SoRBERG Scuuz. GENIUS LOCI TOWARDS A BEE oye or Rizzoud EDINBURGH COLLEGE OF ART LIBRARYPREFACE, “Logie is doubtless un: buriteannot withstand amin who wants to live. Frans Kafka Wie Prial akable, The present book forms a sequel co my theoretical works Intentions at Architec- ture (1963) and Exisience, Space and ‘Architecture (1971). leis also related to my historical study Meaning in Wester Architecture (1975). Common to all of them is the view that architeccure fepresents a means to give man an “existeatial foothold”. My” primary) aim is therefore to investigate the psyhic implications of architecture rather than prectical side, although certainly idmit thot there exists an iaterrelation- ship herween the ewo aspects, In Prten- fons in Architecture the practical, “fanctional”, dimension was in fact discussed as part of a comprehensive system At the same time, however, the book stressed that the’ “environment influences human beings, and chis in plies that the purpose of architecture transcends the definition given by early functicnalism”. A thorough discussion of perception and. symbolization was therefore included, and it was em- phasized thet man’ cannot gain 2 foor hold through scientific understanding aloue, He needs symbols, that is, works sf act which “represent life sitsations™. ‘The conception of the work of art as 4 “coneretization” of a life-situarion is maintained in the present book. It is one cf the basic needs of man to experience his lifesituations as meaningful, and the purpose of the work of art is to “keep” ‘and ansiic meanings. The concept of Smeaning’was abo intcoduced in [re tentions in Architecture. In general, the early hook aimed at understanding ar. chitecture in concrete “architectural” terms, an aim which 1 still consider particularly important. Too much con- fusion is created today by those who talk about everything else when the discuss architecture! My writings chere- + fore reflect a belief in architecture; I do not accept that architecture, vernacular for monumental, is a luxury or perhaps 5 something which i made “to impress the populace” (Rapopon). There are not diffrent. “Kinds* of architecture, but foal lifcren sitvations) whichis requite diferent solutions inorder to satisfy Thais physical ard psychic needs My general aim™ and approach has therefore been the’ same in all the iwritings mentioned above. As time has passed, however, a certain chitge in method fas. become manifest. It (eine We Aroletetate ie aad terete merlin rah Hatin by reste ccoeiode ules Gree io natal ween ink that this approach i wrong, but today Lin Caiher nechoueimure Muriarie (Wher Wwe trent architecture analyticilly, we Iniss the conerete environmental” cae Tacter, that Bde very Guallty Which fs the obec ofl man's Wantifieationy and which may give him a sense of ex istential foothold. To overcame this iroduced in Existence, Space ure the concept of “ex- ial space”, “Existential space” is not a_logico-mathematical term, but Comprises the basic relationships be. eween man and his eaviconment. The present book continues the cearch for a Concrete understanding of the environ- ‘ment. The concept of existential space is here divided in the complementary terms “space” and character’, in accordance with the basic psychic functions “orient ation” and “densification. Space and character are not treated in a purely philosophical way (as has been done by ©. F. Bolinow), bur are directly related to architecture, following the definition of architecture as a “eoncretization of existential space”, “Concretization” is furthermore explained by means of the concepts of * and “thing” The word ‘ originally meant « gathering, and the meaning of anythin Consists in what it gathers. Thus Hei degger said: “A thing gathers world” The philosophy of Heidegger has been the catalyst which has made the present book possible and determined its ap~ proach, The wish for understanding architecture as 9 conerete phenomenon already expressed in Pmtevitions in Are chitecture, could be satisfied in the present book, thanks to Heidewger's essays on language and aesthetics, which have been collecied and admirably trans- lated into. English by A. Hofstadter Pactry, Language, Thonght, New York 1971), Fist of all L owe to Heidegger the concept of dwelling. “Existential foorhnlé” and “dwelling” are synonyms, and “dwelling”, in an existential seme, is the purpose of architecture. Man dwells when he can. orientate himself within and identify himself with an environment, or, in short, when he ‘experiences the environment as meaning- ful, Dwelling therefore implies some thing more than “shelter”. Ic implies that the spaces where life occurs are places in the true sense of the word. A place is a space which has a distinct character. Since ancient times the genizs loct, or “spiric of place. has been recognized 3s, the conerete reality man has t0 face and come to terms with in his daily life Archizecture means to visualize the ge- nins loci, and the task of the architect is to create meaningful places, whereby he helpsman to dwell z Lam well aware of the shortcomings ol the present book. Many problems could only be treated in a very sketchy way, and need further elaboration. The book represents, however, 2 first step towards a "phenomenolozy of archivecture", that is, a theory which understands archi- tecture in concrete, existential terms. The conquest of the existential dimen- sion is in fact the main purpose of the present book. After decades of abstract, “scientific” theory, it is urgent thar we return to 4 qualitative, phenomenolon- ical understanding of architecure. Itdocs aot help much to solve practic problems as long. as this understanding is lacking. The book therefore docs not treat economical and social proble ‘The exiscential dimension is nor “deter mined” by. the socio-economical con- ditions, although they may facilitare or F) realization of certain r impede the (se existential stre ical conditions are like a pictare-fram they offer a certain “space” for life to take place, bur do nor determine its existential ' meanings, The existential meanings have deeper roors. They are determined by the structures of our being-in-the-world, which have been analyzed by Heidegger in his. classical work “Being and Time” (Sein tnd Zeit, 1926). In his essay. “Building Dwelling Thinking” (1951), Heidegger moreover related basic existential structures to the fonctions of building and dwelling, and “The Thing” (1950) he demonstrated the fundamental importance of the con- cept of “gathering”. Modern architects have in general excluded the existential dimension, although some of chem spon= tancously "recognized its _ significance Thus Le Corbusier wrote: “The purpose of architecture is fo move us. Ar- chitectural emotion exists when the work rings within us in tune with a universe whose laws we obey, recognize and. respect”, (Vers me architecture, 1923). Only with Louis Kalin, however, the existential dimension has regained its tue imporcance, and in his questi “What does the building want to be?” the problem is posed in its essential form. The existential dimension (“ruth”) be- comes manifest in history, but its mean- ings wanscend the historical. situatio History, on the other hand, only. b comes meaningful if it represents new concretizations of the existential dimen- sion. In general the concretization of the existential dimension depends on how ¢ socio-econom things are made, that is, it depends on form and technology (‘inspired tech- nology”, Louis Kahn said). This also inchides the “how” of the Nasural environment. Inthe present hook we have therefore chosen. to approach the existential dimension in terms of place. ‘The piace represents architecture's share in wuth, The place is the concree manifestation of man’s dwelling, and his identity depends on his belonging 10 places Twant co thank all chose colleagues ard students who have given me inspiration and help, In particular thanks go to my wife Anna Maria De Dominicis for her criticism and untiring help. Because of the composite nature of the book I have not included any. bie bliography. All references are found in thefoot-nows. Oslo, June 1976 A concrete ter I PLACE? 1. The Phenomenon of Place Our everyday lifeworld consists. of conereie “phenomena”. It consists of people, of animals, of flowers, trees and forests, of stone, earth, wood and weater, of towns,” streets’ and houses, doors. windows and furnitare, And it consists of sun, moon and. stars, of drifting clouds, ‘of night and day ‘and Changing seasons. But it also compnses more” intangible phenomera such as feclings. This, is what is “given”, this is the of our existence. Thus Rilke asks: “Are we perhaps heve to say: house, bridge, founsain, gate, jug, fruit tree, ‘window, at’ best? column, tower...” Everything else, such as acoms and molecules, numbers and all kinds of “daca”, are abstractions or tools Which are constructed 10 serve other purposes than those of everyday Today it is common to give more importance to the tools chan our hfe: world, The concrete things which constiute our given world are interrelated in complex and perhaps contradictory ways, Seme of the phenomena may for instance comprise others. The forest conssts of trees, and the town is made up of houses. “Landscape” is such a com: prehensive phenomenon, In general we may say that some phenomena form an \ “environment” to others. for_environment_is It is common usage to. say. that “nats and occurrences take pplacen in Tact it is meaningless co imagine any hap: pening without reference toa locality. Place—isevidentlyan_integral_part-of- existence! What, then, do we mean with the word place“? Obviously we mean. somethi more than absiraet location, We mean a totality made up of eoneree thi having material substance, shape, tex ture and colour. Together these things determine an “environmental character, pla