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Crim Pro Digest 6

Crim Pro Digest 6

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A2010 Digest
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Criminal Procedure a2010 page 110 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales
171 SCRA 429REGALADO; March 21, 1989
Appeal on the decision of the Court of Appealsupholding the decision of the trial court awardingdamages to the private respondent.
- Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swipedby a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznartStreet, Iloilo City" The respondent Court of Appealsconcurred in the findings of the court
a quo
that thesaid vehicle which figured in the mishap, aVolkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven bypetitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street towardthe direction of the provincial capitol, and thatprivate respondent sustained physical injuries as aconsequence.- Petitioner was accordingly charged before the thenCity Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thrureckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207thereof.
Private respondent, as the complainingwitness therein, did not reserve his right to institutea separate civil action and he intervened in theprosecution of said criminal case through a privateprosecutor. Petitioner was acquitted in said criminalcase "on reasonable doubt".- On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed acomplaint against the petitioner in the former Courtof First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV,
docketed thereinas Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil actioninvolved the same subject matter and actcomplained of in Criminal Case No. 47027.
In hisanswer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as specialand affirmative detenses that the private respondenthad no cause of action and, additionally, that thelatter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch aswhen said criminal case was instituted the civilliability was also deemed instituted since thereinplaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and activelyparticipated in the criminal case.- Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of thereindefendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 anorder of denial. Petitioner thereafter filed in thisCourt a petition for
, prohibition andmandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992,assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Saidpetition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Court'sresolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion forreconsideration thereof was denied for the samereason in a resolution of October 28, 1975.- After trial, the court below rendered judgment onMay 23, 1977 in favor of the herein privaterespondent and ordering herein petitioner to paydamages. Thus, petitioner appealed said decision tothe CA but said respondent court affirmed in toto thedecision of the trial court with a few changes in theamount of the damages to be paid.
WON the private respondent, who was thecomplainant in the criminal action for physicalinjuries thru reckless imprudence and whoparticipated in the prosecution thereof withoutreserving the civil action arising from the act oromission complained of, can file a separate action forcivil liability arising from the same act or omissionwhere the herein petitioner was acquitted in thecriminal action on reasonable doubt and no civilliability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgmentof acquittal
 YES- The action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separatecivil case and his intervention in the criminal case didnot bar him from filing such separate civil action fordamages.
 The allegations of the complaint filed by theprivate respondent supports and is constitutive of acase for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner. The
Court has also heretofore ruled in
Elcano vs. Hill
that:... a separate civil action lies against the offenderin a criminal act whether or not he is criminallyprosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, providedthat the offended party is not allowed, if he is alsoactually charged criminally, to recover damages onboth scores; and would be entitled in sucheventuality only to the bigger award of the two,assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.In other words, the extinction of civil liabilityreferred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refersexclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civilliability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguishedeven by a declaration in the criminal case that thecriminal act charged has not happened or has notbeen committed by the accused . . .- The aforecited case of 
Lontoc vs. MD Transit & TaxiCo., Inc., et al
. involved virtually the same factualsituation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusionhereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that thefailure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right tofile a separate civil case is not fatal; that hisintervention in the criminal case did not bar him fromfiling a separate civil action for damages, especiallyconsidering that the accused therein was acquittedbecause his guilt was not proved beyond reasonabledoubt; that the two cases were anchored on twodifferent causes of action, the criminal case being ona violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Codewhile the subsequent complaint for damages wasbased on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment inthe criminal case the aspect of civil liability was notpassed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civilcase may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of theCivil Code.- Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where thetrial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt,it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civilliability of the accused and the complainant could filea petition for mandamus to compel the trial court toinclude such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. And that the failure of the court to makeany pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as tothe civil liability of the accused amounts to areservation of the right to have the civil liabilitylitigated and determined in a separate action. Therules nowhere provide that if the court fails todetermine the civil liability it becomes no longerenforceable.
Decision of CA affirmed, petion denied.
323 SCRA 754DAVIDE; January 28, 2000
Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Courtconvicting the two accused together with Julian D.Escano for the violation of R.A. 6425, as amended
- On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gunban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police weremanning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator GilPuyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway. Theywere checking the cars going to Pasay City, stoppingthose they found suspicious, and imposing merely arunning stop on the others. At about past midnight,
Criminal Procedure a2010 page 111 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales
they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493.One of the policemen saw a long firearm on the lapof the person seated at the passenger seat, who waslater identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked thedriver, identified as Escaño, to open the door. PO3Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine,from Usana. When Escaño, upon order of the police,parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the otherpassengers were search for more weapons. Theirsearch yielded a .45 caliber firearm which theyseized from Escaño.- The three passengers were thereafter brought tothe police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven byPO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonatoturned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, herequested Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readilyagreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they askedEscaño to open. The bag contained a parcel wrappedin tape, which, upon examination by National Bureauof Investigation, was found positive for hashish.- An information for violation of RA 6425 thereafterwas filed against them. The trial court found thethree accused guilty of the said crime.- Accused-appellants assail the manner by which thecheckpoint in question was conducted. They contendthat the checkpoint manned by elements of theMakati Police should have been announced. Theyalso complain of its having been conducted in anarbitrary and discriminatory manner. Also, theyquestion the validity of the search.
1. WON the check point was illegal2. WON the search was valid3. WON the accused are guilty of violation of RA 6425
1. NO- Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which arewarranted by the exigencies of public order and areconducted in a way least intrusive to motorists areallowed.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpointsare illegal. Those which are warranted by theexigencies of public order and are conducted in away least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For,admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to acertain extent, on motorists’ right to "free passagewithout interruption," but it cannot be denied that, asa rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelersduring which the vehicle’s occupants are required toanswer a brief question or two. For as long as thevehicle is neither searched nor its occupantssubjected to a body search, and the inspection of thevehicle is limited to a visual search, said routinechecks cannot be regarded as violative of anindividual’s right against unreasonable search. Infact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixedarea, are even less intrusive.- The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuanceof the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. TheCOMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual searchof pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose forwhich such ban was instituted. Those who intend tobring a gun during said period would know that theyonly need a car to be able to easily perpetrate theirmalicious designs.- The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for aviolation of the constitutional rights of the accusedagainst illegal search and seizure. PO3 Subaadmitted that they were merely stopping cars theydeemed suspicious, such as those whose windowsare heavily tinted just to see if the passengersthereof were carrying guns. At best they wouldmerely direct their flashlights inside the cars theywould stop, without opening the car’s doors orsubjecting its passengers to a body search. There isnothing discriminatory in this as this is what thesituation demands.We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, asthe accused have invoked. Not only would it beimpractical, it would also forewarn those who intendto violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixedlocation and the regularized manner in which theyare operated.2. YES- Escano consented to the search and consentedwarrantless search is one of the exceptions from thewarrant requirement.
Jurisprudence recognizes six generallyaccepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1)search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of movingvehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customssearches; (5) consented warrantless search; and (6)stop-and-frisk situations.- Even though there was ample opportunity to obtaina search warrant, we cannot invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the searchdone on the car of Escaño was consented to by him.3. NO- No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to thehashish found in the trunk of the car and there wasno showing that Usana and Lopez knew of thepresence of hashish in the trunk of the car or thatthey saw the same before it was seized.
Despite the validity of the search, we cannotaffirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violationof R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following factsmilitate against a finding of conviction: (1) the carbelonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car was notopened soon after it was stopped and after theaccused were searched for firearms; (3) the car wasdriven by a policeman from the place where it wasstopped until the police station; (4) the car’s trunkwas opened, with the permission of Escaño, withoutthe presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) afterarrival at the police station and until the opening of the car’s trunk, the car was in the possession andcontrol of the police authorities. No fact was adducedto link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in thetrunk of the car. Their having been with Escaño in thelatter’s car before the "finding" of the hashishsometime after the lapse of an appreciable time andwithout their presence left much to be desired toimplicate them to the offense of selling, distributing,or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there wasno showing that Usana and Lopez knew of thepresence of hashish in the trunk of the car or thatthey saw the same before it was seized.
Accused appellants are herebyacquitted.
301 SCRA 668PUNO; January 22, 1999
- Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command(Narcom), received information from two (2) civilianinformants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegaldrug activities in Mandaluyong City. They decided toentrap him via a buy-bust operation.-The poseur-buyer, PO2 Manlangit set aside 1600pesos as marked money for the entrapmentoperation, which was then handed to Jun upontransaction. Jun returned an hour later bringingmarijuana where he and his associates subsequentlyarrested Jun but
did not find the marked bills onhim
. Jun said he left the bills to his associate“Neneth”. Jun led the police to Neneth’s house.
Criminal Procedure a2010 page 112 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales
- The police went to Neneth’s house. Standing by thedoor, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under thedining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps wasopen and inside the box was something wrapped inplastic. The plastic wrapper and its contentsappeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" tohim by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangitentered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box.He peeked inside the box and found that it containedten (10) bricks of what appeared to be driedmarijuana leaves. They also found the marked bills. They arrested Jun and Neneth and brought them toheadquarters. It was only then that the policelearned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while"Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama.- The trial court found them guilty.
1. WON the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao,the search of the latter’s person and house, and theadmissibility of the pieces of evidence obtainedtherefrom is valid2. WON the marijuana was seized validly for being inplain view of the police officers
1. YES- We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrestsare allowed in three instances as provided by Section5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on CriminalProcedure, to wit:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — Apeace officer or a private person may,without a warrant, arrest a person:(a)
When, in his presence, the person to bearrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit anoffense;
- Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person maybe arrested without a warrant if he "has committed,is actually committing, or is attempting to commit anoffense."- In the case, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused isapprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized butduty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.- However, the warrantless arrest, search and seizureof Gaddao is invalid- Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to giveground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule113. She was not committing any crime. Contraryto the finding of the trial court, there was nooccasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee fromthe policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."114 In fact, she was going about her daily choreswhen the policemen pounced on her.- Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113."Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests withoutwarrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must bebased upon "probable cause" which means an"actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."In case, there was no reasonable suspicionespecially as she was arrested solely on the basisof the alleged identification made by her co-accused- Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as hisassociate in the drug business, but as the personwith whom he left the marked bills. Thisidentification does not necessarily lead to theconclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired withher co-accused in pushing drugs as Doria mayhave left the money in her house, with or withouther knowledge, with or without any conspiracy.Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, theNarcom agents had no reasonable grounds tobelieve that she was engaged in drug pushing.- As the arrest was illegal, the search and seizureis not incidental to the arrest2. NO- The marijuana was not in plain view of the policeofficers and its seizure without the requisite searchwarrant was in violation of the law and theConstitution as the contents of the box where themarijuana was partially hidden was not readilyapparent to PO Manlangit, one of the arrestingofficers.- As a general rule, objects in plain view of arrestingofficers may be seized without a search warrant butmust follow these requisites: (a) the law enforcementofficer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position fromwhich he can view a particular area; (b) the discoveryof the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it isimmediately apparent to the officer that the item heobserves may be evidence of a crime, contraband orotherwise subject to seizure.- However, if it is not plain view of the police officers,it may not be seized without a warrant except if thepackage proclaims its contents, whether by itsdistinctive configuration, its transparency, or if itscontents are obvious to an observer, then thecontents are in plain view and may be seized.- The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilosof marijuana 137 was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that sheherself is guilty of the crime charged.
the decision of the Regional Trial Court,Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court inCriminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modifiedas follows:1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado issentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos(P500,000.00).2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama isacquitted.
304 US 458BLACK; May 23, 1938
Appeal from the decision of the District Courtdenying the petition for habeas corpus which theCourt of Appeals affirmed
Petitioner and one Bridwell were arrested inCharleston, S.C., November 21, 1934, charged withfeloniously uttering and passing four counterfeittwenty-dollar Federal Reserve notes and possessingtwenty-one such notes. Both were then enlisted menin the United States Marine Corps, on leave. Theywere bound over to await action of the United StatesGrand July, but were kept in jail due to inability togive bail. January 21, 1935, they were indicted; January 23, 1935, they were taken to court and therefirst give notice of the indictment; immediately werearraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced that dayto four and one-half years in the penitentiary; and January 25, were transported to the FederalPenitentiary in Atlanta. While counsel hadrepresented them in the preliminary hearings beforethe commissioner in which they-some two monthsbefore their trial-were bound over to the Grand Jury,the accused were unable to employ counsel for theirtrial. Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty, saidthat they had no lawyer, and-in response to an

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