Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 10, No.

2, 125146, July 2005

ARTICLES

Conict Resolution in the Neighbourhood: Comparing EU Involvement in Turkeys Kurdish Question and in the Israeli Palestinian Conict
NATHALIE TOCCI
European University Institute, Florence, Italy

ABSTRACT Much of the European Unions (EUs) foreign policy in practice is conducted through its bilateral contractual relations with third parties. These have taken different forms, ranging from the accession process to looser forms of association. Contractual ties are characterized by the delivery of specic benets governed by mutual obligations, which can thus potentially transform the incentive structure underpinning conicts within or between third states. The aim of this article is to compare the manner in which the Unions bilateral relations have affected two key conict areas in its neighbourhood: the dispute between the Turkish state and the Kurds, and that between Israelis and Palestinians. The Unions relations with the parties in these two conicts differ signicantly. Yet in view of these very differences, a comparison between the EUs role in both conicts could prove fruitful. It could offer important insights on the potential benets and effective limits of the Union as a third party actor in conict settlement and resolution in its turbulent neighbourhood.

The interest in comparing the EUs role in Turkeys Kurdish question and in the Israeli Palestinian conict is far from immediately obvious. Both the nature of the two conicts as well as the EUs role in these regions have been very different. Yet precisely in view of these differences, this article attempts a comparison between the EUs role and impact in these two conict areas. By doing so, it outlines the EUs major benets and shortcomings in contributing to the pacication of ethno-political conicts in its southern neighbourhood. It also explains the principal reasons underpinning the EUs successes and failures. As such, this article contributes to the wider understanding of the conditions and impact of the EUs role in conict resolution, an objective that is agged as a principal aim in EU foreign policy. It

Correspondence Address: Nathalie Tocci, Campo de Fiori 3, 00186 Rome, Italy. Email: nathalie.tocci@iue.it

1362-9395 Print/1743-9418 Online/05/020125-22 q 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd DOI: 10.1080/13629390500141568

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builds on the emerging comparative literature in this eld, focusing more specically on the effect and effectiveness of EU policy instruments tailored to parties in conict (EUBorderConf, 2003 2005; Coppieters, Emerson & Tocci, 2004). In analysing the EUs role, the rst evident observation is that the Union has not played a prime diplomatic mediation role in either conict. In the Israeli Palestinian conict, despite the formation of the Quartet in 2001, the US has remained rmly in the driving seat of mediation (or lack thereof). On the Kurdish question, the Turkish state has never invited any international mediation, including that of the EU. In turn, this article focuses on a different dimension of European foreign policy, namely the EUs contractual ties with the conict parties. Contractual relations foresee the delivery of EU-related benets through different degrees of integration into the EU, in return for the fullment of specied obligations (Smith, 1998). The fullment of obligations can be ex ante or ex post, that is, either conditions need to be fullled before the contract is agreed (such as the Copenhagen criteria in the case of accession), and/or conditions specied in an agreement need to be respected otherwise the contract may be lawfully suspended (such as the human rights clause in the association agreements) (Zalewski, 2004). Ex ante or ex post conditionality can be tailored to promote degrees of European integration per se, as well as to foster long-run structural change both within and between third countries (Keukeleire, 2000). The latter may affect the incentive structure underpinning ethno-political conicts (Tocci, 2004). The contractual ties linking the European Union to these two conict areas have been very different. Turkeys 1963 association agreement allowed for the possibility of full membership. In 1996 Turkey formally entered the EUs customs union. A further qualitative step was made in 1999, when the European Council in Helsinki accepted Turkeys EU candidacy (Onis, 2000). Following a European Council decision in December 2004, the EU is expected to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. By contrast, both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have never had any membership prospects. Although Israel concluded its rst trade agreement with the European Community (EC) in 1964, the relationship never included the option of full integration into EU structures. This is not to say that the relationship has been static. On the contrary, it has deepened signicantly and continues to do so. The Community and Israel have also signed complementary agreements on procurement, agriculture and scientic and technical co-operation. The Israel Action Plan under the emerging European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) maps out a wide scope for further integration. Due to the absence of a state and the humanitarian and economic conditions in the occupied territories, bilateral relations between the Union and the Palestinians evolved later and with a greater emphasis of aid over trade. In 1986, the member states allowed preferential trade access to specic Palestinian products. In the context of the Oslo process, the member states stepped up their economic support to the Palestinians, directed primarily to the Palestinian Authority (PA), the embryo of

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a future Palestinian state. In 1997, the EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement came into force, underlying which was the EUs anticipation of Palestinian statehood. Like Israel, the PA has also been included in the ENP. Hence, Turkey, Israel and the PA have all enjoyed different, albeit important, contractual ties with the EU. The difference in these relationships opens the scope for an interesting comparison. To what extent has the EU used the potential inuence embedded within these ties to affect positively the respective conicts? If the EUs potential has not been fully realized, what explains its deciencies? EU Objectives in the Two Conicts In order to determine the effectiveness or otherwise of the EUs role, the natural starting place is an overview of the EUs objectives in these regions. The EUs aims in the Middle East conict have been articulated around two interconnected pillars, which consolidated over the decades into a relatively well-dened view of the conict and its resolution. The rst pillar has been the need to respect the collective rights of the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples. The EC/EU historically recognized Israels right to statehood, living in peace with its neighbours within secure and internationally recognized boundaries. The European position towards the Palestinians instead was dened progressively over the decades. From the openended support of Palestinian self-determination in the 1980 Venice Declaration, by the end of the Oslo process, the 1999 Berlin European Council asserted its implicit support for a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian state (European Council, 1980, point 7; European Council, 1999). With the eruption of the second Intifada, the EU felt emboldened to articulate further its vision for a peaceful Middle East. This entailed the creation of two states, Israel and Palestine, living in peace and security within internationally recognized borders. The state of Palestine would be viable, independent, sovereign and democratic, and it would be established along the 1967 borders, with minor and mutually agreed adjustments if necessary. The second pillar of EU goals has been the importance of respecting human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law. Most EU declarations on the Middle East conict since the 1970s have condemned Palestinian violence and terrorism, pointing to the violations of rights and law that such acts entailed. The member states have also condemned Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, whose construction contravenes the fourth Geneva Convention governing the laws of occupation. With the collapse of the Oslo process, the EU intensied its calls to halt and reverse settlement construction, and denounced the whole array of human rights and humanitarian law violations, ranging from Palestinian suicide bombings, to Israeli incursions, extra-judicial killings and forms of collective punishment. It repeatedly afrmed that Israeli security and Palestinian self-determination should be pursued exclusively within the connes of international law. Since 2002, two nal issues featuring prominently in EU declarations have been Israels barrier/wall constructed in the West Bank, and the reform of the PA. Hence by the turn of the century, EU declarations stipulated clearly both what was the EUs ultimate vision in the Middle East and what were the necessary means to achieve this. The aim was

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that of a two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders. The means were negotiations and the respect for human rights, democracy and international law. When it comes to Turkeys Kurdish question, the EU has never specied to the same extent its preferred solution. Beginning with the 1998 Progress Report on Turkey, the Commission of the EC has called for a political and non-military solution to the problem of the south-east (Commission of the EC, 1998: 20). Yet it barely dened what such a solution entailed in constitutional, socio-economic or political terms. It simply stated that a solution could include the recognition of certain forms of Kurdish cultural identity and greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism or terrorism (Commission of the EC, 1998: 20). In its 2004 Report, the Commission of the EC only went a tentative step further, recommending the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), a strategy for socio-economic development to bridge regional disparities and the full enjoyment of rights and freedoms by the Kurds (Commission of the EC, 2004a: 167). In other words, EU prescriptive steps regarding the Kurdish question have remained extremely vague and open-ended. This is not to say that the EU has not spelled out sufciently precise guidelines on issues that are relevant to Turkeys Kurdish question. When taken collectively, these recommendations give a clear idea of the EUs overall goals. On top of the EUs wish-list has been the need for Turkey to respect the individual human rights of all its citizens, including its Kurdish population. These have included nondiscrimination, the freedoms of expression, association and religion. The Commission of the ECs documents have also called for the abolition of the death penalty, the eradication of torture and the respect of rights in trials and detention periods. Beyond individual human rights, the Commission of the EC has also made specic demands concerning cultural rights, affecting principally (but not exclusively) the Kurds. Hence, the EU has called for the right to use Kurdish names and the rights to broadcasting and receive education in languages other than Turkish. The Commission of the EC has expressly viewed with displeasure the banning of pro-Kurdish parties and it has supported Turkeys rst tentative steps towards decentralization. The Record So Far In the light of these explicit and implicit goals, what has been the record on the ground so far? Violating Rights and Pre-Empting a Viable Two State Solution in the Middle East In the Middle East, with the eruption of the second Intifada in September 2000, the region has seen a mounting cycle of violence that has entailed both violations of human rights, democracy and international law, as well as a steady reversal from the accomplishment of a viable two-state solution. The Intifada has witnessed Israels effective reoccupation of all Palestinian territories, leading to extensive human rights and humanitarian law abuses. Israel has been held responsible for the use of

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excessive force, targeted assassinations and for sweeping restrictions on movement through closures, checkpoints and curfews. Furthermore, the West Bank in particular has witnessed an expanding network of Israeli settlement blocs and highways connecting them. Since June 2002, the Israeli government has proceeded with the construction of a barrier/wall in the West Bank, which cuts deep into Palestinian territories and thus results in a de facto annexation of land. Due to its route as well as its effect on human rights, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has therefore deemed the barrier illegal in July 2004. Palestinian militant groups have also perpetrated grave human rights and international law violations. These have primarily taken the form of suicide bombings targeting Israeli civilians within the State of Israel. The identied responsible groups have been Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Suicide bombings and other attacks aimed at civilians are prohibited by Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention. However, the legal difculty has arisen from the fact that the Convention only refers to the obligations of states and state-like actors. Moreover, the criminal provisions of humanitarian law are based on the doctrine of command responsibility, according to which, people in positions of authority who fail to take adequate preventive measures are also held accountable. An issue has been therefore to what extent the PA, as a state-like actor, should be held responsible for attacks against Israeli civilians. Human Rights Watch did not nd evidence that the PA planned, ordered or carried out suicide bombings or other attacks on Israeli civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2002). However the leadership was criticized for failing to take adequate action to prosecute those responsible for the attacks. The developments in the last four years have also reduced the prospects of a viable two-state solution. On the Israeli side, the policy of cantonization has worked expressly against this end-point. Ongoing and accelerated settlement expansion in the West Bank has gradually rendered Palestinian localities isolated enclaves of a Greater Israel. So far, the West Bank has been subdivided into over 50 enclaves, East Jerusalem has been separated from the rest of the West Bank and the northern sections of the West Bank have been separated from the southern sections. The construction of the West Bank wall forms part of the same logic, given its de facto annexation of 60 per cent of the settlements and 90 per cent of the settler population. The most recent element in Israels cantonization strategy has been the disengagement plan. The plan foresees Israeli troop and settlement withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the northern West Bank. Many have acclaimed the plan, hoping it could trigger a domino effect on settlement dismantlement in the West Bank. Yet, while these spin-off effects might bear fruit, to date, the plans more likely evolution is a disengagement from Gaza as a means to consolidate Israels grip on large portions of the West Bank. Israels ongoing plans for settlement construction in the West Bank and its re-routing of the fence to comprise the expanded settlement blocs fall in line with this strategy. Dynamics within Palestinian politics have also lent support to Israeli strategies and arguments. Two clearly discernible questions are those of violence on the one hand and good governance and democracy on the other. On the question of violence,

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the criminal acts perpetrated by Palestinian militias and the PAs ineptness and perceived unwillingness to quell them have contributed to discrediting the goal of an independent and sovereign Palestine and supported the thesis that due to the absence of a Palestinian partner for peace, Israel should proceed with unilateral actions. On the wider questions of Palestinian governance, the PA, in response to mounting internal criticism and resentment since the mid-1990s and rising international accusations since 2002, launched a process of reform aimed at strengthening good governance and democracy. In 2002, the Basic Law was adopted, and it was revised in 2003 to allow for a prime ministerial post. A Law on the Independence of the Judiciary was passed. Signicant progress was made in the management of the PAs nances, thus curbing the potential for corruption. Yet more often than not reforms have been supercial. In 2003, the creation of the prime ministers post did not come with its effective empowerment, as most control remained in the presidents hands. The cabinet was reshufed in 2002, but changes were largely cosmetic. In the security sector, the bulk of the reform has yet to be undertaken. Within the judiciary, independence in law is yet to materialize in practice. The passing away of Yasser Arafat opened the space for a reshaping of Palestinian domestic politics, not least through new elections and an enhanced dialogue with the Islamic factions. Since then a far more genuine process of reform has been in the making. There has been a greater empowerment of the prime minister, with President Abbas and Prime Minister Qureia sharing powers between them. Greater transparency in PA public nances through the control of the presidents funds is under way. The new technocratic Cabinet has set out an ambitious programme of administrative, security sector and judicial reform. Dialogue between the Palestinian factions has enhanced and improved, opening the prospects for the Islamic parties co-option into the political system (both the PLO and the PA) and an ensuing increased coherence within Palestinian politics. Yet key challenges remain ahead. These are related to the evolving dynamics within the major Fatah movement, between Fatah and the Islamic factions and between the PLO and the PA. In other words, it remains to be seen whether the post-Arafat era will see greater coherence and unity amongst Palestinians or increased chaos and fragmentation in the occupied territories. Nonetheless, the pre-emption of a viable two-state solution is relentlessly progressing. Beneath the day-to-day voices, events, hopes and despairs, the fundamental trends persist unabated. Without their radical overhaul, a worst case scenario could see Israel withdrawing its settlers and soldiers from selected territories and relocating them in large annexed areas of the West Bank. Beyond the barrier, Palestinians would be relegated to enclaves connected by tunnels and roads. If they so wished, these enclaves could also be called a state, which would be more or less democratic and well-governed depending on the success of the reform process. Depending on the form and success of security sector reform, Palestinian violence could reduce, although it is unlikely to cease so long as the situation on the ground remains fundamentally unaltered. Instability would thus persist, and continue to spill over into Europe in increasingly dangerous and complex ways.

Conict Resolution in the Neighbourhood Reforms and Pending Restrictions in Turkey

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In Turkey up until the turn of the century, the Kurdish question either deteriorated or failed to improve beyond cosmetic gestures. Yet, contrary to the Middle East, since 1999 a process of normalization has been under way with an accompanying improvement of human rights and the rule of law for all Turkish citizens. These ongoing reforms, have approximated the EUs recommendations. Particularly since 2000, Turkish governments have pursued an ongoing and unprecedented process of domestic political reform. Irrespective of the limits of the reform process, what appears irrefutable is that genuine democratic change is under way and has affected, for the better, the condition of Turkeys Kurds. More specically, in October 2001, the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved 34 constitutional amendments, most of them in the area of human rights. These were followed by a set of seven harmonization packages passed in 2001 03, which amended the laws in the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. A further set of constitutional amendments was passed in May 2004. This was followed by an eighth harmonization package and the adoption of a new Law on Associations and Penal Code in July and September 2004 respectively.1 Most reforms were tailored to all Turkish citizens, including therefore also the Kurds. Considerable steps were taken to protect the freedom of expression, by amending or abolishing restrictive constitutional and legal provisions. By removing restrictions on the use of any language prohibited by law, the freedom of expression of linguistic minorities such as the Kurds was enhanced. The right to a fair trial was strengthened with the provision to allow for retrials of cases found contrary to the European Convention for Human Rights. This has led to the retrial of the Kurdish MPs Dicle, Dogan, Sadak and Zana who were ultimately acquitted by the Turkish Court of Cassation in 2004. Constitutional amendments and the new Law on Associations also lifted major limitations on the freedom of association, providing more space for the establishment and operation of associations founded by and seeking to serve Kurdish citizens. The constitutional changes also increased the difculty of banning political parties, thus theoretically increasing the future prospects of survival of pro-Kurdish political parties. In terms of good governance, a public administration reform is under way, with a view of decentralizing governance and improving efciency. Other reforms were adopted with the stated purpose of bringing a legal solution to the Kurdish question. These measures responded to the long-sought Kurdish demands for language and cultural rights. The third harmonization package granted linguistic groups broadcasting (radio and television) and private education rights in languages other than Turkish. Under the sixth harmonization package, the broadcasting law was further amended to allow non-Turkish broadcasts on private radio and television stations. Under the seventh package, the foreign language law was amended to extend the rights to private language courses in Kurdish. Finally, the territorial situation in the south-east has been normalizing gradually. By 2002, the state of emergency had been progressively lifted in all provinces, putting an end to 15 years of emergency rule in the south-east. In an effort to remedy

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the legacy of the state of emergency regime, in 2003 the government enacted an East and Southeast Action Plan, covering measures related to public administration, economy, health and education. The Plan also includes a resettlement scheme for the IDPs. This is not to say that the reforms adopted are awless and complete. Less still that the reforms are all respected and implemented. Indeed, when it comes to the Kurdish question, two sets of problems remain to be tackled. First, important omissions in the amendments retained some of the most problematic constraints on the exercise of rights and freedoms. These are the very restrictions that had been enacted and/or disproportionately enforced against Kurds or pro-Kurdish groups and associations. For example, in terms of Kurdish political participation, a political party can still be banned if it is viewed as threatening the states territorial integrity and national cohesiveness. In March 2003, the Constitutional Court ruled to permanently dissolve the pro-Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HADEP) on this very basis. The procedure to dissolve its successor the Democratic Peoples Party (DEHAP) is ongoing. The 10 per cent electoral threshold remains unaltered. In terms of language rights, the law still bans Kurdish public education as well as private education in (rather than only of) Kurdish. Turkish also remains the only ofcial language of the state, creating problems for the legal rights of non-Turkish speaking citizens. Second, the tensions within some of the new laws and regulations render the legal system susceptible to abuse in implementation and enforcement. Many of the reforms, particularly in the area of language rights, were followed by restrictive implementing regulations adopted by the administration. For example, despite the legalization of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, the ensuing broadcasting regulations precluded regional or local broadcasting, required state authorization, established direct state control over content and restricted the timing of the broadcasts. The purpose of the new laws was also hindered by overly activist prosecutors, who took advantage of legal gaps to operate against the letter and spirit of the reforms. Finally, the implementation of the return to village scheme continues slowly and unevenly. Assessing the Effectiveness of the EUs Role Regardless of whether EU goals are being met, the underlying premise of this article is that the EU, as an external actor could not have determined alone events in these two regions. In both cases, developments have been dictated predominantly by domestic determinants, interacting with wider regional and international factors. In the Israeli Palestinian context, the inherent aws of the Oslo Process, the failure of the Camp David II summit, the unwillingness and inability of the late President Arafat to reign in the Intifada in its early days, the election of Sharons Likud and its escalation of violence, and the dramatic change in the international climate following the 11 September attacks all explain the evolution of the status quo. In Turkey, the capture of PKK leader Ocalan, the ongoing self-reassessment of the Turkish military and the 2002 election of the reformist Justice and Development

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Party (AKP) set the context and generated the momentum for fundamental political reform. Yet irrespective of its status and resources, the EU has also been a major external actor in both the IsraeliPalestinian and Turkish Kurdish conicts. The underlying questions tackled below are thus the following: in the light of the EUs relations with the parties and its ensuing potential inuence on them, has the EU put to best use its instruments in order to contribute to the amelioration or resolution of these two conicts? Comparing the two cases, what have been the major strengths of the EUs role, and what its most glaring shortcomings? The Value of EU Benets The potential inuence of the EUs contractual ties depends pivotally on the benets on offer and the costs of compliance with contractual obligations. Only if the potential gains relative to the costs are perceived to be sufciently high, could the EU, if it so wishes, meaningfully attempt to exert inuence on the two conicts. The objective value of the benets. The EU enjoys categorically different relations with the parties in the two conicts. With Israel and the PA, it has had since the mid1990s an association relationship. In the case of Israel, association has been farreaching, while in the case of the PA it has been complemented with high levels of assistance. As such, the objective value of these two relationships should not be underestimated. Certainly when compared to the European Unions contractual ties with non-candidate countries, both Israel and the PA rank high on the EUs list of priorities, judging by the relationship both parties enjoy. Yet, the categorical difference with Turkey is evident. In terms of EU inuence, the Turkish precedent shows how the actual jump from association to accession has been crucial. Between Turkeys 1987 application for membership and the 1999 Helsinki Council, EU actors refrained from giving the green light to Turkeys accession course. The nadir of EU-Turkey ties came at and after the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, in which the European Union opted to open accession negotiations with the central and eastern European countries as well as with Cyprus and Malta, while not recognizing Turkey as a candidate to membership. During the 1990s, in view of the mounting violence in the south-east, EU institutions became increasingly vocal on the Kurdish question, spelling out long lists of political recommendations to Turkey. Yet EU calls and conditions largely fell on deaf ears. With the exception of a few and largely cosmetic gestures (to secure the 1996 customs union agreement and the 1999 Helsinki European Council decision), EU impact on the Kurdish question was virtually nil. Indeed, the rst two Commission Progress Reports on Turkey (in 1998 and 1999) were largely negative. The change of approach since Turkey was accorded EU candidacy in 1999 could not be starker. Although Turkeys reform process gained momentum slowly and was crucially linked to ongoing domestic developments, the launch of Turkeys accession process had a fundamental positive impact on reform. The reforms were undertaken with the stated aim of fullling the Copenhagen political criteria

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(necessary to open accession negotiations). The gap between Turkey and the other candidates remained wide, both in terms of the timeframe for accession and of the Unions political and material commitment to enlargement (Avci, 2001). Yet relative to Turkeys own history of relations with the EU, a categorical jump had been made. This rise in value empowered the most reform-minded circles in the country, tilting domestic political balances in their favour. Drawing from the Turkish experience, logic suggests that the EUs potential impact on countries it does not intend to include is far lower. Both Israel and the PA squarely t this category. Israel is neither included in the EU customs union nor in the European Economic Area, and it certainly has no prospects of entering the accession process. The Palestinians, while receiving key sums of money, are even further away in terms of their degree of European integration. Even the provisions for preferential trade included in their Association Agreement remain largely unimplemented. The ENP, in which both Israel and the PA are included, in principle aims to blur the lines separating EU inclusion and exclusion. Yet, the policy has been developed also to provide a clear and valuable alternative to membership. Furthermore, even this objective is yet to materialize in practice. Particularly when it comes to the Palestinians, the benets on offer in the ENP are hardly discernible. The subjective evaluation of the benets. The qualitative gap between the EUs contractual ties with Turkey on the one hand and Israel and Palestine on the other is wide and in itself provides one explanation of the different inuence of the European Union in these two cases. Yet alone, it cannot explain results. Just as important as the objective value, is the subjective importance attributed by the parties to their respective ties to the EU. Naturally, accession is an inherently more appetizing prize than association, neighbourhood or nancial assistance. Yet it is only so only to the extent that the parties desire full membership. The Turkish establishment has long viewed EU accession as the natural corollary of the modernization and westernization movement, pioneered by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. In turn, it is hardly surprising that for the sake of accession, Turkish authorities have been willing to go the extra mile in terms of the reforms undertaken. This willingness has not been simply the product of a rational calculus by elite actors. Fundamental to Turkeys reform process has been the notion of security embedded within the accession process. When over the course of the 1990s, EU actors called on Turkey to undertake reforms, the authorities rebuffed the Euroepean Union, viewing these changes as too risky for the countrys security. The persistence ` of Turkeys Sevres syndrome exacerbated these views; namely, the perception ` that European powers, under the legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, aim to dismember Turkey, not least by triggering Kurdish secession (Jung and Piccoli, 2001). In other words, reforms were viewed as costly also because they were demanded by Europeans. As and when Europe made the qualitative symbolic step to include Turkey through the accession process, it signalled an increased willingness to share the burden of Turkeys security. Equally important is the prime value accorded to EU accession by Kurdish political actors and public opinion. In some cases, support for EU accession has been

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instrumentally linked to narrow personal interests (such as Ocalans support for the Copenhagen criteria and the lifting of the death penalty). Yet in general, support for EU accession by Kurdish and pro-Kurdish groups, while deriving from an expectation of political and economic gains through reforms has appeared far more genuine. As put by DEHAPs leader Tuncer Bakhiran: DEHAP supports Turkeys EU membership. We nd it positive despite the fact that the adaptation laws have not been implemented, or rather that only some have been implemented. . . The adaptation laws include requests that our party and party members have been expressing for years.2 Kurdish public opinion conveys a similar message. While support for accession is well over 70 per cent throughout Turkey, the greatest support have come consistently from the predominantly Kurdish south-eastern provinces.3 When it comes to the subjective value of relations with the EU by Israel and the Palestinians, it is indisputable that both have accorded high importance to their ties to the European Union. Israel is a small country, whose openness to international trade is key to its economic survival. The EU is Israels largest trading partner. Israels political dependence on Europe is far more controversial. In recent years, Israelis have frequently referred to the crisis in EU-Israel relations. Israels strategic relationship with the US has also overshadowed the murkier political ties with the EU. However, Israel lives at the EUs doorstep, it is surrounded by real and perceived enemies and the US remains on the other side of the Atlantic. Beyond the rhetoric, Israels political links to Europe are valued highly, and the desire of nding a place of belonging is deeply embedded in Israeli society. Turning to the Palestinians, in economic terms the EU (including member states) represents by far the largest donor to the PA. Without EU aid since 2000, the PA may well have collapsed. Palestinian political dependence on Europe is also high. Like Israelis, Palestinians frequently accuse Europe of its inadequate political role in the Middle East. However, unlike Israelis, they would warmly welcome a stronger European involvement in the conict. But this is not to say that Israel and the Palestinians, unlike Turkey, aspire to join the EU. As such, their exclusion from the enlargement process cannot in itself account for the European Unions signicantly lower impact. In the case of the Palestinians, the question is clear-cut. Neither the PA nor the Palestinian public has ever expressed the desire to enter the EU. As far as Israel is concerned, the picture is far more nuanced. At rst glance it appears that the prospect of EU accession could have a strong hold amongst Israelis. A recent poll revealed that 85 per cent of Israelis would back an application to EU membership.4 In recent years, prominent Israeli politicians, including Likud members like Binyamin Netanyahu, have aired the possibility of Israels inclusion in the European Union. Yet these statements appear to stem more from a general desire to withdraw from the turbulent Middle East than from a deep-felt desire to enter the EUand take on the obligations of accession. Most Israeli analysts admit that full EU accession would not be in Israels political interests as currently dened, in so far as it would require a radical transformation of

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the Zionist project (through the adoption of the Copenhagen political criteria) (Dachs and Peters, 2004: 16). To date, it appears that while most Israelis would be willing to compromise on the territorial aspects of the conict, there is no meaningful domestic constituency willing to re-elaborate on the nature of the State of Israel. Far more appetizing to most Israelis would be other forms of virtual membership, which would allow Israel to benet from close association with Europe, without the intrusive political conditionality that full accession entails. Indeed this is what the ENP could offer to Israel. The EU-Israel ENP Action Plan already sets out a long list of EU benets in many areas, ranging from reinforced political dialogue, to economic and social co-operation, trade and internal market integration and co-operation in justice and home affairs, infrastructure, energy, environment and civil society. These and other measures would arguably be more in line with Israeli perceived interests, than full membership. This argument relates back to a crucially important point about Turkey. Far more so than in Israel, large segments of the Turkish political system, from the nationalist right to the nationalist left, both within civilian and military circles, had only paid lip-service to the goal of membership. More accurately, their support for the EU was high up until membership became more realistic through the initiation of Turkeys accession process. As and when the process began and the conditions of membership became clearer, their effective support rapidly dwindled. Fullling EU-dictated conditions was viewed as too costly for the sake of membership. The Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisis (AKPs) 2002 landslide victory dramatically tilted the balance within the party political system in favour of genuinely pro-European reformists. Since then, domestic political balances have been undergoing a radical overhaul. Yesterdays conservatives, including former Islamists as well as other segments of traditional society such as the Kurds, have become todays reformers. Instead, the most vociferous critics of the current reforms have been the self-declared defenders of the twentieth-century reformist project pioneered by Ataturk. Time inconsistency. Despite the high objective value of EU membership, in the case of a drawn-out accession process, the value of the benet is eroded by the expected timeframe for its receipt. Accession comes with ex ante conditionality and as such expected reforms are demanded in the short and medium run, while the delivery of the benets (namely, membership) occurs in the long run. This generates two sets of problems. First, expected long-term gains are valued less than short-term ones, due to the unpredictability of the long term. Second, long-term gains may induce domestic policy makers to delay reforms until the delivery of the benet is closer. This may occur particularly when reforms are considered as potentially threatening, inducing policy makers to delay reforms until the prospect of membership is closer and surer. In the case of Turkey, even if accession negotiations begin in October 2005, membership itself is expected to occur at least a decade later. In its conclusions, the December 2004 European Council made clear that the long-run would be after 2014. The uncertainty of the process both due to its timing and due to the

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developments that may unfold in the meantime, affects negatively Turkeys incentives to engage in difcult reforms in the short and medium terms. The opposite is true for Israel and the PA. In the case of the association agreements, the potential for conditionality is ex post rather than ex ante. In other words, the benet (namely, association) is delivered in the short term, based on an understanding that its obligations, including those on democracy and human rights, would be respected. Otherwise, the European Union reserves itself the right to suspend the agreements. Yet ex post conditionality is rarely applied. As such, the opposite problem of time inconsistency arises. Lying on the opposite end of the time inconsistency spectrum, the Israeli and Palestinian association agreements have been front-loaded with the benets and back-loaded on the obligations, reducing the potential impact of the EUs role through conditionality. EU aid to the PA on the one hand and, potentially, the emerging ENP on the other could represent a more effective formula in this respect. As the PA became critically dependent on EU budgetary transfers over the course of 2002 03, the Commission of the EC rened its techniques of delivering assistance in return for and in compliance with strict conditions and monitoring. Indeed, at specic moments in 2002 03, EU threats to withhold budgetary aid generated the necessary incentives to pursue reforms in the judicial and scal domains. The ENP could also serve to rectify the problem of time inconsistency inherent in the enlargement process. This is because the benets, being far more varied and graduated than the one-off carrot of membership, could be delivered over time, in response to fullled obligations. The Credibility of Conditionality If gains lie on one side of the equation, obligations lie on the other. In other words, for an effective EU role conducted through contractual relations, it is imperative for conditionality to be credible. Credibility in turn depends on the recipients perception of the donors capability and willingness to carry out declared commitments. In the case of ex ante conditionality, this is related to the European Unions track record in delivering its promised gains, when and only when the obligations are fullled. In the case of ex post conditionality, credibility is related to the EUs track record of withdrawing benets in cases of consistent violations of specied and agreed obligations. The limits of ex post conditionality. In the case of Turkey, its 1963 Association Agreement did not include ex post conditionality related to democracy and human rights, which could have been used to exert leverage on the Kurdish question. Yet by the time the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements were signed, ex post conditionality was inserted through the human rights clause. This clause included two components. The essential elements article established human rights and democratic principles as essential elements of the agreements (Article 2). The nonexecution article called for appropriate measures which least disturb the functioning of the agreements, in the event of their material breach (Article 79). Under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 60.3), a material

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breach is a violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the agreement. In principle, the violation of human rights could justify the suspension of the agreements. However, the conditions justifying suspension are hard to meet, detracting from the credibility of negative conditionality. Legally, the violation of human rights could justify suspension only if it represented a material breach of the agreements. But the object and purpose of the association agreements is not the promotion of human rights and democracy. It is rather that of promoting free trade and political dialogue. Hence, only if a violation of human rights hindered these aims could it motivate negative conditionality (Rockwell & Shamas, 2005). Politically, there are also a plethora of reasons preventing the use of negative conditionality. The suspension of one association agreement could set a precedent justifying the suspension of all agreements, given that all countries in the Barcelona Process can be accused of shortcomings in terms of democracy and human rights. Politically (and economically), this is an outcome that all EU member states wish to avoid. In the specic case of Israel and Palestine, despite the grave human rights and international law violations, no attempt has been made to exert ex post conditionality, let alone arms embargoes or sanctions. The relevance of the human rights clause has been more to engage in soft forms of pressures through ` political dialogue. Yet both vis-a-vis Israel and the PA, this form of EU inuence has not led to discernible effects. Reforms and policy shifts in line with EU objectives have not occurred in response to soft EU inducements through political dialogue. The successes, constraints and pending questions in ex ante conditionality. Ex ante conditionality has been far more effective as it has been exercised towards Turkey in the context of accession, and towards Palestine, in the context of nancial assistance. In both cases, ex ante conditionality started in 1999, when on the one hand, the European Union launched Turkeys accession process, and on the other, it became increasingly sensitive to issues of Palestinian reform. As far as Turkey is concerned, the relative credibility of EU conditionality since 1999 contributed to Turkeys progress on human rights, democracy and peaceful reconciliation (Ugur, 2003). Although the Helsinki European Council accorded Turkey candidacy, it refrained from opening accession negotiations on the basis that Turkey did not full the Copenhagen political criteria. In light of the generality of these criteria, since 1998 the Commission has published annual progress reports, assessing the progress (or lack thereof) in Turkeys alignment with EU requirements. Since 2001, the European Union has also published Accession Partnership documents, pinpointing the specic conditions that Turkey should follow in its bid to full the criteria. The six-monthly European Councils have also regularly voiced their views on Turkey, displaying relative consistency in their political message to Ankara. In the rst 18 months following candidacy, the slow pace of Turkeys reforms meant that no additional expectations were raised. Yet when Turkey changed gears in its reform path by adopting its National Programme in March 2001 and implementing the rst set of constitutional amendments in

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October 2001, the European Council concluded that recent developments had brought forward the prospect of opening accession negotiations (European Council, 2001, paragraph 12). In December 2002, in view of the visible commitment of the new AKP government to reform, the European Council decided to review the situation in December 2004. If by then, Turkey were deemed to have met the criteria, accession negotiations would be opened without delay (European Council, 2002, paragraph 19). In light of the successive reforms over 2002 04, and on the basis of the October 2004 Commission Recommendation, the December 2004 European Council decided to open negotiations on 3 October 2005. Turning to the Palestinians, particularly in the case of EU budgetary assistance in 2002 03, EU threats to withhold assistance at key points in time proved sufciently credible to trigger key reforms related to scal transparency and judicial independence. This is not to say that EU involvement in PA reform was unambiguously successful. At times reforms have been supercial and implemented for the sole aim of pleasing EU (and US) interests. However in sharp contrast to both Turkey and the Palestinians, the EU has made ` no attempt to exert ex ante conditionality vis-a-vis Israel. Carrots have been rarely dangled and normally given. Apart from a few exceptions, such as the European Parliaments delayed ratication of EC-Israel trade agreements in 1987 88 and in 1995 2000, the European Union has never attempted to exert any form of conditionality on Israel. A key EU incentive to Israel would be that of threatening to suspend aid to the PA, thus triggering its collapse and obliging Israel to full its onerous legal responsibilities as the occupying power. Yet due to the expected humanitarian crisis this would entail, the European Union is unlikely to proceed with this course of action. And Israel is well aware of this, eliminating any credibility of a possible EU conditionality of this kind. The absence of any conditionality, has led to several paradoxical incidents damaging the EUs credibility. The most recent was in the autumn of 2004, when the Commission of the EC negotiated an ENP Action Plan with Israel following the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling condemning Israel and the EU Councils own criticisms of the Israeli raids in Gaza. The EU-Israel ENP Action Plan made no attempt to formulate political obligations. The Plan does mention the peace process, security, human rights and international law. But specic references are only included as subjects for discussion in reinforced political dialogue. In terms of conditionality, the Plan only loosely states that progress in meeting these priorities will be monitored. . . On this basis, the EU and Israel, will review the content of the Action Plan (Commission of the EC, 2004c: 3). The lack of clear linkage between benets and obligations in the Israel Action Plan contrasts sharply with the EU-PA Action Plan, which goes as far as stating that the very raison detre of the PAs inclusion in the ENP is that of promoting the PAs political and economic reform (Commission of the EC, 2004d: ` 1). This is not to say that vis-a-vis Israel, the European Union should specify in minute detail how economic, institutional and social benets should be conditioned to unrelated political and legal obligations. But neither does the opposite extreme of abandoning the option of conditionality and merely discussing human rights within political dialogue appear to be an effective way forward. Between these two

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extremes, there is wide room for manoeuvre, in which the European Union, both formally and informally, could generally condition economic, social and institutional benets to political and legal obligations. ` The same question may soon arise vis-a-vis Turkey. The December 2004 European Council concluded that Turkey only sufciently fulls the Copenhagen criteria. In turn, EU institutions wish to induce political reform in Turkey over the course of negotiations. Indeed, both the Commission of the ECs 2004 Recommendation and the 2004 European Councils conclusions stated that the EU would continue to monitor Turkeys political progress, on the basis of revised Accession Partnerships. Yet EU actors failed to specify how this would take place. In its Recommendation, the Commission simply stated that the pace of reforms will determine the progress of negotiations, without specifying the precise link between political reforms and negotiations (Commission of the EC, 2004b: 6). The ensuing lack of credibility of this commitment exacerbates in view of the fact that during negotiations, the Commission of the EC becomes increasingly preoccupied with the minutiae of the acquis and tends to set aside political conditionality. The Commission of the EC and the European Council were clearer in stating that in the event of a reversal of the reform path, negotiations would be suspended. However, as in the case of ex post conditionality, once negotiations are opened, although the European Union could halt the talks in principle, in practice it may become difcult to do so. With the opening of negotiations, the accession process acquires an increasingly self-generating momentum, not least in view of the sunk costs entailed in the process. It thus remains to be seen whether and how EU actors will succeed in exerting ongoing political conditionality on Turkey. This may become a particularly pressing question in view of the apparent rise in nationalism and lull in Turkeys reform process in early 2005. Undermining credibility through the disrespect of international law. The European Union has thus been ineffective in its use (or lack of use) of ex post conditionality, ` while reporting mixed results in its use of ex ante conditionality vis-a-vis Turkey and the PA in particular. In the case of Israel, the EU has renounced the use of conditionality, choosing to approach sensitive issues exclusively through political dialogue. However, in the case of Israel, the European Union has revealed a categorically different particularity.5 Quite apart from conditionality, by far the most serious and atypical way in which the EU has related to Israel has been its progressive bending to illegal Israeli policies, to the extent of risking distorting its own law and practice. The dispute over the preferential export of Israeli goods produced in settlements has received sparse attention from academia and civil society. Yet the problem has lain at the core of the conict, primarily because it has exemplied a key cause of the status quo: the international communitys acquiescence to Israels right to differ in its respect for international law. To date, the EU has been aware but has failed to rectify Israels material breach of its association agreement. The breach has derived from the fact that Israel has applied, illegally, its preferential trade agreements to the territories it has occupied

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since 1967. By failing to rectify the resulting material breach, the member states have acted in violation of Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, preventing the participation in or facilitation of the Conventions violation. Because of this, the Commission of the EC and the member states have acknowledged the need to rectify the situation. Various avenues have been explored. All have either failed or represented partial and ad hoc measures to improve the situation. The last move in this ongoing saga has been the agreement on a technical arrangement, which came into effect in February 2005. Of all the attempted solutions, this arrangement and its possible consequences could compromise most the EUs position towards the conict. This is because while lightening the administrative burdens on both sides customs authorities, the arrangement does not require Israel to end its malpractice. By using the arrangement as a possible legal basis on which to upgrade EU-Israel ties, particularly on trade-related matters (for example, by including Israel in the system of pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation), the European Union could accept in law, Israels denition of its territory. In turn, EC law and practice would become incompatible with international humanitarian law. No EU political declaration to the contrary would alter this fact. The Clarity of Conditions A third cluster of issues determining the EUs impact is the clarity of the conditions embedded in its contractual relations. If the European Union is to exert inuence through conditionality, it follows that conditions need to be sufciently clear. ` In this respect, the EU has been most successful vis-a-vis the PA. Beginning in 1999 with the EU-sponsored publication of the Rocard-Siegman Report, the Commission of the EC has devoted increasing attention to the internal shortcomings of the Authority (Sayigh & Shikaki, 1999). These deciencies would not only hamper the establishment of a democratic and well-governed Palestinian state, but could hinder also the peace process through the internal erosion of the rule of law. The recommendations of the Report became a rst basis on which to specify EU conditions for the delivery of assistance. They were then complemented by the recommendations of the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2001, of numerous Palestinian NGOs and of the 100-day reform Plan approved in June 2002. Stringent and specic conditions and International Monetary Fund (IMF) monitoring were set for the disbursement of EU budgetary assistance. In particular, EU conditions called for the consolidation of all revenues in a single IMF-monitored account, a freeze on public sector hiring, the adoption of a Law on the Independence of the Judiciary and the passing and preliminary application of the Basic Law. A further step forward was made in the EU-PA Action Plan. The Plan goes far in specifying the priorities for action in the areas of democracy, human rights and good governance, to be monitored through the relevant EU-PA sub-committees. Nonetheless, several issues deriving from the sui generis situation of the Palestinians bedevil the task of conditionality. The rst issue is the limited

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capability of the PA as a non-state actor. An effective policy of conditionality targeted to a non-state actor would need to distinguish between conditions that the PA can and should meet and conditions that require Israeli or third party cooperation. Making such distinctions in practice is no simple feat. Measuring relative capability is not only open to subjective interpretation, but also requires continuous review under changing circumstances. To ease this task however is the fact that compared to sovereign states, the Palestinian context is far more open, allowing for a more effective specication of benchmarks and monitoring. The second issue concerns the plurality of domestic actors and the inability of the PA to exercise full control. When it comes to conditionality aimed at curbing Palestinian violence, the principal problem has been that the targets of conditionality have not been the direct authors of violence. The EU has had no direct ofcial contact with and thus leverage on Palestinian actors such as Hamas, in direct opposition to the PA. It has been difcult to ascertain to what extent conditionality could have contributed to the PAs ability to secure an end to violence orchestrated by others. The early success of President Abbas in reaching a temporary ceasere in February 2005 points to his greater will to pursue non-violent resistance compared to his predecessor. But the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv two weeks after the declaration of the ceasere, equally highlights the inability of the PA to exercise full control. A different set of problems has arisen in the case of Turkeys Kurdish question. Compared to the Palestinians, EU conditions on the Kurdish question have been far vaguer than those specied to the PA. Rather than advocating a specic solution to the Kurdish question, the EU has limited itself to calling for a political and nonmilitary solution, which included the recognition of a Kurdish cultural identity, which respected democratic practice, human rights and the rule of law. Turkeys Accession Partnerships, never even mentioned the term Kurd. This vagueness had the merit of not antagonizing Ankara, leaving the authorities to nd home-grown solutions in the search for peaceful reconciliation. However, it has presented problems in terms of assessing whether and when conditions were fullled. Without a detailed specication of expected reforms, minimum standards and benchmarks, Turkish authorities could (and have) claimed that all conditions have been met, while EU institutions could (and have) come up with new requirements over time (Zalewski, 2004). The subsequent lack of and distorted communication has eroded trust between the parties. When in comes to Israel, the problem of condition specication is far more acute. Due to the absence of any serious conditionality, EU political and legal obligations on Israel have been largely non-existent. In the EU-Israel Action Plan, the only provisions approximating political conditions are: facilitating efforts to resolve the Middle East conict, strengthening the ght against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, promoting the respect for human rights, improving the dialogue between cultures and religions, cooperating in the ght against anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia (Commission of the EC, 2004c: 3). It is clear that without further elaboration, these statements do not amount to credible conditions and would at best be subjects for political dialogue (as they indeed intend to be).

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Rather than representing a cluster of problems in its own right, political imperatives frequently explain the above-mentioned shortcomings in the EUs role. It is often due to political imperatives, operating beyond the blueprint of a contract with its benets and obligations, that problems arise relating to the value of the benets, the credibility of conditionality and the clarity of obligations. Political imperatives do not appear to have hindered signicantly the implementation of EU-PA contractual ties. Not least because of Israeli and American preoccupation with Palestinian reform since 2000, as well as Israels accusations that EU funds had been re-routed to support terrorism, EU institutions have gone the extra mile to ensure the full respect of conditions under strict monitoring. Yet in the case of Turkey and Israel, political imperatives have played a prominent role, albeit in diametrically opposite ways. In the case of Turkey, contractual ties have been bedevilled by the Turkish suspicion, often corroborated by EU actions, of an underlying European reluctance to include Turkey in the EU club. Up until 2002-03, EU scepticism was rarely expressed openly and European criticisms focused on Turkeys shortcomings in the areas of democracy and human rights. However, as Turkeys reform process gained ground, other, non-Copenhagen criteria-related reservations were increasingly aired. These included fears that Turkeys entry would dilute the loosely-dened esprit communautaire, it would entail rising Turkish immigration and it would bring the European Union dangerously close to the unstable Middle East. Least noble of all, some EU actors have been openly reluctant to embrace a country with an allegedly different culture and religion. This does not mean that the European Union has secretly decided against Turkeys membership. On the contrary, the EU opted to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 (although it mentioned an important list of caveats). However, the very existence of a debate on the desirability of Turkeys membership has led to two spin-off effects. On the positive side, it has entailed that EU institutions have been relatively strict in their monitoring of Turkeys political reforms, adding to the credibility of the European Unions conditionality. On the negative side, it has raised Turkeys sense of insecurity and it has been used as an argument by Turkish Euro-sceptics to question and undermine the reform process. In the case of EU-Israel relations, political considerations have operated in the opposite direction. The political imperative not to antagonize Israel has meant not only that the European Union has renounced the use of conditionality, but also that it has bent its own legal system for the sake of accommodating illegal Israeli practices. During the Oslo years the ofcial reason for this stance was the imperative not to upset the peace process. Since 2000, other political considerations have come into play. Most important, EU policies have been inuenced by Israeli strategies towards the EU, including its criticisms of Europes alleged anti-Israeli bias and its antiSemitism and its calls for separating political issues from economic ones (despite the evident connection between the two as exemplied by the origin rules problem). A nal reason which explains the European Unions acquiescence has been the

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leverage that Israel exerts on Europe. In economic terms, close EU-Israeli trade ties have beneted Europe as well as Israel. More importantly, Israel has been key to European security interests in peace and stability in the Middle East. While the ills of the Middle East by no means hinge on a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conict, a solution has been considered in Europe as a main ingredient to the stability, peace and prosperity of the region.

Conclusions A comparison of the EUs role in two key conicts in its neighbourhood reveals important lessons on the effectiveness of its contractual ties with third parties. In the Israeli Palestinian conict, developments on the ground remain far removed from ` the European Unions declared aims. Except for the partial successes vis-a-vis the promotion of Palestinian reform, underlying trends are moving steadily away from the EUs aims concerning the establishment of a viable two-state solution and the respect for human rights and international law. In the case of Turkeys Kurdish question, developments since the turn of the century instead have seen the initiation of a wide-ranging process of reform that has beneted considerably (while not exclusively) the Kurds. The shortcomings in the European Unions role are tightly interlinked. First, the absence of sufciently clear conditions signals the lack of credible conditionality. It follows that without sufciently clear conditions a credible policy of conditionality could not exist. In turn, the vagueness of conditions indicates a reduced EU readiness to stand by the letter of conditionality. To some extent this has been true of conditions specically linked to the Kurdish question, where the European Union, while strict on general human rights, has allowed free rein to the Turkish state to nd specic solutions to its Kurdish question. Far more evident has been the lack of clear ` conditions towards Israel vis-a-vis its legal obligations and the peace process. Second, the value of EU benets is closely linked to the clarity of conditions, the ensuing credibility of conditionality and to the role of political imperatives. Vague conditions and the absence of credible conditionality add to the uncertainty prevailing in the contract, which in turn reduces the perceived value of the promised gain. Likewise, the value of a carrot is reduced when its receipt is considered to be linked to conditions determined by political imperatives lying beyond the contract. If a recipient views the delivery of the benets to be linked to extra-contractual factors, the incentive to full the obligations inevitably reduce. This appears true in the case of the more conservative voices in Turkey. Likewise, there is little incentive for Israel to heed EU recommendations, in so far as it is aware that the European Union will deliver the promised benets almost irrespective of its conduct. Closing the circle, conditions are often vague and conditionality loose because European actors wish to retain the scope for political manoeuvring. Extreme clarity in the specication of obligations reduces exibility in the assessment of when and whether conditions are met. This has been true both in the case of Turkeys Kurdish ` question and Israels conduct vis-a-vis the Palestinians. In the case of the Kurds,

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vague EU conditions have been used by pro-Turkish forces in the Union to argue that Turkey had met all the conditions and by Turkey-sceptics to argue the contrary. The overall conclusion points unequivocally to the need to tailor EU-related benets to the wishes and expectations of the neighbours, but to do so while minimizing political discretion and maximising the clarity and credibility of attached obligations. In the case of Turkey this would go far in curing the persisting ` Sevres syndrome and bolstering the efforts of domestic reformers towards greater democracy, respect of human rights and acceptance of multiculturalism. In the case of Israel and the Palestinians greater EU clarity, consistency and thus credibility would alter the sterile debate on the alleged bias of the EUs role in the Middle East. While not in itself leading to a resolution of the conict, a shift in the EUs approach would also prepare the ground for the peace which most parties have advocated. In both conicts, and indeed in any ethno-political conict within and beyond the EUs borders, the European Union can only partly shape events, which will be determined predominantly by endogenous factors. Yet this article has attempted to point to a frequently under-researched aspect of EU foreign policy, namely, that the effectiveness of the EUs external role is often determined less by the overall power of its instruments and far more by the precise ways in which such instruments have been deployed.

Notes
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2 3

4 5

At the time of writing, the implementation of the new Penal Code is being withheld, pending its further revision to entrench the freedom of expression. Did DEHAPs defects appear after the elections, Turkish Daily News, 24 September 2003. Presentation by Ali Carkolu at a conference on Turkey and the EU, organized by the British Council and the Centre for European Reform, Istanbul, 15 October 2004. Poll conducted by the Dahaf Institute of the EC Delegation in Tel Aviv, February 2004, p. 8. ` There are many reasons to explain the EUs atypical conduct vis-a-vis Israel, ranging from historical legacies to transatlantic implications, political as well as economic interests. Due to space limitations, ` this article will not delve into the reasons explaining the EUs conduct vis-a-vis Israel. On this see Tocci (2005).

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