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CP text : The United States federal government should establish a joint effort with Japan, Russia, and China to demonstrate the feasibility of space solar power. Only way to solve is a cooperation between Japan, Russia, China, and the US - Their 1ac Author Cox 11 (William, March 13, The Race for Solar Energy from Space
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2011/032311b.html)
President Kennedy once said, "We choose to go to the moon in this decade, not because it is easy, but because it is hard." The United States readily achieved that objective and, effectively, won the Cold War. A similar challenge is now presented in the race for space solar energy. What, if anything, will President Obama say or do? Rather than a competition, however, the

United States, China, Japan, and perhaps Russia, should organize a public service consortium to cooperatively produce energy from outer space to. Such a consortium could take advantage of the unique abilities of each nation to collectively produce space-solar energy , and it would avoid private corporate domination over the
distribution of a product that is essential to human civilization. A Space-Solar Energy Consortium would be a giant step toward world peace and a small leap into the universe of unlimited and unimaginable futures that surround and await us.

****Newsflash:****
1. Requires over 100,000 launches to be sustainable- wont solve for energy needs or warming Globus, 2008, Spring 2008 (Al, space expert, On The Moon, Ad Astra,
http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdf)

To generate all the energy used on Earth today (about 15 terawatts) would require roughly 400 solar power satellites 10 kilometers across. Assuming advanced, lightweight space solar power technology, this will require at least 100,000 launches to bring all the materials up from Earth. But even 400 satellites wont
be enough. Billions of people today have totally inadequate energy supplies and the population is growing. Providing everyone with reasonable quantities of energy might take five to ten times more than we produce today. To supply this energy from solar power satellites requires a staggering launch rate. There

are two major issues with a very high launch rate. The cost issue is obvious: the cheapest launches today run thousands of dollars per kilogram to
low Earth orbit (LEO), and we need to get the materials all the way to geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO), which is significantly more expensive. The cost of launch goes up very quickly with the change in velocity, which is measured in meters per second (m/s). For each increase in velocity, additional fuel is needed, and even more fuel to lift the additional fuel, and heavier structures to hold the increased fuel, and even more fuel to lift the heavier structures you get the idea. In any case, the velocity change from the ground to LEO is 8,600 m/s, but to GEO its 12,400 m/s. Paul Werbos (see references on page 36) estimates that launch costs must come down to somewhere in the neighborhood of $450/kg for SSP to deliver energy near current prices (5-10 cents/kw-h). Fortunately, a high launch rate drives prices down, just as the mass-produced Ford Model-T was far cheaper than the previous generations of automobiles.

2. Cannot solve high launch costs McLinko&Sagar 9 (Ryan &Basant, MIT Professors, 11-30, http://web.mit.edu/basant/www/
SSP_McLinko_Sagar.pdf, 6-28-11, AH)

Launching the SSP constellation into orbit is one of the most difficult aspects of the program.Launch vehicles are expensive, operationally difficult to use, and provide a harsh environment for the health of transported satellites during launch. Some aspects of this architecture,
however, help to mitigate these problems: A large number of small satellites can fit into a single launch vehicle. Modularity of the system means scope can be expanded or reduced to fit available launch vehicle payload capabilities.

3. Launch Costs make SSP unsustainable. 1

CLHS 2011-12 [SPS - DoD] Cox 11 (William, March 13, The Race for Solar Energy from Space
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2011/032311b.html)

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The remaining problem is the expense of lifting equipment and materials into space. The last few flights of the space shuttle this year will cost $20,000 per kilogram of payload to move satellites into orbit and resupply the space station. It has been estimated that economic viability of space solar
energy would require a reduction in the payload cost to less than $200 per kilogram and the total expense, including delivery and assembly in orbit, to less than $3,500 per kilogram. Although there are substantial costs associated with the development of spacesolar power, it makes far more sense to invest precious public resources in the development of an efficient and reliable power supply for the future, rather than to waste U.S. tax dollars on an ineffective missile defense system, an ego trip to Mars, or $36 billion in risky loan guarantees by the DOE to the nuclear power industry. With funding for the space shuttle ending next year and for the space station in 2017, the United States must decide upon a realistic policy for space exploration, or else it will be left on the ground by other nations, which are rapidly developing futuristic space projects. China is currently investing $35 billion of its hard-currency reserves in the development of energy-efficient green technology, and has become the worlds leading producer of solar panels. In addition, China has aggressively moved into space by orbiting astronauts and by demonstrating a capability to destroy the satellites of other nations. Over the past two years, Japan has committed $21 billion to secure space-solar energy. By 2030, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency plans to "put into geostationary orbit a solar-power generator that will transmit one gigawatt of energy to Earth, equivalent to the output of a large nuclear power plant." Japanese officials estimate that, ultimately, they will be able to deliver electricity at a cost of $0.09 per kilowatt-hour, which will be competitive with all other sources. Cheap access to space no longer as achievable as it seemed in 1978? This is a clear reference to the Space Shuttle. But a government shuttle is no longer where cheap space access is at. In 2004 we saw the first space access by a privately-developed reusable spaceplane, and its successor is due to begin test flights later this year in the run-up to commercial service. Sure, its only suborbital. But people are queueing up to ride on the thing. Heres the key fact: SpaceShipTwo represents a completely different economic paradigm from the Space Shuttle because, for the first time ever, manned spaceflight is about to become a profitable enterprise. All hopes that humanity will create a spacefaring civilization rest on this paradigm change. In ten or twenty years time a successful suborbital industry will surely develop a reusable spaceplane for large-scale economic orbital access. The demand for orbital tourist flights exists, and the suborbital service will demonstrate that a spaceline can be run in the same way as an airline. Virgin Galactic may fail. It has plenty of competitors. One day, somebody will succeed. Its only a matter of time. Current barriers to implementation are the cost for the system, the high cost of launch services, solar cell inefficiencies, and possible communication frequency interference. The

type of solar power satellite architecture proposed has a lot to do with cost. Regardless of the architecture all the designs are on an order of several billions of dollars. This price tag has a tendency to scare away potential investors. The high cost of launches contributes to that estimate. Until the price per pound to put a payload in orbit comes down, this will continue to be a barrier. In addition to cost, the inefficiencies of solar cells are also a barrier to implementation. Solar cells, the main method for harnessing solar power currently have efficiencies in the range of 20%. This means that
the solar arrays must be kilometers in size to generate enough power worth beaming back to earth. The final barrier to implementation is frequency interference. In the arena of communications, before scientists conducted experiments, many supposed that there was a potential for interference from the beam on communications systems, radar, and aircraft communications in the geographic area of the beam.21 A Japanese study conducted in 1993 demonstrated that a high power microwave beam would not be strong enough to interfere with telecommunications.22 However, most of the articles and research supporting solar power satellites still list frequency or communications interference as an issue to resolve.

ACTOR SOLVENCY DEFICIT DOD cannot fund or own SPS Skarb 09, (Justin, staff writer for the Space Review, Space-based solar power: right here, right now?, 04/27/2009, AD:
2/3/12, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1359/1)

Were the DOD to undertake such an initiative, it is important that the military make it exceedingly clear that it is merely agreeing to purchase commercial power beamed from space and that it is not funding nor will it own any portion of the space-based solar power systems. This level of clarity is important to prevent the international community from misperceiving our intentions DOD purchase creates the perception of weaponization Skarb 09, (Justin, staff writer for the Space Review, Space-based solar power: right here, right now?, 04/27/2009, AD:
2/3/12, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1359/1) This issue has little to do with the actual need for space-based weapons systems. Even for proponents of building and deploying space-based weapons doing otherwise makes little sense. Were

the DOD to create the international perception

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that it is purchasing or funding space-based solar power systems, it is likely to fuel the fear that the DOD is actively pursuing the weaponization of space.Sending such a signal to the international community
is likely to give further impetus for countries to develop their own brands of space-based weapons as well as the capabilities to destroy space-based systems from Earth.The

danger is, then, that other countries are forced into a position of weaponizing space before the United States embarks on such a path but is then forced to in an attempt to respond to the actions of other nations. DoD cannot invest in SPS; lack of funds Skarb 09, (Justin, staff writer for the Space Review, Space-based solar power: right here, right now?, 04/27/2009, AD:
2/3/12, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1359/1) Second, were

the DOD to make an unconditional agreement to purchase power from SBSP systems, industry is likely to take advantage of such an offer and pass along the majority of the costs for research and development to the military by charge exorbitant costs for the energy. This would force the DOD, again, to siphon resources from readiness, procurement, and maintenance accounts to pay for the project. In the same way that the DOD does not have the funds to pay for SBSP research and development outright because such funding runs the risk of forcing cuts to important weapons programs, it also does not have the funds to pay for the
research and development of SBSP pushed through the back door.

DoD only wants to buy SPS energy, no interest in developing Skarb 09, (Justin, staff writer for the Space Review, Space-based solar power: right here, right now?, 04/27/2009, AD:
2/3/12, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1359/1) Make no mistake about it, the

Department of Defense is NOT interested in being an energy producer or exporterthats not what the Department of Defense does. It is interested in clean energy independence as a way of removing what many consider the single greatest impetus for major conflict in the futureenergy competition. This study will be looking for ways to make space solar power a viable commercial enterprise for fair free-market
competition. The Department of Defense is content being an energy customer.

DoD wants to work with other countries and the private sector, avoids unilateral action Skarb 09, (Justin, staff writer for the Space Review, Space-based solar power: right here, right now?, 04/27/2009, AD:
2/3/12, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1359/1)

The NSSO Study proposed that DoD partner with private companies and foreign allies in creating a test model for SBSP. The DoD would agree to be an anchor tenant customer for the initial SBSP systems. The DoDs high energy supply costs could justify the high initial implementation cost of SBSP. Energy companies working with the DoD could also begin to supply SBSP to the public sector as the costs of SBSP lower over time.

Realism empirically failsapplication to space creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of global violence and backlash
William Alfred Wechsler, 2010, Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Clausewitz in Space: Rethinking Realism in the 21st Century, Proquest, 413-420
I. RECAPPING PROBLEMS AND POSTULATING TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS This enquiry began by attempting to

decipher why Realism in the late 20th and early 21st centuries no longer comported with realities. The initial premise was that Realism was a parsimonious linear theory of International Relations that sprang from the mid20th century pen of Hans Morgenthau, based upon the twin notions that international politics involved a continuous struggle for power and that national interests could be defined exclusively in terms of power. Realism was a useful construct to explain 19th century balance of power politics, and for the most part, the actions of the main protagonists during the Cold War, primarily because the struggle for predominance between the US and the Soviet Union involved the equivalent of a closed system with both parties vying for global domination. But Realism was unable to predict, describe, or explain the end of the Cold War, the emergence of global terrorism, and a host of other phenomena associated with globalization.

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Notwithstanding purported improvements and modifications to the theory associated with various related theories such as neo-Realism, the theorys analytic value has become increasingly problematic in the 21stcentury. NeoRealism itself is subject to intellectual traps associated with reductionism that inappropriately attempts to draw conclusions about the operation of units in the system, from the operation of the whole. In the case of International Relations, it is inappropriate to affix permanent notions about systemic operations based upon the unsatisfactory elixir of anarchy. 21st century international

multidimensional realities reflect an evolving, emerging, and transforming system in a state of permanent flux. Despite scientific and iconic pretensions, Realism maintains limited explanatory, predictive, or prescriptive value in the new millennium. The relationship of Realism to reality can be thought of in terms of a hologram it provides elucidation of international political realities from one reference beam. This image was particularly authentic during the Cold War because of the bipolar international system where two
actors engaged in global competition with one another for global hegemony. To produce a simple hologram, a beam of coherent, monochromatic light, such as that produced by a laser, must be split into two beams. One part, the object or illumination beam, is directed onto the object and reflected onto a high-resolution photographic plate. The other part, the reference beam, is beamed directly onto the photographic plate. Subsequently the interference pattern of the two light beams is recorded on the plate.743 To a large extent interpreting the nature of political and social reality through a two-variable model such as Realism which defines the Cold War as a struggle for power can be analogized to this process. One part, for purposes of the hologram analogy can be directed onto any specified event such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the Korean or Vietnam War and thus revealed in high resolution. The other part, a reference beam of relentless bi-polar global conflict, can be beamed onto the historic plate to provide a vivid image of a contextualized reality. However such historically contingent holograms reflect only partial realities, underscored

when the direction of the reference beam changes. If the reference beam moves, wavers, or disappears, the reflected image becomes entirely different. This is exactly what happened at the end of the Cold War. The conclusion is that Realism is linear reductionist theory inadequate to describe, explain, or predict the emergent realities of the 21st century. As suggested by Popper, the roots of scientific enquiry, dating back to the preSocratics, involve conjectures and refutations, hypotheses and falsifications, in order to distinguish what appears to exist at any one time from universal laws about reality.744 The ultimate purpose was to discern myths from truths and beliefs from objective knowledge. The growth of the latter is an evolutionary process. Induction and deduction involve the twin pillars of traditional scientific method that reveal Humes Problem of induction, how it is that reasonable people can have expectations that future experiences will conform to those instances they have experienced, and Kants Problem, in terms of deduction, how is pure science possible? In other words to the extent that Newton made scientific discoveries about gravity, how is it that everyone else failed to have similar insights?745 Popper, Polanyi, and Clausewitz provide guideposts to solve Humes Problem and Kants Problem by suggesting that scientific knowledge grows through an evolutionary process of critical rationality involving interactions, falsifications, rigorous reassessments of underlying assumptions and ultimately judgments in the mind of individual scientists. Embracing innovations in Critical Scientific Realism and Complex Systems Theory are two steps forward on the long and winding road toward developing Complex Realism as a robust, rigorous, and more accurate method to analyze complex, adaptive, and emergent systems, including international politics. Morgenthaus primary problem is that there isan exponentially widening gap between Realism and 21st century realities. Notwithstanding Realisms empirical and pragmatic pretensions, the iconic theory is trapped by Humes Problem, Kants Problem, linearity, and more generally

by a structural inability to decipher and explain emergent complexities involving oscillations, decay, growth, interactions among actors who react to each other and their environments, feedback loops, and continuing transformations in actors, networks, and systems. Constrained by a simplified twodimensional problemsolving theoretical approach to reality premised upon the iterations of like units operating within a static system, Realism portends to have to have uncovered timeless explanations for global social and political interactions. Realism is unable to explain and describe novelties, changes, and systemic emergence. By failing to distinguish the universal from the particular, particularly given the unpredictable myriad of
motivations and perceived interests of agents both involving and beyond linear understandings of the continuously changing relational dynamics of power among states, Realism is unable to prescribe policies appropriate to the

multidimensional, interactive, and multi-grid complexities of global politics in the 21st century.Realism is predicated upon the notion that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots
in human nature. It postulates that international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Understanding state interests, predicated upon all-encompassing struggle for relative power, provided the primary theoretical tool for many scholars and practitioners to navigate, explain, and predict the realities of international politics throughout the Cold War. Realism was, for the most part, an effective theory used to explain the actions and responses of the major protagonists, predict their interactions, and provide impetus for the grand strategy of the United States, ultimately prompting the strategies of containment, limited war, and deterrence. Notwithstanding fundamental changes in global politics at the end of the Cold War, Realism

remained (and remains) central to American strategic planning, grand strategy, and policy development. Part of the continuing attraction of Realism to corridors of power is explicable insofar as senior decisionmakers oftentimes spend much, if not all, of their professional careers focused upon domestic power dynamics in order to reach their positions. Their understanding and mastery of individual power relationships provides them the position to act on behalf of states. The problem is that relative domestic power among individuals seeking to rise to positions of authority within a state is inherently quite different than international power among states and a myriad of other actors. Part of this is a function of different systemic structures given state sovereignty, a
portion of this is attributable to varying security dynamics, and some of the differences may stem from the inherent differences involving social interactions and calculations involving personal power among humans versus similar processes aimed at complicated, indeterminate, and synthetic institutions such as states. Despite, or perhaps because of, these readily apparent

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distinctions, the continuing predominance of

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a dogmatic strain of Realism in American strategic thought has resulted in an everwidening epistemic disconnect between American grand strategy and changing global realities. Power is only one, admittedly significant, characteristic of international social discourse in the 21st century. Clausewitzs non-linear methodological approach to the study of war provides the framework for a revolution in strategic
thinking that reconnects American grand strategy to emerging global realities. Realisms objective laws provided the theoretical framework for security studies and the North American dominated field of International Relations for much of the 20th century.

However intellectually convenient this may be, power cannot be properly understood as the exclusive independent variable in international politics. Conventional state power as articulated by Realism constitutes one of many means to the ends of national security. As underscored by the event of 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Spain, state power is not an independent variable, causal determinate, nor guarantor of security, conventional or otherwise, in international politics. It has meaning and is fungible only within certain contexts. The nature of security, like the international political system that constitutes its environment, is complex, transformative, and emergent. Notwithstanding radical changes in global politics at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries, the Bush-Cheney Administrations reliance upon power and the Realist-inspired use of force as the dominant, and critics would say nearly exclusive, instrument of American Foreign Policy has sprung what John Ikenberry calls a security trap whereby Americas military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have triggered global resistance and hostilityand made professed policy objectives involving increased security more difficult to achieve. The Bush-Cheney Administrations application of Realist logic to other security policies precipitated misdirected focus on rogue states, massive conventional arms buildups, expensive missile defense programs, and policies involving the weaponization and mission to dominate space that is likely to lead to an arms race, and potentially endless global security dilemmas. Applying flexible Clausewitzian
theoretical, epistemological, and methodological principles provides a meaningful basis to reconsider and reconceptualize an open architecture multidimensional scientific blueprint to comprehend the inherently complex, transformative, and emergent grammar of security across space and time. Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, American grand strategy toward space has been primarily based upon Realist foundations tied the nuclear arms race, the potential use of antiballistic missiles and missile defense. Having faced nuclear Armageddon during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy suggested rethinking foundational strategic attitudes predicated upon the notion that war and peace were inherently interrelated complex processes and that conventional strategic assumptions needed to be carefully re-examined in a nuclear age. Kennedys public pronouncements paved the way for the Outer Space Treat of 1967 that involved maintaining space as a nuclear-free weapons-free zone. For much of the remainder of the Cold War, American grand strategy and policies toward space returned to realist foundations predicated upon continuing suspicions of the Soviets, self-help, and power maximization through the design and deployment of increasingly deadly state-of-the-art offensive and defensive weapons systems. This tendency was exemplified by President Reagans Strategic Defense (or Star Wars) initiative which focused upon missile defense and the weaponization of space. With the end of the Cold War, the global security environment fundamentally changed. Conventional Realisms have not properly adjusted. The meaning of

terrestrial security, particularly as viewed from space, remains an inherently complex, contested, and emergent concept. Realisms conventional twodimensional linear approach to terrestrial security helped launch Americas preoccupation with achieving and maintaining space hegemony. This is based upon the strategic concept of full-spectrum dominance through the unilateral weaponizaton of space. If space were to be weaponized, given that it would be virtually impossible to defend any country from space-based weapons, it would have the overall effect of transforming the heavens into just another theatre of human conflict transforming the traditional source of human spirituality into a cosmological constellation of swords of Damocles. One of the US militarys proposed weaponization programs is thus appropriately named Rods from Gods. If Realist assumptions are correct about universal skepticism regarding the motivations, intentions, and actions of other international actors, any potential for trust, co-operation, and international political community in space, would be transformed into a realm of perpetual fear and apprehension. Launching insecurities into the heavens would be Realisms ultimate selffulfilling prophecy. Adherence to 20th century strategic elements of Realism within evolving 21st century strategic and security environments, as well as failure to acknowledge the radical transformations in the international system, ultimately weaken individual, national and planetary security.