EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 99289-90. January 13, 1992.]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO , petitioner, vs. CONRADO M.

VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA , respondents.

Mariano P. Defensor for petitioner.

Nestor P. Ifurong for movant-intervenor.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents Vasquez and de la Llana.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR INJUNCTION; WHEN

AVAILABLE. — It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will
not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires that
criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society,
except in speci ed cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO COMPLAINTS FILED BY THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DULY AUTHORIZED BY THE OMBUDSMAN AS IN THE CASE AT
BAR. — The rule is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman had authorized
the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation or to le an information
as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsible o cial is vested with discretion
and is endowed with the competence to determine whether the complaint led is
su cient in form and substance to merit such referral. The Ombudsman may himself
dismiss the complaint in the rst instance if in his judgment the acts or omissions
complained of are not illegal, unjust, improper or su cient. The Special Prosecutor, in
case of referral of the complaint, may also dismiss the same on proper grounds after
the requisite investigative and adjudicatory proceedings.
3. ID.; ID.; ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE OMBUDSMAN NOT
SUFFICIENTLY PROVED. — We have carefully gone over the records of the case and,
contrary to the pretensions of petitioner, there is nothing to show that the informations
in question were led with the vindictive intention to oppress, harass and discriminate
against her or to violate her constitutional rights. It is signi cant that petitioner failed to
impute, much less prove, any ill-motive on the part of herein public respondents.
Respondent Ombudsman categorically states that, and convincingly explains why, he
"has no purpose, motive nor desire to endanger or discredit petitioner's aspirations for
the highest position in the land." This is made no more apparent than in the various
memoranda approved by respondent Ombudsman establishing that the admitted facts
of record are su cient to engender a well founded belief that each of the crimes
charged has been committed, which parenthetically, is the requisite quantum of
evidence at this posture of each of said case.
4. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DEFENSES PUT UP BY PETITIONER SHOULD
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 BE RAISED AND SUBSTANTIATED DURING TRIAL IN THE COURT BELOW. — Petitioner
submits that she cannot be held liable as charged and raises the following defenses:
that the donations received were not for personal use but were distributed to the CID
employees in a ra e held during the CID Christmas party; that the legalization of aliens
who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 was in accordance with the
authority vested in her by Executive Order No. 324 and was intended to assure family
unity; and that the defamatory words were made against Maria Tatoy only in self-
defense. We are not persuaded that we should, in the present recourse, pass upon
these asseverations of petitioner which we note have previously been raised during the
preliminary investigation. She will, of course, have all the opportunity to ventilate and
substantiate the same in the proceedings before and/or during the trial of these cases
in the lower courts which would be the proper stages and fora for the adjudication
thereof.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; DISMISSAL OF INSTANT PETITION NOT REFLECTIVE OF
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PETITIONER; ACTS CHARGED, A MATTER OF
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION. — The dismissal of this Petition in no way re ects
on the criminal liability of petitioner. Its immediate effect is only that the cases against
her may now proceed but without prejudice to procedural remedies that are open to
her, like a Motion to Quash, and the defenses that she may raise, among them being, in
at least two of the three cases, that the acts charged, as a matter of law, do not
constitute an offense but are, as stated in Justice Feliciano's dissent, a matter of
administrative interpretation or policy for which a public o cial should not be
subjected to civil or criminal liability.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ALIEN LEGALIZATION ACT OF 1991; DECISION
OF COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION; APPEALABLE TO THE
PRESIDENT. — In a pending bill in Congress (H. No. 30878), or the "Alien Legalization
Act of 1991," the stay in the country of aliens who entered the Philippines prior to 2
February 1987 may be legalized upon their application (Sec. 2), which could mean any
time prior thereto or even after January 1, 1984. The Commissioner is likewise given
the authority to determine who among the alien-applicants may be quali ed to be
permanent residents, any adverse decision made being appealable only to the O ce of
the President (Sec. 7).
3. ID.; ID.; INHERENT FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION; INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE COMMISSIONER GENERALLY
ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT. — Inherent in the Commissioner's
function is the exercise of judgment and discretion in the application of the laws that
said o cial has been authorized to administer and enforce. The interpretation given by
that O ce, as with all other administrative bodies, is, as a general rule, entitled to great
weight and respect.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
1. STATUTES; ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS ARE GENERALLY
ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT FROM COURTS; PUBLIC OFFICIAL
RESPONSIBLE FOR INCORRECT INTERPRETATION, NOT HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE. —
It is a rule too rmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous
interpretations of a statute or implementing regulation by the executive or
administrative o cials precisely charged with the implementation of such a statute or
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 regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself
has in many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by such administrative
o cers. But even if an administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be incorrect
as a matter of law by this Court, the o cial responsible for such interpretation is not,
for that reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or
administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon the public officer
who has so acted, something far graver than error of law or error of judgment must be
clearly shown and that is corrupt personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. As
noted above, no such allegations were made during the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. 16698.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; ENTITLED TO AN EARLY
RESOLUTION OF LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED BEFORE THE COURTS OF LAW; REASONS.
— Whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal
question, on which petitioner in effect asks the Court to rule in this Petition. There is
nothing to prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no
real need for proof of any additional essential facts apart from those already admitted
by petitioner. A public o cer is entitled to have legal questions like that before this
Court resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public o cer should not be
compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole
process of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is
the very issue at stake. The acts charged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime.
Indeed, if the acts which petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense,
very serious consequences would follow for the administration of law and government
rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the criminal information here would
appear to be that public o cers interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions
at their own peril and at the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of any
corrupt intent to profit personally by any such interpretation and application.
3. ID.; ID.; ACTS CHARGED DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF P.D. NO. 46.
— The operative portion of P.D. No. 46, dated 10 November 1972, reads as follows:
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21,
1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby make it
punishable for any public o cial or employee , whether of the national or local
governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer to
give, any gift, present or other valuable thing on any occasion, including Christmas,
when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given by reason of his o cial position,
regardless of whether or not the same is for past favor or favors or the giver hopes or
expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the public o cial or
employee concerned in the discharge of his o cial functions. Included within the
prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainments in honor of the o cial or
employee or his immediate relatives. . . . A serious legal question exists: whether or not
the acts of petitioner, as admitted by her during the course of the preliminary
investigation, fall within the scope of P.D. No. 46. It is not disputed that the solicitation
had been made for the purpose stated in the solicitation letter itself — the 1988
Christmas party of the CID o cers and employees. It is also not disputed that all the
donations in cash or in kind had been utilized for and in connection with such Christmas
party, and that the only personal bene t received by petitioner and her two (2) co-
accused consisted of one Christmas food basket each, along with more than 700 other
o cers and employees of the CID. Petitioner hardly invented the employees' Christmas
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 party, a practice widely observed in both the public and the private sectors. Petitioner's
special contribution consisted of making sure that the solicitation, receipt and
distribution of gifts were all done in an organized and public manner, in full view of all
the o cers and employees of the CID and of the general public, doubtless to
emphasize for whose bene t such solicitation had been conducted, to minimize private
or secret solicitation by individual CID o cers or employees, and to preclude any
charge of secret personal bene t on her part and of those who signed the solicitation
letters. What is at stake here, however, is the legal question of whether or not the acts
which petitioner has admitted constitute a criminal offense under P.D. No. 46 which, is
ripe for determination by this Court. Those acts do not fall within the scope of P.D. No.
46 as it is presently written. It may well be that, as a matter of administrative policy, all
solicitation including solicitation for the bene t of the o cers and employees of a
particular agency of government should be prohibited and perhaps criminalized. That,
however, is something for the legislative authority to consider and act upon, not the
courts and certainly not in a criminal case.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 324; DISREGARD THEREOF DOES NOT
GIVE RISE TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY; ACTS COMPLAINED OF CONSTITUTED OFFICIAL
ACTS OF ACCUSED DONE IN THE COURSE OF INTERPRETING THE EXECUTIVE ORDER;
"UNDUE INJURY" TO GOVERNMENT NOT SHOWN. — Executive Order No. 324 is not
itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregard of
Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal
information in this case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner,
as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was expressly authorized
and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its
provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and regulations to
implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16). The application and administration of
Executive Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the
exercise of judgment and discretion, adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature, and
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows: "11. Except as
provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation
may waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the case of individual aliens
for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity or for the public interest. 12. The
following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating
to aliens likely to become public charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for
so much of those provisions as relates to a single offense of simple possession of
marijuana; and (d) those relating to national security and members of subversive
organization. . . ." Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive
grounds for exclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for
humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public interest." It will be
seen then that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be criminal in
nature, constituted o cial acts of petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting
and construing Executive Order No. 324. It is undisputed that no one has pretended
that petitioner had any personal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien spouses
and minor children of quali ed aliens she had acted upon. No one has suggested, for
instance, that the fees speci ed in paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324 either were
not collected by the Government or were misappropriated by petitioner and converted
to her own use. The facts disclosed in the preliminary investigation showed no "undue
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 injury," to the Government and no " unwarranted bene t or advantage" to the alien wives
and minor children of quali ed aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of
the applications for waiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by
petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or construction given by petitioner to
Executive Order No. 324 is correct — i.e., that applications for waiver of passport
requirements by alien wives and minor children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of
quali ed aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984
and who were otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No.
324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoring
family unity — there would be no "injury," let alone an " undue injury," to the Government.
Neither can the bene t of waiver of passport requirements in the cases of such
spouses and minor children of quali ed aliens be deemed to be an " unwarranted"
benefit to such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive Order No. 324 be held to
be correct.

DECISION

REGALADO , J : p

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the
addendum thereto, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Courts of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e); Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 46; and Criminal Case No. 91-94897 for libel.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 1 led before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner stands
charged as follows:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally approve
the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988
which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury
to the government and giving unwarranted bene ts and advantage to said
aliens in the discharge of the o cial and administrative functions of said
accused.
Contrary to law."
In Criminal Case No. 91-94555 2 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, petitioner, together with Daisy Montinola and Fermin Pacia, are accused of a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 46 allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about November 28, 1988, or for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Daisy Montinola and
Fermin Pacia, all public o cers, being then the Commissioner, Chief of the
Board of Special Inquiry and employee of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, respectively, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally solicit and receive money, gifts and other
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 valuable things from several (F)ilipino and foreign businessmen the same being
given by reason of their respective o cial positions for past favor and expected
favor and better treatment in the future from said accused, in the discharge of
their respective official functions.
Contrary to law."
The information led by the O ce of the Special Prosecutor with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila and docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94897 3 indicts petitioner
for the crime of libel, as follows:
"That on or about May 24, 1988, at the O ce of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, Port Area, Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a
public o cer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation, acting in such capacity and taking advantage of her o cial
position, did then and there with malice aforethought, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously call, utter, state, impute and make scurrilous and defamatory
statements against Maria S. Tatoy, by portraying the latter, then Chief of the
Certificate Section, Commission on Immigration and Deportation to be 'a corrupt
employee, a perennial trouble-maker who has led administrative cases against
all the commissioners under whom she served' and the Certi cate Section of
which she was the head as 'not only useless but the most corrupt unit in the
CID,' in the presence of newspaper reporters and media personalities, thereby
nding print in the newspapers, which tend to cause dishonor, discredit and
contempt of said Maria S. Tatoy, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law."
A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991 4
ordering the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, to respectively
cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal Informations Nos. 11698 for violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e) and 91-94555 for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 46. This Court, in issuing the said restraining order, took into consideration
the fact that, according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991,
was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and
affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said
contingency.
Petitioner avers that in ling the aforequoted criminal informations, respondents
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Speci cally, petitioner contends that the criminal
charges are meant and intended to harass her as a presidential candidate, in violation
o f Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona de
candidates for any public o ce shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination."
Petitioner likewise asserts that the Ombudsman violated the very essence of fair
play by choosing to le the informations at a time when petitioner was clearly
disadvantaged by the injuries which she sustained in a vehicular accident, and only after
three (3) years from the time the sixteen (16) charges were initially led in 1988 by
disgruntled employees of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID); and
that in ling the criminal informations just a year before the presidential elections,
respondent Ombudsman in effect wants to detain petitioner by reason of her political
aspirations. She further submits that the instant petition seeks to prevent respondents
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from proceeding against her in an oppressive and
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 vindictive manner and to afford adequate protection to her constitutional rights. She
consequently posits that, on the foregoing premises, her present recourse should be
considered as an exception to the general prohibition against petitions of this nature in
criminal cases.
In their Comment, respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor refute the
claims of petitioner, explaining in the process the sequence of events which led to the
filing of the three (3) informations, in this wise:

"The charges involved in Criminal Case No. 16698 and Criminal Case No.
91-94555 were taken cognizance of by the O ce of the Ombudsman upon the
same having been prominently published in the January 10, 1989 issue of the
'Manila Standard.' The investigation was originally handled by then Investigator
Gualberto de la Llana but, on request of the petitioner, was reassigned to the
O ce of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon sometime in March, 1989. The
case was handled by an investigating panel which submitted its draft resolution
only on March 29, 1990. After the usual reviews by the O ce of the Special
Prosecutor, and of the O ce of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, the
resolution was submitted for nal action of respondent Ombudsman in late
March, 1991.
"A judicious appraisal of the record resulted in the issuance by the
Ombudsman of the Memorandum for the O ce of the Special Prosecutor
directing the ling of the two (2) informations which have been docketed as
Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan, and Criminal Case No. 91-
94555 of the Manila Regional Trial Court . . .
"The said Memorandum, as may be noted on the face thereof, is dated
April 26, 1991, or two (2) days beforepetitioner met the vehicular accident on
April 28, 1991.
"Respondent Ombudsman received the informations prepared by the
O ce of the Special Prosecutor only on May 13, 1991. Per o ce routine, after
respondent Ombudsman approved the informations, they were forwarded to the
O ce of the Special Prosecutor which led the same in the appropriate courts
on May 13, 1991.
"The record thus attests to the fact that the ling of Criminal Cases Nos.
16698 and 91-94555 was already a settled matter as early as two days before
petitioner's unfortunate mishap. Their ling in court was in accordance with
routine procedure, and impelled in some way by media's impatient and irritating
inquiries as to what respondent Ombudsman had done in the petitioner's cases,
induced no doubt by premature persistent false reports that the cases against
petitioner had been dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman.
"With respect to the libel case which was led with the Manila Regional
Trial Court on May 24, 1991, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 91-94897,
the record will also show that the information in this case could have been led
as early as October 12, 1990 when the resolution recommending the
prosecution of petitioner for libel was approved by respondent Ombudsman . . .
However, on the day it was to be led, some lawyers of the petitioner came and
asked the respondent Ombudsman to defer the ling of the information
inasmuch as they intend to le a motion for reinvestigation, which they did on
October 29, 1990. The reinvestigation was denied in a Memorandum dated 25
March 1991 of Special Prosecution O cer Reynaldo L. Mendoza (approved by
respondent Ombudsman on April 22, 1991) and an information was
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 subsequently filed on May 24, 1991.
"Like in the previous two (2) cases, the ling of Criminal Case No. 91-
94897 for libel had no relation at all to the accident which befell the petitioner
on April 28, 1991. Its ling after that accident was caused by a clearly delaying
tactic on the part of the petitioner. It is rather unkind for petitioner to impute ill-
motivation on the part of the respondents for something she herself is to
blame." 5
The Court accordingly also takes note of the aforesaid disclosures of
respondent Ombudsman that it was petitioner, personally or through counsel, who
made representations with said respondent which he granted and caused him to defer
action for some time on the complaints which were ultimately filed against her.
It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie to
restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires that criminal
acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society, except
in speci ed cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights. 6
The rule is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman had authorized the
Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation or to le an information as in
the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsible o cial is vested with discretion and is
endowed with the competence to determine whether the complaint led is su cient in
form and substance to merit such referral. The Ombudsman may himself dismiss the
complaint in the rst instance if in his judgment the acts or omissions complained of
are not illegal, unjust, improper or su cient. The Special Prosecutor, in case of referral
of the complaint, may also dismiss the same on proper grounds after the requisite
investigative and adjudicatory proceedings. 7 But if, as emphasized by respondent
Ombudsman, "the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation constitute
very valid grounds to charge petitioner Santiago and her co-accused before the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts of Manila," no compelling reason would
exist for us to rule otherwise.
Petitioner, claiming exception to the interdiction against a suit to enjoin criminal
prosecution, avers that the instant petition seeks to prevent the strong arm of the law
from being utilized in an oppressive and vindictive manner. 8 She then postulates that
as one who has consistently topped all major presidential surveys from 1990 to 1991,
the ling of the informations against her will prejudice her standing in the presidential
surveys. This is, contextually and for legal intents and purposes herein, a mere
verisimilitude.
At any rate, we de nitely cannot subordinate the demands of public interest and
policy to the political aspirations of herein petitioner. We have carefully gone over the
records of the case and, contrary to the pretensions of petitioner, there is nothing to
show that the informations in question were led with the vindictive intention to
oppress, harass and discriminate against her or to violate her constitutional rights. It is
signi cant that petitioner failed to impute, much less prove, any ill-motive on the part of
herein public respondents. Respondent Ombudsman categorically states that, and
convincingly explains why, he "has no purpose, motive nor desire to endanger or
discredit petitioner's aspirations for the highest position in the land." 9 This is made no
more apparent than in the various memoranda 1 0 approved by respondent Ombudsman
establishing that the admitted facts of record are su cient to engender a well founded
belief that each of the crimes charged has been committed, which parenthetically, is the
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 requisite quantum of evidence at this posture of each of said cases.
Petitioner submits that she cannot be held liable as charged and raises the
following defenses: that the donations received were not for personal use but were
distributed to the CID employees in a ra e held during the CID Christmas party; that
the legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 was in
accordance with the authority vested in her by Executive Order No. 324 and was
intended to assure family unity; and that the defamatory words were made against
Maria Tatoy only in self-defense.
We are not persuaded that we should, in the present recourse, pass upon these
asseverations of petitioner which we note have previously been raised during the
preliminary investigation. She will, of course, have all the opportunity to ventilate and
substantiate the same in the proceedings before and/or during the trial of these cases
in the lower courts which would be the proper stages and fora for the adjudication
thereof. Accordingly, we quote with approval this portion of the Comment of
respondent Ombudsman:
"In her Petition and in the Addendum hereto, the petitioner had not made
any denial of the operative facts on the basis of which the charges have been
led. Instead, petitioner relies on her perceived defenses on her interpretation of
the said acts and the laws applicable thereto.
"Thus, in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for a violation of P.D. 46, petitioner
admits the solicitation of donations and the giving of the same by those from
whom such donations were solicited. Petitioner justifies the said act by claiming
that the donations were not given for her 'personal use' but for the purpose of
the Christmas Party of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Whether this claim would negate the applicability of P.D. 46 would involve an
inquiry into certain facts which could only be ascertained during the trial of the
case. Signi cantly, petitioner had not denied that the solicitation of said gifts
was at her instance, and that she even scolded a certain Renato Orlanda whom
she requested to sign the solicitation letters, but who refused to do so for fear of
committing a violation of the law punishing such act.
"With respect to Criminal Case No. 16698 for a violation of Sec. 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, petitioner has also not denied that she admitted and approved
the legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984,
which act is contrary to the express provision of Executive Order No. 324. She
reasons out her doing so by putting forth certain alleged principles and
provisions of the same Executive Order which could be interpreted as giving her
such authority to disregard the express prohibition in Executive Order No. 324.
Again, these are matters of defense which the petitioner should prove during the
trial.
"In the libel case (Criminal Case No. 91-94897), petitioner likewise admits
having uttered the words constituting the bases thereof in a television interview.
She does not deny its libelous nature. She claims justi cation for having uttered
the defamatory words against complainant Maria Tatoy on the ground of self-
defense. Allegedly, Tatoy in an earlier interview, had mentioned about desiring
to form a labor union among the employees of CID, but that the petitioner was
against such move. Respondents fail to see how said statement of Tatoy could
be considered as defamatory to justify a libelous response thereto on the
ground of self-defense." 1 1

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 WHEREFORE, the petition and the addendum thereto are hereby DISMISSED, the
writs prayed for are DENIED, and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is
hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Nocon, J . , took no part.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA , J ., concurring :
The long-standing doctrine is, indeed, that Writs of Injunction or Prohibition do
not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution in view of the public interest involved. In fact,
petitioner concedes this point but seeks an exception in her case.
I just wish to emphasize that the dismissal of this Petition in no way re ects on
the criminal liability of petitioner. Its immediate effect is only that the cases against her
may now proceed but without prejudice to procedural remedies that are open to her,
like a Motion to Quash, and the defenses that she may raise, among them being, in at
least two of the three cases, that the acts charged, as a matter of law, do not constitute
an offense but are, as stated in Justice Feliciano's dissent, a matter of administrative
interpretation or policy for which a public o cial should not be subjected to civil or
criminal liability.
I would also like to point out that the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation is charged with the administration of immigration laws. Section 3 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 (C.A. No. 613) provides that the Commissioner
"shall issue from time to time such instructions, not inconsistent with law, as he shall
deem best calculated to carry out the provisions of the immigration laws." Executive
Order No. 324, likewise, explicitly authorizes the Commissioner to issue rules and
regulations necessary to implement the said Executive Order (paragraph 16). The
Commissioner may even waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act, save in
cases otherwise provided by law (paragraph 11).
In a pending bill in Congress (H. No. 30878), or the "Alien Legalization Act of
1991," the stay in the country of aliens who entered the Philippines prior to 2 February
1987 may be legalized upon their application (Sec. 2), which could mean any time prior
thereto or even after January 1, 1984. The Commissioner is likewise given the authority
to determine who among the alien-applicants may be quali ed to be permanent
residents, any adverse decision made being appealable only to the O ce of the
President (Sec. 7).
Indeed, inherent in the Commissioner's function is the exercise of judgment and
discretion in the application of the laws that said o cial has been authorized to
administer and enforce. The interpretation given by that O ce, as with all other
administrative bodies, is, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and respect.
FELICIANO , J ., dissenting :
It is with regret that I am unable to agree completely with the majority opinion
written by my learned brother in the Court, Mr. Justice Regalado, with his customary
lucidity. That opinion expresses clearly the ordinary rule in the following terms:
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 "It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will
not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest
requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the
protection of society, except in speci ed cases among which are to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to
afford adequate protection to constitutional rights." (Citation omitted)
Mr. Justice Regalado also points out that the above general rule is applicable in respect
of criminal prosecutions commenced by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman:
"The rule is of equal application in cases where the Ombudsman had
authorized the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation or to
le an information as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsible o cial
is vested with discretion and is endowed with the competence to determine
whether the complaint led is su cient in form and substance to merit such
referral. The Ombudsman may himself dismiss the complaint in the rst
instance if in his judgment the acts or omissions complained of are not illegal,
unjust, improper or su cient. The Special Prosecutor, in case of referral of the
complaint, may also dismiss the same on proper grounds after the requisite
investigative and adjudicatory proceedings . . ." (Citation omitted)
It is clear, of course, that there are more than a few exceptions to the above general
rule. In Brocka, et al. vs. Ponce-Enrile, et al., 1 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Medialdea, included the following in a list which would appear to be an open-ended one:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or . . . [to
prevent] multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304;
Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27,
1981,104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon
vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);

xxx xxx xxx

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or

regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil.
385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People
and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. City
Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);

xxx xxx xxx

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and
a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-
59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438);

xxx xxx xxx

It is my respectful submission that if the instant case, to the extent discussed

below, does not already fall within one of the above exceptions, another and separate
exception ought to be recognized.
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 The information led before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698
charges the petitioner as follows:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally approve
the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988
which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury
to the government and giving unwarranted bene ts and advantage to the said
aliens in the discharge of the o cial and administrative functions of said
accused.
Contrary to law."
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the
provisions of Executive Order No. 324 approved applications for legalization of the stay
of aliens who had arrived in the Philippines afterJanuary 1, 1984. The information takes
the position that Executive Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for
Immigrants under Certain Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant
to Section 47(A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, which provides that.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:
(a) when the public interest so warrants:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such
conditions as he may prescribe."
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation for waiver of passport requirements during a 12-month
period beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order provides,
among other things, that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines before
January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful
status from such date to the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of
certain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It is clear from the record of this case,
especially of the preliminary investigation conducted by the O ce of the Special
Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses or minor children of
quali ed aliens — the latter being alien spouses or parents who had entered the
Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were themselves quali ed for waiver of
passport requirements under Executive Order No. 324 — to apply for waiver of
passport requirements and, after compliance with requirements of Executive Order No.
324, approved such "legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for
certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to
criminal liability. The criminal information in this case in effect links up Executive Order
No. 324 with Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and
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 Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as follows:
"SECTION 3. Corrupt Practices of such O cers . — In addition to acts
or omissions of such o cers already penalized by existing law, the following
constitute corrupt practices of any public o cer and hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his o cial, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to o cers and employees of o ces or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions." (Emphasis supplied)

It must be noted, rstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration

and Deportation, was expressly authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to
apply and administer and enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to
issue rules and regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16).
Secondly, the application and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve, not
ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion,
adjudicatory and hence quasijudicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably,
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
"11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation may waive exclusion grounds under the
Immigration Acts in the case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to
assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to
criminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become public charges; (c) those
relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those provisions as relates to a
single offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to
national security and members of subversive organization.
xxx xxx xxx"
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for
exclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian
purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public interest." Under Section 29(a) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens excluded
from entry into the Philippines include:
"(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be
required under the provisions of this Act." 2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 speci es the categories of persons in whose cases
no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be granted.
It will be seen then that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to
be criminal in nature, constituted o cial acts of petitioner done in the course of
applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There is no question that
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 the applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and minor
children of quali ed aliens were admitted and approved by petitioner "for humanitarian
purposes to assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the said alien spouses and
minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in
paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no one has
pretended that petitioner had any personal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of
alien spouses and minor children of quali ed aliens she had acted upon. No one has
suggested, for instance, that the fees speci ed in paragraph 9 of Executive Order No.
342 either were not collected by the Government or were misappropriated by petitioner
and converted to her own use. It may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly
authorizes the Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouses
and minor children below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as
noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad faith and manifest partiality." It is
clear, however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary investigation offered
absolutely no basis for such an allegation which is actually a conclusion offered by the
Special Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally" which are
recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the
preliminary investigation showed no undue injury, to the Government and no
"unwarranted bene t or advantage" to the alien wives and minor children of quali ed
aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications for waiver of
passport requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In other words, if the
interpretation or construction given by petitioner to Executive Order No. 324 is correct
— i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor
children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of quali ed aliens who had themselves arrived in
the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were otherwise eligible under the terms
and conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes
in the interest of allowing or restoring family unity — there would be no "injury," let alone
an "undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the bene t of waiver of passport
requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor children of quali ed aliens be
deemed to be an "unwarranted" bene t to such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of
Executive Order No. 324 be held to be correct.
It is a rule too rmly established to require documentation that
contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or implementing regulation by the
executive or administrative o cials precisely charged with the implementation of such
a statute or regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This
Court itself has in many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by such
administrative officers. 3 But even if an administrative interpretation be ultimately found
to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the o cial responsible for such
interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly or
criminally or administratively. It is just as rmly settled that to impose liability upon the
public o cer who has so acted, something far graver than error of law or error of
judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personal intentions, personal
malice or bad faith. 4 As noted above, no such allegations were made during the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by
petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal question, on which petitioner in effect asks
us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to prevent this Court
from addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any
additional essential facts apart from those already admitted by petitioner. It seems to
me that a public o cer is entitled to have legal questions like that before this Court
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 resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public o cer should not be
compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of: the whole
process of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is
the very issue at stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law,
constitute a crime. Indeed, if the acts which petitioner admits having done constitute a
criminal offense, very serious consequences would follow for the administration of law
and government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the criminal
information here would appear to be that public o cers interpret and apply statutory
and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at the risk of criminal liability,
notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent to pro t personally by any such
interpretation and application.
The second information was led in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, charging petitioner with Daisy Montinola and Fermin
Pacia with violation of P.D. No. 46 allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about November 28, 1988, or for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Daisy Montinola and
Fermin Pacia, all public o cers, being then the Commissioner, Chief of the
Board of Special Inquiry and employee of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, respectively, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally solicit and receive money, gifts and other
valuable things from several (F)ilipino end foreign businessmen the same being
given by reason of their respective o cial positions for past favor and expected
favor and better treatment in the future from said accused, in the discharge of
their respective official functions.
Contrary to law."
The facts brought out during the preliminary investigation of the above charge
showed that, in connection with a Christmas party held on 20 December 1988 at 3:30
p.m. in front of the CID building, held by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation for the bene t of its employees, letters of solicitation were sent out to a
great many people and companies, under the signature of Daisy Montinola and Fermin
Pacia who were Chairman of the Christmas Committee and President of the CID
Employees Association, respectively. The identical letters of solicitation read as
follows:
"Dear . . .:
The CID Christmas Party for employees will be held on Tuesday, 20
December 1988 at 3:30 p.m., in front of the CID building on Magallanes Drive,
Intramuros.
We shall be happy to receive your donations for the CID, to be distributed
to the employees during the party. Further, we wish to invite you to the party, so
that you can witness the distribution of proposed Christmas bags.
Under P.D. Nos. 46 and 807, the Commissioner strictly prohibits any
employee from receiving any Christmas gift. Hence, Christmas gifts may be
given, only to the CID as an agency.
Thank you very much for your generosity, and please accept our best
Christmas wishes . . ."

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 Three hundred twenty-six (326) letters were sent out; one hundred one (101)
addressees responded with donations. Petitioner submitted a list of the donors and of
the items and cash donated to the CID. The cash donations were used to purchase
food and grocery items which, together with donations consisting of food, were then
divided and packaged as individual Christmas baskets and distributed to 700 o cers
and employees of the CID, plus 34 members of the CID security force. Donations in
kind, including ve (5) electric appliances, plus small consolation prizes, were ra ed
off to the employees during the Christmas party. Petitioner also furnished a list of
these prizes and of the CID employees who won them, as well as an accounting of the
purchases of food and grocery items. The accounting showed that a balance of
P8,588.75 remained, which balance was earmarked to assist in the funding of the CID
summer excursion for CID employees and their families. 5

The operative portion of P.D. No. 46, dated 10 November 1972, reads as follows:
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1
dated September 22, 1972, do hereby make it punishable for any public o cial
or employee, whether of the national or local governments, to receive, directly or
indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or
other valuable thing on any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift,
present or other valuable thing is given by reason of his o cial position,
regardless of whether or not the same is for past favor or favors or the giver
hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the
public o cial or employee concerned in the discharge of his o cial functions
Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainments in
honor of the official or employee or his immediate relatives.
For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment for not less than
one (1) year nor more than ve (5) years and perpetual disquali cation from
public o ce shall be imposed. The o cial or employee concerned shall
likewise be subject to administrative disciplinary action and, if found guilty,
shall be meted out the penalty of suspension or removal, depending on the
seriousness of the offense." (Emphasis supplied)
Here again, I respectfully submit, a serious legal question exists: whether or not
the above acts of petitioner, as admitted by her during the course of the preliminary
investigation, fall within the scope of P.D. No. 46. It is not disputed that the solicitation
had been made for the purpose stated in the solicitation letter itself — the 1988
Christmas party of the CID o cers and employees. It is also not disputed that all the
donations in cash or in kind had been utilized for and in connection with such Christmas
party, and that the only personal bene t received by petitioner and her two (2) co-
accused consisted of one Christmas food basket each, along with more than 700 other
officers and employees of the CID.
One may, of course, debate the wisdom of the measures so adopted or tolerated
by petitioner in connection with that 1988 CID Christmas party. Petitioner hardly
invented the employees' Christmas party, a practice widely observed in both the public
and the private sectors. Petitioner's special contribution consisted of making sure that
the solicitation, receipt and distribution of gifts were all done in an organized and public
manner, in full view of all the o cers and employees of the CID and of the general
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 public, doubtless to emphasize for whose bene t such solicitation had been
conducted, to minimize private or secret solicitation by individual CID o cers or
employees, and to preclude any charge of secret personal bene t on her part and of
those who signed the solicitation letters. What is at stake here, however, is the legal
question of whether or not the acts which petitioner has admitted constitute a criminal
offense under P.D. No. 46 which, I believe, is ripe for determination by this Court. I also
submit that those acts do not fall within the scope of P.D. No. 46 as it is presently
written. 6 It may well be that, as a matter of administrative policy, all solicitation
including solicitation for the bene t of the o cers and employees of a particular
agency or government should be prohibited and perhaps criminalized. That, however, is
something for the legislative authority to consider and act upon, not the courts and
certainly not in a criminal case.
For all the foregoing, and certainly in respect of two (2) out of the three (3)
criminal informations led against petitioner, I believe that the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition should be granted and vote accordingly.
Gutierrez, Griño-Aquino, Romero, JJ ., dissent.
Footnotes
1. Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 19.

2. Annex B, id.; ibid., 22.

3. Annex E, Addendum to Petition; ibid., 310.

4. Rollo, 285.

5. Ibid., 416-418.
6. Ramos, et al. vs. Aquino, etc., et al., 39 SCRA 641 (1971); Arkoncel vs. Court of First
Instance of Basilan City, etc., et al., 66 SCRA 361 (1975), Asutilla vs. Philippine National
Bank, etc., et al., 141 SCRA 40 (1986).
7. Tabujara vs. Office of the Special Prosecutor, et al., G.R. No. 87912, Resolution En Banc,
January 18, 1990.
8. Rollo, 14.

9. Ibid., 420-421.
10. Annex C, Petition, Rollo, 23; Annex F, Addendum to Petition, Rollo, 312; and Annex 4,
Comment of Public Respondents, Rollo, 445.

11. Rollo, 424-425.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting:

1. 192 SCRA 183 (1990).

2. It is also pertinent to note the following classes of excluded aliens:

"(10) Persons who are members of a family accompanying an excluded alien, unless
in the opinion of the Commissioner of Immigration no hardship would result from their
admission;

(11) Persons accompanying an excluded person who is helpless from mental or

physical disability or infancy, when the protection or guardianship of such
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 accompanying person or persons is required by the excluded person, we shall be
determined by the Commissioner of Immigration;

(12) Children under fifteen years of age, unaccompanied by or not coming to a parent,
except that any such children may be admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner of
Immigration, if otherwise admissible;
xxx xxx xxx

(Section 29 [a], C.A. No. 613, as amended; emphasis supplied).

3. See, e.g., Ramos vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 (1967); Salavaria vs.
Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 (1978); Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of
Customs, 29 SCRA 617 (1969); University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 37
SCRA 54 (1971); Lim Hao Ting vs. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 (1958).

4. See generally Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, 85 SCRA 346 (1990).

5. Rollo, p. 37.

6. It might be noted that Section 36 of the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807, as amended)
specifies, among grounds for disciplinary action, the following:
"(9) Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of
official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is
given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment
than that accorded other persons, or committing acts punishable under the anti-graft
laws." (Emphasis supplied)

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