of no C by necessity’, and let ‘It is contingent
Translation 79
that A holds of all B’ be added. It follows in the second figure25 that it is
contingent that B holds of no C, which is not impossible when it is
assumed that it is contingent that B holds of some C. For if it is
contingent that X holds of some Y, X can also hold of no Y, and it can be
the case that it is contingent that it holds of no Y. The first interpreta-
tion26 of what is said is better. For this proof would show rather that the 15
combination under consideration does not yield a conclusion because
nothing impossible followed <when the negation of the proposed conclu-
sion was assumed>.
(33a25) Similarly, if the major premiss is universal negative contin-
gent and the minor particular affirmative, there follows from the
premisses assumed a particular negative contingent conclusion. For the
definition of ‘It is contingent that X holds of no Y’ is known, and in the 20
case of this combination it produces the conclusion.
(33a27) But if the major premiss is universal and either negative or
affirmative,27 and the particular minor is taken to be privative contin-
gent, a syllogism will result, but not on the basis of the premisses
assumed; rather it results when the particular negative premiss is
transformed into a particular affirmative by converting contingent
propositions.
[33a3428 If the premiss relating to the major extreme is taken as

particular, and that related to the minor is taken as universal, if
both premisses are posited as affirmative or both as privative or
they are not similar in form or they are both indeterminate or both
particular, there will be no syllogism at all. For nothing prevents
B from having a greater extension than A and not being predicated
equally. Let C be taken as that by which B has a greater extension
than A. Then it is not contingent that A holds of all of C or none or
some or not of some, since contingent propositions convert, and it
is contingent that B holds of more things than A does.]
But when the universal premiss is not the major but the major is 25
particular contingent, and the minor is universal contingent, he says
there will be no syllogism, whether both premisses are taken to be
similar in form (i.e., similar in quality) or dissimilar in form (i.e.,
different in quality); and there will not be a syllogism if both are taken
to be indeterminate or both particular. 29He gives the reason why all 30
such combinations in which the major is particular contingent are
non-syllogistic: if it is assumed that it is contingent that A holds of some
B, nothing prevents B from having a greater extension than A and being
said of more things, for example, if it is assumed that it is contingent
that literate holds of something which is asleep; for being asleep is
predicated of more things than literate. Thus, if one takes some of the 35
things falling under being asleep by which B, being asleep, has a greater 171,1
80 Translation
extension than A, literate, for example, horse,30 it is not the case that it
is contingent that A holds of all horse or contingent that it holds of none.
For, if it is contingent that X holds of no Y, it is also contingent that it
holds of all Y. But how could it be contingent that literate holds of all
5 horse? For it holds of no horse by necessity. And it is not contingent that
literate holds of some horse. Nor is it contingent that it does not hold of
some. For if it is contingent that X does not hold of some Y, it is also
contingent that X holds of some Y by the conversion of what is contin-
gent, as he himself indicates when he adds, ‘since contingent
propositions convert’. So, if the conclusion must be either universal
affirmative contingent or universal negative <contingent> or particular
10 and affirmative or negative <and contingent>, and none of these is
possible in the first figure in the case of contingent premisses when the
major is particular contingent, the minor universal contingent, there
will never be a syllogism when the major is of this kind, as is shown
with terms:
33b331 Furthermore, this is also evident from terms; for if the

15 premisses are related in this way it is not contingent that the first
term holds of any of the last and necessary that it holds of all of it.
[Common terms for holding of all by necessity: animal, white,
human; for not being contingent: animal, white, cloak.]
Having said that in the first figure all combinations of contingent
premisses in which the major is particular will be non-syllogistic and
also added the reason (for it is possible32 that the middle term have a
20 greater extension than the extreme), he nevertheless also proves that
the combination is non-syllogistic by setting down terms, thereby mak-
ing this sort of proof and this sort of refutation clearer and more striking.
He shows through the terms which he sets down both that the first
extreme holds of all the last by necessity and that the first term holds
of none of the last by necessity, and he does away with all contingent
25 conclusion as well as all unqualified and necessary ones, that is, all of
‘A holds of all C’, ‘A holds of some C’, ‘A holds of no C’, and ‘A does not
hold of some C’; for each of the universal necessary conclusions – the
affirmative and the negative – does away with all contingent conclu-
sions.
He takes animal, white, human as terms for holding of all by neces-
sity. For let it be contingent that animal holds of something white and
let it be contingent that white holds of every human; animal holds of
30 every human by necessity. Truer terms would be white, walking, swan.
For it is contingent both that white holds of some thing that walks and
that it does not hold of some thing that walks, and it is contingent both
that walking holds of every swan and that it does not hold of every swan
(and also of some); and white holds of every swan by necessity. He sets
Translation 81
down as terms for holding of none by necessity animal, white, cloak. For
it is contingent both that animal holds of something white and that it 172,1
does not hold something white, and it is contingent both that white
holds of every cloak and that it does not hold of every cloak (and of none
and of some and not of some); and animal holds of no cloak by necessity.
Again, truer terms would be white, walking, crow; for the conclusion is
that white holds of no crow by necessity and the premisses can be taken 5
in all the ways mentioned.
33b8 It is, then, evident that if the terms are this way there is no
syllogism.33 [For every syllogism is either of holding or of necessity
or of contingency. But it is evident that there is no syllogism of
holding or of necessity. For the affirmative is destroyed by the
privative, the privative by the affirmative. It remains that there is
a syllogism of contingency. But this is impossible. For it has been
shown that when the terms are related this way, it is necessary
that the first holds of all of the last and not contingent that it holds
of any. Thus there will not be a syllogism of contingency. For the
necessary was not contingent.]
Having shown by setting down terms that in the combinations under
consideration the conclusion is both holding of all and of none by
necessity, he says that not only does something contingent not follow 10
but also nothing else, that is, nothing unqualified or necessary. For we
have shown34 that holding of all by necessity does away with holding of
none by necessity and with holding of none, and holding of none by
necessity does away with holding of all by necessity and with holding of
all. For using these facts we showed the non-syllogistic combinations
with necessary or unqualified premisses <to be non-syllogistic>. Fur-
thermore, as we have said,35 when the conclusion is necessary or 15
unqualified, it is necessary that one or both of the premisses be neces-
sary or unqualified, but both the premisses in the combination under
consideration are contingent. And through this the conclusion would be
shown to be neither necessary nor unqualified.
Having said that none of these things can follow, he shows next that
something contingent cannot follow since holding of all by necessity and 20
holding of none by necessity follow in a combination of this kind. He
indicates this with the words ‘and not contingent that it holds of any’.36
For holding of all by necessity does away similarly with all contingency,
and with holding of none, with not holding of some, and, furthermore,
with holding of none by necessity and not holding of some by necessity. 25
Again, holding of none by necessity itself does away with holding of all
or some and with holding of all or of some by necessity, just as it does
away with all contingency. He recalls the refutation of contingency <by
recalling that> we defined the contingent as what is not necessary.37 For
82 Translation
if A holds by necessity of all C and of no C by necessity, it is not
contingent that it holds of all C or of some or of none or not of all.
<33b18-24 Concluding remarks>

[33b1838 It is evident that if the terms in contingent premisses are
universal, whether they are affirmative or privative, there is
always a syllogism in the first figure, except that the syllogism is
complete if they are affirmative, incomplete if they are privative.
33b22 It is necessary not to include contingency among neces-
sary things, but in the said way specified – this is sometimes
forgotten.]
(33b18) Having said these things, he reminds us of what has been shown
<in this chapter>, namely, that in the first figure if both premisses are
universal there is a syllogism no matter what the quality of the pre-
misses, except that the syllogism is complete if both are affirmative.
173,1 Similarly, if only the major premiss is negative. And (as he showed) the
syllogisms <which come about> by conversion of the contingent premiss
are incomplete, both the one consisting of two negative premisses and
the one with a negative minor.
(33b22) He also reminds us that it is necessary to take contingency
5 in the premisses as non-necessity. For the contingency which is predi-
cated of what is necessary is homonymous and does not convert.39 He
says that such a thing is often forgotten. For we say of what holds of
none by necessity that it is contingent that it holds of none in cases in
which it is not possible to say that it is contingent that it holds of all.40
But even he himself in setting out the terms previously mentioned took
it that it is contingent that animal holds of something white.41 However,
10 it holds of something white by necessity. And for this reason perhaps he
added what he also says elsewhere:42 ‘But the terms ought to be taken
in a better way.’
He has proved that in the first figure there are four <syllogisms>
from two contingent premisses if both premisses are universal; that two
are complete, the one from two affirmative premisses and the one from
a negative major only; the one from a negative minor only and the one
15 from two negatives are incomplete; similarly there are again four
syllogisms when one premiss is particular if the minor premiss is
particular; but also two of these are complete, those in which either both
premisses are affirmative or only the minor is; but those in which only
the minor is negative or both premisses are negative are incomplete.
Translation 83

premiss43
<33b25-33 Introductory remarks>
33b25 If one premiss is taken to be unqualified and the other 20
contingent, [when the premiss relating to the major extreme
signifies contingency, all syllogisms will be complete and their
conclusion will be contingent in the way specified which has been
described; but when the premiss relating to the minor extreme
signifies contingency, all of them are incomplete, and the conclusions
of the privative syllogisms will not be contingent in the way specified
but rather their conclusions will be that something holds of none by
necessity or does not hold of all by necessity.44 For if something holds
of none by necessity or does not hold of all by necessity, we say that
it is contingent that it holds of none or not of all.]
<After discussing first figure syllogisms with contingent premisses> it
would be cohesive to discuss first the second and third figure, and then
mixtures. But since syllogisms in those figures result from conversions
with respect to terms and he has not yet spoken about this kind of
conversion in the case of contingent propositions,45 he first discusses 25
mixtures in the first figure of a contingent and an unqualified46 or a
contingent and a necessary premiss,47 since what is proved in this figure
does not need conversion. Furthermore, he will also show that in the
second figure nothing follows from two contingent premisses because
nothing follows from two affirmative premises,48 but that something
does follow in the case of a mixture of a contingent and an unqualified
premiss.49 But first he had to speak about mixtures of an unqualified50 30
and a contingent premiss in the first figure; and he has made the
mixture of an unqualified and a contingent premiss primary.
51
His associates, Theophrastus and Eudemus, say that also in a
mixture of a contingent and an unqualified premiss the conclusion will 174,1
be contingent no matter which of the premisses is taken to be contin-
gent, since again the contingent is weaker than the unqualified. But
Aristotle does not say this. Rather he says that when the major is
contingent and the minor unqualified, the conclusion will be contingent
in the way specified52 – i.e., ‘<P is contingent> if P is not necessary and 5
nothing impossible follows when it is posited to be.’ And he says that
the syllogisms in such a combination are complete, that is, they directly
prove the proposed conclusion, since the proof for the syllogism is by
means of <the definition of> ‘said of all’ and of ‘said of none’, and
syllogisms which have their conclusion known through these things are
complete. But he also says that all syllogisms in which the minor is 10
contingent and the major unqualified will be incomplete; and further-
more that those which imply a negative conclusion will imply one which
84 Translation
is contingent not in the way specified but in the sense in which what is
merely a negation of necessity is called contingent. For these will imply
<as conclusion> either ‘A holds by necessity of no C’53 or ‘A does not hold
by necessity of all C’,54 and contingency is true when these things are,
15 but not the contingency of which we have given the definition, since
what is contingent in that sense does not yet hold.55 For these things
<which are contingent in the other sense> signify that something does
not hold by necessity without denying that it holds.56 He will make what
he means evident as he proceeds. However the associates of Theophras-
tus57 also call such things contingent and so, reasonably, say that the
conclusion in such combinations is contingent.
20 58
Syllogisms in which the minor is contingent are not complete
because in these cases it is not possible to prove the conclusion using
<the definition of> said of all. For suppose A holds of all B and it is
contingent that B holds of all C; then since C is not yet some of B
(because the contingent does not yet hold), it is not the case that if A is
said of all B and it is not possible to take anything of B of which A will
25 not be said, that thereby and because of this we also have that A applies
to C; for C is not some of B, if it is contingent that B holds of it and B
does not actually hold of it. Consequently, since these syllogisms need
something external for their proof, they are not complete; for they are
proved by reductio ad impossibile.
Having said these things, he first proves that syllogisms having the
major contingent are complete and have a conclusion which is contin-
30 gent in the way specified:
<33b33-34a2 The completeness of Barbara1(CUC) and Celarent1(CUC)>

33b33 For let it be contingent that A holds of all B, and let it be
assumed that B holds of all C.59 [Since, then, C is under B and it
is contingent that A holds of all B, it is evident that it is also
contingent that it holds of all C. Thus there is a complete syllo-
gism. Similarly if the premiss AB is privative and BC is
affirmative and the former is taken to be contingent, the latter
unqualified, there will be a complete syllogism that it is contingent
that A holds of no C. It is evident then that if holding is posited in
relation to the minor extreme, the syllogisms are complete.]
Invoking the notion of said of all and its definition, he proves that the
conclusion is contingent and the syllogism complete. For since it is
175,1 contingent that A holds of all B, it is not possible to take any of B of
which it will not be contingent that A holds; but C is some of B, if, indeed,
B holds of all C; therefore, it will also be contingent that A holds of all
C. And if the major premiss is posited to be privative contingent and the
minor unqualified universal affirmative, the proof that the conclusion
Translation 85
will be contingent negative universal is similar. For it will be by means 5
of the definition of ‘it is contingent that X holds of no Y’.
<34a2-33 Argument that if NEC(P ] >Q) and P is possible, Q is

possible>
34a2 [It is necessary to show by means of the impossible] that
when the premisses are related in the contrary way there will be
syllogisms.60 [At the same time it will be clear that these syllo-
gisms are also incomplete since the proof is not from the premisses
taken.]
He has proved in the case in which both premisses are universal that
when the major premiss is contingent the conclusion is contingent and
the syllogisms are complete (the same proof works for the case in which 10
the syllogism is particular and the conclusion affirmative or negative).61
He turns to the combinations in which the major premiss has been taken
to be unqualified, the minor contingent. For the phrase ‘related in the
contrary way’ signifies for him the interchange of <the modality of> the
premisses. He says that it will be proved by means of the impossible
that combinations of this kind are syllogistic. But if by means of the
impossible, it is clear that these syllogisms are not complete. Therefore 15
he adds the words ‘At the same time it will be clear that these syllogisms
are also incomplete.’ For complete syllogisms are based on the premisses
assumed and need nothing external in addition, but proof by means of
the impossible is not through the premisses which have been taken and
assumed.
34a5 It should be said first that if when A is it is necessary that B

is, then if A is possible,62 B will also be possible by necessity.63 20
He is going to prove using reductio ad impossibile that the combination
of an unqualified major and a contingent minor is syllogistic; but in the
proof ad impossibile in the present cases he hypothesizes and takes not
just the opposite of what he wishes to prove follows; rather he also 25
transforms the contingent premiss into an unqualified one; and this
<unqualified proposition> is not impossible (for if it is contingent that
P come to be, it is not impossible to hypothesize that P is (as the
definition <of contingency> which has been given makes clear); but
nevertheless <the unqualified proposition is> false. Consequently in
order that someone not think that the impossibility which follows from
taking the opposite of what one wishes to prove in the combination under 30
consideration and from the transformation of the contingent premiss
into an unqualified one (which is false but not impossible) follows from
the transformation of the contingent premiss into an unqualified one
86 Translation
but think that it follows from the hypothesized impossibility (which is
the opposite of the conclusion he wishes to prove), he shows first that
something impossible cannot follow from something possible, but that
176,1 it is necessary that that from which an impossibility follows be impos-
sible in the case of every necessary implication.64 (A necessary
implication is not one which holds temporarily, but one in which it is
always the case that the consequent follows from what has been taken
as antecedent being the case.65 For the conditional ‘If Alexander exists,
5 Alexander is conversing’ or ‘If Alexander exists, he is so and so old’ is
not true – even if Alexander is so and so old when the proposition is
spoken.) When it is shown <that that from which an impossibility
follows is itself impossible>, then, in the case of the combination set out,
if the conclusion which results from the assumed premisses is impossi-
ble, it does not result from the contingent premiss having been
transformed into an unqualified one (since the unqualified proposition
is false but not impossible), but from the opposite of the conclusion
(which is impossible) being taken.
10 At the same time by means of what is now proved he might also be
thought to establish that proof by means of reductio ad impossibile is
sound. For if it is not agreed that the impossible follows from the
impossible, then reductio ad impossibile would not appear to have force
either, since a hypothesis would not be absolutely destroyed as impos-
sible when something impossible was inferred <from it>.
15 66
Or can someone make use not of the impossibility but of the
falsehood of the conclusion which follows from the hypothesis to do
away with the hypothesis as false on the grounds that something false
cannot follow from true things? Or is it the case that a <false> conclu-
sion of this kind would not result more from the hypothesis than also
from the transformation of the contingent into the unqualified?
He shows that a possibility always follows from a possibility and that
20 an impossibility cannot follow from a possibility in the following way:
34a767 For let it be the case that this is the situation and that A is
possible, B impossible. [Then if what is possible could come to be
when it is possible and what is impossible could not come to be
when it is impossible, and if A were possible and B impossible at
the same time, then it would be contingent that A comes to be
without B, and if comes to be then is <without B>. For what has
come to be is when it has come to be.]
The words ‘this is the situation’ mean what we have said previously:
‘when A is it is necessary that B is’. If this implication holds and B is
25 the consequent of A by necessity, let it be hypothesized that A is possible
and B impossible. Since A is possible, it could come to be when it is
possible for it to come to be. Similarly also B, if it is impossible, could
Translation 87
not come to be when it is impossible for it to come to be. And if the one
is possible, the other impossible, at the same time, when A is, B – insofar
as it is impossible – would not be, but – insofar as it is necessary that B
be when A is – B would be. Therefore B would be and not be at the same
time, which is impossible. Therefore, if the antecedent is possible, its
consequent by necessity, i.e., B, will also be possible.
34a10  and if68 A were possible and B impossible at the same 177,1
time, then it would be contingent that A comes to be without B,
[and if comes to be then is <without B>. For what has come to be
is when it has come to be.]
He takes as hypothesis that A is possible, B impossible, on the assump-
tion that B follows from A,69 and taking as universal that ‘what is
possible could come to be when it is possible and what is impossible could 5
not come to be when it is impossible’. He adds that B follows from A and
shows the absurdity. For suppose B is impossible at the time when A is
possible (for this is what is meant by ‘at the same time it would be
contingent that A comes to be without B’). What can come to be might
come to be at some time, but the impossible, which B is, could not come
to be; thus if A is (for if it has come to be, it also is), B will not be; but it 10
was assumed that if A is, B is.
It could also be shown from the definition of possible that it is not
possible that B, which is impossible, follow from A, which is possible.
For, if (i), when that which is possible is hypothesized to be, nothing
impossible results because of it, and (ii) when A is hypothesized to be
there results because of the hypothesis an impossibility, namely that B
both is and is not (is, since it was assumed that it follows from A, and 15
is not, because it is impossible), then if (iii) something from which an
impossibility follows is impossible,70 it is either not possible or not sound
for it to be taken that the impossible B follows from A, which is itself
possible.
71
Aristotle, then, shows that an impossibility cannot follow from a
possibility on the grounds that in a true conditional the consequent72 20
must follow from the antecedent by necessity. If X follows from Y by
necessity, then it always follows from it. And the impossible will always
follow from its antecedent, so that, if it is possible for its antecedent to
come to be, the impossible will follow from it when it comes to be. But
the impossible will be at the time when it follows from the antecedent.
It will then be possible for the impossible to come to be; but this is
impossible.
Although Chrysippus says that nothing prevents an impossibility 25
also following from a possibility,73 he says nothing against the proof
stated by Aristotle; rather he tries to show that this is not the case
through some examples which are not soundly constructed. For he says
88 Translation
that in the true conditional ‘If Dion has died, he (referring to Dion) has
30 died’, the antecedent ‘Dion has died’ is possible since it can at some time
come to be true that Dion has died, but ‘He has died’ is impossible; for,
if Dion dies, the statement74 ‘He has died’ is destroyed since the recipi-
ent of the reference no longer exists; for reference is to what is living
and with respect to what is living. So if when Dion has died the word
‘he’ is not possible and Dion does not exist again75 so that it is possible
178,1 to say of him ‘He has died’, then ‘He has died’ is impossible. It would not
be impossible if later, after the death of Dion, of whom when Dion was
alive earlier ‘He has died’ in the conditional were predicated, it were
possible for ‘he’ to be predicated <of Dion> again. But since this is not
5 possible, ‘He has died’ is impossible.
Chrysippus also sets down another example similar to this one: if it
is night, this (referring to the day) is not day. For in this conditional
which – he thinks – is true, the antecedent is possible, the consequent
impossible.
Showing that the conditionals are false76 proves that what Chrysip-
10 pus says is not sound. For ‘If Dion has died, he has died’ is not a true
conditional. For if ‘Dion has died’ is said and said truly in more cases
than ‘He has died’ is, and if ‘he’ is not said of that of which ‘Dion’ is said,
then ‘He has died’ would not follow from the antecedent ‘if Dion has
died’.77 For an implication in which the antecedent can be at a time
when the consequent is not is not sound. For, just as if Dion78 were a
15 homonym, the proposition ‘If Dion has died, he has died’ would not be
true because ‘Dion has died’ could be said of someone else and not of the
referent <of ‘he’>, so too, if the name making the reference is of wider
extension than the Dion referred to, and it is not possible for the
reference to be to everyone to whom the name applies, the proposition
‘If Dion has died, he has died’ will not be true. For it would be possible
20 that ‘Dion has died’ be said of something of which ‘He has died’ is not
also said. And ‘Dion’ does have a wider extension if it is also said of a
dead person but ‘he’ is only said of a living person.
As I said,79 an implication in which the antecedent can be at a time
without what is taken to follow from it is not sound. For there is nothing
absurd about the consequent in a true conditional being when the
25 antecedent is not. For it is not necessary that the antecedent follow from
the positing of the consequent. Therefore, it is possible that the conse-
quent be when the antecedent is not. But it is impossible for the
antecedent in a true conditional to be when the consequent is not.80 For
it is not the case that the conditional is sound if the consequent does not
follow from the antecedent because something has been destroyed. For
the conditional is false because the consequent does not follow, but not
because of the way in which it does not follow.
30 Furthermore, there is no other cause of the destruction of the conse-
quent than the coming to be of the antecedent. But how could what is
Translation 89
destroyed by its hypothesized antecedent having come to be follow from
the antecedent? For Dion81 does not have a wider extension than ‘he’ in
this way.82 For a person who takes it that every triangle has its angles
equal to two right angles, has also taken this for the scalene triangle,
since it is impossible for every triangle to have its angles equal to two 35
right angles unless the scalene also does. The person who says that ‘He 179,1
has died’ is impossible when ‘Dion has died’ is possible is not making
Dion the universal over ‘he’. For if ‘he’ were universal and ‘he has died’
impossible, ‘Dion has died’, which also encompasses the impossible ‘he
has died’, would not still be possible.
Furthermore, how could the consequent be because the antecedent is 5
– and this is the way we judge the true conditional <to be true> – if,
when the antecedent is, what is taken to follow from it is destroyed? If,
then, ‘Dion has died’ is true in more cases than ‘He has died’ and <the
latter> does not always follow from it, the conditional is not true, as has
been shown.
But if ‘he’ applies to the same things as ‘Dion’, the conditional will be
true, but it will no longer be the case that an impossibility follows from 10
a possibility; rather the antecedent will be possible or impossible in the
same way as the consequent is. For – if it is necessary to be precise in
discussing names – if ‘Dion’ is the name of the ‘peculiarly qualified’83
and what is peculiarly qualified is a living thing, the person who
mentions Dion would be mentioning a living thing. For the name refers
to what is named in the same way as ‘he’ does. But, if that is so, then
also ‘He has died’ in ‘If Dion has died, he has died’ would be potentially 15
contained in ‘If Dion has died’ – at least if Dion is the name and sign of
a living thing. In this way the conditional will be true, but the ante-
cedent will no longer be possible. For it is similarly impossible for a
living thing to have died and for ‘him’ to have died.
But if they84 were to say that ‘Dion has died’ can be true because it is
said by anaphoric reference to the living thing (on the grounds that the 20
person who says that ‘Dion has died’ is possible is not saying that the
still living Dion has died but that what <once> was Dion has), it will
also be the case that ‘He has died’ is possible. For the latter does not
signify that the one who is he has died, but that the one who was he has.
For the custom of using ‘he’ anaphorically is also ubiquitous. For we say,
referring to the corpse, ‘He has died’ and someone looking at a corpse 25
says ‘He is the father or brother of him’. And we do not just use
anaphoric reference to the past but also to the future. We say of the
house which is still being built or the cloak which is still being woven
‘This belongs to that person’ with anaphoric reference to the future
house or cloak. But also we say of someone who is fatally ill ‘He is dying’,
but if the ‘he’ who was dying dies and ‘he’ was dying, then ‘he’ would 30
also have died.
In general, if they were to say that ‘If Dion has died, he has died’ is a
90 Translation
true statement without qualification or condition, what they say would
180,1 not be true. For if the conditional were true without qualification, the
consequent would follow from the antecedent without qualification, by
necessity, and always; for that is the way it is with what is necessary
without qualification. But if it is not <necessary> without qualification
but on the condition ‘when the living thing is alive’, the statement will
be true and the antecedent and the consequent will be equally impossi-
ble. For, when he is alive, ‘Dion has died’ is impossible.
In general,85 if Q follows because P is hypothesized to be, Q follows
5 because P is. (For from its being light if it is day and it being hypothe-
sized that it is day, it follows that it is light.) And if Q does not follow
from P being, it is clear that Q will not follow from P being hypothesized
to be either. But ‘He has died’ does not follow from Dion’s having died;
therefore neither will it follow when it is hypothesized that Dion has
died. The same argument applies to ‘If it is night, this is not day’. And
10 Aristotle has also used this kind of dialectical refutation.86 For having
shown that B does not follow from A holding, he shows that B will not
follow if A is hypothesized to hold.87
A more dialectical88 refutation is to show that ‘He has died’ is not
even impossible. For if an impossible statement is always false – just as
a necessary one is always true – what is not always false is not
15 impossible. But ‘He has died’ is not always false, but only when Dion is
alive; for when he has died, <‘He has died’> no longer is, and if it no
longer is, it will not be false, and <consequently> ‘He has died’ will not
be impossible. Furthermore, if they take ‘He has died’ to mean ‘He is
not’ (which is equivalent to ‘He who is is not’), the proposition ‘He has
died’ will be impossible, but it will not follow from ‘If Dion has died’. For
20 that he who is is not does not follow from Dion’s having died, just as also
‘This is not day’ does not follow from ‘If it is night’. For ‘This is not day’
is equivalent to ‘The day which is is not day’, and this does not follow
from ‘It is night’. But ‘It is not day’ follows from ‘If it is night’, and ‘This
is not day’ would follow from ‘If it is night, this being day’, but that
25 <antecedent> is no less impossible than the consequent. Similarly too
‘He has died’ would follow from ‘If Dion, who is alive, has died’, but that
<antecedent> is as impossible as ‘He has died’; for it is impossible that
Dion, who is alive, has died.
89
If they take ‘He has died’ to stand for ‘His soul and body have been
separated’,90 then, according to them, ‘He has died’ would not be impos-
30 sible. For that which can at some time become a true predication is not
impossible; and, according to them, ‘His soul and body have separated’
(referring to Dion) can become true after Dion’s death. For they main-
tain that after the conflagration all things in the world come to be again
35 and are the same in number and that even what is peculiarly qualified
comes to be again in that <subsequent> world and is the same thing as
in the preceding one; Chrysippus says this in his On the world.91 But if
Translation 91
this is so, Dion too will be again at some time, so that at that time ‘He 181,1
has died’ would become true of him; for his soul and body were sepa-
rated and were conjoined again. But if this is so, then, according to
them, ‘He has died’ is not impossible. For they say that the statement
‘This has been destroyed’ (said of fingers which are closed together and
referred to), although false at the time, is not impossible because it is 5
possible that ‘This has been destroyed’ be true when the fingers are
separated (which is the destruction of their being closed together) and
again closed together and referred to; for <being closed together> was
destroyed earlier when the fingers were separated. So too ‘He has died’ 10
will be true of the Dion who has come to be again because his soul and
body were previously separated (as is also the case with the closing
together of the fingers). For, just as in the case of the fingers, the change
has only been with respect to number and what is referred to later
differs from what is referred to earlier only in number, so too in the case
of Dion, at least if the later Dion is the same as the earlier one. But if
they were to say that in the case of the fingers the separated and again
closed together fingers are the same in number, but that in the case of 15
Dion the conjoined soul and body are not the same in number, this is
irrelevant to the argument so long as it is assumed that the later
peculiarly qualified individual is the same as the earlier one. (The
question how the combination of a soul and a body which are not the
same in number could become the same thing is presumably difficult
for those who say that the same peculiarly qualified individual does
come to be.) For the same person receives this same reference. For it is 20
not the case that both the later Dion is the same as the earlier one and
that the word ‘he’ will not be predicated of the same thing.92 But if <the
later and the earlier Dion are the same>, both ‘He has died’ and ‘His
soul and body have been separated’ will be true of him. But if ‘He has
died’ can become true at some time, it is not impossible. For they say
that ‘Dion has died’ is possible for this reason as well: that it is true at 25
some time. 93(And they also say that there are alterations in later
peculiarly qualified individuals as compared with their predecessors
only with respect to certain external accidents – the kind of alterations
which also happen to a Dion who lives and remains the same and do not
make him another person. For he does not become another person if,
having earlier had spots on his face he later has them no more. And they 30
say that these are the kind of alterations that happen in the case of
peculiarly qualified individuals in one world and in another.)
But if ‘He has died’ is neither an impossible nor a perishable state-
ment, they should also agree that ‘If Dion has died, he has died’ is not
a true conditional.94 For it is not the case that when ‘Dion has died’ is
true, ‘He has died’ is also true and furthermore not destroyed.
The proposition ‘If it is night, this is not day’ is similar to this. For in 35
the case of this <antecedent and consequent>, just as it is possible that 182,1
92 Translation
it is night, so too it is possible that this is not day. For when there is
change they will not be.95 For if the person who says ‘This is not day’
means that the day which is, when it is, is not, the conditional is not
true. For ‘The day which is, when it is, is not’ does not follow from ‘It is
5 night’; what follows is ‘It is not day’. But if the person means that the
<night> which is now and is being referred to is not <day>, then the
conditional is true and the consequent and antecedent are equally
possible. And the other things which have been said previously could
also be said in the case of this proof.
It is necessary to understand the following implications. If the ante-
10 cedent in a necessary implication is possible, it is necessary that its
consequent also be possible, as has been shown; and if, again, the
consequent is impossible, it is necessary that the antecedent also be
impossible. But it is not the case that if the consequent is possible it is
necessary that the antecedent also be possible since one does not
establish the antecedent by positing the consequent, but conversely; nor
is it the case that if the antecedent is impossible, it is necessary that the
15 consequent is also impossible since the destruction of the antecedent
does not also do away with the consequent, but vice versa. This is why
he also says, ‘if A is possible, B will also be possible’; for ‘If you are a
bird, you are an animal’ is a true conditional although the antecedent
is impossible and the consequent possible.
20 34a12 And it is necessary to take possibility and impossibility96

not just in the case of coming to be but also in the case of truth and
holding [and in as many other ways as one speaks about possibil-
ity; for the situation will be the same in all cases.]
Having asserted and shown that in implications if the antecedent is
possible, the consequent is also possible, he adds that if the antecedent
25 is unqualified the consequent will also be unqualified, and similarly if
the antecedent is necessary, so is the consequent. He indicates this by
saying that it is necessary not to take what has been said as just being
said about possibility in the case of coming to be. Possibility and
contingency97 in the case of coming to be is what is not yet but can come
to be – he has given the definition of this,98 and his proof concerning
implication took place with respect to it. For taking it that A is possible,
30 B impossible, he said ‘Then if what is possible could come to be when it
is possible.’99 Here he indicated possibility in the case of coming to be
with the words ‘could come to be’.
It is not only the case that ‘It is possible that B comes to be’ follows
from possibility in the case of coming to be, i.e., from ‘It is possible that
A comes to be’ (for ‘It is impossible that B comes to be’ does not follow
from ‘It is possible that A comes to be’). But also, if possibility in the
35 antecedent is taken as holding (since possibility also applies to holding),
Translation 93
its consequent will not be ‘It is impossible that B holds, but ‘It is possible 183,1
that B holds’, i.e., possibility as holding. But if the antecedent is taken
to be possible in the sense of being true, it is necessary that the
consequent also be true, since truth follows from truth. What is said to
be necessary would also be possible in the sense of being true since the
person who says that the necessary is always speaks truly. He says that 5
the consequent of what is possible in this way will be necessary and
always true, and possible in the same way as the antecedent.
It is also possible that the term ‘impossibility’ has been used to refer
to the converse implication from the consequent. For, if the consequent
is impossible, the antecedent is also impossible, and in whatever way
impossibility is taken <in the consequent>, the antecedent is also
impossible in the same way. For, if it is impossible that the consequent 10
come to be, it is also impossible that the antecedent do so; and if it is
impossible that the consequent holds, it is also similarly impossible that
the antecedent do so, and if it is impossible that the consequent ever be
true, it is also similarly impossible for the antecedent. For as we have
said before,100 the implication is in the reverse direction. For the possi-
ble in all its meanings has its implication from the antecedent, the
impossible from the consequent. For if the antecedent is impossible, the 15
consequent is not prevented from being possible, as in the case of ‘If you
are a centaur, you are an animal’. But if the consequent is impossible,
it is necessary that the antecedent also be impossible, whatever mean-
ing of impossibility is taken. For one also speaks about impossibility in
the case of falsehood, so that also if the consequent is false, the antece-
dent is also false, but it is not the case that the consequent is false if the 20
antecedent also is. For just as what is true is possible, what is false is
impossible.101
He may have added impossibility to possibility in order to show that
in whatever meaning of possibility the antecedent is taken to be possi-
ble, impossibility in the sense of the opposite of that possibility cannot
be the consequent of that possibility, as we have said before.102
An example of possibility in the case of coming to be is ‘If Dion has 25
died, a human has died’103 if it is said of a Dion who is still alive. An
example of possibility in the case of holding is ‘If it is day it is light’, if
it is said when it is day; for antecedent and consequent are equally
unqualified. An example of necessity is ‘If there are gods, there is a
world’.
The words ‘and in as many other ways as one speaks about possibil-
ity; for the situation will be the same in all cases’ may be said of what 30
is for the most part, of the indefinite, and of the infrequent (these things
fell under possibility in coming to be104) and perhaps also of necessity (if
he previously took possibility as truth into consideration105); but if he
included necessity then, he would now be speaking about what is true,
since what is true is also possible.
94 Translation
He may also be speaking about possibles and about what is called
106
184,1 Diodorean <possibility>, namely what either is or will be. For Diodorus
posited that only what either is or ever will be is possible. For, according
to him, it is possible for me to be in Corinth if I were in Corinth or ever
were going to be there, but if I were not going to be there, it would not
be possible for me to be there either. And it is possible for a child to
5 become literate, if it ever will be literate. Diodorus propounded his
Master Argument in support of this doctrine.
Similarly he may be speaking about Philonian possibility. This is
what is called simply the suitable for the subject, even if it has been
prevented from coming to be by some external necessity. Accordingly
Philo said that it is possible that chaff lying in unmown wheat107 or in
the depth of the sea be burned where it is, even though by necessity it
is prevented by its surroundings.
10 What Aristotle says is intermediate between these two.108 For that
which can come to be if it is not prevented is possible, even if it should
not come to be. For it is possible that chaff which is not in the unmown
wheat or, in general, prevented by something from being burnt be burnt
even if it never is burnt; and the reason is that it is not prevented <from
being burnt>. But it is not possible that the chaff in the unmown wheat
15 be burnt because its burning is prevented by something. Consequently
nothing impossible follows if it is hypothesized that the chaff not in the
unmown wheat is burnt. But if someone were to hypothesize that the
chaff in the unmown wheat is burnt, an impossibility will follow for him,
namely that what cannot be affected is affected. (<This is correct> at
least if it is hypothesized that the unmown wheat cannot be affected.)
34a16 Furthermore, one should not interpret the proposition ‘if A

20 is B is’ as meaning that B will be if some one thing A is. For
nothing is by necessity if some one thing is. There must be at least
two things, [for example when the premisses are related in the
way described in the case of the syllogism. For if C is said of D and
D of F, C is said of F by necessity; and if each is possible, the
conclusion is also possible. Consequently, if someone were to posit
A as the premisses and B as the conclusion, it would result not
only that if A is necessary, B is at the same time also necessary,
but also that if A is possible, so is B.]
He has shown that every necessary implication is such that from the
manner of holding with respect to possibility in the case of the antece-
dent the similar holding of its consequent follows. He now transfers
25 what has been shown universally to syllogistic implication – he also
constructed the proof for the sake of this. The meaning of what he says
is this: it is necessary not to take this as if it were said of simple
implications only but also as said of syllogistic implications; for in these
Translation 95
too the conclusion follows from the premisses; for if the premisses are,
so is the conclusion, so that the conclusion will be possible, if the
premisses are, whatever meaning possibility is taken to have. Indeed, 30
if A is taken in place of the premisses, B in place of the conclusion, the
proof previously stated would also fit implications of this kind. 185,1
It is necessary to understand the words ‘for nothing is by necessity if
some one thing is’ as saying that nothing is by necessity syllogistically;
for nothing is by necessity syllogistically if some one thing is. The words
‘consequently, if someone were to posit A as the premisses and B as the
conclusion’ are equivalent to ‘and if someone were to take A in place of 5
the premisses and B as conclusion’.109
34a25 This having been proved, it is evident that if one hypothe-

sizes something false and not impossible what results because of
the hypothesis will be false and not impossible. [For example, if A
is false but not impossible and if when A is, B is, B will also be false
but not impossible. For, it has been shown that if when A is B is,
then when A is possible B will be possible; but it is assumed that
A is possible; so B will also be possible; for if it were impossible,
the same thing would be possible and impossible at the same
time.]
Furthermore he makes evident that for the sake of which he showed 10
that what is possible follows from what is possible. For, since it was
shown that in necessary implications of whatever sort the antecedent
is with respect to holding, the consequent is also of the same sort, it is
evident that the false and the impossible are not the same, but there is
a difference between them. For it is not the case that if something is
false, it is thereby also impossible. For there is such a thing as a possible
falsehood. For the person who hypothesizes what is contingent but is 15
not yet posits a falsehood but not an impossibility. But if the antecedent
is false but possible, the consequent will in general be false but not
impossible. (For the conclusion may be true when the premisses are
false, as he will show in book 2.110) But even if the conclusion is also
false, it will be false in such a way as not to be impossible. For if it were 20
impossible in the case of a false but not impossible premiss or premisses,
again an impossibility would follow from a possibility. But if in some
syllogism one premiss which is false but not impossible is hypothesized
and the consequence is impossible, what follows will be impossible not
because of the false but not impossible premiss, but it is impossible
because of the other one of the premisses from which it follows. For, as 25
he said,111 in syllogistic implications something does not follow by
necessity from one assumed premiss.
He says ‘for if it were impossible, the same thing would be possible
and impossible at the same time’112 because if the antecedent is possible
96 Translation
and the consequent impossible, the consequent is possible insofar as it
follows from an antecedent which is possible and when the antecedent
30 is it must be possible, and impossible insofar as it is hypothesized to be
impossible; for what is impossible without qualification is also impossi-
ble when its antecedent is possible.
<34a34-35b17 Barbara1(UC‘C’)>
34a34113 These things having been specified, let A hold of all B,
[and let it be contingent that B holds of all C; then it is necessary
that it is contingent that A holds of all C. For let it not be
contingent, and let it be assumed that B holds of all C. (This is
false, but not impossible.) Then if (i) it is not contingent that A
holds of C, but B holds of all C, (ii) it is contingent that A does not
hold of all B. For there is a syllogism through the third figure. But
(iii) it was hypothesized that it is contingent that A holds of all B.
Therefore, it is necessary that it is contingent that A holds of all
C. For when something false but not impossible is posited the
result is impossible.]
Having discussed and reached an understanding of the implication
186,1 relation of the conclusion to the premisses, a relation of which he is going
to make use, he returns to the business at hand, and discusses mixed
combinations of an unqualified and a contingent premiss in the first
figure, the major being unqualified, the minor contingent. His proof that
5 combinations of this kind in which the major is unqualified are syllogis-
tic is by reductio ad impossibile. This is why he also said114 that the
syllogisms of this kind are not complete. He takes it that A holds of all
B and that it is contingent that B holds of all C, and says that it is
contingent that A holds of all C. For if this is not the case, the opposite
is the case, and the opposite of ‘It is contingent that A holds of all C’ is
10 ‘It is not contingent that A holds of all C’, which is equivalent to ‘A does
not hold of some C by necessity’. Positing this, he transforms the
contingent universal affirmative premiss BC into an unqualified uni-
versal affirmative, which is false but not impossible (since it is assumed
that it is contingent that B holds of all C, and if it is contingent that B
holds of something it is not impossible to take it that B holds of it). From
15 ‘A does not hold of some C by necessity’ and ‘B holds of all C’ there follows
in the third figure115 that it is not contingent that A holds of all B, which
is impossible, since A was assumed to hold of all B.
He says ‘Then if it is not contingent that A holds of C’ rather
deficiently, since he leaves out the word ‘all’. For ‘it is not contingent
that A holds of all C’ is the opposite of ‘It is contingent that A holds of
all C’. He says ‘It is contingent that A does not hold of all B’ as
20 equivalent to ‘A does not hold of all B’. For this was shown to be the
Translation 97
conclusion in the third figure in mixtures of a necessary and an unquali-
fied premiss in which the minor is universal affirmative unqualified
and major particular negative necessary; for the conclusion is particular
negative unqualified. However, he also says ‘But it was hypothesized
that it is contingent that A holds of all B’ instead of ‘It was hypothesized
that A holds of all B’; for the universal affirmative premiss AB is 25
unqualified. From this it is also clear that in referring to the conclusion
he says ‘It is contingent that A does not hold of all B’ as equivalent to ‘A
does not hold of all B’. In this way too what is inferred turns out to be
impossible, if, when it is assumed that A holds of all B, it is inferred that
it does not hold of some. For it is impossible that what holds of all does
not hold of some. But what he seems to take because of the words is not 30
impossible. For it is not impossible, when it is assumed that it is
contingent that A holds of all B – and he says this –, that it is also
contingent that A does not hold of all – and he also seems to have said
that –, since it can be the case that it is contingent that the same thing
holds of all and contingent that it holds of none. But, as I said, he uses
the expression ‘it is contingent that X’ instead of ‘X holds’ in both cases,
since contingency is also predicated of what holds.
Having found and proved what is inferred to be impossible in the case 35
of the premisses under consideration (namely, the hypothesis of the 187,1
opposite of the conclusion and the transformation <of a premiss> into
something which is false but not impossible), he makes use of what has
been shown and says that the impossibility has not followed from the
falsehood. For <that B holds of C> was false but possible, and what
follows from a possibility is possible, not impossible, as was shown.
Therefore the impossibility follows from the other assumption, the 5
hypothesis <of the reductio>, so that it is impossible, since it is neces-
sary that one of the premisses is impossible, and the other one is not
impossible. Therefore the opposite of the hypothesis is true, i.e., ‘It is
contingent that A holds of all C’. For ‘It is contingent that A holds of all
C’ is the contradictory opposite of ‘It is not contingent that A holds of
all C’.
34b2116 It is also possible to produce the impossibility through the

first figure, by positing117 that B holds of C. [For if B holds of all C, 10
and it is contingent that A holds of all B, then it would be
contingent that A holds all C; but it was assumed that it is not
possible for it to hold of all.]
What he asserts and proves is the following. He says that the hypothesis
‘It is not contingent that A holds of all C’ (for this is how the conclusion
is made a hypothesis <for reductio>) is impossible in the case of the
premisses assumed, namely ‘A holds of all B’ and ‘It is contingent that
B holds of all C’, and he says that he proves it by means of the first figure.
98 Translation
15 For at this point it has been proved by means of the third figure. Now
he proves it by taking the two premisses conversely, the unqualified
premiss as contingent and the contingent one as unqualified. He takes
it that it is contingent that A holds of all B (but this premiss was
unqualified universal affirmative), and that B holds of all C (and this
premiss was that it is contingent that B holds of all). When the pre-
20 misses are taken in this way, nothing impossible will be assumed. For
it is not impossible that what holds be contingent nor that what is
contingent holds. The impossible conclusion which is hypothesized in
the case of these assumed premisses and which he allows from outside
is ‘It is not contingent that A holds of all C’. For in the combination under
consideration, which has a universal affirmative contingent major and
25 a universal affirmative unqualified minor, a universal affirmative con-
tingent conclusion follows, as was proved shortly before this;118 for it
was proved that when the major is contingent and the minor is unquali-
fied, the conclusion is contingent. But it is impossible that it is
contingent that A holds of all B and not contingent that it holds of all;
for this is a contradiction. Therefore the opposite of what is hypothe-
sized, that is, ‘It is contingent that A holds of all C’ will be the conclusion.
30 119
He transformed the major unqualified premiss into a contingent
one, but not because the conclusion is not impossible even if both
premisses are unqualified; for when both premisses are unqualified it
follows that A holds of all C, and, if this is true, the conclusion as
hypothesized <for reductio>) ‘It is not contingent that A holds of all C’
188,1 is proved impossible. Rather he wanted to give a proof making what is
assumed <for reductio> the contradictory of what is inferred, which is
a prima facie clear and indisputable impossibility. And furthermore,
this is also what is required to be proved in the case of a hypothesis
which is hypothesized as impossible. For ‘It is contingent that A holds
of all C’ is the contradictory opposite of ‘It is not contingent that A holds
5 of all C’. But if the major premiss AB is posited to be contingent
affirmative, it is inferred that it is contingent that A holds of all C.
120
But it is possible that he has again used ‘It is contingent that X’
instead of ‘X holds’, in connection with the premiss AB and the conclu-
sion, as he did shortly before.121
122
But this proof did not proceed by reductio ad impossibile. For one
of the assumed premisses was not added to a hypothesis which was the
opposite of what was proposed to be proved, an impossibility inferred,
10 the hypothesis destroyed by the denial of this impossibility and its
opposite established.123 Rather two premisses were taken, one of which
was true and assumed,124 the other125 a transformation into something
false but not impossible in the case of these premisses. 126 But if this
is impossible, the opposite of the hypothesis is not introduced by means
15 of it. 127 Thus something different <from the opposite of the hypothe-
sis> is inferred from the assumptions because in the case of things
Translation 99
assumed in this way the impossibility does not result entirely from the
hypothesis, as we have investigated elsewhere at greater length.128
34b7129 It is necessary not to take ‘A holds of all B’ with a temporal

restriction, e.g., ‘A holds of all B now’ or ‘A holds of all B at such
and such a time’; one must take it without qualification. [For we
make syllogisms through such premisses, since there will not be a
syllogism if the premiss is taken with respect to a time. For
presumably nothing prevents human holding of all that moves at
a certain time, if, for example, nothing else were to be moving. And
it is contingent that moving holds of all horses. But it is not
contingent that human holds of any horse. Furthermore, let the
first term be animal, the middle term moving, and the last term
human. Then the premisses will hold in the same way, but the
conclusion will be necessary rather than contingent. For a human
is an animal by necessity. Thus it is evident that one should take
a universal proposition without qualification, not with a temporal
specification.]
He says that in the mixture under consideration it is necessary not to 20
take the first extreme holding of the middle as a matter of holding at a
restricted time. What he means is the following. Those unqualified
universal propositions are temporally restricted if they can be taken to
hold universally at a given time but not always, for example, the
proposition which posits that animal holds of all that moves or that
human holds of all that moves. 130The reason that the unqualified 25
premiss is temporally restricted is that in the case of unqualified
premisses of this kind the middle term is hypothesized to have a wider
extension in that it is possible that it holds of other things of which what
is predicated of the middle universally cannot hold; for at the time when
the middle is taken to hold of that of which it is contingent that it holds
(and that is different and does not fall under the major term which is
predicated of the middle), the universal unqualified proposition which 30
is the major cannot be true. For if we hypothesize that animal holds of
all that moves, because it is possible that moving also holds of non-ani-
mals, when it does hold of some of those things, then the proposition
which says that animal holds of all that moves will no longer be a true
unqualified universal. Thus this proposition holds with respect to a 189,1
restricted time. For so long as moving holds of nothing else, it will be
possible to hypothesize that animal holds of all that moves. But it is
impossible that a combination in which the major is such a proposition
be syllogistic. For it is necessary that the affirmative minor be contin- 5
gent or unqualified or necessary;131 and if it is taken that it is contingent
that the middle holds of something of which the major extreme cannot
also possibly hold, the combination will not be syllogistic because when
100 Translation
the middle holds of that of which it has been taken that it is contingent
that it holds the major premiss does not remain universal unqualified.132
10 Thus it is possible133 for the unqualified <temporally specific> pre-
miss and the contingent premiss to both be true at the same time, but
their combination is not syllogistic.134 For the combination of such
premisses is not proved syllogistic in any way but only by the reductio
ad impossibile in which the contingent premiss is transformed into an
unqualified one. But then <the premisses> cannot be true at the same
time if the middle is taken to hold of all of a last term which falls outside
15 the major extreme. For then, the major premiss cannot still be universal
affirmative unqualified, but it becomes particular.
Thus a universal unqualified proposition of this kind, the truth of
which is restricted <temporally> by the contingent premiss taken with
it, is useless for a syllogism. For the major premiss is true as long as the
minor remains contingent, but when the minor becomes unqualified,
20 the major premiss is no longer true. 135For when it is contingent that
moving holds of stone and it does hold of stone, then it is no longer
possible for ‘Animal holds of all that moves’ to be taken, but rather its
negation, ‘Animal does not hold of all that moves’, which is particular
negative, becomes true then. Thus it is not possible for ‘Animal holds of
stone’ or ‘It is contingent that animal holds of stone’ to be taken, since
25 animal holds of no stone by necessity. For in the first figure when the
major premiss is particular, there cannot be a syllogism involving the
major premiss at that time.
Thus he says it is necessary to take an unqualified premiss of such a
kind that its truth is not restricted by a contingent premiss which is
added to it, but of such a kind that it remains universal affirmative
unqualified even when the contingent universal premiss is transformed
30 into an unqualified one. For it doesn’t make any difference whether one
adds some specification to the unqualified premiss to restrict it tempo-
rally or co-ordinates with it a contingent premiss of such a kind that,
when it is changed to an unqualified one, it does away with the
unqualified premiss. For he does not call a proposition which is always
<true> unqualified – since what is always true is ipso facto necessary –
but rather he calls unqualified a proposition which can remain unquali-
fied universal affirmative and true even when the contingent
35 affirmative universal premiss which has been taken along with it is
transformed into an unqualified premiss. For in this way the proof by
impossibility which he uses to show that this combination is syllogistic
190,1 is preserved. He might say either that it is necessary that the universal
unqualified premiss not be taken in such a way that it is possible for its
truth to be restricted temporally by the contingent premiss added to it
or rather that the contingent premiss added to it must not be such as to
5 restrict temporally the truth of the unqualified premiss taken before it.
The person who says that it is necessary that the truth of the
Translation 101
unqualified premiss not be restricted temporally must not be thought
to make the question of whether the combination is syllogistic or
non-syllogistic turn on material terms, as it might seem to some, but
rather presumably on form.136 For if <the unqualified major premiss>
is restricted temporally and it changes, it makes the major premiss in 10
the first figure particular negative,137 and if this happens, the combina-
tion is non-syllogistic. He puts forward as an indication that the
combination in which the universal affirmative unqualified major is
restricted temporally is non-syllogistic, the fact that when there is a
first-figure combination in which the universal affirmative unqualified
major is restricted temporally by the minor contingent premiss, <it is 15
possible> to take terms similarly for both ‘A holds of all C by necessity’
and ‘A holds of no C by necessity’, while both premisses are true. For he
shows that premisses related in this way are non-syllogistic by setting
down terms and showing that A holds of no C by necessity and that A
holds of all C by necessity . For ‘A holds of no C’ <he takes>: ‘Human
holds of all that moves’, ‘It is contingent that moving holds of every 20
horse’, and ‘Human holds of no horse by necessity’. For since moving has
a wider extension than human, if one takes it that it is contingent that
it holds of every horse, one restricts the unqualified premiss temporally.
For at the time when moving holds of every horse, human cannot still
hold of all that moves. For ‘A holds of all C’ <he takes>: ‘Animal holds
of all that moves’, ‘It is contingent that moving holds of every human’, 25
and ‘Animal holds of every human by necessity’.
What proves and makes the combination non-syllogistic is not pri-
marily showing in it holding of all by necessity since ‘It is contingent
that X holds of all Y’ is true when ‘X holds of all Y by necessity’ is – at
least in the case of what is not contingent in the way specified;138 rather
it is finding in it terms for holding of none by necessity, and this occurs 30
by taking – when the middle term has a greater extension than what is
predicated <of it> – the added contingent premiss in such a way that it
temporally restricts the truth of the major premiss. For it is not possible
to take terms for ‘A holds of no C’ unless the middle has a greater
extension and the contingent premiss is taken in this way. For example,
let walking hold of everything literate; and it is contingent that literate
holds of every human; but the premiss which posits that walking holds 35
of everything literate does not get restricted temporally; for the major
premiss is not destroyed by the universal affirmative contingent pre-
miss co-ordinated with it, if the premiss is taken to be true <without 191,1
qualification>.
And in the case of the terms from which it follows that A holds of all
C by necessity, necessity does not follow because the middle has a
greater extension than the major, since the contingent premiss is not
taken in such a way as to restrict the truth of the unqualified premiss
temporally (for some non-animal was not taken so as to make the major
102 Translation
5 premiss particular and restrict it temporally).139 Rather the necessity
follows because the last term is taken to be contained by the first and
to be in it. This is how human is related to animal. And again when the
contingent premiss is taken to be of this kind, the conclusion is neces-
10 sary, but not contingent in the way specified. But if the unqualified
premiss is not restricted temporally by the contingent premiss and the
last term is not taken in such a way as to be under the first, the
conclusion would seem to be contingent. For let being asleep hold of
every animal, and let it be contingent that animal holds of all that
moves; then it will also be contingent that being asleep holds of all that
moves.
It should be asked whether perhaps the setting down of terms and
15 proof that with true premisses the first term holds of all of the last by
necessity and holds of none by necessity does not rather show that the
combination is non-syllogistic. I have also discussed this elsewhere.140
34b17 Thus it is evident that one should take a universal propo-

20 sition without qualification, not with a temporal specification.
He means the universal affirmative unqualified premiss, since that’s
what he has discussed; for he showed that if this premiss is not taken
as true without qualification but with a temporal restriction, the com-
bination is non-syllogistic because when it is taken with a temporal
qualification it is possible for both ‘A holds of all C by necessity’ and ‘A
holds of no C by necessity’ to be inferred in its case. As a result some
25 people have said certain things against the proof by impossibility141 and
the transformation of the contingent premiss into an unqualified one,
namely that the conclusion is also not impossible – rather it also is false
but not impossible –, so that, if the conclusion is also of this sort, it
becomes so from the transformation of the contingent premiss into an
unqualified one but not because of the hypothesis <for reductio> which
says that A does not hold of some C by necessity. This is the sort of thing
30 that was said:
The assumed premiss was that A holds of all B. It was inferred in

the third figure142 – the one used for the reductio ad impossibile –
that A does not hold of some B.
And this was shown to be false, but not impossible as follows:
If the unqualified premiss is different from a necessary one, A

holds of all B in such a way that it is also contingent that it does
35 not hold of some B; consequently, it is true that, when A holds of
192,1 all B, it is contingent that A does not hold of some B. But if it is
correct to transform a contingent premiss into an unqualified one,
Translation 103
then ‘A does not hold of some B’ will be false but not impossible;
rather, since what holds of all is taken not to hold of some, ‘A does
not hold of some B’ is false but not impossible because it is
contingent that it does not hold.
Against this we say that it is not impossible to transform any contingent 5

particular negative proposition into a particular negative unqualified
one and that it is true that if A holds of all B it is contingent that it does
not hold of some B. However, at the time when A holds of all B, the
transformation is impossible, since, if it is assumed that A holds of all
B, the transformation is impossible. It is necessary for ‘A holds of all B’
to remain unchanged if there is to be a syllogism through it. For it is 10
assumed to be such that it is neither temporally restricted nor destroyed
in the transformation of a contingent proposition into an unqualified
one. But it is impossible for ‘A holds of all B’ to remain fixed if the
particular contingent negative143 is transformed into an unqualified
proposition.
144
But it was said back against this that, when B holds of no C, the
transformation of ‘it is contingent that B holds of all C’ to ‘B holds of all 15
C’ is impossible. For when B holds of no C, it is contingent that it holds
<of all>. For if it in fact already held <of all>, the proposition <‘B holds
of all C’> would no longer be contingent. But ‘it is contingent that B
holds of all C’ has been transformed into ‘B holds of all C’ at a time when
it is contingent that B holds of all C. But when it holds of none, it is
taken to hold of all; but if this is impossible, the transformation of the
contingent proposition into an unqualified one is also impossible. 20
145
This problem could be dissolved by <noting> that the person who
transforms a contingent proposition into an unqualified one without
preserving it – this was contingent but is unqualified negative – makes
the transformation of it into an unqualified proposition; for such a
transformation is impossible. For if it is contingent that B holds of all
C because it holds of none of it, the person who transforms ‘it is 25
contingent that B holds of all C’ into ‘B holds of all C’ does not preserve
it as B holds of no C and at the same time also transform it into ‘B holds
of all C’. For it is impossible to take it that what holds of none – at the
time when it holds of none – holds of all. But as it is possible for a
contingent proposition to become a true unqualified one, so the person
makes it a hypothesis, assuming in advance what will be the case about
it. But it is not possible for ‘it is contingent that B holds of all C’ ever to 30
change into ‘B holds of all C’ if the universal unqualified negative
proposition remains fixed; rather the transformation of it into an un-
qualified proposition is the destruction of the opposite unqualified
negation. For the hypothesis146 is not said to be false because B is
hypothesized to hold of all C when it holds of none, but because B’s
holding of no C is such that it contingently does not hold <of none>.
104 Translation
35 (What indicates this is that it is contingent that what holds of none
193,1 holds of all.) Because ‘B holds of no C’ could change into ‘B holds of all
C’, it is hypothesized to have changed already; as it were, <it is hypothe-
sized that> what will be tomorrow is today, that is <in this case, it is
hypothesized that> today B has ceased holding of no C. And this
becomes false by being assumed in advance, but it is not impossible; for
5 it is taken that what will hold holds already. For one does not at the
same time both preserve it as contingent and take it as unqualified, but
this would be done if it is taken that B holds of all C at the time when
it holds of none. Roughly what happens is a transformation of what does
not hold into what does hold by means of contingency.
10 It is clear how what is transformed could be preserved as the same
and that the transformation is not impossible. The transformation147
being of this kind and the hypothesis being made, what follows, ‘A does
not hold of some B’, is impossible when A holds of all B. For A does not
also come to hold of all B in the change of the contingent premiss BC
into an unqualified one; for this would have been true even without the
15 change. But it is assumed now that A holds of all B not as holding in a
temporally restricted way nor as changing; consequently, the impossi-
bility is thought148 to have been caused to appear in the change of the
contingent proposition into an unqualified one, because of this change,
and through it. Consequently, when the contingent premiss truly
changes and becomes unqualified, A will <still> hold of all B, but it
follows that it does not hold of some. And if it is impossible at that time,
20 it is clear that it is also impossible now. For then and now are similar
and the same.
But these things should be investigated in a better way.
<34b19-35a2 Celarent1(UC [ N [ ) >

34b19149 Again, let AB be a privative universal premiss, [and let
it be taken that A holds of no B, but let it be contingent that B
holds of all C. If these things are posited it is necessary that it is
contingent that A holds of no C. For let it not be contingent, and
let it be assumed that B holds of all C, just as in the preceding.
Then, it is necessary that A holds of some B; for a syllogism results
through the third figure. But this is impossible, so that it will be
contingent that A holds of no C; for when this is posited as false,
the result is impossible.]
He also proves – again by means of reductio ad impossibile – that the

combination of an unqualified negative universal major and a contin-
25 gent universal affirmative minor in the first figure is syllogistic. For if
A holds of no B and it is contingent that B holds of all C, it is contingent
that A holds of no C. For if not, the opposite ‘It is not contingent150 that
Translation 105
A holds of no C’, which transforms into ‘A holds of some C by necessity’,
<is the case>. (For him this move is signified by ‘For let it not be
contingent’.) But also let B hold of all C; for again let the contingent be 30
transformed into the unqualified. And again in the third figure it results
that A holds of some B; for it was proved that in the third figure
consisting of a necessary particular affirmative major and an unquali-
fied universal affirmative minor a particular affirmative unqualified
conclusion follows. But it is impossible that A holds of some B, since it
was assumed to hold of none.
Again, this impossibility did not follow because we transformed the 194,1
universal contingent affirmative premiss into an universal affirmative
unqualified one, since even if the latter is false, it is not impossible.
However, it was shown151 that the impossible is a consequence of the
impossible. Consequently the impossibility comes from the hypothesis
<for reductio>. So the opposite of the hypothesis ‘It is not contingent
that A holds of no C’ will follow, that is ‘It is contingent that A holds of 5
no C’.
34b27 Thus the conclusion of this syllogism is not a proposition

which is contingent in the way specified, but is ‘of none by neces-
sity’;152 [for this is the contradictory of the hypothesis which was
made, since it was posited that A holds of some C by necessity, and
the conclusion of a syllogism by means of the impossible is the
opposite of the hypothesis.
34b31 Furthermore, it is evident from terms that the conclusion
will not be contingent.153 For let A be raven, B reflective, and C
human. Then A holds of no B, since nothing reflective is a raven.
But it is contingent that B holds of all C, since it is contingent that
reflective holds of every human. However, A holds of no C by
necessity. Therefore, the conclusion is not contingent. But it is not
always necessary either. For let A be moving, B knowledge, and C
human. Then A will hold of no B, and it is contingent that B holds
of all C †, and the conclusion will not be necessary†.154 For it is not
necessary that no human is moving, but not necessary that some
are. It is clear then that the conclusion is that A holds by necessity
of no C.155
35a2 But the terms ought to be taken in a better way.]
What he means is this. He is denying that the conclusion in the case of
the combination of a negative unqualified universal major and an 10
affirmative contingent universal <minor> – which was proved a moment
ago by reductio ad impossibile to be that it is contingent that A holds of
no C – is contingent in the way specified; the conclusion is rather that
A holds by necessity of no C. But holding of none by necessity is not
equivalent to holding by necessity of none;156 the latter is what he says
106 Translation
15 follows. For holding by necessity of none is different from <holding of
none by necessity>; for example, walking holds by necessity of no
animal, and this is not the same thing as ‘No animal walks by necessity’.
For some things walk and walk contingently, and some also do not walk
by necessity, and ‘Walking holds by necessity of none’ is true of all of
these.
157
He says that the reason why this follows is that it was hypothe-
20 sized that A holds of some C by necessity since ‘It is not contingent that
A holds of no C’ was transformed into this, and ‘A holds by necessity of
no C’ – which is equivalent to and the same as ‘It is not the case that A
holds of some C by necessity’ – is the opposite of ‘A holds of some C by
necessity’. Consequently, because the opposite of impossibility which
has become evident is inferred in reductio ad impossibile arguments,
what would be inferred in this case is ‘A holds by necessity of no C’; and
25 this is not equivalent to ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’ because
‘A holds of some C by necessity’ is not equivalent to ‘It is not contingent
that A holds of no C’, which was transformed into it. For ‘It is not
contingent that A holds of no C’ is also true when A does not hold of
some C by necessity; for it is true that it is not contingent that walking
holds of no animal, but not because it holds of some animal by necessity,
but because it does not hold of some by necessity. It is clear that this is
30 true from the fact that ‘It is contingent that no animal walks’ is not true.
But it is not true that A holds of some C by necessity when A does not
hold of some C by necessity. And there is a difference between ‘A holds
by necessity of no C’ and ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’. For a
person who says that it is contingent that A holds of no C does away
with all necessary propositions, both affirmative and negative, at least
195,1 if ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’ converts with ‘It is contingent
that A holds of all C’.158 But although ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ does
away with affirmative necessary propositions, it does not do away with
negative ones. For ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ can be true even though
‘A does not hold of some C by necessity’ is true. An example is ‘No
5 animal is by necessity walking’ and ‘Some animal is not walking by
necessity’. Similarly in the case of ‘no animal by necessity laughs (or
talks)’ or anything of this kind.
He himself indicates by what he says that it is necessary to transform
‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ in this combination into a
particular affirmative necessary proposition. For ‘It is not contingent
that A holds of no C’ is no less true when the particular negative
necessary proposition is, but the proof goes through in the case of the
10 former.159 Thus the opposite of that into which <the proposed conclu-
sion> is transformed is established, and he proves that the combination
is syllogistic, that is, he establishes ‘A holds by necessity of no C’. For
he did not transform ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ itself into
something equivalent to and the same as it, but into something of such
Translation 107
a kind as if he originally did not use ‘It is contingent that A holds of no
C’ but took it that what is implied by the combination under considera-
tion is ‘A holds by necessity of no C’. For if it is not the case that A holds 15
by necessity of no C, the opposite of this <is the case>, ‘A holds of some
C by necessity’; but an impossibility follows when this is hypothesized;
therefore, this <is not the case>; therefore, its opposite <is the case>.
(34b31) His setting down of terms makes what he says unclear;160 for
he does not prove through the terms set down that A holds by necessity
of no C but that A holds of no C by necessity, which in no way makes a 20
contradiction with ‘A holds of some C by necessity’. For both are
necessary affirmations, but it is necessary that the contradictory oppo-
site of ‘A holds of some C by necessity’ deny necessity. The terms which
he sets down are raven for A, reflective for B, and human for C. In the
case of these terms, raven holds of nothing reflective, and it is contin-
gent that reflective holds of every human; and raven holds of no human 25
by necessity, but it does not hold by necessity of none161 which is what
he wanted to show follows. He encountered this difficulty by taking the
major premiss AB not as unqualified negative but as necessary;162 for
raven holds of nothing reflective by necessity.
Perceiving this difficulty, he again sets down other terms with which,
he says, the conclusion does not become necessary negative. What he 30
sets down are moving for A, knowledge for B, and human for C. For
moving holds of no knowledge, and it is contingent that knowledge
holds of every human; and it is contingent that moving holds of no
human, that is, moving holds by necessity of no human, even if it holds.
(35a2) But perceiving that in the case of neither the first terms nor 196,1
the second which he set down did he get an unqualified negative
<major> premiss but a necessary one, he says further, ‘But the terms
ought to be taken in a better way.’ Then let the terms being angry,
laughing, human be taken. Let being angry hold of nothing laughing,
and it is contingent that laughing holds of every human; it is contingent 5
that being angry holds of no human, not because it does not hold but it
is contingent that it does hold (for it holds of many humans) – since then
the conclusion would be contingent in the way specified –, but because
it holds by necessity of none.163 The situation would be still clearer if
walking were taken to hold of nothing at rest, it being contingent that
being at rest holds of every animal. For walking holds by necessity of
no animal, although it does not hold of some by necessity. Consequently 10
it is not true that it is contingent that walking holds of no animal
because it is not also true that it is contingent that it holds of every
animal.
164
One might inquire how his assertion that the conclusion is not
‘contingent in the way specified’ can be sound. For he hypothesized the
opposite of ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’, which is ‘It is not
contingent that A holds of no C’. He transformed this into ‘It is neces-
108 Translation
15 sary that A holds of some C’ as its equivalent. But if the contradictory
of ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’ were ‘It is not contingent that A
holds of no C’ and this were equivalent to ‘A holds of some C by
necessity’, but an impossibility followed from the hypothesizing of ‘A
holds of some C by necessity’, it is clear that the opposite of this would
be true. But ‘A holds of some C by necessity’ is equivalent to ‘It is not
contingent that A holds of no C’ and ‘It is contingent that A holds of no
C’ is the opposite of this. How then does it not turn out that the
20 conclusion is contingent in the way specified? Or is he wrong to trans-
form ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ into ‘It is necessary that
A holds of some C’, and is the whole proof fallacious165 because the
opposite of contingency which had to be hypothesized in the reductio ad
impossibile, is not taken? Or if the opposite is what is hypothesized and
this is impossible, in what way is the conclusion not contingent in the
way specified?
25 It is worth seeing how ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ is the contradic-
tory of ‘A holds of some C by necessity’, which was obtained by
transformation of the negation ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no
C’ as being equivalent to it. The proposition that A holds by necessity of
no C is taken either (1) as denying with necessity the proposition that
A holds of some C or (2) as denying the proposition that it is necessary
that A holds of some C.166 Taken in the first way, ‘A holds by necessity
30 of no C’ is not a negation but a necessary affirmation which is not the
opposite of ‘A holds of some C by necessity’, which itself is also an
affirmation. Taken in the second way, ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ is a
negation and is the opposite of the affirmation which says ‘A holds of
some C by necessity’.
But still, how is the proposition which says this not contingent since
a negation of necessity is contingent? Or is the proposition ‘A holds by
35 necessity of no C’, taken as denying the affirmative necessary proposi-
197,1 tion,167 not contingent because, even if A holds of all C (but not
necessarily), it is true even if it does not hold of some by necessity; for
it announces the denial of a modality of holding, not the denial of
holding. But the proposition ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’, when
it is contingent in the way specified, was not posited among things
which hold in fact, but neither can it be true in the case of things of
which the particular necessary negative proposition is true because it
5 converts with ‘It is contingent that A holds of all C’;168 for, as I said,169 a
universal contingent proposition denies all necessary propositions.
But also the transformation of ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no
C’ into ‘A holds of some C by necessity’ is a transformation into some-
thing which is true together with it and not into something which is
straightforwardly equivalent.170 For just as ‘It is not contingent that A
holds of no C’ is true when the proposition which says that A holds of
10 some C by necessity is, so too it is true when the proposition which says
Translation 109
that A does not hold of some C by necessity is, as he himself will also
show shortly.171 For if A does not hold of some C by necessity, it is not
contingent that it holds either of all or of none. Since, then, ‘It is not
contingent that A holds of no C’ is also true when A does not hold of some
C by necessity, he transformed it – as I have already said172 – into ‘A
holds of some C by necessity’, not as into something the same and
equivalent but because the impossibility was proved with this proposi-
tion but not if the negative <‘A does not hold of some C by necessity’> 15
was taken. For when ‘A does not hold of some C by necessity’ was taken
and ‘B holds of all C’ added, there resulted in the third figure the
conclusion that A does not hold of some B, which was not impossible
since it was assumed <in the original premisses> that A holds of no B.
Since, then, when this was taken, nothing was proved, but when the 20
necessary affirmative particular was taken something impossible fol-
lowed, he transformed ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ into this,
which is no less true when ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ is;
and, finding that something impossible follows from the transformation
of ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ into this, he reasonably says
that there will follow what is the unique opposite of that into which ‘It
is not contingent that A holds of no C’ was transformed, but not the
proposition from which the latter was transformed.173 The unique oppo- 25
site of ‘A holds of some C by necessity’ is ‘A holds by necessity of no C’,
which is equivalent to ‘It is not necessary that A holds of some C’. So
this is what has been established by the argument, and not ‘It is
contingent that A holds of no C’; for the opposite of this, ‘It is not
contingent that A holds of no C’, was just as true when it was necessary
that A holds of some C as it is when it is necessary that A does not hold
of some C; but nothing impossible followed if the latter of these was
taken. And so ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’ does away with both 30
‘A holds of some C by necessity’ and ‘A does not hold of some C by
necessity’; and the negation ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ is
true when either of these is.
An indication that ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ was not 198,1
transformed into ‘A holds of some C by necessity’ as being an equivalent
is that when ‘A holds of some C by necessity’ is done away with, he does
not say that the opposite of that from which this was transformed is
posited but that the opposite of this is, since this opposite is different
from the opposite of ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’, namely
‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’.174
175
Another question is whether by making use of these things it is 5
possible to say that in the case of the previously discussed combination
of affirmations the conclusion is not contingent in the way specified
either. For in the case of that combination the transformation was from
‘It is not contingent that A holds of all C’ into ‘A does not hold of some
C by necessity’, since the impossibility is proved from the transforma-
110 Translation
tion into this. For if ‘It is not contingent that A holds of all C’ is
transformed into ‘A holds of some C by necessity’, nothing impossible
10 results, just as it doesn’t in this case176 if the conclusion is transformed
into ‘It is necessary that A does not hold of some C’. But if <the change
is into ‘A does not hold of some C by necessity’> what would be
established is the unique opposite of ‘A does not hold of some C by
necessity’, namely ‘A does not hold by necessity of no C’,177 which is
equivalent to ‘It is not the case that A does not hold of some C by
necessity’. 178If this differs only verbally from ‘It is contingent that A
15 holds of all C’, the conclusion would be contingent in the way specified.
But if in the case of certain material terms it is possible to find that A
holds of some C by necessity and it is not the case that A does not hold
of some C by necessity, then ‘A does not hold by necessity of no C’ would
be true in that case, but ‘It is contingent that A holds of all C’ would not
be true – at least if when it is contingent that A holds of all C it is
contingent that A holds of none, but it is false to say of what holds of
some C by necessity that it is contingent that it holds of none. And thus
20 what is contingent in the way specified would not follow in the case of
that combination either. 179The proposition which says ‘No animal is by
necessity not a breather’ would not be of this sort; for it is true because
some animal is a breather by necessity, and some animal is not a
breather by necessity, and it would be opposite in the strict sense to ‘It
is contingent that being a breather holds of no animal’. ‘It is not
25 contingent that being a breather holds of no animal’ is of this sort, since
such a proposition (‘It is not contingent that being a breather holds of
no animal’) is always similarly true both when being a breather does
not hold of some animal by necessity and when it does hold of some by
necessity. And also in the case of the assumed material terms the
negation of ‘It is contingent that being a breather holds of every animal’,
i.e., ‘It is not contingent that being a breather holds of every animal’
would be perfectly true since ‘It is not contingent that being a breather
holds of no animal’ would be true in the same way. For each of them180
30 is true in either case, that is when being a breather holds of some
animal by necessity and when it does not hold of some by necessity.
But we should consider whether it is not possible that the proposition
which says ‘Nothing rational by necessity does not think’181 or ‘Nothing
which has reason by necessity does not think’ is of this sort. For if
someone admits that the divine is also rational, then thinking will hold
of it by necessity and not thinking will hold by necessity of nothing
rational.
199,1 It would seem that ‘no natural body by necessity does not move’ is of
this kind. For if rotation is motion, motion will hold of the rotating body
by necessity, but there will be no body of which by necessity motion does
not hold.
But if these things are true, then also in the case of that combination
Translation 111
what follows would not be contingent in the way specified but would be 5
the aforementioned opposite of ‘A does not hold of some C by necessity’
into which the negation of contingency was transformed.182 For if some-
one were to say, as the associates of Theophrastus183 do, that these
things are contingent in the way specified, it would no longer be true
that contingent affirmative and negative propositions convert with one
another. And so the combination in which the major is affirmative 10
unqualified, like the combination in which the major is negative <un-
qualified>, will not have a conclusion which is contingent in the way
specified. For whatever is uniquely and properly opposite to that into
which <the conclusion> has been transformed is shown to follow be-
cause the reductio ad impossibile posits nothing other than the opposite
of the hypothesis from which the impossibility followed. 15
34b31 [Furthermore, it is evident from terms that the conclusion

will not be contingent. For let A be raven, B reflective, and C
human. Then A holds of no B, since nothing reflective is a raven.
But it is contingent that B holds of all C, since it is contingent that
reflective holds of every human. However, A holds of no C by
necessity. Therefore, the conclusion is not contingent. But it is not
always necessary either. For let A be moving, B knowledge, and C
human.] Then A will hold of no B, and it is contingent that B holds
of all C †, and the conclusion will not be necessary†. For it is not
necessary that no human is moving, but not necessary that some
are.184 [It is clear then that the conclusion is that A holds by
necessity of no C.
But the terms ought to be taken in a better way.]
185
Since he wants to show with terms that in the case of the combination
under consideration the conclusion is not ‘A holds of no C by necessity’ 20
but that it is ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ and since in the case of the
first terms which he set down what followed was ‘A holds of no C by
necessity’ (and also the major premiss, instead of being unqualified, was
necessary negative but not unqualified186), he tries to show what he
proposed to show by setting down other terms. The terms are moving,
knowledge, human. Moving holds of no knowledge, and it is contingent
that knowledge holds of every human; the conclusion is that moving 25
holds by necessity of no human. He indicates that this conclusion is
different from ‘Moving holds of no human by necessity’ and explains how
it is different when he says, ‘For it is not necessary that no human is
moving, but not necessary that some are’. Here through the words ‘For
it is not necessary that no human is moving’ he denies that the conclu- 30
sion is necessary negative, that is, he shows that it is not ‘A holds of no
C by necessity’; and he shows that the conclusion is ‘A holds by necessity
of no C’; for this is <what is meant by> ‘but not necessary that some are’;
112 Translation
200,1 it is as if he said, ‘The conclusion is not the former, but the latter, that
is, it is not ‘it is necessary that none’ but ‘It is not necessary that none’.187
But instead of saying ‘But not necessary that none are’ he says, ‘But not
necessary that some are’, as being equivalent to ‘Holds by necessity of
none’, which itself is expressed by ‘Moving holds by necessity of no
human’ and does away with the proposition that motion holds of human
5 by necessity.
After this he says, ‘And it is contingent that B holds of all C; for it is
not necessary that no human is moving’ and makes his proof less clear;
for, as far as what he says is concerned, it seems that he is not saying
these things about the conclusion but about the premiss BC which he
has just mentioned.
<35a3-30 Other cases with two universal premisses>

10 35a3188 If the privative is posited in relation to the minor extreme
and signifies contingency, [there will be no syllogism from the
premisses taken themselves. But there will be if the contingent
premiss is converted, as in the preceding. For let A hold of all B,
and let it be contingent that B holds of no C; if the terms are this
way there will be no necessity. But if BC is converted and it is
taken that B holds of all C,189 a syllogism results as before. For the
terms are related similarly in position.
35a11 It is the same way if both intervals are privative, that is,
if AB signifies that A does not hold of B, BC that it is contingent
that B holds of no C. In no way does necessity result through the
premisses taken themselves, but there will be a syllogism if the
contingent premiss is converted. For let it be taken that A holds of
no B, and that it is contingent that B holds of no C; then no
necessity results through these premisses. But if it is taken that
it is contingent that B holds of all C – which is true – and the
premiss AB remains the same, again there will be the same
syllogism.]
He has shown what follows when the major is universal negative
unqualified, the minor contingent affirmative; he now discusses the
combination in which the major is universal affirmative unqualified,
15 the minor contingent negative. He says that nothing will follow if the
contingent negative minor remains fixed, but there will be a syllogism
if it is transformed into the affirmative – since if it is contingent that B
holds of no C it is contingent that it holds of all (for these convert with
one another). It was argued in this way in the preceding190 where
nothing followed from the assumed premisses but <a syllogism> re-
sulted when the contingent negative premiss was transformed into a
20 contingent affirmative one. For there will be a universal affirmative
Translation 113
contingent conclusion when there is a combination of a universal affirm-
ative unqualified major premiss and a universal affirmative contingent
minor. This is the case which seems to have been proved.191 (When he
said ‘But if BC is converted and it is taken that B holds of all C’ he could
have meant not only the conversion of the negative contingent proposi- 25
tion into an affirmative one but also the transformation of the contingent
proposition into an unqualified one, by means of which the reductio ad
impossibile occurred. This is the meaning of his words ‘And it is taken
that B holds of all C’.)
(35a11) And if the major premiss is universal negative unqualified,
the minor universal negative contingent, nothing will follow from the
assumed premisses; but if the negative contingent premiss is trans- 30
formed into an affirmative, ‘there will be the same syllogism’ as there
was when originally the minor was assumed contingent universal
affirmative and the major was universal negative unqualified. Perhaps
he adds the words ‘there will be the same syllogism’ to indicate that the
conclusion in the case of this combination will not be contingent in the 35
way specified either, just as it was shown not to be in the other case.
35a20192 But if it is posited that B does not hold of all C (and not 201,1
that it is contingent that B does not hold of all C), [there will not
be a syllogism in any way, whether the premiss AB is privative or
affirmative. Common terms for holding by necessity: white, ani-
mal, snow; for not being contingent: white, animal, pitch.]
He transforms the minor premiss into an unqualified negative and says
there will be no syllogism whether the major is contingent affirmative
or contingent negative. And again, as is his custom, he shows that this 5
is so by setting down terms and showing both holding of all and of none
by necessity. For the case of A holding of C by necessity he sets down
the terms white for A, animal for B, snow for C. For it is contingent that
white holds of every animal and it is contingent that it holds of none,
animal does not hold of snow, and white holds of snow by necessity. For 10
holding of none he sets down white, animal, pitch. For again it is
contingent that white holds of every animal and of none, animal does
not hold of pitch, and white holds of no pitch by necessity.
The premisses relating to the combination under consideration
would be truer if in the case of holding of all we were to take moving,
white, walking. For it is contingent that moving holds of everything
white and of nothing white, and let white hold of nothing that walks; 15
and moving holds of everything that walks by necessity. In the case of
holding of none <better terms would be> moving, white, standing still.
For again it is contingent that moving holds of everything white and of
nothing white, and let white hold of nothing standing still; and moving
holds of nothing standing still by necessity. And nothing prevents
114 Translation
20 transforming the terms for the sake of making the exposition clearer
since he himself has said previously193 that ‘the terms ought to be taken
in a better way’.
But perhaps with these terms the conclusions are not necessary
without qualification, but necessary on a condition; for moving holds of
everything that walks by necessity – so long as it is walking – and again
of nothing standing – so long as it is standing.
But in any case the combination is non-syllogistic.
25 35a25 Thus it is evident that when the terms are universal [and
one of the premisses is taken as unqualified, the other as contin-
gent, when the premiss relating to the minor extreme is taken to
be contingent a syllogism always results, except that sometimes it
is from the premisses themselves and sometimes when the <mi-
nor> premiss is converted. We have said when and why each of
these is the case.]
<35a30-b22 At most one universal premiss>
[35a30194 But if one of the intervals is taken as universal and the

other as particular, when the interval relating to the major ex-
treme is posited as universal and contingent – whether negative
or affirmative – and the particular as affirmative and unqualified,
there will be a complete syllogism just as when the terms are
universal. The demonstration is the same as before.
35a35195 But when the interval relating to the major extreme is
universal and unqualified (not contingent) and the other is par-
ticular and contingent, whether both are posited as negative or
affirmative or if one is posited as negative and the other as
affirmative, there will in every case be an incomplete syllogism.
However, some of these will be proved by means of the impossible,
others through conversion of the contingent premiss,196 as in the
preceding. There will be a syllogism by conversion when the
universal is posited in relation to the major extreme and signifies
holding and the particular premiss is privative and assumes
contingency, for example if A holds or does not hold of all B and it
is contingent that B does not hold of some C. For a syllogism
results if BC is converted with respect to contingency.]
Having reminded us that he said there is a syllogism in the combina-
tions in the first figure in which an unqualified and a contingent premiss
are mixed and both premisses are universal, he turns next to discussing
combinations having one premiss universal, the other particular. (For
30 he calls premisses intervals.197) 198When he says ‘from the premisses
themselves’ he does not mean that when the minor premiss is contingent
Translation 115
the proof comes from the premisses alone – for all such combinations
are proved by reductio ad impossibile – but he says this because <the
case of> an affirmative <minor premiss> is proved without conversion;
for when this <premiss> is posited as negative, it is first necessary for
it to be converted to affirmative.
(35a30) He says that when the major premiss is universal contingent 202,1
and either affirmative or negative and the minor is particular affirm-
ative unqualified there will be complete syllogisms of which the
conclusion is either that it is contingent that the first term holds of some
of the last or that it is contingent that it does not hold of some of the
last. These syllogisms are complete because again what they yield as
conclusion is evident from the <definition of> said of all or of said of 5
none and they need nothing external to be proved.
(35a35) But if the modalities of the premisses are interchanged and
the major is unqualified universal, the minor particular contingent, and
both are affirmative or both negative or one or the other is affirmative,
the other negative, he says there will be a syllogism, but an incomplete
one. And he adds the reason why all of them are incomplete when he 10
says ‘However, some of these will be proved by means of the impossible,
others through conversion’; this is equivalent to saying that all will be
proved by means of the impossible, but those which have a contingent
particular negative minor by means of conversion also, since <in their
case> the negative contingent premiss is transformed into an affirm-
ative contingent one. Moreover, they also require reductio ad 15
impossibile because the combinations in which the major premiss is
unqualified are proved syllogistic by reductio ad impossibile.
199
The method of proof and of the reductio ad impossibile is the same
and just what they were when both premisses were universal and the
major unqualified. For if A holds of all B and it is contingent that B
holds of some C, it will also be contingent that A holds of some C. For if 20
not, the opposite <is the case>, and the opposite of ‘It is contingent that
A holds of some C’ is ‘It is not contingent that A holds of some C’, which
is equivalent to ‘A holds of no C by necessity’. So A holds by necessity of
no C.200 Let it also be taken that B holds of some C; for in the previous
cases the contingent premiss was transformed into an unqualified one,
which is false but not impossible. There results in the third figure a
major which is necessary universal negative, a minor which is particu- 25
lar affirmative unqualified; the conclusion is particular negative
necessary. Therefore A does not hold of some B by necessity, which is
impossible, since it was hypothesized to hold of all. And even if the
conclusion is not necessary but unqualified particular negative, what
follows is impossible. For it is impossible that what holds of all not hold
of some.
201
The proof is similar if A holds of no B and it is contingent that B 30
holds of some C; for <then> it is contingent that A does not hold of some
116 Translation
C. For if this is not the case, the opposite <is the case>, namely ‘It is not
contingent that A does not hold of some C’, which is equivalent to ‘A
holds of all C by necessity’. But also B holds of some C. Therefore A will
35 hold of some B by necessity; for this conclusion was proved to result in
the third figure in the case of the combination under consideration. But
this is impossible since it was hypothesized that A holds of no B.
Similarly, in the case of this combination <as in the preceding one>
203,1 even if the conclusion is not necessary but unqualified, the result is also
impossible.
It is also clear what the situation with conversions will be like if the
minor premiss is taken to be particular negative contingent. He said
‘There will be a syllogism by conversion’, instead of ‘For there will be a
5 syllogism by conversion’.202 For he is speaking about nothing different
from what he spoke about before. For he says about combinations in
which the major is universal unqualified and the minor particular
negative contingent that <there will be a syllogism> if the contingent
negative is converted into the particular affirmative contingent.
10 35b8203 But when [the particular premiss posited] assumes not

holding of something,204 [there will not be a syllogism. Terms for
holding: white, animal, snow; for not holding: white, animal, pitch.
One must take the demonstration by means of the indefinite.]
He says quite reasonably there will not be a syllogism when the minor
premiss, which is particular negative, is taken as unqualified. For no
syllogism resulted in the first figure when the minor was negative. For
the unqualified negative premiss remains fixed, since, unlike a contin-
gent <negative> premiss, it cannot be transformed into an affirmative.
15 He shows through terms that the conclusion is both ‘A holds of all C’
and ‘A holds of no C’ and adds ‘One must take the demonstration by
means of the indefinite’.205 He says this because, using terms, he takes
the particular negative unqualified minor in such a way that it is also
true universally, not just particularly. For animal holds of no snow and
20 of no pitch, but it was assumed <in the given combination> not to hold
of some. 206But since ‘B does not hold of some C’ is true both when B
holds of no C and when B does not hold of some C and holds of some C,
he says that it is necessary to prove by the indefinite that a combination
of this kind is non-syllogistic, taking the universal negative instead of
the particular negative (since the latter is true if the former is); things
25 were proved in this way in several cases earlier.207 He has used the same
terms a moment ago208 when he showed that the combination of a
universal affirmative contingent major and a universal negative un-
qualified minor is non-syllogistic. He says that it is necessary for this
to be proved in this way because when the particular negative minor is
true per se and not because the universal is true, it turns out that B
Translation 117
holds of some C; <for> when the particular affirmative unqualified 30
minor was of this sort and the major was contingent universal and either
affirmative or negative, complete syllogisms resulted, one with the
conclusion that it is contingent that A holds of some C, the other with
the conclusion that it is contingent that it does not hold of some C. Since
these things were proved syllogistically, it is impossible to take material
terms of this kind for holding of all and of none by necessity. 35
35b11209 But if the universal is posited in relation to the minor 204,1

extreme [and the particular in relation to the major, whether
either is privative or affirmative, contingent or unqualified, there
will be no syllogism at all. Nor will there be a syllogism when the
premisses are posited as particular or indeterminate whether they
assume the contingent or the unqualified or each in alternation.
The demonstration is the same as in the preceding. Common
terms for holding by necessity: animal, white, human; for not
being contingent: animal, white, cloak.]
He has discussed combinations which are mixtures of an unqualified
and a contingent premiss in the first figure of which some were syllo-
gistic. He is now speaking about those which are non-syllogistic, and he
says that if the minor premiss is universal and the major particular 5
there will be no syllogism, however the premisses are taken with respect
to being unqualified or contingent, affirmative or negative. Similarly,
<there will be no syllogism> if both premisses are particular, not only
if one is contingent, the other unqualified – this is what is meant by ‘in
alternation’ – but also if both are contingent or both unqualified.210 He
adds this because the same terms can be used when the premisses are 10
taken in the former way and when they are taken in this way.211 For
again he refutes these combinations arranged in this way by setting
down terms, the demonstration he uses for non-syllogistic combinations.
He shows that sometimes it can follow that A holds of all C by necessity
and sometimes that it holds of no C by necessity. He shows it for holding
of all by necessity with the terms animal, white, human. For let animal
hold or not hold of something white or let it be contingent that it holds 15
or be contingent that it doesn’t hold of something white; and let white
hold or let it be contingent that it holds of every human or let it hold of
some or let it be contingent that it does not hold of some212 – the terms
can be taken to be related to one another in whatever way one wishes.
And animal holds of every human by necessity.
Terms for holding of none by necessity: animal, white, cloak. For
again the premisses will be related in the same way as the previous 20
ones, but animal holds of no cloak by necessity. The words ‘The demon-
stration is the same as in the preceding’213 indicate only that the way of
establishing that the combinations discussed are non-syllogistic uses
118 Translation
material terms. And having said this, he next gives the argument; for
he says ‘common terms’.
25 35b20 It is then evident that there is always a syllogism when the

premiss relating to the major extreme is posited as universal, [but
there is never one when the premiss relating to the minor extreme
is taken in that way.]
It is necessary to understand as added to what is said the words ‘if
214
both premisses are affirmative and the minor premiss is particular

contingent’; for if it, i.e., the minor,215 is unqualified and is taken to be
particular negative, the combination is non-syllogistic.
1.16 Combinations with a necessary and a contingent premiss216

<35b23-36 Introductory remarks>
30 35b23 But when one premiss signifies holding or not holding217 by
necessity and the other contingency, there will be a syllogism [if
the terms are related in the same way; and it will be complete
when necessity is posited in relation to the minor extreme. If the
terms are affirmative, whether they are posited universally or not
universally, the conclusion will be contingent and not of holding.
But if one is affirmative and the other privative, when the affirm-
ative is necessary, the conclusion will be contingent and not of not
holding; but when the privative is necessary, the conclusion will
be that it is contingent that something does not hold and that it
does not hold, whether the terms are universal or not universal.
And one should take its being contingent that something does not
hold218 in the conclusion in the same way as in the preceding. But
there will not be a syllogism of by necessity not holding, since not
holding by necessity is distinct from by necessity not holding.219]
He turns to the mixture of a contingent and a necessary premiss in the
205,1 first figure and shows which combinations of such premisses in the first
figure are syllogistic and which non-syllogistic. He says that in a
mixture of this kind those in which the necessary premiss is assumed
in the same way as the unqualified premiss was assumed in the
combinations just discussed220 will also be syllogistic similarly; and they
5 will be complete in the case of those combinations in which again the
major is contingent and the minor necessary. Furthermore, just as in
those cases, when both premisses are affirmative and universal or just
one is universal, the conclusion will be contingent in the way specified
and not unqualified.221 He says that if one of the premisses is negative
and the necessary premiss is affirmative, the conclusion will be that it
10 is contingent that something does not hold and not that it does not hold;
Translation 119
but he says that when the negative premiss is necessary, if either both
are universal or one is, the conclusion will be ‘it is contingent that
something does not hold and that it does not hold’. The added words
‘when the affirmative is necessary’ refer to the combination which has
a contingent negative major since he has already spoken about combi- 15
nations in which both premisses are affirmative.
When he says that in combinations in which the major premiss is
universal negative necessary the conclusion will be ‘it is contingent that
something does not hold and that it does not hold’, he explains the sense
of ‘it is contingent that X does not hold’ <in this case>; for ‘it is
contingent that X does not hold’ is not taken as signifying one thing and
‘X does not hold’ as signifying another, but ‘it is contingent that X does
not hold’ is taken as what is predicated of what does not hold and not 20
<as expressing contingency> in the way specified.222 He indicates this
when he says ‘one should take its being contingent that something does
not hold in the conclusion in the same way as in the preceding’. By ‘in
the preceding’ he means in the cases in which the major was unqualified
negative; for he also showed223 in those cases that ‘It is contingent that
A holds of no C’ (or that it does not hold of some C) is taken to be 25
equivalent to ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ (or ‘A does not hold by
necessity of all C’).224 For if the minor is contingent particular, then ‘A
holds of all C by necessity’ is hypothesized in the reductio ad impossi-
bile, since ‘It is not contingent that A does not hold of some C’ is the
negation of ‘It is contingent that A does not hold of some C’, and ‘It is
not contingent that A does not hold of some C’ is transformed into ‘A
holds of all C by necessity’. (For if it is transformed into ‘A holds of no 30
C by necessity’ no impossibility turns out.225) But if ‘A holds of all C by
necessity’ is found impossible its negation would be proved, and this is
‘A does not hold by necessity of all C’; if this is equivalent to ‘It is
contingent that A does not hold of some C’, then ‘A holds of all C by
necessity’ would be the same as ‘It is not contingent that A does not hold
of some C’. But if ‘It is not contingent that A does not hold of some C’ is
true not only when A holds of all C by necessity but also when A holds
of no C by necessity, then ‘A does not hold by necessity of all C’ would 35
not be equivalent to ‘It is contingent that A does not hold of some C’; for
then its negation has not been transformed into its equivalent but into
something which implies it.226 For ‘It is not contingent that A does not
hold of some C’ is true not only when A holds of all C by necessity but
also when A holds of no C by necessity because the affirmation which 206,1
says ‘It is contingent that A does not hold of some C’ is not true when A
holds of no C by necessity.
227
†Consequently also its affirmation ‘It is contingent that A does not
hold of some C’ is not only true when A does not hold by necessity of all
C but also when it is not necessary that A holds of some C. Of these ‘A
does not hold by necessity of all C’ does away with the universal 5
120 Translation
affirmative necessary proposition, but it is true when A holds by neces-
sity of no C because ‘A holds of all C by necessity’ (which falsifies ‘It is
not contingent that A does not hold of some C’) is false then, since ‘It is
contingent that A holds of some C’ is true then. And ‘It is not necessary
that A holds of some C’ does away with the particular necessary
proposition. And both together do away with all necessity, and so does
‘It is contingent that A does not hold of some C’, so that it is equivalent
10 to both together. And ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ and ‘A does not hold
by necessity of all C’ are also true if the unqualified non-necessary
propositions are true.†
At the same time he shows us the nature of such propositions since
they are not contingent.228 For this was what was being inquired into.
For they had to be either necessary or unqualified or contingent. He
says that they are unqualified when he says ‘and that it does not hold’.
15 He indicates the difference between ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ and
‘A holds of no C by necessity’ when he says ‘But there will not be a
syllogism of by necessity not holding, since not holding by necessity is
distinct’ (and he proved that not holding by necessity also follows in the
case of a mixture of an unqualified negative major and a contingent
affirmative minor229) ‘from by necessity not holding’. For the former is
20 unqualified, the latter necessary.
<35b37-36a31 Two universal premisses>

35b37230 [It is evident that the conclusion is not necessary] when
[the terms] are affirmative. [For let A hold of all B by necessity and
let it be contingent that B holds of all C. Then there will be an
incomplete syllogism that it is contingent that A holds of all C – it
is clear from the demonstration that it is incomplete, since it will
be proved in the same way as in the preceding cases.]
He proves that in mixtures of a necessary and a contingent premiss the
conclusion is not necessary first in the case in which both premisses are
affirmative and the major necessary. For let A hold of all B by necessity,
25 and let it be contingent that B holds of all C. Then the syllogism is
incomplete; for, as we said,231 the complete syllogisms are those in which
the major is contingent. Those in which the major premiss is necessary
are also proved by reductio ad impossibile, just as those in which the
major was unqualified were. So these aren’t complete either. For if A
holds of all B by necessity and it is contingent that B holds of all C, it
30 will be contingent that A holds of all C. For if not, the opposite ‘It is not
contingent that A holds of all C’ <is the case>; in those combinations
this was also transformed into ‘A does not hold of some C by necessity’.
If this is assumed and – a contingent premiss again being transformed
into an unqualified one – it is added that B holds of all C, the conclusion
Translation 121
in the third figure will be negative unqualified particular, and A will not
hold of some B, which is impossible, since it was hypothesized to hold 35
of all by necessity. Therefore, the hypothesis from which this follows, ‘It
is not contingent that A holds of all C’ is impossible; therefore, the
affirmation ‘It is contingent that A holds of all C’ is true; and, therefore, 207,1
the conclusion is contingent. For A will not hold by necessity of all C232
if the minor premiss is contingent.
But perhaps again in this mixture what is proved is not ‘It is
contingent that A holds of all C’ but the unique opposite of ‘A does not
hold of some C by necessity’, namely ‘A will not hold by necessity of no 5
C’.233 For ‘It is not contingent that A holds of all C’ was transformed into
‘A does not hold of some C by necessity’  because ‘It is not contingent
that A holds of all C’ is true both when A holds of some C by necessity
and when A does not hold of some C by necessity, but if ‘It is not
contingent that A holds of all C’ is transformed into ‘A holds of some C 10
by necessity’, nothing impossible follows in this combination. We have
spoken about this in the preceding.234
235
Again, ‘A does not hold by necessity of no C’ would do away with ‘A
does not hold of some C by necessity’ just as ‘A holds by necessity of no
C’ did away with ‘A holds of some C by necessity’; and ‘A does not hold
by necessity of no C’ can also be true when A holds of some C by 15
necessity. The proposition which says ‘Moving does not hold by neces-
sity of no body’ is like this since there is a body, namely the rotating
body, of which it holds by necessity. We have spoken about this in the
preceding.236
237
However, it is also possible to prove the impossibility without
transforming the contingent proposition into an unqualified one, but 20
keeping ‘It is contingent that B holds of all C’ fixed. For if A does not
hold of some C by necessity and it is contingent that B holds of all C, it
follows in the third figure that it is contingent that A does not hold of
some B, which is impossible, since A holds of all B by necessity. But
since it has not yet been shown what follows in a mixture in the third
figure of contingent propositions and propositions which hold necessar- 25
ily and which combinations in this figure are syllogistic, he uses the
transformation of a contingent proposition into an unqualified one. For
he has already discussed mixtures of a necessary and an unqualified
premiss in all figures. Nevertheless, it is necessary to understand that
insofar as it involves a reductio ad impossibile using the third figure, in
the case of a mixture having a universal necessary major premiss 30
(either affirmative or negative) and a contingent minor it can be proved
that there is a necessary and an unqualified and a contingent conclu-
sion; and the conclusions are affirmative if the necessary premiss is
affirmative and negative if it is negative. But he himself has said, ‘But
there will not be a syllogism of by necessity not holding’.238 We have
investigated these matters at greater length in our book on mixtures.239 35
122 Translation
208,1 36a2240 Again let it be contingent that A holds of all B [and let B
hold of all C by necessity. There will be a syllogism that it is
contingent that A holds of all C but not that A holds of all C. And
the syllogism will be complete, not incomplete; for it is completed
directly through the original premisses.]
He proves that something follows necessarily when the major premiss
is universal affirmative contingent and the minor necessary universal
affirmative, and at the same time he signals that the syllogism from
such a combination is complete since what follows, which is contingent
5 in the way specified, is proved by means of <the definition of> said of
all.241
36a7242 If the premisses are not the same in form, [first let the
privative premiss be necessary, and let it not be contingent that A
holds of any B, and let it be contingent that B holds of all C. Then
it is necessary that A holds of no C. For let it be assumed that A
holds of all or of some C; but it was assumed not contingent that
it holds of any B. Since, then, the privative premiss converts,
neither is it contingent that B holds of any A. But A is assumed to
hold of all or some C, so that it is not contingent that B holds of
†any or of† all C. But it was hypothesized to hold of all originally.
And it is evident that there is also a syllogism that it is contingent
that A does not hold since there is one that A does not hold.]
<The first words mean> this: ‘if only one premiss is affirmative’. He
shows which combinations with such premisses are syllogistic and that
10 none yields a necessary conclusion. He first takes the combination
having a universal negative necessary major premiss – for the words
‘let it not be contingent that A holds of any B’ signify what holds of no
B by necessity243 – and a universal affirmative contingent minor premiss
BC. He says that in the case of this combination it is necessary that A
holds of no C, but he does not mean that A holds of no C by necessity.244
15 For he does not place the necessity in the conclusion; rather he invokes
necessity to make clear that ‘A holds of no C’ will be the conclusion. And
these combinations which imply something by necessity are syllogistic,
and these are the ones in which the same thing results in the case of all
material terms. That he takes the conclusion to be unqualified negative
is clear from the fact that he hypothesizes as the opposite of this for
20 proving by reductio ad impossibile that this is the conclusion of an
unqualified affirmative proposition but not a contingent one (which is
the opposite of a necessary one). For he says ‘Let it be assumed that A
holds’. (He goes beyond what is required and hypothesizes ‘of all or some
C’ to show that something impossible follows from either hypothesis; for
the proposition which posits that A holds of some C is the contradictory
Translation 123
opposite of the one which says ‘A holds of no C’.) Taking and hypothe- 25
sizing the opposite of the conclusion ‘A holds of some C’, he adds the
necessary proposition which converts with the proposition AB, which is
that A holds of no B by necessity. And B holds of no A by necessity; but
also A is assumed to hold of some or all C. It follows in the first figure
when the major premiss is necessary negative universal and the minor 30
is unqualified affirmative and either particular or universal that the
conclusion is necessary negative. The result then is that B does not hold
of some C or holds of no C by necessity, which is impossible, since it was
assumed that it is contingent that B holds of all C. Therefore, in the case
of the combination under consideration the opposite of the hypothesis
will follow, namely ‘A holds of no C’. And if ‘A holds of no C’ then also ‘It 209,1
is contingent that A holds of no C’ since contingency is also predicated
of the unqualified; for it is true to say that the unqualified is also
contingent, but the contingent is not always also unqualified.
245
It is necessary to understand that the preceding proof is sound if it
is true that in mixtures of a necessary major and an unqualified minor 5
in the first figure the conclusion is necessary. But if the conclusion is
unqualified, nothing impossible follows; for in that case it would follow
that B does not hold of some C or holds of none, when it is assumed that
it is contingent that B holds of all C; but this is not impossible.
246
Is it then perhaps more correct to say that contingency in the way 10
specified also follows in the case of this mixture? For if it is assumed
that A holds of no B by necessity and that it is contingent that B holds
of all C, it will follow that it is contingent that A holds of no C. For if
not, the opposite <is the case>, namely ‘It is not contingent that A holds
of no C’, i.e., ‘A holds of some C by necessity’; since this is particular
necessary affirmative and BA, which comes by conversion of AB, is also 15
necessary negative universal, there results from the two necessary
premisses the conclusion that B does not hold of some C by necessity,
which is impossible, since it is contingent that B holds of all C. There-
fore, ‘A holds of some C by necessity’ is also impossible; therefore the
opposite <is the case>, namely ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’.
Or perhaps the conclusion won’t be contingent in the way specified
in this case either since what will follow is the opposite of ‘A holds of
some C by necessity’, which is ‘A holds by necessity of no C’, which has 20
been previously shown to be different from a contingent proposition.247
248
The words ‘so that it is not contingent that B holds of all C. But it
was hypothesized to hold of all originally’,249 are equivalent to ‘so that
it will result that it is contingent that B does not hold of all C’, which he
takes to be equivalent to ‘B does not hold of all C’. For this opposite
follows from what is proved; for he uses this wanting to show that A
holds of no C. 25
250
What he himself wanted to prove, namely that the conclusion of
the combination which has just been discussed is unqualified universal
124 Translation
negative, is also proved through the third figure by reductio ad impos-
sibile. For if it is not true that A holds of no C, it will be true that it holds
30 of some. If one adds to this the transformation of the contingent premiss
into the unqualified ‘B holds of all C’, it will follow that A holds of some
B, which is impossible since it was assumed that it holds of none by
necessity.
36a17251 Again, let the affirmative252 premiss be necessary, let it

be contingent that A holds of no B, [and let B hold of all C by
necessity. Then the syllogism will be complete, but it will conclude
not that something does not hold but that it is contingent that it
does not hold. For the premiss from the major extreme is taken in
this way, and it is not possible to do a reductio ad impossibile. For
if A is hypothesized to hold of no253 C and it is also assumed that
it is contingent that it holds of no B, nothing impossible results
from these things.]
35 He in turn takes a combination in which the major is contingent
universal negative, the minor universal affirmative necessary; and he
210,1 proves both that the conclusion is contingent, not necessary, and that
the syllogism is complete since the conclusion is proved by means of <the
definition of> A holding contingently of no B. To show that the conclu-
sion is contingent in the way specified, he says ‘For the premiss from
5 the major extreme is taken in this way’, that is, the major premiss is
taken as contingent. And we said254 that when the major premiss is
contingent the syllogisms are complete and the conclusion is contingent
in the way specified. For it will be contingent that A holds of C since C
is among the B of all of which it is contingent that A holds.255
The words ‘and it is not possible to do a reductio ad impossibile’ mean
the following. Having said that in the case of this combination it is
10 evident from the assumed premisses that the conclusion is contingent
universal negative (for he said ‘But it will conclude not that something
does not hold but that it is contingent that it does not hold’), he adds
that it is not possible to prove by reductio ad impossibile that the
conclusion is unqualified, as we did in the case of the previous combi-
nation. For suppose we were to proceed in this case as we did in that
15 and were to take as hypothesis <for reductio> ‘A holds of some C’, the
opposite of ‘A holds of no C’, or even ‘A holds of all C’, wishing to prove
that the conclusion is ‘A holds of no C’ and not ‘It is contingent that A
holds of no C’; to this assumption we would add that it is contingent that
A holds of no B; but then the combination would be non-syllogistic since
it is in the second figure with an affirmative unqualified particular
20 premiss and a universal negative contingent one, because the contin-
gent premiss is equivalent to an affirmative one,256 and the proof does
not go through.
Translation 125
257
He has made what he says unclear by being concise. <In his
argument> he takes the conclusion <of the syllogism under considera-
tion> to be unqualified negative universal instead of contingent
negative universal; and, wanting to prove that this unqualified propo-
sition cannot be shown to follow by a reductio ad impossibile, he does
not take the opposite of this and hypothesize it (the opposite is the 25
particular unqualified affirmative ‘A holds of some C’, which, taken
together with ‘It is contingent that A holds of no B’ yields no conclusion);
instead he omits it and only adds the other premiss of the pair with
which it implies nothing <because he assumes> that it is known what
has to be transformed and hypothesized in place of the universal
negative unqualified <conclusion>, namely a particular affirmative
unqualified proposition. However in some texts one reads ‘For if A is 30
hypothesized [not]258 to hold of some C’ instead of ‘For if A is hypothe-
sized to hold of no C’. But even if this were the text the proposition that
A holds of no C would again have been left out; the opposite of this, ‘A
holds of some C’, posited together with ‘It is contingent that A holds of
no B’ implies nothing.
259
Moreover nothing impossible will follow even if we add to the 35
hypothesis that A holds of some C the premiss that B holds of all C. For
it follows <from these assumptions> in the third figure260 that A holds
of some B, but it is not impossible that it be contingent that A holds of 211,1
no B and that it holds of some.
261
It is also possible to prove that the conclusion is contingent by
means of reductio ad impossibile. For if it is not true that it is contingent
that A holds of no C, it will be true that it is not contingent that it holds
of none, i.e., that A holds of some C by necessity. But it is also assumed
that B holds of all C by necessity. From these premisses it follows in the 5
third figure that A holds of some B by necessity, but this is impossible,
since it was assumed that it is contingent that it holds of none (and so
of all).262 Therefore it is also impossible that A holds of some C by
necessity, so that ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’ is true. For the
conclusion will be contingent in the way specified and will not be that
A holds by necessity of no C, as it was in the other cases263 in which ‘It 10
is not contingent that X holds of no Y’ was transformed into ‘X holds of
some Y by necessity’. For in the case of the mixture under consideration
even if ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ is transformed in the
opposite way into ‘A does not hold of some C by necessity’ (‘It is not
contingent that A holds of no C’ is true when this is), an impossibility
follows in the same way, namely that A does not hold of some B by
necessity, when it is assumed to be contingent that it holds of all B.264
So if, when a hypothesis is made with respect to each of these things 15
which alone are such that ‘It is not contingent that A holds of no C’ is
true when they are, an impossibility follows, it is clear that the unique
opposite of that is proved, namely ‘It is contingent that A holds of no C’.
126 Translation
36a25265 But if the privative is posited in relation to the minor

extreme, [when it signifies contingency there will be a syllogism
by conversion, just as before; but when it indicates not being
contingent <i.e., necessity> there will not be. Nor will there be
when both premisses are posited as privative if the minor is not
contingent. The terms are the same. For holding: white, animal,
snow; For not holding: white, animal, pitch.]
He says that if in the mixture of a necessary and a contingent premiss
20 <in the first figure> the major premiss is affirmative and the minor
negative and the privative minor is contingent, there will be a syllogistic
combination when the contingent negative premiss is converted into an
affirmative. But he says there will not be a syllogism when the minor
25 is negative necessary and the major is affirmative contingent. The
reason is that we assume that it is impossible for there to be a syllogism
in the first figure when the minor is negative, but when the negative
premiss is taken as contingent, it can be transformed into an affirm-
ative, but if it is taken as necessary it remains negative and does not
make a syllogism. Nor will there be a syllogism if both premisses are
taken to be negative and the minor is necessary.
He establishes that the combinations having the minor necessary
30 negative are non-syllogistic and shows by setting down terms that when
things are this way both ‘A holds of all C by necessity’ and ‘A holds of
no C by necessity’ can be inferred. The terms for all are white, animal,
snow, since it is contingent that white holds of all animal and contin-
gent that it holds of none, but animal holds of no snow by necessity, and
white holds of all snow by necessity. Terms for not holding are white,
35 animal, pitch, since the premisses will be related the same way and
212,1 white holds of no pitch by necessity. (It is perhaps more correct to take
horse instead of animal since ‘It is contingent that white holds of no
animal’ is not true.266)

[36a32267 The situation will be the same in the case of particular
syllogisms. For when the privative premiss is necessary, the con-
clusion will also be of not holding. For example, if it is not
contingent that A holds of any B but it is contingent that B holds
of some C, it is necessary that A not hold of some C. For if A holds
of all C and it is not contingent that it holds of any B, then it is not
contingent that B holds of any A either. Thus if A holds of all C, it
is not contingent that B holds of any C, but it was assumed
contingent that it holds of some.]
He says ‘The situation will be the same in the case of particular
Translation 127
syllogisms’,268 that is, if one premiss is universal and the other particular
the situation will be the same as it was when both were universal. For 5
in syllogistic combinations in the mixture under consideration when
both premisses are not universal, if the major is universal negative
necessary, the minor particular contingent affirmative, he says the
conclusion will be particular negative and not contingent but unquali-
fied. He proves this as follows. A holds of no B by necessity; let it be
contingent that B holds of some C; then A does not hold of some C. For 10
if that is not so, let the opposite hold and let A hold of all C. But it was
assumed that A holds of no B by necessity. The result is a combination
in the second-figure put together from a necessary negative major and
a universal affirmative unqualified minor, and it was proved that in this
case the conclusion is universal negative necessary. For if the necessary
premiss is converted, it results that B holds of no A by necessity; but it 15
was also hypothesized that A holds of all C; the result is that B holds of
no C by necessity, which is impossible, since it was assumed that it is
contingent that it holds of some. Therefore, the hypothesis269 from which
this followed is impossible, namely ‘A holds of all C’. Therefore the
opposite of this, ‘A does not hold of all C’, is true, and the conclusion is
unqualified.
270
But this proof depends on it being agreed that the conclusion of a 20
necessary major and an unqualified minor <in the first figure> is
necessary. However, it is also possible without this <assumption> to
give an indisputable proof by reductio ad impossibile that the conclusion
of the combination under consideration is contingent particular nega-
tive. For if ‘It is contingent that A does not hold of some C’ is not true, 25
it will be true that it holds of all by necessity. But it is assumed that A
holds of no B by necessity. From these assumptions it follows in the
second figure that B holds of no C by necessity, which is impossible since
it was contingent that it holds of some. Therefore, it is true that it is
contingent that A does not hold of some C.
[36a39271 But when the particular affirmative premiss, i.e., BC, in

a privative syllogism is necessary or a universal premiss AB in an
affirmative syllogism is necessary there will not be a syllogism of
holding. The demonstration is the same as before.]
He now says that, if in a negative syllogism the major negative premiss
is not necessary but the minor is particular affirmative necessary (so 30
that the major is universal negative contingent) or again if in an
affirmative syllogism the major is universal affirmative necessary and
the minor particular contingent, the conclusion (he says) will not still
be unqualified; but it is clear that it will be contingent in the way
specified. (It is necessary to understand this addition.) 272For if the major 35
is contingent negative and the minor necessary particular affirmative,
128 Translation
213,1 the conclusion is proved to be contingent particular negative through
<the definition of> said of none, because some C is under B and it is
contingent that A holds of no B, and so it is contingent that A does not
hold of some C. For it was also this way when the minor was assumed
to be universal affirmative necessary;273 to prove that in the case of this
5 combination the conclusion is contingent he used274 the fact that it is not
possible for an unqualified conclusion to be proved by reductio ad
impossibile. 275For it also is not possible in the case of the present
combination for it to be proved by reductio ad impossibile that the
conclusion is unqualified negative particular, since either there will be
a non-syllogistic combination in the second figure, or in the third the
combination implies nothing impossible, as was also the case when the
10 minor was necessary universal affirmative and the major contingent
negative, as we showed.276
277
As I said previously,278 it is worth asking why the conclusion will
not be necessary negative when the major is taken to be necessary
universal negative. For if we assert that, when AB is necessary univer-
sal negative and the minor is contingent universal affirmative, a
15 necessary universal negative conclusion follows, this will be proved to
be so by reductio ad impossibile. For if it is not the case that A holds of
no C by necessity, it will then be contingent that it holds of some. But
it is also contingent that B holds of all C. Therefore,279 it will be
contingent that A holds of some B, which is impossible, since it was
assumed that it holds of none by necessity.
But even if BC is particular affirmative contingent, it will still be
20 possible to say that the conclusion will be particular negative necessary.
For A does not hold of some C by necessity. For otherwise it is contin-
gent that it holds of all. But it is also contingent that B holds of some C.
Therefore,280 it will be contingent that A holds of some B, which is
impossible since it was assumed that it holds of none by necessity.
Therefore it is true that A holds of no C by necessity if BC is
25 contingent universal, or that A does not hold of some C by necessity if
BC is taken to be particular contingent. But, as I have already said,281
we have investigated these matters in our book on mixtures.
282
Again, he says that if both premisses are affirmative, the major
universal and necessary, the minor particular contingent (this is the
30 meaning of ‘or a universal premiss AB in an affirmative syllogism’,283
the conclusion will be particular contingent affirmative, just as it was
<universal contingent affirmative> when the major was universal af-
firmative necessary, the minor universal contingent. For it was
proved284 by reductio ad impossibile that the conclusion is contingent
universal affirmative. But in fact, this ought to be proved in the case of
35 the combination under consideration as well. Let it be assumed that
214,1 with the given assumptions it is contingent that A holds of some C. For,
if not, the opposite, ‘It is not contingent that A holds of some C’, i.e., ‘A
Translation 129
holds of no C by necessity’ <is the case>. But it is also contingent that
B holds of some C. Let this be transformed into B holds of some C. Then
– in the third figure – A will not hold of some B, or it is contingent that
A does not hold of some B. (For it makes no difference which of these
one takes, <since whether one takes it as>285 contingent or one trans- 5
forms it into an unqualified proposition, the argument goes through.)
But it is impossible that A does not hold of some B or that it is
contingent that it does not hold of some B – that is impossible –, since
it was hypothesized that it holds of all B by necessity. Therefore the
opposite of the hypothesis from which the impossibility followed holds;
that is ‘It is contingent that A holds of some C’, because ‘It is not
contingent that A holds of some C’ is equivalent to ‘A holds of no C by 10
necessity’ and was transformed into it. Therefore the proper thing
which follows is ‘It is not the case that A holds of no C by necessity’, the
opposite of the hypothesis.
286
But suppose the conclusion is taken to be not ‘It is contingent that
A holds of some C’ but ‘A holds of some C’. If the opposite of this, ‘A holds
of no C’ is hypothesized and ‘It is contingent that B holds of some C’ is
added, it will follow that A does not hold of some B or that it is
contingent that A does not hold of some B. Both of these are impossible 15
if A holds of all B by necessity. So, the hypothesis being destroyed, it
would follow that A holds of some C. However, he says that in the
combination under consideration there will not be a conclusion of
holding.
[36b3287 But if the universal premiss is posited in relation to the

minor extreme and is contingent and either affirmative or priva-
tive, and the particular premiss <in relation to the major extreme>
is necessary there will not be a syllogism. Terms for holding by
necessity: animal, white, human; terms for not being contingent:
animal, white, cloak.]
But if the minor and not the major is universal, then no matter how the
minor is taken, whether affirmative contingent or negative contingent, 20
there will be no syllogism when the major is particular necessary. Again
he shows this by setting down terms. Terms for holding of all by
necessity are animal, white, human. For animal holds of something
white, e.g., swan, by necessity, but it also does not hold of something
white, e.g., snow, <by necessity>; and it is contingent that white holds
of every human but also contingent that it holds of none; and animal 25
holds of every human by necessity. Terms for holding of none are animal,
white, cloak. For, again, both premisses are true in the same way, and
animal holds of no cloak by necessity.
130 Translation
[36b7288 But when the universal premiss is necessary, the particu-

lar contingent, then if the universal is privative, terms for holding
are animal, white, crow, terms for not holding animal, white,
pitch; and if the universal is affirmative, terms for holding are
animal, white, swan, and for not being contingent: animal, white
snow.]
Nor will there be any syllogism if the universal premiss, i.e., the minor
(for this was the <one taken to be> universal), is necessary, the particu-
30 lar contingent. For if the minor premiss is privative universal and
necessary, terms for holding are animal, white, crow. For it is contingent
that animal holds of something white and contingent that it does not
hold of something white, and white holds of no crow by necessity, and
animal holds of every crow by necessity. Terms for holding of none are
animal, white, pitch; for the premisses are related similarly, and animal
holds of no pitch <by necessity>.
35 But if the minor is universal affirmative necessary, terms for holding
are animal, white, swan. For again, it is contingent that animal holds
215,1 of something white and contingent that it does not hold of something
white, and white holds of every swan by necessity, and animal holds of
every swan by necessity. Terms for not holding are animal, white, snow;
for the premisses are related similarly, and animal holds of no snow by
necessity.
[36b12 <And there will not be a syllogism> when the premisses

are taken as indeterminate or both particular. Common terms for
holding: animal, white, human; for not holding: animal, white
soulless. 289For animal holds of something white and white of
something soulless, and <in both cases> there is holding by neces-
sity and it not being contingent that something holds. And the
situation is the same in the case of contingency, so that the terms
are serviceable in all cases.]
Nor will there be any syllogism if both premisses are either indetermi-
5 nate or particular, however they are related in quality.290 Common
terms which show holding for all ways whatsoever of taking the pre-
misses are animal, white, human. 291For animal holds of something
white, e.g., swan, by necessity, and does not hold of something white,
e.g., snow, by necessity. 292And it is contingent that it holds of something
white and does not hold of something white, e.g., of <some> human; for
it is contingent that some white thing is a human and it is contingent
that some white thing is not a human, and, if this is so, it would also be
contingent that some white thing is an animal and contingent that some
10 white thing is not an animal. 293And white does not hold of some humans,
e.g., Ethiopians, by necessity, and it holds of some, e.g., of Celts, by
Translation 131
necessity. But it is contingent that it holds of some and contingent that
it does not hold of some, as in most cases. And animal holds of every
human by necessity. Terms for not holding are animal, white, soulless;
for again, if the premisses are taken in the same way, animal holds of
nothing soulless by necessity.
294
He sets down material terms for holding of all and of none by 15
necessity for each proof, and, taking one proposition, he shows using the
terms that all the possible transformations, relating to both necessity
and contingency are indefinite. He leaves to us the task of also seeing
the same thing in the case of the other premisses.
36b15 For animal holds of something white and white of some-

thing soulless,295 and <in both cases> there is holding by necessity 20
and it not being contingent that something holds. [And the situ-
ation is the same in the case of contingency, so that the terms are
serviceable in all cases.]
Since the combinations are composed of two particular premisses, one
necessary, one contingent, he shows that in the case of all combinations
of such premisses it is possible to use the material terms which have
been taken to show them non-syllogistic; he shows that each of the
particular premisses in the case of the material terms assumed can be
taken as necessary affirmative and necessary negative and, again, as 25
contingent affirmative and negative. Consequently, if the premisses are
taken in alternation, one necessary and one contingent, they will be
taken truly and it will be established by reference to them that those
combinations are non-syllogistic.
<36b19-25 Concluding remarks>

36b19296 It is clear297 from what has been said that when the terms
are related in the same way [there is or is not a syllogism] with an 30
unqualified premiss and with necessary ones [except that if the
privative premiss is posited as unqualified the conclusion of the
syllogism is contingent, but if it is posited as necessary the conclu-
sion is both of contingency and of not holding.]
Just as combinations of the same kind were syllogistic in the case of
combinations with both premisses unqualified and of combinations with
both necessary, so it is shown to be the same way in the case of mixtures
of an unqualified and a contingent premiss and of a necessary <and a
contingent premiss>. For combinations in which the unqualified or the
necessary premiss is assumed similarly are syllogistic in both cases or 216,1
again the similar combinations are non-syllogistic. The difference be-
tween them, as he now says, is that in the case of combinations having
132 Translation
an unqualified premiss with a contingent one, when the major is
privative unqualified, the conclusion is contingent; but in the case of
5 combinations of a necessary and a contingent premiss, when the neces-
sary premiss is privative, the conclusion is unqualified and contingent
because it is unqualified, but it is not contingent in the way specified.
But how can this assertion be sound? For he also showed298 that in
the combinations in which the negative premiss is unqualified the
conclusion is not contingent in the way specified but is ‘A holds by
necessity of no C’ or ‘A does not hold by necessity of all C’. Or <is the
10 assertion all right> because the conclusion is still contingent in a way
even if it isn’t straightforwardly contingent in the way specified? ‘A
holds by necessity of no C’ is contingent in this sense. 299But in the case
in which the premiss is necessary negative, it was proved that the
conclusion is straightforwardly unqualified, since <in justifying the
syllogisms> he posited to begin with that the conclusion is unqualified,
hypothesized the opposite of this, and did a reductio ad impossibile.
300
But this does not happen if we use301 a similar reductio in the case in
15 which the major is unqualified universal negative and the minor con-
tingent universal affirmative; for in this case it is impossible for
anything to be proved by reductio ad impossibile in the second figure if
the conclusion is taken to be ‘A holds of no C’. For the opposite of the
conclusion taken, ‘A holds of no C’, is ‘A holds of some C’, and with ‘A
holds of no B’ it implies in the second figure that B does not hold of some
20 C, which is not impossible if it is contingent that B holds of all C. And
if the reductio ad impossibile takes place in the third figure, nothing
impossible is proved; for what follows is ‘It is contingent that A holds of
some B’ when it was assumed that it holds of none, which is not
impossible.
Or should we say that if the contingent premiss is transformed into
25 an unqualified one which is false but not impossible, what follows does
become impossible? For it follows that A holds of some B, but it was
assumed to hold of none.
302
When the major premiss was taken to be necessary universal
negative, it was proved <in the reductio> that B does not hold of some
C by necessity, which was impossible. This resulted because of the
assumption that when the major in a <first-figure> mixture of a neces-
30 sary and an unqualified premiss is necessary, the conclusion is
necessary. But if it is posited that the conclusion in such a mixture is
unqualified, nothing impossible will follow in the second figure whether
the negative premiss is necessary or unqualified. For <what will be
proved in the reductio will be> either B does not hold of some C or that
B holds of no C; but it was assumed that it is contingent that it holds of
all, which is not impossible.
303
Nevertheless an impossibility does result through the third figure.
35 For if one adds to the hypothesis taken, namely that A holds of some C,
Translation 133
the premiss BC, which is (as was assumed) universal affirmative con-
tingent, or if this premiss is transformed into an unqualified one,
something impossible will follow in either case. For A will hold of some
B although it is assumed either not to hold of all of it (as in the first 217,1
mixture) or not to hold of all of it by necessity (in the second mixture).
Alternatively if in the third figure it is inferred from ‘A holds of some C’
and ‘It is contingent that B holds of all C’ that it is contingent that A
holds of some B, nothing impossible will be inferred in the case of the
mixture of an unqualified and a contingent premiss, but an impossibil-
ity will be inferred in the case of the mixture of a necessary and a 5
contingent premiss. For if A holds of no B by necessity, it is impossible
that it is contingent that A holds of some B.
304
Here it would be reasonable for someone to ask how it is, in a
mixture of an unqualified universal negative major and a contingent
universal affirmative minor in the first figure, that the impossible 10
result does not come from the transformation of the contingent univer-
sal affirmative premiss into an unqualified one, if nothing impossible
follows when it is kept fixed and conjoined with the hypothesis <for
reductio>, but what follows is impossible if the contingent premiss is
transformed into an unqualified one and taken together with the same
hypothesis. For the conclusion drawn from ‘A holds of some C’ and ‘It is 15
contingent that B holds of all C’, namely ‘It is contingent that A holds
of some B’ is not impossible when it was assumed to hold of none. But
from ‘A holds of some C’ and ‘B holds of all C’ it follows that A holds of
some B, which is impossible since A was assumed to hold of none of it.
For a universal negative proposition having a truth which is temporally
restricted results if it no longer remains true when the contingent 20
premiss is transformed into an unqualified affirmative one; nor would
what follows be impossible either.305 For since the transformation is
false but it is not impossible, nothing impossible would be a conse-
quence of this transformation.
36b24 It is also clear that all these syllogisms are incomplete [and
that they are completed through the figures previously men-
tioned.]306
Not absolutely all of these <are incomplete>, but only those in which 25
the major was taken to be unqualified or necessary. For he proved that
such combinations yield a conclusion by reductio ad impossibile. ‘They
are completed through figures previously mentioned’ because the reduc-
tio ad impossibile is through one of the assumed figures.
134 Translation
1.17-19 The second figure

1.17 Combinations with two contingent premisses307
<36b26-34 Introductory remarks on 1.17-19>
36b26 In the second figure when both premisses are taken308 as

30 contingent, there will be no syllogism, [whether the premisses are
posited as affirmative or privative, universal or particular.
36b29309 But when one signifies holding and the other contin-
gency, there will never be a syllogism if the affirmative signifies
holding, but there will always be if the privative universal does.
The situation is also the same when one premiss is taken as
necessary and the other as contingent. And in these cases too it is
necessary to take the contingency in the conclusion as it was taken
in the preceding.]
Having discussed all the mixtures in the first figure, he turns to the
second figure; he says that in this figure there is no syllogism from two
218,1 contingent premisses whether they are taken as both affirmative or both
negative or one as affirmative and the other as negative or if both are
universal or one particular. The reason is that it was shown310 that in
the second figure it is impossible for there to be a syllogism from two
5 affirmative premisses. Therefore there can’t be one from two contingent
premisses either. For if the premisses are taken as negative, they will
be equivalent to affirmative ones because affirmative contingent propo-
sitions convert with negative ones.
Someone might ask why, when a contingent negative proposition,
which is equivalent to and converts with a contingent affirmative one,
is transformed into that affirmative proposition and taken, it has the
10 same use as the affirmative in making the combination syllogistic or
non-syllogistic (as in the present case), but the affirmative is not
transformed into that negative nor does it make non-syllogistic the
combinations which need this affirmative proposition in order to be
syllogistic. In the first place it was said311 that if the affirmative premiss
makes a combination syllogistic, it is absurd to seek to transform it into
15 something which will make the combination no longer syllogistic. But
the transformation is reasonable in the case of a negative premiss
because it requires help in order to be syllogistic. For we also do this in
conversions of premisses. In those cases in which combinations are
proved to be syllogistic by conversion we make use of conversions, but
we do not convert those premisses which when converted will not be
20 syllogistic. Furthermore a contingent negative proposition is not in
itself or as contingent negative, since what negates is not attached to
the modality.312 For a negative contingent proposition potentially af-
firms the same thing as it denies, since this is what it means to say that
Translation 135
if it is contingent that X does not hold then it is also contingent that it
holds. Thus, in general, a contingent negative proposition is not a
negation; and because it is an affirmation, since when it is expressed in
this way it has a negative form, it is transformed into that affirmative 25
proposition as being more evident and agreed to.313
Because of this and also because most of the <valid> combinations in
this figure were shown to yield a conclusion by conversion of the
universal negative premiss – only one of them was proved by reductio
ad impossibile314 – there is no syllogism in the second figure from two
contingent premisses. But he will show that a contingent negative 30
proposition does not convert with itself.315
(31b29)316 If the combinations are mixed of an unqualified and a
contingent premiss or of a necessary and a contingent one, then, if only
the contingent premiss in them is negative, the combination will not be
syllogistic because then both premisses are potentially affirmative since
a contingent negative premiss converts with an affirmative one.
317
But something will always follow if the unqualified or necessary 35
premiss is negative and universal.
318
For if the unqualified or necessary premiss is particular negative,
the combinations will not be syllogistic. For in the second figure it is
necessary that the major premiss be universal; consequently when the
major premiss is unqualified <or necessary> particular, the combina- 219,1
tions will be non-syllogistic.
319
And even if this minor is universal and the major contingent
particular, the combinations will be non-syllogistic.
320
However if the minor is universal and the major contingent univer-
sal, the combinations are syllogistic, but they would be proved by
reductio ad impossibile, not by conversion; for the universal affirmative 5
contingent proposition does not convert with itself, as has been
shown,321 nor does the universal negative, as he will show.322 Further-
more the minor premiss in the first figure becomes negative, if the
major is also converted, but a combination of this kind is non-syllogistic.
Furthermore conversion is required in combinations which are syllo-
gistic in this way,323 but neither premiss can be converted, not the 10
negative one because it is particular and not the affirmative because it
is contingent and universal.
324
But there will be a conclusion if both the unqualified and the
contingent premiss are negative and the minor is contingent, because a
contingent negative premiss is transformed into a contingent affirm-
ative one.
This, then, was the reason why, after discussing contingent combina- 15
tions in the first figure,325 he then discussed mixtures of an unqualified
and a contingent premiss and of a necessary and a contingent one in the
first figure326 before discussing combinations of contingent premisses in
the second and third figure:327 there is no syllogism from two contingent
136 Translation
premisses in the second figure, but there is from mixed premisses.
20 However, it was necessary to understand first mixtures in the first
figure, since combinations of mixed premisses in the second figure are
shown to be syllogistic by reduction to the first figure, just as the simple
ones are.328 Therefore it was necessary to understand first which of the
mixtures in the first figure yield a conclusion, how many do, and how
they are produced.
25 36b33 And in these cases too it is necessary to take the contin-

gency in the conclusions as it was taken in the preceding.
Just as it was the case with mixtures in the first figure with an
unqualified or necessary negative major premiss that the conclusion
was not contingent in the way specified, so too, he says, it will be the
case in the second figure. For in syllogistic combinations which mix an
30 unqualified and a contingent premiss or a necessary and a contingent
one in the second figure, the universal negative major is always unquali-
fied or necessary.329
<36b35-37a31 Failure of EE-conversion for contingent propositions330>

36b35 It should first be shown that a privative contingent331
proposition does not convert; [that is, if it is contingent that A
holds of no B, it is not necessary that it is also contingent that B
holds of no A.
36b37332 For let this be assumed and let it be contingent that B
holds of no A. Then, since contingent affirmations convert with
negations – both contraries and opposites – and it is contingent
that B holds of no A, it is evident that it will also be contingent
that B holds of all A. But this is false. For it is not the case that if
it is contingent that X holds of all Y, it is necessary that it be
contingent that Y holds of all X. So the privative does not convert.
37a4 Furthermore nothing prevents it being contingent that A
holds of no B, although B does not hold of some A by necessity. For
example, it is contingent that white does not hold of any human
being – for it is also contingent that it holds of every human being
–, but it is not true to say that it is contingent that human holds
of nothing white. For it does not hold of many white things by
necessity, but what is necessary is not contingent.]
35 When he discussed propositional conversions and showed which propo-
sitions convert with which,333 he said that a universal negative
220,1 contingent proposition does not convert with itself, but he postponed
giving the reason until later. He shows this now, as the situation
demands because syllogistic combinations in the second and third figure
Translation 137
require conversions. Since he is going to show that there is no syllogism
from contingent premisses in the second figure, and since he is also
going to make use of the fact that a universal negative contingent 5
proposition does not convert with itself, he proves this first.
By setting down terms he indicates what kind of conversion he is
talking about – viz., the interchange of terms and not the transforma-
tion of a negative proposition to an affirmative one; for it is assumed to
convert to that.334 However, as we mentioned at the beginning,335 Theo-
phrastus and Eudemus say that the universal <contingent> negative 10
also converts with itself just as both the unqualified and the necessary
universal negative do. They show that it converts in the following way.
If it is contingent that A holds of no B, it is also contingent that B holds
of no A. For since it is contingent that A holds of no B, when it is
contingent that it holds of none, it is then contingent that A is disjoined
from all the things of B.336 But if this is so, B will then also have been 15
disjoined from A, and, if this is so, it is also contingent that B holds of
no A.
It seems that Aristotle expresses a better view than they do when he
says that a universal negative which is contingent in the way specified
does not convert with itself. For if X is disjoined from Y it is not thereby
contingently disjoined from it. Consequently it is not sufficient to show
that when it is contingent that A is disjoined from B, then B is also
disjoined from A; in addition <one must show> that B is contingently 20
disjoined from A. But if this is not shown, then it has not been shown
that a contingent proposition converts, since what is separated from
something by necessity is also disjoined from it, but not contingently.
(36b37) Aristotle shows that there is no conversion using reductio ad
impossibile.337 For, if possible, let it be assumed that there is conversion,
and if it is contingent that A holds of no B, let it also be contingent that 25
B holds of no A. However, we are assuming that negative contingent
propositions also convert with respect to affirmative contingent ones.
But it is assumed that it is contingent that B holds of no A. So it is clear
that it is also contingent that it holds of all A. But this is false. For it is
not the case that, if it is contingent that A holds of all B for the reason
that it is assumed contingent that it holds of none, it is necessary that
it is also contingent that B holds of all A. For if it is the case, it results 30
that a universal affirmative contingent proposition converts with itself,
which isn’t true even according to them.338 For notice that it is contin-
gent that white holds of every human – since it is also contingent that
it holds of none –, but it is not contingent that human holds of every-
thing white; for it does not hold of some white things, e.g., swan, snow,
and many other things, by necessity. But if it is false that it is contin- 35
gent that human holds of everything white, it is also false that it is
contingent that it holds of nothing white. Consequently, it is not the
case that if it is contingent that A holds of no B, it will also be contingent 221,1
138 Translation
that B holds of no A. For what holds of nothing does not thereby
contingently not hold. But they maintain consistency by saying that the
universal negative converts with respect to terms and also denying that
an affirmative contingent proposition converts with a contingent nega-
tive one. The latter conversion is not possible because according to them
5 contingency in the way specified is not the only contingency.339
340
He has said ‘Furthermore nothing prevents’ instead of ‘For nothing
prevents’. For, as is apparent from what is said, there is no other proof
that things are this way than the one from the construction just
described.341 Or perhaps he first showed this by contingent negative
propositions being transformed into affirmative ones, affirmative con-
10 tingent universal propositions being assumed not to convert with
themselves; and now he gives a proof with respect to negative contin-
gent universal propositions themselves, setting down terms and
showing through them that the propositions do not convert. If this were
so this proof would be different from the one before it. But he says:
36b38  since contingent affirmations convert with negations –

15 both contraries and opposites – [and it is contingent that B holds
of no A, it is evident that it will also be contingent that B holds of
all A. But this is false. For it is not the case that if it is contingent
that X holds of all Y, it is necessary that it be contingent that Y
holds of all X. So the privative does not convert.
37a4 Furthermore nothing prevents it being contingent that A
holds of no B, although B does not hold of some A by necessity. For
example, it is contingent that white does not hold of any human
being – for it is also contingent that it holds of every human being
–, but it is not true to say that it is contingent that human holds
of nothing white. For it does not hold of many white things by
necessity, but what is necessary is not contingent.]
He calls the universal propositions ‘It is contingent that X holds of all
342
Y’ and ‘It is contingent that X holds of no Y’ contraries; and he calls the

universal propositions ‘It is contingent that X holds of all Y’ and ‘It is
contingent that X holds of no Y’ opposites of the particular propositions
‘It is contingent that X holds of not all Y’ and ‘It is contingent that X
holds of some Y’. But he does not do so because these are genuine
contraries or opposites of each other. How could they be if they are true
20 together? Rather, he does so because these propositions are related
verbally to one another in the same way as contraries are related to one
another in the case of necessary and unqualified propositions. For the
proposition which says that X holds of all Y by necessity is contrary to
‘X holds of no Y by necessity’, and ‘X holds of all Y’ is contrary to ‘X holds
of no Y’. And as far as what is implied by the words, ‘It is contingent
that X holds of all Y’ is also contrary to ‘It is contingent that X holds of
Translation 139
no Y’; and again ‘X holds of all Y’ is the opposite of the proposition which 25
says that X holds of not all Y, and ‘It is not the case that X holds of all
Y by necessity’343 is the opposite of ‘X holds of all Y by necessity’. And it
seems that ‘It is contingent that X holds of all Y’ is similarly related to
‘It is contingent that X does not hold of all Y’. This is why he also calls
these propositions contraries and opposites.
344
However, he would not say that the particular propositions are
true together with the universal ones to which they seem to be opposite.
For it is not the case that if ‘It is contingent that X holds of some Y’ is
true, ‘It is contingent that X holds of no Y’ is thereby also true. However, 30
he would say that the propositions which seem to be opposite to the
universal ones – i.e., the particular ones, whether affirmative or nega-
tive, – do convert with one another: the universal propositions convert
with one another and again the particular propositions which appear to
be opposite to the universal ones convert with one another.
He also says this in De Interpretatione; for in speaking about contrar-
ies he says ‘Therefore these cannot both be true at the same time’, and 222,1
adds ‘But it is possible345 for their opposites to be true with respect to
the same thing’.346 And it is also possible that he has said that particular
propositions are opposite to one another when they are taken with
respect to the same subject as having their subject determinate. Or is
this not a peculiar feature of opposites?
347
Perhaps he is saying that particular contingent propositions con- 5
vert from those universal contingent ones which seem to be opposite to
them, but not saying that the universal propositions convert from the
particular contingent ones.
(37a4) He shows in a clear way using material terms that universal
negative propositions which are contingent in the way specified do not
convert with respect to terms. For it is contingent that white (and
similarly walking and also being asleep) holds of no human, but it is not 10
contingent that human holds of nothing white (or walking or asleep),
because it is not also contingent that it holds of all; for human necessar-
ily does not hold of some things which are asleep or white. It is even
more evident that it is contingent that moving holds of no human
because it is contingent that it holds of every human, but it is not
contingent that human holds of nothing that moves because it is not
also contingent that it holds of all that moves; for it is not contingent
that human holds of the rotating body,348 since it does not hold of that 15
by necessity.
349
Someone might ask about the conversion of contingent affirmative
propositions with respect to negative ones whether perhaps the contin-
gent propositions do not convert with one another, but do convert with
unqualified ones. For if propositions about the future are contingent in
the strict sense, then it is clear that, if a contingent affirmative is true,
it is true that what was assumed to be contingent does not yet hold. 20
140 Translation
Consequently ‘It is contingent that X holds of no Y’ – said of what does
not hold now – would convert with respect to ‘It is contingent that X
holds of all Y’. (The latter proposition is true because what it says will
hold.) The same thing can be said of the contingent negative proposition
since the affirmation <‘It is contingent that X holds of all Y’ said> of
what holds converts with ‘It is contingent that X holds of no Y’, which
25 is true. For it is not the case that what is going to hold is also going not
to hold, since it already doesn’t hold.
But perhaps even if the thing which the affirmation says is contin-
gent most definitely does not now hold, nevertheless it is contingent
that it later does not hold; for even if P is said to be contingent and P
does not come about, it remains the case that it is contingent that P not
hold again later. And if it is said that it is contingent that P holds and
30 P does come about again, it would remain the case that it was contin-
gent that P not hold at the time when it was also contingent that P
would hold. For if it is true to say of a person that it is contingent that
he walk tomorrow, it is true to say of him that it is contingent that he
not walk tomorrow. Thus, since a proposition about the future is
contingent, it is necessary to take both propositions in relation to the
future. For even if it is true that the unqualified is the opposite of the
35 contingent, it is not assumed to convert with respect to it.
223,1 37a9350 Moreover, it will not be proved from impossibility that

there is conversion either, [for example, if someone were to main-
tain that since it is false that it is contingent that B holds of no A,
it is true that it is not contingent that it holds of none – this is a
case of affirmation and negation –, and if this is so, then it is true
that B holds of some A by necessity; consequently A also holds of
some B <by necessity>, but this is impossible.
37a14 For it is not the case that if it is not contingent that B holds
of no A, it is necessary that B holds of some A. For ‘It is not
contingent that B holds of no A’ is said in two ways; it is said if B
holds of some A by necessity and if it does not hold of some by
necessity. For if B does not hold of some A by necessity, it is not
true to say that it is contingent that it does not hold of all, just as
if B does hold of some A by necessity, it is not true to say that it is
contingent that it holds of all. So, if someone were to maintain
that, since it is not contingent that C holds of all D, it does not hold
of some by necessity, he would take things falsely. For it holds of
all, but we say that it is not contingent that it holds of all because
it holds of certain of them by necessity. Consequently both ‘X holds
of some Y by necessity’ and ‘X does not hold of some Y by necessity’
are opposite to ‘It is contingent that X holds of all Y’. And similarly
in the case of ‘It is contingent that X holds of no Y’.
Translation 141
37a26 It is clear then that with respect to things which are
contingent and not contingent in the way which we have specified
initially it is necessary to take ‘B does not hold of some A by
necessity’ and not ‘B holds of some A by necessity’. But if this is
taken, nothing impossible results, so there is no syllogism. Thus it
is evident from what has been said that a privative <contingent
universal> proposition does not convert.]
Someone might think that it is at least possible for it to be proved that
a universal negative contingent proposition converts by reductio ad
impossibile. And his associates351 have used this same proof. For, <they 5
say,> if it is contingent that A holds of no B, it is also contingent that B
holds of no A. For if this is false, the opposite is true, but the opposite
of ‘It is contingent that B holds of no A’ is ‘It is not contingent that B
holds of no A’, which is thought to be equivalent to ‘B holds of some A
by necessity’. Therefore, B holds of some A by necessity. But since a
particular necessary affirmative proposition converts, A also holds of
some B by necessity, which is impossible, since it was hypothesized that 10
it is contingent (in the way specified) that A holds of no B. Accordingly,
if this is impossible, so is the hypothesis from which it followed, namely
‘B holds of some A by necessity’, which was obtained by transforming ‘It
is not contingent that B holds of no A’. Therefore, the opposite, ‘It is
contingent that B holds of no A’ is true.
(37a14) Aristotle rejects this proof as not being sound. Having set out 15
the proof and being about to refute it, he does not first say ‘This is false’
or something of that kind; rather he turns directly to showing that such
a proof has not proceeded correctly. Consequently what is said seems in
a way rather obscure. For he says ‘for it is not the case that if it is not
contingent that B holds of no A, it is necessary that B holds of some A’.
With these words he censures the transformation of ‘It is not contingent 20
that B holds of no A’ (which is the opposite of ‘It is contingent that B
holds of no A’) into ‘B holds of some A by necessity’ as unsound. For it
is not at all the case that if ‘It is not contingent that B holds of no A’ is
true, thereby and as a result it is true that B holds of some A by
necessity. For the proposition which says ‘It is not contingent that B
holds of no A’ is also true if B does not hold of some A by necessity. And 25
the reason is that ‘It is contingent that B holds of all A’ converts with ‘It
is contingent that B holds of no A’; and the following are uniquely
opposite to them:352
(i) B does not hold of some A by necessity

to
(ii) It is contingent that B holds of all A
and
(iii) B holds of some A by necessity
142 Translation
to
(iv) It is contingent that B holds of no A
Either (i) or (iii) will do away with both (ii) and (iv); at least if (ii) and
30 (iv) are equivalent to one another and convert with one another, each of
(i) and (iii) does away with both (ii) and (iv); and when one of (ii) or (iv)
is done away with the other is. Consequently (iii) and (i) do away with
(iv), and (iii) does so per se, (i) accidentally (since it does away with (ii)
35 and thereby also does away with (iv)). But, if this is so, the negation of
224,1 (iv), ‘It is not contingent that B holds of no A’, will be true not only
because (iii) is true but because (i) is. For both do away with the opposite
5 of this, (iv), since (iv) cannot be true when (i) is. Consequently the person
who hypothesizes ‘It is not contingent that B holds of no A’ does not
always hypothesize it because (iii) holds, but also because (i) does. So,
if, given the hypothesis that it is not contingent that B holds of no A,
someone transforms it into (i) – which is no less a consequence of the
hypothesis than (iii)353 –, nothing impossible will follow.354 For it is not
10 the case that if B does not hold of some A by necessity, thereby A will
not also hold of some B by necessity. For a particular negative necessary
proposition does not convert.
This being so, nothing is proved by reductio ad impossibile. For if
animal is divided into rational and irrational and there are rational and
irrational animals and someone were to assume the existence of an
animal and say absolutely that it is irrational, he would say what is
15 absurd and not true, since it is contingent that it is rational when
rational is posited to be a consequence of animal no less than irrational
is; so too, if someone were to assume that ‘It is not contingent that B
holds of no A’ and say that it signifies (iii) only, he would say what is
absurd, since it is also possible355 that (i) is true.
356
And also it seems that only when (i) holds does the contingent
negative <universal> proposition not convert. For although it is contin-
20 gent that white holds of no human, it is not true that it is contingent
that human holds of nothing white. However, ‘It is not contingent that
human holds of nothing white’ is true not because human holds of
something white by necessity (since it wouldn’t be contingent that white
holds of every human if it held of some human by necessity) but because
25 human does not hold of something white by necessity. Therefore in the
case of conversions from ‘It is not contingent that B holds of no A’ to (iii)
the transformation would not be proper when the negation is not true
because of (iii) but because of (i).
37a17 For if B does not hold of some A357 by necessity, it is not true
to say that it is contingent that it does not hold of all, [just as if B
does hold of some A by necessity, it is not true to say that it is
Translation 143
contingent that it holds of all. So, if someone were to maintain
that, since it is not contingent that C holds of all D, it does not hold
of some by necessity, he would take things falsely. For it holds of
all, but we say that it is not contingent that it holds of all because
it holds of certain of them by necessity. Consequently both ‘X holds
of some Y by necessity’ and ‘X does not hold of some Y by necessity’
are opposite to ‘It is contingent that X holds of all Y’. And similarly
in the case of ‘It is contingent that X holds of no Y’.]
He says ‘It is contingent that it does not hold of all’ instead of ‘It is 30
contingent that it holds of none’.
Taking it that (i) follows from ‘It is not contingent that B holds of no
A’,358 he shows how it follows. For ‘It is not contingent that B holds of no
A’ is true when (i) holds and when (iii) does. For example, if (i), it is not
then true that it is contingent that B holds of no A. For, as I said, he 35
takes ‘It is contingent that it does not hold of all’ instead of ‘It is 225,1
contingent that it holds of none’, which also makes what he says less
clear. And if (iv) is not true when (i) is true, it is clear that the negation
of (iv) which says that it is not contingent that B holds of no A is true
then.
He also shows that this is how things are because of the fact that
again the affirmation (ii) is false not only if (i) is true but also if (iii) is. 5
For if (iii) holds, (ii) is false, since it is not contingent that B holds of
that of which it holds by necessity. And (iii) is related to (ii) in the same
way as (i) is to (iv). So (iv) will not be true when (i) is,359 since it is not 10
true that it is contingent that B does not hold of that of which it does
not hold by necessity. Therefore, the negation of (iv), ‘It is not contingent
that B holds of no A’, will be true when (i) is. So ‘It is not contingent that
B holds of no A’ is true not just when (iii) is, but also when (i) is, since
both (iii) and (i) do away with each of the universal contingent proposi- 15
tions (ii) and (iv). So the negation of either (ii) or (iv) is true no matter
which of (i) and (iii) is.
37a20 So, if someone were to maintain that since it is not contin-

gent that C holds of all D, it does not hold of some by necessity, he 20
would take things falsely. [For it holds of all,360 but we say that it
is not contingent that it holds of all because it holds of certain of
them by necessity. Consequently both ‘X holds of some Y by
necessity’ and ‘X does not hold of some Y by necessity’ are opposite
to ‘It is contingent that X holds of all Y’. And similarly in the case
of ‘It is contingent that X holds of no Y’.]
Taking it that (ii) does not follow from (i) but that it is clear that its
negation ‘It is not contingent that B holds of all A’ does, he uses this fact
to make it evident that ‘It is not contingent that B holds of all A’ is not
144 Translation
25 always true because (i) is. For it has been shown that it is also true
because (iii) is. Consequently the two particular necessary affirmative
and negative propositions <(i) and (ii)> will be opposites of (iv). So, if it
is hypothesized that C holds of all D and of some of D by necessity, the
proposition which says that it is contingent that C holds of all D is not
then true. The reason is not that C does not hold of some D by necessity
30 – for that isn’t true – but that it holds of some by necessity.
There is a reason why he takes it that C holds of all D and of some D
by necessity and that consequently the proposition which says that it is
contingent that C holds of all D is false; for by means of this he says that
the contingent negative proposition which is taken in the conversion,
35 namely (iv), is false because B holds of no A and does not hold of some
by necessity. For just as (ii) is false if B holds of all A and of some A by
226,1 necessity, so too (iv) is false if B holds of no A and does not hold of some
by necessity. Not just (i) but also (iii) does away with (ii), as has been
5 shown. But if both (i) and (iii) do away with (ii), both of them – not just
(iii) but also (i) – will do away with (iv), which is equivalent to (ii) and
converts with it. But since (iv) is equivalent to (ii) and it has been shown
that both (i) and (iii) do away with (ii), it is clear that the same two will
10 do away with (iv).
37a26 It is clear then that with respect to things which are

contingent and not contingent in the way which we have speci-
fied361 initially [it is necessary to take ‘B does not hold of some A
by necessity’ and not ‘B holds of some A by necessity’. But if this
is taken, nothing impossible results, so there is no syllogism. Thus
it is evident from what has been said that a privative <contingent
universal> proposition does not convert.]
Having shown that the two particular necessary and affirmative or
negative propositions <(i) and (iii)> do away with each of the universal
15 affirmative and negative propositions which are contingent in the way
specified <(ii) and (iv)>, he sets down the purpose for which he proved
these things. He says that in the case of the reductio ad impossibile
involving the conversion of a <universal negative> proposition which is
contingent in the way specified, it is necessary, having hypothesized ‘It
is not contingent that B holds of no A’, to transform this into (i). For (iv)
20 was not true362 because (i) was, but its negation, which says ‘It is not
contingent that B holds of no A’, was true because (i) was. For if ‘It is
contingent that A holds of no B’ is true then the proposition which says
‘It is contingent that B holds of no A’ <iv> can be false only because B
does not hold of some A by necessity <i>. For if it were false because B
holds of some A by necessity <iii>, ‘It is contingent that A holds of no B’
25 could not be true. For if B holds of some A by necessity <iii>, A holds of
some B by necessity because a necessary particular affirmative propo-
Translation 145
sition converts. But since the negation <‘It is not contingent that B holds
of no A’> is not transformed into this but into the particular negative
necessary proposition which makes it true <i.e., (i)>, nothing impossible
follows because a negative particular necessary proposition does not
convert. Therefore, a universal negative contingent proposition is not 30
proved or inferred to convert by reductio ad impossibile.
And at the same time from the fact that they are sometimes false
together it is also clear that (iii) is not the opposite of (iv) nor is it
equivalent to the negation of (iv), ‘It is not contingent that B holds of no 35
A’; but the person who wishes to show, using (iii), that a negative
contingent <universal> proposition converts transforms ‘It is not con-
tingent that B holds of no A’ into (iii), as if they were equivalent. For,
(iv) is also false when B holds of no A by necessity (because then it is 227,1
not contingent that B holds of all A), and so is (iii). For it is false that it
is contingent that irrationality holds of no human and also false that it
holds of some by necessity. For it is not the case that if the reductio ad
impossibile goes through in some cases in which the negation <‘It is not
contingent that B holds of no A’> holds (and it does go through when
(iii) holds) and does not go through in some ( e.g., when (i) holds), then
it is any more proved than not proved that a universal negative contin- 5
gent proposition converts; rather it is not proved because it is not this
way in all cases in which the negation is true. For it is necessary that
what is syllogistic be the same in all cases, and a counter-example to it
is sufficient, even if it is shown to hold in some case.363
<37a32-b18 Rejection of all second-figure combinations with two

contingent premisses>
37a32364 This having been shown, let it be assumed that it is 10
contingent that A holds of no B and contingent that it holds of all
C. [Then there will be no syllogism by conversion, since it has been
said that a premiss of this kind does not convert. But there won’t
be one by means of the impossible either. For if it is posited that
it is contingent that B holds of all C, nothing false results; for it
would be contingent that A holds of all C and that it holds of none.]
Having shown that a universal negative contingent proposition does not
convert, he next proves what he said before,365 that there is no syllogism
in the second figure from two contingent premisses. He sets out a first
combination in which the major is universal contingent negative and 15
the minor universal contingent affirmative. He does not mention as
being known the clear fact that nothing follows from two affirmatives.366
He says that the combination under consideration is non-syllogistic. For
first it cannot be proved by conversion. For in this figure with this sort
of combination, the first figure results when the negative premiss is
146 Translation
20 converted, but it has been shown that a contingent negative proposition
does not convert with itself.
Nor can it be proved by reductio ad impossibile, the method by which
combinations which cannot be proved by conversion are proved to yield
a conclusion. For if it is contingent that A holds of no B and contingent
that it holds of all C, then if someone wishing to prove that it follows
25 that it is contingent that B holds of no C takes the opposite of this
(namely ‘It is not contingent that B holds of no C’, which he transforms
into a universal affirmative necessary proposition), nothing false re-
sults. He has said ‘if it is posited that it is contingent that B holds of all
C’ instead of ‘if it is posited and hypothesized that B holds of all C by
necessity’. For ‘It is contingent that B holds of all C’, which is taken,
30 cannot be hypothesized as the opposite of ‘It is contingent that B holds
of no C’, since the one proposition is the same as the other, not its
opposite. But a universal affirmative necessary proposition, which he
seems to have taken, is not the opposite of a contingent universal
negative one either. Consequently, if one transforms the contingent
proposition into a necessary universal one, as we have done, one would
35 not in this way be taking and hypothesizing the opposite, which is what
one should do in reductio ad impossibile arguments.
It seems then that he goes beyond what is required when he takes
the universal affirmative necessary proposition as the opposite of the
universal contingent negative one and shows that nothing impossible
228,1 is a consequence; for if nothing impossible follows when the minor
premiss367 is posited as universal affirmative necessary, then so much
the more will nothing impossible follow if it is particular affirmative
necessary. For if the particular affirmative necessary proposition,
which is the opposite of the hypothesized conclusion, is hypothesized it
5 is shown similarly that nothing impossible follows. For if B holds of all
or some C by necessity, and it is also assumed that it is contingent that
A holds of no B, the result is a combination in the first figure having a
contingent negative major premiss and a necessary minor.368 The con-
clusion in such combinations is contingent. So it will follow that it is
10 contingent either that A holds of no C or that it does not hold of some.
For if BC has been taken as necessary universal affirmative – as he
hypothesizes – the conclusion will be universal negative contingent, ‘It
is contingent that A holds of no C’, which is not impossible, since it was
assumed that it is contingent that A holds of all C. And if BC is
15 particular negative necessary, the conclusion will again be particular
negative contingent; and in this case too what follows is not impossible
since it was assumed to be contingent that A holds of all C. But if it is
contingent that A holds of all C, it is contingent that it holds of none or
does not hold of some.
369
But if ‘It is not contingent that B holds of all C’ were transformed
into ‘B does not hold of some C by necessity’ (and ‘It is not contingent
Translation 147
that B holds of all C’ is also true370 when ‘B does not hold of some C by
necessity’ is), the combination will also be non-syllogistic. For the minor
in the first figure is negative particular necessary. 20
And it is possible that he has said ‘if it is posited that it is contingent
that B holds of all C’ with reference to the conclusion of the combination
under consideration, the conclusion which must be proved by reductio
ad impossibile – if it were possible to do so. (But then either (a) the text
would be defective and take the affirmative instead of the negative
proposition, since what should have been written is ‘if it is posited that 25
it is contingent that B does not hold of any C’ since this would be the
resulting conclusion; or (b) he has taken the affirmative as equivalent
to the negative; and if it is posited that this is the resulting conclusion
nothing impossible will be proved to follow from this by a reductio ad
impossibile. (He says ‘false’ instead of ‘impossible’.)) But if he has taken
‘It is contingent that B holds of all C’ as the conclusion, he has not 30
posited the method of reductio ad impossibile as it is understood. For if
<– following the correct procedure for reductio –> the opposite of ‘It is
contingent that B holds of no C’, i.e., ‘B holds of some C by necessity’, is
taken, it follows371 that it is contingent that A does not hold of some C’,
which is not impossible, since it is also contingent that it holds of all of
it (this was assumed) and that it is contingent that A holds of no C
(because the contingent affirmative proposition converts). But if it is 35
contingent that A holds of no C, it is clear that ‘It is contingent that A
does not hold of some C’ is not impossible.
37a38372 In general, if there is a syllogism, it is clear that the 229,1

conclusion will be contingent373 [because neither of the premisses
has been taken as unqualified. And it would be either affirmative
or privative. But it cannot be either. For if it is posited to be
affirmative, it will be shown using terms that it is not contingent
that B holds of C; and if it is taken to be privative it will be shown
that the conclusion is not contingent but necessary.
37b3 For let A be white, B human, C horse. Then it is contingent
that A, white, holds of all of one <of human and horse> and of none
of the other. But it is not contingent that B holds of C and not
contingent that it does not hold. It is evident that it is not possible
that it holds since no horse is human. But it is also not contingent
that it does not hold; for it is necessary that no horse is human, and
what is necessary is not contingent. Therefore there is no syllogism.
37b10 It will be proved similarly if the privative premiss is
posited conversely, and if both premisses are taken affirmatively
or privatively – for the proof will be through the same terms; and
also when one is universal, one particular, or both are particular
or indeterminate, or however else it is possible374 to transform the
148 Translation
premisses: for the demonstration will always be through the same
terms. It is evident, then, that there is no syllogism if both
premisses are posited as contingent.]
Having shown that it is not possible for the combination under consid-
eration to be proved syllogistic by either conversion or reductio ad
5 impossibile, he now also proves this same thing, going beyond what is
required. For he says that it is clear that, in general, if the combination
under consideration is syllogistic, the conclusion will be contingent
because both premises are contingent. For it has been shown that things
that follow by necessity syllogistically from premisses are similar to
what they follow from: if the premisses are possible and contingent,375
so is what follows from them, and if the premisses are necessary so is
10 what follows from them necessary. He obtained this result when he
showed that an impossibility does not follow from a possibility.376 (It is
necessary to understand the words ‘or necessary’ to be added to the
phrase ‘because neither of the premisses has been taken as unquali-
fied’.) So, if the combination under consideration is syllogistic, the
conclusion will be contingent and either affirmative or negative. But it
15 can’t be either; so there will not be a syllogism. The following considera-
tions make it clear that the conclusion can be neither affirmative or
negative: if we say that the conclusion is affirmative it is possible for it
to be shown using certain terms that ‘It is not contingent that B holds
of C’ follows, and this is not a contingent negative proposition equivalent
to an affirmation, but the negation of a contingent proposition; but if we
20 say that the conclusion is negative contingent, it is possible for it to be
shown again using the same terms that the conclusion is indeed nega-
tive but necessary and not contingent, and the necessary negative
conclusion which is proved will do away with both the contingent
affirmative and the contingent negative conclusion.
(37b3) He proves that this is how things are by taking the terms
25 white for A, human for B, and horse for C. For it is contingent that white
holds of no human and of every horse, and human holds of no horse by
necessity; and if it holds of none by necessity, it is not contingent that
it holds of horse and it is not contingent that it does not hold of horse.
He shows this as follows. Just as the contingent affirmation <‘It is
contingent that human holds of every horse’> is false because it is not
possible that human holds of horse, so too the contingent negative
proposition in these terms ‘It is contingent that human holds of no
horse’ will be false because human does not hold of horse by necessity.
30 It is not the case that it is contingent that human holds of no horse;
rather it holds of none by necessity
(37b10) He says that it will be proved in the same way that the
combination in which the privative premiss has been taken conversely
(the combination which has the major universal affirmative contingent,
Translation 149
the minor universal negative contingent) is also non-syllogistic; for it
cannot be proved to be syllogistic either by conversion or by reductio ad 35
impossibile. And the refutation is through the same terms.
And if both premisses are taken as universal affirmative, it will be
proved through the same terms that a contingent conclusion cannot
follow, whether the conclusion be universal affirmative or universal
negative or particular. For if B is shown to hold of no C by necessity, it 230,1
does away with all cases of contingency. And if both premisses are
negative. And also if one premiss is universal and the other particular
or both are particular, whether they are both affirmative or both
negative or in alternation,377 the same terms when set down will estab-
lish that these combinations are non-syllogistic by verifying the 5
premisses under consideration and the necessity of the conclusion.
378
However, one should not suppose that a universal negative neces-
sary conclusion always follows in the combinations under
consideration; nor should we ever think that these combinations are
syllogistic and yield a conclusion which is not contingent but necessary
negative. For it is possible to show in the case of other terms that B also
holds of all C by necessity. Aristotle does not mention this on the 10
grounds that he showed sufficiently that the combinations under con-
sideration are not syllogistic because in the case of contingent
premisses it is necessary that the conclusion be contingent, but it is
found to be necessary negative universal. But the conclusion is some-
times necessary universal affirmative. The following are terms which
show that B holds of all C by necessity. Let A be white, B human, C 15
literate. For it is contingent that white holds of every human, and it is
contingent that it holds of nothing literate, and human holds of every-
thing literate by necessity. Similarly if it is taken to be contingent that
moving holds of every animal and contingent that it holds of no human,
or conversely. Terms for the contingent universal affirmative are white,
moving, human. For it is contingent that white holds of all that moves 20
and that it holds of no human, and it is contingent that moving holds of
every human or of no human. In setting down <terms> only for the
necessary negative conclusion he was not contented with a deficient
number of terms; rather he <proceeded as he did> on the grounds that
it has been satisfactorily proved by setting down terms for a necessary
conclusion that all combinations of two contingent premisses in the
second figure are non-syllogistic.
1.18 Combinations with an unqualified and a contingent premiss

<37b19-38 Two universal premisses>
37b19379 If one premiss signifies380 unqualified holding and the 25
other contingency, if the affirmative is posited as unqualified [and
150 Translation
the privative as contingent, there will never be a syllogism,
whether the terms are taken as universal or particular; the dem-
onstration is the same and uses the same terms.]
Having shown that there is no syllogism from two contingent premisses
in the second figure, he turns to mixtures, and he first discusses
mixtures of an unqualified and a contingent premiss. He says that there
30 will be no syllogism if the unqualified premiss is affirmative and the
contingent one negative, however the premisses are taken to be <other-
wise>, it being evidently clear that nothing will follow syllogistically if
both premisses are affirmative.381
382
He says that the demonstration that nothing follows syllogistically
if the unqualified premiss is affirmative and the contingent one nega-
35 tive ‘is the same and uses the same terms’. A combination of this kind
is shown to be non-syllogistic because neither a universal negative
contingent proposition nor an unqualified affirmative universal one
231,1 converts. (For if the latter is converted, the result is a particular
affirmative major premiss in the first figure.)
383
Moreover, <such combinations are shown to be non-syllogistic>
because nothing is proved by reductio ad impossibile either. For if the
opposite of either a contingent conclusion or an unqualified one – if
5 someone were to say that the conclusion can be unqualified – is hy-
pothesized <for reductio>, it follows in the first figure that A holds of
some C when it was assumed that it is contingent that A holds of no C,
which is not impossible.
384
But <it can also be shown that these combinations are non-syllo-
gistic> by setting down the same terms. For if white, human, and horse
are taken, they show that the conclusion is neither contingent (affirm-
ative or negative) nor unqualified, but necessary negative; but if the
10 conclusion was inferred syllogistically, it must be either contingent or
unqualified since the premisses are of this kind.
But it is also possible to provide terms for ‘B holds of all C by
necessity’ and ‘B holds of no C by necessity’. He himself used white,
15 human, horse for ‘B holds of no C by necessity’. For, as has been said
before,385 one can take it that white holds of all of one of human and
horse and that it is contingent that it holds of none of the other, and
human holds of no horse by necessity. Terms for ‘B holds of all C by
necessity’ are white, human, literate. For let it be contingent that white
holds of no human and let it hold of everything literate; human holds of
everything literate by necessity. The situation is the same if the ex-
tremes are taken to be animal and human.
[37b23386 But there will be a syllogism when the affirmative

premiss signifies contingency and the privative unqualified hold-
ing. For let it be taken that A holds of no B and that it is contingent
Translation 151
that it holds of all C. If the privative premiss is converted, B will
hold of no A. But it was contingent that A holds of all C. The result
is a syllogism through the first figure that it is contingent that B
holds of no C. The situation is the same if the privative is posited
in relation to C.]
If the contingent premiss is taken to be universal affirmative and the 20
unqualified one universal negative, there will be a syllogism if the
universal negative unqualified premiss is converted, since in this way
there will be the first figure, and the conclusion will be that it is
contingent that B holds of no C. This is so no matter which term the
unqualified privative is posited in relation to; for he says that if the
minor premiss is taken as universal negative unqualified and the major
as universal affirmative contingent, there will be the same syllogism if 25
the negative unqualified premiss is converted. Thus, let it be contingent
that A holds of all B and let A hold of no C. If AC is converted, the result
is that C holds of no A, and it is contingent that A holds of all B.
Therefore, it is contingent that C holds of no B. But since the conclusion
of this syllogism is contingent and a contingent negative proposition 30
does not convert, how will there be an inference to the proposed conclu-
sion? For it is proved through the premisses assumed that it is
contingent that C holds of no B, but not that it is contingent that B holds
of no C, because a contingent negative proposition does not convert. But
it is necessary that B be predicated in the conclusion, since it is assumed
as the major term. So what follows is not contingent in the way specified, 35
but in the sense in which contingency is true of what holds.387 For it was
proved388 that this is what follows if the major premiss is taken as
negative unqualified in the first figure. If this is so, then the conclusion
also converts since it is universal negative unqualified,389 but otherwise
it doesn’t. He will also make it clear in what follows that the conclusion 232,1
is of this kind and not contingent in the way specified.390 And he has
already said at the beginning of his discussion of the second figure, ‘And
in these cases too it is necessary to take the contingency in the conclu-
sion as it was taken in the preceding.’391
392
<Another possibility rests on the idea that> a contingent negative 5
proposition is equivalent to a contingent affirmative one and converts
with respect to it, so that the contingent negative would convert in the
same way as affirmative propositions. But particular affirmative propo-
sitions convert from universal affirmative ones. So if the conclusion CB
is converted in this way the result will be that it is contingent that B
does not hold of some C.
393
Someone might ask how anything follows syllogistically in combi- 10
nations of this kind. For it is possible to show by setting down the same
terms that neither a contingent negative conclusion nor an unqualified
one follows. For if the premisses are related in this way there is an
152 Translation
inference involving terms to both ‘B holds of no C by necessity’ and ‘B
holds of all C by necessity’. For consider that white holds unqualifiedly
15 of nothing human, and it is contingent that white holds of every horse,
and human holds of no horse by necessity, but it is necessary that the
conclusion be either contingent or unqualified. And it is also possible to
take terms for ‘B holds of all C by necessity’. For again white holds of
no human, and it is contingent that white holds of everything literate,
and human holds of everything literate by necessity. Therefore there is
an inference to a universal affirmative and a universal negative <nec-
essary> conclusion.
20 But perhaps the proposition that white holds of no human is tempo-
rally restricted because it is assumed that it is contingent that white
holds of everything literate. For when it is contingent that white
already holds of everything literate, at that time it is false that white
holds of no human.394 But its being proved that395 ‘B holds of no C by
necessity’ is sufficient for rejecting the combination.
But also if we take the premisses conversely – i.e., as ‘It is contingent
that white holds of every human’ and ‘White holds of no horse’ – the
25 premisses are again true, but the conclusion is necessary negative since
human holds of no horse by necessity. For it is not possible to censure
the universal negative unqualified premiss as false; for every negative
unqualified universal proposition is of this kind, just as every affirm-
ative one is. He himself makes it clear that this is so by using such
30 universal unqualified propositions throughout. Consequently it seems
that he posits these combinations as syllogistic by only paying attention
to the conversion of the unqualified negative premiss and by not inves-
tigating them using terms. For if someone requires that we take as
universal what holds always but not what holds at some time, he will
be requiring nothing else than that the unqualified be necessary, since
35 the necessary does always hold. Furthermore, he himself, when he is
considering an unqualified proposition with respect to terms does not
ever consider it with respect to terms of this kind.
396
Furthermore, it is necessary to make use of the fact that the
conclusion is not contingent in the way specified, as he showed in the
case of mixtures in the first figure in which the major premiss is
233,1 necessary universal negative and the minor is contingent. For he said
<then> that the negative conclusion will not be contingent in the way
specified. 397And the conclusion in the case of a mixture of the present
kind must also be of this kind if only the negative and not the affirm-
ative conclusion follows because in their case the negative unqualified
5 premiss is temporally restricted. Consequently, even if what follows is
necessary negative, one can say that the conclusion of the syllogism is
unqualified negative because not holding is also true when not holding
by necessity is. For it is true that something doesn’t hold if it doesn’t
hold by necessity. But this was also said before:398 that it is not possible
Translation 153
for a conclusion to be necessary if neither of the premisses is necessary.
And he said about such mixtures, ‘But there will not be a syllogism of 10
by necessity not holding’.399
Or did he say that there will not always be a syllogism of by necessity
not holding?
37b29400 But if both premisses are privative and one signifies not 15
holding, [the other contingency, nothing results through the pre-
misses taken themselves. But if the contingent premiss is
converted there is a syllogism that it is contingent that B holds of
no C, just as in the preceding. For again there will be the first
figure.]
He says that if both of the premisses are privative there will be a
syllogism if the contingent negative premiss is converted into a contin-
gent affirmative one. And in the case of this combination the conclusion
‘It is contingent that B holds of no C’ will not be contingent in the way
specified, as he proved. For conversion produces a negative unqualified
major in the first figure.401 He himself also indicates this when he adds, 20
‘just as in the preceding. For again there will be the first figure’. For
with these words he indicates the conversion of the unqualified negative
premiss and the quality of the conclusion.
[37b35402 But if both premisses are posited as affirmative, there

will not be a syllogism. Terms for holding: health, animal, human.
Terms for not holding: health, horse, human.]
He shows that in this figure there is no syllogism if both premisses, the
unqualified one and the contingent one, are taken as universal affirm- 25
ative by setting down terms in the way that is customary for him to do.
Terms for holding are health, animal, human. For let it be contingent
that health holds of every animal, and let it hold of every human; and
animal holds of every human by necessity. Terms for not holding are
health, horse, human. For again horse holds of no human by necessity.
<37b39-38a12 At most one universal premiss>403

[37b39404 The situation will be the same in the case of the particu-
lar syllogisms. For when the affirmative premiss is unqualified
whether it is taken as universal or particular, there will be no
syllogism; this is proved in the same way and through the same
terms as in the preceding.
38a3 But when the privative premiss is unqualified, there will
be a syllogism by conversion, just as in the preceding.]
154 Translation
30 The situation is the same in the case of particular syllogisms as it was
in the case of the universal ones, where syllogistic combinations resulted
when the unqualified premiss was taken as negative. For if the unquali-
fied premiss is taken as negative universal, the contingent as particular,
there will be particular syllogisms, whether the major or the minor is
taken as unqualified. However, if the major is taken as unqualified,
35 what follows is known. But if the minor is taken as unqualified and it
234,1 is contingent that A holds of some B and A holds of no C, it is clear that
C holds of no A. But it is contingent that A holds of some B. The result
is that it is contingent that C does not hold of some B. If this proposition
is contingent in the way specified, it will also be contingent that B does
not hold of some C because both particular contingent propositions
convert.405 But if it is not contingent in the way specified, as he showed
5 before,406 the combination will be syllogistic but the conclusion will not
be the one proposed. For the minor term will remain predicated in the
conclusion because a particular negative does not convert if it is either
unqualified or necessary. However, he himself does not clearly say that
the combination is also syllogistic when the minor is universal unquali-
fied negative and the major is taken as contingent particular. For a
10 combination in the second figure having a particular major is not
syllogistic at all.
407
But there is no syllogism if the unqualified premiss is affirmative.
The proof is through the same terms – health, animal, human, and
health, horse, human – since it is possible to take the universal contin-
gent and the particular contingent using the same terms. Nor will
15 reductio ad impossibile go through in this case.
[38a4408 Again, if both intervals are taken as privative and the not
holding is universal, necessity will not result from the premisses
themselves. But if the contingent premiss is converted just as in
the preceding, there will be a syllogism.]
But if both premisses are taken as negative and again the unqualified
one is universal, there will be a syllogistic combination, not <directly>
through the premisses assumed, but when, again, the contingent nega-
tive particular premiss is transformed into its equivalent, a particular
affirmative contingent proposition.
[38a8409 But if the privative premiss is unqualified and it is taken

as particular, there will not be a syllogism, no matter whether the
other premiss is affirmative or privative.]
Nor will there be a syllogism if the unqualified particular premiss is
taken as negative and the other contingent premiss is universal and
Translation 155
either affirmative or negative, because it is clear that the particular
negative unqualified premiss does not convert.
[38a10 Nor will there be a syllogism when both premisses are

taken as indeterminate – whether affirmative or negative – or as
particular. The demonstration is the same and through the same
terms.]
And there will be no syllogism if both premisses are taken as particular
or indeterminate, whatever they are in quality. And he says that this is
proved through the same terms, that is, again, health, animal, human
for holding and health, horse, human for not holding. For the premisses 25
are also true in the case of these terms when they are taken as
particular.
1.19 Combinations with a necessary and a contingent premiss410

<38a13-38b23 Two universal premisses>
38a13411 If one premiss signifies necessity and the other contin-
gency, [then if the privative premiss is necessary, there will be a
syllogism of which the conclusion is not just that it is contingent
that B does not hold of C but also that B does not hold of C; but
there will not be a syllogism if the affirmative premiss is neces-
sary.]
He turns to the mixture of a necessary and a contingent premiss in the
second figure and shows which combinations with this kind of mixture 30
are syllogistic. He says that there will be a syllogism when the contin-
gent premiss is universal affirmative and the necessary premiss is taken
as negative universal. The conclusion will be contingent, but not in the
way specified, but rather it will be of not holding. He already proved
this, because he has said earlier412 that in the first figure, if the negative 35
major premiss is either necessary or unqualified, the conclusion is not
contingent in the way specified because when the necessary negative
premiss in combinations of this kind in the second figure is converted
the result is the first figure having the major premiss necessary nega- 235,1
tive. He sets down how this comes about:
38a16413 Let it, then,414 be assumed that A holds of no B by

necessity, and that it is contingent that A holds of all C. [If the
privative premiss is converted, B will also hold of no A; but it was
contingent that A holds of all C. Again there results through the
first figure a syllogism that it is contingent that B holds of no C.
At the same time it is clear that B does not hold415 of any C. For let
156 Translation
it be assumed to hold of C. Then if it is not contingent that A holds
of any B, but B holds of some C, it is not contingent that A holds
of some C, but it was assumed to be contingent that it holds of all.]
5 If the negative necessary premiss is converted, B holds of no A by
necessity. But it is contingent that A holds of all C. The result is the
first figure having as conclusion that it is contingent that B holds of no
C, but this is not contingency in the way specified, as he indicates when
he says ‘At the same time it is clear that B does not hold of any C’. And
10 he proves by reductio ad impossibile that the conclusion is universal
negative unqualified and not contingent in the way specified. For if it is
not true that B holds of no C, let the opposite of this be taken and let it
be assumed that B holds of some C. But it was assumed that A holds of
no B by necessity – for this is what the words ‘it is not contingent that
A holds of any B’ signify.416 But B holds of some C. The result is that A
15 does not hold of some C by necessity, since he proved417 that in the first
figure when the major is necessary and the minor unqualified the
conclusion is necessary. Therefore, as he says, A does not hold of some
C by necessity, which is impossible, since it was hypothesized that it is
contingent that A holds of all C. Therefore the hypothesis from which
this conclusion follows is impossible. Therefore its opposite <is the
20 case>. But this is ‘B holds of no C’.
418
It is necessary to understand that this proof and the impossibility
which it infers cohere because he thinks that it is true that in the first
figure the conclusion from a necessary major and an unqualified minor
is necessary. A proof of this kind does not go through according to those
who say that the conclusion of such mixtures is unqualified because <on
25 that view> nothing impossible follows. For what follows from the hy-
pothesis which says that B holds of some C and from the necessary
assumption ‘A holds of no B by necessity’ is ‘A does not hold of some C’,
which is not at all impossible when it is assumed that it is contingent
that A holds of all C; for nothing prevents it being at the same time true
30 that it is contingent that A holds of all C and that it does not hold of
some C.
38a25419 This will be proved in the same way if420 the privative is
posited in relation to C.
According to Aristotle, if the minor is taken to be universal negative
necessary and the major contingent universal affirmative, the conclu-
35 sion will be the proposed one because, according to him, the conclusion
236,1 is unqualified negative, so that it will also convert. For if it is contingent
that A holds of all B and it holds of no C by necessity, C also holds of no
A by necessity. But it is contingent that A holds of all B. Therefore it is
contingent that C holds of no B – and now contingency is predicated of
Translation 157
holding. Since, then, a universal negative unqualified proposition con- 5
verts, B also holds of no C; and this is what was required to be inferred.
421
But if the conclusion were not unqualified but contingent in the
way specified, it would not be contingent that B holds of no C because
a universal negative contingent proposition does not convert. So the
proof will not be of the proposed conclusion; but, if there is a proof, a
particular contingent would be inferred because, according to him, a 10
particular contingent proposition converts from a contingent universal
negative one since it is affirmative.
422
However, according to those for whom the conclusion in the proof
under consideration is contingent but not unqualified, the proposed
universal contingent negative conclusion will follow because they main-
tain that a universal contingent negative proposition also converts with
itself.
[38a26423 Again let the affirmative premiss be necessary and the

other be contingent, and let it be contingent that A holds of no B
and let A hold of all C by necessity. There will be no syllogism
when the terms are related in this way, since it results that424 B
does not hold of C by necessity. For let A be white, B human, C
swan. White holds of swan by necessity, and it is contingent that
it holds of no human; and human holds of no swan by necessity. It
is evident then that there is no syllogism with a contingent conclu-
sion, since what is necessary is not contingent.
38a36 And there is no syllogism with a necessary conclusion
either. For what is necessary results either from two necessary
premisses or from a privative necessary premiss.
38a38 Moreover with these premisses assumed it is also possible
that B holds of C. For nothing prevents C being under B and it
being contingent that A holds of all B and that A holds of all C by
necessity, for example, if C is being awake, B animal, A change.
For change holds of what is awake by necessity, and it is contin-
gent that it holds of every animal, and everything awake is an
animal.
38b2 So it is evident that there is no syllogism that B does not
hold of C either, since when the premisses are related in this way
it is necessary that B holds of C.
38b3 Nor is there a syllogism of the opposite affirmations, so that
there will be no syllogism.]
He shows by setting down terms that there is no syllogism in this figure 15
when the necessary premiss is posited as affirmative and the contingent
premiss as negative. He shows first using terms that in such a combi-
nation the conclusion is ‘B holds of no C by necessity’; he takes white,
human, swan. For it is contingent that white holds of no human, it holds
158 Translation
20 of every swan by necessity, and human holds of no swan by necessity.
Having shown with the assumed terms a necessary negative conclusion
in the case of such a combination, he says that the finding of a necessary
conclusion in the case of certain terms is a sufficient indication that the
conclusion is not contingent, and he says that the contingent is different
from the necessary.
(38a36) He next adds that the conclusion will not be necessary
25 negative either. (This <kind of conclusion> is what he proved using the
terms he set down.) For if things turned out this way in the case of all
material terms, someone could say that the combination is syllogistic,
and what follows is necessary, not contingent. He first takes it that this
is not possible on the basis of what has already been proved and is
assumed. For it is assumed that in the second figure the conclusion is
30 necessary if either both premisses are necessary or the negative one
is;425 for if the negative premiss is necessary and universal, there results
by conversion a necessary major premiss in the first figure. But he
thought that when this is so, the conclusion is necessary if the minor is
unqualified. But since the other premiss is contingent, he says that the
35 conclusion is not necessary at all. Because in the second figure the
conclusion from one assumed necessary premiss is necessary only if the
premiss is negative universal necessary, but in the combination under
consideration the necessary premiss is not negative but affirmative, the
conclusion is not necessary. (But in fact, as I said,426 <when the premiss
40 is negative universal necessary> the conclusion does not turn out to be
necessary either because of the contingent premiss.)
237,1 (38a38) However, he also shows that the conclusion cannot be neces-
sary negative by setting down terms. He shows that the conclusion is
also ‘B holds of all C by necessity’, and he specifies the sort of material
terms with respect to which this can come about. For if the last term C
is under the major extreme B and it is contingent that the middle term
5 A holds of all and also of none of the major B, and it holds of all C by
necessity, B will hold of all C by necessity. He takes as terms related in
this way to one another change for A, animal for B, being awake for C.
For it is contingent that change holds of every animal, and if this is so,
it is also contingent that it holds of none. (For he is assuming a
contingent negative premiss, but he takes an affirmative contingent as
10 being the same as it.) And changing holds of everything awake by
necessity, at least if being awake is acting and changing in the sense of
perceiving. And animal holds of everything awake by necessity. The
proof would be clearer if walking were taken instead of being awake.
For it is prima facie clearer that change holds of what walks by
necessity than that it does of what is awake; and animal holds similarly
of all that walks by necessity .
15 (38b2) And having shown that in the combination under considera-
tion both ‘B holds of all C by necessity’ and ‘B holds of no C by necessity’
Translation 159
follow, he says that it is evident that the conclusion will not be negative
unqualified either; for it has been shown that what follows is affirm-
ative necessary in the case of the terms set out. For it is not just the
affirmative unqualified universal proposition which is destructive of
the negative unqualified one; rather, the necessary affirmative one is
even more destructive of it. At any rate both of the negative propositions 20
<‘B holds of no C’ and ‘B holds of no C by necessity’> have been
destroyed by the setting down of <terms for> ‘B holds of all C by
necessity’.
38b3427 Nor is there a syllogism of the opposite affirmations, [so

that there will be no syllogism.]
It is clear that he means by ‘opposites’ the opposites of the negative
propositions, both the universal necessary one and the universal un-
qualified one. It was shown428 that a universal affirmative necessary
proposition does away with these two negative propositions. A particu- 25
lar contingent affirmative proposition is the contradictory opposite of a
necessary universal <negative> and a particular unqualified affirm-
ative proposition is the contradictory opposite of an unqualified
universal <negative>. So it is not possible to say that any of these follow.
He has shown that neither of these negative propositions follows by 30
using material terms to set down the universal affirmative necessary
proposition, which does away with both of them. And he shows again
that none of the affirmative propositions opposite to them, whether
contradictory or contrary, follows by also inferring the universal nega-
tive necessary proposition, which does away with every affirmative
proposition and which has been previously shown using material terms.
Consequently none of the affirmative propositions which are opposite
to these universal negative propositions, not only the contradictory
opposites but also the contraries, follows. For again the necessary 35
universal negative proposition does away with all affirmatives. But if
there was going to be a syllogism it would have been necessary that one
of these things which have been done away with follow. But none of
these follow; so nothing follows syllogistically.
It is also possible that ‘Nor is there a syllogism of the opposite 238,1
affirmations’ is meant to be equivalent to ‘Nor will there be a syllogism
of the opposite assertions’,429 so that he would be saying not affirmations
but assertions, i.e., propositions – since it is also his custom to predicate
the name ‘assertion’ of propositions.430 The propositions in question
would be the contradictory opposites of the ones which have been
proved, namely the universal negative necessary proposition and the 5
universal affirmative necessary one. The contradictory opposites of
these are particular contingent propositions, in one case an affirmative
proposition and in the other a negative. For he means that nothing
160 Translation
particular will follow because the universal negative necessary propo-
sition does away with all affirmative propositions and again the
universal affirmative <necessary> proposition does away with all nega-
10 tive ones. So, if nothing universal or particular follows, nothing will
follow at all.
[38b4431 It will also be proved similarly if the affirmative premiss

is posited conversely.]
Similarly, if, conversely, the major is taken to be necessary affirmative
and the minor to be contingent negative universal. For the refutation is
through the same terms. For if white is assigned to A, swan to B, and
human to C, white holds of every swan by necessity, it is contingent that
15 it holds of no human, and swan holds of no human by necessity. But the
terms which he set down for ‘B holds of all C by necessity’ when he took
the minor as necessary affirmative do not show that B holds of all C by
necessity if they are taken conversely. For it is not the case that if change
holds of everything awake by necessity and it is contingent that it holds
of no animal, thereby also being awake holds of every animal by
necessity. But <rejection of> the universal negative is sufficient to reject
20 the combination as non-syllogistic. For, as he said,432 a necessary propo-
sition follows <only> when both premisses are necessary or the major
premiss is necessary negative.
433
I was perplexed about why these combinations having one premiss
universal affirmative necessary and the other contingent universal
negative are not syllogistic. For it seems possible for a contingent
25 universal negative conclusion to be proved by reductio ad impossibile.
For if it is assumed that A holds of all B by necessity and that it is
contingent that it holds of no C, I say that it is contingent that B holds
of no C. For if not, it is not contingent that it holds of no C, i.e., it holds
of some C by necessity. But A also holds of all B by necessity. Therefore,
A holds of some C by necessity, which is impossible, since it was
assumed that it is contingent that A holds of none of it.
30 It will be proved similarly if the minor is necessary and the major
contingent. For it follows by reductio ad impossibile in the first figure
that it is contingent that A does not hold of some C, when it is assumed
to hold of all C by necessity. And it follows in the third figure that A
holds of some B by necessity when it was assumed that it is contingent
that it holds of none. If this is the way things are, then either reductio
35 ad impossibile should be rejected as insufficient to show that a combi-
nation is syllogistic, or, if this cannot be rejected, it would seem that
material terms are not sufficient to reject a combination as non-syllo-
gistic. I have also said what the solution of this difficulty is in my book
on mixtures.
Translation 161
[38b6434 But if the premisses are similar in form, if they are

privative there will always be a syllogism if the contingent premiss
is converted, just as in the preceding. For let it be taken that A
does not hold of B by necessity and that it is contingent that it does
not hold of C. Then, if the premisses are converted,435 B holds of no
A and it is contingent that A holds of all C. The result is the first
figure.
Likewise, too, if the privative is posited in relation to C.]
He shows how there is a syllogism and what follows if both premisses 239,1
are privative (and obviously universal – for this is missing from the text),
the contingent negative premiss again being transformed into the
affirmative, which converts with it. For the result of converting the
necessary premiss is the first figure having the major premiss universal 5
negative necessary and the minor universal affirmative contingent. It
was proved436 that a combination of this kind is syllogistic and that here
too the conclusion is not contingent in the way specified.
The combination is syllogistic whichever extreme the necessary
negative is posited in relation to, but if the minor is necessary, <the
proof is> through three437 conversions, since it is also necessary to 10
convert the conclusion; the conclusion does convert since it is not
contingent in the way specified (as he thinks has been proved); rather
it is universal negative unqualified. He says ‘if the premisses are
converted’ with reference to the combination having a necessary nega-
tive major. For it is necessary that both premisses be converted, but not
in the same way; the contingent negative premiss is converted into an 15
affirmative one, but the universal negative necessary premiss is con-
verted by terms into a negative necessary one. In this way the first
figure results. But when the universal necessary negative premiss is
the minor, there are three conversions: the two premisses are con-
verted, as already described, and in addition the conclusion is
converted.
[38b13438 But if the premisses are posited as affirmative, there will

not be a syllogism. For it is evident that there will not be a
syllogism that B does not hold of C or does not hold by necessity,
because a privative premiss, unqualified or necessary, has not
been taken. But neither will there be a syllogism which con-
cludes that it is contingent that B does not hold of C. For if the
premisses are this way, B will not hold of C by necessity, for
example if A is posited as white, B is swan, C human. Nor will
there be syllogisms of the opposite affirmations since it has been
shown that B does not hold of C by necessity. Therefore there is
no syllogism at all.]
162 Translation
20 <He says that> if both premisses are taken affirmatively, ‘there will not
be a syllogism’, and this is reasonable because nothing affirmative
follows in the second figure at all. He says that there will not be a
negative conclusion because no negative premiss, whether unqualified
or necessary, is assumed. (For if an unqualified or necessary premiss is
negative, the conclusion is negative; for a contingent and negative
25 premiss which is taken is equivalent to an affirmative.) Having said that
there is not a negative conclusion, he says ‘But neither will there be a
syllogism which concludes that it is contingent that B does not hold of
C’, taking ‘It is contingent that B does not hold of C’ as either not
negative or only negative in its verbal expression because it converts
with the affirmative. He shows that there is not a syllogism with the
conclusion that it is contingent that B does not hold of C by setting down
terms for ‘B holds of no C by necessity’, terms which he has already
30 used.439 For white holds of every swan by necessity and it is contingent
that it holds of every human, and swan holds of no human by necessity.
He says that from the setting down of the terms for ‘B holds of no C by
necessity’ it is also clear that in this combination nothing affirmative
follows syllogistically. For ‘B holds of no C by necessity’ does away with
every affirmative proposition. Having said that a negative proposition
35 does not follow because a negative premiss, whether unqualified or
necessary, was not taken, and having shown using terms that ‘B holds
of no C by necessity’ – which does away with the affirmations opposite
to the negative propositions –, he has shown that nothing follows. (The
words ‘Nor will there be syllogisms of the opposite affirmations’ are
equivalent to ‘Nor will there be syllogisms of the affirmatives which are
opposite to the negative propositions’.)
240,1 However, it is also possible to show by setting down terms for B holds
of all C by necessity, that <the possibility> that a negative conclusion
follows is done away with. For let it be contingent that change holds of
every animal and let it hold of all that walks by necessity. The result is
that animal holds of all that walks by necessity.
440
In the case of this combination too someone might ask why it
5 cannot be proved by reductio ad impossibile that what follows syllogis-
tically is that it is contingent that B holds of no C. For if it is assumed
that A holds of all B by necessity and that it is contingent that it holds
of all C, one could say that something follows – ‘It will be contingent
that B holds of no C’. For if not, it is not contingent that B holds of no
C, i.e., B holds of some C by necessity. But also A holds of all B by
necessity. Therefore, A holds of some C by necessity, which is impossi-
10 ble, since it was assumed that it is contingent that A holds of all C and
<therefore> also of no C.
Translation 163
<38b24-37 At most one universal premiss>

38b24441 The case will be similar with particular syllogisms.442
[For when the privative premiss is universal and necessary, there
will always be a syllogism of which the conclusion is both contin-
gent and unqualified; the demonstration is by conversion.
38b27443 But there will never be when the affirmative premiss is
universal and necessary; for it will be shown in the same way as
in the case of the universal syllogisms and with the same terms.]
He has turned to particular syllogisms, and he shows that in their case
too if the privative premiss is universal and necessary and the contin-
gent premiss is particular there will be a syllogism with a particular
conclusion, but otherwise there will not. And it is clear that in the second 15
figure the combination of a necessary affirmative major and a contin-
gent negative minor is not syllogistic, just as the combination of an
unqualified affirmative major and a contingent negative minor is not
(although the combination of a necessary and an unqualified premiss
taken in this way is syllogistic444).
He says that the conclusion will be both ‘It is contingent that B does 20
not hold of C’ – it is necessary to understand this445 – and ‘B does not
hold of C’ because it has been proved that in the first figure when the
major premiss is negative necessary the conclusion is not contingent in
the way specified. But when the negative necessary premiss <in the
cases now under consideration> is converted it becomes a necessary
major premiss in the first figure.
(38b27) He says that when the necessary premiss is affirmative, 25
there will be no syllogism, just as it was shown446 that there is none
when both premisses were universal and the necessary premiss was
affirmative. For this was shown because ‘B holds of no C by necessity’
followed in the case of certain terms; he showed this in the case of white,
human, and swan. And a necessary conclusion was not possible in the
second figure unless either both premisses or just the privative one was
necessary. And he also set down terms for ‘B holds of all C by necessity’ 30
in the case of the other combination, namely change, animal, being
awake. For animal holds of everything awake by necessity.
However, it should be noted that this combination too can be proved
by reductio ad impossibile to imply syllogistically that it is contingent
that B does not hold of some C. For, if this is not so, the opposite <is the
case>, ‘It is not contingent that B does not hold of some C’, i.e., ‘B holds 35
of all C by necessity’. But it was assumed that A holds of all B by
necessity. Therefore A holds of all C by necessity, which is impossible
since it was assumed that it is contingent that A holds of some C and
that it does not hold of some C.447
164 Translation
[38b29448 Nor will there be a syllogism when both premisses are
taken as affirmative; for the demonstration of this is the same as
before.]
241,1 And there will not be a syllogism when both premisses are affirmative,
but one is universal, the other particular. For there wasn’t when both
were universal and taken in this way. For it was shown using terms
that when both premisses are affirmative what follows is negative
necessary. The terms set down were white, human, swan.
5 Nevertheless, it is also possible to prove by reductio ad impossibile
that this combination syllogistically implies that it is contingent that B
does not hold of some C. For if not, it is not contingent that B does not
hold of some C, i.e., B holds of all C by necessity. But it is assumed that
AB is necessary. It follows that A holds of all C by necessity, but it was
assumed that it is contingent that it holds of some and does not hold of
some.
10 38b31449 But when both premisses are privative and the one
signifying not holding is universal and necessary, [there will be no
necessity through the premisses taken themselves, but if the
contingent premiss is converted there will be a syllogism, just as
in the preceding.]
He has proved that there will be no syllogism when both premisses are
affirmative, whether the necessary or the contingent premiss is univer-
sal. He now discusses combinations of two negative premisses and says
that there will be a syllogism if the necessary premiss is negative
15 universal. (This is what he means by ‘the one signifying not holding is
universal and necessary’.) In a combination of this kind if the particular
negative contingent premiss is transformed into a particular affirmative
and the universal necessary negative premiss is converted, the result is
the same as in the other cases in which the combination was syllogistic
and the necessary premiss was negative universal.
[38b35 If both premisses are posited as indeterminate or particu-

lar, there will not be a syllogism. The demonstration is the same
and is through the same terms.]
20 He says that if both premisses are taken as indeterminate or particular,
whatever quality they have, they will not be syllogistic. He says that
the demonstration ‘is through the same terms’. He means it is through
the same terms through which he proved in the first figure that combi-
nations of two particular premisses, one necessary and one contingent,
25 are non-syllogistic.450 The terms for holding of all by necessity are white,
animal, human. It is clear that white is the middle term in this figure.
Translation 165
It was also the middle term in the first figure, but not in the same
ordering. For in that case animal held of something white by necessity
and white held contingently of some human. 451Now white holds of some
animal, e.g., swan, by necessity and again does not hold of some animal,
e.g., raven, by necessity. And again it is contingent that it holds of some 30
animals and that it does not hold of some animals, e.g., humans. And
animal holds of everything human by necessity.
452
Terms for holding of none were white, animal, and soulless. Again
white is the middle. Again it holds of some animals by necessity and
does not hold of some by necessity, and it is contingent that it holds of
some soulless things and contingent that it does not hold of some. And
animal holds of nothing soulless by necessity.
It is also possible that ‘through the same terms’ is said of the terms 35
he used a short while ago when the premisses were universal and
affirmative.453 These were white, swan, human for holding of none by
necessity, and, for holding of all by necessity, change, animal, being 242,1
awake. For if with these terms we do not take the premisses as univer-
sal as we did then, but as particular, the inference to both ‘B holds of all
C by necessity’ and ‘B holds of no C by necessity’ can be proved with the
premisses being true.
<38b38-39a3 Concluding remarks on chapters 18-19>

38b38454 It is evident from what has been said that if the privative 5
premiss is posited as universal [necessary, there is always a
syllogism which concludes not only that it is contingent that B
does not hold of C, but also that B does not hold of C; but there is
never a syllogism if the affirmative premiss is posited as universal
necessary. And it is evident that there is or is not a syllogism in
the case of necessary premisses and in the case of unqualified ones
when the premisses are related in the same way. It is also clear
that all the syllogisms are incomplete and that they are completed
through the figures previously discussed.]
It is assumed that a combination in the second figure is syllogistic if one
premiss is necessary negative universal and the other is contingent and
either universal (whether affirmative or negative) or again particular
(whether affirmative or negative). And it has also been shown that the 10
conclusion, which is negative, is not contingent in the way specified.
(This is what ‘not only that it is contingent that B does not hold of C,
but also that B does not hold of C’ means; for it is thought that the
conclusion is both because contingency is also predicated of what is
unqualified.) And it has been shown that a combination is not syllogistic
if the affirmative premiss is taken to be necessary.
And it has also been shown that in mixtures of unqualified and 15
166 Translation
contingent premisses and of necessary and contingent ones, if the
necessary and the unqualified premiss are posited in the same way, the
combinations are syllogistic; for <holding the contingent premiss fixed>
when the unqualified premiss was universal negative, the necessary
premiss was taken in the same way in syllogistic combinations; and
when the necessary premiss is not taken as universal negative, the
combinations again are non-syllogistic in the same way.
20 And it has also been shown that all the syllogisms from mixed
premisses in the second figure are incomplete, since universally the
syllogisms in the second figure are incomplete because they are com-
pleted by reduction to the first figure.
He may have said ‘the figures previously discussed’ instead of ‘the
25 first figure’; for the completion of the syllogisms under consideration is
through the first figure – and it is one figure; or he may have said
‘figures’ instead of ‘combinations’;455 for the syllogisms under considera-
tion are completed through the combinations in the first figure through
which he proved them to be syllogistic and to which they are reduced by
conversion and thereby completed; and he might call them figures. (The
syllogisms were proved by means of the second and fourth <first-figure
combinations>).456
1.20-2 The third figure

1.20 Combinations with two contingent premisses
<39a4-13 Introduction to chapters 20-2>
39a4457 In the last figure if one or both premisses are contingent,

there will be a syllogism. [When the premisses signify contin-
gency, the conclusion will also be contingent (and also when one
signifies contingency and the other holding).
39a8 But when one premiss is posited as necessary, if it is
affirmative, the conclusion will not be necessary or unqualified;
but if it is privative there will be a syllogism with a conclusion of
not holding, as in the preceding; and in these cases too the contin-
gency in the conclusions should be taken similarly.]
30 He has turned to the third figure. He says that there is also a syllogism
in this figure if both premisses are contingent. This was not the case in
the second figure, since he showed458 that in the second figure nothing
follows syllogistically from two contingent premisses. And he says that
if both premisses are contingent, the conclusion will also be contingent,
35 and that the conclusion of a contingent and an unqualified premiss will
also be contingent.
(39a8) But if one premiss is necessary and one is contingent and the
necessary premiss is universal negative, the conclusion will not be
Translation 167
contingent in the way specified, but it will also be of not holding, as it 243,1
also was in the case of the previous figures. When he was discussing the
first figure he said459 that if the unqualified premiss is negative univer-
sal, the conclusion will not be contingent in the way specified, but he
did not mention this subsequently. Having said that the conclusion of 5
those combinations in which the necessary universal premiss is nega-
tive will be of not holding, he adds ‘and in these cases too the
contingency in the conclusions should be taken similarly’. Clearly <he
means> that one should call the conclusion contingent negative and
take contingency as holding and not in the way specified. 10
<39a14-28 Two universal premisses>

39a14460 First let the premisses be contingent, [and let it be
contingent that A and also B hold of all C. Then since an affirm-
ative proposition converts partially and it is contingent that B
holds of all C, it would also be contingent that C holds of some B.
So, if it is contingent that A holds of all C and that C holds of some
B, it is necessary that it also be contingent that A holds of some B.
For the first figure results.
39a19461 And if it is contingent that A holds of no C and that B
holds of all C, it is necessary that it is contingent that A does not
hold of some B. For again there will be the first figure by conver-
sion.
39a23462 But if both premisses are posited as privative, there will
be no necessity based on the premisses taken themselves, but
there will be a syllogism if the premisses are converted, as in the
preceding. For if it is contingent that A and also B do not hold of
C, then if there is a transformation into ‘It is contingent that A and
also B hold of C’, there will be again the first figure by conversion.]
He speaks about the first combinations of two contingent premisses and
first about combinations of two affirmative universal ones. He proves
that the combination is syllogistic by conversion of the minor universal
affirmative contingent premiss, reducing the combination to the first 15
figure. For the particular proposition converts with this.
(39a19) But if the major premiss is taken as universal contingent
negative, the minor as universal contingent affirmative, if the universal
affirmative contingent minor is converted, the result is again the first
figure in which a particular negative contingent conclusion follows from
a universal negative contingent major and a particular affirmative 20
contingent minor.
(39a23) But if both premisses are taken as negative and contingent
universal, nothing will be proved syllogistically from the assumed
premisses, but if the minor premiss is transformed into an affirmative
168 Translation
contingent one and converted, the result will be the same combination
25 in the first figure as the one which has just been treated. And both
premisses can be transformed into affirmatives, as he himself also says.

39a28463 But if one of the terms is universal and the other particu-
lar, [there will also be or not be a syllogism when the terms are
related in the same way as in the case of unqualified premisses.]
He says that when one of the premisses is particular, then, whichever
combinations in the third figure when taken from unqualified premisses
30 made syllogistic combinations, exactly the same ones will be syllogistic
in the case of contingent premisses when they are taken similarly; and
the relation of the non-syllogistic combinations with contingent pre-
misses to those with unqualified ones will be the same. For the
premisses which are transformed from negative propositions into af-
firmative ones are transformed as being equivalent to the affirmative
ones.
[39a31464 For let it be contingent that A holds of all C and that B

holds of some C. If the particular premiss is converted there will
again be the first figure, since if <it is contingent that> A holds of
all C and that C holds of some B, it is contingent that A holds of
some B.]
For if the major premiss is taken as universal affirmative contingent,
35 the minor as particular and also affirmative contingent, the combina-
244,1 tion is syllogistic; the proof comes when the particular contingent
affirmative minor premiss is converted; for in this way the first figure
again results.
[39a35465 Likewise if universality is posited in relation to BC.]

And if the major is particular affirmative contingent, the minor univer-
5 sal affirmative contingent, the combination is also syllogistic. For if the
particular affirmative contingent major is converted, the result is again
the first figure. But it will be necessary in the case of this combination
to convert the conclusion as well, since in this way the syllogism will be
of the proposed conclusion.
[39a36466 Similarly if AC is privative and BC affirmative, since

there will again be the first figure by conversion.]
And if the major is taken as universal negative contingent, the minor
Translation 169
as particular affirmative, the combination is syllogistic. For if the minor,
which is particular contingent affirmative, is converted, the result is 10
again the first figure, having the major premiss universal negative
contingent and the minor contingent particular affirmative. It was
proved467 that the conclusion from these premisses is particular negative
contingent.
[39a38468 But if both premisses, one universal and one particular,

are posited as privative, there will not be a syllogism based on the
premisses taken themselves, but there will be if the premisses are
converted, as in the preceding.]
If both premisses are negative contingent, and one is universal, the
other particular, if the particular negative premiss is transformed into 15
a particular affirmative one and converted, the result is the previously
mentioned combination in the first figure. For if the negative premiss
is transformed into an affirmative one it will make the premisses of the
same quality as the ones which were syllogistic in the case of unqualified
premisses. So, when the minor premiss is taken as particular negative,
we will need one conversion, and when the major is, we will need two, 20
since it will be necessary to convert the conclusion, which is particular
negative contingent; but a contingent negative proposition converts in
the same way as an affirmative. This is not possible in the case of
unqualified premisses in the third figure when the minor premiss is
negative universal, the major particular negative, because a particular
negative unqualified proposition does not convert, so that there is no 25
syllogism of the proposed conclusion. Consequently someone might ask
in what sense it is true that ‘if one of the terms is universal and the other
particular, there will also be or not be a syllogism when the terms are
related in the same way as in the case of unqualified premisses’. Perhaps
it is necessary also in the case of contingent premisses to transform the 30
contingent universal negative premiss into an affirmative. But, because
of what has just been said, it will not be true that what holds with
contingent premisses will also hold of unqualified ones.
[39b2 But when both premisses are taken as indeterminate or

particular, there will not be a syllogism. For it is necessary that A
holds of all B and that it holds of none. Terms for holding: animal,
human, white; for not holding: horse, human, white; the middle is
white.]
If both contingent premisses are taken as either particular or indeter-
minate, whether both are affirmative or negative or there is one of each
kind, the combinations are non-syllogistic. And again he shows this by
setting down terms and showing both holding of all and holding of none,
170 Translation
35 holding of all with animal, human, and white; for it is contingent that
each of animal and human holds of something white and it is contingent
that each does not hold of something white – and it is contingent that
one holds of white and it is contingent that one does not hold –, and
animal holds of every human by necessity. Terms for not holding: horse,
human, white. For the premisses hold in a similar way, but horse holds
40 of no human by necessity.

premiss
<39b7-10 Introductory remark>
245,1 39b7469 If one premiss signifies holding and the other contingency,
[the conclusion will be that it is contingent that A holds of B, but
not that A holds of B; and there will be a syllogism when the terms
are related in the same way as in the preceding.]
He has already said470 that in the case of syllogistic combinations of an
unqualified and a contingent premiss in the third figure the conclusion
5 will be contingent in the way specified. So he repeats this here and also
says that the combinations which have their terms assumed in the same
way as those in syllogistic combinations of two unqualified or two
contingent premisses will be syllogistic – for this is what is meant by
‘when the terms are related in the same way as in the preceding’.
<39b10-25 Two universal premisses>

[39b10471 For first let the premisses be affirmative, and let A hold
of all C, and let it be contingent that B holds of all C. Then, if BC
is converted, there will be the first figure, and the conclusion will
be that it is contingent that A holds of some B, since in the first
figure when one of the premisses signified contingency, the conclu-
sion was also contingent.]
10 He first discusses the combination having the major universal affirm-
ative unqualified and the minor universal affirmative contingent. If the
universal affirmative contingent minor premiss is converted into a
particular one the result is the first figure having the major unqualified
affirmative and the minor particular contingent affirmative. The con-
15 clusion of this was proved to be particular affirmative contingent.
He says ‘in the first figure when one of the premisses signified
contingency, the conclusion was also contingent’ with reference to
combinations having one premiss unqualified. But how could what has
been said hold universally <in the case of those combinations>? He did
posit this in the case of affirmative premisses, but in the case of
Translation 171
combinations of a negative unqualified major and a contingent affirm- 20
ative minor, he said the following:
If one premiss is taken to be unqualified and the other contingent,

when the premiss relating to the major extreme signifies contin-
gency, all syllogisms will be complete and their conclusion will be
contingent in the way specified which has been described; but
when the premiss relating to the minor extreme signifies contin-
gency, all of them are incomplete, and the conclusions of the 25
privative syllogisms will not be contingent in the way specified but
rather their conclusions will be that something holds of none by
necessity or does not hold of all by necessity. For if something
holds of none by necessity or does not hold of all by necessity, we
say that it is contingent that it holds of none or not of all.472
So perhaps what he says in the present passage concerns affirmative

premisses <only>. Or perhaps he was being extremely precise when he
said that the conclusion, which he said was of none by necessity, is not
contingent, since ‘of none by necessity’ is different from ‘by necessity of
none’, as he showed then. Nevertheless, thereafter he also classifies a 30
negative proposition of this kind among contingent negative proposi-
tions because it is not directly unqualified. For in the case of a mixture
in the second figure of a negative unqualified major and a contingent
minor he already said473 that the conclusion is contingent in the way
specified.
[39b16474 Similarly too, if B holds of C and it is contingent that A

holds of C, and if AC is privative and BC affirmative, whichever is
unqualified, in both cases the conclusion will be contingent. For
again the first figure results, and it has been shown that if in the
first figure one premiss signifies contingency, the conclusion will
also be contingent.]
But if the major is taken as contingent universal affirmative, the minor 35
as unqualified universal affirmative, the combination is syllogistic. For
the unqualified premiss can be converted. And if the major is taken as
privative universal and either contingent or unqualified, and the minor
is taken as affirmative universal and either contingent (if the major is 246,1
unqualified) or unqualified (if the major is contingent), the combinations
are syllogistic. For if the minor premiss is converted there is a reduction
to the first figure. 475
39b22476 But if the privative is posited in relation to the minor 11

extreme, or if both premisses are taken as privative, [there will not
172 Translation
be a syllogism through the assumed premisses themselves, but if
they are converted, there will be, as in the preceding.]
246,4 Another syllogistic combination will be the one having the minor priva-
tive universal and either unqualified or contingent. 477For if the major
premiss is converted there will be the first figure, and the conclusion is
contingent particular negative with the minor extreme as predicate.
This conclusion converts since it is contingent – as he now says; and if
it is converted, the proposed conclusion would be proved to follow. For
again it was indicated that,478 however the unqualified premiss is taken,
10 whether as affirmative or negative, the conclusion is contingent.
479
He himself says without qualification that if the minor premiss is
taken as universal negative there will not be <a syllogism> through the
premisses assumed, but <there will be> if the privative premiss is
15 transformed into an affirmative one. But it is necessary to understand
the word ‘contingent’ as added when the minor premiss is privative. For
if the minor negative is contingent it will be possible for the negative
premiss to be transformed into an affirmative one. But if the minor
premiss is unqualified negative, it is no longer possible for there to be
a transformation, nor is there a syllogistic combination proving the
proposed conclusion, unless we keep the minor premiss BC negative
20 unqualified and convert the contingent affirmative AC. For then it will
be the case that B holds of no C and it is contingent that C holds of some
A, and the conclusion will be that it is contingent that B does not hold
of some A. And if this conclusion is, as he now says, contingent in the
way specified, it converts and it is contingent that A does not hold of
some B. So it will also follow that this is the conclusion even if no
25 transformation <of the minor premiss> occurs.
480
Again, if both premisses are universal negative and one is unquali-
fied and the other contingent, nothing will follow from the premisses
assumed, but if the contingent negative premiss is transformed into an
affirmative and converted, the combination is syllogistic. If the minor
is contingent negative, the transformation and the proof are evident.
30 But if the major is contingent, the combination will not be syllogistic
when the negative minor is unqualified universal. Or it will be neces-
sary to transform the major, since it is contingent negative, into an
affirmative contingent proposition and convert it and make it the
minor, and then again also convert the conclusion itself, if it is contin-
35 gent in the way specified, as he now says.
<39b26-40a3 At most one universal premiss>

[39b26481 If one of the premisses is universal and the other particu-
lar, then, if both are affirmative or the universal is privative and
the particular affirmative, the situation concerning syllogisms
Translation 173
will be the same. For all will yield a conclusion through the first
figure, so that it is evident that the syllogism will be of contingency
and not of holding.]
‘If one of the premisses is universal and the other particular’, whether
both are affirmative or the particular premiss is affirmative and the
universal premiss is negative, then, no matter which of them is unquali- 247,1
fied, the combination is syllogistic. For if the affirmative premiss is
particular, whether it is contingent or unqualified, if it is converted, the
result is a syllogistic combination through the first figure. The words
‘the situation concerning syllogisms will be the same’ indicate that the
proof will be by conversion. It is again482 indicated that the conclusion 5
will be contingent on the grounds that mixture of an unqualified and a
contingent premiss in the first figure the conclusion is always of this
kind.
[39b31483 But if the affirmative premiss is universal and the

privative particular, the demonstration will be by means of the
impossible. For let B hold of all C and let it be contingent that A
does not hold of some C. Then it is necessary that it is contingent
that A does not hold of some B. For if A holds of all B by necessity,
but B is assumed to hold of all C, A will hold of all C by necessity.
For this was shown before. But it was hypothesized that it is
contingent that A does not hold of some C.]
He says that if the minor is affirmative universal and the major negative
particular, the combination will be syllogistic. But it will not be proved 10
by a conversion in which it is reduced to the first figure but by reductio
ad impossibile. For, let it be assumed that B holds of all C, and let it be
contingent that A does not hold of some C. Then it will be contingent
that A does not hold of some B. For if not, the opposite <is the case> and
A holds of all B by necessity. But B also holds of all C. Therefore, A will 15
hold of all C by necessity. For the result is a combination of a necessary
universal affirmative major and an unqualified universal affirmative
minor in the first figure, and he proved484 that the conclusion of this is
universal affirmative necessary. But it is impossible that A holds of all
C by necessity, since it was assumed that it is contingent that it does
not hold of some C.
485
Someone might inquire why according to him it is not also possible 20
to prove a combination of this kind syllogistic by conversion, at least if
a particular negative contingent proposition converts with itself. For if
it is contingent that A does not hold of some C, it will also be contingent
that C does not hold of some A.
Rather, transforming the negative particular contingent premiss
into an affirmative (for in this way the combination will be syllogistic) 25
174 Translation
it is possible to convert it, and it will be contingent that C holds of some
A. But it is assumed that B holds of all C. The result is that it is
contingent that B holds of some A, and if so, it is also contingent that A
holds of some B; for a contingent particular proposition, affirmative or
negative, converts. And this proof was thought more acceptable. For the
30 reductio ad impossibile is objectionable.486
487
However, this <proof> can work <only> if the major is particular
contingent. But if this major were unqualified particular negative, the
minor affirmative contingent, there would be no place for a proof by
conversion, if these premisses are taken. Nor is anything proved by
reductio ad impossibile because, according to him too, in the first figure
35 a universal affirmative necessary conclusion does not result from a
necessary universal affirmative major and a contingent universal af-
firmative minor. The conclusion is not of this kind, but it is contingent
universal affirmative, and there is nothing impossible in A not holding
of some C and it being contingent that A holds of all C.
248,1 488
The proof by impossibility in the case of the combination under
consideration goes through on his view because, according to him, the
conclusion of a necessary major and an unqualified minor <in the first
figure> is necessary. But nothing impossible will follow according to his
associates489 who say that the conclusion in such cases is unqualified,
since it is not impossible that A holds of all C if it is contingent that it
does not hold of some C.
5 This is the combination which some people use to try to show that
the conclusion of the combination of a necessary universal major and a
unqualified minor in the first figure is necessary. For those who carry
out a proof by reductio ad impossibile for this combination try to show
that what follows is impossible.490
10 As I said,491 if the major AC is unqualified particular negative, the
minor universal affirmative contingent, then, even according to him, no
impossibility will be encountered. For if someone were not to agree that
it is contingent that A does not hold of some B, the hypothesis would be
that A holds of all B by necessity. But it is assumed that it is contingent
15 that B holds of all C. According to him the conclusion of this mixture or
combination is contingent; but if one takes it that it is contingent that
A does not hold of C or that it is contingent that A does hold of C, nothing
impossible results when it is assumed that A does not hold of some C.
Therefore, a combination of this kind is absolutely non-syllogistic.
492
Theophrastus does not prove the combination previously de-
20 scribed493 by a simple reductio ad impossibile. Rather he first
transforms ‘It is contingent that A does not hold of some C’ into ‘A does
not hold of some C’ – which is not impossible – and produces two
unqualified premisses, a particular negative one resulting from the
transformation and the assumed universal affirmative. He says that
the conclusion will be that it is contingent that A does not hold of some
Translation 175
B. For if not, the opposite <is the case>, ‘ A holds of all B by necessity’. 25
Then, by reductio ad impossibile, he finds that something impossible is
a consequence, since it follows that A holds of all C when it was assumed
not to hold of some. But he has not encountered the impossibility
because of the hypothesis <that A does not hold of some C> – for it was
not impossible for the hypothesis to be taken –, but from positing that
A holds of all B by necessity. Therefore, the opposite of ‘A holds of all B
by necessity’ <is the case>, i.e., ‘it is contingent that A does not hold of 30
some B’.
[40a1 When both premisses are taken as indeterminate or particu-

lar, there will not be a syllogism. The demonstration is the same
as in the universals494 and by means of the same terms.]
If both premisses are taken as indeterminate or both particular,
whether both are affirmative or both negative or there is one of each
kind, there will not be a syllogistic combination. He shows that this is
so through terms. He says that this will be shown ‘by means of the same
terms’ as in the case of the universals, and now he means the <combi-
nations> consisting of two contingent particular premisses. It is as if he 35
said ‘by means of the terms with which the wholly contingent combina-
tions, that is the contingent ones consisting of two particular premisses,
were shown to be non-syllogistic.’ The terms for holding of all were
animal, human, white, and for holding of none horse, human, white; and
white is the middle.
But perhaps the text is wrong, and ‘The demonstration is the same 249,1
as in the universals’ has been written instead of ‘The demonstration is
the same as in the case of two contingent premisses.’495
1.22 Combinations with a necessary and a contingent premiss

<40a4-38 Two universal premisses>
40a4 If one of the premisses is necessary, the other contingent,
496
5
[then, if the terms are affirmative, there will always be a syllogism
with a contingent conclusion; but when one is affirmative and the
other privative, if the affirmative is necessary, there will be a
syllogism that it is contingent that A does not hold of B, but if the
privative is necessary, there will be a syllogism that it is contin-
gent that A does not hold of B and that it does not hold.]497
He has turned to mixtures of a contingent and a necessary premiss in
the third figure; and he says that if both premisses are affirmative
universal, the conclusion will be that it is contingent that A holds of
some B; that if one premiss is taken as affirmative, the other as negative,
if the affirmative is necessary, the conclusion will be ‘that it is contingent
176 Translation
10 that A does not hold of B’, and that if the negative is necessary, it will
be ‘that it is contingent that A does not hold of B and that it does not
hold’, which is equivalent to saying that the conclusion will not be
contingent in the way specified but will involve the contingency which
is predicated of what holds.
[40a9 And there will not be a syllogism that A does not hold of B
by necessity, just as there wasn’t in the other figures.]
But the conclusion will not be ‘that A does not hold of B by necessity’;
15 for in the other figures, both in the first and in the second, a necessary
negative conclusion did not result from a necessary negative and a
contingent affirmative premiss.
498
However, in both the first and the second figure, if the major
premiss is necessary universal negative and the minor is contingent, it
is possible to prove by reductio ad impossibile that the conclusion is
20 universal necessary negative. For let it be assumed that A holds of no
B by necessity, and let it be contingent that B holds of all C. I say that
A holds of no C by necessity. For, if not, it is contingent that it holds of
some. But it is also contingent that B holds of all C. It follows in the
third figure that it is contingent that A holds of some B. But this is
impossible, since it was assumed that it holds of no B by necessity.
Therefore the hypothesis that it is contingent that A holds of some C is
false. Therefore its opposite ‘A holds of no C by necessity’ <is the case>.
25 Again, in the second figure, let499 A hold of no B by necessity and let
it be contingent that A holds of all C. I say that B holds of no C by
necessity. For if it is contingent that it holds of some and it is contingent
that A holds of all C, it will follow in the third figure again that it is
contingent that A holds of some B, when it was assumed that it holds
30 of none by necessity. So, since the conclusion is impossible, the hypothe-
sis that it is contingent that B holds of some C will be destroyed and its
opposite ‘B holds of no C by necessity’ posited.
It is worth asking why he says that in a mixture of a necessary
negative universal premiss and a contingent affirmative one there is no
necessary negative conclusion that X holds of no Y by necessity in any
35 of the figures. For <there are three alternatives:> either (i) it is neces-
sary that reductio ad impossibile be rejected; or (ii) the combinations
<of two contingent premisses> in the third figure through which I
produced the reductio ad impossibile must be non-syllogistic; or (iii) it
follows <in these cases> that X holds of no Y by necessity. As I have said
already,500 I have investigated this and spoken about it at greater length
250,1 in On the disagreement of Aristotle and his associates concerning mix-
tures. And I have discussed it at greater length in my notes on logic.
Translation 177
[40a12501 First let the terms be affirmative, and let A hold of all C
by necessity, and let it be contingent that B holds of all C. Then,
since it is necessary that A holds of all C, but it is contingent that
C holds of some B, it will also be contingent that A holds of some
B, but there will not be an unqualified conclusion, since this is the
way it turned out in the case of the first figure.]
If both premisses are affirmative universal and the major is necessary,
if the minor is converted and becomes particular affirmative, the result 5
is a combination in the first figure having a contingent particular
affirmative conclusion – since the major is universal affirmative neces-
sary, and <the situation is> just like the others in which the major was
affirmative unqualified and the minor contingent.
[40a16502 The proof will be similar if BC is posited as necessary and

AC as contingent.]
But also, if the minor is necessary universal affirmative and the major
contingent universal and affirmative, if, again, the necessary universal 10
affirmative premiss is converted, the result is a combination in the first
figure yielding a contingent particular affirmative conclusion, since the
major is contingent universal affirmative. This syllogism in the first
figure was complete, as were the others having a contingent major.
[40a18503 Again, let one premiss be affirmative, one privative, and

let the affirmative be necessary. And let it be contingent that A
holds of no C and let B hold of all C by necessity. Again there will
be the first figure; for the privative premiss signifies contingency.
So it is evident that the conclusion will be contingent, since when
the premisses were related this way in the first figure, the conclu-
sion was also contingent.]
If one of the premisses is taken as negative, the other as affirmative,
and the minor is affirmative necessary universal, the major negative 15
contingent universal, if the universal affirmative necessary premiss is
converted, there will be a particular negative contingent conclusion in
the first figure, since the major is contingent universal negative, and
this was a complete syllogism in the first figure.
He says ‘Again there will be the first figure’ and adds ‘for the 20
privative premiss signifies contingency’, which shows that the negative
conclusion is contingent in the way specified. For the conclusion is of
not holding rather than being contingent in the way specified only when
the major premiss is privative and necessary.504 The text here is in a
way rather incongruous. A congruous formulation of it would be ‘And if 25
178 Translation
the privative premiss signifies contingency, it is evident that the con-
clusion will be contingent’.505
506
There can also be a syllogism if we keep the universal affirmative
necessary premiss fixed and convert the major, which is contingent
universal negative, to a particular proposition and transform it to an
30 affirmative. But the proof is more cumbersome both because of the
transformation of the contingent premiss to an affirmative and because
it is also necessary to convert the conclusion. And in this way the
conclusion becomes particular contingent affirmative, not negative.
[40a25507 But if the privative premiss is necessary, the conclusion

will be both that it is contingent that A does not hold of some B
and that A does not hold of some B. For let it be assumed that A
does not hold of C by necessity and that it is contingent that B
holds of all C. Then, if the affirmative BC is converted, there will
be the first figure, and the privative premiss will be necessary. But
when the premisses were related in this way, it resulted both that
it is contingent that A does not hold of some C508 and that A does
not hold of some C, so that also it is necessary that A does not hold
of some B.]
Furthermore if the major is privative and necessary, the minor contin-
gent affirmative universal, then, if the contingent premiss is converted,
35 there results a combination in the first figure having the major univer-
sal negative necessary and the minor contingent particular affirmative,
and a conclusion that A does not hold of some B, which is in this sense
contingent particular; for it is not contingent in the way specified. (The
words ‘so that also it is necessary that A does not hold of some B’ do not
251,1 say that the conclusion is necessary negative particular; rather they are
equivalent to ‘it is necessary that the conclusion be particular negative
unqualified’.)
[40a33509 But when the privative is posited in relation to the minor

extreme, if it is contingent, there will be a syllogism if the premiss
is transformed, as in the preceding.
If the minor premiss is negative, the major affirmative, then, if the
negative premiss is the minor and is contingent, there will not be a
5 syllogism from the assumed premisses; but if the contingent universal
negative is transformed into a universal affirmative contingent and it
is converted, there will again be the first figure having a particular
contingent affirmative conclusion – the major premiss will be universal
affirmative necessary, the minor particular affirmative contingent. For
10 nothing will follow if the minor premiss remains negative.510
Translation 179
[40a35511 But if it is necessary, there will not be a syllogism. For it

is necessary that it holds of all and not contingent that it holds of
any.512 Terms for holding of all: being asleep, sleeping-horse, hu-
man; for holding of none: being asleep, horse-that-is-awake,
human.]
But if the minor is universal negative necessary, there will not be a
syllogistic combination. Again he shows this by setting down terms and
showing that the major or first term can hold of all or of none of the last
<by necessity>. Terms for holding of all are being asleep, sleeping-horse,
human, since it is contingent that sleep holds of every human, sleeping- 15
horse holds of no human by necessity, and being asleep holds of every
sleeping-horse by necessity. Terms for holding of none are being asleep,
horse-that-is-awake, human, since, again, it is contingent that being
asleep holds of every human, horse-that-is-awake holds of no human by
necessity, and being asleep holds of no horse-that-is-awake <by neces-
sity>.
It is necessary to understand that the conclusions which have been 20
proved here are not necessary without qualification, but on the condi-
tion ‘which are in fact so and so’. Things of this sort do away with there
being a necessary or unqualified conclusion. For ‘X holds of all Y’ does
away with necessary and unqualified negative propositions; similarly
again ‘X holds of no Y’ does away with all necessary and unqualified
affirmative propositions. However, unqualified propositions do not do 25
away with opposite513 contingent ones, since, if X <just> holds of all Y,
it is contingent that it does <not>514 hold of some or holds of none, and
if X holds of no Y, it is contingent that it holds of all or of some of it.
515
And the combination in the third figure having the minor universal
negative necessary and the major universal affirmative contingent is
syllogistic. For, if the contingent premiss is converted, the result is that 30
B holds of no C by necessity, and it is contingent that C holds of some
A. Therefore, B does not hold of some A. For this conclusion was
thought516 to result when the necessary premiss was negative. But it is
not possible for the proposed conclusion to be inferred – since it is
necessary that A be predicated of B. And this is not proved for the
mixture under consideration because a particular negative unqualified
proposition does not convert.
However, if not ‘B does not hold of some A’ but ‘It is contingent that 35
B does <not>517 hold of some A’ were to follow in the case of the mixture
under consideration, a syllogism would seem to result because a par-
ticular contingent negative proposition converts. Again, the reason that
this combination seems to be non-syllogistic is that the minor in the first
figure remains negative.518 519However, it is not true that the minor
becomes necessary negative if both premisses do not convert; for BC 252,1
becomes the major if one does not convert both premisses.
180 Translation
<40a39-40b12 One particular premiss>520

[40a39 The situation will be similar if one of the terms is univer-
sal, the other particular, in relation to the middle. For if both are
affirmative, there will be a syllogism with a contingent but not an
unqualified conclusion.
40b2 And also when one premiss is taken as privative, the other
as affirmative, and the affirmative one is necessary.
40b3 But when the privative premiss is necessary the conclusion
will also be of not holding.
40b4 For the method of proof will be the same whether the terms
are universal or not universal, since it is necessary that the
syllogisms be completed through the first figure, so that it neces-
sarily turns out in these cases as it did in those.
40b8 But when the privative universal premiss is posited in
relation to the minor extreme, if it is contingent, there will be a
syllogism by conversion, but if it is necessary, there will not be one.
This will be proved in the same way as with the universal syllo-
gisms and through the same terms.]
He says that if one of the premisses is universal and one particular and
the combination is in the third figure, the syllogisms will be in a similar
5 way to what they were when both premisses were universal. (This is
what ‘if one of the terms is universal, the other particular, in relation
to the middle’521 means, since he speaks about premisses by mentioning
their terms. At the same time he also gives a description of the third
figure, in which two terms are predicated of one middle, just as he again
10 described the first, in which there are again three terms of which two
are predicated but not of the same thing, but as he said concerning the
first figure, ‘when one of the terms is universal and the other is
particular in relation to the third’.522 For when both terms are not
predicated of the same thing  <and the subject of one term is not
counter predicated of the predicate itself>, but is predicated of a third
15 term, the combination belongs to the first figure.523) For in those cases
too524 when the minor premiss was necessary negative universal, no
<conclusion> resulted, but there was a syllogistic combination when the
minor was contingent negative.525 And similarly when the minor was
necessary affirmative.526 For we converted the universal affirmative and
made it particular and reduced the combination to the first figure.
Similarly, too, in the present cases,527 if we convert the particular
20 premiss, we will produce the same combination in the first figure as
when there were two universal premisses.
528
Turning to the other combinations, in the case of the one having
the major particular negative contingent and the minor universal af-
firmative necessary, <a conclusion will result> by reductio ad
Translation 181
impossibile, as in the case in which the minor premiss was unqualified
universal affirmative and the major particular negative contingent.529
For, when he says ‘The situation will be similar’, he is not referring to 25
the proofs but to the fact that the conclusion is contingent in the same
sense as it was when both premisses were universal.
It is also possible for it to be proved that what follows is contingent
particular affirmative if the particular negative contingent premiss is
transformed into an affirmative one and converted – but it is also
necessary to convert the conclusion. So this kind of combination is not 30
always <proved> by reductio ad impossibile.
530
If both premisses are affirmative, the conclusion will be that it is
contingent that A holds of some B but not that it does hold of some. It
does not matter which premiss is taken as universal, except that if the
major is taken as particular, it will be necessary to convert both it and
the conclusion, since in this way the conclusion will be the one proposed.
531
(40b2) But if one premiss is taken as negative and the necessary 35
premiss is affirmative, the conclusion is contingent particular negative;
†and the necessary premiss must be particular if it is affirmative. For 253,1
if it were universal, it would be necessary† but it is necessary to
transform the particular contingent negative premiss into an affirm-
ative one, and in this way the conclusion will also be affirmative. But it
is possible to prove by reductio ad impossibile that the conclusion is
contingent particular negative if the minor premiss is taken as univer- 5
sal affirmative necessary.
532
(40b3) If the negative premiss is universal and necessary and it is
the major – for then the combination is syllogistic – the conclusion will
be that A does not hold of some B and not that it is contingent that A
does not hold of some B. This will be proved in the same way as it was
proved when both premisses were universal and the negative one was
necessary.533 He says that in a combination of a universal negative 10
necessary premiss and a particular affirmative contingent one in the
third figure the conclusion will be that A does not hold of some B. And
he sets down in a general way the reason why the conclusions are of this
sort when he adds ‘since it is necessary that the syllogisms be completed
through the first figure, so that it necessarily turns out in these cases
as it did in those’, that is, ‘in the case of combinations of this sort, 15
whatever the nature of the conclusions in that figure so they must be in
this figure’.
534
Someone might appropriately ask why he did not say that <the
conclusions> in mixtures of an unqualified and a contingent premiss in
this figure are of the same kind they were proved to be in the first figure.
Perhaps what he says now is universal, and should be followed: as the 20
conclusion is in the first figure so will it be in the other figures in cases
which are proved by conversion to involve the same kind of combination.
535
(40b8) If the minor premiss is privative universal, then, if it is
182 Translation
contingent and the particular affirmative necessary premiss is con-
verted, the combination will be syllogistic and the conclusion will be
25 that it is contingent that B does not hold of some A, and it will again be
also necessary to convert the conclusion. (A particular contingent nega-
tive proposition which is contingent in the way specified converts.)
But if the minor is privative universal and necessary, the combina-
tion will not be syllogistic. This will be shown using the same terms as
were taken a short while ago536 when both premisses were universal
30 and the minor was necessary negative. The reason is again that, when
the major premiss, which is contingent particular affirmative, is con-
verted, the conclusion is unqualified particular negative with the minor
extreme as predicate, but a particular negative unqualified proposition
does not convert. The terms for holding were being asleep, sleeping-
35 horse, human, and for not holding being asleep, horse-that-is-awake,
human. For it was then taken that it is contingent that being asleep
holds of every human, and now it will be taken that it is contingent that
it holds of some.
Nor is the combination syllogistic when the minor premiss is particu-
254,1 lar necessary negative, as the same terms when set down will show.537
One will take being awake, sleeping-horse, human. For it is contingent
that being awake holds of every human, sleeping-horse does not hold of
some human by necessity, and being awake holds of nothing which is
sleeping by necessity.538 And again, being awake, horse-that-is-awake,
5 human. For it is contingent that being awake holds of every human, and
horse-that-is-awake holds of no human by necessity,539 and being awake
holds of every horse-that-is-awake by necessity.
He does not mention the other non-syllogistic combinations, those
with two particular or indeterminate premisses, whether the two are
affirmative or negative or dissimilar in form; for it is already known
because of what has been said that these are non-syllogistic.
<40b12-15 Concluding remark>

[40b12 It is then also evident in this figure when and how there
will be a syllogism, and when the conclusion will be contingent and
when unqualified.]
10 40b15 It is also clear that all the syllogisms are incomplete and
that they are completed through the first figure.
This is also what was said in the case of the second figure: ‘they are
completed through the figures previously discussed’.540 He said ‘figures’
instead of ‘through the figure previously discussed’.
15 And it is clear that the syllogisms in this figure are also incomplete
and are completed through the first figure, since some were shown to
yield a conclusion by conversion of premisses and others – those in
Translation 183
which the minor premiss is universal affirmative and either unqualified
or necessary and the major is particular negative contingent541 – to yield
one by reductio ad impossibile. He mentioned reductio proof only in the
case of the mixture of a contingent and an unqualified premiss;542 and
only in the case of a mixture of a necessary and a contingent premiss 20
did he say that the conclusion is contingent in the way specified.543
The words ‘and also when one premiss is taken as privative, the other
as affirmative, and the affirmative one is necessary’544 did not set down
the proof. For the combination of a universal affirmative necessary
minor and a particular negative contingent major in the third figure is
proved to be syllogistic by both reductio ad impossibile and conversion. 25
For if we transform the particular contingent negative AC into an
affirmative and we convert it, it will follow that it is contingent that B
holds of some A; and the previously mentioned conclusion545 will be
proved if the conclusion is converted. But what is proved by reductio ad
impossibile is particular negative contingent, whereas what is proved 30
by conversion is particular affirmative contingent. Consequently, he
does not use the proof by conversion in connection with a combination
of this kind because doing so does not keep the conclusion negative
when a negative premiss is assumed. 546And in this way, if the minor
premiss is necessary universal affirmative, the major contingent par-
ticular negative, both propositions are converted <if the conclusion is to 35
be contingent affirmative particular>.
Notes
1. As indicated in section III.E.1 of the introduction, there are strong grounds
for holding that no combination of contingent premisses is syllogistic. Aristotle
recognizes eight CCC syllogisms, four complete analogues of the first-figure UUU
syllogisms and four which are reducible to them by EA- or OI-transformationc.
2. Aristotle announces the completeness of Barbara1(CCC) and then of Celar-
ent1(CCC).
3. On the text here see 167,27 with note.
4. On the text here see the note on 167,25.
5. At the end of the previous chapter. Aristotle’s formulation here is perfectly
compatible with taking the second premiss to be CON(BaC).
6. Alexander here quotes his paraphrase of 1.1, 24b29-30. See 24,27-30. How-
ever, it seems clear that Aristotle is not referring to the definition of ‘said of all’
but to the definition of ‘it is contingent that A holds of all B’ which he has more or
less given at 1.13, 32b25-32. Alexander’s reading is presumably due to his desire
to make completeness always turn on the so-called dictum de omni et nullo, but he
undoubtedly thinks that what Aristotle said at the end of the previous chapter is
just a development of the dictum.
7. cf. 25,13-23.
8. Alexander’s difficulty in this paragraph is due to the fact that at 33a5 his text
says ‘A holds’ where most manuscripts say ‘A does not hold.’ Hence in his text
Aristotle is citing an account of CON(AaB) when one of CON(AeB) seems to be
required.
9. The mss of Alexander have legomen where the main ones of Aristotle have
elegomen.
10. Barbara1(CCC).
11. Aristotle now uses EE-conversions to establish AEA1(CCC) and
EEA1(CCC). At 168,21-4 Alexander supplies a justification of EEE1(CCC), perhaps
because he wants to preserve the idea that negative premisses do not imply an
affirmative conclusion.
12. 1.13, 32a29-b1.
13. Alexander supplies a justification of EEE1(CCC); cf. his remark at 168,28-
30.
14. 1.13, 32b18-22. One should read Alexander’s comments on that passage in
connection with what he says here.
15. sumplokê; cf. 164,27.
16. And does not consider the result of transforming negative premisses into
affirmative ones.
17. Aristotle asserts that all four first-figure combinations with a universal
major and a particular minor are syllogistic.
18. For a minor difference between the lemma and our text of Aristotle see
Appendix 6 (on 33a21).
19. Aristotle affirms Darii1(CCC).
20. Aristotle affirms Ferio1(CCC).
21. Aristotle establishes AOI1(CCC), using OI-transformationc. He does not
specifically mention EO_1(CCC), which could be reduced to either Darii1(CCC) or
Ferio1(CCC).
22. See 167,17-18 with note. Alexander first proposes interpreting Aristotle’s
reference to the definition of CON as a reference to the dictum de omni et nullo.
23. Alexander considers as an alternative interpretation that Aristotle is refer-
ring to the diorismos of contingency. He argues that the conclusion of Darii1(CCC),
CON(AiC) satisfies the diorismos because nothing impossible results if CON(AiC)
is assumed along with the premisses. One would have expected him to argue (as
he could have) that nothing impossible results if AiC is assumed along with the
premisses. The argument is a version of what we called the incompatibility
acceptance method in connection with Aristotle’s attempt to show that certain
N+U combinations yield an unqualified and not a necessary conclusion; see section
II.C of the introduction. But, as is pointed out in the note on 130,9, by itself that
method cannot establish that a pair of premisses yields a conclusion.
24. Alexander says (correctly) that nothing impossible results when the ‘oppo-
site’ of the conclusion of Darii1(CCC), ‘i.e.’, NEC(AeC), is conjoined with its
premisses. It is not clear whether what he says is intended to be a third attempt
to interpret Aristotle’s reference to the definition of contingency or a development
of the second. See the note on 170,14.
25. Camestres2(CNCu). There will, of course, be no contradiction even if the
conclusion is taken to be BeC rather than CON(BeC).
26. Alexander has given three interpretations of the words ‘This is evident from
the definition of “It is contingent” ’. The consideration he now adduces shows a flaw
in the third, but gives no grounds for preferring the first or the second.
27. Alexander takes for granted that Aristotle acknowledges EOO1(CCC) as
well as AOI1(CCC).
28. Aristotle rejects all cases in which at most the minor premiss is universal.
29. Alexander shows that Aristotle’s general remark about the remaining cases
is true by showing that it is true when the major premiss is CON(AiB) and the
minor is either CON(BaC) or (equivalently) CON(BeC). The case is sufficient since
CON(AiB) is equivalent to CON(AoB) and indefinite propositions are no stronger
than definite ones. His interpretation of Aristotle’s argument is the following.
Aristotle takes for granted that contingent premisses can only yield contingent
conclusions. We want terms A and B such that CON(AiB), but we can satisfy this
condition while having a C of which A holds of none by necessity and of all or none
of which it is contingent that B holds (e.g. if A is taken as literate, B as being asleep,
and C as horse). But then any pair of contingent first-figure premisses with a
particular major and a universal minor is compatible with a conclusion of the form
NEC(AeC), but NEC(AeC) is incompatible with any genuinely contingent relation
between A and C.
30. Following Aristotle, Alexander omits to say that what is taken must be
non-A by necessity.
31. If we take into account only combinations with a particular major and a
universal minor, Aristotle here takes as true:
(i) CON(Animal i White)
CON(Animal o White)
(ii) CON(White a Human) CON(White a Cloak)
CON(White e Human) CON(White e Cloak)
(iii) NEC(Animal a Human) NEC(Animal e Cloak)
Alexander objects that the propositions numbered (i) are false since NEC(Animal
i Swan). He therefore substitutes:
(i) CON(White i Walking)
CON(White o Walking)
(ii) CON(Walking a Swan) CON(Walking a Crow)
CON(Walking e Swan) CON(Walking e Crow)
(iii) NEC(White a Swan) NEC(White e Crow).
Aristotle uses these same terms to reject the corresponding U+C combinations at
1.15, 35b11-19 and IA_1(NC_), OA_1(NC_), IE_1(NC_), and OE_1(NC_) at 1.16,
36b3-7, thereby treating ‘Some white things are animals’ and ‘Some white things
are not animals’ as unqualified, contingent, and necessary. Alexander does not
raise questions about the other two uses of this set of terms. But see his discussion
at 215,3-14.
32. endekhetai, here used informally and corresponding to Aristotle’s ouden
kôluei at 33a38.
33. For a minor divergence between this lemma and our text of Aristotle see
Appendix 6 (on 33b8).
34. Alexander has asserted this at 171,22-4, but we have not found a place
where he shows it. It seems likely that he is referring to another work of his own.
Cf. 36,5-6 with the note in Barnes et al. (1991).
35. cf. 154,23-155,2.
36. cf. 136,23-9.
37. At 1.13, 32a18-20.
38. Aristotle’s remark seems to apply only to Barbara1(CCC) and EE_1(CCC).
Alexander tacitly extends it to Celarent1(CCC) and AE_1(CCC) at 173,1-3.
39. That is, e.g.,  NEC  (AaB) is not equivalent to  NEC  (AeB).
40. That is, when  NEC(AiC), i.e.,  NEC  (AeC), we say that it is contingent
that no C are A even if, in fact, NEC(AoC), so that  CON(AaC), and so
 CON(AeC). On the expression ‘none by necessity’ (mêdeni ex anankês) see
Appendix 1 on the expression ‘by necessity’.
41. See 171,27-172,4.
42. At 1.15, 35a2. There is, however, no trace of these words at 33b3-8 in our
texts. Perhaps we have here a logically motivated textual conjecture.
43. This chapter is perhaps the most difficult in Aristotle’s presentation of
modal logic. The reader may wish to consult section III.E.2.a of the introduction
before proceeding.
44. For the formulation see Appendix 1 on the expression ‘by necessity’. Alex-
ander quotes this whole passage at 245,21-7.
45. i.e. he has not yet argued that EE-conversionc fails, as he will do in chapter
17 at 36b35-37a31.
46. In chapter 15.
47. In chapter 16.
48. Aristotle argues in chapter 17 that there are no second-figure CC syllo-
gisms. In the present passage Alexander formulates the reasoning rather
unsatisfactorily, relying on the idea that in the second figure there are no syllo-
gisms with two affirmative unqualified premisses, hence there are none with two
affirmative contingent ones; but if there were second-figure syllogisms with one or
two contingent negative premisses, the transformation rules for contingent propo-
sitions would allow those premisses to be changed into affirmative ones.
49. Aristotle treats these cases in chapter 18. Alexander is unable to provide
any conclusive reason for Aristotle’s not doing all the CC figures before the U+C
and N+C ones, and there does not seem to be one available. Alexander takes up
this question again briefly at 219,14-24.
50. Reading huparkhousês te with the Aldine in place of the anankaias printed
by Wallies, of which we can make no good sense. But there may be a lacuna after
eipein in which Alexander said that Aristotle could have taken up the first-figure
N+U cases first, but instead chose to give precedence to the U+C cases.
51. 173,32-174,6, and 174,9-13.17-19 constitute Theophrastus 107A FHSG;
174,1-4 are Eudemus fragment 19 Wehrli.
52. Dropping the to in 174,5.
53. to oudeni ex anankês, meaning  NEC(AiC); see Appendix 1 on the expres-
sion ‘by necessity’.
54. to oudeni panti ex anankês, meaning  NEC(AaC); see Appendix 1 on the
expression ‘by necessity’.
55. Alexander’s point in the present passage is that the conclusion of Celar-
ent1(UC  N  ) is (equivalent to)  NEC(AiC) and that the conclusion of Ferio1(UC
 N ) is  NEC(AaC), and these conclusions are compatible with AiC and AaC,
respectively. But here Alexander apparently adopts the position that CON(AeC)
means that AeC does not hold now. For difficulties with this position see 161,3-26.
56. That is,  NEC( P) is compatible with P, whereas – on Alexander’s reading
– CON(P) rules out P.  NEC( P) is also compatible with NEC(P), which is ruled
out by CON(P).
57. hoi peri Theophraston.
58. Alexander attempts to explain why the first-figure UC syllogisms are not
complete in terms of the definition of ‘said of all’. He takes Barbara1(UC_) as his
example; his argument seems to presuppose that the conclusion of this is not
CON(AaC), but something verging on, if not identical with, AaC. He apparently
argues as follows. Suppose we know AaB and CON(BaC). Then we know that A
holds of everything of which B holds, but because we know only that CON(BaC),
we do not know that B holds of any C. Therefore, we cannot infer AaC. Unfortu-
nately he does not discuss a possible justification of Barbara1(UCC) which relies
on the intuition that if it is now true that AaB and now true that it is contingent
that every C is a B it is now true that it is contingent that every C is an A.
Appendix 6 (on 34a2), and, for a further discrepancy, the note on 34a4.
61. A parenthetical reference to the complete Darii1(CUC) and Ferio1(CUC),
which Aristotle takes up at 35a30-5.
62. dunaton. The word occurs 17 times between 34a6 and 32. It and dunatai do
not occur again until chapter 24, and have occurred previously only 5 times (in our
chapters only at 1.11, 31b9 and 1.13, 32b11). Forms of endekhomai occur only once
in 34a6-16 (at 34a11). For a minor difference between this lemma and Ross’ text
of Aristotle see Appendix 6 (on 34a6-7).
63. For understanding what Alexander says under this lemma it will be useful
to read section III.E.2.a of the introduction.
64. anankaia akolouthia. Alexander does not distinguish clearly between an
implication and a conditional (our translation of sunêmmenon). He also uses the
words ‘sound’ (hugiês) and ‘true’ rather loosely by today’s standards.
65. We conjecture hepomenon for the first eilêmmenon in the aei to eilêmmenon
hepesthai esti tôi to eilêmmenon hôs hêgoumenon einai printed by Wallies. The
parallel passage in [Themistius] (in An. Pr. 25,20-1) is equally opaque to us:
eilêmmenon aei hepesthai esti dia to eilêmmenon hôs hepomenon hôs hêgoumenon
einai.
66. Alexander raises questions about whether in the reductio one derives a
falsehood rather than an impossibility. His main line of interpretation commits
him to the idea that one derives an impossibility. For if all that were at stake in
the argument for Barbara1(UC‘C’) were derivation of a falsehood from a falsehood,
there would be no way to deflect ‘blame’ from BaC, since it is false on Alexander’s
understanding of CON(BaC).
67. Aristotle’s argument that if it is necessary that if P then Q and it is possible
that P, then it is possible that Q is most easily understood in terms of the standard
temporal interpretation of the modal operators. Suppose that if P then Q at all
times, P at some time t and Q at no time (i.e. that it is not possible that Q). But
then ‘if P then Q’ is true at t, so Q is true at t, contradicting Q at no time. (For
possible minor differences between Alexander’s text of this passage and our text
of Aristotle see Appendix 6, on 34a8-10 and 34a10-11.)
68. Ross prints eiê here where Alexander and the manuscripts of Aristotle have ei.
69. Wallies prints keimenou toutôi to A hepesthai. We read keimenou tou to A
hepesthai to B with M and the Aldine. But note that this appears to be said again
in line 6. In general we find the syntax of this paragraph hard to follow.
70. Reading adunaton at 177,16, where Wallies prints dunaton, a correction in B.
71. 177,19-182,8 is fragment 994 Hülser (1987-88). 177,25-178,8 is SVF II.202a.
72. The Stoic term lêgon; see the Greek-English lexicon.
73. Alexander turns to what he takes as an explicit attempt by Chrysippus to
produce counterexamples to the claim that ‘if P then Q’ excludes it being the case
that it is possible that P and not possible that Q. It seems likely that Chrysippus’
concern was to refute the so-called Master Argument of Diodorus by refuting this
premiss of it. See Long and Sedley, vol. I, pp. 230-6.
Chrysippus’ counterexamples are difficult because they depend on the use of
pronouns and time of utterance. Alexander mentions two alleged counterexam-
ples: (i) If Dion has died, he has died; (ii) If it is night, this is not day. Since
Alexander says little about (ii) (see 181,34-182,8) we concentrate on (i). Chrysippus
seems to take it that ‘Dion’ names a unique quality possessed only by Dion and
therefore has a reference independently of whether Dion is alive, but ‘he’ can refer
only to a living person so that an attempt to refer to a dead person as ‘he’ fails.
Thus ‘He has died’ is impossible although it is possible that Dion has died. But why
did Chrysippus think that ‘If Dion has died, he has died’ is a sound conditional?
Perhaps he argued as follows. ‘He has died’ is significant only when ‘he’ has a
referent, a living being; so ‘He has died’ is impossible. On the other hand, since
‘Dion’ picks out a unique qualification, ‘Dion has died’ is significant even when
Dion has died. So ‘Dion has died’ is possible. Thus ‘If Dion has died, he has died’
has a possible antecedent and an impossible consequent. Presumably it also has
significance only when Dion is alive, but then it is true because, e.g., it has a false
antecedent and a false consequent.
74. axiôma.
75. Alexander here touches on the Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence; see
below 180,28ff.
76. Alexander now gives a series of arguments against Chrysippus’ alleged
counterexamples. He first argues that if ‘Dion has died’ can be said in circum-
stances in which ‘He has died’ cannot, the conditional ‘If Dion has died, he has died’
cannot be necessary.
77. Alexander expresses the antecedent with and without the word ‘if’, appar-
ently indifferently.
78. ho Diôn, not to Diôn. It is not clear that Alexander (or the scribes) maintain
consistency in distinguishing between the name ‘Dion’ and the person Dion.
79. Just above at 178,13-14.
80. Apparently Chrysippus claimed that ‘If Dion has died, he has died’ remains
true even if ‘he has died’ loses its significance because of the death of Dion. One
might compare this with a view that ‘If Zeus is strong, Zeus is strong’ is true even
though ‘Zeus is strong’ is ‘meaningless’ because Zeus does not exist. Alexander
insists that Chrysippus’ conditional is false because – according to Chrysippus –
‘he has died’ may fail to hold when ‘Dion has died’ holds.
81. ho Diôn, not to Diôn.
82. i.e. in such a way that ‘Dion has died’ can have application when ‘he has died’
does not. What follows suggests that someone attempted to defend Chrysippus by
making a (far-fetched) comparison between the relation of ‘he’ to Dion and that of
species to genus. In the example it seems to be imagined that there are no scalene
triangles, but that it is true that all triangles have their angles equal to two right
angles and also true that if all triangles have their angles equal to two right angles,
all scalene triangles do, even though ‘all scalene triangles have their angles equal
to two right angles’ is false (or meaningless). Alexander’s rejection of the compari-
son seems sound, but he does not really argue for it.
83. idiôs poios. On this Stoic notion see Long and Sedley (1987), vol. I, pp.
166-79.
84. Presumably the Stoics.
85. In this difficult paragraph Alexander apparently insists that Q follows from
P if and only if Q follows from the hypothesis that P. Perhaps what he means is
that Q holds when P holds if and only if P  Q is sound. One way of understanding
Chrysippus’ position is as saying that although ‘if Dion has died, he has died’ is
sound, when ‘Dion has died’ holds, ‘he has died’ is destroyed and so does not hold.
86. epikheirêsis.
87. Apparently Alexander is referring to 34a5-12 and 34a25-33.
88. logikôteron. In what follows Alexander argues in terms of certain Stoic
assumptions, e.g., that ‘He has died’ is destroyed when Dion has died, and the
belief in cosmic conflagration.
89. Alexander now invokes the Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence. For discus-
sion see Long and Sedley (1987), vol. I, pp. 308-13. On their interpretation
Alexander’s uncertainty about the numerical identity of the recurring Dions
reflects Stoic alterations of an original doctrine according to which the Dions are
numerically identical. (180,31-6, 181,13-17, and 181,25-31 are SVF II.624.)
90. According to Nemesius (2.81 Morani = SVF II.790), Chrysippus charac-
terized death as the separation of the soul from the body.
91. In the only other extant reference to this work Stobaeus (I.79.1 = SVF
II.913) says that in its second book Chrysippus called the substance of fate a
pneumatic power controlling the universe in an orderly way.
92. We have translated Wallies’ text as a negated conjunction equivalent to ‘It
is not the case that the following two things are true: (i) the recycled Dion is the
same as the earlier one; (ii) the word ‘he’ said of the recycled Dion does not refer to
the earlier one,’ that is, ‘If the recycled Dion is the same as the earlier one, then
the word “he” refers to them both.’ An anonymous reader has commended to us the
rendering of Feliciano (Alexandri Aphrodisiensis Super Priora resolutoria Aris-
totelis subtillissima Explanatio: a Ioanne Bernardo Feliciano in latinum conuersa,
Venice: H. Scottus, 1560, p. 147), who takes the contents to be two rhetorical
questions: isn’t the later Dion the same as the earlier one? Isn’t the word ‘he’
predicated of the same thing? (Feliciano’s Greek exemplar actually differs from
Wallies’ text in a way irrelevant to the point raised here.)
93. The material in parentheses seems to be an aside from the main argument,
but obviously relates to the question of the relation between the Dion(s) in different
kosmoi.
94. One might have expected Alexander to conclude that ‘If Dion has died, he
has died’ is a true conditional with a contingent antecedent and consequent. But
he seems to prefer – at least for the sake of this argument – the view that ‘He has
died’ is not a self-refuting proposition and can be false when ‘Dion has died’ is true.
cf. 178,8-22.
95. metaballousa gar ouk estai. We take the point to be that ‘It is night and ‘It
is not day’ are both contingent because there is day and night in alteration. Hülser
((1987-1988), p. 1279) has ‘[der Sinn dieses Ausdrucks] wird ja nicht umschlagen
können.’
96. Our text of Aristotle has ‘impossibility and possibility’.
97. to dunaton kai endekhomenon. The point of Aristotle’s remark is not clear,
but it would seem that all he wants to say is that in whatever way X is possible
(e.g., possibly true, possibly holding), then if Y follows from X, Y will be possible in
the same way. Alexander extends the remark to cover the ‘senses’ of contingency
he understands Aristotle to have mentioned at 1.3, 25a37-9.
98. At 1.13, 32a18-20, the diorismos of contingency.
99. 34a8-9.
100. cf. 182,9-12.
101. i.e. just as one of the ‘senses’ of possibility is truth, so one of the senses of
impossibility is falsehood.
102. At 182,23-183,7.
103. We read ei tethnêke Diôn, tethnêke anthrôpos with the Aldine. Wallies
prints to<te> tethnêke anthrôpos.
104. 1.13, 32b4-23.
105. See 182,33-183,7.
106. The next two paragraphs constitute testimony 135 Döring (1972); frag-
ment 992 Hülser (1987-1988) includes the next two lines as well. For other ancient
material on the subject of Diodorean and Philonian possibility see Döring (1972),
testimonies 130-9 and Sharples (1982), pp. 91-6.
107. to akhuron to en têi atomôi. Long and Sedley (1987) have ‘chaff in atomic
dissolution’, Hülser (1987-1988) ‘nicht weiter teilbar Spreu’, Muller (1985) ‘le
chaume sur pied dans un champ non fauchée’. At 184,16 below it is tentatively
assumed that ho atomos is impassive. The example recurs in Alexander, Quaest.
31,9-10; and apparently he used it in his commentary on De Caelo (Simplicius, in
Cael. 316,25-9, where there is only talk of the chaff’s being destroyed).
108. Because, according to Alexander, Aristotle, unlike Diodorus, thinks that
some possibilities will never be realized, but, unlike Philo, he does not think that
it is possible for chaff at the bottom of the sea to be burnt. If Alexander intends
what he says to apply to contingency, what he says about possibilities which are
never realized would be incompatible with any standard temporal interpretation
of the modalities, including the one which Alexander seems to flirt with.
109. Alexander paraphrases Aristotle’s hôsper oun ei tis theiê to men A tas
protaseis to de B to sumperasma as kai ei tis to men A anti tôn protaseôn laboi to
de B sumperasma. He is presumably worried about the brachylogy of the formula-
tion, on which see Ross ad loc.
110. Reading hôs en tôi deuterôi deixei. The reference is to chapters 2-4 of book
2. Alexander here corrects Aristotle’s careless statement that ‘if A is false but not
impossible and if when A is, B is, B will also be false ’.
111. At 34a16-19. Alexander and Aristotle overlook the case in which two
possible premisses are together impossible.
112. For a minor difference between Alexander’s citation and our text of
Aristotle see Appendix 6 (on 34a32).
113. Aristotle turns to arguing for Barbara1(UC‘C’). See section III.E.2.a of the
introduction; see also Mignucci (1972) for an attempt to defend Aristotle’s argu-
ment. The phrases in the lemma signalled as (i), (ii), and (iii) all cause difficulty.
Ross emends (i) to say ‘it is not contingent that A holds of all C’. Alexander
(186,17-19) says that Aristotle’s formulation is deficient (endeesteron) in leaving
out the ‘all’, (ii), which is sometimes translated as if it said ‘It is not contingent that
A holds of all B’ should say (ii’) ‘A does not hold of all B’ (i.e. AoB), and (iii) should
say (iii’) ‘it was hypothesized that A holds of all B’. Alexander says (186,19-21) that
Aristotle says (ii) instead of (anti) (ii’); he apparently intends to say that this is
what Aristotle means (cf. 186,25-7, where Alexander says that Aristotle says (ii)
as equivalent to (hôs ison) (ii’)). Alexander also says (186,23-5) that Aristotle says
(iii) instead of (iii’). He points out (186,31-4) that if we take (ii) and (iii) straight-
forwardly, they do not contradict one another. He then suggests that Aristotle’s
formulations are all right because in one sense the unqualified is said to be
contingent.
Alexander’s discussion of Aristotle’s treatment of Barbara1(UC‘C’) lasts until
193,21 (omitting 187,9-188,7), and ends with the somewhat pathetic words ‘These
things should be investigated in a better way’ (episkepteon de peri toutôn beltion).
Alexander seems committed to defending Aristotle’s position on Barbara1(UC‘C’),
but the position is untenable, as his discussion of 34b7ff. shows. There is further
discussion related to Barbara1(UC‘C’) at 198,5-199,15, where Alexander makes
clear that the conclusion is not contingent in the way specified.
114. See 34a1-5. Alexander proceeds to give a version of Aristotle’s argument
before discussing the difficulties in Aristotle’s formulation of it.
115. Guided by 34a40-1 (iii), Alexander cites Bocardo3(NU C ), formulating
the conclusion as  CON(AaB), i.e.,  CON (AoB), rather than as NEC(AoB). In
fact, as Alexander goes on to point out, Aristotle denies the validity of Bo-
cardo3(NUN) at 1.11, 32a4-5, which Alexander discusses at 150,25-151,30. Of
course, as Alexander also realizes, Aristotle needs only Bocardo3(NUU) to get an
inconsistency.
116. Ross accepts Becker’s view that this passage is ‘the work of a rather stupid
glossator’. In it the original premisses of Barbara1(UC‘C’), AaB and CON(BaC), are
transformed into CON(AaB) and BaC, from which it is correctly inferred (Bar-
bara1(CUC)) that CON(AaC), which is then said to be incompatible with
 CON(AaC)). It is very hard to know how to interpret this argument; indeed, if
the difficulties in Aristotle’s formulation in the preceding passage carry over to this
one, it is not even clear what argument is being offered. Alexander does not provide
any real elucidation here, and what he says at 188,7ff. is quite obscure.
117. The lemma has thenta where our texts of Aristotle have thentas.
118. In Aristotle’s affirmation of the completeness of Barbara1(CUC) at 33b33-6.
119. Alexander now points out that the transformation of AaB into CON(AaB)
is unnecessary, since AaB and BaC imply (Barbara1UUU)) AaC, which is incom-
patible with  CON(AaC). He suggests that Aristotle chose to transform AaB into
CON(AaB) and infer CON(AaC) because the incompatibility of AaC and
 CON(AaC) is not as ‘clear and indisputable’ as that of CON(AaC) and
 CON(AaC).
120. Alexander points out that – by analogy with his understanding of the
preceding argument for Barbara1(UC‘C’) – one could understand ‘It is contingent
that A holds of all B’ as AaB and ‘It would be contingent that A holds of all C’ as
AaC. This reading would give the argument ruled out in the previous paragraph.
121. In the preceding argument for Barbara1(UC‘C’).
122. We are not able to construe this difficult paragraph in a fully satisfactory
Notes to pp. 98-102 193
way, but we think it might be an argument against indirect proofs depending on
the transformation of a contingent premiss into an unqualified one (what we call
U-for-C substitution). It would then be aimed, at least partly, against the first
argument for Barbara1(UC‘C’), but it is possible that Alexander is only pointing
out that the second argument for Barbara1(UC‘C’) really infers the desired conclu-
sion directly and so is not a reductio. We formulate our notes in terms of the first
argument.
123. Reading kataskeuazetai with the Aldine.
124. This is apparently AaB, the major premiss of Barbara1(UC‘C’).
125. BaC, the transformed minor premiss of Barbara1(UC‘C’).
126. We suspect a lacuna here in which the hypothesizing of the opposite of the
conclusion and the derivation of an impossibity were described.
127. We have excised the words ‘for this is impossible’: adunaton gar touto.
129. On this lemma and Alexander’s discussion see section III.E.2.a of the
introduction. Alexander’s discussion is made less cogent than it need be by his
misunderstanding of rejection by setting down terms. (For a minor divergence
between the lemma and our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6, on 34b7.)
130. Alexander says that ‘All that moves is human’ is true only at a specific time
because moving has a greater extension than human, so that there may be C, e.g.,
horse, of which moving can hold but of which human cannot possibly hold;
consequently, all that moves cannot be human at the time when all horses are
moving.
131. This remark doesn’t seem to be required for Alexander to make his claim.
Alexander’s point is (again) that if B has a larger extension than A, and C is such
that  CON(AaC), and there is a time at which BaC, one cannot have AaB at that
time.
132. i.e. the universal unqualified major premiss ceases to be true.
133. endekhetai.
134. Alexander gives no argument for this unfortunate assertion. We have
already seen that the combination is not syllogistic in the sense that there are
counter-examples to it, that the method mentioned by Alexander is illegitimate,
and that simpler methods of the same illegitimate kind are available.
135. Alexander slightly changes Aristotle’s example, taking as the interpreta-
tion of the premisses:
(i) All that moves is an animal.
(ii) It is contingent that all stones are moving.
Again he points out that (i) cannot be true at a time when even one stone is
moving.
136. skhêma. It is difficult to see how this claim can be defended, since Aristotle
and Alexander have just been saying that only some instances of Barbara1(UC‘C’)
are valid.
137. i.e. when the minor contingent premiss is taken to hold actually, the
universal affirmative major becomes false.
138. This is the first hint that Alexander realizes that the conclusion of
Barbara1(UC_) is not contingent in the way specified. See also 198,5-13. Alexander
goes on to discuss the fact that of Aristotle’s two interpretations only the one which
renders NEC(AeC) true produces the temporal conflict between the two premisses
which Alexander wants to emphasize.
139. Alexander’s point is that ‘All that moves is an animal’ and ‘All humans are
moving’ can be true at the same time.
140. See the note on 207,36 below.
194 Notes to pp. 102-106
141. At 34a34-b2. Although it is, indeed, worthwhile to attack the method of
that alleged reductio, the issue raised here is a red herring. In a reductio one
derives an inconsistency, that is, one derives a proposition P from assumptions
which include or entail a proposition incompatible with P; it follows that one of the
assumptions is false, whether P is ‘false’ or ‘impossible’.
The argument considered by Alexander concedes that Aristotle derives  (AaB),
i.e., AoB, when one of the original premisses is AaB, but argues that, if AaB is
unqualified and not necessary, then AoB will be false but not impossible. Alexan-
der’s response is to say that although CON(AoB) is true at the time when AaB is
(namely now, when it is being taken as a premiss), at that time one cannot change
CON(AoB) into AoB, i.e., presumably, AoB is impossible at a time when AaB.
142. Using Bocardo3(NUU).
143. CON(AoB).
144. The response shifts attention to the real issue, the change of the second
premiss CON(BaC) into BaC, and argues that if Alexander is right about the
impossibility of transforming CON(AoB) into AoB when AaB is assumed, it is
equally impossible for Aristotle to transform CON(BaC) into BaC, when it is true
(as it might be) that BeC.
145. Alexander’s resolution of the problem is not very satisfying; the end of the
discussion shows his own dissatisfaction. His remarks are directed at the oppo-
nent’s transformation of CON(BaC) into BaC on the assumption that BeC, but
apply also to his transformation of CON(AoB) into AoB, given the premiss AaB.
Both transformations are impossible because the new unqualified propositions,
BaC and AoB, are incompatible with the other unqualified assumptions, BeC and
AaB. On the other hand, Aristotle’s transformation of CON(BaC) into BaC is all
right because he is simply assuming what will at some future time hold without
denying that at the present BeC (possibly) and CON(BaC).
146. BaC. We take Alexander’s claim to be that Aristotle’s hypothesizing of BaC
could be said to be false only if it did away with the premiss CON(BaC) as the
assumption of AoB does away with the premiss AaB. For our punctuation of this
sentence see the textual emendation for 192,32-193,1.
147. Of CON(BaC) into BaC.
148. Reading dokei for the dokein printed by Wallies.
149. Aristotle’s argument for Celarent1(UC  N  ) is completely analogous to
his argument for Barbara(UC‘C’). He assumes  CON(AeC), ‘i.e.’, NEC(AiC),
changes CON(BaC) to BaC, and infers (Disamis3(NUU)) that AiB, contradicting
AeB. Alexander spells out the argument and insists that it works. There is a more
critical, but inconclusive, discussion of Celarent1(UC_) at 216,7-217,20, where
Alexander justifies Celarent1(UCU) with a reductio argument in which the contin-
gent premiss is changed into an unqualified one.
150. The endekhetai of M seems to us more likely than the endexetai printed by
Wallies.
151. At 34a5-33.
152. mêdeni ex anankês, i.e.,  NEC(AiC).
153. i.e. in the way specified.
154. On the obeli see the note on 199,16-18 below.
155. mêdeni ex anankês.
156. For this distinction between ‘A holds of no C by necessity’ (NEC(AeC)) and
‘A holds by necessity of no C’ ( NEC(AiC)), see Appendix 1 on the expression ‘by
necessity’.
157. We offer the following paraphrase of the first part of this paragraph.
 CON(AeC), the negation of the ‘conclusion’ of Celarent1(UC_) was transformed
Notes to pp. 106-107 195
into NEC(AiC), and the contradictory of NEC(AiC) is  NEC(AiC) expressed as
either ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ or ‘It is not necessary that A holds of some C’
(ouk ex anankês tini). So  NEC(AiC) is what is inferred in the ‘reductio’, and this
is not equivalent to CON(AeC) because NEC(AiC) is not equivalent to
 CON(AeC); for  CON(AeC) is true when NEC(AiC) is false and NEC(AoC) is
true. For example,  CON(Walking e Animal) because NEC(Walking o Animal)
<since it is necessary that a sponge not be walking>; but also  NEC(Walking i
Animal) <since it might be the case that all animals are at rest>. On this passage
and the sequel see Appendix 5 on weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency.
158. As Aristotle, but not Theophrastus, holds.
159. For the point of this remark see Appendix 5 on weak two-sided Theo-
phrastean contingency.
160. Aristotle gives terms to show that the conclusion of Celarent1(UC_) is not
contingent in the way specified. For this purpose it suffices to give an interpreta-
tion under which the premisses are true and there is some necessary connection
between the major and minor term. His first terms provide such an interpretation:
Raven e Reflective
CON(Reflective a Human)
NEC(Raven e Human)
Aristotle decides to add terms showing that Celarent1(UC_) does not yield a
necessary conclusion. These terms verify:
Moving e Knowledge
CON(Knowledge a Human)
 NEC(Moving o Human)
 NEC(Moving i Human)
(For some reason Aristotle mentions the verification of  NEC(Moving e Human)
rather than  NEC(Moving o Human).) Aristotle indicates dissatisfaction with
these terms, but does not say why. Perhaps his dissatisfaction relates to a possible
ambiguity in his middle term ‘knowledge’: the first premiss would seem to mean
‘No knowledge is in motion’, the second ‘It is contingent that no human is know-
ledgeable’ (but perhaps Aristotle is taking the possible truth ‘Nothing
knowledgeable is moving’ as an unqualified truth). Alexander’s dissatisfaction with
the terms is buttressed by his view that the specification of terms is a way of
confirming that a certain conclusion follows. He finds two failings in the first set
of terms: (i) that they make the first premiss necessary not unqualified; (ii) that,
as Aristotle indicates, they verify NEC(AeC) and not just the desired conclusion
 NEC(AiC). According to Alexander, the second set of terms takes care of (ii), but
leaves (i), which shows that he is taking ‘Moving e Knowledge’ to mean ‘No
knowledge is in motion’. Alexander proposes a set of ‘better terms’:
Angry e Laughing
CON(Laughing a Human)
 NEC(Angry i Human).
Alexander is not comfortable with these terms, perhaps because the major premiss
might seem to be necessary. He offers another set which are not clearly better on
this score.
Walking e Resting
CON(Resting a Animal)
 NEC(Walking i Animal).
These terms might be better than the first set because one might hold that
CON(Angry e Human), whereas, since Alexander takes for granted that
NEC(Walking o Animal), he holds that  CON(Walking e Animal). Alexander
takes up this setting down of terms a second time at 199,19ff.
196 Notes to pp. 107-109
161. Alexander’s point is not that  NEC(Raven i Human) is false but that the
stronger NEC(Raven e Human) is true.
162. Alexander’s suggestion seems incorrect. Aristotle encountered the alleged
difficulty because he took a minor term of which the major does not hold by
necessity. He might have taken, e.g.,
NEC(Raven e Reflective)
CON(Reflective a Walking)
 NEC(Raven e Walking) and  NEC(Raven i Walking).
163. Here is a striking example of Alexander’s view that a proposition which is
contingent in the way specified does not hold. He thinks that CON(Angry e
Human), which is equivalent to CON(Angry a Human) is not true because many
humans are, in fact, angry;  NEC(Angry i Human) is, however, true.
164. Alexander now raises the Theophrastean question whether ‘It is necessary
that AiC’ isn’t the contradictory of ‘It is contingent that AeC’.
165. pseudês.
166. We have paraphrased Alexander’s terse formulation of the two alterna-
tives, which might be rendered: ‘as denying by necessity the assumption (to
keimenon) or as denying the necessity.’ (In the immediate sequel we refer to a
sense of ‘A holds by necessity of no C’ where Alexander uses one of his formulations
to describe the sense.) We might express the two alternatives by saying that ‘A
holds by necessity of no C’ may assert either (1) NEC(AeC) or (2)  NEC(AiC).
Note that at 194,13-19 Alexander suggested that only (2) corresponded to the
words ‘A holds by necessity of no C’, (1) corresponding to ‘A holds of no C by
necessity’, and in general he sticks to what he says there. But he is not always
careful; see, e.g., 202,22. In our translation we have tried to smooth over these
careless formulations.
167. Alexander again makes the point that, unlike CON(AeC),  NEC(AiC) can
be true even when NEC(AoC).
168. That is, CON(AeC) converts with CON(AaC) and so is incompatible, as
 NEC(AiC) is not, with NEC(AoC) and indeed with any necessary proposition
AC.
169. cf., e.g., 156,13-14 and 194,33-195,1.
170. That is,  CON(AeC) follows from NEC(AiC) but does not imply it. Again,
we paraphrase the rest of the paragraph.  CON(AeC) is true if either NEC(AiC)
or NEC(AoC). Aristotle chooses to use NEC(AiC) rather than NEC(AoC) for his
reductio because he is able to get a contradiction using it. The conclusion from
NEC(AoC) and the second premiss BaC of Celarent1(UC_) would be (Bo-
cardo3(NUU)) AoB, which is compatible with the first premiss AeB. So Aristotle
changes  CON(AeC) into NEC(AiC), gets a contradiction, and quite reasonably
infers, not   CON(AeC), i.e., CON(AeC) but,  NEC(AiC). For  NEC(AiC) is
the opposite of NEC(AiC), but the opposite of CON(AeC) is  CON(AeC), which is
implied by either NEC(AiC) or NEC(AoC), both of which are incompatible with
CON(AeC) and compatible with  CON(AeC).
171. The reference is to Aristotle’s rejection of an indirect argument for EE-
conversionc at 1.17, 37a9-31.
172. cf. 195,6-17.
173. i.e. not CON(AeC).
174. The reference is to 35a1-2, ‘It is clear then that the conclusion is that A
holds by necessity of no C,’ but at 34b25-6 Aristotle says ‘But this is impossible, so
that it will be contingent that A holds of no C.’
175. Alexander now raises the question whether the conclusion of Bar-
bara1(UC_), taken up at 34a34ff., is contingent in the way specified. It is not, as
Notes to pp. 110-112 197
Alexander makes clear, although his discussion is not as lucid as it might be; see
also 207,3-18. 198,5-199,10 constitute Theophrastus 103B FHSG.
176. Celarent1(UC_). Cf. 197,7-32 and Appendix 5 on weak two-sided Theo-
177. On this way of expressing  NEC(AoC) see Appendix 1 on the expression
‘by necessity’.
178. Alexander asks whether the difference between CON(AaC) and
 NEC(AoC) is merely verbal. If it is not, the conclusion of Barbara1(UC_) must
be taken to be the latter rather than the former. Alexander goes on to look for
terms which verify  NEC(AoC) and  CON(AaC). See Appendix 5 on weak
two-sided Theophrastean contingency.
179. The rest of this paragraph is difficult. We propose the following interpre-
tation hesitantly. Alexander is looking for terms which will verify  CON(AaC),
 NEC(AoC). For this purpose he need only find terms which make  NEC(AoC)
and NEC(AiC) true. He first considers  NEC(Breather o Animal) (‘No animal
is by necessity not a breather’). He points out that this statement will not do
because, even though NEC(Breather i Animal) is true, it is also true that
NEC(Breather o Animal), presumably because fish don’t breathe. He then
points out in a somewhat long-winded way that both  CON(Breather e Animal)
and  CON(Breather a Animal) are true.
180. viz.  CON(Breather a Animal) and CON(Breather e Animal).
181.  NEC(Thinking o Rational). Alexander presumably thinks it is not
necessary that any rational being not be thinking. But also NEC(Thinking i
Rational) because it is necessary that god be thinking, and, consequently
 CON(Thinking a Rational). In the next paragraph he offers ,  NEC(Motion o
Body) (because there is no necessarily stationary body – or is the earth necessarily
stationary?). Also NEC(Motion i Body) because the cosmos, the rotating body,
necessarily rotates), and, consequently,  CON(Motion a Body).
182. Alexander draws the correct inference: the conclusion of Barbara1(UC_) is
not contingent in the way specified.
183. hoi peri Theophraston. The natural reading of what Alexander says is that
Theophrastus thought  NEC( P) says that P is contingent in the way specified.
Alexander points out that such a position involves abandoning EA-transformation
for contingent propositions.
184. We here translate the text as printed in CAG. In a note to the lemma
Wallies writes ‘non lemma, sed textus verba in M’. He refers to 200,5-9 for the
evidence that the obelized words were not known to Alexander.
185. Alexander has discussed Aristotle’s specification of terms at 195,18-
196,12, a passage which should be read in connection with this one.
186. i.e. it is necessary that nothing reflective is a raven. Alexander thinks that
Aristotle’s project is to find terms which make the premisses of Celarent1(UC_)
true and  NEC(AiC) true. Aristotle’s terms do this since  NEC(Moving i Hu-
man). But what Aristotle points out about these terms is both (i)  NEC(Moving
e Human) and (ii)  NEC(Moving i Human). To explain this Alexander here takes
Aristotle to be saying (i) that the conclusion is not NEC(AeC) and (ii) that it is
 NEC(AiC).
187. ouk anankê mêdena, apparently an alternative formulation of the oudeni
ex anankês of 196,28 (which Alexander takes from Aristotle’s mêdeni ex anankês
(34b28) and finds necessary to reconcile with Aristotle’s use of ouk anankê tina in
the present passage, although Aristotle’s formulation seems like a better render-
ing of  NEC(AiC)).
198 Notes to pp. 112-115
188. Aristotle reduces AEA1(UC‘C’) to Barbara1(UC‘C’) and EEE1(UC  N  )
to Celarent1(UC  N  ).
189. Our text of Aristotle says ‘and it is taken that it is contingent that B holds
of all C’, but Alexander does not have the word endekhesthai, as is made clear by
200,23-8.
190. In the treatment of AEA1(CCC) at 1.14, 33a5-12.
191. That is, Aristotle would seem to be reducing AEA1(UC‘C’) to Bar-
bara1(UC‘C’), but the words (in Alexander’s text) ‘if BC is converted and it is taken
that B holds of all C’ suggest that an unqualified minor premiss has come into play.
The next sentence, which we have put in parentheses, suggests that Aristotle is
not just describing a reduction of AEA1(UC‘C’) to Barbara1(UC‘C’), but the further
reductio ‘justification’ of Barbara1(UC‘C’), in which the contingent premiss is
converted to an unqualified one. This sentence comes in harshly and lacks a
connecting particle; perhaps it is a gloss.
192. Aristotle rejects EE_1(CU_) and AE_1(CU_), taking the following to be true:
(i) CON(White a Animal) CON(White e Animal)
(ii) Animal e Snow Animal e Pitch
(iii) NEC(White a Snow) NEC(White e Pitch)
Alexander worries about (i) since NEC(White a Swan) and NEC(White e Crow).
He substitutes:
(i’) CON(Moving a White) CON(Moving e White)
(ii’) White e Walking White e Standing still
(iii’) NEC(Moving a Walking) NEC(Moving e Standing still)
He points out that the assertions of (iii’) are only necessary on a condition; see
Appendix 3 on conditional necessity. He drops the subject insisting that the two
combinations are not syllogistic.
Aristotle uses the same terms to reject EE_1(CN_) and AE_1(CN_) at 1.16,
36a27-31, where they seem to be more appropriate, since the propositions (ii) seem
necessary rather than unqualified, although the problem with (i) remains. In his
comment at 212,1-2 Alexander suggests dealing with the problem of (i) by substi-
tuting:
(i’) CON(White a Horse) CON(White e Horse)
(ii’) NEC(Horse e Snow) NEC(Horse e Pitch)
(iii’) NEC(White a Snow) NEC(White e Pitch).
193. At 35a2.
194. Aristotle claims completeness for Darii1(CUC) and Ferio1(CUC).
195. Aristotle asserts the validity of Darii1(UC‘C’), Ferio1(UC  N ),
AOI1(UC‘C’), and EOO1(UC  N  ). Alexander gives the argument for the first at
202,17-30 and for the second at 202,30-203,1; he briefly describes what is done in
connection with the last two at 203,1-9. Neither he nor Aristotle raise any of the
doubts about these cases analogous to those treated earlier in connection with
their analogues with a universal minor premiss.
196. For apparent minor divergence between Alexander’s text here and our text
of Aristotle, see Appendix 6 (on 35b1).
197. Alexander made no mention of this fact in connection with 1.4.26b21 where
Aristotle also calls premisses intervals.
198. Alexander insists that Barbara1(UC‘C’) and Celarent1(UC  N  ) are not
complete, since they are established by reductio; so when Aristotle says that in
their cases the syllogisms are through the premisses themselves, he means only
that the premisses don’t have to be transformed in quality to reach the conclusion.
199. Alexander gives a ‘proof’ of:
Darii1(UC‘C’) AaB CON(BiC)  NEC  (AiC).
Notes to pp. 115-118 199
not remarking that it involves the same difficulties as Aristotle’s proofs of Bar-
bara1(UC‘C’) and Celarent1(UC  N  ). (The same can be said of Alexander’s
treatment of the remaining syllogisms in this section.) But see the note on 202,30.
Here is the ‘proof’: Assume  CON(AiC), ‘i.e.’, NEC(AeC); assume BiC; then
(Ferison3(NUN)), NEC(AoB), contradicting AaB. Alexander points out that it
would suffice for the contradiction to take the conclusion of Ferison3(NU_) to be
unqualified, thereby circumventing the controversy over the proper conclusion of
that combination.
200. Here Alexander moves silently from ex anankês oudeni to oudeni ex
anankês. It seems unlikely that he cares about the difference between these two
expressions which he invoked in connection with Celarent1(UC  N  ) at 194,14.
201. Alexander’s ‘proof’ for:
Ferio1(UC  N  ) AeB CON(BiC)  NEC  (AoC)
is analogous: Assume  CON(AoC), ‘i.e.’, NEC(AaC); assume BiC; then (Da-
tisi3(NUN)) NEC(AiB), contradicting AeB. Again Alexander points out that it
suffices for present purposes to assume the validity of Datisi3(NUU). Alexander
says a little more about this case in the next chapter at 205,26-206,11, and makes
clear that the conclusion is  NEC  (AoC).
202. cf. Denniston (1954), p. 169: ‘de is not infrequently used where the context
admits, or even appears to demand, gar. The Scholia often observe: ho de anti tou
gar.’
203. Aristotle rejects AO_1(CU_) and EO_1(CU_).
204. The lemma reads Hotan de to mê huparkhein tini lambanêi where Aristotle
has hotan de to mê huparkhein lambanêi hê kata meros tetheisa.
205. For a minor textual point see Appendix 6 (on 35b11).
206. Alexander points out that since Darii1(CUC) and Ferio1(CUC) are valid,
one cannot show the invalidity of AO_1(CU_) or EO_1(CU_) using terms which
verify the particular negative minor premisses but do not verify the corresponding
universal negative assertion. For if they do not verify the latter, they will verify
the particular minor premisses of the two valid syllogisms and hence verify their
conclusions.
207. e.g., at 1.4, 26b10-20, 1.5, 27b9-28, 1.6, 28b24-31.
208. At 35a20-4.
209. Aristotle rejects cases with a particular major premiss and either a
universal or a particular minor premiss. (For a minor divergence between the
lemma and our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6, on 35b12.)
210. It is difficult to see how else to interpret Aristotle’s ‘contingent or unquali-
fied or in alternation’, even though it makes Aristotle refer to the results of
previous chapters.
212. Certainly the text doesn’t give all the relevant alternatives; the omissions
may be due to a scribe.
213. For a minor textual divergence from Aristotle see Appendix 6 (on 35b17).
214. Aristotle would seem to be asserting the validity of all of:
Darii1(CUC), Ferio1(CUC), Darii1(UC‘C’), Ferio1(UC‘C’), AOI1(UC‘C’),
EOO1(UC‘C’), AOI1(CU_), EOO1(CU_), and rejecting the corresponding cases with
a particular minor and universal major. Alexander realizes that Aristotle has
rejected AOI1(CU_) and EOO1(CU_), so he re-interprets Aristotle to be referring
only to the validity of Darii1(UCC).
215. The words tês elattonos dêladê look very much like a gloss.
200 Notes to pp. 118-120
216. Like chapter 15, chapter 16 is very difficult. The reader may wish to
consult section III.E.3.a of the introduction.
217. The words ‘or not holding’ in the lemma do not occur in our texts of
Aristotle. For two other very minor variations see Appendix 6 (on 35b23; see also
the notes on 35b34 and 35).
218. Our texts of Aristotle do not have the words ‘that something does not hold’
(mê huparkhein) quoted by Alexander at 205,21-2.
219. i.e.  NEC is different from NEC  . For possible minor divergences
between Alexander’s text of this last sentence and ours see Appendix 6 (on 36b34
and 36b35).
220. In the previous chapter.
221. Despite the correct reservations expressed at 198,5-199,15, Alexander now
follows Aristotle and reasserts the false claim that the conclusions of Bar-
bara1(UC‘C’) and Darii1(UC‘C’) are contingent in the way specified.
222. In Alexander’s view when Aristotle argues that a pair of premisses yields
the conclusion ‘It is contingent that P’ because it yields the conclusion P, he is not
talking about contingency in the way specified since for Alexander CON(P) entails
 P. What he says at 216,7-14 suggests that he understands the difference between
CONu and  NEC  , but for the most part he lumps them together under the rubric
‘contingent, but not in the way specified.’ See section III.E.3.a of the introduction.
223. Alexander refers to the treatment of Celarent1(UC  N  ) at 1.15, 34b19-
35a2 and of Ferio1(UC  N  ) at 1.15, 35a35-b8. See 194,9ff. The conclusion of the
former is  NEC(AiC) (A holds by necessity of no C), and that of the latter is
 NEC(AaC) (A does not hold by necessity of all C). See Appendix 1 on the
expression ‘by necessity’.
224. Alexander considers Ferio1(UC  N  ), of which the conclusion is
 NEC(AaC). He wants to explain the non-equivalence of this and CON(AoC) or,
equivalently, of NEC(AaC) and  CON(AoC). His basic point is that  CON(AoC)
is verified not just by NEC(AaC) but by NEC(AeC). See Appendix 5 on weak
two-sided Theophrastean contingency.
225. See Appendix 5 on weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency.
226. i.e. NEC(AaC) implies but is not implied by  CON(AoC). A more literal
translation of what Alexander says might be: ‘Its negation has not been trans-
formed into its equivalent but into one of the things under it by which it is rendered
true’ (tina tôn hup’ autên, kath’ hôn alêtheuetai).
227. This paragraph makes no clear sense to us. We think it is corrupt. Even
paraphrasing what Alexander says is difficult because he uses alternative formu-
lations for equivalent propositions. We use the following abbreviations.
endekhetai tini mê CON(AoC) (a)
ou panti ex anankês  NEC(AaC) (b)
ouk ex anankês tini  NEC(AiC) (c)
oudeni ex anankês  NEC  (AeC) (c’)
panti ex anankês NEC(AaC) ( b)
ouk endekhetai tini mê  CON(AoC) ( a)
Alexander seems to make the following claims:
(i) (a) is true when either (b) or (c) is;
(ii) (b) falsifies ( b) and is implied by (c’) because (c’) implies the falsehood of
( b); also ( b) implies ( a);
(iii) (c) implies the denial of NEC(AiC);
(iv) not only (a), but also the conjunction of (b) and (c) are incompatible with any
necessary relation between A and C; (a) and the conjunction of (b) and (c) are
equivalent;
Notes to pp. 120-121 201
(v) each of (b) and (c’) are true if the corresponding unqualified propositions are
true, i.e., hold unqualifiedly.
What is said under (ii) and (v) is correct and does not involve (c). (iii) involves
(c) and seems very trivial. (iv) is incorrect since although (a) implies that there is
no necessary relation between A and C,  NEC(AiC) implies  NEC(AaC), and
they are quite compatible with NEC(AeC). (i) is also incorrect since neither (b) nor
(c) implies (a). Both of these difficulties would be removed if (c) could be read as
 NEC(AeC) and (i) could understood as saying that (a) is implied by the conjunc-
tion of (b) and (c). This passage would then be an assertion of what we have called
weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency. The latter change seems not impos-
sible, but we are reluctant to suggest that ouk ex anankês tini might have been
altered from ouk ex anankês oudeni at 206,3-4, and we cannot see how to explain
an orginal ouk ex anankês oudeni in 206,8.
228. In the way specified.
229. Celarent1(UC  N  ).
230. Aristotle apparently asserts the validity of Barbara1(NCC). Alexander
gives a U-for-C proof of:
Barbara1(NC‘C’) NEC(AaB) CON(BaC)  NEC  (AaC)
Assume  CON(AaC), ‘i.e.’ NEC(AoC). Take for the contingent second premiss
BaC. Then (Bocardo3(NUU)) AoB, contradicting NEC(AaB). At 207,3-18 Alexander
makes clear that the conclusion is not contingent in the way specified.
231. At 205,4-5.
232. i.e.  NEC(AaC). The point of this last sentence is probably to be under-
stood in terms of Alexander’s remark at 206,22-4, which simply paraphrases
Aristotle’s statement at 35b37-8 that the conclusion of Barbara1(NC_) will not be
necessary.
233. i.e.  NEC(AoC). See Appendix 1 on the expression ‘by necessity’. At this
point Wallies writes ‘nescio, quo vitio periodus turbetur’, but the sense of the text
is clear enough. Alexander points out that NEC(AoC) is not equivalent to
 CON(AaC), because the latter is entailed by either NEC(AiC) or NEC(AoC). He
then points out that one could ‘transform’  CON(AaC) into either of NEC(AiC) or
NEC(AoC), but only the latter works for getting a contradiction; see Appendix 5
on weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency.
We have omitted from our translation words which could be rendered ‘which, if
“A does not hold of some C by necessity” is not equivalent to “It is not contingent
that A holds of all C”.’
234. In connection with U+C combinations at 198,5-199,10.
235. Alexander points out that  NEC(AoC) denies NEC(AoC),  NEC(AiC)
denies NEC(AiC), and that  NEC(AoC) is compatible with NEC(AiC). He illus-
trates the compatibility with  NEC(Moving o Body) (since all bodies might be in
motion) and NEC(Moving i Body) (since it is necessary that the heavens move).
236. At 199,2-4.
237. Alexander gives a circle justification of Barbara1(NC‘C’): Assume
 CON(AaC), ‘i.e.’, NEC(AoC); but NEC(AoC) and CON(BaC) yield (Bo-
cardo3(NC‘C’)) ‘CON’(AoB), contradicting NEC(AaB). On this last paragraph see
section III.E.3.a of the introduction.
238. 35b34-5.
239. On this lost work see Sharples (1987), p.1196. Alexander also refers to it
at 125,30-1, 127,15-16, 213,25-7, 238,37-8, 250,1-2; cf. 188,16-17, and 191,17-18.
These passages suggest that Alexander deliberately refrains from expressing
views on certain controversial subjects, possibly on the grounds that this is not the
task of a commentator, i.e. a person who is expounding a text to students.
202 Notes to pp. 122-123
240. Aristotle asserts the completeness of Barbara1(CNC).
241. Note that this is not what Aristotle says.
242. On Alexander’s discussion of Aristotle’s indirect justification of Celar-
ent1(NCCu) via
see III.E.3.a of the introduction. The Greek behind the obelized words is in Ross’
text of Aristotle, but perhaps not in Alexander’s; see 209,22-5; for a more minor
divergence see Appendix 6 (textual note on 36a11). We here summarize the
argument as it appears in our text of Aristotle (which corresponds to Alexander’s
initial representation at 208,8-209,3). Instead of just assuming the contradictory
AiC of the conclusion AeC Aristotle considers two alternatives:
(i) AaC AiC.
He then (ii) takes the first premiss, converts it to NEC(BeA), and says that there
follows (Celarent1(NUN) or Ferio1(NUN)):
(iii) NEC(BeC) NEC(BoC),
either of which is incompatible with CON(BaC).
243. cf. 126,33.
244. That is, the conclusion is not a necessary truth, but it follows necessarily
from the premisses.
245. Alexander points to the use of first-figure NUN cases.
246. Alexander does a reductio to establish:
Celarent1(NC  N  ) NEC(AeB) CON(BaC)  NEC  (AeC).
He assumes NEC  (AeC), i.e., NEC(AiC), converts the major premiss to
NEC(BeA) and uses Ferio1(NNN) to get NEC(BoC), contradicting CON(BaC). It
is striking that he refers to  NEC  as ‘contingency in the way specified’; cf. the
note on 199,7. Philoponus (in An. Pr. 205,13-27, Theophrastus 109A FHSG)
ascribes a different reductio to ‘those around Theophrastus’. It involves converting
NEC(AiC) to NEC(CiA) and applying Darii1(CNC) to infer CON(BiA), which
conflicts with NEC(BeA), the converted form of NEC(AeB).
247. cf. 1.15, 34b27-35a2 with Alexander’s discussion, starting at 194,9.
248. The remainder of this section is more continuous than our breaking it into
two paragraphs suggests. We have done this because the sense of our second
paragraph is much clearer to us than the sense of our first. We discuss some
textual issues in the first paragraph in the next note. Here we point out that the
paragraph appears to be directed at Aristotle’s expressing the contradiction of the
reductio argument with the words ‘But A is assumed to hold of all or some C, so
that it is not contingent that B holds of [any or of] all C. But it was hypothesized
to hold of all originally’. Aristotle should have said what Alexander represents him
at 208,31-3 as saying: ‘But it was hypothesized originally that it is contingent that
it holds of all.’ The author of this paragraph takes ‘It is not contingent that B holds
of  all C’ to mean ‘It is contingent that B does not hold of all C’, which he says
Aristotle takes to be equivalent to  (BaC), which makes a clear conflict with ‘But
it was hypothesized to hold of all originally’, i.e., with BaC. The notion that
Aristotle assumed BaC instead of the given premiss CON(BaC) leads to the notion
of a U-for-C argument, which is given in the second paragraph.
249. The words ‘so that it is not contingent that B holds of all C’ appear to
correspond to 36a14 ‘so that it is not contingent that B holds of [any or of] all C’,
which Alexander’s earlier remarks suggest that he too read. We are not sure what
to make of this difference, but we note that Becker (1933), p. 44 suggests (without
referring to Alexander) that the original text may have been something like what
Alexander says here. Nor do we know what to make of the words which follow in
Notes to pp. 123-125 203
Wallies’ text (ho hupekeito [de] ex arkhês) and have emended the text to make them
a continuation of what Aristotle says.
250. Alexander offers a U-for-C proof for Celarent1(NCU): assume  (AeC), i.e.,
AiC. But – transforming the minor contingent premiss into an unqualified one –
BaC. Therefore (Disamis3(UUU)) AiB, contradicting NEC(AeB).
251. Aristotle asserts that
Celarent1(CNC): CON(AeB) NEC(BaC) CON(AeC).
is complete and that it is not possible to prove Celarent1(CNU) by reductio. The
second claim is false since AiC and NEC(BaC) imply (Disamis3(UNN)) NEC(AiB),
contradicting CON(AeB), a point which seems to have escaped Alexander’s notice.
(Or perhaps he preferred to avoid invoking a controversial UNN syllogism.) His
discussion is made complicated by what he calls the conciseness of the last sentence
of this passage.
252. The lemma reads katêgorikê where our text of Aristotle has kataphatikê.
253. Ross emends ‘no’ to ‘some’. We quote his comment: ‘ In a23 tini must be
right. The MSS. of [Alexander] record tini mê as a variant (210,32, but Al.’s
commentary (ib. 32-4) shows that the variant he recognized was tini. mêdeni, the
reading he accepts (210,21-30), is indefensible.’
254. See, e.g., 205,2-8.
255. Again Alexander invokes the dictum de omni et nullo, saying that if
CON(AeB) and NEC(BaC), then CON(AaB) and the C’s are included among the
B’s, of all of which it is contingent that A is said; hence CON(AaC) and CON(AeC).
256. Alexander attempts to explain why no impossibility follows from AiC and
CON(AeB), a combination (Festino2(CU_)) which is not discussed until chapter 18
at 37b39-38a2, where it is rejected. Presumably his point is that CON(AeC) is
equivalent to CON(AaC) and it is ‘known’ that there are no second-figure syllo-
gisms with two affirmative premisses. (The same point can be made about AaC
and CON(AeB).)
257. Alexander turns to discuss Aristotle’s problematic sentence ‘For if A is
hypothesized to hold of no C and it is also assumed that it is contingent that it
holds of no B, nothing impossible results from these things’, which he thinks
should say something like ‘For if the conclusion of Celarent1(CN_) is hypothesized
to be A holds of no C and one posits the opposite of this AiC and it is also assumed
that it is contingent that A holds of no B, nothing impossible results from these
things.’
258. mê bracketed by Wallies.
259. Alexander points out that no contradiction follows if AiC, the denial of the
conclusion of Celarent1(CNU), is conjoined with BaC, but the premiss in question
is actually NEC(BaC), with which a contradiction can be derived; see the first note
on the lemma.
260. Disamis3(UUU)
261. Alexander mentions the following indirect way to establish Celar-
ent1(CN‘C’). Assume  CON(AeC), ‘i.e.’, NEC(AiC). But NEC(BaC), so that
(Disamis3(NNN)) NEC(AiB), contradicting CON(AeB). Alexander claims that we
do not in this case have to take the conclusion to be  NEC  (AeC), since we can
also rule out NEC(AoC), because NEC(AoC) and NEC(BaC) imply (Bo-
cardo3(NNN)) NEC(AoB), which is incompatible with CON(AeB). See Appendix 5
on weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency.
In our translation of the first words of this paragraph we have followed the
Aldine.
262. Alexander perhaps adds the words in parentheses, which are irrelevant to
204 Notes to pp. 125-128
the present argument, because in the next argument he will invoke an incompati-
bility with NEC(AoB). See the note on 211,14.
263. See 207,3-12 with the notes and Appendix 5 on weak two-sided Theo-
264. Because CON(AaB) is equivalent to the major premiss CON(AeB).
265. Aristotle accepts the waste case AEA1(NC‘C’). He rejects AE_1(CN_) and
EE_1(CN_), using the same terms he used for their CU analogues at 1.15, 35a20-4;
see 201,1-24 with the note. The next lemma after this one occurs at 215,19.
266. cf. 201,1-24 with the note on 201,1.
267. Aristotle offers the following argument for:
Ferio1(NCU) NEC(AeB) CON(BiC) AoC
Assume  (AoC), i.e., AaC. But NEC(AeB), so that (Cesare2(NUN)) NEC(BeC),
contradicting CON(BiC). Alexander describes the argument, including the reduc-
tion of Cesare2(NUN) to Celarent1(NUN), and then points out that it depends upon
Aristotle’s position on NUN in the first figure. At 212,22 he offers an ‘uncon-
troversial’ alternative derivation of Ferio1(NC  N  ).
268. For a minor textual difference between the citation and our text of Aristotle
see Appendix 6 (textual note on 36a32).
269. Alexander actually says ‘the hypothesized conclusion’.
270. Alexander gives a reductio to establish:
Ferio1(NC  N  ) NEC(AeB) CON(BiC)  NEC  (AoC)
Assume  CON(AoC), ‘i.e.’, NEC(AaC). But NEC(AeB), so that (Cesare2(NNN))
NEC(BeC), contradicting CON(BiC). Alexander does not point out, but presum-
ably takes for granted, that the legitimate conclusion here is  NEC  (AoC)
rather than CON(AoC).
271. Aristotle affirms Ferio1(CNC) and Darii1(NC‘C’).
272. Alexander turns to Ferio1(CN_) until 213,27.
273. i.e., in Celarent1(CNC); see 209,35-210,8.
274. At 36a17-25; see the note on 209,33.
275. Alexander is looking at:
Ferio1(CN_) CON(AeB) NEC(BiC),
and asking whether one can show by reductio that the premisses imply AoC, that
is whether either of CON(AeB) and NEC(BiC) together with AaC yields an
impossibility. The first pair (Cesare2(UC_)) will be rejected by Aristotle in chapter
18 at 37b19-23, and the second pair yields only (Datisi3(UNU)) AiB, which does not
contradict CON(AeB).
276. See 210,8-21.
277. Alexander now gives circle arguments validating Celarent1(NCN) and
Ferio1(NCN). See III.E.3.a of the introduction.
278. cf. 207,28-33.
279. Disamis3(CCC).
280. Datisi3(CCC)
281. At 207,35-6.
282. Alexander turns to Darii1(NC‘C’).
283. For a minor difference between this citation and Ross’ text of Aristotle see
the note on 36b1.
284. Aristotle asserts this about Barbara1(NC_) at 35b37-36a2. Alexander
supplied a U-for-C proof at 206,29-207,3. He now gives a confusing argument (or
pair of arguments) for:
Darii1(NC‘C’) NEC(AaB) CON(BiC) CON(AiC).
He assumes  CON(AiC), ‘i.e.’, NEC(AeC) and transforms CON(BiC) into BiC. He
then says that these imply either AoB or ‘CON’(AoB). Either of these contradicts
Notes to pp. 129-130 205
NEC(AaB), but the only sense we can make of his saying that his two assumptions
might imply ‘CON’(AoB) is if he is imagining an alternative proof in which
CON(BiC) is not transformed into BiC. In that proof one would use Feri-
son3(NCCu), which, of course, has not been dealt with yet and depends on
Ferio1(NC_). (Ferison3(NCCu) could, of course, be said to yield either AoB and
CONu(AoB), but applying it does not require transforming CON(BiC) into BiC.)
When Alexander asserts that the consequence of NEC(AeC) and BiC is AoB, he
apparently chooses to ignore the fact that Aristotle espouses (1.11, 31b31-3)
Ferison3(NUN) rather than the Theophrastean Ferison3(NUU). Alexander also
points out that the conclusion is not contingent in the way specified.
285. Accepting a conjecture of Wallies, which he does not print in the text; see
Textual Emendations at the beginning of the volume (on 214,5).
286. Alexander now gives an argument for:
Darii1(NCU) NEC(AaB) CON(BiC) AiC.
Assume  (AiC), i.e., AeC. Alexander says that the consequence of AeC and
CON(BiC) is either AoB or ‘CON’(AoB), either of which contradicts NEC(AaB).
The second of these conclusions follows from Ferison3(UC‘C’), which Aristotle
affirms at 1.21, 39b26-31. The first would follow only if CON(BiC) were trans-
formed into BiC and Ferison3(UUU) applied.
287. Aristotle rejects IA_1(NC_), OA_1(NC_), IE_1(NC_), and OE_1(NC_), using
the same terms as he used to reject CC and U+C combinations with a particular
major premiss at 1.14, 33b3-8 and 1.15, 35b11-19; see the note on 171,14. He takes
as true:
NEC(Animal i White)
NEC(Animal o White)
CON(White a Human) CON(White e Human)
CON(White a Cloak) CON(White e Cloak)
NEC(Animal a Human)
NEC(Animal e Cloak).
288. Aristotle rejects IE_1(CN_), OE_1(CN_), taking as true:
CON(Animal i White)
CON(Animal o White)
NEC(White e Crow) NEC(White e Pitch)
NEC(Animal a Crow) NEC(Animal e Pitch)
and IA_1(CN_), and OA_1(CN_), taking as true:
CON(Animal i White)
CON(Animal o White)
NEC(White a Swan) NEC(White a Snow)
NEC(Animal a Swan) NEC(Animal e Snow).
It is of some interest that Aristotle takes ‘Some white things are animals’ and ‘Some
white things are not animals’ as contingent here, when he has just taken them as
necessary.
289. Since indeterminate premisses are no stronger than particular ones,
Aristotle needs that the two ‘conclusions’ are true, viz,
NEC(Animal a Human) NEC(Animal e Soulless)
and that the following premisses are true:
1. NEC(Animal i White)
2. NEC(Animal o White)
3. CON(Animal i White)
4. CON(Animal o White)
5. NEC(White i Human) 9. NEC(White i Soulless)
6. NEC(White o Human) 10. NEC(White o Soulless)
206 Notes to pp. 130-132
7. CON(White i Human) 11. CON(White i Soulless)
8. CON(White o Human) 12. CON(White o Soulless)
Aristotle does only the set for NEC(Animal e Soulless). He seems to assert the truth
of Animal i White and White i Soulless, and then of 1, 2, 9, 10, and remarks that
the case will be the same for 3, 4, 11, 12
290. i.e. whether they are affirmative or negative.
291. Alexander asserts the (de re) truth of 1 and 2.
292. At this point Alexander wishes to explain the truth of 3 and 4, which would
seem to be incompatible with 1 and 2. He does so in an obscure way by claiming
that CON(Human i White) and CON(Human o White) and ‘inferring’ 3 and 4. It
does not seem possible to treat any of these propositions as de re true.
293. Alexander turns to 5-8 and treats them de re, taking it to be necessary that
Ethiopians are black and Celts white, and to be contingent for most humans
whether or not they are white.
294. We find the text here difficult, but take the sense to be this: Aristotle gives
material terms for both NEC(AaC) and NEC(AeC), but he does only the latter
case, showing that all of 1-4 and 9-12 hold, so that the connection both between A
and B and between B and C is ‘indefinite’. The next lemma reproduces some of the
text already discussed. It and the brief discussion, which seems to say falsely that
Aristotle has done all the cases, may be a later insertion.
295. For a minor divergence from our text of Aristotle, see Appendix 6 (on
36b16).
296. Aristotle makes a general parallel between the U+C and N+C first-figure
syllogisms, but contrasts Celarent1(UC  N  ) and Ferio1(UC  N  ) (and perhaps
EEE1(UC  N  ) and EOO1(UC  N  )) with Celarent1(NCCu) and Ferio1(NCCu)
(EEE1(NCCu) and EOO1(NCCu)). Alexander again raises the question whether the
 N  conclusions should be considered contingent.
297. dêlon; our texts of Aristotle have phaneron.
298. Alexander refers to Aristotle’s treatment of Celarent1(UC  N  ) at 1.15,
34b19-35a2 and Ferio1(UC  N  ) at 1.15, 35a35-b8. Alexander suggests making
a distinction between CONu conclusions which are really unqualified and  NEC
conclusions which are not.
299. See Aristotle’s treatments of Celarent1(NCCu) at 36a7-17 and
Ferio1(NCCu) at 36a32-9 with Alexander’s comments and the notes.
300. Alexander now argues that one cannot establish:
Celarent1(UCU): AeB CON(BaC) AeC
by an argument analogous to the reductio for Celarent1(NCCu); he points out that:
(i) AiC and AeB imply (Festino2(UUU)) BoC, which is consistent with
CON(BaC);
(ii) AiC and CON(BaC) imply (Disamis3(UCC)) CON(AiB), which is consistent
with AeB.
He points out that (ii) would obviously be false if one could change CON(BaC) into
BaC, as in a U-for-C argument; the same change would produce an inconsistency
with (i). Alexander makes this point again immediately below at 216,34-217,7.
301. We read khrômenôn <hêmôn>; cf. 133,32 and 134,16.
302. This paragraph is compressed, but it essentially contains the information
that, if one rejects Aristotle’s point of view on first-figure NU combinations and
does not allow U-for-C substitution, there is no indirect justification for any of
Celarent1(NCCu), Celarent1(UC‘C’), Ferio1(NCCu), Ferio1(UC‘C’) in which the ne-
gation of the purported conclusion and the major premiss are used to derive
something incompatible with the minor, contingent premiss. Alexander refers to
such reductios as using the second figure because the shortest ones would use it,
Notes to pp. 132-134 207
but only a straightforward conversion of the major premiss is required for a
reduction to the first figure.
Alexander first refers to the straightforward second-figure reductio for Celar-
ent1(NC  N  ): assume NEC(AiC) and infer with AeB that NEC(BoC), conflicting
with CON(BaC). He points out that this argument won’t go through without
Aristotle’s assumption about first-figure NU combinations ‘whether the negative
<major> premiss is necessary or unqualified’. He then says that without this
assumption the reductios will yield either BoC (for the two Celarent1 cases), which
is compatible with the minor premiss CON(BaC) or BeC (for the two Ferio1 cases),
which is compatible with the minor premiss CON(BiC).
303. Alexander now looks at ‘third-figure’ reductios of
Celarent1(UCU) AeB CON(BaC) AeC
and
In these one tries to infer from AiC and CON(BaC) an inconsistency with the major
premiss. Given Disamis3(UCC) (or Darii1(CUC) and two II-conversions) one can
infer CON(AiB), which is inconsistent with NEC(AeB). As Alexander points out a
corresponding argument for Celarent1(UCU) requires applying U-for-C substitu-
tion to CON(BaC) and using Disamis3(UUU).
304. Alexander again asks whether the transformation of CON(BaC) into BaC
isn’t ‘responsible’ for the contradiction since none results if the transformation
isn’t made. He again insists that it is not, but what he says is cryptic. Cf. his
discussion of 1.15, 34b7-18 at 188,18-193,21.
305. That is, although AiB is incompatible with the premiss AeB, it is not
impossible, if the incompatibility results from the transformation of CON(BaC)
into BaC.
306. This sentence is excised by Ross, who cites Maier. Alexander’s comment
gives the reason.
307. The main interest in this chapter is the lengthy discussion (1.16, 36b35-
1.17, 37a31) of the failure of EE-conversion for contingent propositions. Aristotle
uses the non-convertibility result to argue (37a32-5) against the possibility of
reducing Cesare2(CC_) to Celarent1(CCC) in the way Cesare2(UUU) was reduced
to Celarent1(UUU). The argument obviously generalizes to Camestres2(CC_) and
Festino2(CC_). Aristotle also gives an obscure argument (37a35-7) against the
possibility of an indirect reduction.
308. For a minor discrepancy from our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6 (on 36b26).
309. Aristotle discusses U+C second-figure combinations in chapter 18 and
N+C ones in chapter 19. The force of what he says here can be gathered by looking
at the summaries of U+C and N+C syllogisms.
310. In chapter 5; cf. 28a7-9; cf. 227,16-17. Alexander’s point is that if a CC
combination with at least one negative premiss yielded a conclusion, so would the
combination with the negative premisses transformed into affirmative ones. But,
of course, what is true of UU combinations need not be true of the corresponding
CC combinations. The important point is that Aristotle’s transformation rules for
contingent propositions make it impossible to reduce second-figure CC combina-
tions to combinations already proved valid. Alexander’s perspective leads him to
go on in the next paragraph to raise the following sort of question: why should one
assume that AA_2(CC_) is non-syllogistic and infer that Cesare2(CCC) is non-
syllogistic rather than assuming that Cesare2(CCC) is syllogistic and inferring
that AA_2(CCC) is syllogistic?
311. Alexander claims some kind of priority of affirmative over negative asser-
tions; one should not undermine syllogistic combinations involving affirmative
208 Notes to pp. 134-135
premisses on the basis of combinations involving negative ones, but the latter
combinations need to be justified. The imperfect ‘it was said’ suggests an inde-
pendent discussion.
312. That is, CON(XeY) is not of the form  P; cf. 158, 32-159,4. Alexander goes
on to argue that somehow CON(XaY) is a prior formulation of CON(XeY).
313. i.e. the person who accepts CON(XeY) eo ipso accepts CON(XaY).
314. That is in 1.5 Cesare2(UUU), Camestres2(UUU), and Festino2(UUU) were
established by conversion of the negative premiss, Baroco2(UUU) by reductio.
315. At 1.17, 36b35-37a31.
316. The discussion in the remainder of this section is not easy to follow.
Alexander is trying to give a general explanation of why the valid second-figure
U+C and N+C combinations are all and only those having their non-contingent
premiss universal negative. Our notes – which deal only with the U+C cases since
the N+C cases are completely analogous – indicate difficulties in construing what
Alexander says. The easiest access to what he is trying to describe is through the
summaries of the U+C and N+C cases. Alexander takes for granted that no
second-figure syllogism has two affirmative or particular premisses. In this para-
graph he rules out AE_2(UC_), EA_2(CU_), IE_2(UC_), EI_2(CU_), OA_2(CU_), and
AO_2(UC_).
317. This description covers all the combinations accepted as syllogistic by
Aristotle in chapter 18: Cesare2(UC‘C’), Camestres2(CU‘C’), Festino2(UC‘C’),
IEO2(CU_), and the four which reduce to them by EA- or OI-transformationc:
EEE2(UC‘C’), EEE2(CU‘C’), EOO2(UC‘C’), OEO2(CU_).
318. This rules out OA_2(UC_), AO_2(CU_), OE_2(UC_), and EO_2(CU_). How-
ever, the reasoning which follows is not clear to us.
319. If we assume that Alexander is only dealing with cases he hasn’t already
discussed or taken for granted, then he is ruling out IE_2(CU_) and OA_2(CU_)
(and not IA_2(CU_), which is a two-affirmative case or OE_2(CU_), which he has
previously accepted).
320. This description covers four cases, two of which have already been ruled
out: AA_2(CU_) and EA_2(CU_). The remaining two cases have already been
accepted: Camestres2(CU‘C’) and EEE2(CU‘C’). When Alexander says these are
proved by reductio ad absurdum, he presumably means that they are proved by
reduction to Celarent1(UC  N  ), which is itself proved by reductio. He goes on
to point out that there is no possibility of reducing them to a first-figure CUC
combination because neither AA-conversionc nor EE-conversionc is valid, and, even
if it were, the result of applying it to the first premiss would be a first-figure
combination with an unqualified universal negative minor.
321. Probably a reference to 1.2, 25a7-10 in the general discussion of conversion
in chapter 2.
322. At 36b35-37a31.
323. It is not clear what kind of syllogisms Alexander is talking about. He goes
on to refer to two cases which he has already rejected: OA_2(UC) and AO_2(CU_).
In these cases there can be no reduction to the first figure because the negative
premiss will not convert and the affirmative will only convert to a particular
affirmative or a universal negative premiss.
324. Alexander’s description applies to EEE2(UC‘C’), EOO2(UC‘C’), and
OEO2(UC_), the first two of which he has already affirmed, the third of which he
has rejected. The reduction he describes applies only to the first two cases.
325. In chapter 14.
326. In 1.15 and 16.
327. In 1.17 and 20.
Notes to pp. 136-138 209
328. Alexander does not give any clear reason why one has to study first-figure
mixtures before studying second-figure CC combinations. One possible reason is
that Aristotle argues that there is no indirect justification for second-figure CCC
combinations, but an indirect reduction would need to invoke a syllogism with a
necessary (i.e. a  C) premiss; cf. 227,36-228,18.
329. That is, all the second-figure U+C and N+C syllogisms reduce ultimately
to Celarent1(UC  N  ), Ferio1(UC  N  ), Celarent1(NCCu), or Ferio1(NCCu), so
that for Alexander their conclusions are not contingent in the way specified.
330. For discussion of this passage see section III.D.2 of the introduction.
331. For a minor divergence from our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6 (on
36b35).
332. Aristole takes for granted the equivalence of CON(AeB) and CON(AaB)
and assumes their compatibility with  CON(BaA). But if CON(AeB) converted
with CON(BeA), then since CON(BeA) is equivalent to CON(BaA), CON(AeB)
would imply CON(BaA). So EE-conversionc must fail. Aristotle’s example to show
that CON(AeB) (and CON(AaB)) is compatible with  CON(BaA) (and
 CON(BeA)) takes it to be true that it is contingent that no human is white but
necessary that some white things are not human.
333. In chapters 2 and 3. The discussion of universal negatives is at 1.3,
25b3-25.
334. i.e. Aristotle is taking for granted EA-transformationc and arguing against
EE-conversionc. Theophrastus accepts EE-conversionc and rejects EA-transforma-
tionc.
335. At 41,21-4. Note that only Theophrastus was mentioned before, and that
in the present passage the verbs translated ‘say’ and ‘show’ are in the singular in
the ms B. (In line 10 Wallies prints phasi with the Aldine instead of B’s phêsi, and
in 12 deiknûsin against the deiknusin of both the Aldine and B. 220,9-221,5 are
Theophrastus 102A FHSG. 220,9-16 are Eudemus fragment 16 Wehrli.) We dis-
cuss this argument and Alexander’s rejection of it in section III.D.1 of the
introduction. In Theophrastus 102C FHSG this argument is briefly formulated as
what is called an ekthetic argument: ‘If it is contingent that white is in no man, it
is contingent that white is disjoined from all man, and man will be disjoined from
all white.’ Alexander gives another Theophrastean argument for EE-conversion‘c’
at 223,4-14.
336. pantôn tôn tou B. On the terminology of disjointedness see the note on
124,20 in volume 1.
337. Aristotle’s argument is not a reductio, but what we have called an incom-
patibility rejection argument.
338. Theophrastus and Eudemus.
339. That is to say,  NEC  (AaB) is not equivalent to  NEC  (AeB).
340. Alexander shows uncertainty about whether the specification of terms is
a new argument against EE-conversionc or a way of showing that the compatibility
assumption underlying it is correct. For a minor divergence between the citation
and our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6 (on 37a4).
341. We read ek tês proeirêmenês kataskeuês with B where Wallies prints [ek]
tês proeirêmenês kataskeuê, following the Aldine.
342. From here to 222,7 Alexander worries about the meaning of contraries and
opposites, first about the fact that Aristotle appears to refer to, e.g., CON(AaB)
and CON(AeB) as contraries and CON(AaB) and CON(AoB) as opposites when in
fact the pairs can be true together, and then about the question of which ‘contraries
and opposites’ convert with which. His solution to the first problem – presumably
the correct one – is that such pairs are verbally similar to pairs of unqualified or
210 Notes to pp. 139-142
necessary propositions which are genuinely contraries or opposites. Alexander
may raise this issue because in On Interpretation, chapter 12 Aristotle says that,
e.g., the opposite of NEC(P) is  NEC(P); cf. Philoponus, in An.Pr. 53,15-56,5 and
Ammonius, in Int. 221,11-229,11. See also Appendix 4 on On Interpretation,
chapters 12 and 13.
Alexander’s treatment of the second question is more tentative, but in the
course of it all the relevant transformations countenanced by Aristotle (AE-,
EA-, IO-, OI-, AO-, and EI-transformationc) are mentioned positively and the
two not countenanced by him (OA- and IE-transformationc) are mentioned
negatively.
343. ouk ex anankês panti.
344. Alexander now worries about the fact that Aristotle’s words might be taken
as implying that, e.g., a particular contingent affirmative is transformable into a
universal contingent negative. He insists that Aristotle only means to assert AE-,
EA-, IO-, and OI-transformationc.
345. endekhetai.
346. 7, 17b22-3. Alexander now apparently suggests that Aristotle might be
treating XiY and XoY as opposites only in the case where the Y in question is the
same thing.
347. Alexander now suggests that Aristotle is accepting AO- and EI-transfor-
mationc, but not OA- and IE-transformationc.
348. i.e. the heaven.
349. The remainder of this section is very difficult, and we are doubtful that we
have grasped Alexander’s meaning entirely. What he says obviously involves his
idea,that ‘It is contingent that P’ means that P does not hold but can hold in the
future. Here Alexander considers a situation in which, say, ‘No X is Y’ is true. He
says that if someone says, e.g., ‘It is contingent that no X is Y’ in this situation, the
proposition will ‘convert’ into ‘It is contingent that all X are Y’, that is to say (we
take it), the latter proposition becomes true. But we cannot transform ‘It is
contingent that all X are Y’ back into ‘It is contingent that no X is Y’; for we cannot
say ‘No X is Y’ will hold since it already does hold. In the second paragraph
Alexander rejects the latter claim apparently with a question-begging argument
which has an intuitive appeal: roughly, if it is contingent that P at one time, it is
always contingent that P.
350. On this Aristotelian passage see section III.D.2 of the introduction.
351. hoi hetaroi autou, Theophrastus and Eudemus. 223,3-15 are Theophrastus
102B FHSG. Alexander gives a legitimate argument for EE-conversion  n or
even for CON(AeB)   NEC (BeA). A somewhat garbled version of this same
argument is ascribed to Theophrastus and Eudemus in Theophrastus 102C FHSG.
352. We here make use of numerical indices to avoid Alexander’s use of
pronouns and repeated longer explicit formulations of these four propositions.
Most of what Alexander has to say amounts to pointing out that each of (ii)
CON(BaA) and (iv) CON(BeA) imply the negations of each of (iii) NEC(BiA) and
(i) NEC(BoA), so that each of (iii) and (i) imply the negations of (ii) and (iv);
however, the negations of (ii) and (iv) do not imply either (i) or (iii). He is
particularly concerned to point out that the negation of (iv),  CON(BeA), does not
imply (iii), NEC(BiA). He develops the point by giving cases in which all of
 CON(BeA),  NEC(BiA), and NEC(BoA) are true.
353. A better formulation would be that neither (i) nor (iii) is a consequence of
the denial of (iv).
354. In the alleged reductio justification of EE-conversionc.
355. endekhetai
Notes to pp. 142-145 211
356. Alexander gives a case where CON(AeB) but  CON(BeA) because, even
though  NEC(BiA), NEC(BoA). He takes as true CON(White e Human),
 NEC(Human i White) (because if NEC(Human i White), NEC(White i Human),
contradicting CON(White e Human)). But also, NEC(Human o White) (presum-
ably because, e.g., NEC(Human o Swan)). This example illustrates the difficulty
of reading Alexander in terms of the de re/de dicto distinction: NEC(Human o
White) would seem to be true de re, but then, since there are white humans, so
would NEC(Human i White), but Alexander takes this to be false.
358. The correct implication is in the opposite direction, and what Alexander
says establishes the correct implication.
359. We have not translated the words ep’ ekeinôn which would seem to mean
‘when either (i) or (iii) is true’ and hence to render the words ‘when (i) is true’
(alêthous ousês tês ex anankês tini mê) redundant.
360. Ross ad loc. takes the sense to be not that C does hold of all D but that C
might hold of all D even though  CON(CaD) since  CON(CaD) is true just
because NEC(CiD). Alexander takes it that Aristotle is assuming CaD and also
 CON(CaD) because NEC(CiD).
362. See 224,18-27.
363. Perhaps Alexander’s clearest statement of the point that a logical rule
must be true in every instance.
364. Aristotle takes up Cesare2(CC_). Cesare2(UUU) was reduced to Celar-
ent1(UUU) at 1.5, 27a5-9 by converting the first premiss. The argument just given
shows that CON(AeB) cannot be converted. Aristotle then turns to showing that
a reductio argument won’t work either. The premisses of Cesare2(CC_) are:
(i) CON(AeB)
(ii) CON(AaC)
and the potential conclusion presumably should be:
(iii) CON(BeC)
So the hypothesis for reductio would be:
(iv)  CON(BeC)
‘i.e.’,
(v) NEC(BiC)
With (i) this implies (Ferio1(CNC)):
(vi) CON(AoC)
which is compatible with (ii), so there is no reductio. (Alexander does not consider
the possibility of combining (v) with (ii), but that also yields no inconsistency.)
However, the text makes it seem that Aristotle takes instead of (iv):
(iva) CON(BaC)
which makes no sense at all. Alexander first suggests (227,28-33) reading (iva) as:
(ivb) NEC(BaC)
He gives no explanation of how the text could possibly be understood this way, but
he points out (227,36-228,17) that no impossibility follows from (ivb) and (i), so that
certainly no impossibility follows from the weaker (v) and (i). Alexander considers
as a second possibility (228,20ff.) that Aristotle is taking (iva) not as the denial of
the purported conclusion of (i) and (ii), but as the conclusion itself, which it could
be since (iii) and (iva) are equivalent for contingency in the way specified. Alexan-
der more or less admits this point (228,26-30), but ends (228,30-7) by insisting that
the conclusion ought to be (iii). In the course of the discussion he mentions
212 Notes to pp. 145-149
(228,23-6) the possibility that the text ought to be read as ‘It is contingent that B
does not hold of any C’ rather than ‘It is contingent that B holds of all C’; see
Appendix 6 (on 37a35-6).
365. At 36b26-9.
366. Alexander presumably has in mind the fact that Aristotle has stated this
for second-figure combinations with unqualified premisses at 28a7-9. But the fact
that CON(XaY) and CON(XeY) convert alters the situation. See 218,3-7 with the
note.
367. That is, the minor premiss in the alleged reductio argument using
NEC(BaC) and CON(AeB).
368. Celarent1(CNC) or Ferio1(CNC)
369. As Alexander has made clear in the discussion of the first part of this
chapter, he considers both NEC(BiC) and NEC(BoC) legitimate reductio hypothe-
ses for establishing CON(BeC) or CON(BaC). He here points out that if NEC(BoC)
is taken one gets the non-syllogistic pair EO_1(CN_) rather than Ferio1(CNC), but
he does not make clear whether he is taking the purported conclusion to be
CON(BeC) or (a possibility he takes up immediately) CON(BaC).
370. More literally ‘is truly predicated’ (alêthôs katêgoreitai).
371. Ferio1(CNC).
372. Aristotle assumes that the conclusion of Cesare2(CC_) must be contingent
and gives terms for showing it is not. It would be sufficient for him to give terms
verifying the premisses and some necessary proposition BC. But he chooses to give
a set of terms and point out separately that they verify  CON(BaC) and
 CON(BeC):
CON(White e Human)
CON(White a Horse)
 CON(Human a Horse)  CON(Human e Horse).
At 231,7-10 Alexander, who takes Aristotle to be showing that neither a contingent
affirmative nor contingent negative conclusion follows, supplies these same terms
to explain Aristotle’s rejection of Cesare2(CU_) and Camestres2(UC_) at 1.18,
37b19-23. But then at 232,10-36 he uses them to undermine Aristotle’s espousal
of Cesare2(UC‘C’) and Camestres2(CU‘C’) at 1.18, 37b23-9.
At 37b10 Aristotle generalizes his claim about Cesare2(CC_) to all second-figure
CC combinations.
374. endekhetai.
375. dunata kai endekhomena.
376. At 1.15, 34a5-24. Note especially 23-4. However, Aristotle’s argument is a
general theoretical one and does not establish the specific result Alexander in-
vokes here.
377. i.e. if one is affirmative the other negative.
378. Alexander worries that someone might think Aristotle has failed to show
that the second-figure CC combinations do not yield a necessary negative conclu-
sion and produces terms to show they do not. He uses the first set, white, human,
literate, in connection with U+C combinations in the way which we have described
in the note on 229,1.
379. Aristotle rejects:
Cesare2(CU_) CON(AeB) AaC
Camestres2(UC_) AaB CON(AeC)
and also some corresponding combinations with particular premisses which he
takes up at 37b39. He indicates that the arguments will be the same as those which
Notes to pp. 149-151 213
he used against the second-figure CC combinations. Alexander fills in some details.
(The commentary on chapter 18 contains only two lemmas, this one and one at
233,13.)
380. For a minor divergence between the lemma and our text of Aristotle see
Appendix 6 on 37b19.
381. cf. 218,3-7 and 227,16-17. In fact, Aristotle gives terms for rejecting
AA_2(CU_) and AA_2(UC_) at 37b35-8.
382. Alexander points out that it would be illegitimate to use EE-conversionc or
AA-conversionu to justify Camestres2(UC_) and Cesare2(CU_), and that the legiti-
mate conversion of the unqualified premiss produces a non-syllogistic first-figure
combination.
383. Alexander claims correctly that there is no indirect argument to show that
these two combinations are syllogistic although he does not consider all possible
indirect justifications. He focuses on the case of Camestres2(UC_), imagining a
reductio in which the conclusion is assumed to be BeC (or CON(BeC)) and it is
argued that AaB and BiC (NEC(BiC)) imply (Darii1(UUU) or Darii1(UNU)) AiC,
which is perfectly compatible with CON(AeC).
384. The terms for Cesare2(CC_) from 1.17, 37b3-4 yield the following truths:
CON(White e Horse) White a Horse
White a Human CON(White e Human)
NEC(Horse e Human)
and so – according to Alexander – rule out any contingent or unqualified conclusion.
To rule out the possibility of a necessary negative conclusion, Alexander adds as
terms verifying NEC(BaC), the same terms he used for the same purpose in
connection with Cesare2(CC_) at 230,14-17.
CON(White e Human) White a Human
White a Literate CON(White e Literate)
NEC(Human a Literate).
385. For a close parallel to this remark see 204,15-19.
386. Aristotle describes a derivation of:
Cesare2(UC‘C’) AeB CON(AaC)  NEC  (BeC).
Convert AeB to BeA and apply Celarent1(UC  N  ). Unfortunately in this case
he does not mention that the conclusion is not contingent in the way specified. For
Alexander this problem comes to a head with Aristotle’s remark that the situation
is the same for:
Camestres2(CU‘C’) CON(AaB) AeC  NEC  (BeC).
For in this case after converting AeC and applying Celarent2(UC  N  ) one
has ‘CON’(CeB), which cannot be converted to ‘CON’(BeC) if we are dealing with
contingency in the way specified.
387. This characterization is more appropriate for the contingency which we
represent by CONu, but, as we have indicated, Alexander tends to think of this
kind of contingency as the same as the one we represent by  NEC  . Of course,
either kind of contingency will permit EE-conversion.
388. At 1.15, 34b19-35a2.
389. Alexander puts this too strongly.  NEC  (BeC) is not unqualified, but it
– unlike CON(BeC) on Alexander’s usual construal – is compatible with BeC, and
it does convert with  NEC  (CeB). Elsewhere (e.g. at 245,30-2) Alexander
recognizes that  NEC(  P) is not ‘directly’ unqualified.
390. Aristotle does not make this clear in the sequel, but Alexander works hard
to make him do so. See 233,15-23 and perhaps 232,36-233,12.
391. 1.17, 36b33-4 in Aristotle’s general account of second-figure combinations
with a contingent premiss.
214 Notes to pp. 151-153
392. Alexander considers the possibility that the conclusion reached applying
Celarent1(UC_) is CON(CeB) and that this could be converted to CON(BoC) to
make the major term the predicate of the conclusion. He suggests that this
conversion is possible because CON(CeB) is equivalent to CON(CaB) and that
converts to CON(BiC). But one does not need the analogy to justify the conversion
since CON(BiC) converts with CON(BoC). Elsewhere (e.g. at 234,3-4) Alexander
straightforwardly asserts OO-conversionc. In any case the point is of little signifi-
cance since the conclusion of Celarent1(UC_) is not contingent in the way specified.
393. Alexander now makes a decisive objection to Aristotle’s modal syllogistic,
although he does not make it as decisively as one might like: using terms which
Aristotle first used in connection with Cesare2(CC_) at 1.17, 37b3-4 and apparently
again in connection with Cesare2(CU_) and Camestres2(UC_) at 37b19-23 (see the
note on 229,1) he offers the following counterinterpretation to Cesare2(UC‘C’):
(i) White e Human
(ii) CON(White a Horse)
(iii) NEC(Human e Horse).
Then, taking his own terms used in the same connection at 230,14-17 and 231,16-
19, he gives a second counterinterpretation:
(i) White e Human
(ii) CON(White a Literate)
(iii) NEC(Human a Literate).
Alexander worries about shortcomings of the second terms on the grounds that
everything literate can’t be white when no humans are white (cf. the discussion of
1.15, 34b7ff. starting at 188,20). Instead of rejecting this suggestion, he decides
that he can do without the second interpretation because the premisses shouldn’t
be compatible with a necessary conclusion. Alexander goes on to use the first
interpretation against Camestres2(CU‘C’):
CON(White a Human)
White e Horse
NEC(Human e Horse).
In this case he considers the objection that ‘No horse is white’ is not a satisfactory
interpretation of an unqualified proposition and rightly rejects it.
394. Here again Alexander appears to be imagining the realization of a contin-
gent proposition at a given time. See section III.D.1 of the introduction.
395. Adopting Wallies’ conjecture of deikhthen for lekhthen.
396. As we have seen, Alexander is quite right that the conclusions of Cames-
tres2(CU_) and Cesare2(UC_) are not contingent in the way specified because they
are justified using Celarent1(UC  N  ). He now cites Aristotle’s treatment of
Celarent1(NCCu) at 1.16, 36a7-17 and perhaps of Ferio1(NCCu) at 36a39-b2 as a
confirmation of his view, again not distinguishing CONu and  NEC . He is
particularly interested in Aristotle’s words at 35b28-36, which he takes to reaffirm
that the conclusion of Celarent1(UC‘C’) is not contingent in the way specified. But
he ends this section with another expression of uncertainty.
397. cf. 232,10-23. Alexander remains caught in his misunderstanding of inter-
pretations. He suspects that only his interpretation verifying NEC(BeC) is
legitimate and that this shows that the two combinations may imply NEC(BeC).
He thinks that this means that the conclusion is contingent but not contingent in
the way specified.
398. At 1.12, 32a6-14.
399. 1.16, 35b34-5.
400. Aristotle affirms EEE2(CU‘C’) and EEE2(UC‘C’). In either case one applies
EA-conversionc to the contingent premiss yielding the premisses of Cames-
Notes to pp. 153-155 215
tres2(CU‘C’) or Cesare2(UC‘C’). Alexander insists correctly that the conclusion is
not contingent in the way specified. (For a minor difference between the lemma
and our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6, on 37b30.)
401. i.e. the ultimate reduction in both cases is to Celarent1(UC  N  ).
402. Aristotle rejects AA_2(CU_) and AA_2(UC_), taking the same propositions
as contingent or unqualified. Alexander does the former case a little more explic-
itly.
403. Aristotle does not explicitly discuss particular combinations with two
affirmative premisses; nor does Alexander. Presumably they are rejected.
404. Aristotle’s words imply rejection of all of:
Festino2(CU_)
IE_2(UC)
OA_2(CU_)
Baroco2(UC_)
and then acceptance of
Festino2(UC‘C’) AeB CON(AiC)  NEC  (BoC)
IEO2(CU‘C’) CON(AiB) AeC  NEC  (BoC)
OA_2(UC_)
Baroco2(CU_)
However, he rejects the last two of these at 1.18, 38a8-10. Alexander discusses the
two accepted cases first. The situation with Festino2(UC‘C’) is, he says, known.
That is, one converts AeB to BeA and invokes Ferio1(UC  N  ) to get  NEC 
(BoC). Neither Aristotle nor Alexander mentions anything about the nature of the
conclusion. However, IEO2(CU‘C’) raises more serious difficulties for Alexander
than Camestres2(CU‘C’) did earlier, since after the conversion of AeC to CeA and
the application of Ferio1(UC  N  ) one is left with  NEC  (CoB), which,
Alexander points out, cannot be converted unless the conclusion is contingent in
the way specified. He ends by suggesting that perhaps Aristotle doesn’t intend
IEO2(CU_) to be syllogistic at all since no second-figure UU combination with a
particular major premiss was syllogistic.
405. i.e. both II-conversionc and OO-conversionc hold.
406. Alexander presumably means that the reducing syllogism Ferio1(UC N
) was ‘shown’ by Aristotle not to be contingent in the way specified. Aristotle
asserted this to be the case at the beginning of chapter 15.
407. Alexander gives the terms used by Aristotle at 1.18, 37b36-8 to reject
AA_2(UC_) and AA_2(CU_) to reject all the combinations rejected by Aristotle at
37b39-38a2 and says that none of them could be shown to be syllogistic by reductio.
408. Aristotle apparently accepts EOO2(UC‘C’) and OEO2(CU‘C’), which reduce
to Festino2(UC‘C’) and the problematic IEO2(CU‘C’) by OI-transformationc.
409. Aristotle rejects OA_2(UC_), Baroco2(CU_), OE_2(UC_), and EO_2(CU_).
Alexander says only that the unqualified o-premiss cannot be converted.
410. For an overview of this chapter see section III.E.3.b of the introduction.
411. Aristotle announces the validity of Cesare2(NCCu) and Camestres2(CNCu),
and denies that of Cesare2(CN_) and Camestres2(NC_).
412. Alexander is thinking of the cases Celarent1(UC  N  ) and Celar-
ent1(NCCu). Only the latter case is clearly relevant in the present context, but
Alexander is always concerned about the parallels between the U+C and the N+C
cases because of Aristotle’s indefiniteness about contingency. Celarent1(NCCu) is
treated at 1.16, 36a7-17 and described at 35b30-4. For complications see sections
III.E.3.a of the introduction.
413. Aristotle does:
Cesare2(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(AaC) CONu(BeC).
216 Notes to pp. 155-157
This clearly has a straightforward reduction to Celarent1(NCCu) if one converts the
major premiss to NEC(BeA). Aristotle expresses this conversion as if it were to
BeA, but Alexander takes it for granted that he intends the proper conversion, and
that he infers ‘It is contingent (but not in the way specified) that BeC’. Aristotle,
however, gives a separate argument that BeC follows. He assumes BeC), i.e.,
BiC, and NEC(AeB), from which it follows (Ferio1(NUN)) that NEC(AoC), contra-
dicting CON(AaC). Alexander points out that this argument depends upon the
non-Theophrastean Ferio1(NUN).
414. The lemma has oun where our text of Aristotle has gar.
415. Reading the oukh huparkhei of Alexander (235,9) and some mss. Ross
prints oud’ huparxei, but does not record Alexander’s citation.
416. cf. 1.10, 30b9 with Alexander’s commentary at 136,20-9.
417. In chapter 9.
418. The next paragraph is Theophrastus 108B FHSG.
419. Aristotle briefly affirms:
Camestres2(CNCu) CON(AaB) NEC(AeC) CONu(BeC),
for which Alexander supplies the following derivation. He converts the minor
premiss to NEC(CeA) and invokes Celarent1(NCCu) to get CONu(CeB), which –
since it is really unqualified – converts to CONu(BeC). Alexander points out that
such a conversion is not possible for CON(CeB), and then that Theophrasteans are
able to use Celarent1(CN  N  ) to infer  NEC  (CeB), which does convert to 
NEC  (BeC). So the Theophrasteans have Camestres2(CN N ).
420. For a minor divergence between the text of the lemma and our text of
421. With this paragraph cf. 232,5-9. Alexander’s point is that if the conclusion
reached before the conversion were CON(CeB), then one could only transform it
into CON(CaB) and then into CON(BiC) (and perhaps (cf. 234,3-4) into
CON(BoC)).
422. 236,11-14 constitute Theophrastus 109C FHSG.
423. With this passage one should look at Aristotle’s rejection of Cesare2(CC_)
at 1.17, 37a38-b10 with the note on 229,1. Aristotle here wishes to show that the
premisses of:
Cesare2(CN_) CON(AeB) NEC(AaC)
are not syllogistic. He gives the following interpretation:
CON(White e Human)
NEC(White a Swan)
NEC(Human e Swan)
which he takes to show that no contingent conclusion follows from the premisses.
He gives an argument that no necessary conclusion does either and then offers
what appears to be the following interpretation:
CON(Change a Animal)
NEC(Change a Awake)
Animal a Awake
The first premiss here should be:
CON(Change e Animal)
Alexander (237,9-10) handles this difficulty by saying that Aristotle takes for
granted EA-transformationc. He changes Animal a Awake to NEC(Animal a
Awake) without comment, but he expresses misgivings about the perspicuousness
of this proposition, and substitutes walking for being awake at 237,13-16.
If Aristotle’s interpretations are acceptable, they suffice to show that the
premisses of Cesare2(CN_) yield no conclusion, so that Aristotle could be finished
at this point. He, however, adds the unnecessary remark that he has shown that
Notes to pp. 157-160 217
the premisses don’t imply BeC (38b2-3) or the ‘opposite affirmations’ (38b3-4).
Alexander takes up the last remark in the next section of the commentary.
At 238,29-34 Alexander points out that the Theophrastean Cesare2(CN  N )
can be proved.
424. i.e. ‘there is an interpretation under which the premisses are true and’.
425. This is the upshot of chapters 8 and 10; for a brief formulation for the N+U
cases see 1.10, 30b7-9. Alexander interprets Aristotle as saying or assuming that
a N+C combination cannot yield a necessary conclusion in cases where the corre-
sponding N+U combination does not. He adds that N+C combinations never yield
a necessary conclusion.
426. cf. 154,23-155,2.
427. As we have seen, whatever Aristotle means by this remark (he makes a
similar statement at 38b21-2), he doesn’t need it to argue that there will be no
syllogism with the premisses:
CON(AeB) NEC(AaC).
Alexander mentions two accounts of what Aristotle says. According to the first
Aristotle has shown that neither NEC(BeC) nor BeC can be inferred and now
points out that their opposites, both their ‘contradictories’, CON(BiC) and BiC, and
their ‘contraries’ CON(BaC) and BaC, cannot be inferred either. On the second
interpretation Aristotle has ruled out a universal conclusion and now says that one
will not be able to infer the opposites of NEC(BaC) and NEC(BeC), understood as
the CON(BoC) and CON(BiC). An unclear (but acceptable) generalization is made
to all particular propositions, and it is concluded that nothing can be inferred from
the premisses. A striking feature of this passage is that Alexander treats CON( P)
as the contradictory of NEC(P), when he normally insists that they may be false
together.
428. It does not seem that Alexander could have any specific passage in mind
here.
429. Alexander considers interpreting kataphaseôn as phaseôn (= protaseôn), a
reading which has found its way into some mss. Both readings were already known
to Philoponus (in An. Pr. 226,5).
430. cf. Bonitz (1870), 813a24-34.
431. Having rejected Cesare2(CN_), Aristotle now says there will be a similar
rejection for: Camestres2(NC_) NEC(AaB) CON(AeC). Alexander points out that,
with a variation in order, the same terms used to verify the premisses of Ce-
sare2(CN_) and NEC(BeC) can be used to verify the premisses of Camestres2(NC_)
and NEC(BeC). But the same is not true for NEC(BaC), since although it may be
true that:
NEC(Change a Awake)
CON (Change e Animal)
it is not true that
NEC(Awake a Animal)
Alexander is clearly right to say this since any interpretation verifying NEC(BaC)
and NEC(AaB) will falsify CON(AeC). Alexander first says that the one counter-
interpretation is sufficient, but he goes on to give proofs for both Camestres2(NC
 N  ) and Cesare2(CN  N  ). He refers the reader to his work on mixtures for
a solution to the impasse.
432. See 236,29-31 with note. Alexander’s point would seem to be again that the
one interpretation with a necessary conclusion rules out all contingent conclu-
sions.
433. Alexander gives a reductio argument for:
Camestres2(NC  N  ) NEC(AaB) CON(AeC)  NEC  (BeC)
218 Notes to pp. 160-161
He assumes  CON(BeC), ‘i.e.,’ NEC(BiC), and infers (Darii1(NNN)) NEC(AiC),
contradicting CON(AeC). He does not remark that the conclusion is not contingent
in the way specified.
He then offers two reductio arguments for:
Cesare2(CN  N  ) CON(AeB) NEC(AaC)  NEC  (BeC).
He assumes NEC  (BeC), i.e., NEC(BiC) and uses either Ferio1(CNC)) to infer
CON(AoC), contradicting NEC(AaC) or Disamis3(NNN) to infer NEC(AiB), con-
tradicting CON(AeB).
It is not clear to us why Alexander leaves out the alternative demonstration for
Camestres2(NC  N  ), converting NEC(BiC) to NEC(CiB) and using
Ferio1(CNC) to get CON(AoB), contradicting NEC(AaB).
We note also that one could give similar derivations for:
Festino2(CN  N  ) CON(AeB) NEC(AiC)  NEC  (BoC),
which Aristotle presumably rejects although neither he nor Alexander mentions it
specifically. For if one assumes NEC(BaC) one can use Disamis3(NNN) to get
NEC(AiB), contradicting CON(AeB) or Celarent1(CNC) to get CON(AeC), contra-
dicting NEC(AiC).
434. Aristotle now asserts that both of:
EE_2(NC_) NEC(AeB) CON(AeC)
EE_2(CN_) CON(AeB) NEC(AeC)
yield a conclusion, presumably CONu(BeC). He says the second pair is treated
similarly to the first. For the first he transforms the premisses into NEC(BeA) and
CON(AaC), the premisses of Celarent1(NCCu). Alexander points out that the
conclusion is not contingent in the way specified.
Alexander also points out that in the second case the same two conversions yield
CON(AaB) and NEC(CeA), the premisses of Celarent1(NCCu), but in this case the
conclusion has C as predicate and so has to be converted, a conversion which is
legitimate if the conclusion is either CONu(CeB) or  NEC  (CeB), but not if it is
CON(CeB).
435. For a small textual point here see Appendix 6 (on 38b10).
436. 1.16, 36a7-17.
437. Reading triôn for Wallies’ duo. This may be a slip by Alexander; it is
corrected eight lines below at 239,18.
438. Aristotle now apparently rejects:
AA_2(NC_) NEC(AaB) CON(AaC),
AA_2(CN_) CON(AaB) NEC(AaC),
although he explicitly does only AA_2(NC_). He first rules out NEC(BeC) and BeC
as conclusions on the ground that either would require a negative necessary or
unqualified premiss. Alexander understands him to be ruling out all negative
conclusions with this remark, contingent negative premisses being irrelevant since
they are equivalent to contingent affirmative ones. He is therefore somewhat
perplexed by Aristotle’s next remark ruling out CON(BeC), since that is a ‘negative’
conclusion.
In any case Aristotle gives terms verifying the premisses of AA_2(NC_) and
NEC(BeC). These terms take as true:
NEC(White a Swan) CON(White a Human) NEC(Swan e Human).
The same terms will work for AA_2(CN_) if Human and Swan are interchanged.
So any negative conclusion is ruled out, but so is an affirmative one since NEC(BeC)
is incompatible with any affirmative one.
At 239,39 Alexander seems to say that he will give terms verifying NEC(BaC)
and the premisses of AA_2(NC_), but he actually verifies the premisses of
AA_2(CN_), taking as true:
Notes to pp. 162-164 219
CON(Change a Animal) NEC(Change a Walking) NEC(Animal a Walking).
In fact, he could not give terms verifying NEC(BaC) and the premisses of
AA_2(NC_) since if he verifies NEC(BaC) and NEC(AaB), he will verify NEC(AaC)
and hence not verify CON(AaC) if contingency is taken in the way specified. At the
end of his remarks on the passage Alexander points out – but draws no moral from
it – that the premisses of AA_2(NC_) actually yield  NEC  (BeC).
439. cf. 38a30-2.
440. Alexander now derives:
AAE2(NC  N  ) NEC(AaB) CON(AaC)  NEC  (BeC)
Assume NEC  (BeC), i.e., NEC(BiC). Then Darii1(NNN), NEC(AiC), contradict-
ing CON(AeC), which follows from (AE-transformationc) CON(AaC). Obviously he
could also verify:
AAE2(CN  N  ) CON(AaB) NEC(AaC)  NEC  (BeC)
Assume NEC  (BeC), i.e., NEC(BiC). Then NEC(CiB) and (Darii1(NNN))
NEC(AiB), contradicting CON(AeB), which follows from (AE-transformationc)
CON(AaB).
441. Aristotle apparently asserts that both:
Festino2(NCCu)NEC(AeB) CON(AiC) CONu(BoC)
IE_2(CNCu)CON(AiB) NEC(AeC) CONu(BoC)
can be proved syllogistic by conversion. This is clearly correct in the first case since
if we convert NEC(AeB) to NEC(BeA), we can apply Ferio1(NCCu). Alexander
remarks that for Aristotle the conclusion is CONu(BoC). He does not point out that
one could also establish Festino2(NC  N  ), but it may well be that he is taking
this point for granted.
He does not discuss the second case, which involves the same difficulty as
IE_2(CU_): if we convert NEC(AeC) to NEC(CeA), we get ‘CON’(CoB), which can
be converted to CON(BoC) only if the conclusion of Ferio1(NC_) is contingent in
the way specified, which it is not. See Alexander’s discussion of IE_2(CU_) at
233,34-234,11.
442. For a minor divergence between the lemma and our text of Aristotle see
443. Aristotle asserts that neither of:
Baroco2(NC_) NEC(AaB) CON(AoC)
OA_2(CN_) CON(AoB) NEC(AaC)
yields a conclusion on the grounds that he has already shown that they do not yield
one when the contingent premiss is made universal, that is, Camestres2(NC_) and
Cesare2(CN_) do not yield a conclusion.
Alexander gives a reductio argument that the first combination yields  NEC
 (BoC). Assume NEC (BoC), i.e., NEC(BaC). Then (Barbara1(NNN)),
NEC(AaC), contradicting CON(AoC). (The other combination can be proved syllo-
gistic only if it is assumed that corresponding necessary and contingent particular
propositions are incompatible.)
444. Baroco2(NUU), treated at 1.10, 31a10-15.
445. Aristotle says literally that the conclusion will be both of being contingent
(tou endekhesthai) and of not holding. Alexander points out that ‘being contingent’
must be understood as contingently not holding (tou endekhesthai mê huparkhein).
446. At 1.19, 38a26-b5, but for complications see above 236,15-238,38. Alexan-
der’s discussion in this paragraph only applies to Camestres2(NC_), not
Cesare2(CN_), which Aristotle described as disprovable in a similar way.
447. The premiss in question is CON(AoC). Alexander’s argument does not
require CON(AiC) as well. However, he does need this at 241,5-9 below.
220 Notes to pp. 164-166
448. Aristotle now asserts that none of:
AI_2(NC_) NEC(AaB) CON(AiC)
AI_2(CN_) CON(AaB) NEC(AiC)
IA_2(NC_) NEC(AiB) CON(AaC)
IA_2(CN_) CON(AiB) NEC(AaC)
yield a conclusion, presumably on the ground that he showed at 1.19, 38b13-23 that
the pairs yield no conclusion when the particular premiss is made universal. But
see the discussion at 239,20-240,11. Alexander gives a reductio argument that the
premisses of AI_2(NC_) yield  NEC  (BoC). Assume  CON(BoC), ‘i.e.,’
NEC(BaC). Since NEC(AaB), it follows by Barbara1(NNN) that NEC(AaC), con-
tradicting CON(AoC), which follows from CON(AiC) by OI-transformationc. There
is an analogous derivation for AI_2(CN_): Assume  CON(BoC), ‘i.e.,’ NEC(BaC).
Since NEC(AiC), NEC(CiA) and it follows by Darii1(NNN) that NEC(BiA), i.e.,
NEC(AiB), contradicting CON(AaB). The two remaining cases can be proved only
if it is assumed that NEC(AiB) and CON(AiB) are incompatible.
449. Aristotle apparently asserts that both of:
EO_2(NC_) NEC(AeB) CON(AoC)
OE_2(CN_) CON(AoB) NEC(AeC)
yield a conclusion when the contingent premiss is ‘converted’, but he does not say
what the conclusion is. An application of OI-transformationc reduces these to the
cases affirmed at 38b2427; see the note on 240,12. Alexander does the ‘good’ case,
EO_2(NC_), carrying out the full reduction to Ferio1(NCCu).
For a minor textual issue see Appendix 6 (on 38b32).
450. At 1.16, 36b12-18; see Alexander’s discussion of that passage at 215,3-28
with the notes. The propositions to be verified here are the same as those to be
verified there except for the interchange of subject and predicate in the major
premiss, i.e., the only difference is that Alexander now must verify:
1’. NEC(White i Animal)
2’. NEC(White o Animal)
3’. CON(White i Animal)
4’. CON(White o Animal)
451. Alexander verifies 1’ and 2’ understood de re. For his probable under-
standing of 3’ and 4’ see his treatment of CON(White i Human) and CON
(White o Human) at 215,10-13 with the note.
452. Alexander turns to the NEC(BeC) case, for which there is really nothing
new to do. He mentions only four of the eight relevant premisses.
453. Alexander presumably has in mind the treatment of AA_2(NC_) and
AA_2(CN_) at 1.19, 38b13-23. There Aristotle only mentions the terms for holding
of none by necessity, but Alexander supplies the other terms at 239,39-240,4.
Aristotle had given both sets of terms in his treatment of Cesare2(CN_) at 38a26-
b4. It is not clear why Alexander thinks these terms might do. He can at best verify
NEC(White i Swan), and not NEC(White o Swan) or CON(White o Swan).
454. Aristotle reasserts that the only N+C syllogisms in the second figure are
Cesare2(NCCu), Camestres(CNCu), EEE2(NCCu), EEE2(CNCu), Festino2(NCCu),
IEO2(CNCu), EOO2(NCCu), and OEO2(CNCu), and he reaffirms the parallelism
between the U+C and N+C cases.
For a minor textual difference between the lemma and our text of Aristotle see
455. Alexander here uses the two words which we translate ‘combination’,
suzugia and sumplokê. With this brief passage cf. 254,12-14, where Alexander opts
for something close to the first alternative.
456. i.e., Celarent1 and Ferio1.
Notes to pp. 166-168 221
457. To get a sense of the content of this passage one should consult the
summary. If one restricts attention to the standard syllogistic combinations Aris-
totle appears to be saying that all third-figure pairs with one or two contingent
premisses yield a conclusion which is contingent in the way specified except for
Felapton3(NC_), Ferison3(NC_), and Bocardo3(NC_), which yield CONu conclu-
sions.
458. In chapter 17.
459. Aristotle used the expression ‘not in the way specified’ in connection with
Celarent1(UC  N  ) and Ferio1(UC  N  ) at 1.15, 33b28-33; cf. 34b27-31 and
35a35-b2. In the case of Celarent1(NCCu) and Ferio1(NCCu) he said that the
conclusion is of not holding and of contingency (1.16, 35b30-34; cf. 36a7-17 and
32-9).
460. Aristotle first does:
Darapti3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB)
by converting the second premiss and invoking Darii1(CCC).
461. Aristotle affirms:
Felapton3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BaC) CON(AoB)
since Ferio1(CCC) results when the second premiss is converted.
462. Aristotle affirms:
EEI3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB)
essentially reducing the combination to Darapti3(CCC) by transforming both
premisses. Alexander points out that Aristotle could have justified:
EEO3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BeC) CON(AoB)
by reducing it to Felapton3(CCC) by just transforming the second premiss. He does
not point out that Aristotle could also verify, e.g.
AEI3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB)
with the same kind of reasoning. Of course, he could also give terms for rejecting
all third-figure CC syllogisms, e.g., for holding of all by necessity: A Animal, B
Human, C Moving; for holding of none by necessity: A Horse, B Human, C Moving.
The same terms will work for rejecting all third-figure U+C combinations.
463. Aristotle’s remark here suggests that he will recognize the validity of
Datisi3(CCC), Disamis3(CCC), Ferison3(CCC), and Bocardo1(CCC) and of no other
particular syllogisms with two contingent premisses, exactly one of which is universal.
But at 1.20, 39a38-b2 he claims that EO_3(CC_) and OE_3(CC_) are syllogistic. Here
Alexander hints at the solution he will suggest somewhat more explicitly at 244,14-32,
but finally take back: the premisses of EOO3(CCC) are ‘really’ those of Ferison3(CCC)
and those of OEO3(CCC) are those of Disamis3(CCC).
This is the last lemma in our text of Alexander for this chapter. For two possible
minor differences between Alexander’s text of this passage and our text of Aristotle
see Appendix 6 (textual notes on 39a29 and 30).
Datisi3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BiC) CON(AiB)
by converting the minor premiss and invoking Darii1(CCC). At 249,25-32 Alexan-
der uses Datisi3(CCC) to establish Cesare2(N‘C’N), a mood rejected by Aristotle.
465. Disamis3(CCC) CON(AiC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB)
is reduced to Darii1(CCC) by converting the major premiss. But in this case, as
Alexander points out, the resulting conclusion has to be converted.
466. Here Aristotle seems to announce the validity of both:
Ferison3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BiC) CON(AoB)
Bocardo3(CCC) CON(AoC) CON(BaC) CON(AoB)
Alexander does only the former case, reducing it to Ferio1(CCC) by converting the
minor premiss to CON(CiB). He never mentions the problematic Bocardo3(CCC).
222 Notes to pp. 169-172
Ross (ad loc.) proposes a derivation for OAI3(CCC) by converting CON(AoC) to
CON(AiC) and then to CON(CiA), using Darii1(CCC) to get CON(BiA) and con-
verting that to CON(AiB). Alexander’s remarks in the next section suggest that he
would prefer to ignore OA_3(CCC).
467. See 1.14, 33a25-7.
468. Aristotle now does what Alexander takes to be:
EOO3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BoC) CON(AoB)
OEO3(CCC) CON(AoC) CON(BeC) CON(AoB)
Alexander does the first by transforming the minor premiss to CON(BiC), which
yields Ferison3(CCC), just reduced to Ferio1(CCC). He says that in the second case
if the major premiss is transformed to CON(AiC), Ferison3(CCC) will yield
CON(BoA), which can be converted to CON(AoB). Alexander points out that this
latter conversion has no analogue for unqualified propositions, so that the Aris-
totle’s claim of a parallelism between third-figure UUU and CCC particular
syllogisms at 39a28-31 breaks down.
469. The only other lemma in this chapter is at 246,11. For a minor textual point
see Appendix 6 (on 39b7).
470. 1.20, 39a5-8. There Aristotle says only that the conclusion will be contin-
gent. But what Aristotle says in this chapter leads Alexander to conclude that he
has abandoned the distinction between  NEC  and CON, and is treating both
as contingency in the way specified. See 245,16-35, and note Alexander’s refer-
ences back to 1.20, 39b14-16 at 246,8, 9, 22, and 34-5, and 247,6-9. Alexander is
sufficiently uncertain or reverential to refrain from judgment when Aristotle
blunders at 39b22-5. See 246,13-36.
Darapti3(UC‘C’) AaC CON(BaC)  NEC  (AiB),
converting CON(BaC) to CON(CiB) and using Darii1(UC‘C’) to infer the conclu-
sion.
472. 1.15, 33b25-33.
473. At 1.18, 37b28 Aristotle describes the conclusion of Cesare2(UC‘C’) as ‘It is
contingent that B holds of no C’, but he doesn’t say anything about the nature of
the contingency.
474. Aristotle now does:
Darapti3(CUC) CON(AaC) BaC CON(AiB)
Felapton3(CUC) CON(AeC) BaC CON(AoB)
Felapton3(UC‘C’) AeC CON(BaC)  NEC  (AoB)
converting the minor premiss and invoking Darii1(CUC), Ferio1(CUC), and
Ferio1(UC‘C’). Again Aristotle marks no distinction between contingency and
non-necessity.
475. We have moved 246,4-10 after the next lemma, where they belong.
476. Aristotle apparently announces that the following combinations are syllo-
gistic:
(i) AE_3(UC_) AaC CON(BeC)
(ii) EE_3(UC_) AeC CON(BeC)
(iii) AE_3(CU_) CON(AaC) BeC
(iv) EE_3(CU_) CON(AeC) BeC
(i) and (ii) are waste cases of Darapti3(UC‘C’) and Felapton3(UC‘C’), and so imply:
(ia)  NEC  (AiB)
(iia)  NEC  (AoB)
(iv) is a waste case of (iii) or vice versa, but, as Alexander indicates, neither can be
shown to imply syllogistically a conclusion with A as predicate and B as subject.
477. Alexander first considers cases (i) and (iii). He imagines converting the
Notes to pp. 172-174 223
major premiss to CiA or CON(CiA) and applying Ferio1(CUC) or Ferio1(UC  N )
to get CON(BoA) or  NEC  (BoA). The former of these converts to:
(ib) CON(AoB),
but the latter does not convert, as Alexander’s remarks at 246,17-25 and 30-5 make
clear. He is, however, sufficiently confused by Aristotle’s lax treatment of contin-
gency and perhaps sufficiently uncertain of his own logical acumen to leave open
the question whether the conversion is possible.
478. 1.20, 39b14-16.
479. Alexander now suggests that Aristotle only intended to do cases (i) and (ii),
essentially as waste cases of Darapti3(UC‘C’) and Felapton2(UC‘C’). He points out
that an analogous procedure will not work for (iii) and (iv). He repeats the
procedure he has already described for (iii) and suggests that Aristotle now holds
that the conclusion of Ferio1(UC  N  ) is contingent in the way specified.
480. Alexander reaffirms the feasibility of validating case (ii), but points out
that combination (iv) will not be syllogistic unless it is legitimate to transform
CON(AeC) into CON(AaC), convert that to CON(CiA), apply Ferio1(UC  N  ) to
get  NEC  (BoA) and pretend that that can be converted to CON(AoB).
481. Aristotle apparently asserts the validity of: Datisi3(UC‘C’), Datisi3(CUC),
Disamis3(UCC), Disamis3(CU‘C’), Ferison3(UC‘C’), Ferison3(CUC), IE_3(UCC),
and IE_3(CU‘C’). Alexander points out that in each case conversion of the particu-
lar premiss produces a first-figure syllogism with the desired conclusion. He does
not indicate that in the last case there is an OO-conversion‘c’ problem.
482. cf. 1.20, 39b14-16.
483. Aristotle apparently asserts that the following can be shown to yield a
conclusion by reductio but not by conversion: Bocardo3(CU_), Bocardo3(UC_),
AO_3(CU_), and AO_3(UC_). However, he may only be interested in the case he
does:
Bocardo3(CU‘C’) CON(AoC) BaC  NEC  (AoB),
For a detailed discussion of the important next section of the commentary see
section III.E.2.c of the introduction.
484. At 1.9, 30a15-23.
485. Alexander now sketches two arguments for OAI3(CU  N  ). In the first one
presumably transforms CON(AoC) into CON(CoA) and invokes AOI1(UC‘C’) (ac-
cepted by Aristotle at 1.15, 35a35-b8) to get  NEC  (BiA), which converts to  NEC
 (AiB). In the second one changes CON(AoC) into CON(AiC), converts that to
CON(CiA), infers (Darii1(UC‘C’))  NEC  (BiA), which converts to  NEC  (AiB).
486. Because of the use of the non-Theophrastean Barbara1(NUN).
487. Alexander denies the possibility of establishing:
Bocardo3(UC‘C’) AoC CON(BaC)  NEC  (AoB)
on the grounds that transformation of the minor premiss yields a non-syllogistic
pair and a reductio gives as premisses NEC(AaB) and CON(BaC), which yield
(Barbara1(NC‘C’)  NEC  (AaC), a conclusion compatible with AoC. Alexander
repeats this point below at 248,10-19. He does not point out that one gets no
inconsistency either, if one combines NEC(AaB) with AoC because – according to
Aristotle – Baroco2(NU_) has an unqualified conclusion.
488. This paragraph is Theophrastus 108A FHSG.
489. Theophrastus and Eudemus.
490. cf. 127,3-14. Alexander refers to people who invoke Bocardo3(CU‘C’) to
derive from the minor premiss, BaC, and the denial,  NEC(AaC), of the conclu-
sion, NEC(AaC), of Barbara1(NUN) ‘CON’(AoB), which is ‘impossible’, i.e.,
incompatible with the major premiss, NEC(AaB), of Barbara1(NUN).
491. 247,30-9; see the note there.
224 Notes to pp. 174-178
492. This is Theophrastus 107B FHSG. For the significance of what is said here
for Theophrastus’ ‘logic’ see section III.E.2.c of the introduction.
493. Bocardo3(CtUCt).
494. Alexander and all the mss of Aristotle read ‘in the universals’ (en tois
katholou). Ross (40a1-2) prints ‘in the preceding’ (en tois proteron). But he takes
the reference to be the same as Alexander does, viz, 1.20, 39b2-6.
495. Alexander suggests reading epi tôn ex amphoterôn endekhomenôn in place
of en tois katholou.
496. Aristotle asserts the validity of:
Darapti3(NC‘C’) (accepted at 40a12-16)
Darapti3(CNC) (accepted at 40a16-18)
Felapton3(CNC) (accepted at 40a18-25)
Felapton3(NCCu) (accepted at 40a25-32)
His words also imply acceptance of
AEO3(NC‘C’) (AEI3(NC‘C’) (apparently accepted at 40a33-5),
AEO3(CNCu) (rejected at 40a35-8).
Neither Aristotle nor Alexander ever discusses the waste EE cases, but EE_3(CN_)
stands or falls with AE_3(CN_) and EE3(NCCu) with Felapton1(NCCu). Alexander
considers the possibility of justifying AEO3(CN  N  ).
The only other lemma in this chapter is at 254,10.
497. For a divergence between Ross’s text of Aristotle and Alexander’s see
Appendix 6 (on 40a8-9).
498. Alexander here argues for Celarent1(NCtN), using Disamis3(CtCtCt); see
section III.E.3.a of the introduction. He adds an argument for:
Cesare2(NCtN) NEC(AeB)  NEC  (AaC) NEC(BeC)
Assume  NEC(BeC), i.e.,  NEC  (BiC). Then (Datisi1(CtCtCt))  NEC  (AiB),
contradicting NEC(AeB).
499. Reading estô for Wallies’ estai (omitted in the Aldine).
500. The reference is to 207,35-6 and 213,25-7. We have no other knowledge of
Alexander’s notes on logic (scholia logika). The sentence referring to it may be a
gloss.
Darapti3(NC‘C’) NEC(AaC) CON(BaC)  NEC  (AiB)
Alexander reproduces his argument, converting CON(BaC) to CON(CiB) and
invoking Darii1(NC‘C’). Alexander says nothing about the character of the conclu-
sion, but contents himself with remarking that the situation is analogous to the
U+C case.
502. Darapti3(CNC) CON(AaC) NEC(BaC) CON(AiB)
Alexander fills out Aristotle’s ‘similar’ proof, converting NEC(BaC) to NEC(CiB)
and invoking Darii1(CNC). Alexander is no doubt right to call Darii1(CNC) com-
plete (as far as Aristotle is concerned), but neither he nor Aristotle discusses the
mood, which probably explains why Alexander says ‘This syllogism in the first
figure was complete, as were the others having a contingent major.’
Felapton3(CNC) CON(AeC) NEC(BaC) CON(AoB)
converting NEC(BaC) to NEC(CiB) and invoking Ferio1(CNC). Alexander repeats
the proof.
504. Alexander repeats Aristotle’s view of Barbara1(NC‘C’) and Darii1(NC‘C’),
which he knows to be false; see section III.E.3.a of the introduction. Nothing turns
on the point in the present circumstances.
505. Alexander suggests understanding estai dê palin to prôton skhêma; kai ei
hê sterêtikê protasis endekhesthai sêmainei, phaneron hoti to sumperasma estai
Notes to pp. 178-180 225
endekhomenon where Aristotle has estai dê palin to prôton skhêma; kai gar hê
sterêtikê protasis endekhesthai sêmainei; phaneron oun hoti to sumperasma estai
endekhomenon.
506. Alexander mentions but apparently rejects a way of establishing that the
premisses of Felapton3(CNC) yield the conclusion CON(AiB): ‘convert’ CON(AeC)
to CON(CoA) and then to CON(CiA). By Darii1(NC‘C’), ‘CON’(BiA), which can be
converted to ‘CON’(AiB). Alexander may mention this alternative because he is
going to invoke changing CON(XeY) into CON(YiX) in connection with
AEO3(NCC), which Aristotle says is handled ‘as in the preceding’ (40a35).
Felapton3(NCCu) NEC(AeC) CON(BaC) CONu(AoB)
converting CON(BaC) to CON(CiB) and invoking Ferio1(NCCu); Alexander repro-
duces the proof, and does not mention the possibility of establishing  NEC 
(AoB) by reductio.
508. Aristotle uses the letter representing the minor term in the discussion of
the first figure rather than the ‘B’ which is appropriate here.
509. Aristotle asserts the validity of AE_3(NC_). Alexander takes him to be
accepting AEI3(NC‘C’), a waste case of Darapti3(NC‘C’). See the next note.
510. This remark seems false, since one could establish:
AEO3(NCC) NEC(AaC) CON(BeC) CON(AoB)
by converting NEC(AaC) to NEC(CiA) and inferring (Ferio1(CNC)) CON(BoA),
which can be transformed into CON(AoB).
511. Aristotle is apparently rejecting:
AE_3(CN_) CON(AaC) NEC(BeC)
For discussion of the next part of the commentary see section III.E.3.c of the
introduction.
512. i.e. NEC(AaB) and NEC(AeB) under the interpretations given.
513. enantios.
514. Wallies cites 251,36 to justify not inserting a ‘not’ here; we think the sense
in both places requires it.
515. Alexander now considers the possibility of proving:
AEO3(CN‘C’) CON(AaC) NEC(BeC) ‘CON’(AoB)
He converts CON(AaC) to CON(CiA) and infers (Ferio1(NCCu)) BoA (=
CONu(BoA)), but, as Alexander points out, it is not possible to convert this to AoB.
But then he expresses doubts about whether the conclusion might not be
CON(BoA), which would convert.
516. See 1.16, 36a32-9 with Alexander’s discussion at 209,35-211,17.
517. cf. the note on 251,26.
518. Alexander seems to suppose that the obvious way to try to justify
AE_3(CN_) is to convert the minor premiss to NEC(CeB) producing a first-figure
combination which yields no conclusion.
519. We retain the mê of 251,39 bracketed by Wallies. It is not clear to us why
Alexander chooses to speak of not converting both premisses rather than of just
converting the major CON(AaC). In any case it seems to us likely that the text is
corrupt since we would expect Alexander to say ‘if both premisses are not con-
verted’ rather than ‘if both premisses do not convert’.
520. In this note we offer an overview of this last part of the commentary on the
modal logic. On the basis of 1.22, 40a39-b2 and 40b4-8 we have an alleged
parallelism between the proofs of the following pairs:
(i) Datisi3(NC‘C’) and Darapti3(NC‘C’)
(ii) Datisi3(CNC) and Darapti3(CNC)
(iii) Disamis3(NCC) and Darapti3(NC‘C’)
226 Notes to p. 180
(iv) Disamis3(CN‘C’) and Darapti3(CNC)
On the basis of 40b2-4 we can add parallelism for:
(v) Ferison3(CNC) and Felapton3(CNC)
(vi) Ferison3(NCCu) and Felapton3(NCCu)
Alexander confirms the claims of parallelism at 254,14-21, 31-35, and 253,6-17.
However, what Aristotle says at 40b2-4 also implies that there will be parallelisms
for:
(vii) Bocardo3(CNC) and Felapton3(CNC)
(viii) Bocardo3(NCCu) and Felapton3(NCCu)
as well as for:
(ix) AO_3(CN_), IE_3(CN_) and AE_3(CN_)
(x) AO_3 (NC_), IE_3(NC_) and AE_3(NC_)
Aristotle accepts AE_3(NC_) at 40a33-5. Alexander takes him to be accepting
AEI3(NC‘C’), and apparently mistakenly denies that he could have established
AEO3(NCC); see the note on 251,10. At 40b8-12 Aristotle suggests a parallel
treatment for IE_3(NC‘C’). Alexander discusses what he says at 253,23-7. In
this case, however, he takes Aristotle to be plumping for IEO3(NCC), and
doesn’t even consider the possibility that he has IEI3(NCC), a waste case of
Disamis3(NCC), in mind. Neither Aristotle nor Alexander says anything ex-
plicit about AO_3(NC_), which can be treated as a waste case of Datisi3(NC‘C’)
or shown to yield the conclusion CON(AiB) by reduction to Darii1(CNC).
Since Aristotle has rejected AE_3(CN_) at 40a35-8 and rejects IE_3(CN_) at
40b8-12, it seems unlikely that he intends to accept IE_3(CN_) at 40b3-4. Alexan-
der explains Aristotle’s rejection of IE_3(CN_) at 253,27-36 and offers terms for
rejecting AO_3(CN) at 253,36-254,6.
This leaves us with (vii) and (viii). It is clear that we cannot establish either case
of Bocardo3 by mimicking the derivations for Felapton3, since conversion of the
minor premiss leaves two particular premisses. Alexander never discusses:
Bocardo3(NCCu) NEC(AoC) CON(BaC) CONu(AoB)
although it admits of an easy indirect derivation. Assume  (AoB), i.e., AaB. Then
(Barbara(UC‘C’)) ‘CON’(AaC), contradicting NEC(AoC). However, Alexander does
spend a lot of time on OA_3(CN_), for which he mentions two kinds of justification,
a reductio for:
Bocardo3(CN  N  ) CON(AoC) NEC(BaC)  NEC  (AoB)
which he never gives, and a direct proof for:
OAI3(CN‘C’) CON(AoC) NEC(BaC)  NEC  (AiB)
This is just a waste case of Disamis3(CN‘C’) but Alexander describes a full reduction
to Darii1NC‘C’) briefly at 252,27-9 and more fully at 254,26-9. The indirect proof
obviously proceeds by assuming NEC(AaB) and using Barbara1(NNN) to infer that
NEC(AaC), contradicting CON(AoC). At 252,25-7 Alexander indicates his prefer-
ence for assigning the reductio to Aristotle by saying that Aristotle’s words ‘the
situation will be similar’ refer to the character of the conclusion not the nature of
the proof. Of course, the conclusion of Felapton3(CN_) is ‘contingent in the way
specified’, that of the indirectly proved Bocardo3(CN_) and the directly proved
OAI3(CN_) is  NEC  . Again at 254,21-35 Alexander re-affirms his claim that
Aristotle intends the indirect proof this time on the grounds that he wants there
to be a negative conclusion when there is a negative premiss. What Alexander says
just previously suggests that he is also influenced by the fact that Aristotle offered
an indirect justification for Bocardo3(CU‘C’) at 1.12, 31b31-9.
521. For a minor divergence between Alexander’s citation and our text of
522. 1.4, 26a17. For minor textual variations see Appendix 6.
Notes to pp. 180-182 227
523. Wallies prints hotan gar mê tou autou katêgorôntai amphoteroi, alla mêde
hoi duo allêlôn antikatêgorôntai, <all’ ho tôi heterôi hupokeimenos mê tou
katêgoroumenou autou antikatêgorêtai> alla tou heterou, tou prôtou skhêmatos hê
sumplokê. The inserted words are from the Aldine. We have not translated the
words alla mêde hoi duo allêlôn antikatêgorôntai, which seem to be rendered
redundant by the insertion (which is however required).
524. i.e. the universal ones already discussed. Alexander here reports Aris-
totle’s rejection of AE_3(CN_), although he has just worried about it at
251,19-252,2.
525. AEI3(NC‘C’) (and perhaps the undiscussed EEO3(NCCu)).
526. Darapti3(CNC) and Felapton3(CNC). It is not clear why Alexander leaves
out the two corresponding NC cases.
527. Alexander would appear to be thinking about all six N+C cases of Datisi3,
Disamis3, and Ferison3.
528. Alexander turns to OA_3(CN_). See the introductory note on 252,3.
529. Bocardo3(CU‘C’), which Aristotle justified at 1.21, 39b31-9. But that case
required Barbara1(NUN), whereas the present one needs only Barbara1(NNN).
530. Alexander returns to the Datisi3 and Disamis3 cases, pointing out that the
former just require conversion of the minor premiss, but those for Disamis3 require
converting the major premiss, invoking the relevant case of Darii1, and then
converting the conclusion.
531. It seems to us likely that this paragraph is corrupt. We believe that
Alexander is picking up on 40b2 and is thinking about:
Ferison3(CNC) CON(AeC) NEC(BiC) CON(AoB)
OA_3(CN_) CON(AoC) NEC(BaC)
He first says that they both yield a contingent particular negative conclusion, but
then (ignoring the obelized words) refers to the two derivations for the second case
described in the note on 252,3. We have, in effect, translated the following text of
252,35-253,2: alla kan hê hetera apophatikê lêphthêi <kai> hê {for Wallies’ lêphthêi
ê} anankaia kataphatikê, endekhomenon epi merous apophatikon to sum-
perasma. dei de [kai en merei einai tên anankaian ousan kataphatikên; an gar
autê katholou, deêsei] tên epi merous endekhomenên apophatikên eis tên
kataphatikên metalabein.
532. Alexander takes up Ferison3(NCCu).
533. Felapton3(NCCu) established at 40a25-32.
534. For the point of Alexander’s query see, e.g., the note on 245,3.
535. At 40b8 Aristotle accepts:
IEO3(NCC) NEC(AiC) CON(BeC) CON(AoB)
and rejects:
IE_3(CN_) CON(AiC) NEC(BeC)
Alexander gives the proof for the first of these: convert NEC(AiC) to NEC(CiA)
and apply Ferio1(CNC) to get CON(BoA), which can be converted to CON(AoB).
For the second Alexander first explains why a straightforward reduction won’t
work: if one converts CON(AiC) to CON(CiA), one can apply Ferio1(NCCu) to get
BoA (or  NEC  (BoA)), but that will not convert. He then gives Aristotle’s terms.
He does not repeat his claim (see 252,19-252,2) that the terms are inadequate to
reject a contingent conclusion.
At 253,36 Alexander uses similar terms to reject:
AO_3(CN_) CON(AaC) NEC(BoC)
536. 40a35-8.
537. Alexander speaks loosely, since the terms are not exactly the same.
538. And hence of no sleeping horse.
228 Notes to pp. 182-183
539. And therefore a fortiori, does not hold of some human by necessity.
540. See 1.19, 39a2-3 and Alexander’s discussion at 242,22-7.
541. i.e. Bocardo3(CU‘C’) and Bocardo3(CN‘C’).
542. In justifying Bocardo3(CU‘C’) at 1.21, 39b31-9; see Alexander’s discussion
at 247,9-248,30.
544. 40b2-3. Alexander claims that those words in their context are compatible
with either a proof by conversion of OAI 3(CNC) or a reductio for Bocardo 3
(CN N ). He goes on to describe the proof by conversion for OAI3(CNC) again,
and then says that Aristotle would not use it because he expects a combination
with a negative premiss to yield a negative conclusion.
545. It is contingent that A holds of some B. We suspect that Alexander wrote
(or intended to write) ‘proposed conclusion’ (prokeimenon rather than
proeirêmenon).
546. This last sentence is difficult. We have interchanged the words ‘major’ and
‘minor’ in Wallies’ text. If Wallies text is right Alexander is suddenly turning from
OA_3(CN_) to AO_3(NC_), and saying that its justification requires that a premiss
and the conclusion be converted. But that is simply not true; see the note on 253,23.
We suspect that someone – possibly Alexander himself – has interchanged the
words ‘minor’ and ‘major’, and that Alexander is simply characterizing again the
direct justification of OAI3(CN‘C’).
Appendix 1
The expression ‘by necessity’

(ex anankês)
For the most part Alexander’s formulations of propositions involving contingency
are not difficult to construe because he uses forms of the verb ‘be contingent’
(endekhesthai). His formulations of propositions involving necessity are often more
problematic because, like Aristotle, he usually uses the phrase ‘by necessity’ (ex
anankês). At 1.15, 33b29-31 Aristotle says of the conclusions  NEC(AiC) and
 NEC(AaC) of Celarent1(UC N ) and Ferio1(UC N ), ‘ their conclusions
will be that something holds of none by necessity or does not hold of all by necessity
(mêdeni ê mê panti ex anankês huparkhein).’ At 1.15, 34b27-28 (cf. 35a1-2) he says
of the conclusion of Celarent1(UC N ), ‘Thus the conclusion of this syllogism is
not a proposition which is contingent in the way specified, but is “of none by
necessity” (mêdeni ex anankês) .’ Commenting on this passage at 194,14ff.
Alexander insists on the distinction between ‘by necessity of none’ (ex anankês
mêdeni) and ‘of none by necessity’ (mêdeni ex anankês), where the first corresponds
to NEC(AeC) and the second to  NEC(AiC), the conclusion of Celarent1(UC N
), apparently understood as something like ‘There’s no C of which A holds neces-
sarily’. Alexander does not adhere to this distinction uniformly (see, e.g., 131,11-12,
136,25, 202,22), and at 196,28-33 he indicates that ‘of none by necessity’ (in this
case oudeni ex anankês) is ambiguous. We have not thought it worthwhile to
distinguish these two phrases and others except in cases where it seemed clear
that Alexander wanted to stress a difference. We have instead adopted a uniform
English translation of the four necessary propositions as follows to render what we
take to be Alexander’s intentions:
‘A holds of all B by necessity’ when we take Alexander to mean NEC(AaB);

‘A holds of no B by necessity’ when we take Alexander to mean NEC(AeB);
‘A holds of some B by necessity’ when we take Alexander to mean NEC(AiB);
‘A does not hold of some B by necessity’ when we take Alexander to mean NEC(AoB).
As is indicated by the discussion at the beginning of this appendix, negations of

necessary propositions cause Alexander – and consequently us – more difficulty.
When Alexander uses something like mêdeni ex anankês (which he says at 197,26
is equivalent to ouk ex anankês tini) to express  NEC(AiB) (=  NEC (AeB)) we
write ‘A holds by necessity of no B’.
At 198,5 Alexander takes up the question whether the conclusion of Bar-
bara1(UC_) is CON(AaC) or  NEC  (AaC), i.e.,  NEC(AoC). He expresses this
second alternative as oudeni ex anankês ou. We find this expression rather
baffling, and we translate it and its analogues with the equally baffling ‘A does not
hold by necessity of no B’.
At 174,13 Alexander indicates that the conclusion of Ferio1(CU N ) is ou
panti ex anankês, for which we use the translation ‘A does not hold by necessity of
all B’. Thus we have the correspondences:
230 Appendix 1
‘A holds by necessity of no B’ for  NEC(AiB) (=  NEC (AeB));
‘A does not hold by necessity of no B’ for  NEC(AoB) (=  NEC (AaB));
‘A does not hold by necessity of all B’ for  NEC(AaB) (=  NEC (AoB)).
We have not noticed any passage in which  NEC(AeB) (=  NEC (AiB)) requires
special attention.
Appendix 2
Affirmation and negation

To talk about the quality of propositions Alexander mainly uses the adjectives
‘affirmative’ (kataphatikos) and ‘negative’ (apophatikos) and the nouns ‘affirma-
tion’ (kataphasis) and ‘negation’ (apophasis). No problems arise in non-modal
syllogistic where a- and i-propositions are affirmations and affirmative and e- and
o-propositions are negations and negative. The fact that a- and i-propositions might
also be construed as negations of o- and e-propositions is avoided by talking about
contradictories or opposites rather than negations.
At 31,5-6 Alexander informs us that Aristotle calls a universal apophatikos a
universal sterêtikos. We follow Barnes et al. in translating sterêtikos ‘privative’.
Sterêtikos is Aristotle’s word of choice, but almost every occurrence of the word in
this section of the commentary is in a citation or paraphrase of Aristotle. For
reasons which are not clear to us Alexander has a strong preference for apopha-
tikos. Alexander also eschews one of Aristotle’s words for ‘affirmative’, katêgorikos
(see the Greek-English index.)
What Aristotle says in the course of our text clearly implies that propositions
such as NEC(AeB) and CON(AoB) are both negative (1.15, 35a30-40; 1.18, 38a10-
11) and negations (1.17, 36b38-9). This leaves Alexander with a problem about
how to talk about, e.g.,  NEC(AeB) and  CON(AoB). There is no question that
Alexander understands the relevant difference between these kinds of proposition.
At 158,24-159,23 he introduces a distinction between a contingent or necessary
negative (e.g., CON(AoB) or NEC(AeB)) and a negation of contingency or necessity
(e.g.,  CON(AoB) or  NEC(AeB)). Unfortunately he sometimes calls a proposi-
tion like NEC(AeB) an apophasis by contrast with a kataphasis such as
NEC(AaB). In these cases, which are listed in the Greek-English index, we have
opted for the translations ‘negative proposition’ and ‘affirmative proposition’.
Appendix 3
Conditional necessity
Toward the end of his discussion in On Interpretation of contingent statements
about the future Aristotle writes:
It is necessary that what is is when it is and that what is not is not when it
is not. But it is not necessary that everything which is be nor that what is
not not be. For these are not the same:
(a) everything that is is by necessity when it is;
(b) everything that is is without qualification (haplôs) by necessity. (On
Interpretation 9.19a23-6)
It appears that Theophrastus and, following him, the ancient commentators took
Aristotle to be marking here a distinction between (b) necessity without qualifica-
tion and (a) a necessity which they typically labelled either ‘on a hypothesis’ (ex
hupotheseôs) or ‘on a condition’ (meta diorismou). Alexander typically uses the
latter expression.1 Ammonius (in Int. 153,13-154,2) explicates the distinction in
terms of affirmative subject-predicate propositions. It is necessary without quali-
fication that S is P if S cannot exist without being P; it is necessary on a condition
that S is P as long as P holds of S. Ammonius makes a further distinction between
two kinds of necessity without qualification on the basis of whether or not the
subject is eternal.
In his commentary on the Prior Analytics Philoponus invokes the distinction to
defend Aristotle’s claim that Barbara1(NUN) is valid:
Aristotle says in On Interpretation that necessity is said in two ways: in the

strict sense (kuriôs) and on a hypothesis. And necessity on a hypothesis is
said in two ways: something is said to be necessary as long as the subject
exists (huparkhein); and something is necessary as long as what is predi-
cated holds (huparkhein). For example, ‘The sun moves’ is said to be
necessary in the strict sense; ‘Socrates is an animal’ is said to be necessary
on a hypothesis, <namely, as long as the subject exists>, since as long as
Socrates exists, it is necessary that he is an animal – this type is closer to
necessity in the strict sense; and the third sense occurs when we say that it
is necessary that what is seated is seated; for as long as what is predicated
holds, I mean being seated, it necessarily holds of what is seated in the sense
of necessity on a hypothesis.2
Accordingly, we say that the major premiss has been taken as necessary
in the strict sense, but the conclusion has been taken as necessary on a
hypothesis, namely ‘as long as what is predicated is the case’. For as long as
A holds of C, it holds of it by necessity. And Alexander, explicator of Aristotle,
says in a certain short work (en tini monobiblôi)3 that his teacher Sosigenes4
is of the same opinion, namely that here Aristotle draws a conclusion which
is necessary on a hypothesis. For, he says, that he means this is clear because
when the major premiss is unqualified, the minor premiss necessary, and the
Appendix 3 233
conclusion is inferred to be unqualified, he sets out terms <to show that the
conclusion cannot be necessary>, but when the major premiss is necessary,
the minor unqualified, and the conclusion is inferred to be necessary, he does
not manage to set out terms which imply necessity in the strict sense.
Therefore, he says, it is clear that he also takes the necessity to be on a
hypothesis. (in An. Pr. 126,8-29)
The argument about terms is opaque partly because of Philoponus’ misunderstand-

ing of the role interpretations play as counterexamples to alleged syllogisms, a
misunderstanding which we have seen to be Alexander’s as well.5 There is abso-
lutely no reason for Aristotle to set out terms in connection with a premiss
combination he deems syllogistic. However, it seems likely that what underlies the
argument is the existence of counter-interpretations for Barabara1(NUN) of the
kind which Alexander gives at 124,21-30. The first of these takes the following
proposition to be true:
It is necessary that all humans are animals;

Everything moving is human;
It is not necessary that everything moving is an animal.
It appears that Sosigenes tried to defend Aristotle against such counterinterpre-

tations by pointing out that ‘Everything moving is an animal’ is necessary on a
hypothesis or condition. On the basis of what is said by Philoponus and Ammonius
one would expect the condition to be that everything moving is an animal, but
because of the necessary first proposition it is also possible to take the condition
to be that everything moving is human. Alexander takes this second option in a
passage which makes it likely that he dissented from the position of Sosigenes. In
the passage Alexander is commenting on Aristotle’s rejection at 1.10, 30b31-40 of
Camestres2(NUN) on the basis of the following interpretation:
It is necessary that all humans are animals;

Nothing white is an animal;
It is not necessary that nothing white is human.
Aristotle says of the third proposition:
Then, human will also hold of nothing white, but not by necessity; for it is
contingent that a human be white, although not so long as animal holds
of nothing white. So the conclusion will be necessary if certain things are
the case, but it will not be necessary without qualification. (1.10, 30b36-
40)
Alexander says what he takes to be the force of these words:
He indicates that when he says, in connection with mixtures, that the

conclusion is necessary, he means ‘necessary without qualification’ and not
‘necessary on a condition’, as some of the interpreters of the subject of
mixture of premisses say, thinking that they strengthen his position; they
assert that he does not speak about inferring necessity without qualification,
but about inferring necessity on a condition. For they say that when animal
holds of every human by necessity and – as in the first figure – human of all
that moves or walks, the conclusion is necessary on a condition; for animal
234 Appendix 3
holds of all that moves or walks as long as the middle, human, holds of it. For
it is not the case that if the minor premiss is necessary, the conclusion is
necessary; for it is not the case that if moving holds of every animal and
animal of every human by necessity, moving holds of every human by
necessity as long as animal holds of every human – for that is false – but for
as long as moving holds of every animal. (140,16-28)6
Alexander goes on to cite Aristotelian passages which suggest very strongly that
the interpretation offered by Sosigenes is untenable.7 Alexander might, of course,
have taken a different position in the ‘certain short work’ to which Philoponus
refers, but we have no way of knowing this.
Alexander concludes his discussion of Sosigenes’ position by citing the passage
from On Interpretation with which we began this appendix:
At the same time he has also indicated by the addition <of the words
‘although not so long as animal holds of nothing white. So the conclusion will
be necessary if certain things are the case, but it will not be necessary
without qualification’> that he is aware of the division of necessity which his
associates <Theophrastus and Eudemus> have made, and which he has also
already established in On Interpretation, where, discussing contradiction of
propositions about the future and individual things, he says, ‘It is necessary
that what is is when it is, and that what is not is not when it is not’. For the
necessary on a hypothesis is of this kind. (141,1-6)
There are two other passages in the commentary connecting Theophrastus with
necessity on a condition. In the first Alexander offers a possible justification for the
view that, according to the diorismos of contingency, if CON(P),  P:
Or does he deny that what is contingent is unqualified by saying ‘if P is not

necessary’; for, according to him, necessity is also predicated of the unquali-
fied; for what holds of something holds of it with necessity, as long as it holds.
At any rate Theophrastus in the first book of his Prior Analytics, discussing
the meanings of necessity, writes the following: ‘Third, what holds; for when
it holds it cannot not hold.’ (156, 26-157,2)
It seems reasonable to assume that this third sense of necessity is the third sense
of Ammonius and Philoponus, the one according to which S is P by necessity as
long as P holds of S.
In the other passage the connection with the account of Ammonius and Phi-
loponus is even clearer:
What is necessary is either necesssary without qualification or is called

necessary on a condition, e.g., ‘Human holds of everything literate by neces-
sity, as long as it is literate.’ This proposition is not necessary without
qualification. Theophrastus showed the difference between them; for there
are not always literate things, and a human is not always literate. Since they
differ in this way, we must recognize that Aristotle is now discussing what
is called necessity in the strict sense and without qualification. (36,25-31)8
Although this passage occurs just before the lemma on AI-conversionn, we believe
that Alexander invokes this distinction here in defense of AI-conversionn. His
general point seems clear: we cannot convert a proposition like ‘Human holds of
Appendix 3 235
everything literate by necessity’ to ‘Literate holds of some human by necessity’.
But the distinction between the two types of necessity does not seem to explain the
failure of conversion. It only puts a label on the kinds of a-proposition which are
assumed not to convert. However, we can perhaps see why Philoponus classified
propositions with non-eternal subjects as necessary on a hypothesis. For if he did
not, he would have to say that human holds of everything literate by necessity
without qualification.9 Pursuit of this line of reasoning would seem to lead to the
conclusion that AI-conversionn holds only when the subject of the a-proposition is
eternal. Alexander never pursues this point, but it may have been one of the ways
in which people tried to make sense of AI-conversionn.
And the point does come up tacitly at three other places in the commentary
where Alexander invokes necessity on a condition. One such passage concerns one
of Aristotle’s most striking specification of terms for rejecting a combination when
he takes as true:
It is necessary that every sleeping horse is asleep and it is necessary that

every horse-that-is-awake is awake.
Alexander is certain that these propositions are only necessary on a condition, that
is, hold only as long as the predicate asleep or awake holds, and he is certain that
such propositions are really unqualified. But he is uncertain what to make of the
situation because he is uncertain about the status of the combination which
Aristotle rejects.10 Elsewhere Alexander suggests that ‘What walks moves’ is only
necessary on a condition:
Or is it the case that even if it is taken that all that walks is human and all
humans move, still the conclusion ‘all that walks moves’ is not necessary
without qualification but with the additional condition ‘as long as it is
walking’? For all that walks does not move by necessity, if, indeed, it is true
that what walks does not even walk necessarily except, as I said, on the
condition ‘as long as it is walking’. (155,20-5; cf. 201,21-4)
Although the exact construal of these words is uncertain, one plausible reading
would commit Alexander to the view that a necessary truth requires an eternal
subject term. Of course, such a view is not compatible with Aristotle’s practice in
the Prior Analytics.11
Notes
1. See the entry on meta diorismou (anankaios) in the Greek-English index.
2. We note that Philoponus divides the three kinds of necessity differently from
Ammonius, producing two kinds of necessity on a hypothesis where Ammonius has
two kinds of necessity without qualification. Stephanus (in Int. 38,14-31) agrees
with Ammonius. At 162,13-26 Alexander suggests that necessity which is condi-
tional on the existence of a non-eternal subject is not necessity at all.
3. This is generally thought to be the work on mixtures of premisses; see 207,36
with the note.
4. On Sosigenes, see Moraux (1984), 335-60.
5. See section I of the introduction. We mention here a suggestion of an
anonymous reader, according to which Sosigenes espoused a method of showing
that a pair of premisses assumed to imply a conclusion of one kind does not imply
236 Appendix 3
a stronger one by producing a counter-example rejecting the stronger conclusion
(the method used by Aristotle in connection with first-figure UN cases). According
to this suggestion, when Sosigenes claimed that Aristotle took the conclusion of,
e.g., Barbara1(NU_) to be only necessary on a hypothesis, he was asked why he
didn’t produce a counter-example to a strictly necessary conclusion. Sosigenes’
answer: Aristotle was not able to produce such terms. This suggestion has the
advantage of providing a reasonably unobjectionable sense to the notion of provid-
ing terms to establish an implication, but we have not succeeded in working it out
fully.
6. We are not certain what to make of this last sentence. The anonymous reader
mentioned in the previous note has argued persuasively that it is part of the view
against which Alexander is arguing, according to which syllogistic NU cases yield
a conclusion which is necessary as long as the minor premiss is true whereas the
corresponding UN cases do not yield a conclusion which is necessary in any sense.
7. Further evidence that Alexander did not follow Sosigenes on this issue is
provided by the fact that [Ammonius] (in An. Pr. 39,10-25) ascribes to Sosigenes
alone the position that the conclusion of Barbara1(NU_) is ‘necessary on a condi-
tion’, while ascribing to Alexander an argument in support of Barbara1(NUN). (For
the argument see Alexander’s commentary at 127,3-14.)
8. For another (less clear) passage of Alexander (citing Galen) which connects
Theophrastus with a distinction between necessary truths with eternal subjects
and those with perishable ones see Theophrastus 100C FHSG.
9. The fact that ‘Human holds of everything literate’ is not necessary without
qualification shows that necessity without qualification is not so-called de re
necessity, since it is presumably de re necessary that human hold of everything
literate.
10. See 251,11-252,2 and section III.E. 3.c of the Introduction.
11. Alexander mentions necessity on a condition one other time in the commen-
tary (179,31-180,3) in connection with the problematic conditional ‘If Dion has died,
he has died’, but he does so in a way which seems marginally related to the topic
of this appendix. He also twice (181,13-17 and 189,2-3) uses in what seems to be
an informal way the standard formula (est’ an) for introducing the condition on
which something is necessary.
Appendix 4
On Interpretation, chapters
12 and 13
In chapter 12 of On Interpretation Aristotle proposes to investigate ‘how affirma-
tions and negations of the possible to be and the not possible to be and of the
contingent to be and the not contingent to be are related to one another and about
the impossible and the necessary’. (21a34-37) In what follows Aristotle makes no
distinction between the possible and the contingent, but since the way he treats
the two notions differs from the way he treats contingency in the way specified in
the Prior Analytics, we shall introduce the operator POS to represent what he says
here. We shall also ignore difficulties in the details of what Aristotle says. Since
‘It is impossible that’ and ‘It is necessary that it is not the case that’ end up as
equivalent, we can formulate what Aristotle says in terms of possibility and
necessity. In chapter 12 the results are:
The negation of POS(P) is  POS(P), and it is not POS( P)

The negation of NEC(P) is  NEC(P), and it is not NEC( P)
These statements cause Alexander and other commentators some difficulty be-
cause, as indicated in the appendix on affirmation and negation, in the Prior
Analytics Aristotle sometimes speaks as if, e.g., CON(AeB) is a negation. However,
Alexander quite rightly takes the view expressed here as the norm to which
Aristotle’s apparently discordant statements have to be adjusted (see, for example,
158,24-159,3 on 32a29, and 221,16-222,4 on 36b38).
In chapter 13 Aristotle seems to come out strongly for Theophrastean contin-
gency, that is, he seems to hold that:
(i) POS(P) if and only if  NEC( P)
Aristotle’s argumentation is confused, but he clearly commits himself to a con-

sequence of this equivalence, which is obviously incompatible with the diorismos
of contingency, namely:
(ii) if NEC(P) then POS(P)
At 22b29 he raises the question whether this implication is correct. He uses the
example of being cut to suggest that POS(P) implies POS( P), which, with (ii),
would produce the impossibility that NEC(P) implies POS( P). Aristotle’s way
out is to speak of different kinds of possibility, only some of which are two-sided;
he also suggests that possibility is homonymous, and introduces a notion which is
something like what we represent by CONu:
For some possibilities are homonymous. For possible is not said in just one
way. But one thing is said to be possible because it is true in the sense of
238 Appendix 4
actually being – for example, it is possible for something to walk because it
does walk, and, in general, it is possible for something to be because it
already is in actuality; another thing is said to be possible because it might
be actual, e.g., it is possible for something to walk because it might walk.
(23a6-11)
In his commentary on On Interpretation Ammonius fixes on the homonymy of

possibility. He recognizes that in the Prior Analytics Aristotle denies (i) and (ii) for
contingency in the way specified and that this contingency is the fundamental
notion of possibility in the Prior Analytics, although it rather clearly is not in On
Interpretation. Ammonius (see in Int. 245,1-32) adopts what we think is a rather
unusual expedient to harmonize the two texts. He says that the notion of contin-
gency in On Interpretation is contingency without qualification (haplôs) whereas
contingency in the Prior Analytics is contingency in the strict sense (kuriôs). We
find no clear trace of this distinction in Alexander, but it is clear from 37,28-38,10
(quoted in section III.A of the introduction) that Aristotle’s discussion in On
Interpretation was a primary source of Alexander’s view that contingency is
homonymous. Of course, the way Aristotle handles the notion of contingency in the
Prior Analytics could only encourage such a view.
Appendix 5
Weak two-sided Theophrastean

contingency
Aristotle and Alexander are committed to:
CON(P)   NEC( P)
Given:
AE-transformationc: CON(AaB)  CON(AeB)

EA-transformationc: CON(AeB)  CON(AaB)
IO-transformationc: CON(AiB)  CON(AoB)
OI-transformationc: CON(AoB)  CON(AiB)
they are, indeed, committed to:
CON(AaB)   NEC (AaB) &  NEC (AeB)

CON(AeB)   NEC (AaB) &  NEC (AeB)
CON(AiB)   NEC (AiB) &  NEC (AoB)
CON(AoB)   NEC (AiB) &  NEC (AoB)
or equivalently to
CON(AaB)   NEC(AoB) &  NEC(AiB)

CON(AeB)   NEC(AoB) &  NEC(AiB)
CON(AiB)   NEC(AeB) &  NEC(AaB)
CON(AoB)   NEC(AeB) &  NEC(AaB)
In section III.D.2 of the introduction we mentioned equivalents of the first two of
these propositions labelled as NCa and NCe. We here introduce analogous equiva-
lents of the other two as well:
(NCa) NEC(AoB) v NEC(AiB)   CON(AaB)

(NCe) NEC(AoB) v NEC(AiB)   CON(AeB)
(NCi) NEC(AeB) v NEC(AaB)   CON(AiB)
(NCo) NEC(AeB) v NEC(AaB)   CON(AoB)
In section III.D.2 we have sketched some reasons for thinking that Aristotle and
Alexander may have accepted the converses of NCa and NCe:
(  CaN)  CON(AaB)  NEC(AoB) v NEC(AiB)

(  CeN)  CON(AeB)  NEC(AoB) v NEC(AiB)
to which we now add:

240 Appendix 5
( CiN)  CON(AiB)  NEC(AeB) v NEC(AaB)
( CoN)  CON(AoB)  NEC(AeB) v NEC(AaB)
Combining these pairs of propositions into equivalences makes explicit what we

shall call weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency:
(2TCa) CONtc(AaB)   NEC(AiB) &  NEC(AoB)

(2TCe) CONtc(AeB)   NEC(AiB) &  NEC(AoB)
(2TCi) CONtc(AiB)   NEC(AaB) &  NEC(AeB)
(2TCo) CONtc(AoB)   NEC(AaB) &  NEC(AeB)
These equivalences enable one to prove a number of principles which Aristotle
accepts and to block some that he doesn’t accept. This is trivially true for AE-trans-
formationc, EA-transformationc, IO-transformationc, and OI-transformationc. We
give a proof that:
CONtc(AaB)  CONtc(AiB)
Suppose CONtc(AaB) and  CONtc(AiB). Then  NEC(AiB) &  NEC(AoB), and

either NEC(AaB) or NEC(AeB). But in either case there is a contradiction since
NEC(AaB) implies NEC(AiB) and NEC(AeB) implies NEC(AoB).
This same proof establishes that:
CONtc(AeB)  CONtc(AoB)
On the other hand we can block both EE-conversiontc and OO-conversiontc, that is,
we can show:
CONtc(AeB) does not imply CONtc(BeA)

CONtc(AoB) does not imply CONtc(BoA)
that is
 NEC(AiB) &  NEC(AoB) does not imply  NEC(BiA) &  NEC(BoA)

 NEC(AaB) &  NEC(AeB) does not imply  NEC(BaA) &  NEC(BeA)
Since  NEC(AiB) does imply  NEC(BiA) and  NEC(AeB) does imply

 NEC(BeA), these two claims reduce to the obviously true:
 NEC(AoB) does not imply  NEC(BoA)

 NEC(AaB) does not imply  NEC(BaA)
that is
NEC(BoA) does not imply NEC(AoB)

NEC(BaA) does not imply NEC(AaB)
These arguments are, of course, also arguments against AA-conversiontc and

II-conversiontc, that is, they show:
CONtc(AaB) does not imply CONtc(BaA)

CONtc(AiB) does not imply CONtc(BiA)
Appendix 5 241
The failure of II-conversiontc means that  CiN would have to be rejected by
Aristotle and presumably by Alexander. We have found no evidence that either one
accepts it or  CoN. In addition one might expect Alexander to be suspicious of
 CaN and  CeN, since they are incompatible with his apparent belief that if
CON(P), P does not hold now. However, there are passages which suggest that
Alexander did accept these principles. The strongest is perhaps his presentation
at 211,2-17 of a proof of what he asserts to be:
Celarent1(CNC) CON(AeB) NEC(BaC) CON(AeC)
He assumes  CON(AeC) and transforms it into NEC(AiC). But NEC(BaC), so

that (Disamis3(NNN)) NEC(AiB), contradicting CON(AeB). Alexander insists that
in this case the conclusion really is CON(AeC) and not  NEC(AiC), since he can
also rule out NEC(AoC); for NEC(AoC) and NEC(BaC) imply (Bocardo3(NNN))
NEC(AoB), which is incompatible with CON(AeB). This inference obviously only
makes sense if Alexander is assuming ( CeN).
This argument throws light on a difficult passage in which Alexander is
discussing:
Celarent1(UC N ) AeB CON(BaC)  NEC (AeC)
which Aristotle established indirectly by refuting NEC(AiC). In his comment

Alexander invokes NCe:
He himself indicates by what he says that it is necessary to transform ‘It is

not contingent that A holds of no C’ < CON(AeC)> in this combination into
a particular affirmative necessary proposition <NEC(AiC)>. For ‘It is not
contingent that A holds of no C’ is no less true when the particular negative
necessary proposition is, but the proof goes through in the case of the former.
(195,6-10)
What Alexander says suggests that the only reason Aristotle didn’t make
NEC(AoC) the hypothesis for reductio is that it would not enable him to derive a
contradiction. He does not make clear what sense he would make of a justification
of EAA1(UC N ). In the light of the passage we have just discussed it seems to
us likely that underlying Alexander’s remark here is the idea that the conclusion
of Celarent1(UC_) is not CON(AeC) because the premisses do not imply
 NEC(AoC). This idea obviously presupposes ( CeN); cf. 197,12-22, 198,9-11,
205,29-30, 207,9-11.
Other passages suggest the same thing but not so decisively. For example,
Alexander writes:
 ‘A holds of some C by necessity’ is not equivalent to ‘It is not contingent

that A holds of no C’, which was transformed into it. For ‘It is not contingent
that A holds of no C’ is also true when A does not hold of some C by necessity;
for it is true that it is not contingent that walking holds of no animal, but not
because it holds of some animal by necessity, but because it does not hold of
some by necessity. (194,25-9)
This suggests that  CON(AeC) means that either NEC(AiC) or NEC(AoC) ( CeN).
But everything Alexander says here is compatible with his accepting only NCe. He
can deny the equivalence of  CON(AeC) and NEC(AiC) simply on the grounds
242 Appendix 5
that NEC(AoC) alone implies  CON(AeC). Unfortunately Alexander says nothing
to make explicit this idea (see also 205,16-206,11).
However, the question whether Alexander recognizes  CeN or  CaN is made
more difficult by the way in which he searches for terms to confirm the difference
between, say,  CON(P) and NEC( P). He does this for  CON(AaC) and
NEC(AoC) at 198,13-199,4. Obviously, he could simply verify NEC(AaC) and thus
verify  CON(AaC) and falsify NEC(AoC), but he chooses to verify  CON(AaC),
 NEC(AoC), and NEC(AiC). Again, however, we are not forced to conclude that
he is presupposing  CaN, and, indeed, we suspect that he adopts his method
because he is discussing Barbara1(UC‘C’), and he does not want terms which would
falsify the possible conclusion which he is considering at the moment, viz.
 NEC(AoC) (=  NEC (AaC)).
Appendix 6
Textual notes
In this appendix we indicate places where Alexander’s text may have been different
from that printed by Ross. Places where we have not followed the text printed by
Wallies are listed on pp. 73-4 above.
Aristotle
26a17 Ei d’ ho men (Ross); hotan ho men (citation, 252,8 (Wallies, following

the Aldine); the lemma at 58,24 has Ei d’ ho men)
30a15 ton sullogismon (Ross); to sumperasma (citation, 128,6-7; the lemma
at 123,26 has ton sullogismon)
30a21-2 huparkhei ê oukh huparkhei to A (Ross); huparkhein ê mê
huparkhein to A keitai (lemma, 127,25-6).
30a27 gar (Ross); de (citation, 128,29;129,9; lemma, 129,8).
30a27 toiouton (Ross); toiouton ti (lemma, 129,8, but toiouton in the citation
at 128,29).
30b7 de tou deuterou (Ross); de deuterou (lemma, 135,20).
30b18 de hê (Ross); d’ hê (lemma, 137,22).
30b19 ouk estai to sumperasma anankaion (Ross and the Aldine of
Alexander); to sumperasma ouk estai anankaion (lemma, 137,22-3).
30b24-5 eti d’ ei (Ross); eti ei (lemma, 138,3).
31a1 d’ hexei (Ross); de hexei (citation, 135,29, but the lemma at 142,18
has d’ hexei).
31a10 te kai (Ross); kai (lemma, 143,3).
31a17 Alexander reports (144,4-5) that some copies have henos monou
metalambanomenou after hê apodeixis.
31b17 estin (Ross); esti (citation, 148,10).
31b20 estin (Ross); esti (citation, 148,24).
31b29 to de A (Ross); to A (citation, 149,4).
31b31 dipoun ti katheudein ê egrêgorenai (Ross); dipoun ti mê katheudein
(citations, 149,8 and 10-11).
31b39 tauta (Ross); ta auta (citation 150,12; at 150,30 Wallies follows the
Aldine in printing tauta where B and M have panta).
32a5 zôion, meson zôion (Ross); zôion, dipoun meson (treated as a scribal
blunder, 151,14-16).
32a7 ean (Ross); an (lemma 151,32, but ean in the citation at 153,4).
32a8 monon (Ross); monês citation, 153,2; the mss. divide on the citation
at 152,26 and on the lemma at 151,33).
32a17 legômen (Ross and the Aldine of Alexander); legomen (lemma, 156,1
and some mss. of Aristotle).
32a18 d’ endekhesthai (Ross); de endekhesthai (lemma, 156,8).
32a22 apophaseôn kai tôn kataphaseôn (Ross); kataphaseôn kai tôn
apophaseôn (lemma, 157,11).
32b4 de (Ross); dê (lemma, 161,27. Both Ross and Wallies print legômen
244 Appendix 6
in this line, although the mss. of Aristotle which Ross cites and the
Aldine of Alexander have legomen).
32b19 esti (Ross); estin (lemma, 164,16).
32b21 ekeinôn (Ross); ekeinôs (citation, 165,4).
32b30 enkhôrein (Ross); endekhesthai (lemma, 166,4 and following citations).
32b37 kathaper kai en tois allois (Ross); kathaper epi tôn allôn (citation, 167,3-4).
33a1 elegomen (Ross); legomen (citation, 167,27).
33a4 mê endekhesthai (Ross); endekhesthai (citation 168,4).
33a21 Ean (Ross); An (lemma, 169,15).
33b4 houtô (Ross); houtôs (lemma, 171,14).
33b8 touton ton tropon ekhontôn tôn horôn hoti oudeis (Ross); hoti touton
ton tropon ekhontôn tôn horôn oudeis (lemma, 172,6-7).
33b27 t’esontai pantes (Ross); te pantes esontai (citation, 245,23).
33b28-9 to elatton (Ross); ton elattona (citation, 245,24).
33b34 huparkhein (Ross); huparkhon (lemma, 174,32).
34a2 d’ enantiôs (Ross); de enantiôs (lemma, 175,7).
34a4 kai hoti ateleis (Ross); hoti kai ateleis (citation, 175,16 [aB (d); hoti
ateleis M]).
34a6-7 estai kai to B (Ross; kai omitted in three main manuscripts); kai to B
estai (lemma, 175,20).
34a8-10 to men dunaton, hote dunaton einai, genoit’ an, to d’ adunaton, hot’
adunaton, ouk an genoito (Ross); to men [A] dunaton, hote dunaton,
genoit’ an, to de [B] adunaton, hote adunaton, ouk an genoito
(citation, 177,4-6).
34a10-11 hama d’ eiê to A dunaton kai to B adunaton, endekhoit’ an to A
genesthai aneu tou B (Ross; the mss have ei for eiê); the lemma at
177,1-2 reads hama d’ ei to A dunaton kai to B adunaton, endekhoit’
an genesthai to A aneu tou B. At 177,8 Alexander cites the lines as
hama de endekhoit’ an genesthai to A aneu tou B.
34a12 to adunaton kai dunaton (Ross); to dunaton kai adunaton (lemma,
182,20-1).
34a32 dunaton estai to auto (Ross); to auto estai dunaton (citation, 185,27).
34a38 panti tôi G (Ross); tôi G (citation, 185,15 and most mss. of Aristotle).
34b3 thentas (Ross); thenta (lemma, 187,10).
34b7 huparkhon (Ross); huparkhein (lemma, 188,18 and one of the mss. of
Aristotle cited by Ross).
34b40-1 The words kai ouk estai to sumperasma anankaion were not known
to Alexander (citation, 200,6-7).
35a9-10 The word endekesthai was not read by Alexander (citations,
200,24-5, 27-8).
35b1 kai dia tês antistrophês (Ross); di’ antistrophês (citation, 202,11).
35b8-9 hotan de to mê huparkhein lambanêi hê kata meros tetheisa (Ross);
Hotan de to mê huparkhein tini lambanêi (complete lemma 203,10).
35b11 adioristou (Ross); aoristou (citation, 203,16 and some mss. of Aristotle).
35b12 to elattona akron (Ross and the Aldine of Alexander); ton elattona
akron (lemma, 204,1).
35b17 hêper kapi (Ross); hê kai epi (citation, 204,21-2).
35b23 Hotan d’ hê men ex anankês huparkhein hê d’ endekhesthai (Ross);
Hotan d’ hê men ex anankês huparkhein ê mê huparkhein hê d’
endekhesthai (lemma, 204,30-1).
35b32-3 to d’ endekhesthai (Ross); to de endekhesthai mê huparkhein
(citation, 205,21-2).
Appendix 6 245
35b34 tou d’ ex (Ross); tou de ex (citation, 207,34).
35b35 heteron gar to mê ex anankês huparkhein (Ross); heteron gar esti to
mê huparkhein ex anankês (citation, 206,16-17).
36a11 huparkhein (Ross); huparkhon (citation, 208,22 and one ms. of
Aristotle reported by Ross).
36a14 hôst’ oudeni ê ou panti tôi G to B endekhoit’ an huparkhein (Ross);
hôst’ ou panti tôi G to B endekhetai huparkhein (citation, 209,22, on
which see the note).
36a17 kataphatikê (Ross); katêgorikê (lemma, 209,33, although Alexander
uses kataphatikê in the commentary at 209,36).
36a23 to A tôi G tini huparkhein (Ross). The mss read to A tôi G mêdeni
huparkhein, and Alexander clearly did as well (210,21-34). But he
indicates (30-1) that some manuscripts read to A tôi G tini [mê]
huparkhein (mê bracketed by Wallies, following Waitz).
36a32 kapi (Ross); kai epi (citation, 212,3).
36b1 to en tôi katêgorikôi (Ross); en tôi katêgorikôi (citation, 213,30 and
the majority of the Greek mss. used by Ross).
36b16 apsukhôi tini (Ross); tini apsukhôi (lemma, 215,19).
36b19 Phaneron (Ross); Dêlon (lemma, 215,29).
36b26 lambanôsin (Ross and most mss.); lambanôntai (lemma, 217,29).
36b35 endekhesthai (Ross and the Aldine of Alexander); endekhomenôi
(lemma, 219,34).
37a4 d’ ouden (Ross); de ouden (citation, 221,6).
37a18 tini tôn A (Ross); tini tôi A (lemma, 224,8).
37a27 diôrisamen (Ross); diôrikamen (lemma, 226,12).
37a35-6 tethentos gar tou B <mê> panti tôi G endekhesthai <mê> huparkhein
(Ross); Alexander (citations, 227,27-8; 228,20-1 and 25-6) does not have
the inserted words, but he mentions (228,25-6) the possibility of reading
tethentos gar tou B panti tôi G endekhesthai <mê> huparkhein
37a38 endekhesthai (Ross); endekhomenou (lemma, 229,1).
37b19 sêmainei (Ross with most manuscripts and the Aldine of Alexander);
sêmainoi (lemma, 230,25).
37b30 d’ hê (Ross); de hê (lemma, 233,13).
38a17 gar (Ross): oun (lemma, 235,3).
38a22 oud’ huparxei (Ross); oukh huparkhei (citation, 235,9 and some mss.
of Aristotle).
38a25 kai (Ross); kan (lemma, 235,31).
38b10 oun (Ross); goun (citation, 239,13).
38b24 kapi (Ross); kai epi (lemma, 240,12).
38b32 anankaia hê (Ross); anankaia êi hê (lemma, 241,11; Alexander also
cites (241,16) the text printed by Ross, although Wallies prints
anankaia <êi> hê because of the lemma.
38b39 tês katholou (Ross); katholou (lemma, 242,6 and one ms. of Aristotle
reported by Ross).
39a29 esti (Ross); estin (citation, 244,27, but the lemma at 39a28 has esti).
39a30 te kai (Ross); kai (citation, 244,29).
39b7 Ean (Ross); An (lemma, 245,1).
40a2 proteron (Ross); katholou (citation, 249,3, and all mss. of Aristotle).
40a8-9 endekhesthai kai (Ross); endekhesthai mê huparkhein kai (citation,
249,11 and the major manuscripts of Aristotle).
40a39 ei ho (Ross); ei d’ ho (citation, 252,4)
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English-Greek Glossary
This glossary lists most of the terms in the Greek-English index (which should be
consulted in connection with this glossary), but eliminates some which occur
infrequently and includes some not there when they are sometimes used to
translate an English word in this glossary.
absolutely: pantôs; haplôs consideration, under: ekkeimenos,

absurd: atopos prokeimenos, keimenos
accident: sumbebêkos contain (v.): periekhein
accidentally: kata sumbebêkos contingent, be (v.): endekhesthai
additional condition: prosdiorismos contingent in the way specified: kata
affirm (v.): kataphaskein ton diorismon endekhomenon
affirmation: kataphasis contradiction: antiphasis
affirmative: kataphatikos; katêgorikos contradictory (adj.): antiphatikos
affirmative proposition: kataphasis contradictory (n.): antiphasis
agree (v.): homologein; sunkhôrein contrary: enantios
alter (v.): allassein conversely: anapalin
alteration: parallagê convert (v.): antistrephein
anaphoric reference (or use): anaphora co-predicate (v.): proskatêgorein
antecedent: hêgoumenon correct: alêthês; orthos
antithesis: antithesis counter-example: enstasis
ask (v.): epizêtein; episkeptein counterpredicate (v.): antikatêgorein
assertion: phasis; legomenon;
eirêmenon deduce (v.): sullogizein
assume in advance (v.): prolambanein define (v.) horizein
assumed, be (v.): keisthai definition: horismos; horos
demand (v.): apaitein
categorical: katêgorikos demonstration: apodeixis
cause: aition demonstrative: apodeiktikos
censure (v.): aitiasthai denial: arsis
clear: dêlos; enargês deny (v.): anairein; apophanai;
combination: suzugia; sumplokê apophaskein
complete: teleios destroy (v.): anairein; phtheirein
complete (v.): teleioun destruction: anairesis
completion: teleiôsis destructive: anairetikos
conclusion: sumperasma; determinate: diôrismenos
sunagomenon determination: diorismos
condition: diorismos determine (v.): horizein
conditional: sunêmmenon differ (v.): diapherein
confirm (v.): pistousthai difference: diaphora
conflict (v.): makhesthai different: diaphoros
congruous: katallêlos directly: autothen; euthus
conjectural: stokhastikos disjoin (v.): apozeugnunai
consequent: hepomenon; lêgon dissimilar in form: anomoioskhêmôn
English-Greek Glossary 249
divide (v.): diairein endeiknunai; episêmainein
division: diairesis indication: sêmeion
do away with (v.): anairein; also do individual: atomos; kath’ hekaston
away with (v.): sunanairein induction: epagôgê
inference: sunagôgê
ekthesis: ekthesis infrequent: ep’ elatton
encompass (v.): perilambanein inquire (v.): zêtein
equally: ep’ isês; homoiôs instrument: organon
equivalent, be (v.): antakolouthein; interchange (n.): hupallagê
isodunamein; ison dunasthai; ison interchange (v.): metatithenai;
sêmainein; isos einai. allattein
establish (v.): kataskeuazein; investigate (v.): episkeptein
elenkhein; deiknunai investigation: exetasis
evident: phaneros ipso facto: hêdê
extension, of wider: epi pleon
extension, have a greater (v.): justification: pistis
huperteinein
external: ektos; exôthen keep, keep fixed (v.): têrein
extreme: akros known: gnôrimos
fall (outside) (v.): piptein (ektos) last (term): eskhatos

falling under: hupo
false: pseudês major: meizon
figure: skhêma material terms: hulê
find (v.): heuriskein mean (v.): sêmainein
follow (v.): akolouthein; hepesthai; minor: elattôn
sunagesthai mixture: mixis
for the most part: epi to polu modality: tropos
genus: genos name (n.): onoma

go through (said of a proof) (v.): name (v.): onomazein
proeinai; proerkhesthai; prokhôrein necessary: anankaios (‘be necessary’
sometimes represents dei)
hold (of) (v.): huparkhein necessity: anankê
hold fixed (v.): phullattein negation: apophasis
holding: huparxis; huparkhein negative proposition: apophasis
hypothesis: hupothesis negative: apophatikos
hypothesize (v.): hupokeisthai non-syllogistic: asullogistos
immediately: eutheôs objection: enstasis

imply (v.): sunagein oppose (v.): antidiastellein
implication: akolouthia; akolouthêsis opposite (be the opposite of) (v.):
impossible: adunatos antikeisthai
in general: holôs; katholou at 164,31
and 180,4 part: meros; morion
in itself: haplôs particular: en merei; kata meros; epi
incomplete: atelês merous
incongruous: akatallêlos peculiar feature: idion
indefinite: aoristos peculiarly qualified (individual): idiôs
indemonstrable: anapodeiktos poiôs
indeterminate: adioristos per se: kath’ hauto
indicate (v.): dêloun; deiknunai; posit (v.): tithenai
250 English-Greek Glossary
possible, be (v.): dunasthai ton diorismon endekhomenon
possible: dunatos specify further (v.): prosdiorizein
potentially: dunamei statement: axiôma
predicate (v.): katêgorein straightforwardly: antikrus
predication: katêgorêma strict sense, in the: kuriôs
premiss: protasis subject (logical): hupokeimenon
preserve (v.): phullattein; têrein; sôzein subject (of study): pragmateia
privative: stêretikos substance: ousia
proof: deixis syllogism: sullogismos
proposed (conclusion): prokeimenos syllogistic: sullogistikos
proposition: protasis
prove (v.): deiknunai take (v.): lambanein
provide (terms) (v.): euporein term: horos
put together, be (v.) sunkeisthai thereby: hêdê
transform (v.): metalambanein
quality: poion; poiotês transformation: metalêpsis
true: alêthês (‘be true’ may represent
reason: aitia, aition. alêtheusthai)
reasonable: eikos; eikotôs; eulogôs true together, be (v.) sunalêtheuein
reduce (v.): anagein
reductio ad impossibile: eis adunaton under consideration: prokeimenos
apagôgê understand (v.): eidenai; akouein;
reduction: anagôgê. exakouein; prosexakouein;
refer (v.): deiknunai; semainein prosupakouein; hupakouein.
reference: deixis understandable: gnôrimos
refutation: elenkhos understood: gnôrimos
refutation, dialectical: epikheiresis unique opposite, be the (v.): idiôs
refute (v.): elenkhein; epikheirein antikeisthai; idiai antikeisthai
reject (v.): diaballein; paraiteisthai universal: katholou (katholikos at
remain, remain fixed (v.): menein 125,27)
restrict (v.): horizein unqualified: huparkhôn
result (v.): sumbainein; gignesthai unqualifiedly: huparkhontôs
usual: epi to pleiston
separate (v.) khôrizein
set down (v.): paratithenai view (outlook): doxa
setting down: parathesis
show (v.): deiknunai weaker: kheirôn
signify (v.): sêmainein whole: holos
similar in form: homoioskhêmôn without condition: adioristôs
simple: haplos without qualification: haplôs
simply: haplôs (kata psilên at 184,7)
sound: hugiês yield a conclusion (v.): sunagein
species: eidos
specification: diorismos
specified, contingent in the way: kata
Greek-English Index
This index refers to the page and line numbers of the CAG text and covers
Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 1.8-22, translated in this
series in two volumes, of which this is the second. The index includes a range of
logical and philosophical terms and a few commentator’s expressions used by
Alexander. Only the first few occurrences (followed by ‘etc.’) of the most common
terms are given. We have sometimes left out of account non-technical uses of a
word, and we do not cite occurrences in the lemmas or in Alexander’s quotations
of Aristotle. The translations indicated are our usual but not invariant ones.
adiaphoros, duplicating (in the two occurrences at 157,29 which

phrase adiaphorôs perainontes, a express the relationship of
kind of argument considered by the predicate to subject and have been
Stoics), 164,30 translated ‘apply to’, and an
adioristos, indeterminate (said of occurrence at 235,21 which we
propositions which do not specify have translated ‘cohere’. See also
quantity), 159,22; 160,22; 170,29; epakolouthein
215,4; 234,22; 241,21; 244,32; akolouthia, implication, 158,18;
248,31; 254,8. The adverb 176,2(2).24; 178,13.22;
adioristôs is translated ‘without 182,10.23.29; 183,8.13.14;
condition’ at 179,32 and as ‘in an 184,22.25; 185,1.12.26.33. We note
indeterminate way’ at 215,17 (a three difficult occurrences: 161,18;
difficult passage). See also 177,6 and 221,24
diôrismenos akolouthêsis, implication, 184,26
adunatos, impossible. We give a few akros, extreme (term), 124,31;
of the many occurrences not in the 125,20; 148,12; 164,22; 171,19.23;
phrase apagôgê eis adunaton, 188,21; 189,6.15; 231,19; 237,4;
128,32; 131,13.14(2).17(2), etc. 239,9; 246,7; 253,33. There are
aitêma, postulate, 126,11 more occurrences of this word in
aitia, reason, 130,6; 133,18; 148,23; Aristotle’s presentation of modal
160,16; 162,14.23; 164,22; 170,31; logic than in Alexander’s
171,19; 202,10; 220,1; 253,12. Cf. commentary on it (excluding
aition quotations). Only at 171,23 does
aitiasthai, to censure, 223,30; 232,27 Alexander clearly use the neuter
aition, reason, 120,13; 144,13; substantive to horon; all other
149,28; 159,10; 188,25; 194,19; occurrences can or must be read as
211,24; 218,3; 223,26; 251,38; masculine with an explicit or
253,30. We have translated aition implicit horos; by contrast Aristotle
‘cause’ at 163,14 and 178,31. Cf. would seem to use the neuter
aitia substantive uniformly. (The entry
akatallêlos, incongruous, 250,24 akron in the Greek-English index
akolouthein, to follow, 130,8; 131,17; of Barnes et al. should be
133,14; 135,30; 138,28, etc. We note corrected.) At 36a21-2 Aristotle
252 Greek-English Index
refers to a major premiss as the paraphrase of Aristotle, it occurs
premiss apo (relating to) the major only in the nominative and is often
extreme. In the last two uses of translated ‘It is necessary’.
akron Alexander characterizes a 131,19.30; 157,17; 158,29-31(4), etc.
conclusion in which the minor term anankaios, necessary,
is the predicate as apo the minor 119,9.10.14.19.23, etc.
extreme anankaiôs, necessarily, 119,22.23;
alêthês, true, correct, 119,24.25; 130,8.9.18; 143,30; 149,5; 155,7.24;
126,10.11(2).12, etc. 197,1; 207,25; 222,11
alêtheuesthai, to be true, 174,14; anapalin, conversely. Alexander
183,2.4.12; 198,30; 203,20; 205,37; uses this adverb when features of
206,5; 211,13.15; 231,36; 233,8. We two propositions are interchanged,
wish to call attention to the modality (146,12; 187,16; 232,24),
italicized passages in which quality (229,33; 230,18; cf. 37b11),
Alexander uses the expression or both (238,11.17; cf. 37b11). At
alêtheuesthai kata such and such to 182,14 he applies the adverb to the
mean something like ‘to be true in interchange of antecedent and
the case of’. In 233,8 Alexander consequent
uses the preposition epi to the anaphora, anaphoric reference or
same effect use. Four occurrences in 179,20-9.
anagein, to reduce (one syllogism to The word is used non-technically at
another), 136,3; 137,4.26; 145,28; 165,5, where we translate
149,21; 151,3; 242,26; 243,15; ‘application’
247,11; 252,19 anapodeiktikos, indemonstrable,
anagôgê, reduction (of one syllogism used at 124,6 to refer to a complete
to another), 123,17; 136,11.16; syllogism. See the note ad loc.
138,5; 145,26; 154,9; 219,22; anomoioskhêmôn, dissimilar in form
242,22; 246,4 (= quality), 170,28; 254,9. Cf.
anairein, to do away with, to destroy, homoioskhêmôn
131,19; 139,8; 171,26; 172,27, etc. antakolouthein, to be equivalent,
We have rendered anairesis 158,24; 159,4.23.25.31;
(182,16; 188,10; 192,32; 198,1; 160,15.17.23.25; 223,29. See also
223,31) and anairetikos isos einai
(172,11.23.26; 195,2, etc.) anti, instead of; to stand for. We
accordingly. Barnes et al. give ‘to mention this term because
destroy’, ‘to reject’, ‘to cancel’ for Alexander uses it in phrases such
anairein and ‘rejection’ for as ‘Aristotle says a instead of b’.
anairesis. (At 174,17; 196,28.29.35; These phrases can sometimes
197,2.6; and 198,29 we translate mean something like ‘the
anairein ‘deny’.) expression a means b’, and
analutika, Analytics. Occurs in sometimes they seem to mean
references to Theophrastus’ Prior something like ‘he says a, but he
Analytics at 123,19 and 156,29. means b’, and sometimes it is hard
Otherwise there are no occurrences to tell what exactly Alexander has
of forms of analuein, analusis, or in mind. The following are the
analutikos in this section of the relevant occurrences. 127,28; 129,9;
commentary 144,21; 147,27; 149,6; 152,20.23;
anankê, necessity (ubiquitous in the 161,24; 180,28; 184,31(2); 185,5;
phrase ‘by necessity’ (ex anankês)), 186,24.34; 200,2; 203,4; 210,28.30;
119,11; 121,25.26.27.29(2).31.32. 221,6; 224,30.35; 227,28; 228,24;
33, etc. Reasonably rare otherwise 228,29; 242,23.24; 249,1; 254,13
and usually in quotation or antidiastellein, to oppose, 152,24
antikatêgorein, to counterpredicate, 245,11; cf. 239,14) Q. For the most
252,12 part it is impossible to tell whether
antikeisthai, to be the opposite of, saying that P converts with Q is
121,4.5; 126,33; 127,7, etc. also saying that Q converts with P.
Normally it is clear that the In five cases (222,5.7; 232,7;
opposite of a proposition is what we 236,11; 243,16) the relation does
would call its contradictory. But not appear to be symmetric, and we
sometimes Alexander underlines have translated the dative by
this fact by speaking of the ‘from’. Pros has caused us the most
contradictory opposite difficulty; we have chosen to
(antiphatikôs antikeisthai; 187,8; translate ‘with respect to’. In two
188,4; 199,22; 208,24; 237,25; cases (128,16 and 160,13) ‘from’
238,4). The unique (or unique and seems correct (cf. the lexicon in
proper) opposite (idiôs (kai oikeiôs) Barnes et al.), but in the remaining
antikeisthai; 197,24; 199,13; 207,4; cases (220,27; 222,17.21.35; 232,6)
211,16), or the opposite in the strict ‘to’ or ‘with’ (symmetric) seems
sense (kuriôs antikeisthai; 198,24). likely. See also antistrophê and
At 237,22-37 Alexander is driven horos
by an obscure remark of Aristotle’s antistrophê, conversion,
to consider including contraries 120,16.23.25; 121,23; 122,1, etc.
among opposites. Cf. antiphasis Alexander twice (200,25 and
antikrus, straightforwardly, 197,8 224,25) speaks of conversion of one
(equivalent); 216,11 (contingent); proposition into (eis) another, but
216,12 (unqualified) otherwise he just speaks of
antiphasis, contradictory conversion or of conversion of a
(157,16-30(5); 158,5; 159,29.30; proposition. See antistrephein and
188,1; 196,15.25); contradiction horos
(141,4; 187,28; 195,20). Alexander antithesis, antithesis, 160,5. Used by
prefers antikeimenon, which we Aristotle at 32a32 in a passage
have translated ‘opposite’, to quoted once by Alexander (159,17)
antiphasis; see antikeisthai aoristos, indefinite (a kind of
antiphatikos, contradictory, 157,20; contingency mentioned by Aristotle
237,30. Alexander uses the adverb at 32b10-11). The word occurs 11
antiphatikôs with antikeisthai at times between 163,1 and 165,18
187,8; 188,4; 195,21; 208,24; and again at 169,5 and 183,31.
237,26.34; 238,4; we have Alexander uses the noun aoristia
translated ‘be the contradictory at 164,21. At 203,16 and 21 he uses
opposite’ the word in connection with 35b11
antistrephein, to convert. Alexander apagôgê, reductio. Except at 216,16
can say that a proposition converts this word occurs only in the phrase
(120,20.22; 126,7; 138,13; 139,4, hê eis adunaton apagôgê, which we
etc.) or that it is converted (136,2- translate reductio ad impossibile.
20(8), etc.) or that a person 120,28; 121,3; 123,22; 126,29;
converts it (122,13; 130,30; 135,4; 127,4, etc. There are very
137,15; 142,9, etc.). In discussing occasional variants, hê di’
relations between propositions P adunatou deixis, translated ‘proof
and Q he can say that P and Q by impossibility’ (134,17; 189,36;
convert, that they convert with 191,25; 248,1. Cf. hê deixis hê eis
(dative) each other, that P converts adunaton at 175,24, and dia tou
with (dative) Q, that P converts adunatou, translated ‘by means of
pros Q, and that P converts eis the impossible’ (175,14-17 (3 times;
(into; 168,25; 201,34; 203,8; 211,21; cf. 34a20), 202,11 (cf. 35a40)).
Alexander once uses the phrase negates’. See the appendix on
apagein eis adunaton (216,14) affirmation and negation
apaitein, to demand, 220,2 apozeugnunai, to disjoin,
apo. Alexander uses this preposition 124,19(2).20; 220,14-21(7)
only 14 times in this section of the arkhê. In this section of the
commentary. The interesting commentary the word is used only
occurrences are at 246,7 and in its ordinary sense of ‘beginning’
253,32 where Alexander (151,16; 168,33; 195,14; 200,31;
characterizes a conclusion as apo 216,12; 220,9) or idiomatically in
tou elattonos akrou, and we the phrase tên arkhên (‘at all’
translate ‘with the minor extreme 152,12; 169,33; 234,10). Similarly
as predicate’ for arkhesthai (167,3; 232,3)
apodeiktikos, demonstrative. This arsis, denial, 131,20
word is used only at 164,15 asullogistos, non-syllogistic
(lemma) and 165,14 (explanation of (adjective applied to a pair of
the occurrence in Aristotle). Cf. premisses which do not yield a
apodeixis conclusion). 125,18; 135,2;
apodeixis, demonstration. In this 141,25.27; 165,22, etc. See also
section of the commentary all but sullogistikos
one occurrence of this word is in a atelês, incomplete, 173,2.14.18;
quotation of Aristotle or 174,10; 202,9.10; 206,25; 217,25;
explanation of a quotation in which 242,21(2); 254,15. Cf. teleios
it occurs. 130,26; 144,4.21(2); atomos, individual, 122,32.36. The
203,17; 204,12; 204,21; 230,34; word is translated ‘uncut’ at
241,22; 249,1.2. At 164,19 and 29 184,9-17 (5 occurrences)
Alexander uses it in connection atopos, absurd, 177,6; 178,25; 218,13;
with a passage in which Aristotle 224,14.17
speaks of an apodeiktikos axiôma, statement (all occurrences in
syllogism. The term apodeiknunai this part of the commentary reflect
(demonstrate) does not occur in Stoic usage), 177,31; 179,32;
this section of the commentary. 180,2.13; 181,4.32
Alexander prefers deixis (proof) autothen, directly, 169,22; 174,7;
and deiknunai (prove) 245,32
apodidonai, to give (the reason or
definition), 160,17; 167,30; 170,31; deiknunai (1), to prove, to show.
174,15; 175,28; 182,29 Alexander uses this verb and the
apophasis, negation (136,24.26; noun deixis (‘proof’) with very great
157,20-30(8), etc.); negative frequency mainly in connection
proposition (138,22; 158,25; 159,28; with Aristotle’s validation or
160,23.27; 161,12.30; 229,29; rejection of combinations of
237,20.23.28.33; 238,6.8; 243,33; premisses, 120,15.16.18.25.30, etc.
245,31, 251,23). See the appendix Sometimes ‘prove’ or even ‘show’
on affirmation and negation seemed too strong. We have
apophanai, to deny, 156,23.25.26 translated deiknunai ‘indicate’ at
apophaskein, to deny, 138,31; 128,5; 147,19.20; 148,25; 149,7.11;
195,22; 218,22 150,11; 158,18; 165,2. Other
apophatikos, negative, 120,22.26.27; variants of no real significance are
121,5.15.17, etc. At 159,21 and ‘establish’ at 141,3, 156,4, 159,8
218,21 Alexander uses the term to and 238,16, ‘to yield conclusions’ at
apophatikon to refer to what we 165,11, ‘deal’ at 200,23, ‘argue’ at
might call the negation operator; 200,18 and 203,25
there we have translated ‘what deiknunai (2), to refer, 177,28;
178,6.17(2); 179,14.24; 180,33; are given under kata ton diorismon
181,4.7.11.12; 182,6. deixis (2), and meta diorismou. At 156,3 he
reference. 177,32.33; 178,18.19; refers to the modal operators as
179,26; 181,20. These passages all diorismoi (‘specifications’); at 160,9
occur in the context of a discussion and 22 he speaks of the quantifiers
of Chrysippus’ use of propositions as diorismoi (‘quantitative
such as ‘If Dion has died, he has determinations’); and at 189,31 he
died.’ In the first and last of the speaks of adding a temporal
passages Alexander speaks of the diorismos (specification) to a
referent as receiving proposition. At 159,24 and 160,23
(anadekhesthai) a deixis he refers to quantitatively definite
deiktikos, 122,26; 146,9; 147,20; propositions as diorismenos
149,7.11; 191,17; 215,6; 230,14; diphoroumenos, duplicated (a kind
238,16; 250,21. We have translated of argument considered by the
with forms of ‘prove’, ‘show’, and Stoics), 164,29
‘indicate’; see deiknunai (1) doxa, view, position, 126,9; 127,15;
dêlos, clear. 119,12.25; 120,30; 140,19; 247,39
139,16; 143,1, etc. dunamei, potentially, 154,8; 179,15;
dêlotikos, see dêloun, 125,12; 137,18; 218,23.33. At 184,26 we have
154,11; 159,17; 166,15; 167,15; rendered dunamei with the word
192,35; 204,22; 208,16; 247,5 ‘meaning’. This is the only form of
dêloun, to indicate (119,18.23; 120,3; dunamis in this section of the
122,7, etc.); make clear (154,8; commentary
163,29; 175,28; 220,7; 232,29). This dunasthai, to be possible (sometimes
verb is translated ‘show’ at 151,17 translated by ‘can’), 123,7; 125,28;
and ‘express’ at 200,24. See also 129,28; 130,4; 134,21, etc.
dêlotikos dunatos, possible (sometimes
diaballein, to reject (a proof, a translated by ‘can’). Over 90% of
combination, a method of proof; the occurrences of dunatos are in
Barnes et al. render ‘to disprove’). the commentary on chapter 15. We
223,15; 232,23; 238,20.34.36; list the few which are not: 139,3;
249,35. Alexander uses the 157,8; 160,8(2); 168,13; 220,24;
adjectival form adiablêtos at 238,35 224,4; 229,9.10
diabolê, showing false, 178,9
diapherein, to differ, be different, êdê. Alexander uses this word in its
make a difference, 119,14; 135,8; ordinary sense of ‘already’, e.g. at
155,29; 156,18; 158,27; 189,30; 141,2. But he also uses it to convey
198,14; 206,14; 214,4; 245,30 a notion of implication and
diaphora, difference, 119,13.18(2).25; non-implication; for example he
124,1; 125,30; 129,19; 135,12; might say something like ‘Just
137,6; 185,13; 194,33; 216,2 because P, not êdê Q.’ We have
diaphoros, different, 170,28 frequently translated this êdê as
diairesis, division, 141,1; 161,32.33 ‘thereby’, but we have also used
diairein, to divide, 224,13 ipso facto, ‘in fact’, and other terms.
diôrismenos, determinate (opposite Examples of this use at 119,24,
of adioristos), 159,24; 160,23; 125,23; 131,19; 140,10 and 156,22
222,3. This is the only form of eidos, species, 122,28; 162,1
diorizein used by Alexander in this eikos, reasonable, 129,28; 160,20. See
section of the commentary also eikotôs and eulogôs
diorismos, specification; eikotôs, reasonable, reasonably,
determination; condition. 122,25; 123,3; 124,31; 160,20;
Alexander’s main uses of diorismos 174,18; 197,23; 203,12. See also
eikos and eulogôs 252,36. See also kata meros and epi
ekkeimenos, under consideration merous
(usually applied to a premiss enallax, in alternation; in this
combination), 121,18; 126,31; section of the commentary the
128,23; 137,27; 138,27; 175,30; word occurs only in a quotation of
187,23; 199,19; 201,13; 227,17; Aristotle at 204,9. At 230,4
229,4.6.13; 230,5.7.11; 236,11.37; Alexander uses the participle
237,16; 248,1. The word is applied enêllagmenos
to the setting out of terms at enantios, contrary, 159,29.30;
237,18. This is the only form of 221,16-34(6); 227,30.34. At 251,25
ekkeisthai used by Alexander in Alexander uses the term loosely,
this section of the commentary. See and we have translated ‘opposite’
also keisthai and prokeimenos (2) enargês, clear, 171,21
ekthesis, ekthesis (a method or endeiknunai, to indicate, 128,30;
methods of proof used by Aristotle), 164,25; 165,2; 233,20
122,17.24.28.31; 123,4.9.20; 143,14; endein, to be missing (from the text),
144,25.33; 151,26). The term is 239,1
applied to the setting down of endeixis occurs just once (133,32) in
terms at 173,8 and to a the commentary, with the sense of
combination being considered at ‘proof ’
176,7 (cf. ekkeimenos) endekhesthai, to be contingent
ektithenai, set out (cf. ekthesis), (exceptions noted in translation),
121,16; 122,19.27.29; 123,12.14; 119,10.12.19.24; 120,3, etc.
227,14 (technical uses only) endekhomenôs, contingently, 147,19;
elattôn (elassôn at 231,24), minor 149,10; 167,19.22; 192,34; 194,17;
(usually said of a premiss, 210,2; 220,18.21.23; 221,2; 241,28
sometimes of a term), 120,26; enkhôrein, may, might, 128,29;
124,23.31.32; 125,10, etc. We have 138,32; 154,2; 160,20; 165,4;
translated ‘less’ at 124,12 and 17, 185,17. This word occurs more
where it is used as a synonym of often in Aristotle’s discussion of
‘weaker’ (kheiron) in a description modal logic than in Alexander’s
of the peiorem rule enstasis, counter-example (227,8);
elenkhein, elenkhos. In this section objection (247,30). The verb
of the commentary Alexander enistasthai does not occur in this
mainly uses these words in section of the commentary
connection with the use of terms as ep’ elatton, infrequent,
counterexamples. Sometimes we 163,5.7.10.13.18.22; 169,2.4; 183,31
have used ‘refute’ or ‘refutation’ to ep’ isês. Alexander uses this phrase
render elenkhein (129,23; 134,27; four times (163,2.9.18.29) to
204,11) and elenkhos (171,22; describe a proposition which is as
229,36; 238,13). But sometimes we often true as it is false (by contrast
have translated the former as with what is epi to polu or ep’
‘establish’ (126,13; 129,27; 211,29; elatton; in those places we
215,28; 230,6) or ‘show’ (139,9) and translate it ‘equally balanced’. In
the latter as ‘way of establishing’ the same context (164,1) he speaks
(204,23). At 221,12 we have of two propositions being ep’ isês
translated elenkhôn kai deiknus as (equally) true. At 125,20 he speaks
‘showing’ of two terms being ep’ isês
en merei, particular, 148,2; 149,27; (co-extensive). At 163,23 and 28
150,4; 170,3.6; 203,11.19; 214,29; Alexander refers to equal balance
215,24; 219,1; 230,3(2); 233,32; as to hopoter etukhen and to hôs
234,11; 241,2; 242,9; 251,37; hopoter etukhe <endekhomenon>
epagôgê, induction, 159,31 153,30; 163,30; 166,2; 222,1; 243,6).
epakolouthein, to follow, 129,33; In three passages (124,32.33;
196,17; 208,24 174,25) Alexander uses it for the
epharmozein, to apply to, 125,28; relation of predicate to subject in a
157,5; 161,32; see also harmozein conclusion; there we have
epi merous, particular (of i- and translated it ‘to apply’
o-propositions and of syllogisms epistêmê, knowledge, science.
with such conclusions), 120,26.27; Aristotle uses the word at 32b18
121,5.15.20.22, etc. See also kata and Alexander repeats it at 164,18.
meros and en merei, which we also Otherwise epistêmê occurs only as
translate ‘particular’. In the modal a term in counterexamples at
logic chapters Aristotle uses epi 124,26-7; 195,31-2; 199,24-5
merous once, kata meros 12 times, epizêtein, to ask, 131,29; 144,23;
and en merei 45 times. In his 155,3; 213,11; 217,8; 218,7; 222,16;
commentary on that text 232,10; 240,4; 244,26; 249,34;
Alexander uses kata meros once. 253,17
His overwhelming preference is for eskhatos, last (term), 124,33;
epi merous, which he uses close to 125,1-2(4); 171,23; 189,14;
300 times. Many of the 30-odd 191,6.11.16; 202,3; 237,3; 251,14
occurrences of en merei are in eulogôs, reasonable, 119,9; 144,23;
quotations or paraphrases of 158,19; 163,18; 217,8; 218,16;
Aristotle 239,21. See also eikos and eikotôs
epi to pleiston, usually (synonymous euporein, to provide, 231,13
with epi to polu), 162,9.13.28; euthus/eutheôs, directly,
163,1.4.11.24.32.33; 164,2; 168,32; immediately, 129,3; 134,29; 223,17
169,1(2).7; 183,30. At 163,5 exetasis, investigation, 125,29; 145,9;
Alexander uses epi pleiston with 232,32
the same sense, and at 163,17 he exôthen, external, from outside,
uses epi pleiston in a more general 132,2; 174,27; 175,17; 181,27;
sense 184,8; 187,22; 202,5
epi pleon, of wider extension (of
terms, 178,17 (pleion).21.32; genesis, coming to be (163,20;
188,25; 190,21. Cf. 125,20 where ep’ 182,27(2).31.32; 183,25.31);
isês is translated ‘co-extensive’); production (136,1)
true in more cases (of propositions, genos, genus, 161,33
178,10; 179,7; 263,17); at greater gnôrimos, known (121,9; 123,23;
length (of discussions 136,24; 143,5; 149,32; 170,20;
[non-technical]), 188,17; 207,35; 174,9; 210,27; 227,17; 233,34;
249,38; 150,1). See also 254,9); understandable (157,14.32);
huperteinein understood (228,31)
epi to polu, for the most part gnôsis, understanding, 120,32
(synonymous with epi to pleiston,
which we translate ‘usually’), haplos, simple, 121,10; 184,26;
162,2.6.7.12.30; 163,23; 165,13.14 219,23. Cf. haplôs
epikheirein, refute, 180,12 haplôs, simply (frequently =
epikheirêsis, dialectical refutation, huparchontôs), 122,19;
180,9 128,20.27.28; 130,23; 131,1; 139,9;
epipherein. Alexander usually uses 140,3; 142,5.13; 143,23.23; 150,25;
this word to introduce what 152,28; 248,19. Without
Aristotle goes on to say; in these qualification (often contrasted with
cases we have translated it ‘to add’ meta diorismou; see 139,27-141,7).
(125,14; 137,16; 140,7; 152,25; 151,34; 155,22; 169,10;
179,32.33.34(2); 180,1; 185,30; and 169,27-30(3)). Otherwise it
191,22; 201,21; 246,13; 251,20. In occurs at 158,19; 170,19; 174,15.33;
itself, 158,32; 159,2; 218,21. 175,6.28; 177,12
Absolutely, 217,25. Cf. haplos horizein, to define (156,12-13(3);
harmozein, to fit (135,18; 185,1); to 157,13; 161,3.12; 172,28), to
apply to (150,29); to verify (230,5); restrict (temporally)
see also epharmozein (188,21-193,15(22); 217,19; 232,20;
hêgoumenon, antecedent, 176,3.31; 233,5); to determine (163,16.17); to
177,21.22.29, etc. At 178,31 specify (161,31)
Alexander uses the verb hêgesthai horos, term, 120,1.4; 124,32; 125,21;
to mean ‘to be the antecedent’ 127,30, etc. We note five places in
hepesthai, to follow (see also which Alexander distinguishes
hepomenon), 129,11; 131,17.23; ordinary conversion, which
133,20.23, etc. involves interchanging subject and
hepomenon, consequent (sometimes predicate terms, from such things
‘consequence’), 156,20; 157,7; as AE-transformationc, 159,14
165,16; 176,24.31, etc. Cf. lêgon (antistrophê kata tous horous);
heuriskein, to find, 125,19; 131,28; 164,14 (hê tôn horôn hupallagê);
145,11.15.16; 155,17; 186,35; 173,23 (antistrophê kata tous
190,30; 197,22; 198,15; 205,30; horous); 221,3 (antistrephein tois
230,12; 236,23; 248,26 horois); 222,7 (antistrephein kata
holos, whole, 121,32; 126,8; 158,32; tous horous). We have translated
162,1; 196,21; 248,36 horos ‘definition’ at 182,28
holôs, in general (oud’ holôs, never, hugiês, sound. This is usually a fairly
not at all), 119,21; 125,8; 155,15; general word of commendation for
163,15; 165,10; 171,12; 184,13; a statement or piece of reasoning
185,17; 218,24; 229,5; 236,34; (122,16(2); 125,33; 127,3.15(2);
238,10; 239,21 139,9 (wrong, ouk hugiôs); 144,17;
homoioskhêmôn, similar in form, 147,23; 155,3.4; 157,30 (true);
166,9; 167,3.5; 170,27. Aristotle 159,9; 176,11; 177,27; 178,8; 196,20
uses homoioskhêmôn six times in (wrong, ouk hugiôs); 209,6; 216,7;
the Prior Anaytics to apply to the 223,15.21). It is applied to
premisses in a combination. In five conditionals or ‘implications’ at
of them (27b11 and 34; 33a37; 178,13-29(3) and 196,12
36a7; 38b6) it means ‘having the hulê. We have signalled occurrences
same quality’, but at 32b37 it of this word (standardly translated
means ‘having the same modality’. ‘matter’) with the phrase ‘material
In commenting on this passage at terms’. It occurs most commonly
166,5ff. Alexander uses the term in with the preposition epi, which we
the same way, once (166,9) have usually rendered with some
applying it to combinations rather form of the verb ‘to use’. 124,21;
than their premisses; there we 125,4.16.19.23.25; 126,13;
have translated it ‘with premisses 145,9.15.16; 198,16; 198,29; 203,34;
similar in form’. Cf. 204,22; 208,18; 215,24; 222,8;
anomoioskhêmôn. See also 86,12 236,26; 237,3.28.32. The
with the note in Barnes et al. occurrences without the
homologein, to agree, accept, 176,12; preposition epi are 125,28; 190,8;
181,32; 212,20; 218,25; 247,29 215,15.23; 238,36. At 164,30
horismos, definition. Aristotle uses Alexander refers to an obscure
this word at 32b40 and 33a25, and Stoic argument called apeiros hulê
it occurs in the commentary on the (infinite matter)
relevant passages (167,17-30(4) hupallagê, interchange (of terms in
conversion, 164,13; 220,7; of the antikeisthai) and 214,11 (idiôs
modalities of two premisses, 175,13) sunagomenon)
huparkhein, to hold (of), isodunamein, to be equivalent to,
119,11(2).12.22.23(2).24, etc. 160,7; 205,36; 234,18. See also isos
huparkhontôs, unqualifiedly, einai
124,27; 129,25; 130,16.18.20; 132,8; ison dunasthai, to be equivalent to
133,24; 134,29.31; 143,30; 144,9.18; (with dative), 136,26; 140,9;
145,2; 146,6; 147,24.28; 149,3.19; 196,15.27; 197,8.32; 200,3;
155,7; 166,21; 232,14 205,25.32; 214,9; 218,7.8; 223,7;
huparkhôn, unqualified, 119,18.22; 226,8; 228,27; 229,18; 239,25;
120,3.5.7.14, etc. 243,33. See also isos einai
huparxis, holding, 184,23.24; 185,11; ison sêmainein, to be equivalent,
197,2(2) 151,12. Cf. 166,31 ison kai tauton
huperteinein, to have a greater sêmainein, ‘to mean the same thing
extension (of terms), 170,32.35; as’. See also isos einai
171,19; 190,30.32; 191,3 isos einai, to be equivalent to (with
hupokeisthai, to hypothesize, 127,2; dative), 122,26; 136,28; 147,22;
131,1; 133,26; 176,25; 184,18, etc. 160,3; 164,10 etc. See also
Cf. hupotithenai. We have isodunamein, ison dunasthai, ison
translated hupokeimenos as subject sêmainein, isos kai autos. isos is
at 122,25; 126,5; 129,34; 138,31; translated ‘equal’ only at 163,10.23
184,7; 222,3.4; 252,11 and 178,33-5. The phrase ep’ isês is
hupothesis, hypothesis, 126,10; translated ‘co-extensive’ at 125,20
130,24; 131,16; 134,11.14, etc. See isos kai autos, equivalent to and the
also hupotithenai and hupokeisthai same as (with dative), 194,22;
hupotithenai (We use ‘hypothesize’ 195,13; 197,15. See also isos einai
or some closely related expression
for this verb, which Alexander kata meros, particular, 230,1 (said of
consistently uses in connection a conclusion). See also epi merous
with arguments by reductio and and en merei
arguments resembling them), kata sumbebêkos, accidentally,
121,6; 131,10.12.14; 132,3, etc. One 163,14; 223,33
problematic exception is at 228,4 kata ton diorismon
where we have used ‘suppose’. See (endekhomenon), (contingent) in
also hupokeisthai and hupothesis the way specified (Alexander’s way
of referring to contingency as
idion, peculiar feature (Barnes et al. characterized by Aristotle at
use ‘proper characteristic’), 152,13; 32a18-20. We list all the
157,2.5.8; 158,24; 159,33; 161,7.14; occurrences of this stock phrase,
168,27; 222,4. There are informal excluding those in quotations of
uses of idiôs at 152,27 (‘just’) and Aristotle), 161,5.11; 174,5.12.30;
214,11 (‘properly’) and idiai at 190,29; 191,9; 194,12;
167,4 (‘on its own’) 196,7.13.20.25; 197,3; 198,6.15.20;
idiôs poios, peculiarly qualified 199,5.8.12; 200,35; 205,8.20; 208,5;
(individual), 179,11.12; 180,34; 209,10; 210,3.7; 211,9; 212,34;
181,17.18.26.30. For a discussion of 216,6.8.10; 219,28; 220,18; 221,5;
this Stoic notion see Long and 222,8; 226,13.17; 231,35; 232,2.37;
Sedley (1987), vol. I, pp. 166-79 233,2.18; 234,3.5.33.35; 235,8.10;
idiôs antikeisthai, to oppose 236,7; 239,7.11; 240,23; 242,10;
uniquely (i.e., be the contradictory 243,1.4.10; 245,5.35; 246,23.34;
of), 197,23.26; 198,11; 199,12; 249,12; 250,22.23.38; 253,27;
207,4; 211,16. Cf. 223,26 (idiai 254,21. We note also
endekhomenon ek tou diorismou at translated ‘assumed premiss’.
223,11 124,12; 131,27; 132,27; 135,2;
katallêlos, congruous, 129,9; 250,25 145,20.27; 168,24.26;
kataphasis, affirmation 169,3.13.23(2); 170,18.23; 175,16;
(157,19-160,30(14); 164,7; 168,28; 185,25; 187,22; 200,19.29; 210,9;
196,30.31; 206,2; 207,1; 218,24; 216,1; 231,32; 243,22; 246,14.26;
222,24.26; 229,18). Affirmative 251,4. In some cases the word
proposition (158,25.28; 160,23.27; seems to mean something closer to
161,29; 218,26; 220,8; 229,28; ‘to be established’, but, even then,
237,25.30.31.33; 238,6.7; 239,34.37; we have stuck with ‘to be assumed’;
251,24). See the appendix on see, for example, 211,24 and
affirmation and negation 217,28. There is an interesting use
kataphaskein, to affirm, 218,22 of keimenon to refer to the
kataphatikos, affirmative, 120,21(2); proposition P in the proposition
121,7-8(3), etc. See the appendix on NEC(P) at 196,28-30. Other less
affirmation and negation significant exceptions to our
kataskeuazein, to establish, 131,18; practice are 125,7 (to apply),
134,1.8; 176,11; 182,13; 188,11; 132,13, 139,21, 170,16 and 202,35
195,11; 197,27; 198,12. The noun (to be under consideration; cf.
kataskeuê occurs at 184,5 and 221,8 215,24 and ekkeimenos), 158,19 (to
katêgorein, to predicate, 126,4; lay down), 164,12 (to be placed),
130,2-21(10); 146,17.24; 156,15.27; 205,4(2) (to play a role; cf. 216,1).
160,26.30; 170,34; 173,5; See also hupokeisthai, lambanein,
178,3-5(3); 180,30; 181,21; 186,34; tithenai
188,27.29; 190,31; 205,20; 209,2; kheirôn, weaker (universal
231,34; 234,6; 236,4; 238,3; 242,13; proposition than particular,
249,13; 251,33; 252,6.7.10.11. We negative than affirmative,
note an unusual use at 228,19 necessary than unqualified than
katêgorêma, predication, 180,30 contingent), 124,12; 174,2. See also
katêgorikos, affirmative (136,14; elattôn
166,19; 173,1; 213,30); categorical khôrizein, to separate, 130,4;
(119,16), This word is much more 132,26(2).27.29(2); 220,23. These
common in Aristotle than in are the cases with a logical sense.
Alexander, who prefers The word is applied to the
kataphatikos. For Aristotelian uses separation of soul and body five
of this word to mean affirmative times between 180,28 and 181,23
see, e.g. 1.9, 30a36. Barnes et al. koinos, general, common, 130,10;
translate katêgorikos ‘predicative’ 152,27; 215,5
kath’ hauto (hautên), per se, 163,15; kuriôs, in the strict sense (applied to
203,29; 223,33 contingency at 156,19-21(2), and
kath’ hekaston, individual, 141,4; 222,18, and to the opposition of
160,4.24; 162,16. The expression is propositions at 158,31-159,2(2),
used non-technically at, 120,8.10; and 198,24)
121,16; 123,29.31; 165,21
katholikos, universal, 125,27 lambanein. We have translated this
katholou, universal, frequently occurring word as ‘to
121,7.8(2).21.23.24.30, etc. take’ as often as seemed at least
keisthai, to be assumed, 122,10; minimally feasible, 120,14;
123,5.6; 126,33; 127,11, etc. 121,20-30(3); 122,9-36(9), etc. It
Alexander frequently uses the frequently means something like
participle keimenos to refer to a ‘to assume’ and we have so
premiss; in these cases we have translated it at 165,11; 188,15.16;
210,36; 224,14.16; 236,36. Other 203,13; 211,27; 217,21; 222,28;
variations occur at 141,22 (to add), 234,7; 251,9.39
152,24 (to use), 158,18; 232,35.36 meros, part, 122,10.12.28; 123,5.8;
(to consider), 159,27 and 161,12 (to 130,3; 162,1. At 157,30-2 we have
assert), 196,2 (to get), 229,10 (to paraphrased a sentence in which
obtain). See also hupokeisthai, Alexander refers to a ‘part’ of a
keisthai, tithenai contradiction, meaning one of a
lêgon, consequent (Stoic term; see pair of contradictory propositions.
Philoponus, in APr. 243,1-10), See also en merei, epi merous, kata
177,21; 178,28; 179,34. Cf. meros, para meros, morion
hepomenon meta diorismou (anankaios),
lexis is used to refer to the text or (necessary) on a condition,
verbal formulation. We have 140,18.21.23.34; 155,25; 180,1;
translated it as, e.g. ‘text’, ‘what is 202,22; 251,22. We note also
said’, ‘what he says’, ‘words’, 129,9; anankaios meta prosdiorismou at
167,31; 169,26; 170,15; 186,30; 155,22 and the one occurrence of ex
195,7; 200,8; 204,27; 210,21; hupotheseôs anankaios at 141,6.
221,7.20.24; 225,1; 228,24; See Appendix 3 on conditional
239,2.27; 249,1; 250,25; 254,22. necessity
Barnes et al. translate ‘expression’. metabolê, change, 193,17
See also phônêi metalambanein, to transform. The
logikos. This word occurs three times word is applied particularly to
in each of two brief passages what are sometimes called
(198,32-199,1 and 224,13-15) as an complementary conversions of
example, where it is translated contingent propositions, e.g., at
‘rational’. At 250,2 there is a 168,13-31(7). Examples of other
controversial reference to a work uses of the word are at 121,22 (to
called ‘logical notes’ (scholia logika). transform), 131,26 and 141,7 (to
Finally at 180,12 Alexander take instead), 143,11 (to turn to (a
characterizes an argument he is subject)), and 144,20 and 147,26 (to
about to give as more logikos; there change (terms))
we have translated ‘dialectical’ metalêpsis, transformation, 169,3.14;
logos is of no particular interest. We 175,32; 176,19; 191,26, etc. See
have translated it most often as metalambanein
‘argument’ or ‘discussion’, 121,28; metapiptein, to change, 190,10;
122,18; 123,21; 124,17; 125,27; 192,31; 193,1.2.16(3).18
133,15; 134,10.20; 135,29; 149,27; metaptôsis, change, 193,16(2)
157,19; 164,30; 165,3.6; 166,10; metatithenai, to interchange
180,8; 181,16; 184,5; 191,21; (applied to the assignment of terms
197,27; 214,6; 219,35; 222,23; to letters at 144,9.10; 149,16; and
232,3. It is translated ‘account’ at to the modalities of two premisses
119,9 and 157,5, and ‘definition’ at at 202,6)
160,19 mixis, mixture (a combination of two
premisses of different modalities),
makhesthai, conflict with (with 121,9; 123,23(2).30.32, etc.
dative), 152,1 morion, part, 121,26.31; 122,15;
meizon, major, used of a premiss 123,5. At 157,16-18 we have
(120,27; 124,5.22; 126,19.35, etc.) or paraphrased a sentence in which
a term (124,31.33(2); 125,1.2, etc.) Alexander refers to a ‘part’ of a
menein, to remain, remain fixed, contradiction, meaning one of a
136,10.13; 150,1; 181,28; pair of contradictory propositions.
189,19.29.34; 192,9.12.29; 200,15; See also meros
oikeios, appropriate, proper, 119,28; piptein (ektos), to fall (outside),
199,13 189,14
onoma, name. This word occurs six pistis, credibility (125,32);
times in a discussion of Stoic ideas justification (135,7)
(178,17-18(2) and 179,11-16(4)), pistousthai, to confirm, 125,5; 127,3
where the name in question is poion, quality (the quality of a
‘Dion’ and once at 238,3, where proposition is its being affirmative
Alexander says that Aristotle or negative), 123,32; 170,27-8(2);
applies the name phasis to protaseis 172,33; 215,5; 234,23. See also
onomazein, to name, 179,14 poiotês and idiôs poios
organon, instrument, 164,31; 165,1 poiotês, quality, 233,23; 241,21. See
ousia, substance, 130,4.11 also poion
pragmateia, subject (of study), 164,25
para meros, at alternating times, prodêlos, prima facie clear, 123,22;
161,21 142,14; 188,2; 237,13
paradeigma, example, 177,27; 183,25 proeinai, to go through (said of a
paraiteisthai, to reject, decline, proof), 210,21; 234,15; 247,39. See
121,12; 125,28.29; 164,23.27; also proerkhesthai and prokhôrein
165,3.8 proêgoumenôs. primarily, 190,27
parallagê, alteration, 181,26.27 proerkhesthai, to go through (said of
parathesis, setting down, 129,30; a proof), 134,10; 227,3. See also
139,30; 143,18; 144,22; 149,1, etc. proeinai and prokhôrein
See also paratithenai prokeimenos. (1) Alexander uses to
paratithenai, to set down, 130,24; prokeimenon to refer to what we
134,29; 135,18; 138,30; 147,12, etc. call the proposed conclusion. Some
Normally it is terms which are set of his uses of this term occur in
down as an interpretation of discussions which show the
propositions, but Alexander speaks importance he attaches to the order
four times (230,22.23; 237,21.28) of of terms in a conclusion; see, e.g.,
setting down a conclusion or the 146,23; 148,13; 234,6; 244,8; 251,3;
setting down (parathesis) of a other occurrences at 122,4; 131,18;
conclusion (meaning giving terms 137,7; 141,27; 174,7; 231,31;
which make it true) 235,35; 236,9.13; 244,26; 246,9.19;
perainein, to conclude. The word 252,34. Cf. 188,9 and four
occurs only at 164,30 in the phrase occurrences of protithenai at
adiaphorôs perainontes, a kind of 166,13; 167,6; 199,24 (2). We also
argument considered by the Stoics translate this word ‘under
periekhein, to contain, 129,4; 179,15; consideration’ when it is applied to
191,7. At 184,10 periekhontôn is combinations of premisses. 123,20;
translated ‘surroundings’ 144,8; 167,15; 172,8.17; 186,35;
perilambanein, to encompass, 179,3 188,20; 195,15; 208,34; 211,11;
phaneros, evident, 122,21; 132,26; 212,6.23; 213,34; 214,18; 228,22;
141,7; 153,5; 157,15, etc. 251,35.36. See also the more
phasis, assertion, 238,1-3(3). The general uses of this word at 165,9,
words apophansis, apophainein, 175,24 and 186,2 and the use of
and apophantikos do not occur in prokeisthai at 144,8. And see
this part of the commentary ekkeimenos
phônêi, verbally, 198,14 (only prokhôrein, to go through (said of a
occurrence of the noun) proof), 135,16; 195,10; 235,25. See
phullattein, to preserve, hold fixed, also proeinai and proerkhesthai
161,5; 168,12.32; 193,9. See also prolambanein, to assume in
sôzein and têrein advance, 157,15; 192,29; 193,4
prosdiorismos, additional condition, formulation of the dictum de omni
155,22 et nullo by substitution of
prosdiorizein, to specify further, rhêthêsetai for lekhthêsetai. We
155,17 only wish to signal this fact, since
proskatêgorein, to co-predicate, Alexander consistently uses the
119,28 verb he substitutes when he cites
proskeisthai, to be added or the dictum, and he uses it in the
attached, 144,5; 151,15; 154,15; same way twice in a discussion of
155,12; 159,21; 205,14; 218,22 ekthesis. We suggest that insofar as
proslambanein, to add (as a rhêthêsetai is a technical word for
premiss), 121,6; 128,24; Alexander it is used to express the
132,3.10.14; 134,1.5.12; 139,24; relation of predication between a
170,4.6.11; 188,9; 197,17; 206,32; universal and a particular under it
208,26; 209,30; 210,18.29.35; as opposed to the relationship of
214,14; 216,35 two universals. We give the
proslêpsis. This word occurs in the relevant passages, 24,30.33;
phrase kata proslêpsin at 166,18; 25,2.19; 32,18; 54,7.15.18;
see the note ad loc 55,5.6.10; 60,24.25.29; 61,26;
prosrhesis, adjunct, 156,17 122,33; 123,1; 126,5; 130,1; 167,18;
prosthêkê, addition. Alexander refers 169,26; 174,24 (technical uses only)
to the addition of a modal operator
at 119,27 and at 155,11-12(2); for its sêmainein, to mean (150,18; 151,12;
non-technical sense see prostithenai 152,29; 157,1, etc.); to signify
prostithenai, to add. Alexander (126,27; 129,33; 140,6; 155,11;
mainly uses this word to remark 157,1, etc.); to refer (150,12; 205,14
that Aristotle adds something to (only occurrence of sêmantikos))
what he has already said. He sêmeion, indication (134,28; 145,8;
applies it to adding a premiss or a 190,13; 198,1; 236,23); sign (179,16)
diorismos at 189,28-190,31(5), and sêmeiôteon, it should be noted,
at 155,11 he speaks of adding a 122,17; 128,32; 149,5; 168,28;
modal operator. Cf. prosthêkê. The 240,32. Barnes et al. translate
word prosthesis does not occur in ‘Note!’ Their entry under sêmeioun
this part of the commentary is incorrect
protasis, proposition skhêma, figure (of a syllogism),
(119,10.12.19.26.26, etc.) or 120,8-26(6), etc. The word is
premiss (120,10.29; 121,3.6.15, translated ‘form’ at 190,9
etc.). Note that we have often sôzein, to preserve, 189,36, see also
supplied the word ‘proposition’ or phullattein and têrein
‘premiss’ where Alexander simply stêretikos, privative, 135,23-136,4(4),
has a nominalization of feminine or etc. See the appendix on
neuter adjectives; for example affirmation and negation
where he speaks of a combination stokhastikos, conjectural, 165,9
of a contingent and a necessary, we sullogismos, syllogism,
will translate ‘a contingent and a 119,9.13.14.16.17.26.27, etc.
necessary premiss’ sullogistikos, syllogistic (adjective
pseudês, false (sometimes applied to a pair of premisses
falsification), 119,25; 126,13; which yield a conclusion), 120,12;
128,10.20.27, etc. The word is 121,2.24.33; 123,20, etc. See also
translated ‘fallacious’ at 196,22 asullogistos
sullogistikôs, syllogistically.
rhêthêsetai, will be said. At 24,27-30 Normally used with sunagein
Alexander paraphrases Aristotle’s (141,29; 168,13; 230,32.34; 231,11;
232,11; 237,37; 239,33; 240,5.33; 137,7; 167,25; 202,5; 231,31;
241,6; 242,33), once with 232,14.19; 242,4
akolouthein (229,8), once with sunaktikos, yielding a conclusion
deiknunai (243,22). There are two (Barnes et al. translate ‘deductive’),
other occurrences at 124,10 and 217,27; 227,23
185,3 sunalêtheuein, to be true together
sullogizein occurs only at 165,9 with, 157,31(2); 159,29; 160,2.21;
where it is translated ‘deduce’ 164,7; 168,26.28; 197,8; 221,20.29.
sumbainein, to result. Alexander On sunalêtheuein see Lee (1984),
rarely uses this word except when pp. 88-92
quoting or paraphrasing Aristotle. sunanairein, to also do away with
The following are passages where (Barnes et al. translate ‘to reject
he uses it more or less on his own: together with’), 182,15; 223,34. See
123,22; 157,10; 177,13.14; 198,10; anairein
216,28; 217,11; 236,39; 248,17 sunaptein, to attach, 125,2
sumbebêkos, accident, 181,27 sunekhês, continuous, 162,25
sumperasma, conclusion (an (picking up on 32b8)
extremely common word in the sunêtheia, custom, 179,23
commentary), 121,5; 122,5; 123,32; sunêthôs, customarily, 155,14
124,3.4, etc. sunistasthai, to compose, 121,18
sumplokê, combination (of two sunkeisthai, sunthesis,
premisses; Barnes et al. translate suntithenai. Six of the
‘conjunction’). In general there occurrences of these three words
seems to be no difference between are at 181,4-16, and refer to either
sumplokê and suzugia. But we note the conjunction of soul and body or
two occurrences of sumplokê where the closing together of fingers to
it seems to mean something like make a fist. The remaining
formal validity, 164,27 and 169,10. occurrences are, for sunkeisthai (to
Standard occurrences, 120,10; be put together), 124,10; 177,27;
121,7.24, etc. Alexander 212,13; and, for suntithenai (to
occasionally uses participles of the compose, to conjoin), 121,10 and
verb sumplekein to the same effect 217,12
(155,29; 156,5.6) sunkhôrein, to agree, 129,15; 132,7;
sunagein. This is Alexander’s usual 139,5.6; 248,13
term for expressing the relation of sunêmmenon, conditional (a
implication (Barnes et al. translate proposition of the form ‘if P then
it ‘to deduce’). We have usually Q’). The word occurs 18 times in
translated the active forms as this section of the commentary, all
‘yield a conclusion’ (e.g., 120,18; between 176,4-182,18 (on 34a5-12)
125,19; 135,8; 142,19; 208,10) or suntattein, to co-ordinate with,
‘imply’ (e.g., 125,21; 127,1.10; 159,19; 189,32; 190,36
128,26; 138,7) and the passive ones sustasis, construction, 119,15.16
as ‘follow’ (e.g., 121,9; 123,24; suzugia, combination (of two
124,14; 125,11.23(2)). But premisses). Apparently
sometimes we have used ‘be interchangeable with sumplokê,
inferred’ (e.g., 131,10; 134,6.10; but more common. 120,12;
138,25.26) for the passive forms, 121,18-21(3), etc.
and sometimes we have simply
spoken of a conclusion (e.g., 132,1; taxis, order, ordering, 149,16; 241,27
167,31; 176,10; 186,20) tekhnê, art, 165,8; 169,8
sunagôgê, inference (Barnes et al. teleios, complete (Barnes et al.
translate ‘deduction’). 122,21; translate ‘perfect’), 169,13;
173,1.13.17; 174,6.9.20.27.29.34; classify’ at 245,32. Like keisthai it
175,9.15.16; 186,7; 202,3.4.32; sometimes seems to mean
205,4; 206,26.29; 208,4; 210,2.6; something more like ‘to establish’
245,23; 250,12.19 than ‘to assume’; see, e.g., 199,14
teleiôsis, completion (Barnes et al. and 249,31. See also thesis,
translate ‘perfection’), 242,24 hupokeisthai, and lambanein
teleioun, to complete (Barnes et al. tropos, modality (rather than the
translate ‘to perfect’), 217,27; standard ‘mode’, adopted by
242,22.26; 253,13; 254,10.12.15 Barnes et al.), 119,17.26(2).28;
têrein, to keep, keep fixed, preserve, 120,21.24; 154,13; 155,11.17;
146,1; 148,8.31; 154,16; 189,9; 159,21; 160,30; 172,5; 197,2; 202,6;
192,22.25; 193,6; 207,20; 217,12; 218,21 (technical uses only)
246,19; 250,28; 254,32. See also
phullattein and sôzein zêtein, to inquire, investigate, seek,
thesis, positing, 178,25. See tithenai 161,3; 165,6.11; 188,17; 196,12;
tithenai, to posit, 130,13; 131,20; 206,12; 207,35; 213,26; 218,14;
132,6.19; 133,31, etc. This word is 247,22; 249,37
used with more frequency by zêtêsis, inquiry, 165,7.19
Aristotle than by Alexander. We
have translated it ‘to assign’ at
150,15, ‘to place’ at 208,15, and ‘to
Subject Index
References are to the pages of this book.
a(-proposition), 4 Cesare2(CU_), 42-3, 149-50

AE-transformationc, 21-2, 60, 134-5, Cesare2(NC_), 49-50, 155-6, 176
137-40, App. 5, see also waste cases Cesare2(UC_), 41, 150-3, 171
affirmation, affirmative, 138-9, App. Chrysippus, 87-92
2, 4 circle argument, 45-7, 49, 121, 129
AI-conversionc, 22, 28-31, 60 combination, 4
AI-conversionn, 9, 27, 60 complete, 5-6, 83-4, 115, 133, 177; see
AI-conversionu, 7, 59 dictum de omni et nullo
Alexander’s proofs of unproveable completion, 7-8
syllogisms, 50, 160, 162-4 conditionals, 85-96
AO-transformationc, 139 contingency in the way specified, 20-1,
37-8, 41-2, 46-9, 78-9, 119-20, 124,
Barbara1(NC_), 44-7, 53-4, 120-1, 177 150-3, 160, 166-7, 170-2, 177-8,
Barbara1(NU_), see NU first-figure 179; see also Barbara1(UC_) and
combinations Barbara1(NC_), Celarent1(UC_),
Barbara1(UC_), 37-41, 85, 96-104, and Celarent1(NC_)
109-10, 115, 118-19, App. 1, 2 contingency, 9, 12-13, 19-54, 78-81,
Barbara1(UN_), 13-18 92-4, 104-12, 121, 132-3, 136-7,
Baroco2(NC_), 163 138-40, 150-2, 156-7
Bocardo3(CC_), 57 n.55, 221 n.466 contingently (holding), 19-20, 29-31
Bocardo3(CN_), 180-3 contradictories, 7, 98, 107-8, 159-60
Bocardo3(CU_), 43-4, 53-4, 173-5, 180-1 contraries, 7, 138-40, 159-60
Bocardo3(NC_), 45-6, 121, 225 n.520 conversion, 7-8, 76-7; see also
Bocardo3(NNN), 12-13, 52-3 AI-conversion, EE-conversion, and
Bocardo3(NU_), 13, 96, 102 II-conversion
Bocardo3(UC_), 174
Darii1(NC_), 44-7, 58 n.74, 129, 177
Camestres2(CN_), 49-50, 156-7 Darii1(NU_), see NU first-figure
Camestres2(CU_), 41, 150-3 combinations
Camestres2(NC_), 50, 160, 163 Darii1(UC_), 37-41, 115, 118
Camestres2(UC_), 42-3, 149-50 Darii1(UN_), 16-18
Celarent1(CN_), 44, 124-5 de re/de dicto distinction, 14-15, 23,
Celarent1(NC_), 44-9, 58 n.74, 122-3, 36, 55 n.22, 130-1, 164-5, 211 n.356
128-9, 133, 152-3, 155, 166-7, 175-6 dictum de omni et nullo, 6, 11, 15-16,
Celarent1(NU_), see NU first-figure 75, 78, 83-4, 122, 124
combinations Diodorus Cronus, 94
Celarent1(UC_), 37-8, 47-9, 104-12, diorismos of contingency, 20-1, 78, 87;
120, 132-3, 152-3, 155, 166-7, App. see also ‘contingency in the way
1 (p. 229) specified’
Cesare2(CN_), 50, 157-9
267 Subject Index
e(-proposition), 4 necessarily (holding), 30-1
EA-transformationc, 21-2, 60, 110-11, necessity, 51, 90, 105-6, 107-9, 113-14,
134-5, 136-8, 158, App. 5; see also 120, 179, App. 1, 3
waste cases negation, negative, 107-9, 138-9, App.
EE-conversionc, 25, 27-35, 36-7, 60, 2, 4 (p. 237)
136-45, App. 5 Nemesius, 190 n.90
EE-conversionn, 9-10, 25-7, 60 non-syllogistic combinations, 6-7
EE-conversionu, 7, 59 NU first-figure combinations (i.e.
EI-tranformationc, 139 Barbara1(NU_), Celarent1(NU_),
ekthesis, 13, 52 Darii1(NU_), Ferio1(NU_)), 13-18,
eternal recurrence, 87-8, 90-1 43-4, 48-9, 53, 115-16, 123, 126-7,
Eudemus, 15-16, 29, 83-4, 137, 141, 128-9, 132, 155-6, 173-4
195
extreme, 4 o(-proposition), 4
OI-transformationc, 21-2, 60, 79,
Feliciano, Giovanni Bernardino, 190 138-40, 164, 178, App. 5; see also
n.92 waste cases
Ferio1(NC_), 44-8, 51-2, 58 n.74, OO-conversionc, 32, 41-2, 151, 154,
126-9, 132, 136, 163, 167, 171, 179, 169, 172, 179, 181
181-2 opposites, 78-9, 96-7, 106-9, 121, 122-4,
Ferio1(NU_) see NU first-figure 128-9, 132, 138-40, 141-5, 159-60
combinations
Ferio1(UC_), 37-41, 83-4, 115-16, 118, peculiarly qualified (idiôs poios), 89-91
131-2, 136, 153-4, 167, 172, App. 1, peiorem rule, 15-16, 35, 44, 49, 52-4,
2 83-4
Ferio1(UN_), 24-6 n.93, 22-5, App. 1 premiss, 4
figure, 4 Philo the Dialectician (‘of Megara’), 94
propositions, 4
i(-proposition), 4 quality, 4
idiôs poios, 89-91 quantity, 4
II-conversionc, 10-11, 22, 28-31, 60
II-conversionn, 9, 27, 60 reductio ad impossibile, 8, 43-4, 50-1,
II-conversionu, 8, 59 78-9, 85-6, 97-9, 102-9, 114-16,
incompatibility acceptance argument, 119-25, 127-9, 131-3, 137-8, 140-47,
16-18, 78-9; see also 150, 160, 162, 176
incompatibility rejection argument reduction, 77-8
incompatibility rejection argument,
16-18, 32-3, 136-8 Sosigenes, App. 3
interpretations, 6-7, 32-3, 36, 39-41, Stoics, 87-92
42-3, 50-1, 79-81, 99-102, 107,
110-12, 113-14, 126, 129-31, 137, temporal interpretation of modality,
139, 142, 148-9, 151-2, 157-9, 160, 23-5, 28-31, 139-40, 189 n.67
179, 182 terms, 4; see interpretations
IO-transformationc, 21-2, 60, 138-40, Theophrastus, 3, 15-16, 29, 43-4, 52-4,
App. 5; see also waste cases 83-4, 111, 202, 137, 141, 157, 174,
195 n.158, App. 3
major, 4 transformation, 56 n.38
major term must be predicate of two affirmative premisses in the
conclusion, 154, 156-7, 162, 168-9, second figure, 134-5, 145, 203 n.256
172-4, 179
middle, 4 U-for-C substitution, 39-40, 43-4,
minor, 4 48-9, 53-4, 85-6, 98-105, 115, 120-1,
Subject Index 268
123-4, 128-9, 132-3; see waste cases, 21-2, 76-7, 79, 112-13,
Barbara1(UC_), Celarent1(UC_), 126, 153, 154, 161, 164, 169, 172,
Darii1(UC_), Ferio1(UC_) 178, 180-2
universal (propositions), 14, 30-1, weak two-sided Theophrastean
39-40, 99-102, 151-2 contingency, 32-5, 105-11, 119-21,
unqualified, 9 125, 141-5, 146-7, App. 5
unqualifiedly (holding), 29-31
Index Locorum
Bold type is used for references to the pages, notes and appendixes of this book.
ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS 25a7-10, 135

in An. Pr. 25a27-36, 10-11, 25-7
24,27-30, 191 n.106 25a29-32, 10, 25-6
25,26-26,14, 23-5 25a32-4, 10
26,29-27,1, 56 n.33 25a37-9, 19, 191 n.97
31,5-6, App. 2 25a37-b3, 22, 28
36,7-25, 26 25b3-14, 31
36,25-31, App. 3 25b3-25, 136
37,3-13, 27 25b14-15, 19
37,14-17, 27 25b14-19, 32
37,17-21, 26 26a17, 180
37,28-38,10, 19, App. 4 (p. 238) 26b21, 198 n.197
39,4-11, 32 28a7-9, 134, 145, 207 n.310
39,19-23, 20 2.2-4, 95
41,21-4, 137 Int.
54,12-18, 6 17b22-3, 172-3
60,27-61,1, 6 19a23-6, App. 3
On the difference between Aristotle 23a6-11, App. 4 (pp. 237-8)
and his associates concerning 23a7-20, 19
mixtures chs. 12-13, App. 4
99, 102, 121, 128, 160, 176
Quaest. EUDEMUS (fragments, ed. Wehrli)
31,9-10, 191 n.107 16, 209 n.335
19, 188 n.51
AMMONIUS
in Int. NEMESIUS
153,13-154,2, App. 3 De natura hominis (Morani)
221,11-229,11, 209 n.342 2.81 190 n.90
245,1-32, App. 4
PHILOPONUS
[AMMONIUS] in An. Pr.
in An.Pr. 53,15-56,5, 209 n.342
39,10-25, App. 3 n.7 126,8-29, App. 3
205,13-27, 58 n.74
ARISTOTLE 205,13-27, 202 n.246
An. Pr. (outside 29b29-40b15) 226,5, 217 n.429
24b22-4, 6
24b26-30, 6 SIMPLICIUS
24b29-30, 185 n.6 in Cael.
25a1-2, 23 316,25-9, 191 n.107
25a2-3, 56 n.33
Index Locorum 270
STEPHANUS II.624, 190 n.89
in Int.
38,14-31, App. 3 n.2 THEOPHRASTUS (fragments, FHSG)
100C, App. 3 n.8
STOBAEUS 102A, 209 n.335
Eclogae 102B, 210 n.351
I.79.1, 190 n.91 102C, 209 n.335
103B, 196 n.175
STOICS (dialectic fragments, ed. 107A, 188 n.51
Hülser) 108B, 216 n.422
992, 191 n.106 109A, 58 n.74, 202 n.246
994, 189 n.71
[THEMISTIUS]
SVF (von Arnim) in An. Pr.
II.202a, 189 n.71 25,20-1, 188 n.65

(Ancient Commentators On Aristotle v. 1, 14-22) Ian Mueller - Alexander of Aphrodisias - On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.14-22-Bristol Classical Press (1999) PDF

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Alexander of Aphrodisias

On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.14-22

Translated by Ian Mueller with

Introduction, Notes and

LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway

Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in 1999 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

© 2013 Ian Mueller

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-2876-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The present translations have been made possible by generous

Typeset by Ray Davies

Editor’s Note vii

Translation: The commentary

Appendix 1. The expression ‘by necessity’ (ex anankês) 229

This text, translated in two volumes, is a very important one because

December 1998 R.R.K.S.

December 1998 I.M.

We offer here a translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on

In both cases the conclusion proved is a particular negative necessary

In both cases the conclusion proved is a particular negative necessary

There is in general no way for a reader to tell whether, e.g., the

1.1-3 Introductory material

I. Assertoric syllogistic (1.1, 2, 4-7)

A. Terms are capital letters from the beginning of the alphabet: A, B, C,

B. Propositions. There are four types of propositions:

XaY (read X holds of all Y or All Y are X)

C. Pairs of propositions with one common term are called combinations,

As members of combinations propositions are called premisses. In the

1. AaB BaC AaC (1.4, 25b37-40)

As a preliminary notation for these syllogisms (which will be compli-

to represent the pair

Aristotle calls these four syllogisms complete (teleios, rendered ‘perfect’

For one thing to be in another as in a whole and for the other to be

Alexander understands this passage to be saying something like:

XaY if and only if it is not possible to take any Y which is not an X;

Alexander’s treatment of Barbara1 and Ferio1 show how he invokes the

If something of C is in B as in a whole,8 and B is in no A, then A will not

E. At this point it is convenient to describe the principal procedure by

a. XaY and XoY are contradictories, i.e.,

Given these relationships, an interpretation making XaZ true rules out

F. Aristotle shows that second- and third-figure assertoric combinations

EE-conversion: XeY  YeX (25a14-17)

1. Cesare2 AeB AaC BeC (1.5, 27a5-9)

G. Aristotle seems to assume the completeness of his reduction proce-

II. Modal syllogistic without contingency

and the assertoric combination AE_1 becomes:

The following examples should make the notation to be employed clear:

Barbara1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BaC NEC(AaC)

II.A. Conversion of necessary propositions (1.3, 25a27-36)

EE-conversionn: NEC(XeY)  NEC(YeX) (25a29-31)

If it is necessary that A holds of no B, it is necessary that B holds of no A;

Aristotle here appears to reduce EE-conversionn to:

II-conversionc: CON(XiY)  CON(YiX)

If A holds of all or some B by necessity, it is necessary that B holds of some

apparently taking for granted that

which, if it is not just another formulation of II-conversionn itself, would

(i)  NEC(P)  CON( P) ( N  C )

(ii) CON(XeY)  CON(YeX) (EE-conversionc)