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2.0 $Ljy; Ntiy tha;g;Gfs;: ,e;jpa Njrpa mZkpd; fof topfhl;Ljypd;gb epiyaj;jpw;F Njitahd epue;jug;gzpahsh;fspd; vz;zpf;if tiuaWf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. ,Jkl;Lky;yhJ> xg;ge;jg; gzpahsh;fshf Ntiynra;a gy topfs; cs;sd. mjhtJ> Jg;GwT gzpahsh;fshfTk;> fl;bl guhkhpg;G gzpahsh;fshfTk;> Ra cjtpf; FOf;fspd; %yk; xg;ge;j mbg;gilapy; gzpahsh;fs; epakpf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. ,t;thwhf Rkhh; 2000-3000 cs;Sh; njhopyhsh;fs; gy;NtW xg;ge;jjhuh;fspd; %yk; Ntiy nra;fpd;wdh;. ,J kl;Lkpy;yhky; Njitfspd; mbg;gilapy; Neuj;jpw;Nfw;g Gjpa xg;ge;jq;fspd; %yk; gzpahsh;fSf;F njhlh;r;rpahf Ntiy fpilf;f tha;g;G cs;sJ. NkYk; epiya tphpthf;fj;jpw;fhf vjph;fhyj;jpy; Ntiy tha;g;Gfs; mjpfhpf;Fk;. ,t;thW vjph;fhyj;jpy; Ntiy ngWk; jFjpia tsh;f;f ,e;jpa mZkpd; fofk; epiyaj;jpd; mz;ikapy; thOk; Foe;ijfspd; gbg;gpy; Jiz nra;fpwJ. ,e;jpa mZkpd; fofk; fy;tp kw;Wk; gapw;Wtpj;jiy Nkd;NkYk; tsh;f;f tpiofpwJ. 5.8) tp.tp.<.Mh;. (VVER) mZciy tbtikg;Gk; nghwpapaYk; a) tp.tp.<.Mh;-MdJ> mOj;jg;gl;l nke;ePh>; Fsp&l;bahfTk; kpjg;gLj;jpahfTk; (coolant & moderator) ehd;F jdpg;gl;l Fsph;ePh; Row;rpg; ghijfs; cs;s mZ ciy MFk;. ,e;j mZciyapd; xt;nthU Row;rpg; ghijapYk; kpFe;j ePh;f;nfhs;ssT nfhz;l ePuhtpf; nfhjpfyd; cs;sJ. rw;Nw nrwpt+l;lg;gl;l vhpnghUs; Mf;irL [ph;f;Nfhdpak; - epNahgpak; cNyhff; fyitahy; Md Foha;fspy; milf;fg;gl;L mWq;Nfhz tbTs;s vhpnghUs; fw;iwfshf mZciyapy; cs;sJ.

b) $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;l tp.tp.<.Mh;-1000 tbtikg;ghdJ mbg;gilapy; u\pa khjphp V-320 ufj;ijr; Nrh;e;jJ. V-320 rh;tNjr mZrf;jp Kfikapd; GEN-III ufj;jpw;F ,izahd Nkk;gl;l ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fis cilaJ. $lq;Fsk; mZciy nfhz;ljdhy; jpl;lk; NkYk; $Ljy; ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fshd jhdpaq;fp Fsp&l;L Kiwia (PHRS) nfhz;ljdhy;; GEN-III+ mZciy vd miof;fg;gLfpwJ. u\pah> $lq;Fsk; mZciyia V412 ufk;; vdf; Fwpg;gpLfpwJ.

11

c) $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;l mZciyapd; Kf;fpakhd myFfs;: kpd;jpwd; : 1000 nkfhthl; (kpd;) mdy; jpwd; : 3000 nkfhthl; (mdy;) vhpnghUs; fl;Lfspd; vz;zpf;if : 163 cl;GFk; Fsp&l;b ntg;gepiy : 291 nry;rpa]; ntsptUk; Fsp&l;b ntg;gepiy : 321 nry;rpa]; Fsp&l;bapd; mOj;j epiy : 15.7 nkfh gh];fy; Row;rpg;ghijfspd; vz;zpf;if : 4 fl;Lg;ghl;Lf;fopfs; : 103 mOj;jk; mOj;jf;fyd; %yk; epiyg;gLj;jg;gLfpwJ.

d) Nkk;gl;l ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fs;: $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpy; epWtg;gl;Ls;s Kf;fpa ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fshtd: Jhpjkhf Nghuhd; cs;nrYj;Jk; mikg;G (Quick Boron Injection System) ,ay;G epiy Fsph;tpg;ghd; (Passive Heat Removal System) ,uz;lhk; epiy ePh;f; nfhs;fyd;fs; (II stage Hydro accumulators) jhdpaq;fp i`l;u[d; kW ,izg;ghd;fs; (Passive Hydrogen Recombiners) cs;slf;fp fl;blq;fspd; ,ilg;gFjpapd; jhdpaq;fp tbfl;Lk; mikg;G (Annulus Passive Filtration System) mZciyf;fU cs;thq;Fk; fyd; (core catcher) mtrufhy fl;Lg;ghl;L miw (Emergency control room)

Nkw;$wpa mikg;Gfs;> tphpthd Muha;r;rp kw;Wk; khjphpr; Nrhjidfs; %yk; cUthf;fg;gl;lit. ,tw;wpd; nray;ghl;L ,af;fk;> mZ ciyapd; nrayhf;fg; gzpfspd; (Commissioning) Nrhjid Xl;lj;jpd; NghJ ep&gpf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. ,e;j mikg;Gfs; fPo;tUk; gphpTfspy; NkYk; tpthpf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. e) tp.tp.<.Mh;; 1000 epiya khly; epiyaq;fs; ghyNfhth mZkpd; epiyak; (1-4)> [g;NghNuh\h m.kp.ep. (1-6)> Nuht;Ndh m.kp.ep. (3>4)> f;nky;epj;];fp m.kp.ep. (1>2)> njd; cf;iud; m.kp.ep. (3)> Nuh];Nlht; m.kp.ep. (1>2)> nlk;ypd; m.kp.ep. (1>2)> fypdpd; m.kp.ep. (3)> Nfh];Nyhb m.kp.ep. (5>6). $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyak; (1>2) bahd;thd; mZkpd; epiyak; (1>2)> rPdh. Nkw;fz;lit jtpu: VVER 1000 mZ ciyfs; u\;a ehl;by; fl;Lkhdj;jpy; cs;sd. jw;NghJ VVER mZ ciyfs; tpal;ehk;> JUf;fp kw;Wk; gq;fshNj\; ehLfspYk; epWtj; jpl;lkpl;Ls;sd. jw;Nghija epiy ,af;fj;jpy; cs;sd fl;Lkhdj;jpy; cs;sd ,af;fj;jpy; cs;sd epiyaq;fspd; vz;zpf;if

tp-320

22

tp-412 tp-428

2 2

12

(f)

VVER 1000 (tp-320) gw;wpa IAEA ghJfhg;G Ma;T

1994 k; Mz;L mfpy cyf ty;Yeh;fshy; ,e;j Ma;T Nkw;nfhs;sg;gl;L mjd; ghpe;Jiufs; tp-320 kw;Wk; KKNPP ufk; tp-412 mZ ciyfspy; mky; gLj;jg;gl;Ls;sd.

g)

mZkpd; epiyag; ghJfhg;Gr; nray;ghLfs; epiyaj;jpd; vy;yhr; nray; epiyfspYk; fPo;f;fz;l ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fs; nray;gLj;jg; gLfpd;wd. ,tw;wpy; tof;fkhd ,af;fk;> mbg;gil tbtikg;gpd; epfo;Tfs; (Design basis

events), mbg;gil tbtikg;G kPwpa epfo;Tfs; (beyond design basis events) Mfpa ,af;f
epiyfs; mlq;Fk;. hpahf;btpl;b fl;Lg;ghL (mZg;gpsTj; njhlHtpidf; fl;Lg;ghL) mZciy ntg;g ePf;fk; fjphpaf;f cs;slf;fk;

h)

rjhuz ,af;fk; ghJfhg;G : tof;fkhd ,af;fepiy (Normal Operation) kw;Wk; ,af;fepiy ,lHfspd;NghJk; (Operational

Transients) (turbine trips, pump trips, etc) mZciyahdJ fl;Lg;ghl;Lf; fUtpfspd; %yk; tiuaWf;fg;gl;l ,af;fepiyfSf;Fs; fl;Lg;gLj;jg;gLfpwJ. ,e;jf; fl;Lg;ghL fPo;f;fz;l myFfs; %yk; epiwNtw;wg;gLfpwJ. hpahf;btpl;b fl;Lg;ghL (mZg;gpsTj; njhlHtpidf; fl;Lg;ghL) (i) fl;Lg;ghl;Lf; fopfs; (CPSAR) (ii) urhad kw;Wk; nfhs;ssT fl;Lg;ghL (Chemical & Volume Control)
mZciy ntg;g ePf;fk; (i) Kjd;ik FspHT+l;Lr; Row;rpg;ghij (ehd;F jdpg;gl;l Row;rpg; ghij) (ii) ePuhtpf; nfhjpfyd; (xt;nthU Row;rpg; ghijapYk; xd;W)

(iii)

lHigd; kw;Wk; fz;nld;rH

gy mLf;Fj; jLg;G nfhz;l fjphpaf;f cs;slf;fk; (i) vhpnghUs; thh;g;glk; kw;Wk; frptw;w vhpnghUs; ciw

(ii) (iii)

mZciy FspHT+l;L mikg;G kw;Wk; urhadf; fl;Lg;ghL cs;slf;fp kw;Wk; cs;slf;fp tbfl;L mikg;Gfs;

epiya ,af;fk;, mZrf;jp xOq;fikg;G thhpak; (AERB) mq;fPfhpj;Js;s ,af;fj;jpw;fhd njhopy;El;g tiuaiw Nfhl;ghLfSf;Fs; (technical specification) Nkw;nfhs;sg;gLfpwJ. ,J epiyak; ghJfhg;G mstPLfSf;Fs; ,aq;Ftij cWjp nra;fpwJ.

I)

tbtikg; tbtikg;G mbg;gilahd epfo;Tf;fhd ghJfhg;G mikg;Gfs; (Design Basis Events): tphpthd tbtikg;G Ma;Tfs;> mZciy tbtikg;G mstPLfSf;Fs; ,aq;Fk; vd;W czh;j;jpdhYk;> ghJfhg;G mikg;Gfs;, rpy tpthpf;fg;gl;l epfo;Tfspd;NghJ ghJfhg;ig cWjp nra;a epWtg;gl;Ls;sd. ,tw;iw tbtikg;gpw;F mbg;gilahd epfo;Tfs; (DBE) vdf; $WfpNwhk;. tpthpg;Gfs; mZrf;jp xOq;fikg;G thhpaj;jpd; topfhl;L newpfspd;gb jahhpf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. NkYk;> mit rh;tNjr eilKiwfis xj;J cs;sd. DBE-d; cjhuzk; Fsph;tpg;ghd; Fohapy; Vw;gLk; cilg;gpdhy; epfOk; Fsph;tpg;ghd; ,og;G tpgj;J (Loss of Cooland Accident). DBE epfo;Tfspd;NghJ mZciy ,af;fk; fl;Lg;ghl;L fopfshy; epWj;jg;gLfpwJ. mZciyf;fU gpd;tUk; ghJfhg;G mikg;Gfspd; %yk; Fsph;tpf;fg;gLfpwJ. mikg;Gfs; ehd;F jdpj;jdpahd mikg;Gfshf tbtikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. ,e;j

DBE

13

mjpf mOj;j mtrufhy Nghuhd; nrYj;Jk; mikg;G: Kjd;ik Fsp&l;L mikg;gpd; mOj;jk; 7.9 MPa mstpw;F fPo;tUk;NghJ ,e;j mikg;gpy; ,Ue;J Nghuhd; fyf;fg;gl;l ePh; mZciyfSf;Fs; nrYj;jg;gLk;. Kjy;epiy ePh; fyd;fs; (ce;J rf;jp Njitaw;w mikg;G): Kjd;ik Fsp&l;L mikg;gpd; mOj;jk; 5.9 MPa mstpw;F fPo;tUk;NghJ ,e;j mikg;gpy; ,Ue;J Nghuhd; fyf;fg;gl;l ePh; mZciyfSf;Fs; nrYj;jg;gLk;. ePz;l Neu fjphpaf;f rpijtpshyhd ntg;gj;ij (decay heat) ePf;Fk; mikg;G: Kjd;ik Fsp&l;L mikg;gpd; mOj;jk; 1.9 nkfh gh];fy;MPa mstpw;F fPo;tUk;NghJ ,e;j mikg;gpy; ,Ue;J Nghuhd; fyf;fg;gl;l ePh; mZciyfSf;Fs; nrYj;jg;gLk;. mtrufhy ghJfhg;G Nghuhd; nrYj;Jk; mikg;G: Nghuhd; fye;j ePiu mOj;j fydpy; (pressuriser) ,e;j mikg;G nrYj;JfpwJ. ,jdhy; ePuhtp cw;gj;jp fyd;fspy; (Steam Generator) cs;s Foha;fspy; frpT Vw;gLk;NghJ> Kjd;ik Fsp&l;L mikg;gpd; mOj;jk; Ntfkhf Fiwf;fg;gLfpwJ. ,jd; gadhy; Kjd;ik Fsp&l;L mikg;gpd; frpT Fiwf;fg;gLfpwJ.

j)

fl;Lg;ghl;L fopfSf;F khw;W mikg;G (4 mikg;Gfs;): fopfSf; fl;Lg;ghl;L fopfs; Gtp <h;g;G tpirapdhy; jhdhfNt mZ ciiyf;Fs; tpOk;. mit kpf tphpthd Kiwapy; Nrhjid fl;likg;gpYk;> nray;gLj;Jk; fl;lj;jpYk; ghpNrhjpf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. mZciy ,af;fj;jpd;NghJk; fl;Lg;ghl;L fopfspd; nray;ghL fz;fhzpf;fg;gLfpwJ. ,Ue;j NghjpYk;> fopfs; gOjile;j #o;epiyapy; (vjph;ghh;f;ff;$ba mZciy ,af;fj;ij epWj;j jtwpa epfo;T) (Anticipated Transient Without Scram ATWS), mZciy ,af;fk; fPo;tUk; $Ljy; ghJfhg;G mikg;Gfshy; epWj;jg;gLfpwJ. mtrufhy Nghuhd; nrYj;Jk; mikg;G: Nghuhd; fye;j ePh; mZciyf;Fs; 16MPa mOj;jj;jpy; nrYj;jg;gLfpwJ. (ce; Jhpj Nghuhd; nrYj;Jk; mikg;G (ce;J rf;jp Njitaw;w mikg;G): mlh;j;jp kpf;f Nghuhd; fye;j ePh; mZ ciyf;Fs; nrYj;jg;gLfpwJ.

k)

tbtikg;G mbg;gilf;F mg;ghw;gl;l epfo;TfSf;fhd mikg;Gfs; (Nkk;gLj;jg;gl;l ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fs;): jw;Nghija rh;tNjr eilKiwfspd;gb> mbg;gil tbtikg;Gf;F mg;ghw;gl;l epfo;TfSk; fUj;jpy; nfhs;sg;gl;lJ. ,e;j epiyfspy; NkYk; ghJfhg;ig cWjp nra;J nfhs;tjw;fhf fPo;f;fz;l mikg;Gfs; mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. ,e;j Nkk;gLj;jg;gl;l ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fs; $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyaj;Jf;F $Ljyhd mikg;Gfs; MFk;. 1. kpd;rhuk; ,d;wp mZciyia Fsph;tpf;Fk; mikg;G - ,ay;G epiy Fsph;tpg;ghd;

(PHRS):

Xl;Lnkhj;j kpd; jilapd; (Station Black-Out) NghJ mZciyiaf; Fsph;tpg;gjw;fhd mikg;G.

2. $Ljyhf mZciyapd; fUit jhdpaf;fj;jpd; %yk; ePh; epug;Gk; mikg;G (Passive Second Stage Accumulator):
xNu Neuj;jpy; Fsph;tpg;ghd; ,og;G tpgj;J kw;Wk; epiya KO kpd; ,og;G Nghd;w gy;NtW gOJfs; Vw;gLk;nghOJ mZciyapd; cl;gFjpf;F Nghuhd; fye;j ePh; mDg;Gk; mikg;G. 3. cUfpa mZciyapd; fUit jq;fitj;J kw;Wk; Fsph;tpf;Fk; mikg;G mZciyf; mZciyf; fU nfhs;fyd; (Core Catcher): fUj;jpy; nfhs;sg;gl;l fLikahd ghJfhg;ghf jq;fitj;J kw;Wk; ePz;l tpgj;jpd;NghJ cUfpa fhykhf Fsph;tpg;gJ. mZciyapd; fUit

14

l)

mZciy cs;slf;fp (Reactor Containment): mZciyAk;> ePuhtp tpepNahf itf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. NkYk;> mJ Mgj;Jj;JfspypUe;J ghJfhf;fpwJ. cs;slf;fp fl;likg;gpd; rpwg;gk;rq;fs;: m) ,ul;il cs;slf;fp fl;likg;G : Kd;dpWf;fk; nra;ag;gl;l> v/F jfLfs; nghUj;j;ggl;l frptpy;yh> fhd;fPhpl; Kjd;ik Rth; kw;Wk; tYt+l;lg;gl;l fhd;fPhpl; ,uz;lhk; Rth;. mikg;GfSk; mZciy cs;slf;fpapy; fjphpaf;fk; kw;Wk; ntspapypUe;J Vw;gLk;

M) ,ul;il fjTfs; $ba fhw;W Gfh Eiothapy;. Fsph;tpg;ghd; ,og;G tpgj;jpd; fhuzkhf kjpg;gplg;gl;l mOj;jj;jpd; tbtikg;G mOj;jk; 0.4MPa (g). tbtikg;G ntg;gk; 120C. Nrhjid mOj;jkhf 0.46MPa-f;F cs;slf;fp ghpNrhjpf;fg;gl;lJ. mbg;gilapy;

mDkjpf;fg;gl;l cs;slf;fpapd; frpT tPjk; ehs; xd;Wf;F 0.3% fdmsT. nray;ghl;Lf;F tUk; Kd; Nrhjidapd;NghJ cs;slf;fpapd; frpT tPjk; 0.18% Mf ,Ue;jJ. ,af;f epiyapd; NghJ nra;ag;gLk; Ma;tpd; xU gFjpahf cs;slf;fpapd; frpT tPjk; Fwpg;gpl;l ,ilntspapy; nra;ag;gLfpwJ. 2) ,uz;lhk; epiy cs;slf;fp fPo;f;fz;litfis tbtikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. 1. tpkhd Nkhjy; (Cessna and Learjet aircraft) 2. fhw;W mjph;tiyfs;. jiu cauj;jpy; ,af;fj;jpd;NghJk; guhkhpf;fg;gLfpwJ. m) jhq;Ftjw;fhf

fjphpaf;f ntspNaw;wj;ij Fiwg;gjw;fhf kw;Wk; tpgj;jpd;NghJk; Fiwe;j tsp

ruhrhpahd fhw;wOj;jk;

cs;slf;fpapd; mikg;Gfs;: cs;slf;fpapd; fl;Lf;Nfhg;G kw;Wk; mrhjhukhd epiyfspd;NghJ mjDila nray;ghl;L jpwid guhkhpg;gjw;fhf fPo;f;fz;l mikg;Gfs; nfhLf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. cs;slf;fpAs; jz;zPh; njspg;G mikg;G mZciyapd; Kjd;ik ePh; Rw;W my;yJ ,uz;lhk; ePh; Rw;wpy; Vw;gLk; ePh;f;frptpdhy; ntspg;gLk; ePuhtpia Fsph;tpj;J ePuhf khw;Wtjhy; cs;slf;fpapy; cs; mOj;jk; Fiwf;fg;gLfpwJ. cs;slf;fpfspd; ,ilg;gFjpapd; tbfl;b mikg;G (jhdpaq;fp mikg;G) Kjd;ik kw;Wk; ,uz;lhk; fl;l jLg;Gr;Rth;fspd; ,ilg;gl;l gFjpapy; tspkz;ly fhw;wOj;jj;ij tpl Fiwe;j fhw;wOj;j gFjpahf itj;jpUg;gjhy; cs;fhw;W ntspNa nry;tJ jLf;fg;gLfpwJ. epiyaj;jpy; KO kpd; ,og;gpd;NghJ ,e;j ,ilntspapy; cs;s Fiwe;j fhw;wOj;jkhdJ ,ay;G epiy Fsph;tpg;ghd; (PHRS) %yk; jf;f itf;fg;gLfpd;wJ. jhdpaq;fp i`l;u[d; kW ,izg;ghd;fs; tpgj;jpd; NghJ VNjDk; i`l;u[d; cz;lhFkhapd;> ,e;j jhdpaq;fp i`l;u[d; kW ,izg;ghd;fs; %yk; jz;zPuhf khw;wg;gLfpwJ. ,jdhy; cs;slf;fpapy; i`l;u[d; vhptJ jLf;fg; gLfpwJ. ,e;j kW ,izg;gpfs; cs;slf;fpay; gy;NtW ,lq;fspy; itf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ.

15

n)

Jiz fl;Lghl;L miw: Kjd;ikf; fl;Lg; ghl;L miwiag; gad;gLj;j KbahjNghJ mZciyapd; Kf;fpa ghJfhg;G nray;fisAk;> Kf;fpa mstPLfisAk; fz;fhzpf;f ghJfhf;fgl;l Jizf; fl;Lg;ghl;L miw mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. gapw;rp kw;Wk; jFjp: gapw;rp - %d;W fl;l gapw;rp Kiw i. NghJkhd mDgtkpf;f nghwpapay; gl;ljhhpfs; mZciyia ,af;Fgtuhf epakpf;fg;gLfpd;wdh;. ii. gapw;rp Kiw-A: tFg;giw gapw;rp kw;Wk; Njh;T iii. gapw;rp Kiw-B: u\;ahtpy; eilngWk; ghlk; kw;Wk; nray;ghl;L khjphp gapw;rp iv. gapw;rp Kiw-C: ,e;jpahtpy; eilngWk; nray;ghl;L eltbf;ifapy; gq;FngWjy; kw;Wk; nray;ghl;L khjphp gapw;rp(simulator training) nray;ghL kw;Wk; guhkhpg;G Jiwf;fhd jFjp: i. ,af;fk; kw;Wk; guhkhpg;G gzpahsh;fSf;F mZrf;jp xOq;fikg;G thhpaj;jpd; mDkjp ii. kWjFjp> Nkyhz;ikj;Jiwia rhh;e;jth;fSf;F cl;gl iii. jFjprhd;W ngWk; KiwAk; jPh;khdpf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. ,af;f epiy Ma;T (In Service Inspection): ,af;fepiy Ma;tpd;gb mZ ciyapd; fUtp kw;Wk; mikg;Gfspd; nray;ghl;L jd;ik fz;lwpag;gLfpwJ. ,af;fepiy Ma;tpd; msTfs; Kd;-,af;f Ma;Tfspd; (Pre Service Inspection) msTfSld; xg;gplg;gLk;. fz;fhzpf;fg;gLk; Kf;fpa mikg;Gfshtd: i. mZciyia Fsph;tpf;Fk; Kjd;ik Rw;W Foha; kw;Wk; fUtpfs; ii. mZciy nray;ghl;il ghJfhg;ghf epWj;j cjTk; my;yJ Fsph;tpf;Fk; Kf;fpa mikg;Gfs;. iii. cs;slf;fp mikg;Gfs; iv. Nkw;$wpatw;iw nray;gLj;j cjTk; mikg;Gfs; kw;Wk; fUtpfs;

o)

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q) nghUs;fspd; fz;fhzpg;G (Material Surveillance) 5.9) mZ ciyfyd; Rthpy; epA+l;uhd; fjph;tPr;R kw;Wk; ntg;g tpistpdhy; Vw;gLk; khw;wq;fis mwpa khjphp jl;Lfs; cs;Ns itf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. Fwpg;gpl;l fhy ,ilntspapy; ,e;j khjphp jl;Lfs; ntspNa vLf;fg;gl;L Ma;T nra;J mZ ciy fyd; Rthpy; Vw;gLk; nghwpapay; khw;wq;fs; Muhag;gLfpd;wJ. ,j;jifa Ma;Tfs; Njitahd Kd; eltbf;if vLf;f NghJkhd fhy mtfhrk; nfhLf;fpwJ. VVER nray;ghL kw;Wk; ghJfhg;G gFjp vz;-3y; nfhLf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. 5.10) khjphp vhpnghUs;; mZ vhpnghUs; fw;iwf;F khw;whf mNj msTfSk; vilAk; cs;sthW khjphp vhpnghUs; gad;gLj;jg;gLfpwJ. khjphp vhpnghUs; ve;jf; fjphpaf;fKk; ,y;yhjthW ,Uk;Gf; Foy;fspy; milf;fg;gl;l fhhPaj;jhy; cUthf;fg;gLfpwJ. mZ ciyapd; Kjd;ikr; Rw;Wg; ghijapy; fhZk; mOj;jk;> ntg;g khw;wk;> ePNuhl;l msT Mfpa ePhpay; gz;Gfis> mZ ciyf; Fsph;tpf;Fk; gk;Gfspd; gy;NtW
16

epiyfs; kw;Wk; ntg;g msTfspy; Ma;T nra;Ak; nghUl;L> mZ ciyapd; nrayhf;fg; gzpfspd; NghJ ,t;tif khjphp vhpnghUl;fs; nghUj;jg; gLfpd;wd. khjphp vhpnghUl;fs; fjphpaf;fk; mw;witahjyhy; ,tw;iw mg;Gwg;gLj;Jtjpy; vt;tpj ,lUkpy;iy> NkYk; ,it gpd;tUk; mZ ciyfspy; cgNahfpg;gjw;nfd Nrkpj;J itf;fg; gLfpd;wd. 5.11) vhpnghUs; ngWjy; u\;ah kw;Wk; ,e;jpa murpd; mZ rf;jpj; Jiwf;F ,ilNa Vw;gl;l xg;ge;jg; gb $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpd; epiyak; 1 kw;Wk; 2 f;fhd Kjw;fl;l kw;Wk; mLj;j fl;lq;fSf;F Njitahd vhpnghUs; ngwg;gl;Ls;sJ. mZ ciyap;d; vhpnghUs; cgNahfj;jpw;F Vw;w nrwpT+l;lj;Jld; cw;gj;jp nra;ag;gl;L fw;iw tbtpy; mspf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. vhpnghUs; juf;fl;Lg;ghl;L jpl;lj;jpd;gb, ciyf;F Njitahd vhpnghUs; u\;ahtpy; cw;gj;jp nra;Ak;NghJ mjd; juk; ,e;jpa mZkpd; fofj;jpd; epGzh;fshy; Nrhjid nra;ag;gLfpwJ. G+h;j;jp nra;ag;gl;l vhpnghUs; fw;iwfs;> rpwg;ghf tbtikf;fg; ngw;w fyd;fspy; rpwg;G thdT+h;jp %yk; u\;ahtpypUe;J ,e;jpahTf;F nfhz;Ltug;gLfpwJ. tpkhd epiyaj;jpypUe;J $ld;Fsk; epiyaj;jpw;F ,it rhiy topahff; nfhz;Ltug;gLfpd;wd. u\;aj; njhopw;rhiyapy; njhlq;fp> $ld;Fsk; epiyak; tiu vhpnghUs; nfhz;LtUk; nghOJ rh;tNjr mZrf;jp Kfik (IAEA) kw;Wk; ,e;jpa mZ rf;jp xOq;fikg;G (AERB) thhpaj;jpd; ghJfhg;G tpjpfs; Kiwahfg; gpd;gw;wg;gLfpd;wd. (Fresh water Supply) 5.12) ed;dPh; Njitfs; ( ) $ld;Fsk; 1 kw;Wk; 2 epiyaq;fspd; ,af;fj; Njitfs; kw;Wk; FbePh; Njitfisg; G+h;j;jp nra;a fly; ePh; Rj;jpfhpg;G Miyfs; tbtikf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. ,it ,ae;jpuk; %yk; ePuhtp mOj;j Kiwj; njhopy; El;gj;jpy; ,aq;Ftd. epiyaj;jpd; ,af;fj;jpw;fhf ehnshd;Wf;F 5664 fd kPl;lh; kw;Wk; FbePh; Njitf;fhf ehnshd;Wf;F 1272 fd kPl;lh; jz;zPh; Njitg;gLfpwJ. epWtg;gl;l Rj;jpfhpg;G Miyapd; nkhj;j cw;gj;jpasT ehnshd;Wf;F 7680 fd kPl;lh;. ,jw;fhf %d;W Rj;jpfhpg;G Miyfs; KiwNa ehnshd;Wf;F 2560 fd kPl;lh; tPjk; cw;gj;jp nra;fpd;wd. NkYk; xU epiyak; ehnshd;Wf;F 2560 fd kPl;lh; cw;gj;jpf; nfhs;sstpy; jahh;epiyapy; cs;sJ. Rj;jpfhpg;G MiyapapypUe;J fpilf;Fk; jz;zPh; jhJf;fs; mfw;wg;gl;l gpd;G epiya ePh;j;Njitf;;fhf cgNahfpf;fg;gLfpwJ. ,t;thW ngwg;gl;l ePh; kPz;Lk; Rj;jpfhpf;fg;gl;L FbePh; Njitf;fhfg; gad;gLfpwJ. FbapUg;Gg; gFjp jz;zPh; NjitfSf;nfd xU jdp Rj;jpfhpg;G Miy vjph;r; rt;T+L guTjy; (reverse osmosis) Kiwapy; ,aq;FfpwJ. gy;NtW njhl;bfspy; jz;zPh; Njf;fp itf;fg;gLk; nfhs;ssthdJ> kpd;rhuk; xl;Lnkhj;jkhf jilgl;l epiyapy; mZ ciyia 10 ehl;fSf;F Fsp&l;lf;$ba mstpy; cs;sJ. (mZrf;jp xOq;fikg;G thhpaj;jpd Njitg;gb 7 ehl;fSf;F ,Ug;gNj NghJkhdJ) 5.13) gpw ePh; Mjhuq;fs; fly;ePh; Rj;jpfhpg;G epiyaq;fs; NghJkhd nfhs;ssTf;F Vw;g tbtikf;fg;gl;L> epWtg;gl;L> ,af;fg;gl;L tUfpd;wd. Mifahy; Ngr;rpg;ghiw miz kw;Wk; jhkpuguzp ejp cs;spl;l gpw ePh; Mjhuq;fspy; ,Ue;J ePh; ngWjy; vd;w Nfs;tpf;Nf ,lkpy;iy.

5.14) fly;ePh; Rj;jpfhpg;G epiyaq;fs;:

17

$lq;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyaj;jpy; cs;s fly;ePh; Rj;jpfhpg;G epiyak; mzy; Rj;jpfhpg;G mjhtJ nkf;fhdpf;fy; Ntgh; fk;g;u\d; (MVC) Kiw mbg;gilapy; MdJ. (mjhtJ Fiwe;j mOj;jj;jpy; ePuhtpahf;fp Fsph;tpf;Fk; Kiw). ,jw;F fly;ePuhdJ epiyaj;jpy; mikf;fg;gl;Ls;s gpujhd Fsph;tpf;Fk; ePh; cs;spOf;Fk; fhy;thapd; topahf ngwg;gLfpwJ. fly;ePh; Rj;jpfhpg;G epiyaj;jpy; ,Ue;J ntspNaw;wg;gLk; cg;G gbkk; jz;zPUld; fyf;fg;gl;L ntspNaw;Wk; fhy;tha; topahf kPz;Lk; flYf;Fs; mDg;gg;gLfpwJ. ePNuhl;lk;> epiyaj;jpypUe;J ntspNaw;wg;gLk; cg;G nrwpe;j ePhpd; fiyT kw;Wk; flypy; fyf;Fk; tpjk; gw;wpa xU mbg;gilahd Rw;Wr; #oy; kjpg;gPL kw;Wk; fzpj tbt Ma;T> ,d;Nlhkh; flNyhu ePhpay; gpiuNtl; ypkpnll;> nrd;id (Indomer Coastal Hydraulics Pvt Ltd, Chennai) vd;w epWtdj;jpdhy; Nkw;nfhs;sg;gl;lJ. ,e;j epWtdk; fhy;eil kw;Wk; ghy;tsj;JiwahYk;> tptrha mikr;rfj;jhYk; rhd;wspf;fg;gl;lJ. neha;lhtpYs;s ,e;jpa cs;ehl;L ePh;top Mizaj;jpdhy;> A ju ePh;ts mstPl;lhsh; vd rhd;wspf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ.

ntspNaw;wg;gLk; cg;G nrwpe;j ePhpd; msT kzpf;F 350 fd kPl;lh; (350 m3/ltr) MFk;. mJ rhjhuzkhf kzpf;F 2>50>000 fd kPl;lh; ePNuhl;lj;jpy; (2>50>000 m3/ltr) ntspNaw;wg;gLk; fly;ePhpy;> ntspNaw;wf; fhy;tha;fspy; fye;J ePh;j;j(dilution) fly; ePuhf khwptpLfpwJ. ,J Muk;g epiyapy; 700 klq;F ePh;f;fg;gLfpwJ. ,e;j Muk;g epiy ePh;j;jk;> ,e;j cg;G nrwpe;j ePhpd; mlh;j;jpia 69 ppt (ppt vd;gJ parts per thousand mjhtJ Mapuj;jpy; xU gq;F) apypUe;J flypd; ,ay;G epiy msthd 35.1 ppt mstpw;F Fiwj;J tpLfpwJ. vdNt Kd;ghfNt ePh;f;fg;gl;l cg;Gr; nrwpe;j ePh;> flypy; fyg;gjpd; %yk; fly; rhh;e;j Rw;Wr; #oypw;F ve;jtpj ghjpg;GfisAk; Vw;gLj;jhJ. ,e;j cg;Gr; nrwpe;j ePhpy; er;Rj; jd;ik tha;e;j kw;Wk; fhpk khRg; nghUs;fs; vJTk; ,y;iy. 5.15) fly; ePh; Rj;jpfhpg;G epiyaj;jpd; Rw;Wr; #oy; jhf;fk; ,J 5.14y; tpthpf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. 5.16) mZf;fopT eph;tfpg;G Kd;Diu 1. mZciyapd; fjphpaf;fj;jpd; %yfhuzk; vhpnghUspy; Vw;gLk; fjphpaf;fk; kw;Wk; mZg;gpsT. vhpnghUisr; Rw;wpAs;s cNyhff; Foha; ,e;j fjphpaf;fj;ij cs;slf;fp itj;Js;sJ. vjph;ghuhjtpjkhf xU rpwpa Jthuk; Vw;gbd; ,jpypUe;J fjphpaf;fk; mZciyap;y; cs;s ntg;gj;ij Fsp&l;Lk; ePhpy; fyf;Fk;. 1.1 ,t;thwhf Kjd;ik Fsph;tpf;Fk; ePhpy; fyf;Fk; fjphpaf;fk>; tbfl;b(filter) kw;Wk; madp khw;wp fyd;fspy;(ion-exchange column) rpwg;ghd Kiwapy; tbfl;b gphpj;J vLf;fg;gLfpwJ. Kjd;ik Fsph;tpg;ghdpy; cs;s ePh; njhlh; Row;rp Kiwapy; ,aq;fptUtjhy;> vhpnghUspypUe;J ntspNaWk; fjphpaf;fk; Nkw;$wpa rpwg;ghd Kiwapy;; njhlh;e;J tbfl;b gphpj;J vLf;fg;gLtjhYk;> ,J gzpahsh;fSf;Fk;> nghJkf;fSf;Fk; ve;jtpj ghjpg;Gk; Vw;gLj;jhJ. vdNt ,J Rw;Wr;#oYf;F nry;tjw;fhd thag;;Ng ,y;iy. kw;w jputf; fopTfs; ePuhtpahf khw;wg;gl;L mjpypUe;J ngwg;gLk; ePh; kpff; Fiwe;j gl;r fjphpaf;fj;ij nfhz;bUg;gjhy; ,e;j ePh; kPz;Lk; mZciyapy; gad;gLj;jg;gLfpwJ. ,jpypUe;J ngwg;gLk; mlh;kpF fopTfs; fhq;fphPl; cld; Nrh;f;fg;gl;L
18

epiyahd tbtk; nfhz;ljhf Nrfhpj;J itf;fg;gLfpwJ. 1.2

khw;wg;gLfpwJ.

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mNj Nghy;> fjphpaf;fk; nfhz;l jplf; fopTfs; gj;jpukhf Nrfhpf;fg;gl;L Kjy;epiyahf mjd; nfhs;ssT vhpj;jy; kw;Wk; mOj;jy; Kiwapy; Fiwf;fg;gl;L rpkpz;l; cld; Nrh;f;fg;gl;L fhq;fphPl;lhf khw;wg;gl;L gj;jpukhf jw;fhypf Nrkpg;gpy; itf;fg;gLfpwJ. gpd;dh; ,f;fopTfs; Fiwe;j tho;ehs; nfhz;l fjphpaf;f nghUs;fspd; rpijtpdhy; fjphpf;f msTfs; Fiwe;jTld;> jiukl;l ghJfhg;G mikg;Gfspy; Nrkpj;J itf;fg;gLfpd;wd. mZciy fl;blj;jpy; ,Ue;J ngwg;gLk; fhw;wpy; VNjDk; fjph;tPr;R ,Ue;jhy; mit njhlh; tbfl;bfspd; %yk; Rj;jk; nra;ag;gl;L caukhd GifNghf;fpapd; %yk; ntspNaw;wg;gLfpwJ. vhpnghUs; Fohapy; vy;yh fjphpaf;fKk; fl;Lg;gLj;Jtjhy; mZciyapypUe;J ngwg;gLk; Fiwe;j fjphpaf;f fopTfs; kw;Wk; kpfr;rpwpa ,ilepiy fopTfs; kl;LNk cz;lhfpd;wd. cah;epiyf; fopTfs; $lq;Fsk; mZciy ,af;fj;jpdhy; cz;lhtjpy;iy. Mf> vy;yhtpj Kd;vr;rhpf;if kw;Wk; Rw;Wr;#oy; ghJfhg;ig fUj;jpy; nfhz;L gy mjpetPd njhopw;El;gq;fs; %yk; fjphpaf;f fopTfs; gj;jpukhf eph;tfpg;G nra;ag;gLfpwJ. ,J rk;ge;jkhf> ,e;jpa mZrf;jp Jiwapd; fle;J ehw;gJ Mz;Lfspy; ,Ue;J ngwg;gl;l Gs;sptptukhdJ cyfpy; kpfr; rpwe;jjhf fUjg;gLfpwJ.

1.3

1.4

1.5

2. KjYk; Kjd;ikahdJkhf fUj;jpy; nfhs;sNtz;baJ vd;dntd;why;> cgNahfg;gLj;jg;gl;l vhpnghUs; vd;gJ> ,e;jpa mZrf;jp jpl;lj;jpd; gb xU fopT vhpnghUshdJ njhlh;Row;rp nra;ag;gLtjhy; gad;kpF ANudpak;> my;y. GSNlhdpak; Nghd;wit cgNahfg;gLj;jg;gl;l vhpnghUspypUe;J gphpj;J vLf;fg;gLfpwJ. 2.1 cgNahfg;gLj;jg;gl;l nghf;fp\k;. vd;gJ vhpnghUs; ghJfhf;fg;glNtz;ba xU

$ld;Fsj;jpy;> mZ ciyapypUe;J ntspnaLf;fg;gLk; cgNahfg;gLj;jg;gl;l vhpnghUs; Rj;jkhd jz;zPh; epug;gg;gl;l> gad;gl;l vhpnghUs; Nrkpg;Gj; njhl;bfspy; ftdkhf Nrkpj;J itf;fg;gLfpd;wd. ,e;jj; jz;zPh;> njhlh;r;rpahf Row;rp nra;ag;gl;L Rj;jpfhpg;Gk; nra;ag;gLfpwJ. ,e;jj; njhl;bfs;> kpfTk; fl;Lf; Nfhg;ghd fhd;fphpl;lhy; Mdit. Kw;Wk; mjd; cl;Gwr; Rth; JUg;gpbf;fhj v/Fj; jfLfshy; (Stainless Steel) MdJ. ,e;jf; fl;likg;G> ePz;l fhyj;jpw;F gad;gl;l vhpnghUis mjDs; KOikahd ghJfhg;Gld; jf;f itj;Jf; nfhs;s cWjp nra;fpwJ. ,e;jpa mZrf;jpj; Jiw> gad;gl;l vhpnghUspd; ghJfhg;ghd Nkyhz;ikapy; ePz;lfhy mDgtKk;> cah;epiy epGdj;JtKk; ngw;Ws;sJ. 2.2 $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpy; cgNahfg;gLj;jg;gl;l vhpnghUis kWRow;rp nra;a jpl;lk; vJTkpy;iy. vdNt ,e;j ,ilfhyj;jpy; cgNahfgLj;jg;gl;l vhpnghUis ftdkhf Nrfhpj;J gpd;dh; kWRow;rp tsh;r;rpf;F mDg;GtjhFk;. $ld;Fsk; epiyaj;jpy; gad;gl;l vhpnghUspd; Nrkpg;G vd;gJ kWRow;rp epiyaq;fSf;F nfhz;L nry;Yk; tiu itj;Jf; nfhs;sf;$ba xU ,ilf;fhy eltbf;ifahf Nkw;nfhs;sg;gLfpwJ. gad;gl;l vhpnghUis> xU tshfj;jpypUe;J kw;nwhU tshfj;jpw;F rhiy kw;Wk; uapy;ghij topfshf nghJkf;fSf;F ve;jtpj ghjpg;Gk; tpistpf;fhj tifapy;> ghJfhg;ghd Kiwapy; ,lkhw;wk; nra;tjw;F NghJkhd njhopy;El;gk; kw;Wk; gy tUl mDgtj;ijAk; ,e;jpa mZrf;jpj; Jiw ngw;Ws;sJ. ,e;j ,lkhw;wk; ,e;jpa mZrf;jp xUq;fikg;G thhpaj;jpd;>
19

2.3

ghJfhg;ghd ,e;jpa mZrf;jp Nghf;Ftuj;J tpjpKiwfspd; tiuaiuf;Fl;gl;L Nkw;nfhs;sg;gLfpwJ. kWRow; (Re-Processing) 5.17) kWRow;rp ( ) ,J 5.16 y; tpthpf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. 5.18) fjph;tPr;R ghJfhg;G tof;fkhd ntspNaw;wk;. $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyaj;jpd; Mtzq;fis Ma;T nra;jjpypUe;J fPo;f;fz;lit njhpa tUfpwJ. mZciyapy; Roy;tpf;fg;gLk; jz;zPhpypUe;J epiyaj;jpy; Fsph;tpf;fg;gad;gLj;jg;gLk; fly; ePh; %d;W epiyfspy; njhlh;gpy;yh gphpe;j epiyapy; tbtikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. MapDk; epiya ,af;fj;jpdhy; Vw;gLk; rpy Fiwe;j kw;Wk; kpjkhd tif fopTfs; cs;NsNa eph;tfpf;fg;gLfpwJ. kpff; Fiwe;j tifapyhd cw;gj;jp nra;ag;gLk;; fopTfs;> mjDila tiuaiwf;F cl;gl;L ntspNaw;wg;gLk; vd;w tpjp ,Uf;fpwJ. thAepiy fopTg;nghUl;fs; ,Ug;gpd; mit fl;bj;jpy; cs;s fhw;Wld; fye;J Gifg;Nghf;fp %yk; ntspNaw;wg;gLfpwJ. mt;thwd fhw;whdJ GifNghf;fpapy; ntspNaw;Wtjw;F Kd;djhf mjpfjpwd; nfhz;l ghh;l;bFNyl; fhw;W tbfl;b kw;Wk; J}z;lg;gl;l fhp tbfl;bapd; %yk; tbfl;lg;gLfpwJ.

kf;fs; ghJfhg;G kw;Wk; eyd; ICRP eph;zapj;Js;s nghJkf;fSf;fhd fjphpaf;f msT Mz;L xd;Wf;F (1kpy;yP rPth;l;). $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyaj;jpypUe;J fhw;W kw;Wk; ePhpd; %yk; ntspahFk; Fiwe;j epiy fopTfspd; msT fl;Lg;gLj;jg;gLj;Jtjdhy; ,f;fopTfsp;d; msT ICRP eph;zapj;Js;s 1 kpy;yp rPth;l;-y; 4.36 rjtPjkhf ,Uf;Fk;. MapDk; vjph;ghh;f;fg;gLk; rjtPjk;). ntspNaw;wj;jpd; msT kpf FiwthdjhfNt ,Uf;Fk; (0.02

ePh;epiy kw;Wk; fhw;W %ykhd ntspNaw;wj;jpd; tPhpakhdJ xUNghJk; mjpfhuG+h;tkhd vy;iyf;F Nky; ,uhJ. GifNghf;fpapd; ntspNaw;wq;fs; njhlh;r;rpahf fz;fhzpf;fg;gLfpwJ. jput ntspNaw;wj;jpd; tPhpa msT jpdKk; fz;fhzpf;fg;gLfpwJ vd;gij cWjp nra;fpwJ. NkYk; jhtuq;fs;> fly;tho; caphpdq;fs; kw;Wk; Rw;Wr;#oypy; Vw;glf;$ba jhf;fj;ij ,e;jpa mZkpd; fofj;ij rhuhj epWtdkhd Rw;Wr; #oy; Ma;tfk;> Rw;Wr; #oy; Ma;T Nkw;nfhz;L njhlh;e;J kjpg;gPL nra;J nfhz;bUf;fpwJ. ,e;j Ma;tfkhdJ 2004 Mk; Mz;bypUe;J epiyak; ,af;Ftjw;F Kd;ghfNt gy;NtW ,lq;fspypUe;J khjphpfis Nrfhpj;J mtw;wpDila fjphpaf;fj;ij kjpg;gpl;L xU mbg;gil jfty;fis itj;Js;sJ. Rw;Wr;#oy; fjphpaf;f kjpg;gPL epfor;rpahdJ midj;J mZkpd; tshfq;fspYk; epiyaq;fs; nray;gl;l gpwF Rw;Wg;Gwr; #oYf;Fk;> nghJkf;fSf;Fk; ve;j tpj jhf;fkpy;iy vd;gij cWjp nra;a njhlh;e;J kjpg;gpl;L tUk;. Fwpg;gpl;l fhyj;jpd; KbTfs; mwpf;iffs; xOq;FKiw thhpaj;jpdhy; jzpf;if nra;ag;gLfpwJ. Rw;Wg;Gw #oy; Ma;tfk; epiyaj;ij Rw;wpAs;s Rw;Wr;#oiy fz;fhzpf;fpwJ. epiyaj;jpd; nray;ghl;bw;F Kd;djhfNt 2003 Mk; Mz;bypUe;J fhw;W> ePh;> kz;> jhtuq;fs;> caphpdq;fs; Mfpatw;wpd; khjphpfis Nrfhpj;J kw;Wk; gFg;G Muha;e;j mtw;wpd; mbg;gil jfty;fis itj;Js;sJ. ,e;j mbg;gil jfty;fs; midj;Jk; epiyepWj;jg;gl;Lk; kw;Wk; ghh;itf;F jahuhf ,Uf;fpwJ.

20

,e;j nray;ghlhdJ epiyaj;jpd; Mtzq;fs; guhkhpf;fg;gLk;.

KO

tho;ehs;

tiu

njhlh;e;J

,Uf;Fk;

kw;Wk;

kw;w mZkpd; epiyaq;fspy; cs;s Mtzq;fs; jhtuq;fSf;Fk;> ve;jtpjkhd jhf;fKk; ,y;iy vd;gij Rl;bf;fhl;LfpwJ.

caphpdq;fSf;Fk;

cz;ikapNyNa nrhy;yg; Nghdhy; mZkpd; epiyaq;fisr; Rw;wpYk; jhtuq;fSk;> Njhl;lq;fSk; caphpdq;fSk; kpfr; rpwe;j Kd;Ndw;wkile;js;sJ. ,J vy;yh mZkpd; epiya tshfq;fSk; Ch;[pjg;gLj;jg;gl;Ls;sJ. kf;fspd; cly;ey ghJfhg;G jpUtde;jGuj;jpYs;s kz;ly Gw;WNeha; fofj;jpd; Ma;tpd;gb ,aw;if fjph;tPr;rpd; %yk; kf;fSf;F cz;lhFk; ghjpg;ghdJ mZkpd; epiya fjph;tPr;R ghjpg;ig tpl 25 klq;F mjpfkhf ,Ug;gpDk;> ,e;j ,aw;if fjph;tPr;rpdhy;; kf;fSf;F ve;j xU Nkhrkhd gpd;tpisTfis vw;gLj;jtpy;iy vd;W cWjpnra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ. ,e;jpah KOtjpYs;s mZkpd; epiyaj;jpw;F mUfpy; trpf;Fk; mZkpd; fof Copah;fspd; mZf;fjph;tPr;rpd; Vw;ghdJ $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; epiya Copah;fspd; Vw;gsittpl 100 klq;F mjpfkhf ,Ue;j NghjpYk;> ,Jtiu Fwpg;gplj;jf;f cly;hPjpahd gpd;tpisTfs; Vw;gltpy;iy vd;Wk; cWjp nra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ. ,jdhy; $lq;Fsk; mZkpd;epiyaj;ijr; Rw;wp trpf;Fk; kf;fSf;F fjph;tPr;R rk;ge;jg;gl;l tp\aq;fspypUe;J ghJfhg;G cWjp nra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ vd;Wk; mZkpd; epiyak; ,aq;Ftjpdhy; kf;fSf;F ve;j xU jhf;fj;ijAk; Vw;gLj;jhJ vd;Wk; ehq;fs; ek;Gfpd;Nwhk;. fjph;tPr;rpd; %yk; tk;rhtspapdUf;F Vw;gLk; tpisT rk;ge;j xU Fwpg;G: Nfus khepyj;jpy; ,aw;if fjph;tPr;R mjpfKs;s ,lq;fspy; tk;rhtspahf thOk; kf;fSf;F ,aw;if fjph;tPr;Rk; ve;j xU Fwpg;gplj;jf;f ghjpg;Gfs; VJk; ,y;iy vd;W jpUtde;jGu kz;ly Gw;WNeha; fofj;jpduhy; jdpj;jdpahf Nkw;nfhs;sg;gl;l Ma;tpy; Fwpg;gpl;Ls;sJ. mZkpd; epiya Copah;fspd; fjph;tPr;R Vw;Fk; msthdJ nghJ kf;fspd; fjph;tPr;R Vw;Fk; msittpl 20 klq;F mjpfkhf ,Ue;j NghjpYk; mZkpd; epiya Copah;fSf;F ghjpg;Gfs; VJkpy;iynad Ma;Tfs; $Wfpd;wd. UNSCEAR vd;w If;fpa ehl;L epWtdk; 60 tUlq;fshf fjph;tPr;R rk;ge;jg;gl;l midj;J tpisTfisAk; Ma;T nra;J tUfpd;wJ. ,J mZFz;L %yk; kpfTk; Nkhrkhd ghjpg;Gf;F cs;shd `pNuh\pkh kw;Wk; ehfrhfp Mfpa efiur; Rw;wpAs;s kf;fspd; tpisTfisAk; Ma;e;J mth;fspd; jiyKiwapdUf;Fk; ghjpg;Gfs; ,y;iy vd;W $wpAs;sJ.

,t;thwhf gy fjph;tPr;R rk;ge;j cz;ikfs; cs;s epiyapy; mZkpd; epiya fjph;tPr;rhdJ ,aw;if fjph;tPr;rpd; mstpy; xU rjtPjNk (1%) cs;sNghJ> mZkpd; epiyaj;jpdhy; jiyKiwapdUf;F ghjpg;G vd;Wk; Gw;WNeha; tUnkd;Wk; $wpf;nfhs;tJ vt;thW cz;ikahf ,Uf;fKbAk;? fjph;tPr;R rk;ge;jkhd kf;fspd; gakhdJ ntWk; czh;r;rpg;g+h;tkhdJ vd;Wk; mij tpQ;QhdhPjpapy; xj;Jf;nfhs;s KbahJ vd;gNj cz;ik. MNuhf; cly; MNuhf;fpak; rk;ge;jg;gl;l mbg;gil jfty;fs;: $lq;Fsj;ij Rw;wpAs;s kf;fspd; cly; MNuhf;fpa epiy: $lq;Fsk; kw;Wk; mjd; Rw;W tl;lhuj;ij Nrh;e;j 52 fpuhkq;fspy; trpf;Fk; kf;fspd; cly; MNuhf;fpaj;ij gw;wp jpUney;Ntypapy; cs;s kNdhd;kzpak; Re;judhh; gy;fiyf;fofj;jpdh; 2004 Kjy; 2008 Mz;L tiu Ma;T nra;Js;sdh;. ,e;j Ma;tpd; njhFg;Ng mZkpd; epiyak; Jtq;fpagpd;dh; fjph;tPr;rpdhy; Vw;gLk; jhf;fj;Jld; xg;gpl cjTk;. ,e;j Ma;tpy; nkhj;jk; Nrfhpf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. 67029 jiyg;Gfspy;; Gw;WNeha; rk;ge;jg;gl;l jfty;fs;

21

nkhj;jj;jpy; 136 Gw;WNehahspfs; ,Ug;gjhf $wg;gl;Ls;sJ. ,tw;wpy; mNefkhd $wg;gl;Ls;sJ. Gw;WNeha;fs; tha; kw;Wk; ngz;fspd; gpwg;GWg;Gfspy; ,Ug;gjhf

,e;j Ma;tpy; $lq;Fsk; kw;Wk; mjd; Rw;W tl;lhuj;jpy; ruhrhpahf xU yl;rk; kf;fs; njhifapy; 202.8 NgUf;F Gw;WNeha; ,Ug;gjhfTk; ,e;j msthdJ jkpo;ehl;bd; ruhrhpahd xU yl;rk; kf;fs; njhifapy; 225 Ngh; Gw;WNeha; tha;g;gl;lth;fs; vd;gJld; xg;gpl KbfpwJ. cyfshtpa tprhuizfs; rpytifahd Gw;WNeha;fs;> gpurpj;jkhf ijuha;L Nghd;w xd;W fjpHtPr;rpd; tpisthf tUfpwJ vd;gij Fwpg;gpLfpwJ. gzpahsHfspd; ghJfhg;G kw;Wk; eyd; : rHtNjr fjpHtPr;R ghJfhg;G fofj;jpd; rpghhpRfspd;gb fjpHtPr;R gzpahsHfspd; Vw;gsT tiuaWf;fg;gl;bUf;fpwJ. ruhrhpahf tUlj;jpw;F 20 kpy;yp rptHl; vd njhlHe;J 5 tUlq;fSf;F E}W 100kpy;yp rpth;l; vd;Wk; VjhtJ xU tUlj;jpy; 30 kpy;yp rptHl; (3000 kpy;ypnuk;) vd;Wk; cs;sJ. tho;ehs; KOtjw;Fkhd nkhj;j mstPl;bd; tiuaiw : 1 rptHl; ,e;j tiuaiwTfs; mZrf;jp xOq;fikg;G thhpaj;jpdhy; Vw;Wf;nfhs;sg;gl;Ls;sJ. NkYk; $ld;Fsk; mZkpd;epiyak; ve;j gzpahsH xUtUk; ,e;j tiuaiwia kPwhjpUf;fNtz;ba cs;tPl;L epge;jidfis Vw;gLj;jpAs;sJ. mtHfs; khjhe;jpu kw;Wk; fhyhz;L tiuaiwfs; ,ij cWjpg;gLj;JfpwJ. fle;j 5 tUl fhyj;jpy; mDgtj;jpypUe;J ve;j xU mZ ciyfspypUe;Jk; ve;j gzpahsUk; nkhj;j tiuaiwapypUe;J kPwtpy;iy vd;gijAk; Fwpg;gpLfpwJ. ,e;j tiuaiwfs; ve;jtpj vjphpilahd Rfhjhu tpisTfisAk; cz;lhf;ftpy;iy. xspH ntg;g msTkhdpia (TLD) cgNahfpj;J thq;ff;$ba fjpHtPr;rpd; msit fz;fhdpf;f xU Mo;e;j jpl;lj;ij itj;jpUf;fpwJ. NkYk; fjPh;tPr;rsT Nehpilahd mstPl;L msTkhdpahYk; mstplg;gLfpwJ. ,e;j Mtzq;fs; epiyaj;jpy; itf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. gjpTfspYk; ikag;gLj;jg;gl;Ls;sJ. kw;Wk; mZrf;jpJiwapd; mstPl;L

$ld;Fsk; mZkpd;epiyaj;jpd; nray;ghLfshy; Rthrpj;jy; my;yJ czTf;Foha; %yk; cl;Gwf;fjPh;tPr;R ngWtjw;fhd tha;g;GfNs ,y;iy vdyhk;. ,Ue;j NghjpYk; cl;GwfjPH;tPr;rpid fz;lwptjw;fhd KO clk;G fjphpaf;f msTkhdpfs; $lq;Fsk; tshfj;jpy; cs;sJ. :5.19) tof;fkhd ntspapLjy; :,J rk;ge;jkhd tptuq;fs; ghfk; 5.18y; mlq;fpAs;sJ. :5.20) gzpahsHfspd; ghJfhg;G kw;Wk; eyd; :,J rk;ge;jkhd tptuq;fs; ghfk; 5.18y; mlq;fpAs;sJ. 5.21) kf;fspd; ghJfhg;G kw;Wk; eyd;:ghJfhg; ,J rk;ge;jkhd tptuq;fs; ghfk; 5.18y; mlq;fpAs;sJ.

5.22) cly; MNuhf;fpa Ma;tpd; mbg;gil jfty;fs; ::,J rk;ge;jkhd tptuq;fs; ghfk; 5.18y; mlq;fpAs;sJ.

22

:5.23) fjpHtPr;R ghjpg;G :,e;jpahtpy; mZkpd;epiyaq;fspypUe;J nghJkf;fs; kw;Wk; njhopw;rhiy gzpahsHfSf;F fpilf;Fk; fjpHtPr;rpd; tiuaiwahdJ fjpHtPr;rpdhy; ghjpg;G Vw;gLk; vd;w Nfs;tpw;Nf ,lkpy;yhj mstpw;Nf cs;sJ. 5.24) kf;fs; njhif: 2001k; Mz;L kf;fs;njhif fzf;nfLg;gpd;gb $lq;Fsk; mZkpd;epiyaj;ijr; Rw;wpAs;s kf;fs;njhifapd; msTfs; ,q;Nf nfhLf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ: 0-2 fp.kPl;lH 0 2-5 fp.kPl;lH 23960 5-16 fp.kPl;lH 94733 5.25) flypay; 1.0 $lq;Fsk; mZkpd;jpl;lj;jpd; nts;sePH mikg;G kw;Wk; Kf;fpa fl;bl jiukl;lq;fs; kw;Wk; ,lq;fs; 1.1 tbtikf;fg;gl;l nts;s msT fly; kl;l cauj;jpypUe;J $lq;Fsk; mZkpd;epiya tshfkhdJ ghJfhg;G jiukl;l caukhf +7.5 kPl;lH cauj;jpy; mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ kw;Wk; flw;fiu ghJfhg;G jLg;gizahdJ fly; kl;l cauj;jpypUe;J +8.0 kPl;lH cauj;jpy; fl;lg;gl;Ls;sJ. Rdhkp kw;Wk; Gayhy; Vw;gLk; fly;kl;l caHit fUj;jpy; nfhz;L fPo;fz;l ghJfhg;G jiukl;l cauq;fs; fzf;fplg;gl;Ls;sd. t.vz;. jz;zPH caUk; msT (kP.) miy Xl;l mjpfgl;r Gayhy; Vw;gLk; Rdhkp nkhj;jk; caHT miy fly;kl;l caHT (midj;ijAk; $l;b) 1. 2.0 1.42 2.46 -5.88 2. 2.0 1.42 -2.50 5.92 vdNt mjpfgl;rkhf jz;zPH caUk; msT = (5.92 - 0.481)= 5.439 kPl;lH (fly;kl;l msit xg;gpLf) fly;kl;l msit xg;gpl;L vjpHfhy ghJfhg;gpy; $Ljyhf 2 kPl;lH cauk; fzf;fpy; nfhz;L> ghJfhg;G cau msT 7.44 kPl;lH (7.5 kPl;lH) vLj;Jf; nfhs;sg;gl;Ls;sJ). 1.2 $lq;Fsk; mZkpd;epiya fl;bl jiukl;lq;fs; xt;nthU fl;blq;fSk; ghJfhg;G jiukl;l cauj;Jld; rpwpjsT $Ljy; cauq;fs; fzf;fpy; nfhz;L fl;lg;gl;Ls;sd. fPo;fz;l ml;ltizapy; Kf;fpa ghJfhg;G fl;blq;fspd; jiukl;l cauq;fs; kw;Wk; ,lq;fs; nfhLf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. fl;blk; ePNuw;Wk; epiyak; mZ ciy fl;blk; ghJfhg;G Bry; n[dNul;lh; fl;blk; (jz;zPh; Gfh mikg;G nfhz;l fl;blk;) Bry; n[dNul;lh; fl;blj;jpy; cs;s Bry; Nrkpg;G njhl;b kpd;fy njhFjp fl;blk; (jz;zPh; Gfh mikg;G nfhz;l fl;blk;) ,aw;ifahf Fsph;tpf;Fk; mikg;G Kf;fpa fl;Lg;ghl;L miw jiukl;l cauk; kP (fly; kl;lj;jpypUe;J) +7.65 +8.7 +9.3 +13.8 +16.4 +52.2 +26.0 $Ljy; cauk; kP 2.21 3.26 3.86 8.36 11.06 46.76 20.56

23

ghJfhg;G rk;ke;jg; gl;l fl;blq;fs; ,e;j cah;e;j jiu kl;lj;jpy; mikj;jJ kl;Lky;yhky; ,e;j fl;bl fjTfs; ,uz;lLf;F frpT jLf;Fk; fh];fl; nghUj;jg;gl;Ls;sJ. flw; 1.3 flw;fiu epiyj;jd;ik $ld;Fsk; mZkpd;epiya gFjpapy; flw;fiuNahu gFjpapy; ghiwfs; ,Ug;gjdhy; fly; mhpg;G Vw;glhky; flw;fiu ghJfhf;fg;gLfpwJ. NkYk; ,e;j gFjpapy; fly; mhpg;G Vw;gl;ljhf ve;j tuyhWk; ,y;iy. 2.0 Rdhkp fz;lwpjy;:

Rdhkp Vw;gl tha;g;G ,Uf;Fk; vr;rhpf;ifia fPo;f;fz;l mikg;Gfs; %yk; njhpe;J nfhs;syhk;. $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyak; i`juhghj;jpy; cs;s INCOIS y; (,e;jpa Njrpa fly; jfty; Nrit ikak;) gjpT nra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ. Rdhkp vr;rhpf;if tpLf;fg;gLk; rkaq;fspy; epiya ePh;thfj;jpd; miyNgrp vz;fSf;F jfty; fpilf;Fk;. fzpdp mbg;gilapyhd epy eLf;f vr;rhpf;if mikg;G (ENS) fy;ghf;fk; nrd;id mZkpd; epiyaj;jpy; mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. epyeLf;fk; Vw;gLk; rkaq;fspy; ,e;j mikg;G fl;Lghl;L miwf;F vr;rhpf;if nfhLf;Fk;. ENS MdJ USGS (mnkhpf;f Gtpapay; Ma;T) kw;Wk; EMSC (INuhg;gpa kj;jpa jiu epy eLf;f ikak;) cld; ,izf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. VnjDk; vr;rhpf;if fpilj;jhy; mJ cldbahf $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyaj;jpw;F mDg;gg;gLk;.

5.26)

kPd; tsk;> fly; czT ghJfhg;G kw;Wk; Fsph;tpf;Fk; ePh; ntspNaw;wk; kw;Wk; ntg;g #oy; mbg;gil Gs;sp tptuk; Nrfhpg;G: $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; epiya jpl;lj;jpd; flw;rhh; #o;epiy Fwpj;j Muk;g fhy Gs;sp tpguq;fs; fPo;fz;l mikg;Gfspd; gy;NtW Ma;Tfs; %yk; rpwg;ghf gjpT nra;ag;gl;Ls;sd. m) kNdhd;kzPak; Re;judhh; gy;fiyf;fofk; M) ngUq;fly; Nkyhz;ik gapyfk;> mz;zh gy;fiyf;fofk;. ,) ,e;jpa nghwpahsh;fs; epWtdk; / rp.vk;.vg;.Mh;.I. 1. fly;ePh; (Fsph;tpg;ghd;) mikg;G. cs;thq;Fk; fl;likg;gpd; rpwg;gk;rk; kPd; ghJfhg;G

$lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpy; ePuhtp Row;wpapy; (Steam Turbine) ,Ue;J ntsptUk; ePuhtpia Fsph;tpj;J kWRow;rp nra;tjw;fhf fly;ePh; gad;gLj;jg;gLfpwJ. ,e;j fly;ePh; ePNuw;W epiyaj;jpw;F tUk; Kd;Ng> me;j ePhpy; cs;s kPd;fis fhg;gjw;fhf kPd; ghJfhg;G mikg;G vdg;gLk; jdpj;jd;ik tha;e;j fl;likg;G mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. ,t;tikg;gpy;> mOj;jg;gl;l fhw;iw cs;tUk; fly;ePhpy; nrYj;jp> kPd;fs; xU gFjp fly;ePUld; kPz;Lk; flYf;Fs;NsNa ghJfhg;ghf jpUg;gp mDg;gg;gLfpd;wd. ,J fly; tho; caphpdq;fis ghJfhg;gjw;fhfNt mikf;fg;gl;l jdpj;jd;ik tha;e;j mikg;ghFk;. Fsph;tpg;ghdpy; tpisTfs;. ,Ue;J ntspNaWk; fly;ePhpdhy; fly; tho; caphpdq;fSf;F Vw;gLk;

$lq;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyak; ,aq;Fk;NghJ> Njhuhakhf ehnshd;Wf;F xU epiyaj;jpypUe;J vOgJ yl;rk; ld; fly;ePh; flYf;Fs; ntspNaw;wg;gLfpwJ. mjd; ntg;gk;; fly;ePhpd; ntg;gepiyiatpl 70C msTf;F kpfhky; ,Uf;Fk;.

24

$ld;Fsk; fly; #oypy;> fly; Nkw;gug;G ePhpd; ntg;gepiyahdJ kio kw;Wk; Fsph;fhyq;fspy; 230C mstpypUe;J Nfhil fhyq;fspy; 290C msTtiu khWgLfpwJ. ruhrhp fly;ePh; Nkw;gug;G ePhpd; ntg;g epiy 26.60C Mf cs;sJ. $ld;Fsk; fly; #oypy; cs;s kPd;fs; kw;Wk; ,why;fisg; gw;wp elj;jg;gl;l Ma;tpy;> mitfSf;F nfLjy; tpistpf;ff; $ba fly;ePhpd; ntg;gepiy 38.20C Kjy; 43.20C tiu vd fz;lwpag;gl;Ls;sJ. Rw;Wr;#oy; kw;Wk; td mikr;rfj;jpd; tiuaiwapd;gb> kpd; epiyaq;fspy; ,Ue;J ntspNaWk; fly;ePhpd; ntg;gepiy cs;thq;Fk; fly;ePhpd; ntg;gepiyiatpl 70C mstpw;F kpfhky; ,Uj;jy; Ntz;Lk;. $ld;Fsk; fly; #oypy; Nfhilf;fhyq;fspy; fly; Nkw;gug;G ePhpd; mjpfgl;r ntg;gepiy 290C Mf fzf;nfLj;Jf; nfhs;Sk;NghJ> $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyaj;jpy; ,Ue;J ntspNaWk; fly; ePhpd; mjpfgl;r ntg;gepiy 360C MFk;. Mjyhy;> ntspNaw;wg;gLk; fly;ePh;> ntspNaw;wg;gLk; ,lj;jpd; mUfhikapy; $l ve;j tif kPd;fSf;Fk; ghjpg;ig Vw;gLj;jhJ. mJNghy kio kw;Wk; Fsph; fhyq;fspy;> fly; Nkw;gug;G ePhpd; mjpfgl;r ntg;gepiy 230C Mf ,Uf;Fk;. Mjyhy;> ve;j tifahd ghjpg;Gk; mZkpd; epiyaj;jpypUe;J ntspNaWk; fly;ePhhy; Vw;glhJ. cz;ikapNyNa fly; miyfshYk;> ePNuhl;lq;fspdhYk; mZkpd; epiyaj;jpypUe;J ntspNaWk; kpj ntg;gkhd fly;ePh; flypy; kpf Ntfkhf fye;J tpLfpwJ. Mifahy;> ntspNaWk; ePhpd; ntg;gepiy tpiuthf FiwAk; vd fUjg;gLfpwJ. ,jd; %yk;> $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jhy;> $ld;Fsk; fly;gFjpapd; kPd;tsk; ve;j tifapYk; ghjpf;fg;glhJ vd;gJ njspthfj; njhpfpwJ. NkYk;> ,f;$w;wpw;F tYNrh;f;Fk; tifapy;> kPd; xU Fsph; ,uj;j gpuhzpahf ,Ug;gjhy;> mJ jdJ cly; ntg;gepiyia Rw;Wr;#oYf;F Vw;wthW jdJ ghjpg;gspf;fhj ntg;gepiy tuk;gpw;Fs; khw;wpf;nfhs;Sk; rf;jp tha;e;jJ. NkYk;> kPd;fspd; mt;thwhd cly; ntg;gepiy mjpfhpg;G> mtw;wpd; caphpay; nray;ghLfspd; tsh;r;rp kw;Wk; ,dg;ngUf;fj;ij mjpfg;gLj;JfpwJ. NkYk;> kPd;fs; kw;Wk; ,why;fs; fly;ePh; ntg;gepiy khw;wj;ij czh;e;J kpj ntg;gkhd fly;ePh; ntspNaw;wg;gLk; ,lj;jpy; gpujp$ykhd #o;epiy Vw;gLk; gl;rj;jpy; $l mt;tplj;jpypUe;J jhdhfNt efUk; jpwik tha;e;jJ. ,e;jpa flNyhu gFjpfspy; ,aq;fp tUk; jhuhg;G+h; mZkpd; epiyak;> jhuhg;G+h;> kfhuh\;buh khepyk; kw;Wk; kjuh]; mZkpd; epiyak;> fy;ghf;fk;> jkpo;ehL Mfpatw;wpd; fly; gFjpapYs;s fly; tho; caphpdq;fSf;F (kPd;fs; cl;gl) ve;j tifahd ghjpg;Gk; Vw;gltpy;iy. 5.27) epyk;> tptrhak;> fhy;eilfs; kw;Wk; czT ghJfhg;G Mfpatw;wpd; kPjhd jhf;fk;. epyj;jpd; kPjhd jhf;fk;: kuq;fs; nrbfis tsh;j;J gRikahd gFjpfis cUthf;Fjy; %yk; epyj;ijg; gad;gLj;JtjpYk; epy mikg;gpYk; mD$ykhd khw;wq;fis czu KbAk;. mZciyfs; ,aq;fg;gLk;NghJ (Rw;Wr;#oy; epyg;gFjpapy;) ciyapd; ntspaPLfs; ,aw;ifahfNt ,g;gFjpapy; epyj;jpy; cs;s mstPLfis tpl kpfTk; Fiwthf cs;sjhy; ve;jtpj ghjpg;igAk; Vw;gLj;jhJ. ,g;gFjpia gRikg;gLj;Jtjw;fhf ,Jtiu 23>890 nrbfSk;> kuq;fSk; elg;gl;L> tsh;j;J> guhkhpf;fg;gLfpd;wd. Gy;ntspfSk;> Njhl;lq;fSk; 16>419 rJu kPl;lh; gug;gstpy; cUthf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. nrbfs; 2>467 kPl;lh; ePsj;jpw;F cUthf;fg;gl;L mZkpd; jpl;lr; #oypd; juj;ij cah;j;j cjTfpd;wd. gRikg; gFjpia tphpTgLj;Jk; gzp vjph;fhyj;jpy; njhlh;e;J Nkw;nfhs;sg;gLk;. ,g;gzp kw;w epiyaq;fspy; caphpdq;fis (gwitfis) <h;j;J ,g;gFjpapy; thOk; chphpdq;fspd; tsh;r;rpf;F tif nra;Ak;.

25

tptrhak;> fhy;eil tsh;g;G> czTg;ghJfhg;G kPjhd jhf;fq;fs; Njrpa Rw;Wr;#oy; nghwpapay; Muha;r;rp epWtdk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;ij Rw;wp cs;s 30 fpNyhkPl;lh; J}u mstpw;F cl;gl;l gFjpapy; epy gad;ghl;L ,dq;fis nraw;iff;Nfhs; %yk; Ma;T nra;J Mtzk; jahhpj;Js;sJ. ,e;epWtdk; Rw;Wr;#oy; ghjpg;G mwpf;ifia cUthf;fpAs;sJ. epyg;gad;ghL / epyj;jpd; mikg;Gfs; ,dq;fs; 8.73% gug;gsT jhtuq;fshfTk; 8.73% gug;gsT nghl;ly; epykhfTk;> 23.39% gug;gsT Gjh;fshfTk;> nrbfshfTk;> 8.52% msT kzy; gFjpahfTk;> 0.08% fl;blq;fSk;> 49.68% msT ePh;epiyfshfTk; (fly;> MWfs;> Fsq;fshfTk;) cs;sd.

5.28) jhtuq;fs; kw;Wk; caphpdq;fs; kPjhd ghjpg;G

Njrpa Rw;Wr;#oy; nghwpapay; Muha;r;rp epWtdk; $ld;Fsk; jpl;lg; gFjpapd; cs;NsAk;> mijr; Rw;wpAs;s Rw;Wr;#oypy; cs;s caphpdq;fis Ma;T nra;J jpl;lk; njhlq;fg;gLtjw;F Kd; cs;s tpguq;fis gjpT nra;Js;sJ. jpl;lj;jpw;fhf ifafg;gLj;jg;gl;l gFjp ePuhjhukw;W twz;l epykhfTk;> nghl;ly; epykhfTk; cs;sjhy; jpl;lj;jpw;F cl;gl;l epyg;gFjpapy; jhtuq;fs;> tpyq;Ffs; kPjhd ghjpg;Gfs; VJkpy;iy. NkYk;> [{d; 2011 tiu 23>890 gRikr;#oy; cUthf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. gug;gstpy; cs;sd. nrbfs; mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. kuq;fisAk;> nrbfisAk; tsh;g;gjd; %yk; Gy;ntspfs;> Njhl;lq;fs;> 16>419 rJu kPl;lh; 2>467 kPl;lh;fs; ePsj;jpw;F tug;Gfshf

$ld;Fsk; 3-ypUe;J 6 tiuapyhd jpl;lj;jpw;fhd ,lk; jPh;khdpf;fg;gl;l gpwF> gRikg;gLj;Jjy; jpl;lk; njhlh;e;J nray;gLj;jg;gl;L gad;ghlw;w ,lj;jpy; nrbfs;> kuq;fs; tsh;f;fg;gLk;. gRikg;gLj;Jjy; fhuzkhf mZkpd; jpl;lk; kw;Wk; efhpaj;ij Rw;wpAs;s gFjpfs; ,lk; ngaWk; gwitfis <h;f;Fk; ikakhf khwpAs;sJ.

5.29) Fsp&l;Lk; ePh; ntspNaw;wk; kw;Wk; ntg;gr; #oy;

NkNyAs;s gphpT 5.26-y; tpthpf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ

26

5.30) epyeLf;ftpay; ,e;jpa mZkpd; epiyaq;fspd; fl;likg;Gfs; cs;s mikg;Gfs; kw;Wk; ghfq;fs; mZrf;jp xOq;fikg;G thhpak; (AERB, India) kw;Wk; rh;tNjr mZrf;jp Kfik Mfpatw;wpd; topKiwfspd;gb (IAEA Guide-50SG-SI) kjpg;gPL nra;ag;gl;l ,uz;L mstpyhd epyeLf;fj;ij jhq;Fk; tifapy; tbtikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. 1) S1 mstpyhd epy mjph;T my;yJ OBE (Operating Basis Earth Quake - ,af;fepiy epy mjph;T) 2) S2 mstpyhd epy mjph;T my;yJ SSE (Safe Shut Down Earth Quake ghJfhg;ghd ,af;f epWj;j epy mjph;T) S1 msthdJ mZkpd; jpl;l tshfj;jpy; mZkpd; epiyaj;jpy; tho;ehspy; mjpfgl;rkhf vjph;ghh;f;fg;gLk; epy mjph;T msthFk;. mjhtJ> E}W tUlq;fSf;F xUKiw MFk;. mZkpd; epiyaj;jpd; kpd; cw;gj;jpf;F Njitahd midj;J fl;likg;Gfs;> cs; mikg;Gfs; kw;Wk; ghfq;fs; ,e;j mstpyhd epy mjph;it jhq;Fk; tifapy; tbtikf;fg;gl;Ls;sd. S2 msthdJ gj;jhapuk; tUlq;fSf;F xUKiw Vw;gl tha;g;Gs;s epy mjph;thf ghJfhg;ghd Kiwapy; kjpg;gplg;gl;Ls;sJ. mZciy ghJfhg;gpw;F Njitahd midj;J fl;likg;Gfs;> cs; mikg;Gfs; kw;Wk; ghfq;fSk; S2 mstpyhd epy mjph;tpYk; $l nray;gLk; tifapy; tbtikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. ghJfhg;G ,af;f epWj;jk; epy mjph;T msthdJ mg;gFjpapy; mike;Js;s epy mLf;F mikg;Gfs; kw;Wk; epy mjph;T mLf;F gFjpfis rhh;e;J fPo;f;fz;l fhuzpfis fzf;fpy; nfhz;L mg;gFjpapy; Vw;gl tha;g;Gs;s mjpfgl;r epy mjph;thFk;. 1) Fwpg;gpl;l epy mLf;F mikg;Gfis rhh;e;J> jpl;l tshfj;jpd; mLf;Fg;gFjpapy; Vw;gl tha;g;Gs;s mjpf gl;r epy mjph;T. epy mjph;T

2) Fwpg;gpl;l epy mLf;F mikg;Gfis rhuhj> jpl;l tshfj;jpd; epy mjph;T mLf;F gFjpapy; Vw;gl tha;g;Gs;s mjpfgl;r epy mjph;T. 3) Fwpg;gpl;l epy mLf;F mikg;Gfis rhh;e;j> jpl;l tshfj;jpd; mLj;jpUf;Fk; epy mjph;T mLf;Fg;gFjpapy; Vw;gl tha;g;Gs;s mjpfgl;r epy mjph;T. 4) Fwpg;gpl;l epy mLf;F mikg;Gfis rhuhj jpl;l tshfj;jpd; mLj;jpUf;Sk; epy mjph;T mLf;Fg;gFjpapy; Vw;gl tha;g;Gs;s mjpfgl;r epy mjph;T. epiyak; 1&2 (KKNPP 1&2)-w;fhd epy mjph;T tbtikg;G Mjhuf; $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyak; 1 ) nfhs;if. $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyak; ek; ehl;bNyNa epy mjph;T Vw;gLk; tha;g;Gfs; kpff; Fiwe;j gFjpahd ,e;jpa epyeLf;f gFjp II - y; mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ (ghh;f;f IS 1893). ,Ue;j NghjpYk;> mZkpd; jpl;l tbtikg;gjw;fhf Fwpg;gpl;l tshfj;jpw;F Rw;wpAs;s epy mjph;T mLf;F kw;Wk; g+Nfhstpay; epiyikfis tphpthd Ma;T nra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ. mjd; %yk; mZkpd; jpl;lk; kpf kpf Fiwe;j tha;g;Gila ghJfhg;G ,af;f epWj;jk; epy mjph;tpw;F tbtikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ (gj;jhapuk; tUlq;fSf;F xUKiw). $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;l tshfj;jpw;F chpj;jhd epiyikfis tphpthd Kiwapy; kjpg;gPL nra;tjw;fhf fPo;f;fz;l gzpfs; Nkw;nfhs;sg;gl;ld. m) kz;lyj;jpd; epy mjph;T mLf;Ffs; kw;Wk; G+Nfhstpay; mikg;ig gw;wpa Ma;T. M) epy eLf;fk;: gjpthd epy eLf;fj;jpd; KLf;f tiugl mstPL> epyeLf;f %yk; NkYk; jpl;l tshf Gtpj;jd;ikapidAk; Mfpatw;iw fzf;fpy; nfhz;L mjid xj;j mstPL nfhz;l jpl;l tshfj;Jld; xg;gPL nra; gpujpgypg;G tiuglk; %yk; fzf;fplg;gl;lJ.

27

,) ,ijg;Nghy gy gpujpgypg;G tiuglk; Njh;T nra;ag;gl;l Neuj;jpw;fhf cUthf;fg;gl;L gy fhy mstPLs;s mjph;tiyfs; kw;Wk; Gs;spapay; gpujpgypg;G tiuglk; nkhj;jKk; gFg;gha;T nra;ag;gl;lJ. <) epyeLf;fk; rk;ge;jkhd $Ljy; jfty;fs; Nrfhpf;fg;gl;L> tl;lhu> jpl;l> cs; Gtp mikg;G rk;ge;jg;gl;l Gtp xl;bd; jd;ik Mfpatw;iw fzf;fpy; fz;lwpag;gl;L Ma;Tf;F cl;gLj;jg;gl;lJ. c) NkNy $wg;gl;l midj;J xd;W jpul;lg;gl;l jfty;fs; mbg;gilfpay; epy eLf;f tbtikg;G nra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ. (EDB). ,J gyjug;gl;l S1 & S2 gFjpfis cs;slf;fpatw;wpy; cr;rf;fl;l epymjph;T KLf;fg;gl;L> gpujpgypg;G tiuglj;jpd; msT epy mirTfis mwpag;gl;lJ. C) xj;j KLf;f miyfis cUthf;Fjy; vy;yh nray;jpwDs;s> nray;jpwdpy;yhj epyf;FiwghLfisAk;;> epy rpwg;G mk;rk;> epy mjph;T tuyhW Mfpatw;wpid 300 fp.kP tl;likg;G J}uk; nfhz;l vy;iyf;Fl;gl;l gFjpfis Ma;T nra;J SSE kw;Wk; OBE epyeLf;f mstPL fzf;fplg;gl;lJ. NkNy $wg;gl;l jftypd; mbg;gilapy;> jpl;lk; kw;Wk; jpl;lk; rhh;e;j gFjpfspy; ve;j epyf;FiwghLf;fhd Kfhe;jpuk; ,y;iy. ,e;j 300 fp.kP. tl;lhuj;jpy; 08-02-1990 md;W Nfhak;Gj;J}hpy; (307 fp.kP) ikakhf nfhz;l epyeLf;fk; czug;gl;lJ. mjd; epyeLf;f ika msT, rPh;gLj;jpa nkh;fyp msTNfhypy; VII (MMI Scale-VII)vd;w msthf gjpthfpAs;sJ. Nkk;gLj;jg;gl;l ghJfhg;G Nehf;fpy;> rf;jp tha;e;j epyeLf;fk; ,e;j jpl;l Gtp mikg;G gFjpapy; Vw;gLk; vd fw;gidahf fUj;jpy; nfhz;L epymjph;T neUq;fpa gFjp kw;Wk; rhh;e;j gFjpfis nfhz;L SSE mstPLfs; fzf;fplg;gl;Ls;sJ. ,e;j mDkhdpf;fg;gl;l epfo;Tfspd; mbg;gilapy; jpl;l gpujpgypg;G tiuglk; $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpy; SSE mstPLf;fhf tiuaWf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. Nkw;fz;l epfo;Tfis fUj;jpy; nfhz;L jpl;l Gtpg;ghiw Fwpj;j #j;jpuk; %yk; Vw;Wf;nfhs;sf;$ba cr;rf;fl;l epy mjph;T mstPL tiuaWf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpy; Ma;Tf;F cl;gLj;jg;gl;l cr;rf;fl;l epymjph;T KLf;f mstPLfs; gpd;tUkhW:cr;rf;fl;l Gtp KLf;fk; (g) msT Neh;kl;lk; cah;kl;lk; 0.15 0.11 SSE 0.05 0.036 OBE Fwpg;gPL: mwpf;if %yk; - $lq;Fsk; jpl;l epy mjph;T tbtikg;G cUthf;fpath; lhf;lh; V.Nf. Nfh\; kw;Wk; jpU. b.rp.ghdh;[p> AMD. KbTiu: $lq;Fsk; SSE tbtikg;Gf;fhd epy mjph;T fhuzpfs; kpfTk; rpwe;j ghJfhg;G Kiwapy; mZrf;jp xOq;fikg;G thhpaj;jpd; topfhl;Ljypd;gb fz;lwpag;gl;Ls;sJ. NkYk; jpl;l epyeLf;f ghJfhg;ghdJ> mjpf ghJfhg;G ,ilntspAld; cWjp nra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ.

28

5.31)

ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fs; (tq;fhs tphpFlh g+Nfhs mikg;G & Nkw;F njhlh;r;rp kiy) tq;fhs tphpFlh g+Nfhs mikg;gpd; mlf;fk;:tq;fhs tphpFlh g+Nfhs mikg;gpd; mlf;fj;jpy; nrwpthf thOk; fly;tho; caphpdq;fs; J}j;Jf;Fbf;F tlf;fpy; cs;sJ. ,J jpl;l tshfj;jpy; ,Ue;J 80 fp.kPl;lUf;F mg;ghy; cs;sJ. kj;jpa fly;rhh; kPd; ts Muha;r;rp ikak; (CMFRI) KO tptuq;fs; mlq;fpa Rw;Wr;#oy; jfty; mwpf;ifia (EIA) rkh;gpg;gjw;fhf> jpl;l ikaj;jpy; ,Ue;J 60 rJu fp.kPl;lh; njhiytpy; khjphpfs; ghpNrhjpf;fg;gl;lJ. mjpy; mth;fs; njspthf njhptpf;fg;gl;lJ vd;dntdpy;> $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;ij Rw;wpAs;s fly; tho; caph; tho; mikg;ghdJ> Kw;wpYk; flypay; rhh;e;j gz;Gfis nfhz;Ls;sJ. ,jdhy; Nkw;F flw;fiu> tisFlh kw;Wk; tphpFlh gFjpfspd; fly; tho; caphpdq;fspd; ,dg;ngUf;f mikg;gpypUe;J Kw;wpYk; khWgl;lJ. kw;nwhU kpf Kf;fpa Rw;Wr;#oy; mk;rk; vd;dntdpy;> $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;l fly; gFjpapy; Ez;zpa ,aw;if caphpdq;fs; mjhtJ khq;FNuht; kw;Wk; gtsg;ghiwfs;; ,y;iy. NkYk; J}j;Jf;Fbf;F njw;Nf kw;Wk; fd;dpahFkhp flw;fiu rhh;e;j gFjpfspy; (jpl;lj;jpw;F mUfhik cs;slf;fpa gFjp) ve;jtpj gtsg;ghiwfSk; cUthf tha;g;G ,y;iy vd CMFRI cWjpnra;Js;sJ. Nkw;Fj; njhlh;r;rp kiy: jpl;lj;jpd; 15 fp.kP. cs;slf;fpa gug;gstpy; ve;j tpj fhLfSk; ,y;iy vd Rw;Wr;#oy; jhf;fy; mwpf;if (EIA) cWjp nra;Js;sJ. NkYk; $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;ij cUthf;Ftjhy; Nkw;F njhlh;r;rp kiyf;F ve;jtpj ghjpg;Gk; ,y;iy.

5.32)

jPtputhjKk; ghJfhg;G vr;rhpf;ifAk;: ,e;jpahtpy; cs;s mZkpd; jpl;lq;fisg;Nghy tphpthd ghJfhg;G Vw;ghLfs; kpfr;rpwe;j Kiwapy; $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpy; nra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ. jpl;lj;ij Rw;wpYk; 24x7 Kiwapy; tphpthd Neub fz;fhzpg;G ghJfhg;G mky;gLj;jg;gl;Ls;sJ. ,e;j mikg;ghdJ gy mLf;F ghJfhg;G kw;Wk; Neub NrhjidfisAk; nfhz;lJ.

5.33) ,Ujug;G cwTfs;

,e;j tp\ak; $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; ghJfhg;Gf;F rk;ge;jk; ,y;yhjJ. 5.34) Ruq;f eltbf;iffspd; jhf;fk; $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; Nkw;nfhs;sg;gltpy;iy. 5.35) jPtpu tpgj;J Nkyhz;ik: mZkpd; epyaq;fs; jPtpu ghJfhg;G Nfhl;ghLfis gpd;gw;wp tbtikf;fg;gl;L ,af;fg;gLfpd;wd. ,e;j Nfhl;ghLfspd;gb fjphpaf;f ntspaPl;il jLf;f mLj;jLj;j jLg;Gr; Rth;fs; kw;Wk; ghJfhg;G gzpfs; xt;nthd;Wf;fhfTk; gy;NtW ghJfhg;G mLf;Ffs; toq;fg;gl;L ,Uf;f Ntz;Lk;. epiya gFjpapy; ve;jnthU Ruq;f eltbf;ifAk; jpl;lj;ij Rw;wpAs;s cs;Sh; kf;fspd;

29

Kjy;epiy ghJfhg;G: mOj;jk;> ntg;gepiy Kjyhd midj;J ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fSk; Fwpg;gplg;gl;l msTfSf;Fs; guhkhpf;fg;gLk; tz;zk; epiyak; tbtikf;fg;gLtij cWjp nra;tjpNyNa jPtpu ghJfhg;gpd; Kjy; epiyahdJ vl;lg;gLfpwJ. ,uz;lhk; epiy ghJfhg;G: ,uz;lhk; epiyg; ghJfhg;ghdJ epiya ,af;fj;jpd;NghJ kpd;jil Vw;gLk; fhyq;fspy; epiyikia epth;j;jp nra;tjhFk;. ,e;j ,uz;lhk;epiy tbtikg;ghdJ ,k;khjphpahd epiyfspy; ghJfhg;ig kpfj;jplkhf cWjp nra;Ak; tz;zk; cs;sJ. %d;whk; epiy ghJfhg;G: tiuaWf;fg;gl;l ghJfhg;G msTfis epiya mk;rq;fs; kPWk; #o;epiyapy; nray;gLfpwJ. mZ ciy ,af;fj;ij jhdhf tpiue;J epWj;jk; nra;aTk;> ntg;gk; mjpfhpj;J fjphpaf;f frpNtJk; Vw;glh tz;zk; jLf;f vhpnghUs; Fsph;tpg;ghdhdJ NghJkhd mstpy; nra;aTk; VJthf mZkpd; epiyaj;jpd; ghJfhg;G tbtikf;fg;gLfpwJ. ehd;fhk; epiy ghJfhg;G: rpy fhuzq;fshy; NghJkhd mstpy; vhpnghUs; Fsph;tpf;f Kbahj epiyfspy; mZciyapy; tpgj;J Nehplyhk;. mjid jLf;Fk; tpjkhf mike;jNj 4-k; epiy ghJfhg;G. ,k;khjphpahd tpgj;J epiyfspy; $l> tpgj;ij NkYk; tsutplhky; fl;Lg;gLj;jp> Rw;Wr;#oYf;Fk; nghJkf;fSf;Fk; Nkhrkhd tpisTfis Vw;gLj;jhj tifapy; Ngustpyhd fjphpaf;f ntspaPl;il jLf;Fk; tifapy; mZkpd; epiya tbtikg;Gfs; jpfo;fpd;wd. Ie;jhk; epiy ghJfhg;G: vjph;ghuhj fhuzq;fspdhy; my;yJ tbtikg;gpNyh> ,af;Fk; KiwfspNyh> mtw;iw nray;gLj;JtjpNyh VNjDk; jtWfs; Vw;gLtjhy; fjphpaf;fk; ntspahf Nehplyhk;. ,e;epfo;T elf;f tha;g;G kpfmhpnjdpDk; ele;jhy; nra;a Ntz;ba Kd;ndr;rhpf;if Kiwahf 5-k; epiy ghJfhg;G mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. Mifahy;> ,k;khjphpahd fjphpaf;f ntspaPl;il rkhspg;gjw;fhf Njitg;gLk; fhyq;fspy> nray;gLj;jf;$ba mtrufhy jahh;epiy jpl;lk; xd;W nra;ag;gl Ntz;Lk;. jpl;lk; nrk;ikahdJ vd;W Fwpg;gpLtij tpl mij xt;nthU fhyj;jpYk; Nrhjpj;J ghh;j;jy; mtrpakhdJ. nghJkf;fspd; xU gFjpapdiu ntspNaw;w NjitAs;s ntsp mtrufhy xj;jpif cs;spl;l mtruepiy gapw;rpAk; Nkw;nfhs;sg;gLfpwJ. mtruepiy Vw;glf;$ba tha;g;G kpfkpf mhpJ vd;whYk;; ,e;j gapw;rp kWKiw nra;ag;gl Ntz;Lk;. NkYk; ,e;j gapw;rpfs; jahh;epiyapy; ,Ug;gjw;fhf kl;LNk nra;ag;gLfpd;wd. ,e;jpahtpy;> mZkpd; epiyaq;fs; fle;j 40 Mz;LfSf;Fk; Nkyhf ,af;fj;jpy; cs;sd. NkYk; nghJkf;fis mtrufhy eltbf;ifapy; <LgLj;jf;$ba VNjDk; Njit Vw;glhj mstpy; ve;jnthU tpgj;Jk; xUNghJk; elf;ftpy;iy. cyfk; KOf;f 430f;Fk; Nkw;gl;l mZkpd; epiyaq;fs; ,af;fj;jpy; cs;s NghjpYk;> nghJkf;fis <LgLj;Jk; mtrufhy eltbf;iff;fhd Njit ,UKiw kl;LNk vOe;Js;sJ. xd;W: 1986-y;; nrh;Ndhgpy; tpgj;jpd; NghJ. kw;nwhd;W: 2011-y; GF\pkh tpgj;jpd; NghJ. 5.36) $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpy; mtrufhy jahh;epiy $lq;Fsk; mZciy tbtikg;gpy; gy Kd;Ndwpa ghJfhg;G mk;rq;fs; Nrh;f;fg;gl;Ls;sJ Fwpg;gplj;jf;fJ. ,tw;wpy; xd;W kpd;jil Vw;gl;l NghjpYk; (GF\pkhtpy; ele;jij Nghy) vhpnghUis Fsph;tpf;Fk; jhdpaq;fp ntg;gk; mfw;Wk; mikg;G (PHRS). NkYk; ,ul;il cs;slf;fp kw;Wk; mZciyf;fyid
30

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31

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32

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33

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45

Xyp khRghL tpjpfs; 2000-j;jpd; gb> eph;zapf;fg;gl;l xyp khRghL jpl;l msTfs; fPo;f;fz;lthwhFk;. Xyp msT Fwpj;j Rw;Wg;Gw fhw;wpd; ju jpl;l msTfs; gFjp FwpaPl;L vz; A B C D Fwpg;G : gFjp / kz;lyk; tiffs; njhopw;rhiy gFjp th;j;jfg; gFjp FbapUg;Gg; gFjp mikjpahd kz;lyk; tuk;gsT dB (A) Leq* gfy; Neuk; ,uT Neuk; 75 70 65 55 55 45 50 40

1. gfy; Neuk; : fhiy 6 kzp Kjy; ,uT 10 kzp tiu. 2. ,uT Neuk; : ,uT 10 kzp Kjy; fhiy 6 kzp tiu. 3. mikjpahd kz;lyk; vd;gJ kUj;Jtkidfs;> fy;tp epWtdq;fs; kw;Wk; ePjpkd;wq;fis Rw;wp Fiwe;jgl;rk; 100 kPl;lh; njhiytpy; cs;s gFjpfs; mikjpahd gFjpfs; vd;gJ jFjpAs;s mjpfhhpfshy; mt;thW mwptpf;fg;gLtjhFk;. 4. Nkw;fz;l gFjpfs; (Areas / Zones) fye;J ,Ug;gpd;> mg;gFjp jFjpAs;s mjpfhhpfshy; Nkw;fz;l gFjpfspy; VNjDk; xd;whf mwptpf;fg;gLfpwJ. *dB (A) Leq vd;gJ kdpj nrtpj;jpwDld; rk;ge;jg;gLj;jg;glf;$ba xypapd; (nlrpgy; msTNfhy; A) fhyj;ij fzf;fpy; vLj;Jf;nfhz;l ruhrhpahFk;. nlrpgy; (dB) vd;gJ xypapd; myF MFk;. dB (A) Leq-y; cs;s A vd;gJ xypapd; mstpy; mjph;ntz; fzf;fpy; vLj;Jf; nfhs;sg;gLtijf; Fwpg;gJ Fzhjpraq;fs; rk;ge;jg;gl;ljhFk;. 3.0 xyp khRgLjypd; jhf;fq;fs;: 3.1 fl;Lkhd fl;lk;: fl;Lkhd fl;lj;jpy; vOk; xypapd; msthdJ kpfTk; FiwthFk;. tshfj;jpd; ntspg;Gw gFjpapy; ve;j jhf;fKk; Vw;glhJ. Mifahy;> jpl;l

3.2 ,af;fj;jpw;F jahh;gLj;Jk; fl;lk;: mZkpd; epiyaq;fs; nghJthf mikjpahf nray;gLgitahFk;. vdpDk;> ntg;gePh; Nrhjid Xl;lj;jpd;NghJ> ePuhtp ntspNaw;W thy;Tfs; (Relief Valve) topahf Rw;Wg;Gwj;jpw;F ntspNaw;Wk; NghJ> xyp Vw;gLfpwJ. mj;jifa ntspNaw;Wk; thy;Tfis Nrhjid nra;J ePuhtpia ntspNaw;WtJ vg;NghjhtJ elf;Fk; epfo;thFk;. ,af; 3.3 ,af;fepiy fl;lk;: epiyak; njhlh;e;J ,aq;Fk; NghJ ve;j xU ,ae;jpuKk; tiuaWf;fg;gl;l xypapd; mstpw;F mjpfkhf xypapid Vw;gLj;jhJ.

34

5.46) $ld;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpd; tphpthf;f jpl;lq;fs;: ,e;jpa murhq;fj;jhy; $ld;Fsk; mDkjp toq;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. mZkpd; jpl;lk; 3-6-w;fhf nfhs;if mstpy;

5.47) rh;tNjr mZrf;jp Kfikapd; ghJfhg;G Vw;ghLfs;: $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; jpl;lj;jpw;F> ,u\;a murhq;fj;jhy; toq;fg;gLk; mZciy vhpnghUspw;fhd ghJfhg;G xg;ge;jj;ij ,e;jpa murhq;fk; rh;tNjr mZrf;jp KfikAld; ifnaOj;jpl;Ls;sJ. mt;nthg;ge;jkhdJ 27.09.1988 Kjy; mKypw;F te;jJ. mjpy; cs;s topfhl;Ljy;fs; gpd;gw;wg;gLfpd;wd. INFCIRC/360 rh;tNjr mZrf;jp Kfikapd; ,izajsj;jpy; mspf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ. mZ ciy vhpnghUspw;fhd ghJfhg;G Vw;ghLfspd; nrayhf;fk; Fwpj;J kw;w ,e;jpa mZkpd; epiyaq;fspypUe;J ehk; neLq;fhy mDgtk; cilath;fs;. $ld;Fsj;jpy; gpd;gw;wg;gLk; ghJfhg;G Vw;ghLfspd; topKiwfSk; kw;w mZkpd; epiyaq;fspy; gpd;gw;wg;gLtij tpl khWgl;ljy;y. 5.48) mZciy ghfq;fs; (NSG) toq;Fk; FOtpd; gq;F fUj;jpy; vLj;Jf;nfhs;sg;gltpy;iy. 5.49) $lq;Fsk; mZkpd; epiyaj;jpy; cs;s MAj gad;ghLfs; fUj;jpy; vLj;Jf;nfhs;sg;gltpy;iy. 5.50) gpw Fwpg;Gfs; VJkpy;iy.

35

Presentation to Tamilnadu Government nominees and people representatives regarding safety of KKNPP on 18112011 in the office of District Collector, Tirunelveli by Expert Group on KKNPP constituted by Government of India.

Background The activities relating to the establishment of KKNPP were progressing satisfactorily till recently when a protest by a section of the local population against KKNPP started from the last week of July, 2011. From October 13, 2011, KKNPP staff could not go to Site to carry out normal functions. Presently, only a few personnel of KKNPP are attending to bare minimum surveillance work. Government of India constituted an Expert Group of 15 specialists to interact with the officials of State Government of Tamil Nadu and spokespersons of the people in the neighborhood to explain the factual position on various aspects of the project and to dispel the apprehensions of a section of local people through a platform, provided by the State Government. The Expert Group (EG) had the first meeting with the State Government nominees and the Peoples representatives on 8th of November, 2011 in the office of the District Collector, Tirunelveli. After brief introductory remarks and discussions, the peoples representatives submitted a memorandum with several points and requested the Expert Group to provide the information. During the meeting both the Expert Group and the Peoples representatives agreed to work jointly to resolve the issues keeping in mind both the Welfare of People and the Welfare of the Nation. The Kudankulam site was evaluated by the DAE Site Selection Committee and approved after due process then prevalent in 1988. Detailed studies comprising geotechnical examination, seismo-tectonic data, safe grade level, meteorological, hydrological and other studies were carried out by the expert agencies in the country. Based on these studies, a detailed Site Evaluation Report (SER) was submitted to Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) who accorded the site clearance vide approval No.CH/AERB/KK/8486/89 dated 10.11.1989. The Environment Clearance was obtained from the Ministry of Environment and Forest vide letter No.4011/1/88-1A dated 9th May, 1989, as per the Environment Protection Act 1986 with stipulations and the same was revalidated by MoEF vide their letter dated 06.09.2001, in which it was indicated that public hearing is not required. The stipulations are being complied with. NEERI carried out a comprehensive EIA for KK-1&2 in the year 2003. Further, a comprehensive EIA by NEERI and Public Hearing including the
1

response to stake holders were carried out as per the EIA notification of 2006 when clearance for additional nuclear reactors was sought. In 1989, MoEF while granting environmental clearance, permitted for construction of plant structure within 500m of high tide line. As per CRZ notification introduced for the first time in 1991 and subsequently revised in 2011 Projects of Department of Atomic Energy are permitted activities in CRZ areas and require to obtain environmental clearance from MoEF. The Expert Group learnt that recently some members of the public residing in the vicinity of KKNPP developed certain apprehensions related to safety of the plant. It appears that these apprehensions got mainly generated as a sequel to the accident that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP in Japan on 11.03.2011. The preparatory work for conducting an off-site emergency exercise at KKNPP, which is required as per AERBs safety regulations prior to loading of nuclear fuel seems to have further aggravated these apprehensions. The EG has reviewed the design safety aspects of KKNPP and have concluded that an accident similar to that occurred at Fukushima, is not conceivable at KKNPP. The root cause of the accident at Fukushima was complete loss of power supply at units 1 to 4 on account of flooding at the site caused by the tsunami. While units 1, 2 &3 got shut down automatically (unit-4 was already in shut down state with its fuel unloaded in the spent fuel pool), the cooling of their cores could not be maintained in the absence of power supply, which caused the accident. The EG has carefully examined the design of the KKNPP in this respect and finds that all safety related structures, systems and components of KKNPP are located well above the maximum flooding that can cover the site from all possible causes including tsunami. A total loss of power supply at KKNPP, unlike in the case of Fukushima, is therefore not possible. In addition, KKNPP has been provided with certain engineered safety features (ESF) like the Passive Heat Removal System. With these ESFs, the reactor core can be effectively cooled even under the condition of total loss of electric power. The EG also noted that a very detailed and in-depth review of KKNPP that includes its siting, design and operational safety and QA aspects has been conducted by AERB over the last few years following its established multi-tier review process before issuing clearances for various stages of the Project. This review by AERB has been done through a thorough study of the design documents that run in several thousands of pages and intense discussion in a large number of meetings of its Advisory Committee on Project Safety Review of KKNPP and its specialists working groups. In addition, members of the Advisory committee and working groups have spent considerable time and effort in studying the technical material outside the formal meetings and in discussing the safety matters with NPCIL officials and with the design experts from Russian Federation. This extensive review by AERB provides assurance of the
2

robustness of the safety design and construction of KKNPP. The commissioning program is also progressively reviewed by AERB. Observations of Expert Group on the memorandum submitted by peoples representatives The Expert Group examined the memorandum, interacted with the KKNPP officials and visited the KKNPP for a detailed study. The observation of the Expert Group on the global trends in the use of nuclear energy for power generation, Indian experience on Nuclear Plants, Radiation in the Environment around Nuclear Plants in India and Safety Features in KKNPP are presented in Annexure-1 and the observations on the points mentioned in the memorandum are presented in Annexure-II. The EG wishes to express that quite a few points contained in the memorandum lack clarity and consequently leads to difficulty in providing focused feedbacks. The information provided are based on the data and the documents supplied by KKNPP and NPCIL officials, on request by EG and the findings of the group members during the plant visit and interactions with the plant officials. Further clarifications can be provided on specific relevant points, if required.

ThefollowingfivepointsinthememorandumhavenotbeenaddressedbytheEG sincetheyfalloutsideitspurview: 1. InterGovernmentalAgreement 2. ImpactonBilateralrelationsbetweengovernments 3. RussianandIndianliabilityissues 4. NSGrelatedissues 5. SettinguppossibleweaponfacilityatKKNPP

3

ANNEXUREI
1.Theglobaltrendontheuseofnuclearenergyforpowergeneration. Globally, as on date, 433 Nuclear reactors are operating in 30 countries and producing 366590 MW(e) and 65 reactors are under construction to produce 62592MW(e).FurtherthefollowingNuclearPowerPlants(NPPs)areconnected torespectivegridsafterFukushimaaccidentonMarch2011: ChashappUnit2(300MWe,PWR,Pakistan)on14thMarch2011 Lingao4(1000MW,PWR,China)on3rdMay2011 CEFRChinaexperimentalFastReactor(20MWe,FBR,China)on21st July2011 Bushehr1(915MWe,PWR,VVER,Iran)on3rdSeptember2011 Thestatusinsomeothercountries,postFukushima,issummarizedbelow: Russia:9reactorsareunderconstruction.14reactorsarefurtherplanned. USA:Thereareproposalsforover20newreactors. France:Buildinga1600MWeunitatFlamanvilleforoperationin2012andsecond tofollowatPenly. UK:Four1600MWeunitsareplannedforoperationin2019 Germany : It had 17 reactors and it has not granted sanction for further life extension to 8 reactors among them that had completed design life. The design lifeoftheremaining9willbecompletedby2022.Germanyannouncedthatthey will not consider further extension of life of these plants. There had been a debate in Germany about the need for nuclear power plants, even before Fukushima accident, based on sufficient availability of electrical energy from othersourcesandenergyavailabilityfromneighboringnations. Switzerland : It has 5 reactors in operation. It has decided to phase out Nuclear powerby2034oncompletionoftheirdesignlife.

Japan:Ithas54Nuclearreactors.11reactorscontinuedtobeinoperationeven duringearthquakeandtsunamiinJapanandarestillinoperation.Theremaining 43reactorswereonshutdown/maintenance.Decisionsweretakentostartthem aftersafetyreviewandthefirstofthese43reactors,hasbeenrestartedinAugust 2011. BangladeshhasrecentlysignedintergovernmentalagreementwithRussiatostart constructionofanewVVERplantinBangladeshinNovember2011. Vietnam has signed an agreement recently with Russia for the establishment of their first nuclear power plant (VVER) and with a consortium from Japan to constructasecondnuclearplant. UAE continues work related to setting up of its first nuclear plant through a consortiuminSouthKorea. Turkeyhasinitiatedactionforsettingupitsfirstnuclearpowerplant(VVER) Fromtheabove,thetrendappearstobeonincreaseduseofNuclearPowerinthe globalenergyscenario. 2.IndianExperienceonNuclearPlants. Indiahas 20reactorsinoperationin6 different placesalloverthecountry.The first one started about 40 years back. India has an excellent record of performancewithnoincidentsofradiationexposuretothepublicexceedingthe allowablelimit.ThedetailscanbeseenfromtheWebsiteofNPCIL.Indiaalsohas well trained personnel with knowledge and expertise. India has demonstrated capability in establishing, maintaining and operating Nuclear Power plants for powergeneration. 3.RadiationintheEnvironmentaroundNuclearPlantsinIndia. The DAE establishes Environmental Survey Laboratories at all the power plant siteswellbeforeanuclearpowerplantgoesinoperation,andregularlymonitor the radiological conditions in the environment. A comparison of the

Environmental radiation doses at NPP sites during 2006 to 2010 is given fig 1 below.

Radiation doses measured by the Environmental Survey Laboratory around KudankulamisgiveninFig2below.

Further in places like Manavalakuruchi, Kanyakumari, Karunagappalli, Chavara etc.whereradioactivemineraldepositsexist,thenaturalbackgroundlevelsare farinexcessofthosemeasuredneartheNPPsites.Peopleliveforgenerationsin theseplaceswithoutanymajorhealthhazards. 4.SafetyFeaturesinKKNPP. The reactor being built at KKNPP is advanced model of Russian VVER1000 MW Pressurised water reactor which is a leading type of reactor worldwide. The designhasbeenevolvedfromserialdesignofVVERplantandfallinthecategory ofAdvancedLightWaterReactor.Thesalientfeaturesare: Passiveheatremovalsystemtoprovidecoolingfortheremovalofdecayheat.
8

Higherredundancyforsafetysystem. Doublecontainment. Additionalshutdownsystemlikequickboronandemergencyboroninjection systems. Incorporationofcorecatchertoprovidesafetyintheeventoffuelmeltdown Passivehydrogenmanagementsystem ThesafetyfeaturesofKKNPPwerecomprehensivelyreviewedbyataskforceof NPCILinthecontextofrecentFukushimaaccident.Thereportofthetaskforceis availableinthewebsiteofNPCILandDAE.

ANNEXUREII
1) KKNPPStatus
During the visits to KKNPP the Expert Group observed that the further construction activities are not progressing and the status quo is maintained by only some essential surveillanceoftheinstalledequipment.

2) StatementsonSafetyofKKNPP
StatementsontheKKNPPhaveappearedinthepressonthesafetyandpresentstatusof the plant. In the opinion of the expert group, there have been no contradictions among statementsmaderegardingthecurrentstatusandsafetyofKKNPP.

3) AvailabilityofEIAReport,PerformanceReportsetc.
TheEIAreportisavailableontheNPCILwebsitewww.npcil.nic.in.TheVVERperformance dataisavailableontheIAEAwebsitewww.iaea.organdhasalsobeengivenbelow. Performance of VVER reactors worldwide has been very good. There are about 55 VVER typereactors.FournewVVER1000plantshavebeenconnectedtogrid(threeinRussiain 2010,andoneinIran)in2011. There are nine VVER1000 units in operation in Russia and eleven VVER1000 units in Ukraine.SeventeenVVER1000unitsbuiltinthe1980sinerstwhileUSSRhavecumulative loadfactorof72%. Three VVER1000 units which started commercial operation (a) in 1996 (Zaporozhe6, Ukraine), (b) in 2002 (Rostov1, Russia) and (c) in 2004 (Kalinin 3, Russia) have lifetime cumulativeloadfactorof83%. OutsideRussianFederation,thereactorsatLoviisa1&2ofVVER440(Finland)whichwent intocommercialoperationin1977and1980respectivelyhavearound88%cumulativeload factorandtheyareconsideredamongstthebestperformingPWRsintheworld. The Site Evaluation Report and the Safety Analysis Report are documents that have been madeavailabletoAERBwhichisthestatutorybodyauthorizedtoacceptandreviewthese documents.

4) IntergovernmentalAgreement
Notaddressed.

10

5.1)SitingofKKNPP1&2
NPCIL submitted an application for site clearance of twin units of 1000 MWe capacityofRussianVVERin1988toAERB SpecialistCommitteeswereappointedbyAERBtoreviewtheapplication. Based on the specialist committee recommendation, Atomic Energy Regulatory BoardgrantedClearanceforSitingoftwo1000MWeVVERsatKudankulamsiteon Nov10,1989 Thereviewandassessmentprocesswasbasedonthe a) IAEASafetyCodes&Guides; b) prevalentInternationaldocumentsonthesubjectand c) AERBSafetyCodeonSiting For KKNPP basic design considered was V320 with enhanced safety features/ systemsasspecifiedbyNPCIL The Review process and Assessment were based on the following areas of significance a) Thoserelatedtothesiteandtheenvironmentalconditionsandaspectsthatwill influencethedesignbasisofNPPsuchasgeologicaldata,topography,hydrology andhydrogeology,meteorologydata,naturalphenomenasuchasearthquakes, floods, tornadoes, tsunami, potential external maninduced events such as planecrash,firesandexplosions,failureofdams,availabilityofcoolingwater. b) Thoserelatedtotheeffectsoftheplantontheenvironmentthatcouldwarrant specificdesignandoperationalrequirements,namelydispersionofradioactive/ toxic liquid and gaseous effluents, the impact of radiation exposures to public during Normal Operation and Postulated Accident conditions taking into account dispersion patterns, population distribution, public water supply, milk andfoodconsumption c) Exclusion Zone of 1.6 Km and Sterilized Zone up to 5 Km are provided. Emergencypreparednessplanningisdoneforzoneupto16km.ESLcarriesout theradiationmonitoringinthisarea. d) Availability of Infrastructural facilities to assess response to a Postulated Emergencycondition

5.2)EIA
Environmental clearance obtained from MoEF, New Delhi for KKNPP 1&2 as per EnvironmentalProtectionAct1986on09051989. NoPublichearingwasstipulatedaspertheaboveact. Ministry (MoEF) vide their letter dated 6th Sept 2001 (Letter no: J.14011/I/88IA.II(M) dated September 6, 2001 issued by Director MoEF) confirmed that the Environmental Clearance issued in May 1989 is valid and there is no requirement of public hearing and freshenvironmentalclearances.
11

However,NPCILwiththeassistanceofNEERIpreparedaRapidEIAforKKNPP1&2inthe year 2001 and subsequently a comprehensive EIA was prepared in year 2003. The comprehensiveEIAreportisavailableinNPCILWebsitewww.npcil.nic.in. Comprehensive EIA and EMP for KKNPP 36 was prepared as per EIA notification 2006 (latest), This includes impact of KKNPP 1&2 and Unit No KKNPP 36 (which are similar in designtothatofKKNPP1&2)hasobtainedenvironmentalclearancefromMoEFin2008& 2009.

5.3)CRZ
The environmental clearance for KKNPP 1&2 was obtained in 9th May 1989 as per Environmental Protection Act 1986 with the exemption for constructing the plant within 500MtrsfromHTL. Alltheconditionswerefulfilledasperthestipulations.Hencethereisnoviolation

5.4)Publichearingprocess
TherewasnorequirementbyMoEFforthepublichearingprocessatthetimewhentheKK NPP1&2clearancewasgrantedin1989.ThebriefhistoryoftheMoEFclearanceforKKNPP 1&2isgivenat5.2above.

5.5)ConstructionQA
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited is having a corporate quality management programwhichgivesassuranceofqualityinallactivitiesundertaken. Based on the observations and perusal of documents available at siteit is concluded that adequate quality standards are incorporated in all stages of works in the project. The assuranceofqualityisaccordedhighestattentioninallfieldsi.e.indesign,manufacturing andprocurement,construction,erection,commissioningandoperation. The components manufactured in Russia and supplied to KKNPP 1&2 from Russian Federation are subjected to undergo the stringent checks as detailed in the quality assuranceplansdevelopedjointlybyNPCILandRussianNuclearauthorities. TheconstructionworksarecarriedoutinaccordancewithQAmanualespeciallyinrespect ofcivilconstruction,thematerialsusedaretestedforeverybatchattheconcretetesting lab at site. The construction QA personnel inspect the works as per the QA plan and the works are carried out as per approval of QA staff. The records of testing and inspections whichareextensivearewelldocumented.Theregularreviewsofthequalityarecarriedout byinternalauditswithinNPCILandauditsonspecificsystemsbyAERB. Thereactorbuildingcontainmenthaswithstoodastructuralintegrityandleakratetestat the test pressure, which is much higher than the design pressure. The hydrotests, non
12

destructive tests (radiography, ultrasonic test) etc were carried out and records are maintained.Hotrunhasbeencarriedouttovalidatethedesign. Alltherelevantdocumentspertainingtoqualityarekeptproperlyforreadyreference.

5.6)ContractofWorks
ExpertgroupnotedthatNPCILhasappropriateproceduresinplaceforawardofcontracts andworks.

5.7)LocalEmploymentOpportunities
1.0OnthesubjectofemploymentopportunitiesforthelocalpopulationinKKNPP,ona query by the expert group, the KKNPP authorities provided the following information. 1.1 AspertheexistingorderofGovernmentofIndia,posttoberecruitedforGroupB,C andDtobenotifiedtoDistrictEmploymentExchangeandalsotobepublishedin Employmentnews.TheadvertisementhadalsobeencirculatedtoLandLoserVillage Panchayatsforvidecirculation. 1.2 Being an organization under the Government of India, basic qualification and experiencerequiredfortheposthastobefulfilledbyeachapplicant.Relaxationin ageandpostsisasperexistingordersofGovernmentofIndia 1.3 As per G.O. Ms. No. 188 dated 28.12.1976 of Personnel & Administrative Reforms (Personnel Dept.), only land losers who are displaced as a result of acquisition of landbypublicsectorundertakingsaretobegivenpriority.HonbleDivisionBench of Madurai bench, Madras High Court has also emphasized for providing employment opportunity to the displaced land losers. However at KKNPP no displacementoffamilyhadtakenplaceduetoacquisitionofland. 1.4 As can be seen from the data provided below, out of 541 employees recruited at KKNPP, 528 employees (97.5%) belong to Tamilnadu in the category of GroupB, C&D. 1.5 Detailsofemployeesrecruitedareasbelow. S.No Description No.of Remarks employees 1) Land affected panchayats such as 110 62employeesbelongs Kudankulam, Chettikulam, tolandlosercategory. VijayapathiandIrukundurai. 2) RadhapuramTaluk 160 IncludesS.No.1 3) Tirunelvelidistrict 295 IncludesS.No.1&2 4) Tirunelveli, Kanyakumari and 386 IncludesS.No.13 Tuticorindistricts 5) Tamilnadu 528 IncludesS.No.14.
13

2.0

Additionalemploymentopportunities: Plantishavingthefixedsanctionstrengthofregularmanpoweremploymentasper guidelines of NPCIL. There is more scope for getting employment opportunities by way of working with the contractors. In addition, various contract employees are working under major contractors and also through jobs like housekeeping, civil maintenanceetc.,throughSelfHelpGroups.Inthisprocess,around20003000local persons are working with various contractors. In addition, the requirement of personsunderthecontractvariesfromtimetotimeanditisacontinuousprocess dependinguponthetimeofcontractperiodandnewcontractscomingupthereon basedontheworkexigencies.Furtherduetoexpansionofplanttohavemoreunits in future the job opportunities will increase. NPCIL has been supporting the educationofthechildrenaroundtheplantwiththeintentionthatmoreandmore persons in future qualify for these jobs. NPCIL intends to expand the activities relatedtoeducation/traininginabiggerway.

5.8)VVERReactorDesignandEngineering
a) VVER is a pressurized light water cooled and moderated reactor with four independent cooling loops. The reactor has horizontal steam generators in each loop thatgiveshighwaterstoragecapacity.Ituseshexagonalfuelassemblieswhichhavelow enrichedfuelinoxidematrix,housedinsealedZirconiumNiobiumalloytubes. KKNPP VVER 1000 adopts the basic Russian design by model marked V320 with EnhancedSafetyFeaturestomakeitinlinewithIAEAGENIIIreactors.Further,certain additionalsafetyfeatureswereincorporatedlikePassiveHeatRemovalSystemtakingit toGENIII+category.RussianFederationhasmarkedKKNPPreactorasV412. SalientNormalOperatingParametersofKKNPPReactors: d) ElectricalPower 1000MWe ThermalPower 3000MWt No.ofFAs 163 Coolantinlettemp 291C Coolantoutlettemp 321C CoolantPressure 15.7MPa No.ofLoops 4 No.ofControlRods 103 PressureMaintenancebyPressurizer

b)

c)

Enhanced Safety Features: Key Safety Features incorporated in KKNPP as required India: QuickBoronInjectionSystem PassiveHeatRemovalSystem SecondStageHydroAccumulators
14

PassiveHydrogenRecombiners Annuluspassivefilteringsystem(passivesystem) CoreCatcher EmergencyControlRoom

The above systems have been developed based on extensive R & D and simulated testing by Russian design institutes. Functional performance of these systems are established during commissioning stage. These systems are described in subsequent sections.
e) VVER1000

Plant model

Site(units)

Status

No.of Units

Balakovo NPP (14), Zaporozhe NPP (16), Rovno NPP (3,4), Khmelnitsky NPP (1,2), V320 South Ukraine NPP (3), Rostov NPP (1,2), Temelin NPP (1,2), Kalinin NPP (3), Kozloduy NPP(5,6) V412 KudankulamNPP(1,2) V428 TianwanNPP(1,2)

Operating

22

Under Construction Operating

2 2

*Inadditiontotheabove: f) VVER1000reactorsareunderconstructioninRussianFederation. RecentlyVVERSareplannedinVietnam,TurkeyandBangladesh.

IAEASafetyReviewOfVVER1000(V320) ThisreviewwasdonebyinternationalExpertsin1994andrecommendationshave beenincorporatedintheV320andarepartofKKNPPV412also.

g)

SafetyFunctionsforaNPP Thefollowingsafetyfunctionsshallbeperformedinalloperationalstates,i.e.during normaloperation,duringandfollowingdesignbasiseventsconditionsandspecified beyonddesignbasisevents(BDBEs):

15

 h)

ControloftheReactivity(controloffissionchainreaction) Heatremovalfromthecoreand Confinementofradioactivity

SafetyduringNormalOperation: DuringNormalOperation(NO)&OperationalTransients(suchasTurbinetrip,pump tripsetc),thereactoriscontrolledbythecontrollerswithincertainoperationallimits andconditions.Thecontrolisachievedbyfollowingparameters: ControlofReactivity: i)CPSAR(ControlandProtectionSystemAbsorberRods) ii)CVCS(ChemicalVolumeControlSystem) HeatRemovalfromCore: i)PrimaryCoolantCircuit(fourindependentloops) ii)SteamGenerator(oneineachloop) iii)Turbine&Condenser ConfinementofRadioactivitybyfollowingmultiplebarriers: i)FuelMatrixandsealedFuelClad ii)ReactorCoolantSystemwithChemistrycontrol iii)ContainmentandContainmentfiltrationSystems Plant operation shall be carried as per Technical Specifications for operation approved by AERB which ensures that the plant is operated within safe parameters.

i)

SystemsCateringtoDesignBasisEvents(DBE): Though a detailed design analysis indicates that the rector will operate within the design parameters, safety systems have been provided to ensure safety during postulatedevents,knownasDesignBasisEvents(DBEs). DBEpostulationshavebeenmadeasperAERBguidelineswhichfollowinternational practices. An example of DBE is break of main coolant pipe resulting in loss of coolantaccident,knownasLOCA. DuringDBEs,reactorisshutdownbythecontrolrods. TheReactorcorecoolingwillbemaintainedbythefollowingsafetysystems,which arefourtrainindependentsystems: HighPressureEmergencyInjectionSystem:Startsinjectingboratedwatertothe reactorcorewhenprimarypressurefallsbelow7.9MPa

16

FirstStageHydroAccumulators(Passivesystem):Startsinjectingboratedwater tothereactorcorewhenprimarypressurefallsbelow5.9MPa Long term decay heat removal System: Starts injecting borated water to the reactorcorewhenprimarypressurefallsbelow1.9MPa Emergency Safety Boron Injection System: Injects borated water to the pressurisertodepressurizethereactorduringsteamgeneratortubeleak,soas tominimizetheleakageofprimarycoolant.

j)

BackupSystemsforControlRods(4Trains): Controlrodsarepassivesystemswhicharedesignedtodropundergravity.Theyare tested extensively in the test set ups and during commissioning. During reactor operation and annual shutdown, the performance of the rods is monitored. However, even under the postulated failure of control rods ( eventt known as Anticipated Transient Without Scram or ATWS) , reactor is designed to shutdown usingfollowingadditionalsafetysystems: EmergencyBoronInjectionSystem:Injectionofboricacidsolutiontothereactor athighpressure16MPa Quick Boron Injection System (Passive System): Injection of concentrated boric acidsolutiontothereactor.

k)

SystemsforcateringtoBeyondDesignBasisEventsBDBE(EnhancedSafetyFeatures)

In line with the current international practices, certain beyond design basis events have been postulated. To ensure the safety under these conditions, following systems have been provided. These enhanced safety features are additional systemsinKKNPP. PassiveHeatRemovalSystem(PHRS):

Decayheatremovalfromthecorefollowingcompletelossofpowersupply,known asstationblackout(SBO). AdditionalCorePassivefloodingsystem(passiveIIstageaccumulator):

Supplies borated water to the reactor core during a multiple failure such as simultaneousoccurrenceofLOCAandSBO. Systemforretainingandcoolingofmoltencore(CoreCatcher):

Retentionandlongtermcoolingofmoltencoreunderapostulatedsevereaccident condition.
17

l)

ReactorContainment NuclearsteamsupplysystemsarehousedinaReactorContainment,tocontainany releaseofradioactivity.Italsoprovidesprotectionagainstexternalhazards. SalientFeaturesofContainmentstructure i. ii. Double containment structure: Prestressed inner Containment (IC) with leaktightinnersteelliner&ReinforcedconcreteSecondaryContainment. Airlockswithdoubledoors;

Designpressureis0.4MPa(g)basedonestimatedpressureduetolosscoolant accident Designtemperatureis120C Containmenthasbeentesteduptoatestpressureof0.46MPa Permissible containment leakage rate is 0.3% volume/day. Leakage rate observedduringcontainmentleakratetestconductedduringprecommissioning was0.18%volume/day.Aspartofinserviceinspection,containmentleaktestis carriedoutperiodically. SecondaryContainmentDesignedtowithstand i. ii. AircraftCrash(suchasCessnaandlearjetaircraft) AirShockwave

m)

Subatmospheric pressure maintained during normal operation and under accidentconditionssoastominimizegroundlevelreleases

ContainmentSystems: Followingsystemsareprovidedtomaintaintheintegrityofthecontainmentandits functionalcapabilityunderabnormalconditions: Containment Spray System: Condenses steam due to any leakage from the primaryorsecondarysystem,thuslimitingpressureriseinthecontainment. Annulus passive filtering system (passive system): The annular space between the primary and secondary containments is always maintained at a negative pressurewhichpreventsanygroundlevelreleases.DuringanSBOcondition,this negativepressureismaintainedbythenaturaldraughtcreatedduetothePHRS operation. Passive Hydrogen Recombiners: Hydrogen, if generated during accident conditions, is recombined in Passive Hydrogen Recombiners to convert it to water. This prevents any hydrogen ignition within the containment. They are locatedatvariouslocationswithinthecontainment.

18

n)

SupplementaryControlRoom Supplementary controlroom (SCR) is provided in the shielded control building, to enableessentialsafetyfunctionsandmonitoringofalltheimportantparametersin caseofmaincontrolroom(MCR)becominginaccessible.

o)

TrainingandQualification TrainingThreePhaseProgramme i. Operatorsaregraduateengineerswithadequateexperience ii. PhaseAOrientationcourseandExamination iii. PhaseBTheory&SimulatorTraininginRF iv. PhaseCParticipationincommissioningactivitiesandSimulatorTraining inIndia QualificationofO&M i. LicensingofO&MpersonnelbyAERBandtheirperiodic ii. Requalificationincludingmanagerialcadre. iii. DetailsofQualificationMethodologyFinalized InServiceInspection Monitoring of healthiness of equipments and components is conducted as per ISI program. ISIdataiscomparedwithbaselinedatacollectedduringPreServiceInspection Typicalsystemsmonitoredare i. Reactorcoolantpressureboundary. ii. Systems essential for safe reactor shut down and/or safe cooling of nuclear fuel. iii. ContainmentSystems iv. Other systems and components whose functioning is essential for systems mentionedabove.

p)

q)

MaterialSurveillance MaterialsurveillancecouponsareinstalledinsidethereactortoassessstateofRPV materialtypicallyduetoneutronirradiation&temperatureeffects. These set of coupons are withdrawn at specified interval of reactor operation and subjected to destructive testing to assess change in mechanical properties of RPV material. Thismethodprovidessufficientleadtimeforactions,ifrequired.

5.9)VVERPerformanceInformation
GiveninAnnexure1

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5.10)DummyFuel
Dummy Fuel is used to simulate the Nuclear Fuel Assembly, both by geometrical and by weightconsideration.DummyFuelismadeofleadencapsulatedinsteeltubesandhasno radioactivematerial. Thesearerequiredtobeinstalledinthereactorduringcommissioning,tostudyhydraulic characteristics like pressure and temperature variations, flow pattern with various combinationsofReactorCoolantPumps,temperatureetc.,inthePrimaryCoolantSystem. TheDummyFuelassemblieshavenoproblemsofdisposalastheyarenonradioactive,but infactarepreservedandreusedinsubsequentnewreactorsduringcommissioningtest.

5.11)FuelSupply
Fuel for initial and reload of Unit1&2 of KKNPP is procured as per Fuel Contract signed betweenRussianFederationandDAE,GOI.Thefuelissuppliedintheformoffinishedfuel assemblies of designated enrichment to be loaded in to the core. The quality of fuel fabricationatthefuelfabricationplantinRussiaisinspectedbyDAE/NPCILfuelexpertsat differentstagesoffuelfabricationasperapprovedQualityAssurancePlan. The finished fuel assemblies are packed in specially designed casks and transported by specialaircraftfromRussiatoIndia.FromAirporttotheKKNPPfacility,thetransportation is done by road. The entire transportation, starting from fabrication plant in Russia to KKNPP facility, strictly adheres to the safety regulations of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and AERB of India. Security arrangements are followed as per the DAE Securitynorms.

5.12)FreshWaterSupply
Desalinationplant,basedonMechanicalVapourCompressiontechnology,atKKNPPsitehas been designed to meet the process requirements of Unit # 1&2 and the potable water requirements. The plant water requirement is 5664 m3/day and the potable water requirement is 1272 m3/day.Againstthis,theinstalleddesalinationplantcapacityis7680m3/day.Thisismetby threeunits,eachofcapacity2560m3/day,withoneadditionalunitof2560m3/dayunit,as a standby. The output water from the desalination plant is further purified by de mineralizing and used for industrial purpose. The product water is treated further for makingitpotablewater. The provision of water storage and inventory available in various tanks are adequate for coolingrequirementsofReactorPlantforatleasttendays,incaseofpowerfailurefromthe Grid(eventhoughtheregulatoryrequirementisonly7days).

20

5.13)OtherWaterSources

Thedesalinationplantshavebeendesignedforsufficientcapacityandhavebeenerected and commissioned. Hence, the question of water utilization from other sources such as PechiparaidamandTamirabharaniriverdoesnotarise.

5.14)DesalinationPlants
Desalination Plant at KKNPP site is based on thermal desalination i.e Mechanical Vapour Compression (MVC) system. The system draws sea water from the main cooling water intakechannelprovidedforthepowerplant.Thebrinerejectfromthedesalinationplant will be mixed with the condensed cooling water discharges, diluted and released into the seathroughtheexistingoutfallchannel. A base line environmental assessment and mathematical modeling study on flow, dispersionofbrinerejectandextentofmixingintheseahasbeendonebyIndomerCoastal Hydraulics Pvt Ltd, Chennai, who is a certified consultant by Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Animal Husbandry & Dairying, New Delhi and also a certified A grade hydrographicsurveyorbyInlandWaterwaysAuthorityofIndia,Noida. The brine reject volume is 350 m3/ hour and it gets diluted with sea water discharge throughtheoutletcanalwhichis2,50,000m3/hourduringplantnormaloperation.Thiswill give an initial dilution of the order 700. This predilution would reduce the brine concentrationfrom69ppttoanambientvalueof35.1ppt. Thebrinerejectwillnothaveanyimpactinthemarineenvironmentwhilejoiningthesea. Thebrinerejectdoesnotcontainanytoxicororganicpollutant.

5.15)EnvironmentalImpactofDesalinationPlants
Thisiscoveredat5.14)above.

5.16)NuclearWasteManagement
Theoriginofradioactivityinareactoristhefuelthatisundergoingirradiation/fission.The fueliscladinametallictubesoalltheradioactivityproducedinthefuelstayswithinthe fueltubeorclad.Intheunlikelyeventofanypinholeleakfromthefueltube,radioactivity could come into contact with the circulating coolant water which is constantly being recirculatedthroughthecoreofthereactorforremovalofheat,producedbyfission. 1.1Ifanyradioactivityenterstheprimarycoolingwatercircuit,itiseffectivelyremovedby Filters and IonExchange columns provided in the circuit. As the primary cooling water circuitinKKNPPisaclosedcycle,anyradioactivitythatescapedfromthefuelgetstrapped in Filters and Ion Exchangers andwould not pose any hazard to either plant or personnel andthereisnowayitcanfindits waytoenvironment.Otherliquidprocesseffluentsare evaporated for an extremely high decontamination, rendering the condensate with insignificantcontamination,consideredfitforreuseintheplantandtheconcentratesare
21

concretedtoresultinastablematrixforsafestorageandsubsequentdisposal 1.2 Similarly if any solid wastes get contaminated with radioactivity, they are carefully collectedandasafirststepvolumeofthewastesproducedarereducedtoasmallfraction bytreatmentmethodslikeincinerationandcompaction,apartfromsizereduction;thenthe wastesareconditionedbybeingfixedincementconcretebeforetheyarestoredsafelyfor an interim period, .They would be considered for disposal in a Near Surface Disposal Facility,inafewyearstime,givingadequatetimefordecayofshortlivedradioactivity. 1.3 Any radioactivity, in the exhaust air system from the reactor buildings, though insignificantisinvariablytreatedthroughaseriesofoffgascleanupsystem,beforerelease throughtallstacks. 1.4Duetothetotalcontainmentofallradioactivityinthefueltube,thetypeofwastesthat result from various systems in this reactor are essentially low level wastes, with a small quantity of intermediate level wastes. There are no high level wastes associated with the operationofthereactorsatKudankulam 1.5 Thus, as a matter of abundant caution and abiding concern for safety ofenvironment andmembersofPublic,anumberofstateofthearttechnologiesareemployedintheSafe Management of Radioactive Wastes. The track record of DAE in this regard has been exemplaryoverthepastfourdecades,andcomparesfavourablywiththebestintheworld. 2.0Spentfuel:FirstandforemostitshouldberememberedthatSpentFuelisnotawaste intheIndianNuclearProgramme.Aclosedfuelcycleisfollowed,wherethevaluablefissile materialslikeUraniumandPlutoniumwhicharepresentintheSpentFuelarerecoveredfor reuse. 2.1Spentfuelisthereforeanassetthatneedstobepreserved.AtKudankulam,SpentFuel from the Reactors will be carefully stored in Storage Pools, which are always filled with pure,demineralized,boratedwaterwhichisconstantlyrecirculated.Thesepoolsarehigh integrity concrete pools which are additionally lined with stainless steel sheets, to ensure effectivecontainmentforextendedperiodsoftime.TheDepartmentofAtomicEnergyhas longexperienceandexpertiseofahighorderinthesafemanagementofSpentFuel 2.2ThereisnoplantodothereprocessingoftheSpentFuelatKudankulamsite.Assuch thestorageofSpentFuelatKudankulamistobeconsideredonlyasaninterimmeasure tilltheyaretransportedtoaReprocessingFacility. 2.3AdequateTechnologyandyearsofexperienceareavailablewithDepartmentofAtomic EnergyfortransportingSpentFuelfromonesitetoanotherthroughbothRailwaysandby roadways, in a safe manner without any public hazard. This is done as per stipulations of AERB,regardingTransportRegulationsthatgovernsafety.

22

5.17)Reprocessing:
Thishasbeencoveredat5.16)above.

5.18)RadiationSafety
RoutineEmissions: AftergoingthroughthedocumentsofKKNPP,itisseenthat Noradioactivityreleasethroughtheseawatercoolingispossiblesincethisloopis physicallyseparatedbythreelevelsfromthecoolantloopwhichentersthereactor. However some low and medium level waste would be generated in the station which is treated inside the plant. Very low level effluents from these would be generatedandtherearenormsandlimitsfortheirreleases. Gaseous routine emissions are basically exhaust air from building ventilation systems.It isfilteredinHighEfficiencyParticulateAir(HEPA)filtersandActivated CharcoalfiltersbeforedischargetotheStack.

Peoplessafetyandwellbeing: The authorized limit of low level effluents through air and water from KKNPP is restrictedsuchthatitwillnotleadtomorethanaround4.36percentofthedoselimit for the public recommended by ICRP (1 mSv). The expected rated releases would howeverbemuchlower(0.02%).Theconcentrationsofdischargesaremeasurableand their limits are fixed to ensure this. The limits of concentrations in aquatic and atmospheric releases fixed are such that the dose will never exceed the authorized limits.Theconcentrationsofdischargesthroughstackaremonitoredcontinuously.The activity levels of liquid discharge are monitored daily to ensure this. Further the environmentalsurveyprogramoftheEnvironmentalSurveyLaboratory,anorganization independentofNPCissufficientlyintensetoassesstheimpact,ifany,onthefloraand fauna and in estimating the dose to a member of the public. The laboratory is in operationsince2004androutinepreoperationalradioactivityanalysesofthesamples arebeingcarriedouttoestablishbackgroundlevels.Asinalltheothernuclearsitesthe environmental radioactivity assessment program would be continued after the station goesintooperationtoensurethatthereisnoimpactofthestationontheenvironment andtothepublic.TheperiodicreportsareauditedbytheRegulatoryBoard. ESLmonitorstheEnvironmentaroundthePlant.Ithasbeencollectingandanalyzingthe sampleslikewater,air,soil,floraandfauna,rightfromthepreoperationalstageofthe plant from the year 2003, which forms the baseline data. The baseline data has been established and records are available for reference. This activity will be continued
23

throughout the entire lifetime of the Plant and records maintained. Records at other NuclearPowerPlants(NPP)sitesinIndiaindicatenoimpactonthefloraandfauna.Asa matteroffactthefloraaroundNPPsitesarevastlyimprovedwithlargescaleplantings andlandscapedgardensascanbeseenatKKNPPwhichimprovesthefaunaaroundthe station.ThiscanbecorroboratedinallNPPsites.

Peopleshealth People who have been living for generations in the high background areas in our country,receiving25timesmoredosefromnaturalradiationdonothaveanyilleffects asmedicallyprovedbythestudiesofRegionalCancerCentreTrivandrum. DAE workers live in close vicinity of atomic centers all over India (their limit for exposure is 100 times more than the KKNPP limit)have been proved to have no noticeablehealtheffects. AssuchwefeelthattheradiationsafetyofthepeoplearoundKKNPPisguaranteedand therewouldbenoimpactoftheoperationofthepowerstationonthepublic. Awordaboutthegeneticeffectsofradiation. People in the high background areas of Kerala stay for generations exposed to more than 10 times the natural radiation background elsewhere. Many independent studies particularly by the Regional Cancer Research Centre, Thiruvananthapuram on the people there have been conducted and the conclusions show that no deleterious effect could be noticed which is attributabletoradiation. Theepidemiologicalsurveyoftheradiationworkersinthecountrywhosedose limitis20timesmorethanthatforthepublicdoesnotshowanysucheffects. UNSCEAR,anInternationalcommitteeontheeffectsofatomicradiationworking formorethan60yearsfoundnogeneticeffectsevenamongsttheprogeniesof theHiroshimaNagasakiatomicbombvictims.

Whenthisisthefacthowasmallpercent(1%)ofthenaturalradiationdosethatmight be received around nuclear power stations lead to any genetic effect or cancer incidence? The fear about genetic effects of radiation around nuclear sites is more psychological andiscontrarytoscientificfacts. Baselinedataonhealthconcerns: PreoperationalhealthdataaroundKudankulam
24

Ahealthstatusanddemographicsurveyofthepeoplein52villagesaroundKudankulam wasconductedbyMSUniversityduring20042008.Thiswillserveasthebaselinedata toevaluatetheimpactduetotheoperationofthestationlater. 67,029subjectswereinvolvedanddataoncancerincidencewaspartofthissurvey 136casesofcancerwerereported.Cheekanduteruscancerwerethemostcommon. Theprevalenceofcancercorresponds to202.8perlakhofpopulationwhichisinparwiththerateforTamilNadu(225) The world over investigations show that only certain type of cancers notably that of thyroidisduetotheeffectofradiation. Workerssafetyandwellbeing: TherecommendationsoflimitsofexposureforradiationworkersbyICRPare: 20mSv/yraveragedoverfiveconsecutiveyears Adoseof30mSvinanyyear; Lifetimeeffectivecumulativedoselimit1Sv ThesearethelimitsadoptedbyAERB.KKNPfurtherstipulatesinhouselimitstoensure thatinnocaseworkerswillexceedtheselimits.Theyhavemonthly,quarterlylimitsto ensure this. The experience in all NPCIL nuclear reactors shows that during the last 5 yearsnoworkerhasexceededthecumulativelimits. Thelimitsaresuchthatthesedonotleadtoanyadversehealtheffects.KKNPPhasan intenseprogramofmonitoringtheradiationexposuresusingmonthlymonitoringusing TLdosimeters.Theseareaugmentedbyuseofdirectreadingdosimeters.Therecordsof theexposuresarekeptbythestationandbythecentralizedDAEdoseregistry. TheoperationscarriedoutinKKNPPdonotenvisageleadingtoanysignificantinternal exposures through inhalation or ingestion of radioactivity. However there are internal monitoring programs at KKNPP such as whole body counting to assess the dose to workersthroughthisroute.

5.19)RoutineEmissions:
Thishasbeencoveredat5.18)above.

5.20)Workerssafetyandwellbeing:
Thishasbeencoveredat5.18)above.

25

5.21)Peoplessafetyandwellbeing:
Thishasbeencoveredat5.18)above.

5.22)HealthSurveyandbaselinedata
Thishasbeencoveredat5.18)above.

5.23)Radiationillness
The limits of radiation exposure from the nuclear power plants, for the public and occupationalworkersinIndia,aresuchthat,thequestionofradiationillnessisnotrelevant.

5.24)Population:
The2001censuspopulationfiguresfortheareaaroundKKNPPareasfollows: Distance Population 02km 25km 516km 0 23960 94733

5.25)Oceanography
1.0FlooddesignofKKNPPandImportantplantlevelsandlocations 1.1DesignBasisFloodLevel ThesafegradeelevationofKKNPPsitehasbeenkeptat7.5MtraboveMSLandashore protectionbundisconstructedallalongtheshoretoaheightof+8.0MtrtoMSL. The detail of arriving at the safe grade elevation, considering either tsunami or storm surgeislistedinthetablebelow. SlNo 1 RiseWaterlevelDueto(m) Wave Max.Tide StormSurge Runup 2.0 1.42 2.46 Tsunami Total (w.r.tCD) 5.88
26

2.0

1.42

2.50

5.92

Thereforethemaximumwaterlevel=5.920.481=5.439m withrespecttoMSL.

Keeping a further safety margin of 2.0m, the safe grade elevation is keptas7.44m(say7.5m)w.r.tMSL 1.2KKNPPBuildingelevations. Inadditiontothesafegradeelevation,sufficientmarginsareavailableineachbuilding. Elevationsandlocationsofimportantsafetybuildingsaregiveninthetablebelow.
Description Elevationsinmeters Marginavailable aboveMSL meters

Pumphousegradeelevation ReactorBuildinggradeelevation SafetyDGbuilding(sealedbuilding) DieseltanksinDGbuilding BatteryBanks(sealedbuilding) PassiveHeatRemovalSystem Heatexchangers MaincontrolRoom

+7.65m +8.7m +9.3m +13.8m +16.5m +52.2m +26.0

2.21 3.26 3.86 8.36 11.06 46.76 20.56

Inaddition, havingahighergradeelevation,allthesafetyrelatedbuildingsareclosed withdoublegasketleaktightdoors. 1.3Shorestability No potential of shore instability exists at Kudankulam site area, as protruding rock outcrops are present all along the coast protecting the shore from erosion. Also, no historicalshoreerosionhasbeenrecordedinthearea. 2.0Tsunamiwarningsystemsavailable: TsunamiEventIdentification:PossibleTsunamioccurrencecanbeknownasalertsformthe followingagencies: KKNPP is registered with INCOIS, Hyderabad (Indian National centre for ocean information service). In case of any Tsunami warnings, information in the mobile numbersofthestationmanagementwillbereceived.

27

Madras Atomic Power station, Kalpakkam has established PC based Earthquake Notification System (ENS) which gives alarm in the control room in case of an earthquake. ENS is an application which scans USGS (US Geological survey) and EMSC (EuropeanMediterraneanSeismicCentre)sites.ImmediatealertwillbegiventoKKNPP controlroomfromKalpakkamincaseofanyalarm.

5.26) FISHERIES, SEAFOOD SECURITY AND COOLANT WATER DISPOSAL & THERMALECOLOGY.
Baselinedatacollection. The baseline data of the marine environment of KKNPP has been well established throughthestudiesundertakenby
a. ManonmaniamSundaranarUniversity,. b. InstituteofOceanManagement,AnnaUniversity c. EngineersIndiaLimited/CMFRI Specialfeatureinintake:FishProtectionsystem

Kudankulam project uses sea water for condenser cooling for which water is drawn from intake dykes. . To save the fishes from coming into the fore bay / pump house area and getting trapped, KKNPP houses a unique fish protection system where in all the fishes which are coming into the intake will be separated by means of a unique air curtain and Oogeeweirsandaresafelyreturnedbackintothesea.Thisisanuniquefacilitytoprotect themarineorganisms.. EffectofCondensercoolingwaterinthemarinelife Theapproximatequantityofcoolantwater,whentheplantisinoperationreleasedinsea willbe70,00,000CuMperdayperunitwithamaximumdeltaTof7degreeCelsius. The seasonal variation in surface water temperature of Kudankulam Marine Environment rangedfrom23Cduringmonsoonandwinterseasonto29Cduringsummerseason,with anannualaverageof26.6C. The studies on the lethal affects of temperature on selected fishes and prawns of KudankulamMarineEnvironmentshowedthatthelethaltemperatureoffin&shellfishes was found to be between 38.2 and 43.2 C. Considering maximum possible surface sea watertemperatureofKudankulamareasas29C,duringsummermonthsandtherisingthe temperature as stipulated by MoEF as 7C, the maximum temperature at discharge point willbe36C,whichmaynotharmanyfisheveninthevicinityofdischargepoint.Butduring monsoon and winter season the ambient surface water temperature will be considerably low(23C)andhencenoeffectwillbeenvisagedinthedischargearea.Infactthemixing willbeveryfastduetowaveactionandotherwatercurrents.Duetothewaveactionthe
28

mixingofwarmwaterfromcondenserwithambientseawaterwillbeinstantaneousanda possiblereductionofambientseawatertemperaturewillbeexpected.Consideringthefact itisobviousthattheremaynotbeanyharmtothefisherypotentialofKudankulamMarine EnvironmentduetotheestablishmentofKKNPP.Itisagainsupportedbythefactthatfish, beingacoldbloodedanimal,itcanadjustthebodytemperaturewiththatofenvironment withinthesublethaltemperatureandariseinbodytemperaturewillenhanceallbiological activities,includinggrowthandproduction.Inaddition,thefishandprawnswillhavethe capacitytosensethechangeintemperatureinambientwaterandtrytoavoidandmove awayfromtheadversecondition,ifany.,fromthepointofdischarge The operation of Nuclear Power Plant in the country at the coastal locations at TAPS, Tarapur in Maharashtra and MAPS at Kalpakkam in Tamil Nadu has also not shown any adverseeffectsonMarinelifeincludingthefish.

5.27)IMPACTONLAND,AGRICULTURE,LIVESTOCKANDFOODSECURITY.
Impact on Land: Beneficialimpactswouldbefeltonlandusepatternandtopographicalfeaturesofthe areaduetogreeningoftheareathroughplantationandgreenbeltdevelopment.Under operating conditions, there will not be any impact on the land environment as discharges are insignificant as compared to the combined natural background parameters. Asofnow,atotalof23890plantsandtreeshavebeendevelopedforgreenbelting,at Kudankulam site (KKNPP). The area covered by lawns and gardens is 16419 Square meters. Hedges accounts for 2467 Running meters and this will help to improve the quality of environment around NPP. The green belt development will be continued in futurewhichwillattractmorefaunaspeciallyavianspeciesresultinginimprovementin biodiversityasevidentinothernuclearpowerstationlikeKaiga,Kalpakkam,Tarapuretc. Impact on Agriculture, live stock and food security: National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) has prepared the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report and had documented the land use classificationin30Kmsradiusoftheplantsitebasedonsatellitemapping. The land use/ land cover classification indicates 8.73% area covered by vegetation, 8.73% are covered by Barren land, 23.39% area covered by scrubland, 8.52% area coveredbysandyarea,0.08%builtuparea,49.68%waterbodyincludingsea,river/nala etc. This is the baseline data. However data from the other nuclear power plants in the countryindicatethatoperationofNPPsdonothaveanyadverseimpactonagriculture, livestockandfoodsecurity.

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5.28)IMPACTONFLORAANDFAUNA
As such the land acquired has been dry and barren and hence there is no impact on the flora and fauna inside the plant area. NEERI has conducted the base line study of the biologicalenvironmentinandaroundKKsiteandiswelldocumented. Also as on June 2011, a total of 23890 plants and trees have been developed for green belting,atKKNPP.Theareacoveredbylawnsandgardensis16419Squaremeters.Hedges accountsfor2467runningmeters. The Green Belt programme will be continued to develop a green belt in the vacant land, afterassigningtheplantstructuresofKKNPP3to6. Because of the green belt developed, the area around plant and township has become a hubformigratorybirds.

5.29)COOLANTWATERDISPOSAL&THERMALECOLOGY
Alreadydiscussedat5.26)above.

5.30)Seismology
Structures,systemsandcomponents(SSC)ofIndiannuclearpowerplant(NPP)aredesigned for two levels of earthquakes which are estimated according to safety requirements laid down by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) which are in line with the IAEA (InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency)guidelines(IAEAGuide50SGS1): 1) 2) S1 level of ground motion or OBE (Operating Basis Earthquake). S2 level of ground motion or SSE (Safe Shutdown Earthquake).

S1 level corresponds to the maximum ground motion which can be expected to be

30

experiencedattheSiteduringthelifeoftheNPPi.e.onceina100years.AllSSCnecessary forpowergenerationaredesignedforthislevelofgroundmotion. S2levelcorrespondstotheconservativelyestimatedlevelofgroundmotionwhichcanbe expectedtooccuroncein10,000years.AllSSCimportanttosafetyaredesignedtoremain functionalduringaS2levelearthquake. SSEisderivedonthebasisofmaximumearthquakepotentialassociatedwiththetectonic structuresandseismotectonicprovinceintheregionandtakesintoaccount, I. II. III. IV. themaximumearthquakepotentialinsidetheseismictectonicprovinceofthesite associatedwithspecifictectonicstructures the maximum earthquake potential inside the seismic province of the site not associatedwithspecifictectonicstructures the maximum earthquake potential for the adjoining seismotectonic provinces associatedwithspecifictectonicstructuresand the maximum earthquake potential for the adjoining seismotectonic provinces not associatedwithaspecifictectonicstructure.

EarthquakeDesignBasisforKudankulamNuclearPowerPlant(KKNPP)1&2 Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant is located in Indian Seismic Zone II which is the least seismicpotentialregionofourcountry.(ref.IS1893).However,fordesigningofthePlant, detailed studies are conducted to conservatively estimate extent of ground motion applicabletothespecificSitewithreferencetoSeismotectonicandGeologicalconditions around it so that NPPs are designed for a SSE level earthquake which has a very low probabilityofbeingexceeded(returnperiodof1in10,000years). For Kudankulam NPP, the following tasks were undertaken for detailed evaluation of Site specificconditionsasbelow: a) Studyoftheseismotectonicandgeologicalsetupoftheregion. b) Selection of a set of recorded accelerograms with source and site conditions resemblingthoseatSiteforcomputingresponsespectra. c) Generationofresponsespectraof theselectedtimehistoriesforvariousvaluesof dampingandstatisticalanalysisoftheensembleofresponsespectra. d) Collectionofadditionalinformationonearthquakes,regionalandlocalgeologyand tectonics pertinent to evaluating fault activity and design basis ground motion parameters.
31

e) IntegrationoftheaboveinformationtoarriveattheEarthquakeDesignBasis(EDB). This involves the generation of peak ground acceleration and response spectral shapesforvariouscomponentsofgroundmotionforbothS1andS2. f) Generationofspectralcompatibleaccelerograms. All potential, active and nonactive faults, lineaments and seismic history within a radius 300kmshavebeenanalyzedtoarriveattheSSEandOBElevelsofearthquake.Asperabove data, there are no faults / lineaments in the near vicinity of the site. The most intense earthquake experienced in this 300 km region is the earthquake that occurred at Coimbatore (307 km) on 08/02/1900 which had an epicentral intensity of VII on the MMI scale. Towards enhanced conservation, the high intensity earthquakes that occurred in this seismotectonicregionhavebeenassumedtoactattheclosestfaults/lineamentsnearthe siteinarrivingattheSSElevel.TheSitespecificresponsespectraforSSEatKKNPPhasbeen derivedfromtheenvelopeofthesehypotheticalevents. Considering the above events, a rocksitespecific formula for the maximum peak ground accelerationvalidfortherangeofmagnitudeanddistanceofinteresthasbeenderived. ThepeakgroundaccelerationsthusevaluatedforKKNPPareasfollows. Peak ground acceleration (g) Level SSE OBE Horizontal 0.15 0.05 Vertical 0.11 0.036

References: i) Report on Earthquake Design Basis for Kudankulam Site prepared by Dr.A.K.Gosh, BARC&ShriD.C.Banerjee,AMD.

Conclusion:theseismicparametersforthedesignofSSCofKKNPPhavebeenarrivedat
in a highly conservative manner following the AERB stipulations and thus the seismic safetyoftheplantisassuredwithalargesafetymargin.

32

5.31)CONSERVATIONISSUES(GULFOFMANNARBIOSPHEREANDWESTERN GHATS)
GulfofMannarBiospherereserve: ThenearestbiodiversityrichnessregionofGulfofMannarbiospherereserveislocated northofTuticorinwhichismorethan80Kmsfromtheplantsite. CMFRIwhilepreparingthemarineEIAhadconductedexhaustivesamplingcovering60 SqKmsofthesite.TheyhaveclearlystatedthatthemarineecosystemoftheKKNPP region has characteristics of an oceanic region which is different from the productive ecosystemsofthewestcoast,gulfsandbays. AnothersignificantecologicalfeatureofKKNPPSiteistheabsenceofsensitivehabitats likemangroveandcoralreefsinKKNPPcoast.TheCMFRIhaveconfirmedthatthereare no formations of coral reefs south of Tuticorin and along the Kanyakumari coast (includingthePlantneighborhood).

WesternGhats: TheEIAdocumentconfirmsthatthereisnoforestareawithin15kmoftheplantsite. AssuchthereisnoimpactontheWesternGhatduetosettingupofKKNPP.

5.32)TerroristandSecurityThreats
ElaboratemeasureshavebeentakenforthesecurityofKKNPPasisdoneforalltheNPPin the country. An exhaustive physical protection system with 24X7 monitoring is implementedfortheplantareas.Thesesystemsconsistofmultilayeredsecurityandonline surveillances which are regularly reviewed with regard to threat perception to ensure adequateprotection.

5.33)Bilateralrelations
Notaddressed

5.34)Impactofminingactivities
NominingactivityiscarriedoutbyKKNPP.

5.35)SevereAccidentManagement:
NPPsaredesignedandoperatedfollowingtheprincipleofdefenseindepth.Thisprinciple requiresthattherebesuccessivebarriersagainstreleaseofradioactivityandseverallayers ofprotectionbeprovidedforeachofthesafetyfunctions.
33

Thefirstlevelofdefenseindepthisachievedbyensuringthattheplantisdesignedinsuch awaythatallsafetyparameterslikepressure,temperatureflowetc.aremaintainedwithin thespecifiedlimits. The second level corresponds to upset operating conditions that can be expected during plant operation, like, failure of grid power supply. The design ensures that safety is not jeopardizedonaccountofsuchupsetconditions. Thethirdlevelrelatestothesituationwhereplantparametersexceedtheprescribedsafety limits. The safety design of the NPP ensures that the reactor is promptly shut down automaticallyandcoolingoffuelisadequatelymaintainedtopreventitfromoverheating andcauseanyreleaseofradioactivity. The fourth level corresponds to a situation where adequate cooling of the fuelcannot be maintained for some reason whereby the reactor gets into the accident mode. Even for such accident conditions, the NPP design provides the means to be able to control the progression of the accident and prevent any major release of radioactivity to the environment such that there are no significant adverse radiological consequences in the publicdomain. The fifth level of defenseindepth assumes, in a hypothetical manner that due to unforeseen reasons or due to any failures in design or operating procedures or in their implementation,radioactivityreleasedoestakeplace.Henceanemergencypreparedness planmustbeinplacewhichcanbeexecuted,ifrequired,tomitigatetheconsequencesof sucharelease. The emergency preparedness plans should therefore be viewed in the overall context of the safety philosophy of defenseindepth. Needless to mention that for any plan to be effective, it must be tested periodically. The emergency exercise including the offsite emergencyexercisethatmayrequireevacuationofasectionofthepopulation,arecarried out accordingly. It must, however, be reiterated that the possibility of an emergency situation arising is extremely remote and the exercises are done only to be in a state of preparedness,shouldtheneedarise. InIndia,NPPshavebeeninoperationoverthelastmorethan40yearsandtherehasnever beenanyaccidentoftheneedforanyemergencyactionsinthepublicdomain.Eveninthe entireworldwhereover430NPPsareinoperation,theneedforemergencyactioninthe public domain has arisen only twice; once in 1986 from the Chernobyl accident and the otherin2011fromtheFukushimaaccident.

5.36)EmergencyPreparednessatKKNPP:
It may be noted that in KK reactor design, many advanced safety features are deployed. These include the passive heat removal system, which ensures cooling of the fuel even if powerisnotavailable(aswasthecaseinFukushima)andothersafetyprovisionslikethe double containment and core catcher that strengthen the plant safety such that any
34

intervention in the public domain outside the plant exclusion zone will not be required even in case of an accident. However, as a matter of abundant caution following the defenseindepth safety philosophy, emergency plan for actions to be taken in public domainduringanyoffsiteemergencywerepreparedandprovidedtoDistrictAuthorities. These procedures are accordingly included in the Emergency Preparedness Plans Vol1 and Vol2 duly approved for Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project. Volume 1 covers Plant Emergency and Site Emergency conditions which have been prepared by the KKNPP Site, reviewed and approved by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. The document no. is I01.KK.0.0.TM.MN.WD001.Volume2isfortheOffsiteEmergencyPreparednesswhichhas been prepared by NPCIL in consultation with the State authorities, concurred by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and approved by the District Collector, Tirunelveli District. DocumentNo.isI01.KK.0.0.TM.MN.WD002.Bothofthesedocumentsareinplace. Theseemergencypreparednessplansbringsouttheconditionsatwhichplant,siteandoff site emergencies may be declared by the respective authorities. They also bring out in detail the roles and responsibilities of various agencies involved. The plants are tested periodically by conduct of emergency exercises such that any deficiency can be observed andcorrectedandtokeeptheplantupdated.Plantemergencyexerciseisconductedonce in 3 months, site emergency is conducted once in a year. The offsite emergency is conducted once is two years. Prior to first criticality, plant, site and offsite emergency exerciseshavetobeconductedonce. For the plant and site emergency, all the KKNPP employees and the CISF personnel have been trained. First plant emergency mock exercise has been conducted involving KKNPP personnelandcontractpersonnel. ImplementationofoffsiteEmergencyplaninvolvesvariousStateGovernmentDepartments like District Revenue, Social Welfare, Fire, Health, Horticulture & Agriculture, Fisheries, Irrigation, Forest, Animal Husbandry, Electricity Board, Transport, Local Administration & Police Departments. A detailed training programme was conducted as per the schedule providedbytheDistrictCollectoratefortheofficialsfromalltheabovedepartmentsinthe monthofAugust2011abouttherolesandresponsibilitiesoftherespectivedepartments. Around 600 officials from these departments have been trained on offsite emergency preparedness. Fresh Fuel transportation will be done with due consents from AERB, following all the stipulations. NoRadioactiveWastewillbetransportedoutoftheplantpremises. AlltheabovearesubjecttoAERBapprovalandaudit.

5.37)RussianandIndianliabilityissues:
Notaddressed.
35

5.38)ProjectCostandRussianDebtAnalysis:
OnaquerytoNPCIL,theyhavegiventhefollowinginformation The sanctioned cost of the KKNPP 1&2, is Rs 13,171 crores including interest during construction. About half of the cost is financed by the credit facility extended from the Russian Federation. As per the agreement, the credit is to be utilised during the constructionoftheplantandistoberepaidin14annualinstallments,aftercommissioning oftheplant. Thesetbackinprojectcompletionschedulehasresultedinrevisionofthecostestimates, mainlyduetoincreaseintheinterestonborrowings,establishmentcostandescalationon thecostofbalanceworks.Therevisionofcostestimatesisinprocess.

5.39)GenerationandTransmission
Thetransmissionsystemwasfinalisedtakingintoconsiderationsthevariousrequirements i.e reliability and security levels as stipulated in the Transmission Planning criteria documentissuedbyMinistryofPowerGovernmentofIndia,NewDelhi. 2000MW(e)electricalpowergeneratedfromKKNPPUnit#1andUnit#2isexportedthrough the400KVpowertransmissionlines. The power generated from KKNPP is exported to Tirunelveli through the four 400KV transmissionlines.KKNPPstationloadsnormallyderivepowerfromthefour400KVpower supplies.

5.40)CAPACITYFACTORMONITORING
CapacityfactorismonitoredbyNPCIL.

5.41)SpentFuelTransportation
Thisiscoveredat5.16)above.

5.42)Decommissioning
The objective of decommissioning is to release the NPP site for reuse or for unrestricted use, depending on the requirement, ensuring safety of members of the public and occupational workers as well as protection of the environment. Provisions for facilitating decommissioninginKKNPP1&2havebeenmadeinthedesign. Decommissioningstrategyconsistsofdefuellingofreactorandremovalofallradioactive fluidsfrom thesystems,attheendofitsoperatinglife.TheSSCsarethenkeptinasafe storage mode for a period of time to allow for natural decay of radioactivity for ease of
36

dismantling of components and their packaging and transportation for disposal. The necessarymachinery,components,structuresandthebuildingareleftintactforsuchsafe keeping.SomeoftheconventionalSSCsmaybedismantledatthisstage. The cost of decommissioning of NPPs in India has been worked out through a detailed exercise. The estimates indicate that decommissioning cost can be met by a decommissioninglevyof2paiseperKWhtobechargedalongwithtarifftocreateacorpus to be used at the time of decommissioning. The levy will be reviewed periodically to ascertainitsadequacytomeetthedecommissioningfundrequirementsandmayberevised ifnecessary. In this context, it maybe noted that some of the Indian NPPs have undergone significant renovation and modernization activities. These included replacement of components like pressure tubes end fittings, feeder pipes etc. This experience has demonstrated that technology for such dismantlement activities that are similar to decommissioning, is available in the country. The experience also shows that costs involved are within the estimated values. The radioactive waste arising from decommissioning is not significantly different than the waste generated from normal operation of the NPP, except that its volume will be comparatively large. In India we have good experience in handling and disposalofsuchwasteandthereforenodifficultyisforeseenforhandlinganddisposalof wastearisingfromdecommissioningwork.

5.43)Impactofincreasedseapatrolandmilitarizationofthearea:
Sea Patrol and militarization of the area is governed by the requirements of National Security.KKNPPisalsocoveredintheserequirements.

5.44)Erosionofcivilliberties
OnlythePlantareaisarestrictedarea.Otherthanthisarea,movementandactionsofthe peoplearegovernedbytheLawsofLand.

5.45)NoisePollution
1. Base line data collection: M/s Engineers India Limited (EIL) has measured the noise levels at the following places for preparing a rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)forKudankulamNuclearunits.
Location (Residential area) Date Maxi mum [dB (A)] Daytime* Minimu m [dB(A)] Average [dB(A)] Nighttime** Maximu m [dB(A)] Minimu m [dB(A)] Averag e[dB (A)] Standards Day Nigh t time time * ** [dB 37

(A)]
Vijayapathy 01.07.2011 07.07.2011 14.07.2011 20.07.2011 05.07.2011 11.07.2011 17.07.2011 27.07.2011 02.07.2011 09.07.2011 15.07.2011 21.07.2011 02.07.2011 09.07.2011 15.07.2011 21.07.2011

Chettikulam

Erukandurai

Udayathur

57.0 54.6 56.9 58.2 54.2 56.2 56.2 57.2 54.2 55.6 28.6 59.2 56.4 56.2 57.0 57.0

37.4 33.2 36.9 36.4 36.4 33.2 33.4 39.2 36.2 34.2 30.4 34.2 35.4 32.6 34.6 38.6

52.5 49.4 51.0 50.8 50.0 51.1 50.7 49.5 49.9 51.1 51.9 50.8 51.5 50.3 51.8 50.3

39.0 40.6 45.4 42.5 40.1 41.2 41.2 41.6 40.9 40.6 42.6 45.6 37.9 44.2 41.2 44.1

30.0 33.4 33.2 33.2 30.4 30.2 33.6 33.4 30.6 30.9 34.5 32.1 30.8 33.4 36.4 33.6

36.0 38.0 39.7 39.4 37.8 37.2 38.7 39.6 38.1 36.5 39.0 40.1 35.1 39.0 39.4 40.1

55 55 55 55

[dB (A)] 45 45 45 45

*Daytime:(6AMto10PM)**Nighttime:(10PMto6AM) 2. Standards: The standards prescribed as per the noise pollution rules 2000 are as follows. AmbientAirQualityStandardsinrespectofNoise AreaCode CategoryofArea/Zone (A) (B) (C) (D) Note: 1. Daytimeshallmeanfrom6.00a.m.to10.00p.m. 2. Nighttimeshallmeanfrom10.00p.m.to6.00a.m. 3. Silencezoneisdefinedasanareacomprisingnotlessthan100metresaround hospitals,educationalinstitutionsandcourts.Thesilencezonesarezoneswhich aredeclaredassuchbythecompetentauthority. 4. Mixedcategoriesofareasmaybedeclaredasoneofthefourabovementioned categoriesbythecompetentauthority. *dB(A)Leqdenotesthetimeweightedaverageofthelevelofsoundindecibelsonscale Awhichisrelatabletohumanhearing.
38

LimitsindB(A)Leq* DayTime 75 65 55 50 NightTime 70 55 45 40

Industrialarea Commercialarea Residentialarea SilenceZone

 A"decibel"isaunitinwhichnoiseismeasured. "A", in dB(A) Leq, denotes the frequency weighting in the measurement of noise and correspondstofrequencyresponsecharacteristicsofthehumanear. Leq:Itisanenergymeanofthenoiselevel,overaspecifiedperiod. 3. ImpactsduetoNoisepollution: 3.1 Construction phase: During construction phase the noise levels are minimal and thereisnoimpacttotheoutsideareas. 3.2 Commissioning Phase: Nuclear Power Plants are relatively silent operators. However, during Hot Run test, the steam is vented to atmosphere through relief valve.TestingandVentingofsteamreliefvalvesareoccasionaloperations. 3.3Operationphase:Duringoperationoftheplant,thereisnoequipment,whichwill producesoundabovetheprescribedlimitsduringcontinuousoperation.

5.46)KKNPPExpansionPlans
InprincipleapprovalforestablishmentofKK3to6existsfromGovtofIndia.

5.47)IAEASafeguards
Government of India has entered into an agreement with International Atomic Energy AgencyfortheapplicationofSafeguardsforthenuclearfueltobesuppliedforKKNPPby the Russian Federation. The agreement entered into force on 27th September 1988 and followstheguidelineavailablein.INFCIRC/360availableonIAEAwebsite.Wehavelong experience in implementation of safeguards on nuclear fuel in some of our NPPs and the procedures to be followed at KKNPP will be o different. Hence there are no problems in implementationofIAEAsafeguardsforthenuclearfuelinKKNPP.

5.48)NSGrelatedissues
Notaddressed

5.49)SettingupofpossibleweaponfacilityatKKNPP
Notaddressed

5.50)anyotherrelatedissues
Nil
39

 SUPPLEMENTARYREPORT ONSAFETYOF KUDANKULAMNUCLEARPOWERPROJECT ANDIMPACTOFITSOPERATIONSONSURROUNDINGS BY EXPERTGROUPCONSTITUTEDBYGOI 31JANUARY2012

Page1of70

S.No 1. 2. 3. 4. Annexures 1. Introduction

Contents

Page 3 3 4 6 6

DocumentsfromEGandPMANE Observations Conclusion References

List of the members of EG, the state government nominees and 7 representativesofpeople
Summary of the 1st Meeting of the Expert Group for KKNPP with State 8 GovernmentNomineesandPeoplesRepresentatives Letterdated8thNovember2011submittedbypeoplesrepresentatives

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8&8A 9&9A

15 19

Letterdated18thNovember2011submittedbypeoplesrepresentatives

Response to PMANE letter submitted in the joint meeting of EG, State 22 Governmentnomineesandrepresentativesofpeopleon18.11.2011.

LetterdatedDecember15,2011submittedbypeoplesrepresentatives AdditionalviewsofEGonspecificissuesraisedinthePMANEreport
QualityofConstructionandQAProgramme Reviewofthegeologicalandtectonicaspects(chapter1)ofPMANEreporton KKNPP,TamilNadu,India

24 26 42
47

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SUPPLEMENTARYREPORTONSAFETYOFKUDANKULAMNUCLEARPOWERPROJECT ANDIMPACTOFITSOPERATIONSONSURROUNDINGS
1. INTRODUCTION
The Government of India constituted a 15 member Expert Group (EG) to interact with the officials of state government of Tamil Nadu and spokespersons of the people in the neighborhood of KKNPP, nominatedbythestategovernment,toexplainthefactualpositiononvariousaspectsoftheProjectand toallaythefearsanddispeltheapprehensionsofasectionofthelocalpeople.Thelistofthemembers ofEG,thestategovernmentnomineesandrepresentativesofpeopleisgiveninAnnexure1. Thefirstjointmeetingoftheforumwasheldon8thNovember2011,thesecondoneon18thNovember 2011andthethirdoneon15thDecember2011,allthreeintheofficeofDistrictCollector,Tirunelveli. The summary of these three discussions is given in Annexure 2. In the first joint meeting the representatives of people submitted a letter dated 8th November 2011, given in Annexure 3 and requestedresponsefromEG.InresponseEGaddressedallpossibleissues,44innumberandprepareda reporttitledPresentationtoTNGovernmentnomineesandPeoplerepresentativesregardingsafetyof KKNPPon18112011intheofficeofDistrictCollector,Tirunelveli(Ref.1).Copiesofthisreportwere giventoallmembersofthejointforumon18thNovember2011inthesecondjointmeeting.ThoughEG hadpreparedpowerpointpresentationsandwaspreparedfordiscussionstoallaythefearsoflocalsin the meeting through their representatives, no presentation was permitted by the representatives of people.Theywerenotpreparedforanydiscussioneither.Theyexpressedtheirinabilitytocomprehend the presentations and discuss with experts. However they were repeatedly demanding the closure of KKNPPprojectwithoutjustifyingtheirdemand. Inthesecondjointmeeting,heldon18thNovember,therepresentativesofpeoplesubmittedanother letter dated 18th November 2011, given in Annexure 4, and requested for response from EG. EG observedthatnospecificissue/concernapprehensionwasraisedwhichcouldbeaddressedtoallaythe fears of the people in the neighborhood of KKNPP for which EG was constituted. Also EG is not the custodianoftherequesteddocumentswhichcanbehaddirectlybytherepresentativesofpeople.The responseofEGtothisletteralongwithadditionalresponsetothefirstletterweresubmittedinthethird jointmeetingwhichisenclosedinAnnexure5.

2. DOCUMENTSFROMEGandPMANE
Atthethirdjointmeetingon15thDecember,EGobservedthatseveralstatementsofprotestingleaders inpublicmeetings,newsitemsonKKNPPinmediaandthefearsofthelocalpeopleareunfoundedand the design of KKNPP meets current safety standards and the activities for establishing the plant is proceedingstrictlyaspertherulesandproceduresofAERBundertheirsupervision. However,toallaythefearsinthemindsofthelocalpeople,EGhaspreparedadocumenttitledSafety of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant and Impact of its Operation on the Surroundings (Ref.2) and presentedtoallmembersofthejointforumatthethirdjointmeeting.Thereportaddressedtheglobal
Page3of70

trends in Nuclear Power and need for Nuclear Power in India, safety features of KKNPP against TMI, Chernobyl,Fukushimatypeseverenuclearaccidents,RadiationaroundNuclearPowerPlantsandimpact onthepublichealth,KKNPPReactorDesignandSafety,PrinciplesandPracticesforRadioactiveWaste and Spent Fuel Management, Ecological Effects, earthquakes and tsunami, Regulatory and Statutory clearances, fuel supply, IAEA safeguards, Fresh water supply and Desalination plants, Construction Quality Assurance, Emergency Preparedness and Decommissioning. It concludes that the fears of the localpopulationareunfounded. In this third joint meeting too no comprehensive discussion or any presentation was allowed. After raisingissueslikecontinuationofconstructionactivities,QAofconstruction, expansionofthepresent forumofinteractionetc.therepresentativesofpeoplesubmittedareporttitledReportofthePeoples MovementAgainstNuclearEnergy(PMANE)ExpertCommitteeonSafety,FeasibilityandAlternativesto Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP)(Ref.3) and requested response from EG. This report addressedKKNPPSpecificSafetyRelatedIssues,HealthStudiesSomaticandGeneticEffects,Effectson MarineBiologyandSaferandSustainableAlternativesandFuelswitchingandFailureofIndianNuclear Program.Theyalsosubmittedanotherletter,giveninAnnexure6.

3. OBSERVATIONS
EG examined the report and the letter. EG observed that the letter is a copy of the earlier letter submittedtoEGinthesecondmeetingwithanadditionofoneitemwhichwastakenfromsomepoints referredintheirfirstletter.SinceEGhasalreadyaddressedtheseissuesandresponded,EGfindsthat thereisnoneedoffurtheractionontheletterof15thDecember. ThereportofPMANEdoesnotaddressjustthefears/apprehensions/concernsinthemindsofthelocal people, but instead attempts to address global and national issues on Nuclear power. The genuine effortstoprojectthefearsoflocalswithreasonsandwelfaremeasuresforthebenefitoflocalpublic andfindsolutionstoendtheimpassearenotapparent.Consequently,EGdecidedtoaddressonlythe issues related to allaying the fears of people living around KKNPP. The fears, though not specifically broughtoutwithfocus,appeartobeonthesafetyofthepowerplantandimpactofitsoperationinthe neighborhoodprimarilyonthelifeandhealthofthepresentandfuturegenerations.AsindicatedEGhas preparedadetailedreportonthisandrelatedissuesandplaceditinpublicdomain.Thoughtherewas neitherpresentationnordiscussioninthejointforum,EGhasaddressedalltherelevantissuesandhas concludedthattheKKNPPmeetsallcurrentsafetyrequirementsforsafeoperation.Itisalsonotedthat thePMANEreport(Ref.3)waspreparedpriortothereleaseofEGreport(Ref.2)on15thDecember.Itis very likely that an unbiased reading of the EG report could have cleared many doubts and the views expressedinPMANEreportcouldhavebeendropped. On many issues PMANE has tried to contest the findings of the EG KKNPP group (Ref.1) basing their observationsonwrongcalculations,wronginterpretationsandskewedstatisticstoputtheobservations oftheEGinbadlight.SomeofthegrossmistakesintheirapproachrelevanttoKKNPParepointedoutin theAnnexure7and8.Thisisratherunfortunate.Annexure7givessomeadditionalviewsfromEGon specificissuesraisedinthePMANEreport.Annexure8addressestheissueofqualityofconstructionand
Page4of70

QAissuesraisedatthethirdjointmeetingof15thDecember.AttheinstanceofEG,theprojectauthority has made studies and site verification on the issue of volcanic activity in the region and the report is giveninAnnexure9. In this era of technological revolution, every day we find advancement in technology and improved performance of operating systems in every field including nuclear power. Without appreciating the advanced design features in the VVER 1000 reactor and associated development efforts, it is unfortunate that references and conclusions are made based on 50 years old VVER designs. The aim appearstobetomisleadthepublic. National programs on Power are evolved after detailed study and analysis over years with active participationofalargenumberofexpertsinseveralwalksoflife,takingintoaccountseveralaspectsand thenationalneeds.Weallknowthatthereareseveralpossibilitiestoreachagoal,butallpossibilities cannotbefeasibleandallfeasibilitiescannotbecomerealitiesatalltimes.Itappearswiseandproper to suggest alternates to KKNPP only after detailed studies and analysis and establishing the techno economicfeasibilities.Thisisnotdone.ThesuggestionforIndiatofollowwhatUSdidineightiesby converting nuclear power stations as thermal power stations makes very little sense since the advancement in technology and the needs of every nation are different and can change with time. Accordinglytheprogramsofthenationneedorientationbycarefulanalysisandnotbyrhetoric. AnanalysisoftheworldscenarioofpowerconsumptionclearlybringsoutthelargedeficiencyforIndia to reach world average per capita consumption. Also the analysis of available energy sources in our countryclearlybringsouttheneedfornuclearenergyforpowergenerationinourcountrytobecome one among the developed nations. The statement in the PMANE report that Nuclear Power all over theWorldisdecliningdoesnotappeartobebasedonfacts.Alsoournationalpolicyhasnotimposed anyrestrictionson,butratherhasstronglysupportedthedevelopmentofRenewableenergy.Thebasis forlinkingRenewableenergygenerationwithNuclearenergygenerationisnotclear.Whynotbothbe developed simultaneously? Every citizen should contribute towards efficiency and conservation in the energysectortomakeournationadevelopedone. Asiswellknown,theThreeMileIsland(TMI)in1979inUSA,Chernobylin1986inUSSR,Fukushimain 2011 are the nuclear power plant (NPP) accidents involving damage to the reactor core that have occurredinnearly60yearsofhistoryofNPPoperationsintheworld.Thenuclearindustryworldover hasawellstructuredsystemofusingoperatingexperiencefeedback.Thenature,causeandimpactsof these three accidents were critically analyzed based on reported data and analysis reports by expert agenciesworldoveranditisconcludedbyexpertsinourcountryinthenuclearfieldthatanyaccidentof the type that occurred in TMI, Chernobyl and Fukushima can never take place at KKNPP. Further, the KKNPPhasadvanceddesignsafetyfeatureswhichprovideassuranceofreactorcoolingandcontainment of radioactivity under even hypothetical accident conditions. The facts being so, creating Fear in the mindsofpublicwithpartialinformationandselectedvideoclippingsonFukushimaismischievousand notintheinterestofthelocalpublicandthenation.

Page5of70

Impact of low level radiation on human health involves very low incidences compared to many confounding and overriding factors totally unrelated to radiation such as chemical pollutants, ethnic andgeneticfactoretc.Inspiteofvoluminousamountofworkthereisnoconclusiveevidenceonany adverse impact of very low level of radiation. The views expressed in the report on the effects of radioactivereleaseshowsbiasagainstnuclearenergy. Theviewsexpressedontheeffectsofhotwaterdischargestotheseaarebiased,notbasedonfactsand misrepresented to cause a sense of fear in the minds of local public when one recognizes the safe operationofnuclearplantsalongthecoastsandthedischargeofhotwaters,evenmixedwithash,from thermalpowerstationsalongthecoastalareas. The report reflects the lack of appreciation on the capabilities and potential of our Scientists and Technologists and the four decades of our experience in establishing and operating nuclear power plants for power generation, inadequate knowledge and understanding of the advanced design and safetyfeaturesoftheReactorbeingestablishedatKKNPP,incompleteinformationonmarineecology, biasedviewsonhealthhazardsetcThestatementbeingadvocatedinthereportthatInpublicdomain truthisnottruthbutperceptionisthetruthcannotbeacceptedwhenanintegratedapproachistaken fortheWelfareofthePeopleandtheWelfareoftheNation.FurthertheEGrecognizesthattheworld overtheOpponentsofNuclearenergystatetheirpositionsandsticktotheirstandandhencedecided nottogoinfordebatesonmanyissuesinthereportwithwhichEGdoesnotagree.

4. CONCLUSION

EG critically examined the views expressed in the report of PMANE expert group and after detailed deliberations, EG restates that the nuclear power project at Kudankulam is proceeding in accordance with the regulatory requirements stipulated by AERB and it has received all required clearances from AERBandalsobyvariousotherstatutoryauthoritiesintheStateandCentre.Itmeetswithallcurrent safetyrequirementsandissafeforoperation. EGhasconclusivelyaddressedallsafetyrelatedissuestoallaythefearsinthemindoflocalpeopleliving around KKNPP. Since the representatives of people in the joint forum are not prepared for any presentationfromexpertsinEGanddiscussions,EGfindsthatitisnotinapositiontoproceedfurther.

5. REFERENCES

1) PresentationtotheTNGovernmentnomineesandpeoplesrepresentativesregardingsafetyof KKNPP on 18.11.2011 in the office of District Collector, Tirunelveli by Expert Group on KKNPP constitutedbyGOI. 2) SafetyofKKNPPandImpactofitsOperationontheSurroundings,ReportbyExpertGroupon KKNPPconstitutedbyGOI,December2011. 3) Report of the Peoples Movement against Nuclear Energy (PMANE) Expert Committee on Safety,FeasibilityandAlternativestoKudankulamNuclearPowerPlant(KKNPP),12thDecember 2011.
Page6of70

ANNEXURE1
ExpertGroup Dr.A.E.Muthunayagam,Convener. Dr.M.R.Iyer,Member. Prof.M.N.Madhyastha,Member. Prof.N.Sukumaran,Member. Dr.A.K.Pal,Member. Dr.V.Shantha,Member Dr.C.S.Pramesh,Member. Prof.HarshK.Gupta,Member. Prof.KannanIyer,Member. Prof.C.V.R.Murthy,Member. ShriS.K.Mehta,Member. ShriS.K.Sharma,Member. ShriK.Balu,Member. Dr.S.M.Lee,Member. ShriW.StephenAruldossKanthiah,Member.

StateGovernmentNomineesandPeoplesRepresentatives
DistrictCollector,Tirunelveli,StateGovernmentnominee. SuperintendentofPolice,Tirunelveli,StateGovernmentnominee. ThiruJ.Thangaraj,Yacapuram,localpeoplesrepresentative. ThiruIvanAmbrose,BishopofThoothukudi,localpeoplesrepresentative. ThiruM.Pushparayan,Thoothukudi,localpeoplesrepresentative. ThiruM.P.Sesuraj,Cheranmahdevi,localpeoplesrepresentative.

Page7of70

ANNEXURE2
Summary of the 1st Meeting of the Expert Group for KKNPP with State Government Nominees and PeoplesRepresentatives ThefirstmeetingoftheExpertGroup(constitutedvideDAEOMNo.4/1(7)/1/2011Power/11365dated 19.10.2011) with the State Government Nominees and Peoples Representatives (constituted vide Energy(C2)DepartmentD.O.LetterNo.7634/C2/2011dated02.11.11)washeldon08.11.2011atthe TirunelveliCollectoratefrom11.30am. Thefollowingwerepresent: DistrictCollector. SuperintendentofPolice. ShriJ.Thangaraj,localpeoplesrepresentative. ShriM.Pushparayan,localpeoplesrepresentative. ShriM.P.Sesuraj,localpeoplesrepresentative. Dr.A.E.Muthunayagam,ConvenerExpertGroup. Dr.M.R.Iyer,MemberExpertGroup. Prof.M.N.Madhyastha,MemberExpertGroup. Prof.N.Sukumaran,MemberExpertGroup. Dr.C.S.Pramesh,MemberExpertGroup. Prof.KannanIyer,MemberExpertGroup. ShriS.K.Mehta,MemberExpertGroup. ShriK.Balu,MemberExpertGroup. Dr.S.M.Lee,MemberExpertGroup. ShriW.StephenAruldossKanthiah,MemberExpertGroup. i. Themeetingstartedwithselfintroductionofthosepresent.ItwasnotedthatShriPushparayan and Shri Sesuraj were the only activists of the Peoples Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE). ThePMANErepresentativesregisteredaformalprotestagainsttheinclusionofShriJ.Thangaraj as peoples representative on the committee as he was not involved with PMANE or with the agitationagainstthenuclearpowerstation.

ii.

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iii.

Shri Thangaraj responded that the local persons around the KKNPP could be affected by the plantand thathewasalocalpersonwhocouldbeaffectedbytheplantwhereasthePMANE representativeswerenotlocalsbutfromotherplaceswhichwouldnotbeaffectedbytheplant. ConvenerExpertGroup,Dr.Muthunayagamaddressedthecommitteeandstatedthattheinitial task of the Expert Group would be to listen to the grievances. They would then collect the relevantinformationfromNPCILandbyvisitingtheproject.Lastlyitwouldattempttoaddress the grievances by presenting the actual facts and technical information to the committee. He emphasized that all the members of this committee and the deliberations of the committee should have a common goal of enhancing the safety of the local people and enhancing the powerproductioninthecountry. The representatives from PMANE stated that as per the TN Assembly resolution the Expert Groupwastoallaythepeoplesfearsandhenceshouldaddressthelocalpeopledirectlyandnot through the representatives on this committee. They should also discuss with the Expert GroupofPMANE. PMANE representatives stated that the resolution of the TN Assembly calling for work on the KKNPPtobestoppedtillthepeoplesfearsareallayedhasnotbeendone.Astatementfromthe projectauthoritiesthattheworkhasbeenstoppedshouldbeissued. PMANErepresentativesalsostatedthattheEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentReport,theSite EvaluationReportandtheSafetyAnalysisReportmustbesuppliedtothosewhowantit. White paper on several issues raised by the agitators must be given in Tamil, Hindi and Malayalam.Inthisconnectionadocumentcontainingtheissuestobeaddressedwastabledby thePMANErepresentatives. ThePMANErepresentativesalsomadeothercommentssuchascontradictorystatementson thesafetyoftheplanthavebeenissuedbyDr.S.K.Jain,Dr.S.BanerjeeandDr.AbdulKalam, the place for excavation has been changed from that originally selected by the Russian advisers,manyproblemsanddefectsinKKNPPconstructionexist,manyaccidentsinIndian NPPhavebeenhiddenbyNPCIL. The Expert Group neither agreed nor disagreed with the comments of the peoples representativesbutstatedthatappropriateresponseswouldbemadeafterthoroughlystudying theissuesraisedandexaminationoftheKKNPPbyactualvisits. Attempts made by Convener and other members of the Expert Group to give technical explanationstosomeoftheissuesraised(suchasEIAreport,KKNPPandgeneralnuclearsafety, wastemanagement,environmentaleffectsofnuclearpowerandsoon)wasresistedunderthe cover that PMANE representatives were not technical people and the Expert Group should addressthepeopledirectlyortothePMANEexpertgroup.

iv.

v.

vi.

vii.

viii.

ix.

x.

xi.

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xii.

TheDistrictCollectorthenclosedthemeetingwiththestatementthattheExpertGroupwould preparetheresponsestotheissuesraisedandpresentthematthenextmeeting.

Summary of the 2nd Meeting of the Expert Group for KKNPP with State Government Nominees and PeoplesRepresentatives The second meeting of the Expert Group (constituted vide DAE OM No.4/1(7)/1/2011Power/11365 dated19.10.2011)withtheStateGovernmentNomineesandPeoplesRepresentatives(constitutedvide Energy(C2)DepartmentD.O.LetterNo.7634/C2/2011dated02.11.11)washeldon18.11.2011atthe TirunelveliCollectoratefrom11.00am. Thefollowingwerepresent: DistrictCollector. SuperintendentofPolice. ShriJ.Thangaraj,localpeoplesrepresentative. ShriM.Pushparayan,localpeoplesrepresentative. ShriM.P.Sesuraj,localpeoplesrepresentative. Dr.A.E.Muthunayagam,ConvenerExpertGroup. Dr.M.R.Iyer,MemberExpertGroup. Prof.M.N.Madhyastha,MemberExpertGroup. Prof.N.Sukumaran,MemberExpertGroup. Dr.A.K.Pal,MemberExpertGroup. Dr.V.Shantha,MemberExpertGroup. Prof.KannanIyer,MemberExpertGroup. Prof.C.V.R.Murthy,MemberExpertGroup ShriS.K.Mehta,MemberExpertGroup. ShriS.K.Sharma,MemberExpertGroup. ShriK.Balu,MemberExpertGroup. Dr.S.M.Lee,MemberExpertGroup. ShriW.StephenAruldossKanthiah,MemberExpertGroup. i. ii. ThemeetingstartedwithawelcomeaddressbytheDistrictCollector. OnquerytheDistrictCollectorstatedthattheminutesofthefirstmeetinghadbeenprepared andavailablewiththeChiefSecretary.Itwasnotdistributedtotheparticipants.
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iii.

Dr.Muthunayagam,ConvenerExpertGrouppresentedtheproposedplanforthediscussion.He stated that selected members of the Expert Group would present information on some of important points that are being misrepresented to the local people and these points are also mentioned in the Memorandum submitted by two of the peoples representatives at the first meeting. Expert Group felt that presentation of the correct information to the public by the peoplesrepresentativesontheStateGovernmentCommitteewouldallaythefearofthepublic. The points to be covered are KKNPP design and safety features, Discharges and radiation aroundNPP,HealthhazardsincludingcancerincidenceinNPPneighbourhood,Radioactive wastemanagement,KKNPPsafetyfeaturesprotectingagainstFukushimatypeaccidentand Globaltrendsandneedfornuclearpowergeneration. Twoofthepeoplesrepresentatives(ShriPushparayanandShriSesuraj)insistedthattheyhad nointentiontolistentoanypresentationofinformationbytheExpertGroup.Theywantedto discussthe Minutesofthefirstmeetingof8thNov.2011withtheExpert Group,theTNGovt. ordersonKKNPPandtheirMemorandumsubmittedbythematthefirstmeeting. BasedonadviceoftheStateGovt.nomineesthepointbypointdiscussionoftheMemorandum wastakenup. The first point was that the GOI and DAE have not announced formally that the work on the KKNPP would be stopped till the peoples fears are allayed as recorded in a TN Govt. Cabinet resolution. The Expert Group made a statement that the further commissioning and constructionworkwasnotbeingcontinuedandonlysurveillanceactivitieswerecontinuing.This wasvehementlycontestedbytwoofthepeoplesrepresentativesanditwasdecidedthatthe StateGovt.nomineeswoulddeputestafftovisitKKNPPandconfirmthestatus. ThesecondpointwasthestatementsissuedbyChairmanAECandDr.AbdulKalamonthesafety of KKNPP which appeared contradictory. The Expert Group explained the context of the two statementsandthattherewasnocontradiction. The third point was the availability of reports such as EIA report, the Site Evaluation Report, Safety Analysis Report and VVER performance reports. It was stated by the Expert Group that theEIAreportwasinthepublicdomainandhadbeenmadeavailablebyNPCILonitswebsite. The VVER performance reports were available on web sites such as that of IAEA. Also, informationonVVERperformancehadbeenpreparedforpresentationattodaysmeetingand couldbetakenupimmediately.ThetwopeoplesrepresentativesstatedthattheEIAreportfor KK 1&2 was not available on the NPCIL web site. This was checked on the spot and it was confirmed that the report was recently uploaded to the web site on 16.11.2011. On being questionedbythetwopeoplesrepresentativesitwasstatedbytheExpertGroupthattheSite EvaluationReportandSafetyAnalysisReportarenotpublicdomaindocumentsbuthavebeen preparedforthestatutorybodieslikeAERBthatareauthorizedtoreceiveandreviewthem. ThefourthpointonIndoRussianIGAwasskippedastheExpertGroupstatedthatitwasoutside itspurviewandnotrelatedtothesafetyofKKNPP.
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iv.

v.

vi.

vii.

viii.

ix.

x.

The fifth point referred to the various subjects (about 50 in number) that the two peoples representatives wanted position papers on. The Expert Group stated that presentations had been prepared on some of the important topics that could be given. However, the peoples representatives stated that they had not come to listen but only wanted the information in writingtobetakenbacktotheirexperts.TheExpertGroupthenhandedovertothePeoples Representatives copies of the document entitled Presentation to the Tamilnadu Government NomineesandPeoplesRepresentativesregardingSafetyofKKNPP,on18.11.2011attheOffice oftheDistrictCollector,TirunelvelibytheExpertGrouponKKNPPconstitutedbyGovernment of India (copies of the document had been already made available to the State Government Nomineesjustbeforethestartofthemeeting). Onreceivingtheabovedocument,twoofthepeoplesrepresentativesthensubmittedanother documenttotheCollectorandConvener,Expert Groupcontainingarepresentationthatwork had been resumed at various locations in KKNPP site. The document also contained a list of documents pertaining to KKNPP that the peoples representatives wanted from MoEF, TNPCB andotherbodies.

xi.

Summary of the 3rd Meeting of the Expert Group for KKNPP with State Government Nominees and PeoplesRepresentatives ThethirdmeetingoftheExpertGroup(constitutedvideDAEOMNo.4/1(7)/1/2011Power/11365dated 19.10.2011) with the State Government Nominees and Peoples Representatives (constituted vide Energy(C2)DepartmentD.O.LetterNo.7634/C2/2011dated02.11.11)washeldon15.12.2011atthe TirunelveliCollectoratefrom11.00am. Thefollowingwerepresentatthemeeting: DistrictCollector. SuperintendentofPolice. ShriJ.Thangaraj,localpeoplesrepresentative. ShriM.Pushparayan,localpeoplesrepresentative. ShriM.P.Sesuraj,localpeoplesrepresentative. Dr.A.E.Muthunayagam,ConvenerExpertGroup. Dr.M.R.Iyer,MemberExpertGroup. Prof.M.N.Madhyastha,MemberExpertGroup. Prof.N.Sukumaran,MemberExpertGroup. Dr.V.Shanta,MemberExpertGroup. Dr.C.S.Pramesh,MemberExpertGroup.
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Prof.C.V.R.Murthy,MemberExpertGroup. ShriS.K.Mehta,MemberExpertGroup. ShriS.K.Sharma,MemberExpertGroup. ShriK.Balu,MemberExpertGroup. Dr.S.M.Lee,MemberExpertGroup. ShriW.StephenAruldossKanthiah,MemberExpertGroup. i. ii. iii. ThemeetingstartedwithawelcomeaddressandintroductoryremarksbytheDistrictCollector. Dr.Muthunayagam,ConvenerExpertGroup,recapitulatedaboutthemandateoftheEGandthe authorizedforumallottedtotheEGfordiscussionsonalltherelevantissues. The Convener, EG submitted written response to the letters from two of the peoples representativesthathadbeensubmittedattheearliertwomeetingsof8thNovemberand18th November and stated that all the actions of the EG were now complete. He pointed out that manydocumentsofvariousgovernmentdepartmentsandstatutorybodieshadbeenrequested in the letters from two of the peoples representatives. These were not available with the EG and would have to be obtained directly from the concerned authorities by the peoples representatives. The Convener EG made available copies of the report entitled Safety of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant and Impact of its Operation on the Surroundings. He stated that the EG had studiedtherequiredandrelevantdocumentstopreparethiscomprehensivereportgivingfacts that could allay the local fears regarding KKNPP. The peoples representatives agreed to examinethereport. Two of the peoples representatives (Shri Pushparayan and Shri Sesuraj) also made available copies of a report entitled, Safety, Feasibility and Alternatives to Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) prepared by PMANE experts and requested the EG to examine and respond, whichtheEGagreedtodo. TheDistrictCollectorindicatedthatbasedontheearlierinspectionreport,onlythesurveillance and maintenance works are going on at KKNPP with minimum personnel and there are no construction activities. Convener, EG stated that the issue of attendance at KKNPP and the nature of work going on was a matter between the district administration and the KKNPP authoritiesandwasoutsidethepurviewofthe EG.Howeverhestated that theEGfeltthatit wasveryimportanttosustainthehealthofthealreadyinstalledequipmentandmachineriesby surveillance and minimum O&M activities. He handed over to the District Collector, for consideration,aletterfromtheKKNPPauthoritiesindicatingthenumberofpersonnelrequired forsuchminimalsurveillanceandO&Mactivities. TwoofthepeoplesrepresentativesrequestedtheEGtoholddiscussionswiththeirexperts.EG pointedoutthattheexistingTNGovt.orderslimitedtheEGtothepresentforum.However,if
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iv.

v.

vi.

vii.

the orders are modified the EG was prepared for discussions in an expanded forum. The peoplesrepresentativesagreedtogiveawrittenrepresentationtotheCollectorrequestingthe TNGovt.toincludetheirexpertsinthecommittee. viii. Twoofthepeoplesrepresentativesmadeallegationsofirregularitiesinawardingofcontracts and raised the issue of quality of construction especially of the reactor containment building. After detailed discussion it was decided that the EG would go through the construction QA recordsandifnecessaryrecommendpermissibleadditionaltestingtoconfirmtheadequacyof thequalityofcivilstructuresimportanttosafety. DifferentEGmembersansweredquestionsonthefollowingtopics: i. ii. ImpossibilityofKKNPPreactorexplodinglikeanatombomb. AnypossibilityofaccidentsatKKNPPreleasingmoreradioactivitythanthatoccurredat ChernobylandFukushima? WastemanagementpracticesatKKNPP. ActualdataoncancerprevalencearoundNPP. RoleofEnvironmentalSurveillanceLaboratories. ExternalobservationsmadebyEGonthecivilstructuresatKKNPP. ReactorcontainmentbuildingleakratetestandacceptancebyAERB.

ix.

iii. iv. v. vi. vii. x.

ItwasproposedtoplanforthenextmeetingbymiddleofJanuary2012.

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Annexure3

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Annexure4

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Annexure5

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Annexure6
December15,2011 From PeoplesMovementAgainstNuclearEnergy(PMANE) Idinthakarai&P.O.627104 TirunelveliDistrict TamilNadu Phone:9865683735;9842154073;pushparayan@hotmail.com To TheMembers TheCentralGovernmentExpertGroupand TheGovernmentofTamilNaduTeam Tirunelveli DearTeamMembers: We,theactivistsofthePeoplesMovementAgainstNuclearEnergy(PMANE),arehappytomeetwith youforthethirdtime.Wewouldliketopointouttoyouthatourrequestforthebasicdocumentson theKoodankulamNuclearPowerProject(KKNPP)hasnotbeenaccededtountilnow.Sowearenotina positiontounderstandallthedifferentaspectsoftheKKNPPproject.YouresteemedExpertGroupisyet to meet with any section of our people in order to allay their fears and concerns about the KKNPP projectandwealsorequesttheNPCILandtheCentralExpertPaneltopermitandtakePMANEExpert TeamtovisittheKKNPPpremises. Inthisbackdrop,ourownPMANEExpertTeamhascomeupwiththeFirstReportontheKKNPPproject whichwearehappilysharingwithyou.Theirworkwouldhavebeenalotmoreexhaustiveandeffective iftheyhadaccesstothefollowingdocuments.WealsorequesttheCentralExpertTeamtositwithour PMANEExpertTeamtoallaythefearsandconcernsofthepeopleaboutKKNPPproject.Sowewould liketorequestyouonceagaintoprovideuswithcopiesofthedocumentswehadalreadyaskedfor. 1. The Site Evaluation Study, Safety Analysis Report, VVER Performance Report and all other relevantdocumentsforreactors1and2. 2. DetailedProjectReport(DPR)submittedtotheMoEFwithannexures(includingmaps)ifanyin respectofreactors1and2; 3. Thecompletedapplicationintheformatprescribedinthe EIAnotification withtheannexures (includingmaps)seekingEIAclearanceinrespectofbothreactors; 4. Reports/CommentsfromtheTamilNaduPollutionControlBoard(TNPCB),includingminutesof thepublichearinginrespectofbothreactors;
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5. ApplicationwithannexurestotheTNPCBseekingNOC/ConsentunderAirandWaterActalong withtheConsentordersofbothreactors;StopWorkNoticeandothershowcausenoticesifany issuedbyTNPCBalongwithrepliestothesame; 6. Reports/CommentsfromtheRegionalOfficeoftheMoEFofbothreactors; 7. Reports /Comments obtained from any other government or expert agency such as port authorities,fisheries,coastguard,navyetc.ofbothreactors; 8. All minutes (including draft minutes) of all the meetings of the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC)oftheMoEFofbothreactors; 9. Anysupplementaryoradditionalreports/studiessubmittedtoMoEFpursuanttoanyqueriesof theEACofbothreactors; 10. All studies/reports sub contracted to other agencies for the preparation of the EIA report (exampleSocialImpact,impactonfloraandfaunaetc)ofbothreactors; 11. Reportsalongwithmaps obtainedfromNIOTorotheragencies fortheCRZ clearanceofboth reactors; 12. ApplicationwithannexuresforCRZclearanceifanyofbothreactors; 13. Minutes(includingdraftminutes)ofEACofMoEFforCRZofbothreactors; 14. RequestforinspectionofallfileswiththeMoEFinrespectofbothreactors; Our dialogue process could be a lot more productive and meaningful if you could give your written responsetoourownExpertTeamsreport,sharetheabovedocumentswithusandallaythefearsand concernsofourpeopleearnestlyandeffectively.Thesethreestepswouldtakeourprocesstothenext stageandwehopeyouwouldrespondpositively. Withbestpersonalregardsandallpeacefulwishes, Cordially, s/ds/d M.Pushparayan M.P.Jesuraj Copiesto TheDistrictCollector TirunelveliDistrict Tirunelveli TheSuperintendentofPolice TirunelveliDistrict Tirunelveli

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Annexure7

AdditionalviewsofEGonspecificissuesraisedinthePMANEreport
I. Kudankulamsitegeologyandoceanography IssuesraisedinthePMANEreporthavebeenadequatelyaddressedintheearlierreportofEG (Ref.2,Ch8). AttheinstanceoftheEG,theprojectauthoritieshaveagainmadestudiesandsiteverification ontheissueofthevolcanicactivityintheregionandthesearecontainedinAnnexure9. As concluded in the cited EG report (Ref.2), it can be seen that there has been no volcanic activityinthepeninsularIndiaforseveralmillionyears. II. WatersupplyatKudankulamsite

WATERBALANCESHEETOFKKNPP TheaspectsoffreshwatersupplyandavailabilityatKKNPPhadalreadybeenaddressedinEG report(ref.1&2).Supplementaryinformationisprovidedasunder. KudankulamNuclearpowerplantunits1&2(KKNPP)hasaselfcontaineddesalinationplantto meet the plant water requirements. The desalination plant is based on mechanical vapor compressiontechnologyandisinstalledandoperatedbyTataprojectslimitedforthelastthree yearsunderthesupervisionofNPCIL.ThewaterproducedfromplantestablishedinKKNPPsite isnotrequiredtocatertheneedsofKKNPPtownship(situatedabout10KmsawayfromKKNPP site) as township requirements are completely met through a separate desalination plant establishedattownship. The plant water quantity requirement has been conservatively worked out considering extra marginstoestablishthecapacityofthedesalinationplant.Theplantprocesswaterrequirement is 5664 CuM/Day and the plant potable water requirement at plant site is 1272 CuM/Day, thereby the total water requirement for plant site is 6936 CuM/Day. Applying the principle of redundancy,fourstreamseachof2560CuM/dayhasbeenestablished.Normallythreestreams will be operating thereby producing 7680 CuM/Day against the daily requirement of 6936 CuM/Day.Inadditionthereisanadditionalcapacitystreamof2560CuM/Daykeptasstandby whichwillcomeintooperationincaseofoutageofanystream. Thedesalinationplanttechnologyisaprovenoneandthesametypeissuccessfullyoperatingin manycountries.InKKNPP,forthelastthreeyearsthedesalinationplanthasgivenatroublefree and continuous operation. Also as one stream is always available as standby and as a part of systematic maintenance management program, routine preventive maintenance is always undertakentoensurecontinuousavailabilityofplants.Adequateexperiencehasbeengainedin operation and maintenance of the plant by Indian engineers. Indian engineers are operating
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nuclear plants for the last forty years and challenging them that they are not capable of operatingdesalinationplantisunderminingourcountryscapability. The power supply to KKNPP is from two separate sources of grid power. One is from 400 KV national grid maintained by Power Grid Corporation of India Limited and is having inter connection from different power centers like Cochin, Madurai etc. Four dedicated feeders of 400KVareconnectedbetweenTirunelveliandKudankulamtoensurereliabilityandavailability. Thesecondsourceis230KVpowersupplyfromtheTamilnaduElectricityGridandthisisadirect dedicated line connected to KKNPP from Tuticorin Thermal plant. In addition four nos of dedicated diesel generators are available per unit and two nos of common station Diesel generators are also available (i.e. 10 nos of diesel generators each of 6.2 MW inside KKNPP 1&2)tomeetthepowerrequirementsifexternalpowerisnotavailable. As far as water availability is concerned, around 11000 CuM of water is available in different storagetanksinsidetheplant.Alsothereisaprovisiontoaugmentthiscapacitybyaddingan 8000CuMcapacitystoragetank. Thefollowinggivesbriefreviewofthewaterrequirementandsubsequentcoolingofthereactor indifferentscenarios. i. Reactornormaloperation Therequirementis6936CuM/Day(5664CuM/Dayprocesswater+1272CuM/Day potablewater) Desalination plant capacity is 4 X 2560 Cu M/day. Three streams normally working (producing7680CuM/day)andonestream(of2560CuM/day)availableasstandbye.

ii.

ReactorShutdownbutexternalpoweravailable. The process water requirement drastically reduces as only decay heat removal will be required. Even one stream of desalination plant will be sufficient to meet the requirements.

iii.

LossofExternalPower(Both400KVand230KV). Onlossofexternalpower,reactorwillbeshutdownandonlydecayheatremovalisto beensured. DieselGenerators(DGs)willstartinaminute(automaticonlossofpowersupply)and decayheatremovalisensuredbyshutdowncoolingsystempumpswhicharefedwith powerfromtheDieselgenerator(ItistobenotedthatoneDGissufficientperunitto meettherequirementseventhough4DGsperunitareprovidedasstandby).

iv.

LossofExternal(400KVand230KV)andInternal(DGsets)powersupplyforalongperiod (formorethan30daysduetosolarTsunamietcasstatedinPMANEreport).

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Eventhoughthissituationistotallyimaginaryandtechnically/scientificallynotcorrect, KKNPPhasthefollowingfeaturestotakecareofthiseventalso. Asthereactorwillbeshutdown,onlydecayheatremovalhastobedone. Thiswillbeautomaticallyachievedbynaturalcirculationoftheprimarycoolantwater throughSteamGenerators,whichinturnwillbecooledbyPassiveHeatRemovalSystem (PHRS).Decayheatremovalisguaranteedwithatmosphericairastheheatsink.

III EarlierminingactivitiesatKudankulamsite When the land for the Kudankulam project was acquired, Government of Tamilnadu issued GovernmentOrderno:GONo:829dated2941991layingdownprerequisiteconditionstobe followedwithin5kmsradiusoftheproposedNuclearplant(KKNPP1&2). M/sIndiaCementsLtdwerehavingaminingleaseandtheywereperformingminingoperations in KKNPP area at the time of land acquisition. In the GO referred above, M/s India Cements weregivenpermissiontocontinuetheirminingactivitiestilltheexpiryoftheirleasein1994or whentheprojectworkstartswhicheverisearlier. AstheprojectrelatedinfrastructureworksofKKNPPhadstartedin199394,M/sIndiaCements requested for continuation of limestone with latest technology of surface scrapping using a surface miner which would ensure the topography intact and would maintain a pollution free atmosphere.Withtheuseofthismachine,limestonecollectionactivitiescouldbecarriedout withoutdrillingandblastingtherebyeliminatingnoiseandpollution.Consideringthesuperior technology of the machine, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) issued a No Objection CertificatetotheTamilnadugovernmentvidetheirletterno:18101996stipulatingthatonly surfaceminingshouldbecarriedoutintheidentifiedareaswithintheplantboundary. Government of Tamilnadu issued a mining lease to M/s India Cements Limited for an initial periodof5yearsinKKNPPareavidetheirorderno:GO.3(D)No68dtd2371999.Theperiodof lease was stipulated as 5 years i.e. up to September 2004, with the stipulation that M/s India CementswillvacatetheareaasandwhenrequiredbyDAEandcollectionoflimestoneshould bedonebysurfacescrappingonly. Accordingly M/s India Cements carried out collection of lime stone and they also carried out tree plantation in the areas where the scrapping had been carried out as stipulated. Periodic

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inspectionbyAERBandNPCILwerecarriedoutintheareaofactivitytoensurethecompliance tothestipulations. Subsequently,M/sIndiaCementsLtdgavearequestlettertocontinuetheiractivitiesasitwas mainlybeyond1.5KmsradialdistancefromtheRB1&2siteandtherehadbeenaclearfencing isolatingtheareaoftheactivity.Alsothisactivitywasinnowayimpactingtheactivitiesofthe plant.Inaddition,theyhadagreedtodevelopagreentreeplantationintheareawherethelime stonehadbeencollected.Consideringthisandotherfactsthatthereisnoblastingadoptedto for lime stone collection by M/s India Cements Ltd, NPCIL forwarded the request to AERB for givingpermissionforcontinuingthelimestonecollectionbysurfacescrapping.AERB,basedon theobservationthatthereisnodrillingandblastingbeingdoneaswellastheareahasbeen separatedfromthemainplantareabyfencing,gavefurtherpermissiontocarryoutlimestone collection activities beyond 1.5 Km (radial distance from RB1 & 2 site) up to 31122005.The miningworkwascompletedon15112005. ThefollowingaresalientpointsoftheworkscarriedoutbyM/sIndiaCementsltd. i. Therewasnodrillingandblastingworks.Onlysurfacescrappingworkshadbeencarried outsince1994. TheactivitiesundertakenafterMarch2002arewiththepermissionofAERB. PeriodicinspectionsofAERBandNPCILofficialswerecarriedoutintheareatoensure fulfillmentofconditions. TheareawasalsoinspectedperiodicallybyDirectorateofMinesandSafety. A Green belt was developed by M/s India Cement in the area where lime stone had beencollected. PopulationaroundKudankulamsite

ii. iii.

iv. v.

IV

ItislearntthatCASANagarwasdeveloped,subsequenttotheTsunamiintheyear2004,mainly toprovideaccommodationtothosewholosttheirhousesduringtsunamiattackandalsothose whowerelivingattheseashorelineatIdinthakarai.Thisisoccupiedbythosewhowerelivingin Idinthakarai. VidetheTamilnaduG.O.829dated29.4.1991,inthesterilizationzoneof2to5kmfromKKNPP, onlytheindustrialgrowthisnotallowed.Otherwise,thereisnorestrictiononthegrowthofthe populationinthesterilizationzone.Also,sincethisCASANagarisonlyforaccommodatingthe

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public from the Idinthakarai village, and since, it is not an industrial activity, there is no restrictionasperthisG.O829. It is to be noted that, the CASA Nagar is located outside the plant boundary i.e. beyond the exclusionzone.Once,thisislocatedoutsidetheplantboundary,thedistancefromtheplant stackismorethan1.6kmspecifiedforexclusionzone.Theplantboundaryis2kmawayfrom the plant vent stack. The CASA Nagar is outside the plant boundary at a further distance of about one km from the plant boundary and hence at a distance of about 3 km from nearest reactorbuildingventstack.(Thedistanceiswronglymentionedas0.9kminthePMANEExpert CommitteeReport). V PostFukushimaNPCtaskforcereportsonMAPSandKKNPP

The chapter of the PMANE report (Ref. 3) deals with the comparison of the Fukushima Task Force Reports on MAPS/PFBR and on KKNPP. This response is pertaining to issues concerning KKNPP.TheissuesraisedwithregardstoKKNPPare PartI RiskofFloods(ResponseasPartI) ThePassiveFeaturesoftheThirdGenerationofReactorsatKKNPP(ResponseasPartII)

Query#1
The water level experienced at (KKNPP) site during the 2004 tsunami was only about 2.2 meters above mean sea level. The flood level experienced at MAPS during the same tsunami was10.5meters.(PartIChapter5,Pg28ofPMANEReport:RiskofFlood). Response The Design basis Flood Level (DBFL) for KK NPP is 5.44 meter above MSL, which is arrived at basedonthemaximumastronomicaltide,stormsurge/tsunamiwaveheightandwaverunup. ThehighestwaterlevelexperiencedatKKNPPsiteduringthetsunamieventofDecember2004 was less than 2.5 m above MSL. There was no flooding experienced during the tsunami event norwasthereanythreatofanysafetyrelatedSSCsbecomingnonfunctional.Theelevationof safetyrelatedSSCsatKKNPPwithrespecttomeansealevelareasgivenbelow: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Safetyrelatedpumphouse: ReactorBuildingGroundFloor: SafetyDieselGeneratorSets: SwitchGearforSafetyItems: SupplementaryControlRoom: Group1BatteryBank: StationBlackoutBatteries: ControlInstrumentationforSafetyTrain: 7.65m 8.7m 9.3m 9.3m 9.7m 12.9m 16.5m 16.5m

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It can be seen that there is ample safety margin in the elevations of safety related SSCs at KKNPPovertheDBFL(seepictorialillustrationbelow).

Query#2
Chapter 5, Pg 29, Para 3 of PMANE Report: (Recommendations of the Task Force to further enhancethelevelofsafetyandtobuildmoreDefenseinDepth) Response Additionalfeaturessuchasseismicallyqualifiedwaterstoragetank,mobilepumpsand powersuppliesareatvariousstagesofimplementation. PartII Query The PMANEs expert committee report contains a statement (on page29) pertaining to the innovativesafetyfeaturesinKKNPPHowever,thesefeatureshavenot been testedinreal life situations.Theyaretheproductsofsimulationsandmodels. Response ThePassiveSafetyFeaturesofThirdGenerationReactoratKKNPP Thesystemsmentionedare:
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a. b. c. d.

PassiveHeatRemovalSystem SecondStageAccumulators QuickBoronInjectionSystemand Systemforretainingandcoolingofmoltencore

TheadvancedEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESFs)inKKNPPprovideadditionalDefenseinDepth whichareofinnovativedesign.Henceitisonlytobeexpectedthatnooperatingexperienceon these would be available from any operating NPP. However, these safety features have been developed and finalized after extensive analysis and testing in mock up facilities, which is the universally accepted practice for deployment of new designs. To this end, the Russian design organizations have provided Topical Reports on each of these designs. These reports were assessed by NPCIL and have been reviewed by AERB Specialist Groups taking into account International practice and safety culture established in India. The IAEA safety standards also permit use of innovative design features provided they are appropriately qualified by testing andanalysis. In spite of extensive testing carried out before their use in reactor systems, all design safety features have to be again checked during commissioning of the NPP systems to verify and confirmthattheyareabletoperformtheirfunctionsasperdesignintentintheasbuiltplant. Thisisapplicabletobothprovenaswellasinnovativedesignfeaturesandconstitutesthevery purposeofcommissioningchecks.Further,suchfunctionalcheckingduringcommissioninghas to be done for even the nonsafetyrelated systems and components also and for the same reason. Results of this testing are analyzed by NPCIL and verified by the Regulatory Authority beforeaccordingregulatoryconsents. Itisimportanttoensurethattheplantconfigurationismaintainedasperdesignintentandall safetysystemsarekeptappropriatelypoisedandarealsotestedfromtimetotimeduringthe operating life of the NPP. Towards this objective, a set of operating limits and conditions are developed that also include operating procedures and testing requirements based on the informationfromtheresultsofthecommissioningchecks.Theserequirementsareincorporated inthedocumentknownasTechnicalSpecificationsforOperationwhichrequiresapprovalby theRegulatoryBodyandhastobefollowedintotalitybytheoperatingpersonnel. Thedataobtainedduringcommissioningisusedasbaselinedataforperiodicsurveillanceduring operationofreactor.SomeofthesesystemshavealreadybeentestedduringHotrunofKKNPP 1&2. VI FailureofElectricityGridSupplyandKKNPPSafety

ThissectionofthePMANEreport(Ref3)referstospaceweatheranomaliesandnuclearsafety andpostulatesthepossibilityofelectricitygridsupplyfailureduetogeomagneticstormcaused bysolareruptions. TheissueofprolongedpowersupplyfailurehasbeenansweredadequatelyinEGreport(Ref.2 Ch3.3)asthescenariodescribedissimilar.

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VII

RadiationeffectsofKKNPPonsurroundingpopulationandExperienceofKalpakkam

iResponsetoChapter4onRoutineairreleasesofradionuclides(p2426) PMANE document wonders why KKNPP reactor has a 100 meter high stack, higher than the reactorbuildings.Furtheritstates: KKNPPEIAforreactors3and4hassomedataontheradioactivegasesthatwouldbereleased from them. That list available in Chapter 4, page 4.1 of KKNPP EIA for 3rd and 4th reactors is partial and has lesser details. The United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) has published more details of VVER reactor emission. They take the releasedatafortheyear2002aspublishedinUNSCEAR,2006.PMANEproceedstocalculate thetotalradioactiveemissionthatwouldbeinhaledbyaperson. EGsResponse It is a well known fact that the discharge at a height from a stack substantially dilutes the emissionswhenitreachesthegroundandthatisthepurposeofthehighstackasinthecaseof anyindustry.AsexplainedintheEGsreportofDecember2011thereleasesaresocontrolled that the maximum dosedeliveredat thegroundlevelresultsonlyin4.26 percentofthedose limit.Soanywhereonthegroundlevelitisperfectlysafetolive.Theestimatesareallbasedon rigorouscalculationsandplantdesignparametersspecifictotheKudankulamsiteandthereis no need to take the general data given by UNSCEAR. And as explained below the PMANE has made several computational errors and mistakes in doing their own calculations on UNSCEAR data.

SomeofthefactualerrorsandmistakesinthereportofPMANE(Table26)aregiven below:
The dilution factor to arrive at the radionuclide concentration at 2 km (X/Q) is given in column5as3E7withoutunits.ThisvaluegivenbyUNSCEARat2kmfromreleasepointis 2.5E7s/m3.TousethisfactortheunitofreleaserateshouldbeBq/sandNOTBq/dasinthe table.Thisisbecausetheunitsofdilutionfactoris(Bq/m3)/(Bq/s),i.e.s/m3. The air concentration in column 5 in the above table has been obtained by multiplying column4valueswith2.5E7.Thisisnotcorrectsincetheunitsofthetwoquantitiesusedare (Bq/d)andnotBq/sasisrequired&(s/m3).Thisrenderstheconcentrationinairtoohighby afactorof86400.Theactualvalue,forexampleforNGshouldbe(9.5E10/86400)x2.5E7= 0.27andNOT9300Bq/m3.Thismistakeinunitsappliestoallthevaluesquotedincolumn5, 6 and 7. .If the corrected concentrations are used the dose to a member of the public correspondingtothosereleasesincolumn3intableworksoutto0.022mSv/yearwhichisa mere 2.2 percent of the dose limit to the public which is almost what we claimed in our report. Thus it substantiates the conclusions of the December 15 SG KKNP report. The factorgivenbyUNSCEARquotedinthePMANEreportisnottheappropriateoneforKKNPP site;thefactorderivedforKKNPPis2.87E8forthe100mstack. Therearemistakesofradionuclideandtheirhalflives. Regardingthecolumn3valuesofannualreleases,thereferencequotedinDoc1(UNSCEAR 2006,tablesA3,A4,etc)isnotcorrect.UNSCEAR2006doesnotgiveanysuchreleasedata. Thisdealswithepidemiologicalaspects.ButUNSCEAR1993givestheaveragevaluesofthe
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releases from PWR reactors. The values from which the dose to a member of the public givenintheSGKKNPPreportisbasedonspecificestimatedvaluesforKKNPP. Further, the total activity intake in a day is not indicative of the dose. If one uses the appropriatedosetoactivityconversionfactorsonewouldgetonlytheinhalationdose.The factorvariesfromnuclidetonuclidefore.g.4.6E9Sv/Bqforparticulatesandwouldresult in a very small dose of only 1 microSv using the corrected values of Bq/m3. If one has to determine the dose to man, then dose through all pathways viz., inhalation, ingestion, immersion and ground shine need to be taken into account. This has been done in our calculationstoarriveatthedoseof0.022mSvmentionedinPara2above.

InthedocumentpassedonbyEGKKNPPonDecember15itwasconvincinglyshownthattheimpact duetotheKKNPPonthepublicwouldbenilbasedonthedesignvaluesofthedischargesandthe authorized discharge limits. The limits of discharges are very conservative in that the dose limit would be reached only if the corresponding concentrations are continued for 365 days in a year whichishighlyimprobable. TheEGisconvincedthatthedischargetothepublicdomainfromtheoperationofthetwinreactors atKKNPPwouldbenomorethan4.26percentoftheregulatorylimitofdosetothepublicof0.2 mSvfixedforthetworeactors.ItmaybestatedthatthelimitforpublicasadoptedbyAERBonthe basis of ICRP recommendations is 1 mSv and if one consider this, the dose that a member of the publicmayreceivefromthestationisnotmorethan1percent.Thenaturalradiationdosearound Kudankulamitselfisassessedtobebetween2.36and4.36mSvfromthedetailedmappingbyESL during the pre operational surveys carried out since 2002. Thus the 1 percent of 1 mSv which is expected from the operation of the reactors represents only half a percent of the variation in natural radiation dose received by the public around Kudankulam. Any additional radiation dose that is expected from KKNPP is only a small percent of the geographical variation of natural dose receivedbythepublicaroundKudankulam.Henceitdoesnotrepresentanyimpactonthepublic. Thusthereisnoneedtogointotheglobalquestionoftheeffectoflowlevelnuclearradiationin ordertoallaythefearsofthepubliconthesafetyofKKNPP. ThereportpassedonbythepeoplesrepresentativesonDecember15containstoomanymistakes andfactualerrorsandinvolvesnotonlytwistingofstatisticsbutevenmixingofunitsandconversion factors.Itis ouropinionthatthereportofPMANE doesnotchangetheconclusionscontainedin ourreportofDecember15butrathersubstantiatesourfindings ii Part II of PMANE report on epidemiological studies in Kerala high background radiation area(page4244ofRef.3) PMANEcontestedthefindingofEGKKNPPearlierthatthehighbackgroundareasofKeraladid notshowanygeneticeffects.TheyquotedthestudiesofV.T.Padmanabhancarriedoutduring 19881994whichtheyclaimshowedthattherewasastatisticallysignificantincreaseofDowns Syndrome(DS),autosomaldominantanomalies,andmultifactorialdiseasesandaninsignificant increase of autosomal recessive and Xlinked recessive anomalies in the High Background RadiationAreas(HBRA).
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EGresponse
Thedocumentsgivenbythepeoplesrepresentativequotingpublicationsontheeffect of HBRAs are highly biased and not in line with the findings of the painstaking work of many stalwartsallovertheworld.Thereferencesandwriteupscontainedintheresponsesfromthe peoples representatives do not even quote the accepted results of internationally acclaimed research work. The findings of authentic international agencies such as WHO, FAO, IAEA, UNSCEAR ICRP and some outstanding national institutes BARC, CRC etc cannot be simply ignored or wished away. One has to scientifically and logically conclude why they cannot be acceptedbeforesomealternateconclusionscanbeconsidered.Asiswellknownradiationisnot the only agent, in fact it is a minor agent in many of the effects studied and the confounding factors in epidemiology can make it appear as though there is an effect when, in fact, none existsparticularlyifonechoosestotwistthestatistics.ThepapersquotedinPMANEreportin this respect are known to have many deficiencies and lacunae as pointed out in many publications in the past. The statistical methods used are highly biased and designed to reach predetermined conclusions. The conclusions are arrived at by exploiting the inherent poor statisticsandinherentmultiplecausesfortheeffects.Ontheotherhandmanystudieswhich useinternationallyacceptedstatisticalmethodssuchasthecasecontrolmethodofKoyaetal (2012),cohortmethodofNairetal(2008)inKeralaHBRAsandthemorerecentworkBirajlaxmi et.al,haveallfirmlyandconclusivelyprovedthatthereisnoperceptibleadverseeffectoflow levelofradiation Anotherstudyquotedinthereference(KochuPillaiet.al.1976)whichclaimedtoreveal an excess of individuals with DS in HRBAs has long since been disproved by Edwards and Harnden (1977) and Sundaram (1977). The prevalence of downs syndrome reported was approximately1per1000andhence,thestatisticalvalidityforthedatafailedtoprovethathigh levelnaturalradioactivitytoberesponsiblefortherecordedexcessinthenumberofDScases. ThefollowingpointsmaybenotedregardingthequotedpaperinInt.JofHealthService: All the references quoted in the 2004 publication are of pre 1977, omitting the later works. The paper meticulously avoids reference to several publications on the subject whichhaveclearlyestablishedthatthereisnoincreasedeffectoftheelevatedradiation backgroundonthepeople.ThewellestablishedpaperofDr.KrishnaNairsschoolisalso avoided. Thebasisofsamplingcohortisnotmentionedtoenableajudiciousjudgment Thedosimetryiswoefullyinadequateforapopulationof200,000.Dosesareaggregated fromfewmeasurementstotheentirepopulation.Comparethiswiththeintensehouse to house dosimetry of 70,000 data points in the work of Nair et al. (Health Physics, 2008)andtheindividualdosimetrymethodofdetectedcasesandcasecontrolmethod ofKoyaetal.(Rad.Research,2012) TheoccurrenceofDSreportedinthereference,forHBRAs(1in1088)matcheswiththe averagesforthedistrictestimatedbypainstakingstudies(1in1361)andalsotheworld averages.ButtheDSincontrolareasselectediscuriouslyunderestimated(1in3265)to showanincreaseinDSinradiationareas.
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Duetothesereasonstheconclusionsdrawninthepaperishighlybiasedandarequestionable. iiiResponsetoRadiationeffectonsexratioinchildrenofradiationworkers(PartIVPage 4748ofRef.3) The PMANE report attempts to make a case that the males to female sex ratio at birth (SRB) havedecreasedovertheperiodfortheoffspringofDAEemployees.Theyconsideredthecases ofoffspringofBARCandTAPS.ThesourceoftheirdataisthereportsofDinshawetal.(1998) EGresponse: Dinshawet.al.havebasicallyprovidedtheagestructureoftheoffspringpopulationasof1994. Theagestructureofthemale/femaleoffspringsofBARCemployeeshavebeengivenseparately forRadiationandnonradiationworkers. ThePMANEgroupwantsestablishthattheM/Fsexratioatbirthbefore1984washigherthat M/Fsexratioafter1985.Theyassumedthatthenumberofchildrenpresentintheagegroup above 10y (i.e. years 10 to 25+) is a direct measure the birth rate before 1984. This is the source of their fallacy. With this assumption they compare the ratios of male proportions beforeandafter1984. Further theyusedthe pooleddataofRadiationworkers(RW)andnon radiation workers (NRW) and do not distinguish between off springs of RW and NRW for claimingradiationeffects. Whatisseenisthatthereisagreaterproportionofmalesintheagegroups10yandaboveas comparedtotheagegroups<10y,asobtainedfromthe1994agestructuredata.Thisissimply becausefemalesintheolderagegrouppreferentiallygooutofthestudycohortduetovarious socialfactors.Thisisborneoutbythefactthatthefemaleproportionhasdroppedmainlyin theageintervals1519andabove(inwhichgirlsgetmarriedoffafterage17+).Furtherthisis seen all the data irrespective of it is belonging to a NRW or RW. Analysis of one time age structuredatacannotbeusedforSRBstudy.Oneactuallyneedslivebirthsatdifferentcalendar periods. Additionalpointsfromliteraturetoshowthatthereisnosexratiochangeduetoradiation. The speculation that radiation changes the male to female child ratio was suggested in 1958. However,anextendedstudypublishedin1966thatincreasedthesamplesizebyabout70%to 47624childrenofparentsexposedtoatomicradiationfailedtoconfirmtheearlierfindingofa changeinthesexratiooftheoffspringofthesurvivors(Schulletal,1966) Studies of the offspring of survivors of childhood and adolescent cancer offer a unique opportunitytoevaluatewhetherpreconceptionradiationcanalterthesexratio.Wintheretal carried out such a study of the children of surviving child hood cancer patients who have undergone therapy treatment in Denmark. (Br J Cancer. 2003 February 10; 88(3): 382387). Gonadaldoseswereatveryhighlevels(typicalbetween0.01and2 Gyfromscatterradiation).

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Overall,1100survivorsofchildhoodcancerbecametheparentsof2130children.Thesexratio for male (0.99) and female (1.00) cancer survivors was similar and did not differ significantly fromtheDanishpopulation(1.06).Radiotherapydidnotinfluencethesexratioofthechildren of either male or female survivors, and there was no evidence for doserelated changes over categoriesofestimateddosetoparentalgonads. In the absence of any such effects noticed even in very high doses the speculation of male to femaleratiochangesintheworkersinIndiaisfoundtobebaseless. ivCommentonPMANEanalysisonHigherdiseaseburdennearKalpakkamusingthedataof theASPIREreport(Chapter8P5054ofRef.3) ThePMANEintendtoshowthatthegeneralpubliclivingnearKalpakkamnuclearfacilitiesareat a higher risk of contracting cancer as well as noncancer diseases as compared to the general public living far away. This is a "far" versus "near" type of comparison in contrast to the "youngerunits"versus"olderunits"comparisonsattemptedforDAEemployeesandfamiliesin the other chapters. The authors stated there that MAPS has "better occupational and environmental hygiene". Now they want to show that even this relatively cleaner unit is polluting the environment of the nearby villages to cause alarming rate of disease conditions. TheybasethisargumentbyanalyzingthedataoftheASPIREreport. EGresponse: ThedatapresentedintheASPIREreportonahostofdiseaseconditionsinvillageswithin8km andthosebeyond50km,aregeneratedfromonetimehealthstatussurvey.Itisnotintended for generating hypothesis on effects "far" versus "near" because it neither possesses any pre operationalhealthstatusinformationnorhasitbeendesignedwithadequatestatisticalpower and survey strategy. The report wished to merely show general patterns of diseases. It is impossible to arrive at reliable estimate of cancer rate in any population by just interviewing about 7000 persons for 1 year. No serious epidemiologist will ever draw conclusions and "generate hypothesis" on radiation effects on all sorts of health conditions, based on "one time" survey reports, which most importantly does not discuss anything on the natural variations in the rates of occurrences of diseases, life style factors and the natural radiation levels in the area and their variabilities. Further it is significant to note that the measured radiation databases show there is no significant addition to the natural dose due to the operation of the reactors even in the nearby sectors. (Upper limit is 2 percent of the allowed limitforpublicof1mSv/year). The authors have chosen some diseases to attribute their occurrence to radiation exposures. The most likely reason for this could be natural variations, inadequate database, differing socioeconomicconditions,imperfectvalidationofdata,orpoorerqualityofsurveyespeciallyin the far off villages. If we strictly go by the logic of the PMANE authors (i.e. any higher rate nearbyascomparedtodistantshouldbebecauseoftheradiationfromtheplant)wecanarrive at all sorts of absurd conclusions. To prove this, let us look at the data on several other
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conditionspresentedintheASPIREreport,whichbynostretchofimaginationcanbeattributed toradiation.Italsocomparestheprevalenceofconditionssuchas"amputations","snakebite", "scorpion sting", "dog bite" and "consanguineous marriages" and smoking habits which indicates higher relative occurrence in nearby villages with statistical significance (p<0.01). Theseareinnowayassociatedwithradiation. AsshowninthepaperbyMayyaetal.usingrigorousdatabaseanalysis,itwouldtakeatleast 2100 years of continuous observation of the populations in the vicinity of the Kalpakkam to detectanycancerrisksattributabletodischargesfromtheplant.Itisonlyjusttothepeopleif genuine causes are looked into for their disease conditions rather than feed them with implausiblehypotheses". v. Comment on PMANE Report: Chapter7, PartV: Cancer among DAE Employees and their Families: (Page49ofRef.3) The PMANE report attempts to argue that the cancer risk among employees and families of older DAE units such as BARC and TAPS is higher than that for the newer units such as MAPS becausetheolderunitshavecausedhigheroccupationalandenvironmentalexposures.Itbases thishypothesisonthedatapresentedinthereportsofDinshawetal.TakingMAPSdataasthe baseline,ithasbeenarguedthattheprevalenceatTAPSis1.75timeshigherandthatatBARCis 3.69timeshigher.ForBARC,itclaimsthattheratioisstatisticallysignificant. EGresponse Dinshawetalhavealreadycarriedouttherelativecomparisonoftheirdata,afteraccountingfor agestructuredifferences,andhavefoundnostatisticallysignificantexcesses.Further,TAPSand MAPShaverecordedonly5and4cancerprevalencecasesrespectivelyamongmaleemployees andtodrawanyconclusionbasedonsuchsmallnumbersisscientificallyinappropriate.Itisalso interestingtocomparethecancermortalitydataforBARC,TAPSandMAPSpublishedbyNambi and Mayya in 1998. Here a reverse situation is seen. The cancer mortality rate for MAPS is observedtobe31.64per100,000PersonYear,whichisslightlyhigherthanthatforBARC(22.21 per100,000PY).ThiswouldmeanthattherelativeriskofMAPSw.r.tBARCismorethanunity (1.42) having 2= 1.2, which implies a lack of statistical significance, even at the level of p=0. Thecorrectinterpretationthereforewillbethatthetwopopulationshavealmostsimilarcancer risk,whichisalsocomparabletotheprevalenceobservedelsewhere. Onecannotdrawmeaningfulconclusionsfromstatisticaldatawhenthesamplesizeisverysmall andthattoowithoutaccountingforvariousinfluencingfactors.Inordertodetectanyradiation relatedeffects,thereisnoalternativebuttofollowupalargecohortforlongperiodsoftime. Databasecalculationsshowthatonehastoaccrueatleastamillionpersonyeardatabasetobe abletodetectanyhealtheffectsduetoradiation.

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The different reports published by DAE from time to time are basically health status studies. These are neither intended for radiation epidemiological studies, nor will they have the statistical power to establish causeeffect relations between radiation and cancer. This is obvious from the fact that in spite of numerous studies with large PY databases conducted worldwide on occupational workers and persons residing in high background radiation areas, unambiguouslowdoseriskfactorscouldnotbeestablished.Radiationstillremainstheweakest carcinogenamongahostoffactorswhichareresponsibleforcancer. viCommentsonthestudiesdoneinIndiaaboutcancerandradiationexposure Most of the Indian studies that have been quoted in the above context have been cross sectional surveys: either populationbased or involving workers and/or spouses/offspring of them.Onlyprevalencecanbecalculatedfromthesestudiesanditiswellknownthatacross sectional survey is not the recommended method and prevalent cancer cases are usually a biasedsampleofallcancers.Hence,thecomparisonsshouldbebasedonincidenceandnoton prevalence. This requires proper study design (cohort study) and uniform data collection mechanisms(throughregistry). OnelargecohortstudycarriedoutinKarunagappally,Kerala,(ahighbackgroundradiationarea) with an average follow up of 10.5 years and adjusted for all potential confounders (tobacco smoking, etc.) clearly established that there was no excess risk for any type of cancer attributable to high background radiation. These results are based on appropriate epidemiologicalstudydesignandhavehighdegreeofvalidity. The cancer prevalence estimated in the population health survey around Kalpakkam (<10 km; 212per100,000)andbeyond(>50km;30per100,000)shouldbeevaluatedwithcaution.The population sizes were not comparable. The caseascertainment was not done in the same manner. In distant villages, cancer cases were only selfreported by a questionnaire while in villagesaroundKalpakkam,medicalscreeningwasundertakeninaddition.Eventhisfigureison par or lesser than the state average (225 per 100,000). Now, to attribute lesser prevalence in villagessituated50kmfromKalpakkamtodistancefromnuclearplantisincorrect(Chennaiis 75 km from Kalpakkam and has a prevalence of 275 per 100,000) and also not based on appropriatestudydesign. Cancer validity is enhanced only when caseascertainment is based on sound medical documentation and adequate coverage like it is done in a cancer registry. Surveys can only complimentitbutcannotreplaceit.Moreover,wecouldthengetcancerincidencethatcanbe monitoredovertimetoformulatehypothesesandalsotestthem. The cancer occurrence (incidence) among nuclear plant workers (radiation vs. Nonradiation) over 10 years in different places has not shown any excess risk (both cases and mortality) compared to national or state averages. This is encouraging. Occupational cohorts can be formedtotestanyhypothesisbasedonradiationexposure.

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VIIINuclearPowerProgrammePerformanceinIndia The programme was affected by the Technology Denial Regime after the peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokhran in 1974. This has beneficially led to an enormous strengthening and independenceofthePHWRprogrammeinIndiawithmuchR&Dandtechnologydevelopment withallcomponentsmadeinIndiaandstrictsafetyreviewbyAERB.However,itisacceptedthat thetargetsfornuclearpowergenerationhavesuffered.Itispreciselyforthisreasonthat,with considerablediplomaticefforts,thecountryisimportingLWRstomeetfillthegap.Theissuesof nuclearliabilityisbeingtakencareofbytheParliamentandtheGovernment anditwouldbe inappropriatefortheExpertGrouptocomment. IXOtherIssues Ecological Effects Regarding the apprehensions of increase in the sea water temperature aroundKKNPP. TheissuehasbeenaddressedindetailinthetwoearlierEGreports(Ref.1andRef.2). XDecommissioning The points raised by PMANE Report (Ref. 3), are already covered in Ref.2. The cost of decommissioningmentionedinthePMANEReportas900million$/kWegivesafigureof900x 106 million $/GWe. Hence, as per PMANE expert, a 1000 MWe nuclear power plant would require Rupees 45,000 lakh crores to be decommissioned. (and not Rupees 45000 crores as wrongly calculated in the report). This amount would be enough to decommission all the nuclearreactorsintheworld!TheExpertGroupstandsbyitsearlierreportofRef.2. XIConvertingKKNPPtoalternateschemesofelectricitygenerationAMYTH! Thetechnologyofconvertingacompletednuclearplantintoafossilpoweredplantisatotally nonscientificapproach.Informationavailableintheinternetonthiswassearchedbyus.Itwas observed that the article written by the author of PMANE regarding Alternatives to KudankulamFuelSwitching,hassimplybeencopiedfromsomearticlepublishedinawebsite inNorthAmericaTaiwaneseProfessorsassociation(NATPA). Asperthearticlefollowingneedstobedoneforconversion! Forusingcoalasalternativefuel: Mothballingthereactoranditscontainmentbuilding. newboilerincludingpulverizedcoalsystemandfurnaceneedtobeadded steamturbinesandgeneratorsshouldbemodified Newcoalunloading,transferandstoragesystemwouldbeneeded Formakingtheplantpollutionfreecleancoaltechnologyequipmentsshouldbeinstalled.

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ForusingLPGasanalternativefuel, Mothballingthereactoranditscontainmentbuilding. newgasturbineseachhavingitsownheatrecoverysteamgeneratorandstackshouldbe installed. ForsupplyofgasanewLNGtankergasunloading,transferandstoragesystemneedtobe installed steamturbinesandgeneratorscouldbemodified.

Ithasbeenobservedthattheauthorisnotawareeventhebasicsofanuclearpowerplant.The author should be aware of the fact that the technologies are developed over years before becomingareality.Tilldatenoscientificknowledge/experienceisavailableforconversionofa completednuclearplantintoathermalplant. In a nuclear plant, the Reactor building and its Auxillary buildings consists of reactor componentsanditssafetysystems.Itisaheightoffantasytothinkthatthiscanbereplacedby placingboilersandotherfossilfuelplantcomponentsastheworkingtechnologyandlayoutis totallydifferent.Thecontrolsofthemainplantreactorandothercomponentsarelocatedina control building inside the reactor auxillary building which cannot be used for controlling a thermalplantasthesystemsaretotallydifferent.EventheconventionalTurbinebuildingofa NuclearplantistotallydifferenttothatoftheoneusedinaThermalplant.TheNuclearplant uses saturated steam turbine where as the Thermal plant (Coal) uses superheated steam turbines and Gas plants uses gas turbines. Hence the Turbine sets need to be replaced as a whole.Thiswillleadtoatotalchangeintheloadingpatternofthebuildingtherebythelayout willgetchanged.Thiseventuallyleadstoasituationthatthereisnomajorsystemwhichisleft out that can be reused for converting Nuclear plant to a Thermal plant. It needs to be mentionedherethatKKNPPishousingthelargestsingleunitTurbogeneratorof1000MW.So farthermalplantsinIndiahascomeupto660MWsingleunitcapacityonly. TheabovestatementssimplypointstothefactthattheexistingNuclearplantasawholehasto bescrappedandanewthermalplanthastobebuiltasnoneofthecomponentscanbeusedfor thesuggestedfuelswitchingmodes.ThisisincontradictiontotheauthorsviewthatKKNPP canbeconvertedfromNucleartofossilfuelplanttoa2000MWthermalplant. Toconclude,thereisnoscientificorengineeringbasisinclaimingthatthenuclearplantcanbe convertedtoathermalplant.
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Annexure8
QualityofConstructionandQAProgramme IGeneral Safety related structures, systems and components(SSC) of a nuclear power plant (NPP) are designed, constructed and operated following established criteria (as laid down by AERB) to accomplishthebasicradiationprotectionobjective;thesecriteriaareinlinewithinternational safetyrequirements.Regulatoryrequirementsfordesign,constructionandoperationofthese SSCarelistedinrelevantAERBSafetyCodes&StandardsandGuides.TheRegulatoryControlfor safetyinsiting,construction,commissioning,operationanddecommissioningofaNPPinIndiais exercisedprimarilythroughasystemofregulatoryconsentsthatallowsactivitieswithstipulated conditions. The consent for construction of NPP in India is issued by AERB after satisfactory review and approval of the design and quality assurance program in construction of the proposed NPP. Review and assessment of the safety related designs in detail is completed beforeconstructionprogressandpriortocommissioningofNPP. IIDesignSafetyReview ThetechnicalinformationprovidedbyNPCILinthesafetyanalysisreportsareassessedbyAERB toseethattheNPPtobesited,constructed,commissioned,operatedanddecommissionedshall not result in radiological, chemical or industrial risk to site personnel, the public and environment beyond established limits. In addition, on specific aspects, the AERB carries out independent design checks to ensure that safety requirements are met with. The extent of review to be completed before consent for a particular stage of NPP is stipulated in relevant AERBsafetydocuments. NPCILconducteddetailedinhousesafetyreviewofdocumentspriortoitssubmissiontoAERB forregulatoryreviewandapproval.AERBreviewofNPCILsubmittalswasindependentofNPCIL review.TheAERBsafetyreviewforKKNPPhasbeencarriedoutinathreetierprocess.Thefirst tierreviewwascarriedoutindetailbySpecialistGroups(SG)consistingofexpertsintherelated subjects,secondtierbyAdvisoryCommitteeforProjectSafetyReview(ACPSR)andthirdtierby theboardofAERB.TheSGsandACPSRwereconstitutedbyAERB.Inlinewiththeestablished regulatory requirements of AERB codes and guides, the SG reviewed in detail the design methodology, design basis, structural analysis and construction methodology for select structurespriortoissueofconstructionconsentforKKNPPatdifferentstages. ThedesignofcivilengineeringstructuresofKKNPPhasbeencarriedoutusingCodes/Standards ofRussianFederation(RF).AERBcarriedoutanindependentdesigncheckforcertainimportant structures. And, the final design of KKNPP is stated to meet the requirements of AERB review basisanddesignrequirement. IIIQualityAssuranceProgramme In line with international practice, the quality assurance (QA) requirements for SSC in an NPP followagradedapproach,dependingonthesafetysignificanceoftheSSC.Theminimumlevel ofQArequirementsarethosefollowedforconventionalindustrialstructures.AllSSCimportant to safety are first identified and then classified on the basis of their function and significance
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with regard to safety. The QA requirements for safety class components are much more elaborate and stringent compared to those for components that are not important to safety. SimilarapproachwasadoptedforKKNPP,whichhasbeenreviewedextensivelyandacceptedby AERB. EstablishmentandimplementationofaQAprogrammebyNPCILduringallstagesofaNPPisa mandatory regulatory requirement by AERB for assuring safety of the NPP. AERB safety documentsalsostipulatetheminimumnecessaryorganizationalstructureandfunctionalbasis for the QA group in NPCIL. QA Group responsible for both Quality Control and Quality AssurancewasestablishedbyNPCILatKKNPPpriortocommencementofconstruction,inline with AERB requirements. The QA group functions independently and consists of experienced, trained staff stationed at site to carry out Quality Assurance during construction. Sufficient authority and organizational freedom are provided to the QA group to perform independent QualityControl. ThequalityofconstructionwasassuredthroughQualityAssurancePlans(QAP)whichspecifies thesequenceofactivities,identifiesthequalitycontrolpoints(witness,holdandreview)ateach stageandagenciesresponsibleforperformanceandverificationingradedapproach.TheQAPs were prepared by contractors of NPCIL for their work based on the NPCIL QA manual and Russian Working Documents (Drawings and Specifications). The contractors QC manual and workprocedureswerereviewedandacceptedbyNPCIL,andthesamewasfollowedduringthe construction.AdedicatedISO9001certifiedConcreteTechnologyLab(CTL)wassetupunder NPCILQAgroup,priortostartofcivilworksatKKNPPsite,ensuresandcontinuouslymonitors thequalityofconcrete,anditsingredients. AllsourcesofconstructionmaterialsweretestedandqualifiedbyNPCIL(asperapprovedQAP and specifications) prior to commencement of construction and continued at specified frequencies.Materialqualificationwasperformedforallmaterials,including, Cement, Aggregatesandthequarryfromwhichtheaggregatesareobtained, Wateralongwithitssource, Admixtures, Reinforcingsteel, Batchingplant, Concrete,and Cementgrout. Inadditiontotestingofingredients,aspertheapprovedQAPs,samplingwasdonebyNPCILof standard concrete cubes from the concrete mix used during casting of all important concrete pours.Postconcretinginspectionswereconductedtoverifythattherearenodefectsinthein situ concrete and observations were documented. Any observation on quality related matters duringthisinspectionareinvestigatedforfurtheractiontoensurethattheasbuiltstructureis ofacceptablestandardofqualitytoperformasperthedesignintent. Extensive documentation as per the approved QAPs has been archived for future references. With regard to concrete construction, the archived records include construction procedures, preconcrete and postconcrete survey reports, concrete pour cards, batching plant records,
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testing records for all ingredients of concrete, fresh concrete and hardened concrete. This documentation was included as a part of the construction completion certificates and were auditedbyAERBfortheircompleteness. Nosignificantdeviationsintheerection/constructionofcivilstructureswerereportedbyNPCIL inthecompletedstructures.AsperAERBrequirement,anydesignmodificationfromapproved design basis requires rereview by AERB. All less significant deviations, which are still in compliancewiththedesignintent,canbeapprovedbyNPCILSdesignagency. i. RegulatoryInspection

The entire construction activities of KKNPP are supervised by NPCIL construction group and NPCILQAgroup.Inaddition,AERBcarriedoutregulatoryinspectiontocheck: Compliance to applicable codes, standards, specifications and practices for siting, design,construction,commissioning,operationanddecommissioningofNPPs; That NPPs are sited, constructed and operated in conformity with design intent duly approvedbyAERB;and Thatsafetyrelatedstructures,componentsandsystemsareofapprovedqualitybased onstandardslaiddownbyAERB. RegulatoryinspectionsasperthefrequencyspecifiedinAERBsafetyguideswereundertakenat KKNPPandasperaboverequirements.Inaddition,specialinspectionswereundertakentotrack thequalityofconstructionandimplementationofregulatorystipulations.Theperformanceof the site (based on the observation during inspections) was satisfactory. Verification of functioning of the project construction quality management system, sample checking of all construction quality related records on construction procedures, inspections and tests on cement, concrete, reinforcement; witnessing of important construction and/or test/mockup activitiesatsitewereperformedduringtheregulatoryinspections. SpecialinspectionswereundertakenbyAERBfor Verifyingthegeologicalmappingpriortofirstpourofconcrete; Verifyingconcretequalityduringand/oraftercompletioninimportantareas; Witnessinginsituprestressingqualificationtests; Witnessingcontainmentstructuralintegrityandleakageratetest;and Reviewingtheconstructioncompletioncertificates. QualityrequirementswerefoundtobemetwithbyAERB. iiMockupStudiesandQualification Considering the importance of the structure and complexities involved, fullscale mockup studiesofcertainconstructionactivitieswereundertakentoenhanceconfidenceindesignand analysis. These mockups were performed by NPCIL and witnessed by AERB. Based on satisfactoryperformanceofmockups,constructionofactualstructurewaspermittedbyAERB.
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The inner containment (IC) structure is a critical civil engineering structure of a NPP. The IC structure of KKNPP is prestressed with 55C15 unbonded prestressing system by Freyssinet. TheprestressingsystemqualificationwasreviewedindetailbyAERB.Baselinedataonprestress parameters were collected to monitor the status of prestressing through the lifetime of the plant.Adequateamount ofembeddedinstrumentationforinsitustructural monitoringofthe containmenthasbeenprovidedforKKNPP.Regulardatacollectionfromthisinstrumentationis beingcarriedoutbyKKNPPsite.TheperformanceofthisinstrumentationwasreviewedbyAERB duringtheregulatoryinspectionsandfoundtobesatisfactory. iiiContainmentStructuralIntegrityTest The final qualification of containment is carried out by testing of the containment for its structural integrity and leakage rate at specific design pressures. The containment structural integrity and leakage rate test was conducted by pressurizing the containment to its design pressurebyinjectingairinside.AERBobserversalsowitnessedthetests.Thebehaviourofthe structure (deformation and recovery) was monitored using embedded and installed instrumentation.Thestructurebehavedelasticallyandnodistresswasobserved.Theobserved leakagefromthecontainmentwasaround0.1%ofcontainmentvolumeperday,muchlessthan the conservatively estimated permissible limit of 0.3%. Baseline data with regard to performanceofthecontainmentwerecollectedduringthestructuralintegrityandleakagerate tests.Asperregulatoryrequirements,theleakratetestwillberepeatedeveryyearathalfthe designpressureandatfullpressureatafrequencyof10years.Theperformanceofcontainment during these tests would be compared with the baseline data obtained during the pre commissioningtests.

Someoftheimportantaspectsofsafetyreviewandregulatoryinspectionofthereactorbuilding ofKKNPParelistedoutintheAnnexure8Aasanexample.

Annexure8A
RegulatoryReviewforReactorBuilding AERBinitssafetyreview ofreactorbuildingofKKNPPcoveredthefollowing topicsasperthe requirements of AERB safety documents. The following safety requirements were complied with: Plantlayoutandstructurallayoutofbuildings Geotechnicalinformation Site characteristics, seismological, meteorological parameters to arrive at design basis externaleventparameters Loadsandloadcombinations Analysismethodology Finiteelementmodels Analysisresultsfor o Seismicanalysis o Aircraftimpact o Ventstackfall Analysisanddesignofinnercontainmentliner
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Independent design check for selected locations of reactor building to understand the designapproachasperRFregulationsandalsotogainconfidenceinthedesign. Analysisanddesignforheatofhydrationandshrinkagetodecideontheheightofpour Constructionmethodology Qualificationofprestressingsystem Procedureforcontainmenttesting

Complete construction activities of KKNPP are supervised by NPCIL construction group and controlled by NPCIL QA. In addition, AERB carries out periodic inspections that includes the following: Visualinspectionofallconstructionfronts VerificationofQAdocumentation o Qualificationreportsofmaterials(see1.5formaterials) o Preconcretingsurveyreports o Pourcardsandbatchingplantrecordstoreviewtheactivitiesduringconcreting o Post concrete survey report to review any abnormal observations during deshuttering o CTLrecordstoreviewtheconcretetestresultsandverifyitscompliancetostipulated requirements FollowupofanyAERBrecommendations/stipulations As per the stipulations of relevant AERB safety documents, AERB conducts special regulatory inspectionsatvariousidentifiedstagesoftheproject.Theseinclude: Geologicalmappingoftheexcavatedfoundationstrata Witnessingofconcretingmockups Qualificationmockupsforprestressingsystem Threadingmockup Rethreadingmockup Groutingmockup Inspectionofcutsamplesfromgroutingmockup Testsfordeterminationofwobbleandfrictioncoefficientforprestressingsystem Preparednessforcontainmentstructuralintegritytest Constructioncompletioncertificateverification Witnessingofcontainmentstructuralintegrityandleakratetesting

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Annexure9

REVIEWOFTHEGEOLOGICALANDTECTONICASPECTS(CHAPTER1)OFPMANEREPORTON KKNPP,TAMILNADU,INDIA
(ReportbyNationalInstituteofRockMechanics,KolarandAtomicMineralsDivision,Hyderabad)

TheNPCILvideitsemailsentareportofPMANE12thDecember2011addressingvariousissues

relatedtoKudankulam nuclearpowerprojectandrequestedNIRMto,reviewandoffercommentson the same. The Peoples Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE) have studied various reports, documentsandpapersonKKNPPandcameoutwithmanydoubtsonthesafetyoftheplant.

Various issues raised in the Chapter 1 of the report are studied, along with scientific and technicalinformationavailablefromtheliteratureandtheviewsoftheexperts.Inviewofthesiteis fallingonthecoast,theonshoreandoffshorefeaturesfallinginthevicinityof300kmwerealsostudied fromtheliteratureavailableforthestructuralfeaturesincludingtheGulfofMannar.Theseareinferred from geological and geophysical studies by various organisations including the volcanic activity, active tectonicfeaturesetcinregionalperspective. The National Institute of Rock Mechanics (NIRM) carried out seismotectonic studies around 30km radius (Rao et al., 2011) and evaluating the seismotectonic status of the lineaments within the studyareaof50kmradiusaspertheAERB(AERB,1990)guidelines.Thebriefreviewondifferentissues alongwiththecommentswithreferencetochapter1ofthereportarediscussedbelow IRiftoranaulacogen ThePMANEreportindicatedthatthesubvolcanicbodieshavebisectedthenearsurfacecrustintheform ofplugstothewestandintheformofdykeswarmstotheeast,indicatingaseverecrustaldilationtothe east.Thesitehasthecharacteristicsofariftoranaulacogen. For answering this concern, it is necessary to understand the present tectonic status of the

Peninsular India. The Southern Granulite terrain is made up of several litho tectonic units and crustal scale lineaments that are characterized by the different periods of crustal evolution and exhumation process (eg., Sunil, et al., 2010). Suture zones are the remnants of the zones of amalgamation of different terrains (eg., Kumar et al., 2009). This terrain has undergone thermotectonic events many
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timesinthegeologicalpastbeforethesplitofGondwana(eg.,Ghoshet.al.2004).Between160130Ma, thesplittingofGondwanatookplaceandIndiansubcontinentmovedtowardsnorth(Desaet.al2006 andothers).TheentirePeninsulawasundertensiontillitcollidedwithEurasiatoformHimalayas.The last volcanic eruption in Peninsular India happened while the Indian land mass passed through Kerguelen hotspot. The Deccan basalts and their derivatives were dated between 6863 Ma (Radhakrishna, et al., 1994). These dolerite dykes were formed during the last major extensional tectonism (Cretaceous) witnessed by the Peninsular India (Radhakrishna, et al., 1994). Based on palaeomagneticandisotopicagedata,thedoleritedykesappearstorepresentfeedersystemsforthe Deccan volcanic sequences. They suggest that the Deccan eruptions were widespread and probably extended southward at least into central Kerala. The entire magmatic episode might have occurred between70and65Ma.

The Palar, Godavrari, Kaveri sedimentary basins were formed during late Jurassic to early

cretaceousperiod(Sastrietal1973),undertensionalregimeandareriftaulacogen.However,recent studies in Peninsular India show that the area is under compression (eg. Subramanya, 1996; Vita Finzi,2004, Talwani and Rajendran 1991; Rajendran, et al 1992; Gowd et al., 1996; Biju John and Rajendran 2008; Biju John and Rajendran 2009). Mapping of mega drainage anomalies and related lineaments/faults in southern peninsular India indicates northerly directed compressive force is active andstilldeformingtheIndianplate(Ramasamy,etal.,2011).RecentstudiesbyNIRMidentifiedfeatures suggestingcompressionaltectonics(Raoetal.,2011;BijuJohnetal,2011). The

Kudankulam is located in the Southern Granulite Terrain(SGT) of Archean age . NWSE lineament systems in this zone are identified as sympathetic to major Achankoil and Tenmalai faults (GSI, 2000)which are presently under compression. No sedimentary basins are found (GSI, 1989) characteristicsofriftoraulacogen. II.TectonicsandVolcanismofGulfofMannar(GOM) ThestudiesofDesaetal,Murtyetal,Dasetal,Royetaletcprovidethedetailsoftectonicsin

the Mannar basin and are suggesting that the Gulf of Mannar is a failed rift since Cretaceous. They indicatethatIndiaandSrilankaweretogetheruptoLateJurassic(Oxfordian,160Ma). Curray (1984) opined that the first rifting between India, Sri Lanka and Antarctica occurred

throughtheCauveryPalkStraitGulfofMannarzonebutthisriftdidnotprogressintotheseafloor spreadingstage.Instead,thebreakoccurredbetweenSriLankaandAntarctica,asaresulttheCauvery

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PalkStraitGulfofMannarBasinbecameafailedriftoraulacogendatingfromtheLateJurassic/Early Cretaceous. Gulf of Mannar remained a broad graben all through its history between the outcropping Sri Lanka and Indian Peninsular massifs. As per Das et al., (2008) the oldest magnetic anomaly M 11 identifiedbythemsouthofSriLankahasbeendatedas134Ma.TheCretaceousbasininGulfofMannar areaweredividedintotwosubbasins,theMannarsubbasintotheNWandPambandepressiontothe SE. Towards the SE part of the basin adjoining Sri Lanka, maximum thickness of sediments is seen in seismic section, probably indicating Rift initiation. Turonian (~90 Ma) was marked by widespread intrusivevolcanicsinthebasinwhichdrawssupportfromthefactthatIndiansubcontinentwasinclose proximitytoKerguelenhotspotduringthatperiod.Depositionofsedimentsofpostriftphasefollowed this (Nannilam and Portonovo Formations). Sediments of late rift phase and passive margin subsidence(PaleocenetoOligocene) followedthepostriftformations.Extensionalregimecontinued and the sediments keep on depositing into the basin. The normal faults within these sediments were numerous till the rifting stopped prior to the deposition to Toronian sediments (Das et al., 2008). No volcanicrocksyoungerto60Mareportedanywhereinthewells(Dasetal.,2008;Raoetal,2008;Rana et al., 2008). This may imply that no volcanism occurred in GOM after the ones observed in entire Peninsular India (6370 Ma). Present day active volcano in the Indian plate is associated with the subductionzoneasseeninBarrenislandstotheeastofAndamanNicobarislandchainwhichis1800km ENEofKudankulam. The geophysical studies in the Gulf of Mannar infer possibility of presence of reported two volcanic vents in Gulf of Mannar (Murty et al., 1994). The bathymetry of Gulf of Mannar shows three circular features in NS trend as seen from google. These are located about 110km south east of site. These circular features may not be volcanic craters but intrusive bodies (Dr S.K.Biswas, 2012). These featuresmayberepresentingthepossibleintrusivebodies. During the last major tectonic activity of collision of India with Asia, the basin witnessed a compressional regime which is manifested as a gentle folding of Neogene sediments in seismic sections. It is further noticed that no faults of the rift tectonics continued to the surface (Das et al., 2008).Furthertheseismicprofilesshowthattherearenofaultsintheupperlayersdepositedduringthe quaternaryrecenttimes.Itindicatestheriftrelatedactivityendedataround90Maandnofaultrelated disturbancesoccurredsinceQuaternary.

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ThesitewithrespecttotheboundaryfaultofGOMwasstudiedbyajointteamofAERB,NPCIL and ONGC. Offshore seismic data pertaining to a few active faults as per the lineament studies by variousagencieswereexaminedasalsotheNESWboundaryfaultoftheGOMwhichisbeyondthe50 kmradiusfromthesite(NPCIL,2010). InGOM,volcanicactivitiesareconfinedtoUpperCretaceousageandareseenintheformof

dykes and plugs. As per IAEA code the location is devoid of volcanic activity for the last 10 Ma (IAEA, 2011). III.Carbonatitedykes&Swarms The occurrence of Carbonatitedykes was reported about 2km south of Kudankulam (8.110N,77.430E) by Ramasamy (1996). Except this report no such features are reported by any other authorsintheregion. Subsequently AltrinArmstrong studied extensively about the Kudankulam Formations and a number of papers were published. Carbonate rocks of sedimentary origin is mapped around the Kudankulam. Stratigraphy as well as detailed geological map had been appended (AltrinArmstrong et al., 2001, 2003, 2004, 2009). However, no mention of the carbonatite dykes was made in these publications. The papers where the carbonatite dykes were mentioned were also not referred in the subsequentworks. The magnetic and geochemical studies by Longhinos et al. (1993) in Kudankulam identified subsurfaceintrusivesofbasalticnature. The presence of carbonatite rocks were noticed elsewhere in Southern peninsular India too. Thesearemainlyassociatedwithsyeniteplutons(GSI,2006).TheLateProterozoicperiod(550750Ma) inTamilNaduwitnessedlargescaleextensionaltectonismwiththeformationofdeepcrustalfractures withintrusionofalkalinerelatedplutonsandgranites.Thealkalinerelatedplutonismwaswidespreadin the northern parts of Tamil Nadu where a number of ultramaficsyenitecarbonatite bodies occur in a NNESSW trending zone extending over about 200km. A number of smaller ultramaficsyenite carbonatite bodies also occur along subparallel NNESSW trending fault/shear zones on both sides of themainzoneofalkalineactivity(GSI,2006).Thealkaliplutonicintrusivesincludingcarbonatites/basic dykes are of Neoproterozoic in age (550750 Ma) mainly associated with regional lineaments and fracturezonesandarelargelyconfinedtoNWandNElineaments(M.Ramkrishnanet.al,2010).

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The time of emplacement of these alkaline plutons has been well constrained by different isotopic systematics. The available ages for the complexes occurring within the main Dharmapuri AlkalineProvincewererangingbetween700and900Ma(DeansandPowell,1968;Morolovet.al.,1975; Krishna Rao and Nathan 1991; Anil Kumar and Gopalan1991; Miyazaki et.al., 2000). The Salem Ultramafic Complex has also yielded an isochron age of 808 18Ma (Reddy et.al., 1995). Three carbonatites of South India, units are dated 2400 Ma, 770 Ma & 523 Ma. The age of a Kambam carbonatitemonazitebandis71542Ma(Catlosetal.,2008). Carbonatitedykesaredatedbackto2400Ma,770Maand523Maanddoleritedykeactivity(70 63Ma)relatedwithDeccanvolcanisminPeninsularIndiaistheyoungestintrusionrecordedsofar.From description of the features of dykes, volcanic plugs observed in the Kudankulam region (Ramasamy, 1996) shows these are very insignificant features in this region. The length of carbonatite dyke rocks variesupto100mandtheirwidthvariesfromlessthan0.10mto2m.Thecarbonatitedykesofnumber cannotbetermedasswarm. Suchfeatureslargerthanpresentonesinsizeanddensitywererecordedinotherpartsofthe

peninsulaalsolikeGujarat,MaharashtraandMadhyaPradeshwheredykeswarmsofhundredsofsqkm were noticed that have been associated with the preexisting regional fractures in EW, NS NWSE directions that are sympathetic to the regional tectonic features in the vast volcanic sites of Deccan Volcanism(Auden,1949).Someoftheseigneousfeatureswillmanifestaslinearsandinsomeplacesas nearcirculargivingrisetoshapesofvolcanicventssometimesasdykesalso.
IV.Crustalthinningandmantleupwelling Italsosuggestedthatcrustalthinningandmantleupwellinghaveledtotheemplacementofmantlehybrid rocksasdykesandplugs,near(200metersdeep)subsurface.

Volcanoesoccuratweaknessintheearthssurfacemainlyalongoneofthreetectonicsettings viz.subductionvolcanoes,riftvolcanoesandhotspotvolcanoes.Subductionvolcanoesoccurwhereone tectonicplateisthrustandconsumedbyanother.Thistypeisthemostexplosiveandthesearemore or less confined to plate boundaries. Rift volcanoes occur where tectonic plates diverge often on the ocean floor. These are less explosive. Hotspot volcanoes may occur in the middle of plate boundaries also where magma exits from pre existing weakness in the earths surface. These types of volcanoes formwhenthelithosphericplatemovesoverthehotspot.TheHawaiiislandsaresuchexample.When firsteruptedfromavolcanicvent,lavaisaliquidattemperaturesfrom700Cto1,200C.

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The evidences of volcanism in India suggested that the activity was in the form of fissure

eruptions happened during upper Cretaceous period. The large scale fissures which were already present in the crust during the extensional tectonics acted as the feeders for such volcanism. No volcanic eruptions which were violent in other parts of world are noticed in India. Very few cases in Gujarat,MaharashtraandMParetheknownpaleovolcanicconesinIndia.Theepisodehadoccurredin India due to the close proximity of Kerguelen hot spot. Hence the possibility of volcanic eruption as mentionedcannotbeexpected. StudiescarriedouttoascertainthecrustalthicknessinpeninsularIndiathroughDeepSseismic

Studies(NGRI)aswellasgravitymagneticdata(ONGC,NGRI)andcrustalthinningofabout2to3km fromtheaveragecrustalthicknessofabout3540kmwasreportedalongtheeastcoastandadjoining regionsinGulfofMannar(Balakrishnanetal.,2009).Theupwellingbythisamountof3to4kmfrom depthsof3540kmisimpliedbythetermcrustalthinning.Henceinferenceofvolcanicactivitydueto thincrustinthisregionintermsofthepresenceofintrusionsupto200mdeptheventsisnotacorrect proposition.Thesuggestionthattheseintrusivesareduetothiscrustalthinningisnotwellfounded. Theageoftheseintrusivescanbedatedbacktothecretaceousage(Radhakrishnaetal.,1994). Hencetheyareolder. V.NWtrendinghorstgrabenstructure,escarpmentalongthecoastandthedrainagepattern

Theconfigurationofthesesubvolcanicintrusives,broughtoutbyarecentgroundmagneticsurvey,deemsa horstgraben structure crisscrossing the EW trend of the coast. They are suggested as the surface expressionsofananomalousbodyfoundatadepthof110200meters.

The basement configuration as reflected from the magnetic studies indicate NW SE trending linears may be representing the already existing fractures which were under reactivation. These fractureswereconduitsforthebasicintrusiveswhichareverycommonphenomenainPeninsularIndia. Theinterpretationofsuchsmallscalestudiesasduetoregionalfeaturesasdrawnintheconclusionsin thepapermaynotbeproper/correct. Prominent,beachridgecomplexarereportedalongtheeastcoast,whicharemostlyoccupied bylargedeltas;lowlyinghillsandsandyshores(Kunte,andWagle,2005).Thereisnothinganomalous related to tectonics in these observations. These are generally formed due to the combined effect of windandseawave.

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ThedrainagepatternsurroundingKudankulamwasstudiedindetail(Rao,2011).Noanomalies

wereidentifiedinthisareawhichcanrelateittoriftoraulacogen. VI.HeatflownearNagarcoil Heat flow variations in tectonically stable Indian Peninsular region reflect variations in heat producedincrustalcolumnandheatconductedintothecrustfromtheunderlyingmantlealso.These studiesresultinimprovedmodelsforthermalstructureofthecontinentallithosphere.Heatproduction levels in individual rock types are strongly controlled by the nature of their precursors, Pressure Temperatureconditionsofmetamorphismandlatermetasomatismaffectingthem. Nagarcoillocated29kmfromtheKudankulamsitehasbeenfoundtobehavingthehighestsub

crustalheatflowvalueinSouthIndia.ThePrecambrianterrainofsouthernIndiarepresentsamosaicof terrainswithvaryingsubcrustalthermalregimes.Thehighestheatproductionlevelof5.54.4Wm3 was observed in Nagercoil which is characteristic of its geological province Kerala Khondalite block (KKB). AsperstudiesbySukantaRoy,thegarnetbiotitegneissesconstitutethemajorrockformation of the Khondalite suite between Achankoil (AKL) and Trivandrum in Kerala (Roy et al 2007). Radio elemental abundances in these rocks yield a mean heat production of 74 (s.d.) mW m3, the highest amongallrocktypesofthegneissgranuliteprovince(SGP)ofsouthernIndia.IntheKKB(southofthe AKL),heatflowdeterminedinthemiddleoftheNagarcoilcharnockitemassifis58mWm3,thehighest sofarobservedintheentiregneissgranuliteprovinceofsouthIndia.Thehighheatflowvaluehasnot beencorrelatedwithvolcanicactivityoremplacementofmantleoriginatingintrusives(Royetal,2007). Itisto benoted that thereisasyeniteplutonic bodyexistingnearPutteti,in thevicinityofNagarcoil (MiyazakiandSantosh2005). Thehighthermalgradientmaybeduetothepresenceofradioactivemineralsinthesyeniterock. HencethehighthermalgradientobservedintheregionaroundNagarcoilisnotreflectingany volcanic activity. Moreover the high gradient was not connected with any mantle upwelling or crustal thinningbyRoy(2007). VII.ComparisonwithYuccaMountainrangenuclearrepository YuccaMountainrepositorywasmeantfor10,000yearwasteisolationperiodfornuclearwaste (Perry et.al., 2000). Yucca Mountain is composed dominantly of pyroclastic units (welded and non welded tuff rocks) that range in age from 11.4 to 15.2 Ma (John S. Stuckless and Dennis W.OLeary
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2007). Yucca Mountain region is characterized by normal faulting, plateboundary shear, and basaltic volcanism (e.g., Morris et al., 2004, and references therein). Yucca Mountain field identified about 20 ventsand10km3ofbasalt(SmithandKeenam,2005).Toassesstheprobabilitythatvolcanicevents,that will disrupt the potential repository during the 10,000year wasteisolation period, volcanic activity of theareaarestudiedover5Ma(Perryetal.,2000).EightQuaternarybasaltvolcanoeseruptedwithin50 kmoftheproposedrepositoryinthepastmillionyears(SmithandKeenam,2005).Basalticvolcanism nearYuccaMountainisepisodicwiththegreatestnumberoferuptionsoccurringatabout4and1Ma (SmithandKeenan2005).Notably,sixcinderconesformedsince1Mathatarelocatedwithin20kmof thesite(Croweetal.,1983;ConnorandHill,1995;Flecketal.,1996).Basalticvolcanismbeganin10Ma and continued as recently as 80 ka with the eruption of cones and flows about 10 km SSW of Yucca Mountain.(JohnS.Stuckless,2007).Thesefeaturesindicatethatitisatectonicallyandvolcanicallyactive region. Incomparision,theKudankulamislocatedinthesouthIndiangranuliteterrainofPrecambrian ageformingapartoftheIndianPeninsularshield. Such huge volume of volcanic materials, the plate boundary conditions and the associated youngvolcanismasobservedinYuccaMountainswerenotpresentinthePeninsularIndia.Theabove mentionedtworegionsarediverseinage,lithologyandtectonicsandhencecannotbecompared. AsperIAEAcodethelocationistobedevoidofvolcanicactivityforthelast10Ma(IAEA,2011). AsperthepresentdatafromthePeninsula,novolcanicactivitywasreportedinthispartoflandlater thanDeccanvolcanism.
VIII.RockMeltExtrusion

a.

There are reports of rock melting around Abishekapatti, Thiruppanikkarisal kulam, Anikulam

and Pondicheri in Thirunelveli district during 1998 and 1999 and they are spatially associated with electricpoles.(Manimaranetal.,2001;Rajamanickametal.,2000;Ramasamy2000;Vaz2001). Incidencesofrockmeltsinalmostallcasesarereportedduringthelast15yearsinmanyparts

of India namely Parasia in Chhindwara district, Madhya Pradesh (Khanna et.al 1999) and Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh (Khanna, 1999), Gujarat, Uttarakhand ( Nawani, Rao and Bapat, personal communications 2012) and West Bengal (Bhattacharyya et al., 2002), including those under review at the present are confined to the regions very near to high tension electrical transmission lines poles, aroundsnappedhightensionelectricaltransmissionlines.Theyareformedduetothelightningand/or

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shortingofthehighvoltagecurrentintothe groundthroughtheconcrete pole.Thefeaturesarevery shallowandconfinedtoonlyto35metersonly.Inallthecasestheywerereportedtobetaperingwith depththatthesourceoftheactivityliesinthesuperficialveneeronly.Thezoneofinfluenceofthese incidentswasalsoofverynegligibledimensionscomparedtoexpectedvolumesoftheregionsdueto thevolcanicactivityorduetomagmaticintrusionsintheformofdykes,plugsetc. b. A team of officers of NIRM, AMD and NPCIL studied RME sites located at Abishekapatti,

Thiruppanikkarisalkulam,AnikulamandPondicheri.Interactionwithlocalsnearthereportedsitesand physicalinspectionofthefeaturesindicatedthattheyresultedduetothelightningand/orshortingof thehighvoltagecurrentintothegroundthroughtheconcretepole.Theshortcircuitedcurrent(which wasofhighvalue)hadpassedthroughthepoleforalongdurationwhichgeneratedheatandthishas resultedinthemeltingofthereinforcedconcrete(RCC)materialofthepoleparticularlyatthebottom areas. The referred rock melts obtained are the melts of RCC material as well as soil materials in contact with the pole. The RME materials seen at Abishekapatti in surface are similar to fulgurite materialformedduetolightningeffect(Viemeister,1983). ThusRMEisrelatedtoelectricalphenomenonwhichisclearlyseeneventodayasvisibleburnt

andmeltmarksonthetwoelectricalpolesinPondicheri.Hencethereportedrockmeltsarenotthe indicatorsoftheundergroundvolcanicactivityandtheirrelationwiththeexistenceofinferredvolcanic ventsisalsonotcorrect.Itisrelatedtoelectrical/lightningphenomenon. IX.Shorelinestability TherearestudiesthatindicatethattheKudankulamsitehasanunstableshoreline.StudiesbyBrucknur, AltrinArmstrongSamandothershaveprovedthatthisshorehadremainedunstableingeologicalpast. CWPRShascarriedoutshorestability studiesofKudankulamsiteforthe period1992to 2000 (CWPRS 2001). Multidated satellite data (LISS III and PAN Data between 1992 to 2000) analysis was carriedoutforthestudiesrelatedtotidalandshorelinestability. The shore line was found to be fairly stable during the period of years between 1992 to 2000.Thereisnoindicationofshorelineerosionoraccretionalongthecoastduringthewholeperiodas wellasduringtheintermediateperiods. In addition, the site inspection studies carried out by CWPRS (2001) also indicated the stable shorelineatKudankulam.

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X.SubsidencearoundDhanushkodi NPCILtothepresentday,hasnotconductedthenecessarystudiesthatproveaSouthDhanushkodilike faultingphenomenonmightnotoccurattheKudankulamsiteitself. ThestudiesbyG.G.Vazet.al,2007revealthataverticalfaulttrendingWNWESEdirectionlead

to the subsidence of the southern part of the Dhanushkodi township. This fracture appears to be sympathetictotheregionallineamentknownasVaigailineamentintheadjoiningmainland. TheSEISAT(GSI,2000)indicatedVaigailineamenttobeneotectonic.Thisislocatedatdistance

of about 230km from the site. The assigning of earthquake of max M=6.0 to this lineament may not generate considerable accelerations at the site was located on the hard rock. Though neotectonic activitywasobservednearDhanushkodithishasnotgeneratedanyearthquakeinthisarea. InthevicinityofKudankulamnoneotectoniclineamentoractivefaultwithinits5kmradiusis

presenttoinitiatefaultingsimilartoobservedinDhanushkodi(Rao.et.al,2010) XI.Inadequatestudiesongeologicalaspects EvenwhereresearchstudieshavebeencommissionedbyNPCIL,theyhadremainedlargelysubstandard basedonDr.Bhoominathanspaper. InhisresearchpaperpublishedinCurrentScience,byBhoominathan(2004)hasnotindicated

anything about the quality of studies. The above paper addresses various issues that have are carriedoutbeforeestablishingNPPprojects.TheSpecificSurfaceGeoseismicsurveysuggestedbyProf. Bhoominathan have already been addressed by NPCIL through studies by GSI, AMD, NGRI and NIRM andtheoutcomehasbeenconsideredforthedesignaspectsoftheplants. XII.Tsunamisources. StudiesofPaleoTsunamisforthearea,andidentifyingthenearfieldandthefarfieldtsunamigenic sources,potentialtsunamigenicfaultsinGulfofMannarwerenotconducted. In general tsunamis can be generated by large plate movement associated with subduction,

marineexplosivevolcanismandlargesubmarinelandslides. It is already established that no active volcanoes are present in the Gulf of Mannar that can

generatevolcanismrelatedtsunami.

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Thesafetybuildingsoftheplantaredesignedtowithstandanyextremenaturalcalamities

likeearthquake,tsunami,storm,tidalwaves,cyclones,shockwaves,etc.Detailedstudieshavebeen carriedouttoarriveatthesafegradeelevationandthecalculatedsafegradeelevationis+5.5m abovemsl.Thefinalgradeelevationhasbeenfixedatahigherlevelof+7.5mtakingintoaccountof 2.0madditionalmargins. Following the 2004 Tsunami in Indian Ocean, sea water level rise of 2.00 M was

observedinKKNPPsitecoast(FSAR2004).Theplantgradeelevationisat7.5Mandtherewasno ingressofwaterintotheplantareawhichwasunderconstructionatthattime.
XIII.Submarineslumps Thefeaturesofslumpswerereportedby(VestalandLowrie(1982)fromseismicsectionsofONGC.The possibilityofslumpsintheGulfandthepossibilityofgenerationduetooccurrenceofearthquakewere alsoansweredby.Gupta&Murthy(2011).AsstatedtheslumpsintheGulfofMannari.etheColombo slump(1535km)andEastComorin(70100km)slumpsarenotlargeenoughtogeneratetsunami(Gupta &Murthy2011). XIV.IndranifaultextendsintoGulfofMannarandhasthecapacitytodisturbtheseslumps. ThepresentpositionofSriLankaanditspastfitinGondwanalandareinvestigatedinrelationto

thedevelopmentoftheIndianOcean(Katz,1978).TheevolutionoftheIndianOceanwereshowntobe controlled by fundamental NW, NS, and NE Precambrian lineament directions in Sri Lanka and South India. These older lineaments were rejuvenated in the MesozoicTertiary to form oceanic transform faults. The Indrani fault is one such NS trending transform fault. The rifting stopped prior to the depositiontoToroniansediments(Dasetal.,2008). The historical earthquake data of the Gulf of Mannar region shows that in past the maximum

magnitude of the earthquake was 5.8(IMD)/6.0(Global) of December 1938. The earthquake of 19th November2011(M=5.2)waslocatedatlat4.50Nandlong.79.30E.(IMDwebsite)intheGulfofMannar. Thetwoearthquakesof1938(M=6.0)&1993(M=5.4)werelocatedatepicentraldistancesofabout174 and162kmrespectivelysoutheastofsite.TheNovember2011(M=5.2)earthquakewaslocatedatabout 230 km south of site and it is 100 km east of Comorin ridge. It is not associated with Indrani fault as mentioned.

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XV.Karstterrains. NPPsiteislocatedoncharnockiticbasementrocksofArcheanage.About1.5kmnorthofNPP site sedimentary rocks of Cuddalore sandstone (calcareous sandstone and shell limestone) of Upper MiocenePliocene(11.62.6millionyears)inageareexposed.About2kmwestofNPPsitecalcareous deposits (shell limestone, shell fragments with sand etc) of PleistoceneRecent (2.6million years Recent)inageareseenasthinlayers.Theselithicunitsaregenerallynotfavorablefordevelopmentof karsttopography.Alsotheabovementionedsedimentaryrocksareyoungerinageandoccurasoutliers oncharnockitesawayfromthesiteandathighertopography. These lithic units are generally not favorable for development of karst topography. Also the

abovementionedsedimentaryrocksareyoungerinageandoccurasoutliersoncharnockitesawayfrom thesiteandathighertopography.Evenifsubsidenceoccursduetokarstphenomenainthesedimentary rocks,itcannotaffectthebasementrocki.e.charnockiteonwhichthepowerplantsarelocated.Hence thesekarsts,evenifthereisany,canneveraffectthestabilityofNPP(AMD,2011). The borehole data of GSI (Balachandran &Satyanarayana, 1988) shows that calcareous

sandstonewithvaryingthicknessareobservedabovethecharnockitebasementrock.Thethicknessof calcareoussandstoneasperthedrillingdataareseenuptoamaximumdepthupto9.7maroundthe existingreactors.Duringtheexecutionstage,intheareaofreactorbuildingfoundationaround10mof overburdenwasremovedwhichwasfollowedbyconsolidationcementgroutingofanother15m.This was reviewed by Bhoominathan and Gandhi of IIT Chennai(2001a &b). Therefore no possibility of subsidenceinthefoundationstrataaroundreactorbuilding. VIEWS&OBSERVATIONS TheKudankulamislocatedintheSouthernGranuliteTerrain(SGT)ofArcheanage.NWSElineament systemsinthiszoneareidentifiedassympathetictomajorAchankoilandTenmalaifaultswhichare presentlyundercompression.Nosedimentarybasins,geomorphicanddrainageanomaliesarefound inKudankulamareawhicharethecharacteristicsofriftoraulacogen. The basement configuration as reflected from the magnetic studies indicates that the NW SE trendinglinearsmayberepresentingthealreadyexistingsubsurfacefractureswhichwereconduit forbasicrockintrusions.. Yucca Mountain is composed dominantly of pyroclastic units (welded and non welded tuff rocks) that range in age from 11.4 to 15.2 Ma. Huge volume of volcanic materials, associated young
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volcanism and its plate boundary conditions indicate that it is a tectonically active region. The KudankulamislocatedinthesouthIndiangranuliteterrainofPrecambrianageformingapartofthe IndianPeninsularshield.Theabovementionedtworegionsarediverseinage,lithologyandtectonics andhencecannotbecompared. The high thermal gradient observed in the region around Nagercoil is not suggesting any volcanic activity and the high gradient is not connected with any mantle upwelling or crustal thinning. The highthermalgradientmaybeduetothepresenceofradioactivemineralsinthesyeniticrocklocated aroundNagarkoil. TheNovember2011(M=5.2)earthquakewaslocatedatabout100kmeastofComorinridgebutnot relatedtoIndranifault.

The slumps in the Gulf of Mannar are not large enough to generate tsunami. Followingthe2004 Tsunami in Indian Ocean, sea water level rose by around 2.0m in KKNPP site coast. The plant gradeelevationisat7.5mandtherewasnoingressofwaterintotheplantarea(FSAR,chapter 2.)
ThoughneotectonicactivitywasobservednearDhanushkodithishasnotgeneratedanyearthquake. In the vicinity of Kudankulam no neotectonic lineament or active fault within its 5 km radius is presentwhichcaninitiatefaultingsimilartoobservedinDhanushkodi. StudyhasbeencarriedoutforshoretidalandstabilityofKudankulamsiteusingmultidatedsatellite data(LISSIIIandPANDatabetween1992to2000).Theshorelinewasfoundtobefairlystableduring this period and there is no indication of shore line erosion or accretion along the coast during the wholeperiodaswellasduringtheintermediateperiods. ThereportedrockmeltextrusionsareduetomeltingofRCCpolesandsoil/weatheredrockswhich wereatthecontactofthechargedpoles.Thecauseofmeltingmaybeduetothelightning,short circuitingandfailureofthetrippingmechanism.Thisisclearlyseeneventodayasvisibleburntand melt marks on the two electrical poles in Pondicheri. Hence the reported rock melts are not the indicators of the underground volcanic activity and their relation with the existence of inferred volcanicventsisalsonotcorrect.Itisrelatedtoelectrical/lightningphenomenon.

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References

AERB(1990)GuideNoAERB/SG/S11SeismicstudiesanddesignbasisgroundmotionforNuclearPower Plantstudies. AMD (2011) Report on geology and seismotectonics of the area around Kudankulam, Thirunelveli District,TamilNadu.unpublishedreportofAMD. Anil Kumar and Gopalan, K., (1991) Precise RbSr age and enriched mantle source of the Sevattur carbonatites,TamilNadu,SouthIndia,CurrentScience,16(ii),pp.653654. ArmstrongAltrin, J.S., Ramasamy, S., And Makhnach, A., 2001, Stable isotope geochemistry and evidence for meteoric diagenesis in Kudankulam Formation, Tamil Nadu: Geological Society of India,Journal,v.57,p.3948. ArmstrongAltrin, J.S., Verma, S.P., Madhavaraju, J., Lee, Y.I., Ramasamy, S., 2003. Geochemistry of upperMioceneKudankulamlimestones,southernIndia.Int.Geol.Rev.45,1626. ArmstrongAltrin,J.S.,Lee,Y.I.,Verma,S.P.,Ramasamy,S.,2004.Geochemistryofsandstonesfromthe upper Miocene Kudankulam Formation, Southern India: implications for provenance, weathering,andtectonicsetting.J.Sed.Res.74,285297 ArmstrongAltrin, J.S, Lee, Y.I, Verma, S.P and Worden, R.H, (2009). Carbon oxygen and strontium isotopegeochemistryofcarbonaterocksofupperMioceneKudankulamformation,SouthIndia. ChemiederErde,vol.69,pp4560. Auden, J.B., 1949. Dykes in western India. A discussion of their relationships with the Deccan Traps. Trans.Natl.Inst.Sci.India3,123157. BapatA.Personalcommunication2012. Bhoominathan A. 2004. Seismic site characterization for nuclear structures and power plants. Current ScienceVol.87No.10. Bhoominathan A. and Gandhi, S.R., 2002a. Report on review of Geotecnical and geological data of reactorbuildingunit1KudanKulamAtomicpowerproject Bhoominathan A. and Gandhi, S.R., 2002b. Report on review of Geotecnical and geological data of reactorbuildingunit2KudanKulamAtomicpowerproject Balachandran,V.andSatyanarayana,B.,(1988)AReportontheDetailedGeotechnicalInvestigationsof theKudankulamAtomicPowerProject,Tirunelvelidistrict,Tamilnadu,UnpublishedGSIReport forFieldSeason198788. Balakrishnan,T.S.,Unnikrishnan,P.andMurthy,A.V.S.,(2009)TheTectonicMapofIndiaandcontiguous areas,J.Geol.Soc.India,Vol.74,158170. Bhattacharya,C.,Das,S.,Banerjee,JandPal,S.P.,(2002)RockmeltextrusionatPuruliya,WestBengal. Jour.Geol.Soc.India,Vol.60,pp.323327. Biju John and Rajendran, C.P. 2009. Evidence of episodic brittle faulting in the cratonic part of the Peninsular India and its implications for seismic hazard in slow deforming regions Tectonophysics,Vol.471.P.240252. Biju John and Rajendran, C.P., 2008. Geomorphic Indicators of Neotectonism from the Precambrian TerrainofPeninsularIndia:AStudyfromtheBharathapuzhaBasin,Kerala.J.GeolSoc.IndiaVol. 71P.827840. Biju John, Rao, D.T., Yogendra Singh and Nawani, P.C., 2011 Signatures of active faulting in Southern Peninsular India, In international conference on 2001 Bhuj Earthquake and Advances in EarthquakeScience,January2227,2011. Biswas,S.K.,(2011)personalcommunication Catlos,E.J.,ChandraS.Dubey,C.S,andSivasubramanian,P.,2008.Monaziteagesfromcarbonatitesand highgrade assemblages along the Kambam Fault (Southern Granulite Terrane, South India)

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Kunte,P.D.andWagle,B.G.,2005ThebeachridgesofIndia:areview.J.coastalRes.Vol.42,P.174183. Longinosis, B., Anand, S.P., Rajaram, M., 1993. Subvolcanic intrusives of Kudankulam, India: a ground magneticcharecterisationofsubsurfacestructure.IGCPP2030. Manimaran, G., Sivasubramaniyan, P. and Senthiyappan, M., 2001 Rock Melt Extrusion at Abisheka patti,TirunelveliDistrict,TamilNaduAReport,J.Geol.Soc.India,Vol.57.pp.464466. Miyazaki T. and Santosh, M. 2005 Cooling History of the Puttetti Alkali Syenite Pluton, Southern IndiaGondwanaResearch,V.8,pp.567574. Miyazaki, T., Kagami, H., Shutto, K., Morikiyo, T., Ram Mohan, V. and Rajasekaran, K.C. (2000) RbSr Geochronology,NdSrisotopesandwholerockgeochemistryofYelagiriandSevattursyenites, TamilNadu,SouthIndia,Gond.Research,v.3,No.1,pp.3953. Morolov,V.M.Voronovsky,S.N.andBorodine,L.S.(1975)Newfindingsabouttheageofcarbonatites andsyenitesfromSouthernIndia,USSR.AcademyofScience,v.222,pp.4648. Morris,A.P.,Ferrill,D.A.,Sims,D.W.,Franklin,N.,andWaiting,D.J.,2004,Patternsoffaultdisplacement andstrainatYuccaMountain,Nevada:JournalofStructuralGeology,v.26,p.17071725,doi: 10.1016/j.jsg.2003.12.005. Murty,G.R.K.,Satyanarayana,Y.AndkumarT.P.,1994MagneticprofileacrossGulfofMannar.J.Geol. Soc.Indiavol.44P.443449. Murty,S.V.S.,Basu,S,andAnilKumar(2006)NoblegasesinSouthIndiancarbonatites:Trappedandin situcomponents.JournalofAsianEarthSciences,Volume30,Issue1,1April2007,Pages154 169. Nawani,P.C.Personalcommunication2012. NPCIL(2010)NoteontheseismotectonicstatusoftheoffshoreareaintheGulfofMannarregionbased onthedataobtainedfromONGC. Perry,F.V.Crowe,B,M.andValentine.GA.2000.AnalyzingVolcanicHazardsatYuccaMountainLos AlamosScienceNumber26P.492493. Radhakrishna, T., Dallmeyer, R.D. and Joseph,. M., 1994 Palaeomagnetism and36Ar/40Arvs. 39 Ar/40ArisotopecorrelationagesofdykeswarmsincentralKerala,India:Tectonicimplications EarthandPlanetaryScienceLettersVolume121,Pages213226. Rajamanickam, G.V. and Chandrasekar, N.2000 Extrusion of Rock melt in the vicinity of high tension electricline,inJournalofJ.Geol.Soc.India.,Vol.55,p.109. Rajendran K, Talwani P, & Gupta KH 1992 state of stress field in the Indian subcontinent. A review : Currentscience,vol.62p8693. RamakrishnanMandVaidyanadhanR(2010)GeologyofIndia,VolI,GeologicalSocietyofIndia. Ramasamy. (1996) Carbonatite dykes from Kudangulam area, near Cape Comorin, Tamil Nadu. Jour. Geol.Soc.India,Vol.48,pp.221226. Ramasamy,R.2000MoltenRockExtrusions,J.Geol.Soc.India.,Vol.55,pp.221226. Ramasamy, R. 1995, Effects of metasomatism on the country rocks around the carbonatites of Kudankulamarea.Tamilnadu.J.Geol.Soc.IndiaVol.46,P.117123. Ramaswamy,S.M.,Kumaran,C.J.,Selvakumar,R.andSaravanavel,J.(2011) Remotesensingrevealed drainageanomaliesandrelatedtectonicsofSouthIndia,Tectonophysicsvol.501,P.,4151. Rana, M.S., Chakraborty, C., Sharma. R. and Giridhar, M. (2008) Mannar Volcanics Implications for MadagascarBreakup,7thInternationalconferenceandexpositiononpetroleumgeophysics. Rao, D.T., Biju John and Yogendra Singh, 2010 Report on Seismotectonic evaluation of Kudankulam AtomicPowerPlantwithin5km. Rao, D.T., Biju John and Yogendra Singh, 2011 Report on Seismotectonic evaluation of Kudankulam AtomicPowerPlantwithin30km.

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Rao,M.V..,Chidambaram,LBharktya,D.andJanardhanan,M(2008)IntegratedAnalysisofLateAlbian toMiddleMioceneSedimentsinGulfofMannarShallowWatersoftheCauveryBasin,India:A Sequence Stratigraphic Approach 7th International conference and exposition on petroleum geophysics. Roy,S.,Ray,L.,BhattacharyaA.andSrinivasanR.(2007)Newheatflowdatafromdeepboreholesinthe greenstonegranitegneiss and gneissgranulite provinces of south India, DCSDST news, Jan 2007 Reddy, B.M., Janardhan, A.J. and Peucat, J.J. (1995) Geochemistry, age and origin of alkaline and ultramaficrocksofSalem,TamilNadu,SouthIndia,Jour.Geol.Soc.India,v.45,pp.251262. Sastri, V.V., Sinha, R.N., Singh, G. and Murti, K.V.S, (1973) Stratigraphy and tectonics of sedimentary basins on East coast of Peninsular India, Bull. Am. Asso. Petrolium Geologists. Vol. 57, P. 655 678. Smith E. I. and Keenan D. L. Yucca Mountain Could Face Greater Volcanic Threat Eos, Transactions, AmericanGeophysicalUnion,Vol.86,No.35,30August2005,Pages317,321. Subramanya,K.R(1996)ActiveintraplatedeformationinSouthIndia.Tectonophysics,Vol.262P.231 241. Sunil, P.S., Radhakrishna, M., Kurian, P.J., Murty, B.V.S., Subrahmanyan, C., Nambiar, C.G., Arts, K.P., Arun, S.K and Mohan, S.K. (2010) Crustal structure of the western paer of the Southern GranuliteTerrainofIndianPeninsularShieldderivedfromGravityData.J.AsianEarthSciences Vol.39,P.551564. Talwani P,and Rajendran K,1991 some seismological geometric features of intraplate earthquakes tectonophysicsvol186,p1941. Vaz. G. G. (2001) Rock Melt Extrusion at Abishekapatti, Tamil Nadu: An Enigma. Jour.Geol.Soc.India, Vol.58,p272. VazG.G.,Hariprasad,M.,Rao,B.R.andSubbaRao,V.(2007)Subsidenceofsouthernpartoferstwhile Dhanushkodi township, Tamil Nadu evidences from bathymetry, side scan and underwater videography,CurrentScience,Vol.92,No.5, VestalW.andLowrie,A.,1982LargescaleslumpsoffsouthernIndiaandSriLankaGeoMarineLetters, Vol.2,P.171177, Viemester,P.E.,1983Petrifiedlightning:Inlightningbook VitaFinzi2004,BucklecontrolledseismogenicfaultinginPeninsularIndia,QuaternaryScienceReviews ,vol23,p24052442.

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ANNEXURE9A

InspectionNoteonthevisittoascertainRockMeltExtrusions(RME)sitesaround KudankulamProject
(ReportbyNationalInstituteofRockMechanics,KolarandAtomicMineralsDivision,Hyderabad)

IIntroduction: RockMeltExtrusions(RME)havebeenreportedaroundAbishekapatti,Thiruppanikkarisalkulam,

Anikulam and Pondicheri in Thirunelveli district during 1998 and 1999 (Manimaran et al., 2001; Rajamanickametal.,2000;Ramasamy2000;Vaz2001). The occurrences of RME in Thirunelveli district were referred by PMANE in their report on

KudankulamNPP,dated12thDecember,2011andquotePlacesaroundKudankulamhaveexperienced smallvolumevolcaniceruptionsintheyears1998,1999,2001and2005.Thenearesteruptionoccurred atjust26kilometersawayfromtheKKNPPsite.Theproductsoftheseeruptionshavebeenconfirmed byvariousresearchersastheonesproducedbyvolcanicactivity.Onecannotruleoutsucheruptionsat the site itself. Issues of subduction, fire and impact of high speed missiles emanating from the burst needtobeaddressed. The review of similar incidences indicate that in addition to the above mentioned incidences, similarrockmeltshavebeenreportedduringthelast15yearsinmanypartsofIndianamelyParasiain Chhindwaradistrict,MadhyaPradesh(Khannaet.al1959)andBhopal,MadhyaPradesh(Khanna,1999), Gujarat, Uttarakhand (Nawani, Rao and Bapat, personal communications 2012) and West Bengal (Bhattacharyya et al., 2002). These studies infer RME phenomenon was confined to the regions very near to high tension electrical transmission lines poles and snapped transmission lines. Lightning / thunder storms have also caused RME at some places. The features are very shallow and confined to only34metersonlyatthetop/surfacelayers.Inallthecasestheywerereportedtobetaperingwith depthindicatingthatthesourceoftheactivityliesinthesuperficialveneeronly.Thezoneofinfluence oftheseincidentswasalsoofverynegligibledimensionscomparedtoexpectedvolumesoftheregions duetoanyvolcanicactivityorduetomagmaticintrusionsintheformofdykes,plugsetc.

To verify the PMANEs claim that these incidents are due to volcanic eruptions, a team consisting of officers Shri D.T.Rao, Dr. Biju John, Shri Yogendra Singh of National Institute of Rock Mechnaics, Kolar, (NIRM), Sri K Muralidharan of Directorate of Atomic Mineral Exploration and Research, Hyderabad (AMD)andShriRajesh,ofNPCILvisitedAbishekapatti, Thiruppanikkarisalkulam,
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Anikulam and Pondicheri RME sites on 22nd January, 2012 to study RME phenomenon and interacted withthelocalvillagersandcollectedthesamplesfromthesites.RMElocationswithrespectedtoKKNPP site are shown in figure 1. The observations are based after physically inspecting the sites and interactionwiththelocalvillagers. IIFieldStudies: i.

Abhishekapatti:

TheAbhishekapattiRMEsiteislocatedinthelivestockfarmrunbytheTamilnadustategovernment. FragmentsofRMEareseeninaheapofexcavateddebris,attheoriginalpoleandassociatedrockmelt locations(Photo1A,1B,1C,1D),carriedoutbyearlierresearchworkers.The11KVhightensionpower line is passing through the field in NW SE direction. The original pole located at (N 80 45.130, E 770 39.784)wasreplacedbytwopolesoneithersideofthesite.Itwasreportedthattheincidentoccurred inthenightandtherewasstronglightning.Thepowerwasrestoredaftertwodaysorso.Thepowerline hadnotsnappedeventhoughthelightningstruck.Strikingoflightningonthepoleinducedthemelting phenomenon.About4mofthepolemelted,wassunkintothegroundandthepoleheightwasreduced. Theconcretematerialofthepolewithitsironreinforcementandthesurroundingsoil/rockmaterialin contactwiththepolegotmelted.TheRMEfragmentsareseeninvarietyofshapesandmaterials.Dark brown to black material, highly vesicular with large voids were seen in some samples. Typical small cylindrical structures were also seen which was an admixture of the rock as well as sand of the surrounding material. The RME also consists of numerous hollow tubes like glass material which are recoveredfromthesite.ThesefeaturesresembletheFulgurites,materialwhicharegenerated/formed duringstrikingoflightningonthatdate.Thecircularmeltfeaturesarenaturalglassesformedresulting fromverylargeelectricaldischargebetweenearthandcloudswherelightningstrikesbarerockorsand. Duetotheveryshortperiodandtheresultanthightemperaturewillmelttherockverticallydownwith theformationofcircular/tubularfeaturearecalledFulgurites. ii. Thiruppanikarisalkulam:

Thissiteislocatedatabout45kmSEfromAbhishekpattiandislocatedabout200mbacksideofalocal temple. The electric pole at (N 80 44.199, E 770 37.704) is made of iron and no damage to it was observed.Informationabouttheemanationofsmokeforfewhoursfromthegroundofaroundonefeet radius at a distance of two feet (Photo 2A,2B ) from the pole was mentioned by the local people. No RMEmaterialsoranyalterationofthesurroundingsoilwasseenaroundthesite.
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iii.

Anikulam:

Theoriginalsiteat(N80 26.370,E770 44.531)ismodifiedwithlayoutdevelopedasresidentialplots. However,thepowerlineandthefragmentsandothermaterialsinthegroundareavailableatpresent (Photo3).FragmentsofblackRMEmaterialalongwiththeadmixtureofthesurroundingsoilalongwith theconcretematerialofthepolewasfoundaroundelectricpole.Thedamagedpolewasreplacedwith newone.Itwasinformedthatatthislocationalsoexcavationwasdoneearlierforthestudy.Manyof theearliermaterialsareavailable.Fewofthesampleswerecollectedfromthesedumps. iv. Pondicheri: Thephenomenonofmeltingwasobservedattwolocalitiesasbelow. Location1(N80 24.144,E770 44.189):Localvillagersinformedthattherewasheavyraininthearea during that period and there was short circuiting near the electric pole bearing no.57931. One goat which was grazing nearby was reported to have been electrocuted. Here no RME was seen on the groundsurface. Features ofRMElike black glassymaterial,openventslinedwithlayers ofblack glass areseenonthesurfaceofthepole.Darkbrowntoblackstainsduetoheatinginthepolewasnoticedat about1mabovetheground.Theconcretefoundationofthepoleisbrowntoblackcolouredwithcracks developedindicatingpartialburningduetothetransmissionofheattoitsbase.RMEseenonthepole hasoccurredduetothegenerationofheatingduetocurrentflowtothegroundfromthesnappedlive wire which was in contact with the pole for a few hours. This pole has not been replaced. The clear burningeffectoftheconcretewasvisible(Photo4A,4B,4C,4D,4E,4F,4G). Location2:Thissiteisafewhundredmetersawayfromthefirstsitesimilarincidentwasreported.At this site (N 80 24.148, E 770 43.845) the live wire was reported to have been snapped at night. The snappedlivewirewasintouchwithpoleforalongtime.Itcausedburningoftheconcretepoleresulting inRMEataheightofabout3mfromsurfacewhichisclearlyseenonthepoleitself.Theconcretemelt of about 5 to 10 cm is seen as long open vent, dark brown to black in colour (Photo 5A, 5B) which is similartofeatureofRMEasobservedatotherlocalitiesonthesurface. TheabovetwoevidencesatPondichericlearlyshowthattheRMEwasderivedfromthemelting

oftheconcretematerialofthepoleitselfandisduetoitscontactwithlivewire. IIIObservations AlltheRMEincidentsarerelatedtoshortcircuiting,failureofthetrippingmechanismandlongduration of contact with live wires. Only in Abhishekpatti the RME is seen to be mainly due to the lightening
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effectwhichcausedthemeltingoftheconcretemixandironreinforcementsintheelectricpoleandthe soilandweatheredrockssurroundingthepole. Thecorroborationofallthematerialsascollectedfromthedifferentsourcesandtheirsimilar

natureofthematerialsatallplacesindicatethatthematerialsarefromthemeltingofthereinforced cementconcrete(RCC)andsurroundingrock/soilmaterialonlyduetoelectricalshortcircuitingandlong timecontactresultingindevelopmentofhightemperature(Photo6A&6B).ThisinfersthatRMEarenot caused by any volcanic activity. Hence relating the RME phenomenon to the presence of any underground volcanic activity or existence of inferred volcanic vents is not correct. It is related to heatingrelatedwithelectricalphenomenaeitherduetoshortcircuitingofthehighvoltagepowerlines or due to the passage of high current passing through the electric poles in the open fields due to lightening.
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SAFETYOF KUDANKULAMNUCLEARPOWERPLANT ANDIMPACTOFITSOPERATION ONTHESURROUNDINGS

REPORTBY EXPERTGROUPCONSTITUTEDBYGOVT.OFINDIA DECEMBER2011

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CONTENTS
1. Introduction 2. GlobaltrendsinNuclearPowerandneedforNuclearPowerinIndia 2.1Globaltrends 2.2NeedfornuclearpowerinIndia 3. SafetyfeaturesofKKNPPagainstTMI,Chernobyl,Fukushimatypeseverenuclearaccidents 3.1TheTMIaccidentandKKNPP 3.2TheChernobylaccidentandKKNPP 3.3TheFukushimaaccidentandKKNPP 4. RadiationaroundNuclearPowerPlants(NPP)andImpactonthePublicHealth 4.1Radiationsafetyandimpactonthepublic 4.2Nuclearradiationandhealth 5. KKNPPReactorDesignandSafety 6. RadioactiveWasteandSpentFuelManagement:PrinciplesandPractices 6.1WastegenerationandTreatment 6.2MethodsadoptedatKudankulam 6.3SpentFuelManagement 7. EcologicalEffects 7.1Marineecologyandfishprotection 7.2Impactonland,agriculture,livestockandfood 7.3Impactonfloraandfauna 7.4Biosphereconsiderations 8. EarthquakeandTsunami 8.1Earthquakedesignmethodology

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8.2EarthquakeDesignBasisforKKNPP 8.3VolcanoandTsunami 8.4FlooddesignofKKNPP 9. RegulatoryandStatutoryClearances 9.1Introduction 9.2NuclearRegulatoryClearances 9.3StatutoryClearances 9.4OtherstatutoryclearancesobtainedbyKKNPP1&2 10. OtherTopics 10.1FuelSupply 10.2IAEASafeguards 10.3FreshWaterSupplyandDesalinationPlants 10.4ConstructionQA 10.5EmergencyPreparedness 10.6Decommissioning 11. Concludingremarks

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1.Introduction
TheKudankulamNuclearPowerProject(KKNPP)isanIndoRussianjointventureforestablishing

a nuclear power station with 2 units (KKNPP1&2) of 1000 MWe Pressurized Water Reactors of VVER designatKudankulaminTamilnadu.TheproposedPowerstationiscoveredbytheInternationalAtomic EnergyAgency(IAEA)safeguards,onlineswithexistingstationslikeTarapur1&2andRajastan1&2built in collaboration with USA and Canada respectively. The project site has the required clearances from AtomicEnergyRegulatoryBoardandalsobyvariousotherstatutoryauthoritiesintheStateandcentre. The VVER reactors being established at Kudankulam belong to the family of advanced

Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). Presently 434 nuclear reactors are under operation in the world and about 269 of them belong to the PWR family including 55 VVERs. Among the 64 reactors under constructionworldwide,53arePWRsincluding10VVERs. The activities towards establishing the two reactors were progressing satisfactorily till the last

week of July 2011 when a section of the population in the neighborhood, in association with an organization called, Peoples movement against nuclear energy (PMANE), started an agitation against theprojectanddemandedtheclosureofKKNPP.Duetothisagitation,projectworkatthesitehasbeen adverselyaffected. TheGovernmentofIndiaconstituteda15memberExpertGroup(EG)toprovideclarifications

on the issues raised by the agitators and allay their fears. The EG has been asked to do this by interacting with the forum provided by the State Government comprising of 2 State Government nomineesand4representativesofthepeople. ThefirstjointmeetingoftheExpertGroupwiththeforumwasheldon8thNovember2011and

thesecondoneon18thNovember2011,bothattheofficeoftheDistrictCollector,Tirunelveli.Inboth themeetingsnodiscussioncouldbeheldforEGtoclarifyontheissuesandapprehensionsraisedbythe agitatorstowardsallayingthefearsinthemindsofasectionofpeople.ThoughtheEGhadpainstakingly prepared power point presentations on selected topics of relevance with details to convey factual informationtoallaythefearsinthemindofpublicthroughtherepresentativesofpeople,makingofthe presentationsbytheEGwasnotacceptedbytherepresentativesofpeople,statingthattheywerenot expertsinthefieldandhencewouldnotbeabletoproperlycomprehendthepresentations.However, they accepted copies of the report prepared by EG, titled Presentation to TN Government nominees and people representatives regarding safety of KKNPP on 18112011 in the office of DC, Tirunelveli.
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TheirsingledemandwastheclosureofthenuclearpowerprojectatKudankulam.Therepresentatives also submitted a letter in the second meeting requesting for documents relating to the project on a wide range of subjects which come under the jurisdiction of different State and Central Authorities, Statutorybodiesetc. TheEGobservedthatseveralstatementsbyprotestingleadersinpublicmeetings,newsitemsin

themediaandthedemandforclosureofthenuclearpowerplantaremainlyduetomisinterpretationof the global trend on the use of nuclear energy for power generation, lack of appreciation of the 4 decadesofIndianexperienceinestablishingandoperatingnuclearplants,misunderstandingandlack of knowledge on the levels of radiation in the neighborhood of NPPs and its impact on health, unfoundedfearsonthehealthofpresentandfuturegenerations,inadequatepublicawarenessofthe advanced design and safety features of proposed nuclear reactors at Kudankulam, imaginary adverse impactonthelivelihoodofpeopleintheneighborhoodetc.Toallaysuchfearsinthemindsofpublic, the EG has prepared this document with brief reports on major topics addressing the perceived concernsofpeople.Whilethename(s)ofthecontributingexpert(s)havebeenindicatedinthedifferent sections below, it is to be noted that considerable inputs and information have been given by NPCIL. Furtherthisisaconsensusdocumentwherethereisagreementamongsttheexpertsonthecontentsof thereport. This report has been prepared by the members of EG based on their expertise, published literature, detailedinformationobtainedfromtherecordsprovidedbyNPCILandinspectionofthesite.Thelead author(s)ofthedifferenttopicsareincludedbeloweachtitle.Thereportisfinalizedwithfullagreement ofallEGmembers. SometextappearinginthisreporthasalreadybeenpresentedintheearlierreporttitledPresentation to Tamilnadu Government nominees and people representatives regarding safety of KKNPP on 18.11.2011intheofficeofDistrictCollector,Tirunelveli.However,thesamehasbeenincludedhere forthesakeofcompletenessandtomakethepresentreportastandalonedocument.

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2.GlobalTrendsinNuclearPowerandneedforNuclearPowerinIndia
(Dr.S.M.Lee,RajaRamannaFellow,SafetyResearchInstitute,Kalpakkam) 2.1Globaltrends

Internationally,asofearlyDecember2011,434nuclearreactorsareoperatingin30countries

andproducing367580MW(e)and64reactorsareunderconstructiontoproduce61642MW(e)(refer Table2.1.1andTable2.1.2). FurtherthefollowingNuclearPowerPlants(NPPs)havebeenconnectedtorespectivegridsafter

theFukushimaaccidentofMarch2011: ChashappUnit2(300MWe,PWR,Pakistan)on14thMarch2011. Lingao4(1000MW,PWR,China)on3rdMay2011. CEFRChinaExperimentalFastReactor(20MWe,FBR,China)on21stJuly2011. Bushehr1(915MWe,PWR,VVER,Iran)on3rdSeptember2011.

Thestatusinsomeothercountries,postFukushima,issummarizedbelow:

Russia:10reactorsareunderconstruction.14reactorsarefurtherplanned. USA:Thereareproposalsforover20newreactors. France:Buildinga1600MWeunitatFlamanvilleforoperationin2012andsecondtofollowatPenly. UK:Four1600MWeunitsareplannedforoperationin2019. Germany: It had 17 reactors and it has not granted sanction for further life extension to 8 reactors among them that had completed design life. The design life of the remaining 9 will be completed by 2022.Germanyannouncedthattheywillnotconsiderfurtherextensionoflifeoftheseplants.There had been a debate in Germany about the need for nuclear power plants, even before Fukushima accident,basedonsufficientavailabilityofelectricalenergyfromothersourcesandenergyavailability fromneighboringnations. Switzerland: It has 5 reactors in operation. It has decided to phase out Nuclear power by 2034 on completionoftheirdesignlife.

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Japan:Ithad54nuclearreactors,11reactorscontinuedtobeinoperationevenduringearthquakeand tsunamiinJapanandarestillinoperation.Theremainingreactorswereputonshutdown/maintenance. Decisions were taken to start them after safety review and the first of these has been restarted in August2011. Table2.1.1:NuclearPowerReactorsinoperation(5thDec2011) Country Argentina Armenia Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Canada China CzechRepublic Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Japan KoreaS. Mexico Netherlands Pakistan Reactors 2 1 7 2 2 18 15 6 4 58 9 4 20 1 50 21 2 1 3 GWe 935 375 5927 1884 1906 12624 11078 3678 2736 63130 12068 1889 4391 915 44215 18698 1300 482 725
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Romania RussianFed. SlovakRep. Slovenia SouthAfrica Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Ukraine UK USA Total (FromIAEAwebsite)

2 33 4 1 2 8 10 5 6 15 18 104 434

1300 23643 1816 688 1800 7567 9298 3263 4982 13107 9920 101240 367580

China has 15 nuclear power reactors in operation and 27 under construction. Additional reactors are planned,includingsomeoftheworld'smostadvanced(liketheRussianVVER),togiveafiveorsixfold increaseinnuclearcapacitytoatleast60GWeby2020,then200GWeby2030,and400GWeby2050. Chinaisrapidlybecomingselfsufficientinreactordesignandconstruction,aswellasotheraspectsof thefuelcycle. Table2.1.2:NuclearPowerReactorsunderConstruction(5thDec2011) Country Argentina Brazil Bulgaria China Reactors 1 1 2 27 GWe 692 1245 1906 27230

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Finland France India Japan KoreaS. Pakistan RussianFed. SlovakRep. Taiwan Ukraine USA Total (fromIAEAwebsite)

1 1 6 2 5 1 10 2 2 2 1 64

1600 1600 4194 2650 5560 315 8203 782 2600 1900 1165 61642

BangladeshhasrecentlysignedintergovernmentalagreementwithRussiatostartconstructionofanew VVERplantinBangladeshinNovember2011. VietnamhassignedanagreementrecentlywithRussiafortheestablishmentoftheirfirstnuclearpower plant(VVER)andwithaconsortiumfromJapantoconstructasecondnuclearplant. UAEcontinuesworkrelatedtosettingupofitsfirstnuclearplantthroughaconsortiuminSouthKorea. Turkeyhasinitiatedactionforsettingupitsfirstnuclearpowerplant(VVER) Fromtheabove,itisclearthatthetrendappearstobeoncontinueduseofnuclearpowerglobally.

2.2NeedfornuclearpowerinIndia
2.2.1Indianelectricityscenario ThegrowthoftheinstalledelectriccapacityinIndiaisshowninTable2.2.1.Theresourcewisebreakup ofthepresentinstalledcapacityisgiveninTable2.2.2.

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 Table2.2.1:IndiaInstalledElectricCapacity Year 1950 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 2011 Table2.2.2:ClassificationofIndiaInstalledElectricCapacityin2011 Resource Coal/Oil/Gas Hydro OtherRenewable* Nuclear Total (*Wind,SmallHydro,Biomass,Solar,Geothermal) (Captiveconnectedtogridis19.5GWe) Poverty, malnutrition, ill health, and underemployment can only be corrected by concerted efforttowardseconomicandindustrial development.Oneofthe infrastructurerequirementsforsuch development is an adequate electricity supply base. The factors that need to be considered for estimating the future electrical energy demand are expected population growth, national economic growth and industrial development. In addition more intangible factors have to be also taken into account like tradeoff of standard of living against environmental protection, cultural and political changeslikepopulationshiftfromruraltourbanandsoon.Tosimplifytheprojectiononecanconsider theprojectedgrowthoftheproductofaveragepercapitaenergyutilizationandthepopulation. The per capita utilization of electrical energy in India in 2005 worked out to be less than 500 GWe 118.7(65.1%) 38.7(21.2%) 20.2(11.1%) 4.8(2.6%) 182.3 GWe 2 14 33 72 108 144 182

kWhperannum,whichisaboutonefifthoftheworldaverageandaboutonetwentiethofthatofthe industrially developed countries (see Table 2.2.3). The per capita utilization of electrical energy could increase by over an order of magnitude as India becomes industrially and technologically advanced. Withapopulationofoveronebillion,eventoattainthepresentworldaverageelectricityutilizationwill requireaproductionofsome3000TWhi.e.aninstalledcapacityofabout600GWe.

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 2.2.2Energyresourcesforelectricityproduction The energy resources are classified as "conventional", "nonconventional" and "future". By

"conventional"ismeantcoal,oil,gas,hydroandnuclearfission.Theconventionalenergyresourcesare able to meet the requirements of central power plant electricity generation in a commercially competitive manner. Their availability in sufficient amounts in India also offers scope for longterm sustainabilityforseveralcenturies. Table2.2.3:PerCapitaAnnualElectricityConsumptionofsomecountriesin2005 (Takenfromwww.earthtrends.wri.org) Country kWh Canada 17321 USA 13636 UnitedArabEmirates 12412 Japan 8201 S.Korea 7804 Germany 7114 UK 6234 Russia 5786 Malaysia 3301 Iran 2143 Brazil 2013 Thailand 1950 China 1781 Iraq 1154 Zimbabwe 961 N.Korea 858 Zambia 710 Vietnam 572 India 481 Pakistan 456 WorldAverage 2596 By"nonconventional"inIndiaismeantwind,biomass,smallhydro,andsolar.Theseareuseful

forelectricityproductiononsmallscaleandinlocalizedplacesorremoteareas. Other resources, which need technological developments before they can be used in a

commerciallycompetitivemannerforelectricityproduction,areclassified"future". 2.2.2.1Conventionalresources Indiahassubstantialcoal depositswiththereservesestimatedat286billion tonnes,ofwhich

114billiontonnesareintheprovencategoryand137billiontonnesareindicated,thebalancebeing
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inferred.Muchoftheresourceisofhighashcontentandconsequentlyoflowercalorificvalue.Coal hasmajorandimportantusesinmetallurgicalandchemicalindustries,transportsectorandforheating. Henceonlypartofthecoalcanbeusedforelectricitygeneration. Indiashydrocarbonreservesareverylimitedandwouldnecessarilybeusedinotherthanthe electricpowersector. India has moderate but mostly untapped hydro potential, which is estimated at a possible installedcapacityof148GWeor84GWegenerationatabout60%loadfactor.Ofthispotentialonly38 GWehasbeeninstalledasin2011.Thedifficultiesinfullutilizationofthepotentiallieinthefactthat muchofitisconcentratedinHimalayanrangesandGhatsectionswherenotonlyaccessisdifficultbut also storage sites are limited. The high capital costs, long gestation periods and environmental objectionshaveprovedtobeotherinhibitingfactors. India has relatively small deposits of uranium. The indicated and inferred resources are equivalent to a total of about 60000 tonnes of uranium. India has vast resources of thorium of about 225,000tonnesofequivalentmetal. Table 2.2.4 approximately compares the approximate energy potential of various resources in India. Table2.2.4:PotentialofConventionalEnergyResourcesinIndiaforElectricityGeneration Utilization Energy Estimated Potential Recoverable ResourceType Capac Numberofyears GWe.y Quantity ity (Loadfactor) GWe Coal 100billiontonnes* 29000 500 81(70%) Hydro Renewable Renewable 148 Renewable(60%) Natural Uranium in PHWR 61thousandtonnes 325 1215 3035(70%) (oncethrough) DepletedUraniuminFBR ~60thousandtonnes 16000+ 300 65(70%) 350 Thorium 225thousandtonnes 155000 500 440(70%) *Withappropriatereservationforuseinotherthanthepowersector. +LimitedbyuraniuminventoryfortheFBRblankets. It is seen from Table 2.2.4 that coal would deplete in about 80 years. Further development wouldneedcoalimportswithdeleteriouseffectontheeconomy.Evensaturationdevelopmentofthe hydro resources cannot meet the projected demand. Exploitation of the Indian nuclear resources and utilization of thorium is the key to energy independence for India in coming centuries. The energy

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potentialofthenuclearresourcesneedsathreestagenuclearpowerprogrammeasshowninthefigure below. Thefirststagewouldproducepowerfromnaturaluraniumwhileplutoniumwouldbeextracted fromthespentfuel(whichisamixtureofdepleteduranium,byproductplutoniumandfissionproducts). Thesecondstagewouldusefastbreederreactorstoproducepowerfromplutoniumandcreatemore plutoniumfromthedepleteduraniumtogrowtheplutoniuminventorytorequiredlevels.Theendof thesecondstagewouldseetheplutoniumbeingusedtoproducepowerandalsoconvertthethorium toU233.ThethirdstagewouldseethelargescaleutilizationofthoriumandU233.Astheuraniumin ourcountryislimitedandthegrowthinthesecondstageislimitedbythephysicsparametersofthefast breeder reactors and not by the rate of investment, it has been decided to augment the indigenous nuclearpowerprogrammebyimportingadvancedlightwatersfromabroadasanadditionalelement.

Fig.2.1ThreeStageNuclearPowerProgamme(thenumbersquotedareindicative) 2.2.2.2Nonconventionalresources
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Indianeedstoexploitallsourcesofenergylikewind,solar,biomassandsmallhydropower.The MinistryofNewandRenewableEnergyresourcesisresponsibleforthedevelopmentoftheseformsof energy.Thepotentialandpresentutilizationin2010areindicatedinTable2.2.5. Table2.2.5:IndiaNonConventionalEnergyPotentialandUtilizationin2010 Resource Wind SmallHydro(upto25MWe) BioPower Solar Total Potential(GWe) 48.5 15 24 2030(per1000sq.km.) Installed(GWe) 12.8 2.8 2.5 0.018 18.2

As can be observed from the Table 2.2.5, the potential of these nonconventional resources

(other than solar) is small. Further, they are not suitable for central plant electricity generation with present technologies.Whilewindhas alowavailabilityfactor,solarelectricityisatpresentaboutfive timesascostlyastheconventionalmeansofelectricityproduction. 2.2.2.3Futureresources Substantially all our energy is presently obtained from fossil fuels and hydroelectric power. There are many other energy resources that have potential for supplying energy needs in the future. Eventhoughsomeoftheseenergysourceshavebeenusedinthepast,theydonotpresentlymakea significant contribution to the energy supply. These are classified as future energy resources as listed below: AcceleratorBreeder; Fusion; Geothermal; Tidal; Wave; OceanThermalEnergyConversion; Coalbedmethane; Deepseahydrates. Ingeneral,itisnoteconomicallyattractive,andinsomecasesitisnottechnologicallyfeasible, toutilizetheseenergyresourcesatpresent.Thetechnologicalfeasibilityofmanyofthesenewenergy resources has been demonstrated analytically, or in the laboratory or in very small installations. The economicsoffullscaleinstallationshavebeenprojectedfromthesesmallscaleoperations.However,all such extrapolations could be questioned as actual costs may prove to be two or three times the
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estimated cost thereby completely negating the anticipated advantage of utilizing a particular energy source. It is even more difficult to predict that major technological breakthroughs can be achieved whichwillmakepossibletheeconomicfeasibilityofutilizingparticularenergysources(likefusionorhot dryrockgeothermal). On account of the tremendous potential of these new energy resources it is obvious that substantial amount of R&D for their development is important for the future. At the same time it is clear from the data given in Table 2.2.4 that the long term energy independence of India requires developmentofthethoriumresourcesonpriority. 2.2.3Comparisonofenvironmentaleffectsofconventionalenergyresourceutilization Theimportantpointtorealizeinadiscussionofenvironmentaleffectsandhazardsofanypower producingsystemisthatitshouldbeevaluatedbycomparingthefollowing: a. Thebenefitsaccruingfromthepowerproduction,perse; b. Theenvironmentaleffectsassociatedwithanyalternatepowerproducingsystems. The benefits of electric power production are enormous. Over the last one hundred years, increaseduseofenergyintheindustrializedcountrieshasbroughtabouteighttimestherealincome, double the life expectancy and halving of the working hours. There is a clear correlation between population health and commercial energy use. India still needs an order of magnitude increase in energy utilization to attain these levels. The effects of not having adequate electricity on society and qualityoflifehavetobebalancedagainsttheenvironmentaleffectsofincreasedelectricityproduction. HumanDevelopmentIndices(HDI)oftheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeareavailablecountry wise and found to be correlated with the per capita annual electricity consumption in the country. TypicalHDIarelifeexpectancy,GDP,fertilitycontrolandothers. TheimprovementinHDIstartssaturatingathigherannualkWh/capitaindicatingthatatabove 10000KWh/capitaperannumtheremaybelittlegaininincreasedenergyconsumptionandtherisksof energyutilizationcouldbecomeimportant.However,fordevelopingcountrieslikeIndiawithelectrical energy utilization in the 600 to 1000 kWh/capita per annum range there is genuine risk in curtailing energyutilization.Itcanbeshownthatiftheenergyutilizationweretobeincreasedthereductionof deathrateduetoincreasedlifeexpectancyisseveralthousandtimesgreaterthantheincreaseindeath rateduetotheriskfromtheincreasedenergyutilization.

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Therisksofindustrialactivitiessuchaselectricpowerproductionarefairlywellquantifiedand relativecomparisonsareavailable.Rigorousstudyoftherisksofnuclearpowergenerationshowsthatit islowerorcomparabletootherformsofpowergeneration.Alowprobabilityofsevereaccidentsexists for all energy producing systems, including nuclear. As an example Table 2.2.6 gives the normalised fatalityratesindifferentenergyoptionsduring19691996. Table2.2.6:Experiencebasedimmediatefatalityratesinfullenergychainfordifferentenergyoptions during19691996 EnergyOption Hydro Oil Coal NaturalGas Nuclear (Source: Stefan Hirschberg et al., Severe accidents in the energy sector comparative perspective in JournalofHazardousMaterials,Vol.111(2004)pp.5765) Comprehensive industrial risk studies taking into account the full energy production cycle No. of Severe No.ofImmediateFatalities Accidents with (perGWe.y) fatalities 9 8.8x101 334 4.2x101 187 3.4x101 86 8.5x102 1 8.4x103

includingtheneedforproductionofthematerialsofconstruction,thefabricationanderection,aswell as waste disposal and the additional energy needed for these, shows that from the point of view of emissionsriskthehydropowerisbestfollowedbynuclear,wind,solarphotovoltaicandfossil.Fromthe pointofviewofacuteriskthebestisnuclearfollowedbygas,coal,oilandhydro. The comparison of the effects of utilization of the conventional resources for electricity production namely thermal, hydro and nuclear indicates that while they may be equally commercially competitive they are also of comparable risk to the environment. Under the Kyoto Protocol it is necessaryforallcountriestorestricttheemissionofgreenhousegasestocertainspecifiedrates.Justto reachthepresentworldaveragepercapitaelectricityutilizationwillneedaninstalledelectriccapacity of600GWeinIndiaascomparedtothepresent182GWe.Suchlevelsofelectricitygenerationwould saturatethehydroresourcesanddepletethecoalreservesinthecountryinafewdecades.Tomeetthe requirementsofelectricityinourcountry,takingintoaccounttherestrictionsoftheKyotoconvention, developmentofthenuclearoptiontoitsfullpotentialisessential.

3.SafetyfeaturesofKKNPPagainstTMI,Chernobyl,Fukushimatypeseverenuclearaccidents
(Shri.S.K.Sharma,FormerChairman,AtomicEnergyRegulatoryBoard)
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Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011 are the nuclear

powerplant(NPP)accidentsinvolvingdamagetothereactorcorethathaveoccurredinthenearly60 yearhistoryofNPPoperationintheworld.TMIwasratedatlevel5whereasChernobylandFukushima were rated at level7 of the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). The INES has 7 levels in which levels1to3areassignedtosafetysignificantincidentsandlevels4to7areforaccidents,withlevel7 signifyingaccidentswithhighestseverity. The nuclear industry has a well structured system of using operating experience feedback. All

incidents and accidents are carefully analyzed to identify the causative factors and this information is used,asapplicable,inNPPstowardsmakingnecessarydesignandoperationalimprovements.InIndia also,allsafetysignificanteventsthatoccurinourNPPsasalsoinNPPsabroad,includingaccidents,are examinedindetailandappropriatesafetyimprovementsinhardware,proceduresandoperatortraining areimplemented.Further,thekeyoperatingpersonnelinourNPPs,unlikeinmanyothercountries,are graduateengineerswhoundergorigoroustheoreticalandinplanttrainingbeforetheyareauthorizedto perform the NPP operating functions. They are also required to be periodically reauthorized after receivingrefreshertraining.ConsequentlytheIndianoperatorsarebetterplacedtocorrectlyinterpret offnormal plant situations and adopt the most appropriate course of corrective action. This ability of IndianNPPoperatorshasbeenamplydemonstratedonseveraloccasions. 3.1TheTMIaccidentandKKNPP TMI2, a 900 MW pressurized water reactor in USA, was operating at near full power in the

morningof26April1979whenthepumpsfeedingwatertothesteamgeneratorstrippedduetosome electricalormechanicalfault.Theturbineandreactortrippedasdesigned.Twotrainsofauxiliaryfeed waterpumpshadbeenprovidedtochargewatertothesteamgeneratorsintheeventoffailureofthe main feed water pumps. Unfortunately the valves at the discharge of these pumps had been left in closed position after carrying out maintenance work earlier rendering the pumps ineffective. With no heatremovalinthesteamgenerators,thereactorcoolanttemperatureandpressurestartedrisingdue todecayheatfromthenuclearfuel.Thisresultedinthereliefvalvelocatedontopofthecoolantsystem pressurizertoopentorelievethepressure.Thereliefvalvefailedtoclosebackafterthepressurehad comedown,leadingtocontinuedlossofcoolantsystemwaterinventory.However,theindicationinthe control room showed that the relief valve had closed as the indication had been derived from the instrumentsignaltothevalveratherthanfromthephysicalpositionofthevalveitself.Asthecoolant pressure came down, emergency water injection to the coolant system started as per design but the
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operatorsterminatedthe injectionaftersometime sincethewaterlevelinstrumentwasshowingthe pressurizerasfullandtheywereworriedaboutthesystemgettingoverpressurized.Inreality,whilethe pressurizerwasfullofwater,thecoolantsystemhadbeenheavilyvoidedonaccountofboilingofthe coolant. In the absence of heat removal from the reactor coolant and no make up for the depleting

coolantinventory,fuelinthereactorcoreoverheatedandpartiallymelted.Theaccidentwasterminated after the operators closed a block valve on the pressurizer relief line and restored emergency water injection.Smallamountsofradioactivitywerereleasedtotheenvironmentfromthereactorventilation systemexhauststackwhenthereactorvesselwasventedtotheatmospheretoreleasehydrogenthat hadgotgeneratedfromthereactionbetweensteamandtheoverheatedzirconiumcladdingofthefuel. The reactor vessel did not breach and the molten fuel was retained within the vessel. The reactor containmentbuildingalsoremainedintactandhencetherewasnoreleaseofradioactivityattheground level.Therewasnodeath,injuryoranyoverexposuretoradiationofplantworkersorthepublic.TMI accident happened due to a combination of equipment failure, lack of sufficient instrumentation and operatorerror. The KKNPP has been provided with four 100% capacity trains for each of the safety functions

which include the auxiliary feed water pumps. There is an elaborate prestart up check list through which it is ensured that all safety systems are poised and are in their design intended configuration before reactor start up can be taken up. The pressurizer instrumentation has been sufficiently augmentedandimprovedtoprovideclearandunambiguousindicationofwaterlevelandstatusofall valves connected to the pressurizer. An elaborate set of emergency operating procedures has been developedtocatertoallconceivableoffnormalsituationsandtheoperatorsarethoroughlytrainedin theirexecutionwhichincludestrainingonafullscopetrainingsimulator.Further,theKKNPPdesignhas severaladvanceddesignsafetyfeaturesliketheprovisionfordecayheatremovalbynaturalconvection cooling by the Passive Heat Removal System (PHRS). The PHRS functions even in the absence of all powersuppliesasalsowithnowaterinjectiontothesteamgeneratorsandthereactorcoolantsystem available.AnaccidentofthetypethatoccurredatTMI2isthereforenotconceivableatKKNPP. 3.2TheChernobylaccidentandKKNPP The Chernobyl4 NPP is an RBMK1000 MW, graphite moderated, vertical channel type, water cooled,andboilingwaterreactor.Thefuelislocatedin~10Mlongverticalpressuretubesandcoolant waterflowsthroughthepressuretubesfrombottomtotop.Thepressuretubes(1660nos.)arelocated
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inside vertical channels in a graphite stack and mixture of nitrogen and helium flows through the gap betweenpressuretubesandgraphitetocoolthegraphiteandpreventitfromcomingincontactwith air.Heavyradiationshieldsareplacedattopandbottomofthereactorcore.Apartialcontainmentis providedforreactorblockonlyunlikeafullcontainmentbuildinginmodernNPPs.Thereare211water cooledcontrolrods(C/R),eachrodwithahighneutronabsorbersectionattopandagraphitesection belowit.WithC/Rinwithdrawncondition,thegraphitesectionresidesintheactiveregionofthecore. InthelowestpartoftheC/R,waterispresentoverasmallheightbelowthegraphitesection.WhenC/R isinserted,theneutronabsorbersectionreplacesthegraphitesectionincore,thusincreasingtherods capabilitytoabsorbneutronstoreducereactorpower. Atestwasplannedtocheckif,onlossofgridpower,theenergystoredintherotatingturbinecan beusedtogeneratesufficientelectricitytooperateemergencycorecoolingpumps(beforethestation DGscomeonline). Unit4wasscheduledforshutdownon25April1986fornormalmaintenanceactivities.Shutdown of the reactor was started but had to be stopped with reactor at 50% full power (FP) as per grid requirementanditcontinuedtooperateat50%FPforabout20hrs.Loweringofpowerwasresumedat midnighttostabilizethereactorat2030%FP(aspertestprocedure)butpowerfellto1%FP(dueto xenonbuildupduringextendedoperationat50%power).Controlrodswereraisedtocompensatefor xenonandwiththisactionpowercouldbestabilizedat7%FP. The test was started by closing steam inlet to turbine to start the process of slowing down the turbine generator. An additional cooling water pump was started as per test procedure which caused steam pressure to fall. Reactor trip on low steam pressure had been bypassed and emergency core coolingsystemhadbeendisabledaspertestrequirement.Morecontrolrodswerewithdrawntoraise reactor power and steam pressure (consequently only 7 control rods were in against the safety requirementofatleast15rodstobeinatanytime).Theriseinsteampressure,incombinationwith low operating power, created a core configuration where overall power coefficient was positive. This meant that any increase in power will drive the reactor power to rise further and can cause power surge.Assteampressurerose,theoperatortriedtomanuallytripthereactorbydroppingcontrolrods. As control rods started moving down, their graphite sections first replaced the water below., This causedtheneutronpopulationinthecoreandthereforethereactorpowertosurgeasgraphiteabsorbs muchlessneutronscomparedtowater.Thepowersurgeresultedinsuddenandveryhighincreasein fueltemperatureleadingtotherupturingoffuelrods.Interactionofoverheatedfuelwithwatercaused
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steam explosion and further heating of fuel caused it to vaporize and gave rise to explosion of fuel vapors. The top shield got lifted due to the pressure wave from the explosions and damaged the pressures tubes severely. The graphite stack now got exposed to oxygen forming flammable carbon monooxidewhichignitedandcausedgraphitefire.Theexplosionsandthelargegraphitefiredestroyed thereactorcompletely The Chernobyl accident was caused by design deficiencies and an inadequate test procedure, coupled with several violations of the prescribed procedure by operators who were not adequately trained for this specific task. This placed the reactor in a configuration that was highly vulnerable to becomingunstableandnotamenabletocontrol. KKNPPisapressurizedwaterreactor,cooledandmoderatedbylightwater,anditscorecontaining thenuclearfuelislocatedinsideapressurevessel.Therearenopressuretubes,nographitemoderator andnoboilingofwaterinthecore.ThecontrolrodsinKKNPPdonothaveanygraphitefollowerand therefore,unlikeinthecaseofChernobyl,cannotcauseanypowersurge.Thedesignensuresthatinany configuration,thepowercoefficientofthereactorremainsnegative.TheKKNPPreactorislocatedinside anairtightprimarycontainmentbuildingwhichissurroundedbythesecondarycontainment.Thereare also other design features in KKNPP which assure adequate core cooling under all conceivable off normal conditions including total loss of electric power. Even for the hypothetical case of a core melt down, a core catcher is provided where the molten core is retained and cooled and the double containmentensuresthattherewillbenosignificantradiologicalimpactinthepublicdomain. The KKNPP is of a most modern design and its design and safety features have almost nothing in commonwithChernobylasexplainedabove.Therefore,itisjustnotconceivablethatevenanaccident scenariosimilartoChernobyl,letalonetheaccidentperse,candevelopinKKNPP. 3.3TheFukushimaaccidentandKKNPP FukushimaI NPP, located on northeast coast of Japan, has 6 units of boiling water reactors. An offshore earthquake of magnitude9 with its epicenter ~ 130 KM from the NPP, struck on 11 March 2011.Thequakealsogeneratedlargetsunamiwaves.Units1,2&3gotshutdownautomatically(units4, 5&6werealreadyinshutdownstate).Gridpowersupplywaslostduetotheearthquake.Asperdesign, emergency diesel generators (EDGs) of the NPP started automatically to supply essential AC power. BatteriesoftheNPPsuppliedessentialDCpower.About14mhightsunamiwaveshittheplantafter~45 minutes.Duetoextensivefloodingcausedbytsunami,theEDGsfailed.DCbatteriesdrainedoutin~1 hourleadingtototallossofpowersupplyatunits1,2,3&4.AnaircooledbackupDGforunits5and6
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locatedatahighelevation,thatwasprovidedasaretrofittoensureavailabilityofemergencypowerin theeventofastrongtsunami,continuedtofunction.Withthispower,thereactorsofunits5&6could be cooled. Units1&2 and units3&4 were also provided with similar backup air cooled DGs but unfortunatelythesewerelocatedatalowerelevationandhencefailedduetofloodingatthesitefrom tsunami. With no power available, reactor cooling in units1, 2&3 was lost resulting in overheating and damage of uranium fuel (fuel of unit4 had been unloaded at that time into spent fuel storage pool located adjacent to reactor vessel). It took a long time and large effort to restore cooling to the Overheatedfuelcladdingmadeofzirconiumreactedwithwaterproducinghydrogenwhichescapedinto reactorbuildings.Equipmenthadbeenprovidedtorecombinethehydrogenwithoxygenintheairbut did not work in the absence of power supply, leading to hydrogen explosions. Some radioactivity escaped from the plant and evacuation of population up to 20 KM radius around the NPP and restrictionsonconsumptionoffood,milketc.wasimposedasamatterofabundantcaution.However, no member of public received radiation dose more than the prescribed limit. With significant efforts overaconsiderablelengthoftime,thereactorscouldbesecuredwithadequatecooling.Cleaningofthe areas around the plant is in progress to enable people to return to their homes. Fukushima accident happenedduetoacombinationofextremeexternaleventsleadingtocompletelossofpowersupply. In the case of KKNPP the nearest off shore fault line (AndamanNicobarSumatra fault) capable of generatingatsunami,islocatedabout1500KMfromKK.Thus,unlikeinthecaseofFukushima,thereis nopossibilityofatsunamiandanearthquakeoccurringtogetheratKK. The maximum flood kevel at KKNPP site on account of the strongest tsunami or storm surge has beendeterminedas5.44Mabovethemeansealevel.Keepingafurthersafetymarginof2M,thesafe gradelevelforthesitehasbeendecidedas7.44Mabovethemeansealevel.Allimportantstructures and components including emergency power supply equipment at KK are located well above this elevation. Thus, unlike in Fukushima, where the emergency power supply equipment failed due to flooding from tsunami, even the strongest tsunami cannot disrupt the emergency power supply at KK andcoolingofthereactorscanbemaintainedwithoutinterruption. Even assuming that all power supplies are lost due to some unforeseen reason, cooling of the reactorsatKKcanstillbemaintainedbythePassiveHeatRemovalSystem(PHRS)thatisprovidedasa furthermeasureofdefenseindepth.ThePHRSworksontheprincipleofnaturalconvectioncoolingand, unlikeinFukushima,doesnotneedanypowersupplyatall.Heatfromthereactoristransferredtothe
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largequantityofwaterpresentonthesecondarysideofthesteamgeneratorsandthiswaterinturnis cooledbyatmosphericairinthecoolersprovidedataheightontheoutsideoftheoutercontainment. Evenunderahypotheticalaccidentconditionofcoremelt,themoltencoreisretainedandcooled inacorecatcherthatisprovidedbelowthereactorvessel.Radioactivityfromthedamagedormolten fuelcannotcomeoutoftheinnercontainmentbuildinginsidewhichthereactorishoused.Thisisanair tightprestressedconcretebuildingdesignedformaximumpressuregeneratedfromtheworstpossible accident and is periodically tested for its leak tightness. Any small leaks from cable and pipe penetrations are retained by the outer containment building. The Fukushima NPP did not have any secondaryoroutercontainment. The catalytic hydrogen recombiners provided at KK are of the passive type and they do not requireanypowersupplyfortheirfunctioning.AtFukushimathehydrogenrecombinersneededpower supplyfortheirworkingandsince powersupplywasnotavailable,theyfailedtofunctionresultingin hydrogenexplosions. FukushimaNPPisofamucholderdesignanddidnothaveseveralofthesafetyfeaturesthatare providedinKKNPPwhichisofamostmoderndesign.Asbroughtoutabove,itisnotconceivablethat anyaccidentsofthetypethatoccurredatTMI,ChernobylandFukushimacantakeplaceattheKKNPP. Further,theKKNPPhasadvanceddesignsafetyfeatureswhichprovideassuranceofreactorcoolingand containmentofradioactivityunderevenhypotheticalaccidentconditions.

4.RadiationSafetyandPublicHealth
(Dr.M.R.Iyer,FormerDirector,DivisionofRadiationSafety,IAEA,Vienna) 4.1Radiationsafetyandimpactonthepublic 4.1.1Introduction TheInternationalCommissiononRadiologicalProtection(ICRP),anInternationalbodyofmulti

disciplinary experts is an advisory body providing recommendations and guidance on setting up radiationprotectionstandards;itwasfoundedin1928.Itusesforitsdatabaselargevolumeofscientific information on the effects of radiation and analyzed by other International bodies such as UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) and is based on a highly technical complex feedback mechanism. The ICRP recommendations on limits of safe exposure from radiationareadoptedandusedbyallcountries. In the Indian context the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), an independent board

regulates the nuclear operations in the country and sets the standards. The Board is being further
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strengthened under a new bill to make it more transparent and having appellate, statutory structure. ThegeneralnotionthattheAERBandNPCILaresameisthuswrong.TheAERBhasanintricatestructure ofevaluationthroughscientificcommitteesofexpertsdrawnfromalloverIndiaforanynuclearproject andthesearetimeconsumingandthoroughtechnicalsafetyevaluationsandmakesappropriatesafety stipulations.TheBoardperiodicallyauditsthesafety,performanceandimpactoftheoperationofallthe nuclear plants in India. During the operation of NPPs for the last 40 years (20 of them are operating now)onlyincidencesofNucleareventscale1orrarely2havehappenedimplyingthatthesehadbeen no effect on the public environment. Thus the safety culture is an integral part of the regulatory structureinIndia.Itmightbeaddedthatinthepasttherewereinternationallyacclaimedsafetyexperts in India who were considered as gurus of the profession internationally. People might talk of tsunami today,butasearlyasmidseventiesthiswasforeseenbyoursafetyexpertswhoinsistedoninstalling severalkeycomponentshighenoughnottobeaffectedincaseoftsunamiwhichdidstoodthetestwell duringtheTsunamiof2004atKalpakkam. 4.1.2 Naturalbackgroundradiation Some information on natural background radiation would not be out of place. Like gravity

humanbeingsareimmersedinaseaofnaturalradiationfromseveralsources.Radiationisinescapable innatureandManhasevolvedwithradiation.Radiationismeasuredintermsoftheenergyabsorbed, throughaunitknownasSievert.ItssubunitsaremilliSievertandmicroSievertarethemorecommon units. Human body receives radiation from external sources or from radioactive materials inside the body.Thenaturalradiationdosevarieswidelyfromlocationtolocation.Thesourcesofradiationarethe cosmic rays which come from the space, radiation from terrestrial materials, as all materials contain someamountradiationemittingmineralssuchasuranium,thorium,potassiumetc.Ourbodycontains lots of potassium and a fraction of this is radioactive. The radioactive gases like radon and thoron emittedfromnaturaluraniumandthoriumareinhaledbyuseverywhere.Inadditiontothisweundergo medical diagnostic treatments such as x ray, CT scan, angiography, angioplasty etc. during which we receiveradiationdose.Theworldaverageofthisradiationisalsosubstantial. ThesourcesofnaturalradiationexposureandmedicalexposuretopublicaregivenintheTable4.1.1 andTable4.1.2below.Apersonontheaveragereceivesaradiationdoseof2.4mSvperyearandan additionaldoseof0.6mSvfromdiagnosticmedicalprocedures.Ascomparedtothistheworldaverage ofdosereceivedfrommanmadesourcessuchasnuclearpowerproductionisveryinsignificant.Thereis averywidevariationinthenaturalradiationexposurebymanfromplacetoplace.
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 Table4.1.1:Dosefromnaturalradiation(mSv/year) Type Natural Manmade Source Naturalair Internal Terrestrial Cosmic Subtotal Medical Manmade Subtotal TOTAL WorldAverage 1.26 0.29 0.48 0.39 2.40 0.60 0.0052 0.60 3.00 Typicalrange 0.2to10 0.2to10 0.3to10 0.3to10 1to13 0.03to20 0to20 0to20 1totens

Source:UNSCEAR Table4.1.2:Radiationexposuretopublicincommonmedicalinvestigations Procedure Chestxray Abdomenxray CTscan Angiography Angioplasty Worldaverageofmedicaldosetoman Dosefromnaturalpotassiuminbody Averageannualdosefromnaturalradiation Airtravelfor5hours ExpecteddosetopublicfromKKNPP Source:UNSCEAR Typicaldose 0.02mSv 6mSv 8mSv 516mSv 857mSv 0.6mSv/year 0.3mSv/year 2.4mSv/year 0.03mSv/year 0.042mSv/year

TheFig.4.1.1belowcomparespictoriallythepermitteddosetothepublicfromKKNPPwiththenatural backgrounddoseandthatduetoothercommonactivitiesinvolvingradiation.

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 Fig.4.1.1KKNPPpublicdoselimitcomparedtocommonradiationexposures 4.1.3EffectoflowlevelradiationasobservedinhighradiationbackgroundareasofKerala. There are areas in many parts of the world where the natural background radiation is much

higherthanotherplacesduetotheoccurrenceofradiationemittingthoriumuraniumbearingminerals. Suchareasexistinourcountryalso.ThewesterncoastofKerala,somecoastalareasinTamiNaduare amongstthesewherepeoplereceive5timesmoreradiationdosethanelsewhere.Otherareasofsuch elevatedradiationbackgroundareinBrazil,ChinaandIran.Theselocationsprovideanaturallaboratory for the study of the effects of low levels of radiation on the health of the people staying there for generations. Therehavebeenseveralevaluationsontheeffectofelevatednaturalradiationbackgroundin

thecountry;thenotedoneisbytheRegionalCancerResearchCentre,Trivandrum.Asyouwillseesuch elevatedradiationbackgroundhasnotgivenrisetoanydeleteriouseffectsonhumanbeings..Andthe levels of radiation from nuclear plants dont exceed a small fraction of even the variation in natural radiationbackground. InfactthephilosophyofICRPinsetting thelimitsofexposuretopublicisinter aliatoconsiderthevariationindosefromnaturalradiationtowhichpublicisalwayssubjectedto.This
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clearlydemonstratesthatthereisnocancerincidenceorgeneticeffectsfromexposuretoradiationat lowlevelsofradiation. The public around Kudankulam will not receive more than 1 percent of this dose due to the

operation of KKNPP. We can safely conclude that there will not be any deleterious effects due to radiationfromtheoperationofthepowerstationonthepublic. 4.1.4 LimitsofradiationexposureadoptedbyAERB The limits of radiation dose from the man made nuclear operations for the pubic and for

occupational workers recommended by ICRP and adopted by AERB are summarized below. These are recommendedbyICRPafterextensivereviewoftheresearchtheworldoverontheeffectsofradiation. Exposureattheselevelswillnotleadtoanyilleffects. Theradiationexposuretoworkersinnuclearoperations(OccupationalDoseLimits)shouldnot

exceedanyofthefollowing: Doseof20mSv/yraveragedoverfiveconsecutiveyears Adoseof30mSvinanyyear; Lifetimeeffectivedoselimit1Sv DoseLimitsforMembersofthePublic:aneffectivedoseof1mSvinayear(thisisoverandabovethe 2.4 mSv on the average everybody receives naturally). This is illustrated schematically in the Fig.4.1.2 below.

Fig.4.1.2Doselimitsforpublic
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4.1.5RoutineradioactiveemissionsfromKKNPP In the context of these limits let us examine the situation proposed for KKNPP. After going

throughthedocumentsofKKNPPitisseenthat: No radioactivity release through the sea water cooling is possible since this loop is physically separated by three levels from the coolant loop which enters the reactor as indicated in Fig.4.1.3below. Howeversomelowandmediumlevelwastewouldbegeneratedinthestationwhichistreated insidetheplant.Verylowleveleffluentsfromthesewouldbegeneratedandtherearenorms andlimitsfortheirreleases. Gaseous routine emissions are basically exhaust air from building ventilation systems. It is

filteredinHighEfficiencyParticulateAir(HEPA)filtersandActivatedCharcoalfiltersbeforedischargeto theStack Fig.4.1.3:SeawatercoolantloopphysicallyseparatedfromtheprimarycoolantloopatKKNPP

4.1.6LimitsofradioactivityreleasesforKKNPP As stated above the regulatory limit of exposure to public: is 1 mSv/year from all sources

excluding the natural radiation. Generally regulatory authorities stipulates only a small portion of this limitshouldbeallowedfromasingleunitandfortwinKKNPPreactorunitsthelimitis0.2mSv.

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Thelimitsofconcentrationofradionuclidesreleasedaresetsuchthattheresultingdosefrom

thereleaseofradioactivityinairandwaterare: FromAtmosphericRelease:4.26%oflimit. ForLiquidDischarges:0.02%oflimit, TotalDose:4.26%oflimit, This is only a small fraction of even the variation in dose due to natural background. (In the

villagesaroundKKNPPdoseduetonaturalradiationvariesfrom2.23to4.23mSv/year). TheauthorizedlimitoflowleveleffluentsthroughairandwaterfromKKNPPisrestrictedsuch

thatitwillnotleadtomorethanaround4.26percentofthedoselimitforthepublicrecommendedby ICRP(1mSv).Theexpectedratedreleaseswouldhoweverbemuchlower(0.02%).Theconcentrations of discharges are measurable and their limits are fixed to ensure this. The limits of concentrations in aquaticandatmosphericreleasesfixedaresuchthatthedosewillneverexceedtheauthorizedlimits. Theconcentrationsofdischargesthroughstackaremonitoredcontinuously.Theactivitylevelsofliquid dischargearemonitoreddailytoensurethis. Environmentalradiationandradioactivitymonitoringisperformedforthepurposeofassessing

thedosetothegeneralpublicfromtheoperationofnuclearfacilitiestodemonstratecompliancewith regulations that the limits of allowable doses are never exceeded. In India the environmental survey program of the Environmental Survey Laboratory, an organization independent of NPC is sufficiently intensetoassesstheimpact,ifany,onthefloraandfaunaandinestimatingthedosetoamemberof the public. An ESL laboratory is in operation aty KKNPP since 2004 and routine pre operational radioactivity analyses of the samples are being carried out to establish background levels and to establishthestrategiesofmonitoring.Asinalltheothernuclearsitestheenvironmentalradioactivity assessmentprogramwouldbecontinuedafterthestationgoesintooperationtoensurethatthereisno impact of the station on the environment and to the public. The periodic reports are audited by the RegulatoryBoard.Theserecordsalsowouldprovetothepublicthatthereleasesarewithinthelimits ESLmonitorstheexternaldosearoundthepowerstationandalsotheradioactivitycontentin

sampleslikewater,air,soil,floraandfaunatoassesstheinternaldose.Thusthedosetothepublicfrom external radiation as well as possible intake of radioactive materials is assessed periodically. The baseline data has been established and records are available for reference. This activity will be continuedthroughouttheentirelifetimeofthePlantandrecordsmaintained.Thisisdonetoinsurethat
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the impact of the operation of the plant is within the limits prescribed by AERB and is a statutory requirement. EnvironmentalradiationdoseatvariousNPPsitesinIndiarecordedduring20062010isshown

intheFig.4.1.4andFig.4.1.5below.

ComparisonofEnvironmentalRadiationDoseatNPPSites(20062010)

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 4.1.7 ImpactofthelowlevelofradiationaroundNPPs Peoplewho havebeenlivingforgenerationsinthe high backgroundareasin ourcountry, receiving25timesmoredosefromnaturalradiationdonothaveanyilleffectsasmedically provedbythestudiesofRegionalCancerCentreTrivandrum. DAEworkersliveinclosevicinityofatomiccentersalloverIndia(theirlimitforexposureis 100timesmorethantheKKNPPlimit)havebeenprovedtohavenonoticeablehealtheffects as observed from the detailed epidemiological survey conducted by the scientists Nambi andMayyain1998. Further, UNSCEAR, an International committee on the effects of atomic radiation working for more than 60 years found no genetic effects even amongst the progenies of the HiroshimaNagasakiatomicbombvictims. When these are the facts, how could a small percent (1%) of the natural radiation dose that

mightbereceivedaroundnuclearpowerstationsleadtoanygeneticeffectorcancerincidence? The fear about genetic effects of radiation around nuclear sites is more psychological and is

contrary to scientific facts. As such we feel that the radiation safety of the people around KKNPP is guaranteedandtherewouldbenoimpactoftheoperationofthepowerstationonthepublic.

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4.1.8 Workerssafetyandwellbeing TherecommendationsoflimitsofexposureforradiationworkersadoptedbyAERBwerelisted

earlier. KKNPP further stipulates inhouse limits to ensure that in no case workers will exceed these limits.Theyhavemonthly,quarterlylimitstoensurethis. KKNPP has an intense program of monitoring the monthly radiation exposures using TL

dosimeters.Theseareaugmentedbyuseofdirectreadingdosimeters.Therecordsoftheexposuresare keptbythestationandbythecentralizedDAEdoseregistry. The operations carried out in KKNPP do not envisage leading to any significant internal

exposures through inhalation or ingestion of radioactivity. However there are internal monitoring programsatKKNPPsuchaswholebodycountingtoassessthedosetoworkersthroughthisroute. For regulatory auditing and control a system of periodic reporting and auditing is in place to

ensure the station operates with no impact on the personnel. The experience in all NPCIL nuclear reactorsshowsthatduringthelast5yearsnoworkerhasexceededthecumulativelimits. TheexhaustiveepidemiologicalsurveyoftheradiationworkersinIndiabyNambiandMayyain

1998hasshownthattheincidenceofcanceramongsttheradiationworkersandtheirfamilieswholive inthevicinityofnuclearpowerplantsinIndiaisnodifferentfromcontrolpopulations. 4.1.9 Conclusion From the exhaustive analysis given above it is concluded that there need to be absolutely no

concernamongstthepubliclivingaroundKKNPPandtheoperationofthenuclearpowerstationwould notcertainlygiverisetoanydeleteriouseffectsamongstpeople. 4.2Nuclearradiationandhealth 4.2.1Introduction There are widespread beliefs amongst the lay public about the potential safety hazards from nuclear radiationtothegeneralpopulationprimarilyrelatedtocancerandbirthdefects.Muchofthisfearand concernhasresultedfromlackofunderstanding/awarenessinpublicmindsaboutradiationingeneral anditseffectsonhealthinparticular.Thislackofawarenesshasresultedinunfoundedfearandpanic about radiation and health hazards. While it is easy to get carried away by passionate rhetoric, it is important to remain dispassionately scientific and objective about evaluating the potential and real effectsofnuclearradiationonhumanhealth.
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4.2.2CausationofCancer Cancerisacomplexbiologicphenomenon.Thereareseveralcausativefactorstobacco,obesity/diet and alcohol are responsible directly or indirectly to more than twothirds of all cancers. The other factorsarerelatedtoultravioletrays,ionisingradiation,excessivethermalsources(asinKangricancers) and chronic irritation (as in sharp tooth causing ulcer in the tongue), in addition to heredity, racial factors and viruses. It is important to understand that radiation is only one of the many causes of cancer and its contribution to cancer causation is small (attributed to 2% of all cancers). Moreover, cancersdonotoccurduetoexposuretolowdoseradiation.Lowdoseexposureofradiationdoesnot contributetoincreasedincidenceofcancer. 4.2.3Backgroundradiation Beforewegoontolookattheevidenceonnuclearradiationandhealth,itisimportanttounderstanda fewbasic pointsaboutradiation. Radiationisuniversal,andoccursnaturallyinour environmentfrom the soil, outer space, televisions and diagnostic medical tests. An average person is struck by about 15,000 particles of radiation every second from natural sources, and a routine xray involves being struck by about 100 billion particles! Although this might appear dangerous, it is not, because the likelihood of a radioactive particle to cause cancer or genetic disease in the human body is one in 30 millionbillion.Theaverageyearwillresultinapproximately2.3mSvbackgroundradiationtoahuman being while radiation due to a nuclear plant being nearby is far less. The radiation exposure in and aroundnuclearpowerplantsisnotdifferentfrompreoperationallevels(Table4.2.1). Table4.2.1:LevelsofRadiationinandaroundNuclearfacilities(Kalpakkam)andControlareas (ExposureRatemSv/yr) a. Zone/Location 1.6to8kmzone Mahabalipuram 816kmzone Thirukazhukundram >16kmzone Kovalam Madras Chingleput Madhuranthakam Preoperational 2.793.20 1.211.48 1.191.36 1.491.56 2.382.82 0.931.06 1.602.04 0.890.98 1.111.34 0.831.24 1.111.12 Operational 2.492.99 1.081.26 0.951.32 1.261.40 2.232.88 0.871.12 1.422.22 0.861.00 0.881.20 0.680.92 0.991.32
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b.

c.

Nosignificantdifferenceisseenaroundnuclearpowerplantsbeforeandafteritstartedoperation. TherearemanyareasinIndiawhichhaveamuchhighernaturalradiationexposurethanthenational average.Forexample,inKerala,somepeoplelivingalongthehighradiationareasreceive10timesthe nationalaverageexposure.Itisalessknownfactthatradiationfromanuclearpowerplantinnormal operation is less than radiation emitted from a coal power plant! Most of the adverse publicity of nuclearradiationstemsfromtheirsupposedeffectsonhumandiseases,mainlycancerandcongenital anomalies(birthdefects).Therehavebeenseveralstudiesindifferentpartsoftheworldonpopulations living close to nuclear power plants. Most of the studies in India have been done in areas close to established nuclear power stations and high radiation areas like Karunagapally in Kerala (close to the thoriumrichsands). 4.2.4Nationalstudies The Regional Cancer Centre at Thiruvananthapuram performed a study involving more than 4 lakh peoplelivingintheareacoveringanareaof192squarekm.Here,theentirepopulationwasstudiedfor theirlifestyle,habitsetc.,andradiationlevelsinsideandoutsidethehouseaswellasinthesoilwere measured. Cancer incidence was recorded from the population based cancer registry using internationally accepted methods. The overall cancer incidence was found to be similar between KarunagapallyandThiruvananthapuramalthoughKarunagapallyreceivedamuchhigherradiationdose. Moreover, cancer was found to be less than half the incidence found in other parts of India like the northeaststatesofMizoramwheretherewerenonuclearpowerplants. The Tata Memorial Hospital performed studies in Tarapur (Maharashtra) and Kakrapar (Gujarat). The Tarapur study was done with over 10,000 individuals working at the nuclear plant, their families and children.Noincreaseincancerincidencewasseenamongstallthecategoriescomparedtothosewho werenotexposedtoradiation.Therewasnoincreaseintheincidenceofbirthdefectsamongchildren borntoradiationworkers.TheKakraparstudyshowednocancersamongstthoselivinginthearea. Using the same methods as the Tata Memorial Hospital, the Arignar Anna Memorial Cancer Research Institute in Kanchipuram performed a similar study in Kalpakkam. More than 5000 radiation workers, nearly4000spouses,andover5000childrenbornoftheseworkerswerestudiedfortheoccurrenceof cancer and birth defects. No differences were seen in cancer incidence between radiation workers in Kalpakkam and nonradiation workers; there was also no difference in cancer incidence between radiationworkersatKalpakkamandnonradiationworkersatBARC,Mumbai.Theprevalenceofcancer

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seenwasinfact,lowerthanthenationalaverageprevalenceofcancer.Occurrenceofbirthdefectswere alsosimilartothenationalaverage. The SMS Medical College, Jaipur conducted a similar study in Rawatbhata with similar results. The Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College, Aligarh conducted the same study in Narora Atomic Power Station and came to similar conclusions as the previous studies. Overall studies done in Tarapur, Kakrapar, Kalpakkam,Rawatbhata,andNarorahaveallreachedsimilarconclusionsthatcancerincidenceandbirth defectsamongstpeoplelivinginnuclearinstallationsaresimilarorlowerthanthenationalaverage. 4.2.5Internationalstudies ThesestudiesarenotconfinedtoIndiaalone.Therehavebeen severalstudiesconductedindifferent partsoftheworldincludingCanada,UK,FranceandFinland.InalargestudyinEldorado,Canada,over 17,000individualswerefollowedupforseveraldecades.Theincidenceofcancerandalldiseaseswere found to be actually lower than the national average. Another study investigated 29 nuclear power stations in France and a 20 km radius around the nuclear plants. This study also showed a lower incidenceofcancerscomparedtothenationalaverage.SimilarstudieswerecarriedoutinFinlandand Taiwanwithnoincreaseintheincidenceofcancersorbirthdefects. AllNationalandInternationalstudieshaveclearlydocumentedthatnuclearfacilitiesdonotcontribute toanysignificantdifferenceinincidenceofcancer,includingleukemia. 4.2.6 Otherhealthconcerns

4.2.6.1Birthdefects Birth defects, abortion etc., occur only when radiation is received during pregnancy directly to the fetus as in xrays or CT scans being done during pregnancy. Xrays and CT scans during pregnancy is bannedexceptunderlifethreateningconditionstothemother.HiroshimaandNagasakistudieswhich had the largest number of persons exposed to radiation did not find any increase in birth defects or hereditaryeffects. 4.2.6.2 GeneticEffectsofRadiation Studiessofarinandaroundnuclearfacilities donotfindany evidenceofgenetic effectsofradiation. Thisisconfirmedby: a)theKarunagapallystudyof4lakhpopulationforover10years; b)theUNSCEARstudyongeneticeffectsamongprogeniesofHiroshima,Nagasakiatomicbombvictims.
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4.2.7Medicalusesofradiation Nuclear radiation has several medical uses both in diagnostics and treatment. Many millions of lives havebeensavedbybothdiagnosticandtherapeuticapplicationsofradiation. 4.2.7.1Diagnosticuses Most diagnostic tests, especially those involving imaging use the principles of radiation. It would be impossibletothinkofmodernmedicinewithoutthesupportofradiologicalimaging,whichusenuclear radiationextensively.Thesetests,tonameafew,xrays,CTscans,bonescans,PETscanshelpclinicians surgeonsandphysicianstheworldoverdiagnosehumandiseasesaccurately,therebyenablingoptimal treatment.Radioisotopesareusedextensivelyindiagnosticprocedureslikethyroidiodinescans,bone scans, lung perfusion scans and brain scans. Radiation exposure due to diagnostic procedures and permissiblelimitshasbeenoutlinedelsewhere. 4.2.7.2Therapeuticuses Nuclear radiation is also extensively used in the treatment of a number of human cancers. Several cancerslikethoseofthelarynxandhypopharynx(throat),esophagus(foodpipe),cervixetcaretreated curativelyusingradiationtherapy.Inaddition,radiationisusedalongwithsurgeryandchemotherapyin anumberof othersolidcancersincludingtheoralcavity(mouth),tongue,stomach,rectumandbone tumors amongst others. It is estimated that over half (5070%) of all patients with cancer are treated using radiation therapy at some point in their disease. Radio isotopes are also used in treatment of cancerslikethyroidcancerinadditiontodiagnosticpurposes. 4.2.8Summary To summarise, nuclear radiation is one of the most important sources of energy, giving clean, green energywithveryminimalriskstothepopulationortotheenvironment.Modernnuclearpowerplants are safe and cause no major increase in environmental radiation. The incidence of cancers and birth defectsarenotincreasedduetoradiationfromfunctionalnuclearplants.Nuclearradiationisextremely usefultomedicineandisappliedwidelyindiagnosisaswellastreatmentofhumandiseases.

5.KKNPPReactorDesignandSafety
(Shri.S.K.Mehta,FormerDirector,ReactorGroup,BARC&Prof.KannanIyer,IIT,Bombay) a. VVERisapressurizedlightwatercooledandmoderatedreactorwithfourindependentcooling loops.Thereactorhashorizontalsteamgeneratorsineachloopthatgives highwaterstorage
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capacity.Ituseshexagonalfuelassemblieswhichhavelowenrichedfuelinoxidematrix,housed insealedZirconiumNiobiumalloytubes. b. KKNPP is an advanced model of the Russian VVER 1000 that adopts the basic Russian design model marked V320 with Enhanced Safety Features to make it in line with IAEA GEN III reactors. Further, certain additional safety features were incorporated like Passive Heat RemovalSystemtakingittoGENIII+category.RussianFederationhasmarkedKKNPPreactoras V412. c. The safety features of KKNPP were comprehensively reviewed by a task force of NPCIL in the contextofrecentFukushimaaccident.Thereportofthetaskforceisavailableinthewebsiteof NPCILandDAE. d. SalientNormalOperatingParametersofKKNPPReactors: ElectricalPower1000MWe ThermalPower3000MWt No.ofFAs 163 291C 321C 15.7MPa 4 103

Coolantinlettemp Coolantoutlettemp CoolantPressure No.ofLoops

No.ofControlRods

PressureMaintenancebyPressurizer

e. EnhancedSafetyFeatures:

KeySafetyFeaturesincorporatedinKKNPPasrequiredbyIndia: QuickBoronInjectionSystem PassiveHeatRemovalSystem SecondStageHydroAccumulators PassiveHydrogenRecombiners Annuluspassivefilteringsystem(passivesystem) CoreCatcher EmergencyControl Room.

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 PassiveHeatRemovalSystem QuickBoronInjectionSystem CoreCatcher

The above systems have been developed based on extensive R & D and simulated testing by Russian design institutes. Functional performance of these systems are established during commissioningstage.Thesesystemsaredescribedinsubsequentsections. f. VVER1000 Plant model V320 Site(units) Status No. Units 22 of

Balakovo NPP (14), Zaporozhe NPP (16), Rovno NPP (3,4), Khmelnitsky NPP (1,2), South Ukraine NPP (3), Rostov NPP (1,2), Temelin NPP (1,2), Operating KalininNPP(3),KozloduyNPP(5,6) KudankulamNPP(1,2) TianwanNPP(1,2)

V412 V428

Under 2 Construction Operating 2

*Inadditiontotheabove: VVER1000reactorsareunderconstructioninRussianFederation. RecentlyVVERSareplannedinVietnam,TurkeyandBangladesh.

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g. IAEASafetyReviewOfVVER1000(V320) This review was done by international Experts in 1994 and recommendations have been incorporatedintheV320andarepartofKKNPPV412also. h. SafetyFunctionsforaNPP Thefollowingsafetyfunctionsshallbeperformedinalloperationalstates,i.e.duringnormal operation,duringandfollowingdesignbasiseventsconditionsandspecifiedbeyonddesign basisevents(BDBEs): i. ControloftheReactivity(controloffissionchainreaction) Heatremovalfromthecoreand Confinementofradioactivity

SafetyduringNormalOperation: During Normal Operation (NO) & Operational Transients (such as Turbine trip, pump trips etc), the reactor is controlled by the controllers within certain operational limits and conditions.Thecontrolisachievedbyfollowingparameters: ControlofReactivity: i)CPSAR(ControlandProtectionSystemAbsorberRods) ii)CVCS(ChemicalVolumeControlSystem) HeatRemovalfromCore: i)PrimaryCoolantCircuit(fourindependentloops) ii)SteamGenerator(oneineachloop) iii)Turbine&Condenser ConfinementofRadioactivitybyfollowingmultiplebarriers: i)FuelMatrixandsealedFuelClad ii)ReactorCoolantSystemwithChemistrycontrol iii)ContainmentandContainmentfiltrationSystems PlantoperationshallbecarriedasperTechnicalSpecificationsforoperationapproved byAERBwhichensuresthattheplantisoperatedwithinsafeparameters.
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j.

SystemsCateringtoDesignBasisEvents(DBE): Thoughadetaileddesign analysisindicatesthatthereactorwilloperatewithinthedesign parameters,safetysystemshavebeenprovidedtoensuresafetyduringpostulatedevents, knownasDesignBasisEvents(DBEs). DBE postulations have been made as per AERB guidelines which follow international practices. An example of DBE is break of main coolant pipe resulting in loss of coolant accident,knownasLOCA. DuringDBEs,reactorisshutdownbythecontrolrods. TheReactorcorecoolingwillbemaintainedbythefollowingsafetysystems,whicharefour trainindependentsystems: HighPressureEmergencyInjectionSystem:Startsinjectingboratedwatertothereactor corewhenprimarypressurefallsbelow7.9MPa FirstStageHydroAccumulators(Passivesystem):Startsinjectingboratedwatertothe reactorcorewhenprimarypressurefallsbelow5.9MPa Long term decay heat removal System: Starts injecting borated water to the reactor corewhenprimarypressurefallsbelow1.9MPa Emergency Safety Boron Injection System: Injects borated water to the pressuriser to depressurize the reactor during steam generator tube leak, so as to minimize the leakageofprimarycoolant.

k. BackupSystemsforControlRods(4Trains): Controlrodsarepassivesystemswhicharedesignedtodropundergravity.Theyaretested extensively in the test set ups and during commissioning. During reactor operation and annual shutdown, the performance of the rods is monitored. However, even under the postulatedfailureofcontrolrods(eventknownasAnticipatedTransientWithoutScramor ATWS),reactorisdesignedtoshutdownusingfollowingadditionalsafetysystems: EmergencyBoronInjectionSystem:Injectionofboricacidsolutiontothereactorathigh pressure16MPa Quick Boron Injection System (Passive System): Injection of concentrated boric acid solutiontothereactor.
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l.

SystemsforcateringtoBeyondDesignBasisEventsBDBE(EnhancedSafetyFeatures) In line with the current international practices, certain beyond design basis events have beenpostulated.Toensurethesafetyundertheseconditions,followingsystemshavebeen provided.TheseenhancedsafetyfeaturesareadditionalsystemsinKKNPP. PassiveHeatRemovalSystem(PHRS):

Decay heat removal from the core following complete loss of power supply, known as stationblackout(SBO). AdditionalCorePassivefloodingsystem(passiveIIstageaccumulator):

Supplies borated water to the reactor core during a multiple failure such as simultaneous occurrenceofLOCAandSBO. Systemforretainingandcoolingofmoltencore(CoreCatcher):

Retention and long term cooling of molten core under a postulated severe accident condition. m. ReactorContainment NuclearsteamsupplysystemsarehousedinaReactorContainment,tocontainanyrelease ofradioactivity.Italsoprovidesprotectionagainstexternalhazards. SalientFeaturesofContainmentstructure i. ii. Doublecontainmentstructure:PrestressedinnerContainment(IC)withleaktight innersteelliner&ReinforcedconcreteSecondaryContainment. Airlockswithdoubledoors;

Designpressureis0.4MPa(g)basedonestimatedpressureduetolosscoolantaccident Designtemperatureis120C Containmenthasbeentesteduptoatestpressureof0.46MPa Permissiblecontainmentleakagerateis0.3%volume/day.Leakagerateobservedduring containment leak rate test conducted during precommissioning was 0.18 % volume/day. As part of inservice inspection, containment leak test is carried out periodically. SecondaryContainmentDesignedtowithstand i. ii. AircraftCrash(suchasCessnaandlearjetaircraft) AirShockwave

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Subatmospheric pressure maintained during normal operation and under accident conditionssoastominimizegroundlevelreleases

n. ContainmentSystems: Following systems are provided to maintain the integrity of the containment and its functionalcapabilityunderabnormalconditions: Containment Spray System: Condenses steam due to any leakage from the primary or secondarysystem,thuslimitingpressureriseinthecontainment. Annulus passive filtering system (passive system): The annular space between the primaryandsecondarycontainmentsisalwaysmaintainedatanegativepressurewhich prevents any ground level releases. During an SBO condition, this negative pressure is maintainedbythenaturaldraughtcreatedduetothePHRSoperation. PassiveHydrogenRecombiners:Hydrogen,ifgeneratedduringaccidentconditions,is recombinedinPassiveHydrogenRecombinerstoconvertittowater.Thispreventsany hydrogenignitionwithinthecontainment.Theyarelocatedatvariouslocationswithin thecontainment.

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o. SupplementaryControlRoom Supplementary control room (SCR) is provided in the shielded control building, to enable essential safety functions and monitoring of all the important parameters in case of main controlroom(MCR)becominginaccessible. p. TrainingandQualification TrainingThreePhaseProgramme i. ii. iii. iv. Operatorsaregraduateengineerswithadequateexperience PhaseAOrientationcourseandExamination PhaseBTheory&SimulatorTraininginRF PhaseCParticipationincommissioningactivitiesandSimulatorTraininginIndia

QualificationofO&M i. ii. iii. LicensingofO&MpersonnelbyAERBandtheirperiodic Requalificationincludingmanagerialcadre. DetailsofQualificationMethodologyFinalized

q. InServiceInspection MonitoringofhealthinessofequipmentsandcomponentsisconductedasperISIprogram. ISIdataiscomparedwithbaselinedatacollectedduringPreServiceInspection Typicalsystemsmonitoredare i. ii. iii. iv. r. Reactorcoolantpressureboundary. Systemsessentialforsafereactorshutdownand/orsafecoolingofnuclearfuel. ContainmentSystems Othersystemsandcomponentswhosefunctioningisessentialforsystemsmentioned above.

MaterialSurveillance MaterialsurveillancecouponsareinstalledinsidethereactortoassessstateofRPVmaterial typicallyduetoneutronirradiation&temperatureeffects. Thesesetofcouponsarewithdrawnatspecifiedintervalofreactoroperationandsubjected todestructivetestingtoassesschangeinmechanicalpropertiesofRPVmaterial. Thismethodprovidessufficientleadtimeforactions,ifrequired.

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6.RadioactiveWasteandSpentFuelManagement:PrinciplesandPractices
(Shri.K.Balu,FormerDirector,NuclearWasteManagementGroup,BARC) 6.1WastegenerationandTreatment Management of radioactive waste in Indian context includes all types of radioactive wastes

generated from the entire nuclear fuel cycle right from mining of uranium, fuel fabrication through reactoroperationsandsubsequentreprocessingofthespentfuel.Fig.6.1depictstheentireactivities acrosstheclosedfuelcycleadoptedinIndiaalongwiththeirconnectivity.Besides,suchwastesarealso generatedfromuseofradionuclidesinmedicine,industryandresearch.
FIG6.1NUCLEARFUELCYCLE

Inconsiderationtotheprimaryobjectiveofprotectinghumanhealth,environmentandfuture generation,theoverallphilosophyforthesafemanagementofradioactivewastereliesontheconcepts ofi)DelayandDecayii)DiluteandDisperseandiii)ConcentrateandContain. Effective management of radioactive wastes involves segregation, characterization, handling, treatment, conditioning and monitoring, prior to final storage/disposal. Radioactive wastes arise in different forms viz solid, liquid and gaseous with variety of physical and chemical/radiochemical characteristics.Dependingonthelevelandnatureofradioactivity,radioactivewastescanbeclassified as exempt waste, Low & Intermediate level waste and High Level Waste. Low & Intermediate level wastesarefurthercategorizedasshortlivedandlonglivedwastes.Radiologicalhazardsassociatedwith
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shortlivedwastes(<30yearshalflife)getsignificantlyreducedoverafewhundredyearsbyradioactive decay. The high level waste contains large concentrations of both short and long lived radionuclides, warranting high degree of isolation from the biosphere and usually calls for final disposal into deep geologicalformation(repository). Intunewithinternationalscenario,acoherent,comprehensiveandconsistentsetofprinciples andstandardsarefollowedandpracticedforwastemanagementsystem.Widerangeoftreatmentand conditioning processes are available today with mature industrial operations involving several interrelated steps and diverse technologies. A brief summary of the various radioactive waste managementpracticesfollowedinIndiahasbeenpresentedinFig.6.2. FIG.6.2:SUMMARYOFTHERADIOACTIVEWASTEMANAGEMENTPRACTICES

6.1.1 Low&IntermediateLevelWastes 6.1.1.1 Liquidwaste Low & Intermediate level (LIL) liquid wastes have generally high volumes with low levels of radioactivity. Number of processes such as chemical precipitation/flocculation, ion exchange,
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evaporation, reverse osmosis etc. is employed either singly or in tandem for the treatment of such wastes. Depending on nature of the waste, radionuclides present and level of contamination, the treatmentschemeischosenwiththeoverallviewtocontainbulkoftheactivityinprocessconcentrates andthesupernatantsaredischargedafterfurtherpolishingandmonitoring.Therelativelysmallvolume ofconcentratescontainingtheactivityisconditionedtowardsimmobilizationinhighlydurablematrices likecement,polymeretc.ManagementofsuchstreamsisschematicallyrepresentedinFig.6.3. Fig.6.3:OVERALLSTEPSINTHEMANAGEMENTOFL&ILLIQUIDWASTE

Rad Waste

Pre-Treatment

Treatment
Exempt Waste
Nuclear material for recycle/reuse

Conditioning

Disposal

Most of the radioactivity present in Low and IL waste is in the form of Cesium(Cs137) and Strontium(Sr90) radioisotopes along with some contributions from Cerium(Ce144), Cobalt(Co60) Ruthenium(Ru106) etc. Chemical precipitation/coprecipitation processes are employed for liquid effluents with higher dissolved solids and varying chemical and radiochemical composition. Copper ferrocyanideandcalciumphosphateareusedascarriersforcoprecipitatingCs137andSr90respectively and polyacrylamide as floculating agents. Specific ion exchange resins developed in house have been found to be very effective for treatment of intermediate level radioactive wastes with high concentrationofsalts(200250gms/l)ofsodiumnitrate.Reverseosmosismethodusingbothcellulose acetateandpolyamidemembranesisalsoinusefortreatmentofL&ILliquidwastes. With the focus on effective radioactivity reduction (decontamination) and minimization of secondary wastes, upcoming technologies include synthesis and use of specific sorbents (inorganic,
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magnetic&bio),adoptionofelectrooxidativetechniquesfororganicwastes,cryogenicdistillationfor separationofradionuclidesfromgaseouswastes,liquidsupportedmembranesetc. 6.1.1.2 Solidwaste Besidesthewasteformsandresidues,containingthebulkactivityfromliquidwastetreatment,

relativelylargerquantumofsolidL&ILwastesofdiversenaturegetsgeneratedinthedifferentnuclear installations. They are essentially of two types: primary wastes comprising radioactively contaminated equipment (viz. metallic hardwares), spent radiation sources etc. and operational/secondary wastes, resultingfromdifferentoperationalactivities,whichareasvariedasprotectiverubber&plasticwears, miscellaneousmetalliccomponents,cellulosicandfibrousmaterials,organicionexchangeresins,filter cartridges and others. Solid waste management plants in India are equipped with facilities for segregation,repacking,compaction,incinerationandembedmentforradiationsources.Treatmentand conditioning of solid wastes are practiced to reduce the waste volume in ways compatible with minimizing the mobility of the radioactive materials contained. Combustible and compactable wastes aregenerallytreatedformechanicalcompactionandincineration.Asappropriate,packagingisusually donein200lwastedrumfollowedbyinsitugrouting.Acompactorof1000toncapacityasshowninFig. 6.4hasbeenindigenouslydevelopedforpelletizationofradioactivemetallicwastedrums.Spentorganic ionexchangeresinsareimmobilizedinpolystyrenebasedpolymermatricesbeforedisposal. FIG6.4:ATYPICALCOMPACTOR

The final packaged and monitored waste is then disposed of in near surface disposal facilities(NSDF),afewtensofmetersbelowtheearthssurface.Amultibarrierapproachisfollowedto ensure confinement and isolation of the wastes from biosphere. Various modules of the disposal
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facilitiesaredesignedtoacceptdifferentlevelsofactivitiesintermsofdoserates.Whilewasteswhich giveoutverylowdosesaredisposedoffinearth/stonelinedtrenches,wasteshavinghigheractivityare disposedofinreinforcedconcretetrenchesandtileholes.Backfillmaterialsareemployedinthedesign of a near surface repository for prevention of activity migration during offnormal scenario of water ingressintotherepositoryenvironment.Specialemphasisislaidonclosureofsuchmodulesafteritgets full.Theseincludeappropriateclosuresuchasclayforthestonelinedtrenchandconcretecoverforthe other two. Provisions for monitoring & surveillance are incorporated during the design of the near surfacedisposalfacilityitself.ProvisionofBoreholeshelpsinsamplingthegroundwaterformonitoring purposes. Regular environmental monitoring ensures that radioactivity in air, water and soil in and aroundthedisposalfacilityremainswithinthesafelimitsprescribedbytheregulatorybody. Fig.6.5showsdifferentmodulesofanearsurfacedisposalfacility.Indiahasextensive&varied experienceintheoperationofnearsurfacedisposalfacilities(NSDFs)inwidelydifferentgeohydrological and climatological conditions. As a national policy, NSDF is planned to be colocated at each site of nuclearinstallationsinIndia. Fig.6.5:MODULESOFNEARSURFACEDISPOSALFACILITY

6.1.1.3 Gaseouswaste The offgas and the ventilation system in nuclear power plants, and other fuel cycle facilities

play a vital role in ensuring that the air in the working area and the environment remains free from radioactivecontamination.Toachievethisgoal,theaircleaningsystemsaredesignedtohandlenormal andanticipatedoffnormalconditions.Variousdesignsofscrubbersaredeployedwhereinoffgasesare intimatelycontactedwithsuitableliquidmediasoastoretaintheactivityintheliquidphase.Specific
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adsorbersarealsousedtoaddressvolatileradionuclideslikeiodine,rutheniumetc.Theoffgasesare finallyroutedviahighefficiencyparticulatefilters(HEPA)whicharedesignedforanefficiencyof>99.9% forsubmicronsizeparticles.Surveillanceandmonitoringoftheoffgasesensurethatthedischargesare well below permissible limits. Treatment of the secondary solid wastes (filters and adsorbers) is accomplishedasdescribedabove. India has achieved self reliance in the management of all types of radioactive waste arising

duringtheoperationofthenuclearfuelcyclefacilities.Decadesofsafeandsuccessfuloperationofour wastemanagementfacilitiesaretestimonytotheIndianwastemanagementpracticesbeingatparwith internationalstandards.Apartfromhavingmadeimmensetechnologicalprogressinthisfield,avaluable humanresourcebasehasbeencreatedcomprisingofscientificandtechnicalmanpowerwellversedin the design, construction, operation and maintenance aspects of these facilities. In line with global scenarios,technologiesareconstantlyupgradedforminimizationofdischargestotheenvironment. 6.2MethodsAdoptedatKudankulam Theoriginofradioactivityinareactoristhefuelthatisundergoingirradiation/fission.Thefuel

iscladinametallictubesoalltheradioactivityproducedinthefuelstayswithinthefueltubeorclad.In theunlikelyeventofanypinholeleakfromthefueltube,radioactivitycouldcomeintocontactwiththe circulating coolant water which is constantly being recirculated through the core of the reactor for removalofheat,producedbyfission. 1) If any radioactivity enters the primary cooling water circuit, it is effectively removed by Filters and IonExchangecolumnsprovidedinthecircuit.AstheprimarycoolingwatercircuitinKKNPPisaclosed cycle,anyradioactivitythatescapedfromthefuelgetstrappedinFiltersandIonExchangersandwould notposeanyhazardtoeitherplantorpersonnelandthereisnowayitcanfinditswaytoenvironment. Other liquid process effluents are evaporated for an extremely high decontamination, rendering the condensatewithinsignificantcontamination,consideredfitforreuseintheplantandtheconcentrates areconcretedtoresultinastablematrixforsafestorageandsubsequentdisposal. 2)Similarlyifanysolidwastesgetcontaminatedwithradioactivity,theyarecarefullycollectedandasa first step volume of the wastes produced are reduced to a small fraction by treatment methods like incinerationandcompaction,apartfromsizereduction;thenthewastesareconditionedbybeingfixed incementconcretebeforetheyarestoredsafelyforaninterimperiod.Theywouldbeconsideredfor disposal in a Near Surface Disposal Facility, in a few years time, giving adequate time for decay of shortlivedradioactivity.
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3) Any radioactivity, in the exhaust air system from the reactor buildings, though insignificant is invariablytreatedthroughaseriesofoffgascleanupsystem,beforereleasethroughtallstacks. 4)Duetothetotalcontainmentofallradioactivityinthefueltube,thetypeofwastesthatresultfrom various systems in this reactor are essentially low level wastes, with a small quantity of intermediate level wastes. There are no high level wastes associated with the operation of the reactors at Kudankulam. 5)Thus,asamatterofabundantcautionandabidingconcernforsafetyofenvironmentandmembersof Public,anumberofstateofthearttechnologiesareemployedintheSafeManagementofRadioactive wastes. The track record of DAE in this regard has been exemplary over the past four decades, and comparesfavourablywiththebestintheworld. 6.3SpentFuelManagement FirstandforemostitshouldberememberedthatSpentFuelisnotawasteintheIndianNuclear

Programme. A closed fuel cycle is followed, where the valuable fissile materials like Uranium and PlutoniumwhicharepresentintheSpentFuelarerecoveredforreuse. 1) Spent fuel is therefore an asset that needs to be preserved. At Kudankulam, Spent Fuel from the Reactors will be carefully stored in Storage Pools, which are always filled with pure, demineralized, boratedwaterwhichisconstantlyrecirculated.Thesepoolsarehighintegrityconcretepoolswhichare additionally lined with stainless steel sheets, to ensure effective containment for extended periods of time. TheDepartmentofAtomic Energyhaslongexperienceandexpertiseofahighorderinthesafe managementofSpentFuel. 2)ThereisnoplantodothereprocessingoftheSpentFuelatKudankulamsite.Assuchthestorageof SpentFuelatKudankulamistobeconsideredonlyasaninterimmeasuretilltheyaretransportedtoa ReprocessingFacility. 3) Adequate Technology and years of experience are available with Department of Atomic Energy for transporting Spent Fuel from one site to another through both Railways and by roadways, in a safe manner without any public hazard. This is done as per stipulations of AERB, regarding Transport Regulationsthatgovernsafety.

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7.EcologicalEffects
(Prof.N.Sukumaran,Director, School of Life Sciencies, VELS University, Chennai, Prof.M.N.Madhyastha, Former Professor, Mangalore University & Dr.A.K.Pal,Professor,CentralInstituteofFisheriesEducation,Versova,Mumbai) 7.1Marineecologyandfishprotection 7.1.1Baselinedatacollection. ThebaselinedataofthemarineenvironmentofKKNPPhasbeenwellestablishedthroughthe

studiesundertakenby a. ManonmaniamSundaranarUniversity. b. InstituteofOceanManagement,AnnaUniversity. c. EngineersIndiaLimited/CMFRI. 7.1.2Fishprotectioninintakefacility Kudankulamprojectusesseawaterforcondensercoolingforwhichwaterisdrawnfromintake

dykes.Tosavethefishesfromcomingintotheforebay/pumphouseareaandgettingtrapped,KKNPP housesauniquefishprotectionsystemwhereinallthefisheswhicharecomingintotheintakewillbe separatedbymeansofauniqueaircurtainandOogeeweirsandaresafelyreturnedbackintothesea. Thisisanuniquefacilitytoprotectthemarineorganisms,includingfishandprawns. 7.1.3EffectofCondensercoolingwateronmarinelife. Theapproximatequantityofcoolantwater,whentheplantisinoperationreleasedinseawill

be70tonsperdaywithamaximumdeltaTof7degreeCelsius. The seasonal variation in surface water temperature of Kudankulam Marine Environment

ranged from 23C during monsoon and winter season to 29C during summer season, with an annual averageof26.6C. ThestudiesonthelethalaffectsoftemperatureonselectedfishesandprawnsofKudankulam

MarineEnvironmentshowedthatthelethaltemperatureoffin&shellfisheswasfoundtobebetween 38.2and43.2C.ConsideringmaximumpossiblesurfaceseawatertemperatureofKudankulamareasas 29C, during summer months and the rising the temperature as stipulated by MoEF as 7C, the maximumtemperatureatdischargepointwillbe36C,whichmaynotharmanyfisheveninthevicinity
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ofdischargepoint.Butduringmonsoonandwinterseasontheambientsurfacewatertemperaturewill be considerably low (23C) and hence no effect will be envisaged in the discharge area. In fact the mixingwillbeveryfastduetowaveactionandotherwatercurrents.Duetothewaveactionthemixing ofwarmwaterfromcondenserwithambientseawaterwillbeinstantaneousandapossiblereduction ofambientseawatertemperaturewillbeexpected.Consideringthefactitisobviousthattheremay notbeanyharmtothefisherypotentialofKudankulamMarineEnvironmentduetotheestablishment ofKKNPP.Itisagainsupportedbythefactthatfish,beingacoldbloodedanimal,itcanadjustthebody temperaturewiththatofenvironmentwithinthesublethaltemperatureandariseinbodytemperature willenhanceallbiologicalactivities,includinggrowthandproduction.Inaddition,thefishandprawns willhavethecapacitytosensethechangeintemperatureinambientwaterandtrytoavoidandmove awayfromtheadversecondition,ifany,fromthepointofdischarge TheoperationofNuclearPowerPlantinthecountryatthecoastallocationsatTAPS,Tarapurin

MaharashtraandMAPSatKalpakkaminTamilNaduhasalsonotshownanyadverseeffectsonMarine lifeincludingthefish. 7.2Impactonland,agriculture,livestockandfood 7.2.1ImpactonLand Beneficialimpactswouldbefeltonlandusepatternandtopographicalfeaturesoftheareadue

to greening of the area through plantation and green belt development. Under operating conditions, therewillnotbeanyimpactonthelandenvironmentasdischargesareinsignificantascomparedtothe combinednaturalbackgroundparameters. As of June 2011, a total of 23890 plants and trees has been developed for green belting, at

Kudankulam site (KKNPP). The area covered by lawns and gardens is 16419 Square meters. Hedges accountsfor2467RunningmetersandthiswillhelptoimprovethequalityofenvironmentaroundNPP. The green belt development will be continued in future which will attract more fauna specially avian species resulting in improvement in biodiversity as evident in other nuclear power stations like Kaiga, Kalpakkam,Tarapuretc. 7.2.2ImpactonAgriculture,livestockandfoodsecurity NationalEnvironmentalEngineeringResearchInstitute(NEERI)haspreparedtheEnvironmental

ImpactAssessment(EIA)reportandhaddocumentedthelanduseclassificationin30Kmsradiusofthe plantsitebasedonsatellitemapping.
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The land use/ land cover classification indicates 8.73% area covered by vegetation, 8.73% are

coveredbyBarrenland,23.39%areacoveredbyscrubland,8.52%areacoveredbysandy area,0.08% builtuparea,49.68%waterbodyincludingsea,river/nalaetc. This is the baseline data. However data from the other nuclear power plants in the country

indicate that operation of NPPs do not have any adverse impact on agriculture, live stock and food security. 7.3Impactonfloraandfauna Assuchthelandacquiredhasbeendryandbarrenandhencethereisnoimpactontheflora

andfaunainsidetheplantarea.NEERIhasconductedthebaselinestudyofthebiologicalenvironment inandaroundKKsiteandiswelldocumented. As stated earlier, a total of 23890 plants and trees has been developed for green belting, at

KKNPP. The area covered by lawns and gardens is 16419 Square meters. Hedges accounts for 2467 runningmeters. TheGreenBeltprogrammewillbecontinuedtodevelopagreenbeltinthevacantland,after

assigningtheplantstructuresofKKNPP3to6.Becauseofthegreenbeltdeveloped,theareaaround plantandtownshiphasbecomeahubformigratorybirds. 7.4Biosphereconsiderations 7.4.1GulfofMannarBiospherereserve ThenearestbiodiversityrichnessregionofGulfofMannarbiospherereserveislocatednorthof Tuticorinwhichismorethan80Kmsfromtheplantsite. CMFRIwhilepreparingthemarineEIAhadconductedexhaustivesamplingcovering60SqKms of the site. They have clearly stated that the marine ecosystem of the KKNPP region has characteristics of an oceanic region which is different from the productive ecosystems of the westcoast,gulfsandbays. Another significant ecological feature of KKNPP Site is the absence of sensitive habitats like mangrove and coral reefs in KKNPP coast. The CMFRI have confirmed that there are no formations of coral reefs south of Tuticorin and along the Kanyakumari coast (including the Plantneighborhood).

7.4.2WesternGhats TheEIAdocumentconfirmsthatthereisnoforestareawithin15kmoftheplantsite. AssuchthereisnoimpactontheWesternGhatsduetosettingupofKKNPP.

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8.EarthquakeandTsunami
(Prof.HarshK.GuptaPanikkar,Professor,NGRI,Hyderabad&Prof.C.V.R.Murthy,Dept.ofCivilEngg, Earthquakeresistantdesignofstructures) 8.1Earthquakedesignmethodology Structures,systemsandcomponents(SSC)ofIndiannuclearpowerplant(NPP)aredesignedfor

two levels of earthquakes which are estimated according to safety requirements laid down by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) which are in line with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)guidelines(IAEAGuide50SGS1): 1) S1levelofgroundmotionorOBE(OperatingBasisEarthquake). 2) S2levelofgroundmotionorSSE(SafeShutdownEarthquake). S1levelcorrespondstothemaximumgroundmotionwhichcanbeexpectedtobeexperiencedatthe Site during the life of the NPP i.e. once in a 100 years. All SSC necessary for power generation are designedforthislevelofgroundmotion. S2levelcorrespondstotheconservativelyestimatedlevelofgroundmotionwhichcanbeexpectedto occuroncein10,000years.AllSSCimportanttosafetyaredesignedtoremainfunctionalduringaS2 levelearthquake. SSE is derived on the basis of maximum earthquake potential associated with the tectonic structures andseismotectonicprovinceintheregionandtakesintoaccount: I. II. III. IV. the maximum earthquake potential inside the seismic tectonic province of the site associatedwithspecifictectonicstructures the maximum earthquake potential inside the seismic province of the site not associated withspecifictectonicstructures the maximum earthquake potential for the adjoining seismotectonic provinces associated withspecifictectonicstructuresand the maximum earthquake potential for the adjoining seismotectonic provinces not associatedwithaspecifictectonicstructure.

8.2EarthquakeDesignBasisforKKNPP (Reference:EarthquakeDesignBasisforKudankulamSitereportpreparedbyDr.A.K.Ghosh,BARC& ShriD.C.Banerjee,AMD) KudankulamNuclearPowerPlantislocatedinIndianSeismicZoneIIwhichistheleastseismic

potentialregionofourcountry.(ref.IS1893).However,fordesigningofthePlant,detailedstudiesare conducted to conservatively estimate extent of ground motion applicable to the specific Site with

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referencetoSeismotectonicandGeologicalconditionsarounditsothatNPPsaredesignedforaSSE level earthquake which has a very low probability of being exceeded (return period of 1 in 10,000 years). For Kudankulam NPP, the following tasks were undertaken for detailed evaluation of Site

specificconditionsasbelow: a) Studyoftheseismotectonicandgeologicalsetupoftheregion. b) SelectionofasetofrecordedaccelerogramswithsourceandsiteconditionsresemblingthoseatSitefor computingresponsespectra. c) Generation of response spectra of the selected timehistories for various values of damping and statisticalanalysisoftheensembleofresponsespectra. d) Collectionofadditionalinformationonearthquakes,regionalandlocalgeologyandtectonicspertinent toevaluatingfaultactivityanddesignbasisgroundmotionparameters. e) Integration of the above information to arrive at the Earthquake Design Basis (EDB). This involves the generationofpeakgroundaccelerationandresponsespectralshapesforvariouscomponentsofground motionforbothS1andS2. f) Generationofspectralcompatibleaccelerograms. All potential, active and nonactive faults, lineaments and seismic history within a radius 300

kmshavebeenanalyzedtoarriveattheSSEandOBElevelsofearthquake.Asperabovedata,thereare nofaults/lineamentsinthenearvicinityofthesite.Themostintenseearthquakeexperiencedinthis 300km region is the earthquake that occurred at Coimbatore (307 km) on 08/02/1900 which had an epicentralintensityofVIIontheMMIscale(6.0intheRichterscale). Towards enhanced conservation, the high intensity earthquakes that occurred in this

seismotectonic region have been assumed to act at the closest faults/ lineaments near the site in arrivingattheSSElevel.TheSitespecificresponsespectraforSSEatKKNPPhasbeenderivedfromthe envelopeofthesehypotheticalevents. Considering the above events, a rocksitespecific formula for the maximum peak ground

accelerationvalidfortherangeofmagnitudeanddistanceofinteresthasbeenderived.

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 ThepeakgroundaccelerationsthusevaluatedforKKNPPareasfollows. Peakgroundacceleration(g) Level SSE OBE Horizontal 0.15 0.05 Vertical 0.11 0.036

Inconclusion,theseismicparametersforthedesignofSSCofKKNPPhavebeenarrivedatina highlyconservativemannerfollowingtheAERBstipulationsandthustheseismicsafetyoftheplantis assuredwithalargesafetymargin. 8.3VolcanoandTsunami TheoverallpassivetectonicofthepeninsularIndiaandSriLankaisreflectedbythemoderate andmaturecontinentaltopographyofPrecambriancratons,whichisamongtheoldestandmoststable landforms on the earth. This stable cratonic landmass of Indian peninsula is separated from the GondwanalandmassduringLateCretaceousperiod(Laughtonetal.,1973;McKenzie&Sclater,1971). This stable landmass has experienced several volcanic activities during its lifespan of more than three billionyears(>3Ga)withyoungestbeingduring90.01.0and87.50.9Maago(Kumaretal.,2001;Fig. 8.3.1),whichcoincideswiththetimingofbreakupofIndiafromMadagascar.Itisthereforeobviousto find volcanic rocks in peninsular India, but they do not suggest any volcanic activity in recent past or foreseeable future. The spatial occurrence of volcanoes on the earth is not random but follows a tectonic regime and the same is observed in the present day distribution of active volcanoes in the worldaswellasIndiansubcontinente.g.BarrenIslandstotheeastofAndamanNicobarIslandchain.It is therefore not appropriate to assume active volcanism just by finding volcanic rock at a location. Further, any parallel from the Yukka Mountains in USA cannot be drawn as the Indian peninsula is a stableshieldwhereastheYukkaMountainsistectonicallyactiveregion.

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 Fig. 8.3.1: Google image of part of Indian peninsula overlaid with the locations of volcanic rocks of respectiveages. The bathymetry of the Gulf of Mannar [Anonymous, 1975] is reminiscent of an amphitheater withanapproximately1kmhighouterlip.Alongthedeepercentralportionsofthebasin(depthfrom 2600to2800m)isasubmarinecanyonwithaNNWtrend.Themaximumdepthwithinthecanyonis~ 350 m. Two suites of submarine slumps from opposite margins of the Gulf of Mannar, namely East Comorin slide and Colombo slide originating on respective continental slopes between southern India andSriLanka[Vestal&Lowrie,1982;Anonymous,1976;Figure8.3.2].Theyarelargerotationalslides with very little internal deformation in the East Comorin side but the Colombo slides show complex internal deformation. To the south, an enlarging and deepening submarine canyon marks the area of slump coalescence. The Eastern Comorin Slump is the more coherent with a length of 70 to 100 km whereas the Colombo slump consists of two to four blocks 15 to 35 km in length. A paleoslump underliesthewesterntoeoftheEastComorinSlumpatadepthofsome800metersisalsoobserved [Vestal&Lowrie,1982].

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 Fig.8.3.2SlumpZonesinGulfofMannar

It is suggested that large submarine landslides can generate Tsunami and may cause coastal hazard. An attempt has been made to quantify the amount of possible water displacement from the aboveslumpbeltsinGulfofMannarthatmayoccurduringtheworstcasescenario.The hypothetical scenario catastrophe affecting the entire submarine landslide (length x width = 100 x 70 Km2) may produceanapparentslipoftheorderof~100mindownslopedirectionalongaslopeof~30o.Thiswill displaceanamountof<2.5Km3ofwaterperkilometerlengthoflandslidealongthecoastparallellength of ~100 km. This is very small amount of water displacement to produce a serious tsunami that can causeanydamagetothesurroundingregion.Further,onlytheColomboslide,whichisfragmentedand smallinsizewith1530kmlengthwithseveralinternaldeformationmaynothaveenoughpotentialto evendisplaceafraction ofvolume calculatedaboveto generateany damaging tsunamithatwillhave directivitytowardsNWi.e.IndianPeninsula(theareaofinterest).
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Inconclusion,itcanbeseenthattherehasbeennovolcanicactivityinthepeninsularIndiaforseveral millionyears.Also,thereisnopossibilityofTsunamiaffectingKKNPPduetolandslipintheIndian Ocean. 8.4FlooddesignofKKNPP 8.4.1DesignBasisFloodLevel The safe grade elevation of KKNPP site has been kept at 7.5 Mtr above MSL and a shore

protectionbundisconstructedallalongtheshoretoaheightof+8.0MtrtoMSL. Thedetailsofarrivingatthesafegradeelevation,consideringeithertsunamiorstormsurgeis listedinthetablebelow. SlNo 1 2 RiseWaterlevelDueto(m) Wave Runup 2.0 2.0 Max.Tide 1.42 1.42 StormSurge 2.46 Tsunami 2.50 Total (w.r.tCD) 5.88 5.92

Therefore the maximum water level = 5.92 0.481 = 5.439m with respecttoMSL.

Keeping a further safety margin of 2.0m, the safe grade elevation is kept as 7.44m(say7.5m)w.r.tMSL 8.4.2KKNPPBuildingelevations Inadditiontothesafegradeelevation,sufficientmarginsareavailableineachbuilding.Elevationsand locationsofimportantsafetybuildingsaregiveninthetablebelow. Elevationsinmeters Marginavailable aboveMSL meters Pumphousegradeelevation +7.65m 2.21 ReactorBuildinggradeelevation +8.7m 3.26 SafetyDGbuilding(sealedbuilding) +9.3m 3.86 DieseltanksinDGbuilding +13.8m 8.36 BatteryBanks(sealedbuilding) +16.5m 11.06 PassiveHeatRemovalSystem +52.2m 46.76 Heatexchangers MaincontrolRoom +26.0 20.56 In addition, having a higher grade elevation, all the safety related buildings are closed with double Description gasketleaktightdoors.

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8.4.3Shorestability NopotentialofshoreinstabilityexistsatKudankulamsitearea,asprotrudingrockoutcropsarepresent all along the coast protecting the shore from erosion. Also, no historical shore erosion has been recordedinthearea. 8.4.4Tsunamiwarningsystems PossibleTsunamioccurrencecanbeknownasalertscomefromthefollowingagencies: KKNPP is registered with INCOIS, Hyderabad (Indian National centre for ocean information service). In case of any Tsunami warnings, information in the mobile numbers of the station managementwillbereceived. Madras Atomic Power station, Kalpakkam has established PC based Earthquake Notification System (ENS) which gives alarm in the control room in case of an earthquake. ENS is an application which scans USGS (US Geological survey) and EMSC (European Mediterranean SeismicCentre)sites.ImmediatealertwillbegiventoKKNPPcontrolroomfromKalpakkamin caseofanyalarm. 9.RegulatoryandStatutoryClearances
(Shri.W.StephenAruldossKanthiah,FormerDirector,HeavyWaterBoard,GovtofIndia, Shri.S.K.Mehta,FormerDirector,ReactorGroup,BARC& Dr.A.E.Muthunayagam,NurulIslamUniversity,Nagercoil,TamilNadu)

9.1Introduction Regulatoryandstatutoryclearancesaretobeobtainedfromtherelevantauthoritiesbeforeand duringthevariousstages ofconstructionand commissioningofaNuclearPowerPlant. NPCILsubmits therequiredinformationtotheseauthoritiesforobtainingtheclearances. Regulatory clearances are accorded by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board where as other statutoryclearancesareobtainedfromdifferentCentralandStategovernmentbodieslikeMinistryof EnvironmentandForest,StatePollutionControlBoard,PetroleumandExplosivesSafetyOrganization, CentralElectricityAuthorityandDirectorofBoilers,TamilNadu,etc. 9.2 NuclearRegulatoryClearances

9.2.1 Guideforconsentingprocess The AERB guide AERB/NPP&RR/SG/G1 published in the year 2007 give in detail the CONSENTING PROCESS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. The guide details the important stages for obtainingconsentinrespectofNuclearPowerPlants(NPPs)andthenatureofsubmissionstobemade bytheapplicantateachstage.ThisregulatoryguideisavailableinAERBwebsitewww.aerb.gov.in.
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9.2.2 MajorstagesofAERBsconsentingprocessforNPPsareasfollows: Siting Construction Commissioning Operation Decommissioning 9.2.3 BriefdetailsofstagewiseconsentingprocessandtheconsentsobtainedforKKNPP1&2 9.2.3.1AERBsitingclearanceforKKNPP1&2 NPCILsubmittedadetailedSiteEvaluationReporttoAERBalongwiththeproposalforlocating KKNPP1&2in1988.FurtherasupplementaryreportwasmadeinFebruaryandMarch1989.Layoutof thetwounitsofKKNPPaswellasanoverallplantlayoutwiththeexclusionzonemarkedwassubmitted. ThesewerereviewedbyAERBinthreelevelsofcommittees. Basedontheabovereviews,AERBgrantedclearanceforKudankulamsiteforlocating2X1000MWe VVERsvidetheirletterno:CH/AERB/KK/8486/89dated10thNov1989. 9.2.3.2ConstructionConsent Forconstructionclearancethefollowingstageclearancesweretobeobtained,viz. clearanceforexcavation, clearanceforfirstpourofconcreteand Clearanceforerectionofmajorequipment. 9.2.3.2.1.AERBConsentforExcavationofKKNPP1&2 NPCILsubmittedDetailedProjectReportandPreliminarySafetyAnalysisReports(PSAR)toAERB inJune2000.Thesubmissionscoveredthefollowing: detailsoftheVVERtypereactor,itsvarioussafetyanddesignfeatures, layoutofthetwounits Philosophyofthesafetyclassificationofthebuildings,systemsandcomponents,Listofallthe buildingandtheirclassification ResultsofthevariousSiteinvestigationscarriedoutandsitespecificdesignparameterssuchas Design Basis Ground Response Spectra, Safe bearing capacity of the ground, Safe grade elevationofthesiteconsideringcoastalfloodingetc Details of the back ground radiation survey carried out all around the site within a radius of 30km Demographicdetailsaroundthesite Meteorologicaldataofthesite

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 ReportonPlantLayoutwhichincludedthelayoutofthebuildingsandstructures,roadswithin theMainplantboundary,movementofpersonal,equipment,andspentfuelandfreshfuel.The reportalsoaddressedtheundergroundnetworks(pipelinesandtunnels),Radiationzoningand contaminationcontrolphilosophy,movementofheavycargowithintheplantsite,overallplant drainageschemeetc. The studies were carried out by various government agencies working in these fields and throughexpertsinthosefields. Afterreviewofthesubmissions,AERBaccordedclearancefor excavationofthesiteforthe main plant buildings of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project vide their letter no: CH/AERB/199/KK/2001/8134dated9thOct2001. 9.2.3.2.2 AERBconsentforFirstPourofConcrete(FPC)ofKKNPP1&2

NPCIL had submitted all the relevant PSARs and other related documents for obtaining AERB clearanceforFirstpourofconcreteofthemainplantbuildingsandthesewerereviewedbyAERB. After review of the submissions in different levels by Specialist Groups and committees constitutedbyAERB,AERBgaveclearanceforFPCvidethefollowing: 1. Clearance for FPC for Reactor Auxiliary Building of KKNPP 1&2 vide letter no: CH/AERB/199/KK/2002/2501dated22ndMarch2002, 2. Clearance for FPC of Reactor Buildings of KKNPP 1&2 vide letter no: Ch/AERB/199/KK/2002/3035dated9thApril2002. 9.2.3.2.3AERBconsentformajorequipmenterectionforKKNPP NPCIL had submitted all the relevant PSARs and other related documents for obtaining AERB clearanceformajorequipmenterection. All the documents were reviewed in three levels by Specialist Groups and committees constitutedbyAERB. Afterreviewofthedocuments,AERBgavethefollowingclearances: ClearanceforequipmenterectioninKKNPP1videletterno:CH/AERB/199/KK/2006/8531dtd30th Aug2006. ClearanceforequipmenterectioninKKNPP2videletterno:CH/AERB/199/KK/2007/6808dtd22nd June2007.

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 9.2.3.2.4AERBConsentforCommissioning Theclearanceforcommissioningistobeobtainedinthefollowingsubstagesasgivenbelow: HotRun Fuelloading Firstapproachtocriticality Powerraiseandconnectionofgeneratortogrid Powerraiseto75% Powerraiseto100%

AERB grants the clearance for each stage after the review of the reports commissioning activitiesandtestscarriedoutuptotheprecedingstage. NPCILsubmittedapplicationtoAERBforobtainingclearanceforhotrunforKKNPPUnit1vide letter dated 30th April 2010. Based on review of the results of various tests, including primary and secondary steam generator hydraulic tests, containment strength and leak rate tests, by specialist committeesandtheirrecommendation,AERBgrantedclearanceforHotRunofKKNPP1videletter CH/AERB/KKNPP/199/2011/39datedJune30,2011. The hot run was completed in July, 2011. All the required tests for hot run were completed successfully.Thenextstageispermissionforopeningofpressurevessel,removalofdummyfuelandin serviceinspectionofvesselsandpiping.NPCILhassubmittedallthedocumentsrelatedtocompletionof HotRunandrequestedAERBforclearanceforthenextstage. Forobtainingconsentforfuelloading,someoftheimportantsubmissionsrequiredare resultsofcommissioningandtestspertainingtohotrun Resultsofinspectionofreactorpressurevesselandothermajorequipment fuelloadingpatternandloadingprocedures radiologicalzoningandcommissioningofradiationmonitoringsystem availabilityofhealthphysicsfacilities Commissioningofstartupinstrumentation

Forobtainingconsentforfirstapproachtocriticalityandlowpowerphysicsexperiments,submissions arerequiredon testsresultsofregulating,protectionandsafetysystems establishmentofexclusionboundary onsiteandoffsiteemergencyprocedures&plans

Forobtainingconsentforvariousstagesofpoweroperation,resultsofoperationandtestscarriedout duringtherespectivepreviousstagearerequiredtobesubmittedprogressively. The documents and further stage clearance is under review by AERB specialist groups.
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 9.2.4 AERBRegulatoryInspections AERB carries out regular Regulatory Inspections (RIs) at KKNPP site to verify compliance to regulatoryrequirements.Regulatoryinspectioniscarriedouttwiceinayear. 9.3 StatutoryClearances Statutory clearances applicable to other major industries are also required to be obtained

beforestartofconstruction/operationofanNPP.TheseareobtainedfromdifferentCentralandState Governmentagenciesthatarespecificallyauthorizedforgrantingpermission. 9.3.1EnvironmentalClearance As per the then prevailing norms (as per environment protection act 1986) when KKNPP was

initiatedin1989,theapplicantwasrequiredtoapplytotheStateMinistryofEnvironmentandForests. Thestategovernmentusedtoissueenvironmentalclearanceafterstudyingtheprojectdetails.Further, thesamewouldbeforwardedtocentralMoEFandtheywouldissueafinalenvironmentalclearance. 9.3.1.1KKNPP1&2Environmentalclearancedetails Application in the standard format to Tamilnadu State Department of Environment and Forests/ TamilnaduPollutionControlBoardforsettingupof2X1000MWNuclearpowerplantsinKudankulam, TamilnaduwassubmittedbyNPCILon12.12.1988aspertheenvironmentalprotectionact1986. Basedonthesubmissionsandverificationthereof,TamilnaduStateEnvironmentalCommitteewhichis under the State Environment and Forests Department vide their letter no: 6264/A3/891 dated 13.02.1989gaveclearanceandforwardedtoCentralMoEF. Further the central Ministry of Environment and Forests considered the environmental clearance applicationandgaveenvironmentalclearancetoNPCILforsettingupof2X1000MWnuclearplantin Kudankulamvidetheirletterdated9thMay1989withstipulations(Refletterno:14011/1/88IAdt09 051989). In 1994 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) notification was introduced for the first time in the country stipulating EIA document to be submitted for getting environmental clearances. Subsequent amendmentwasissuedin1997stipulatedadditionalrequirementofpublichearing. However,the1994EIA notificationgaveanexceptionfortheprojectswhich hadcommenced the pre project stage activities. This exception clause (clause 8) stated that if the project land has been acquiredandallrelevantclearancesoftheStateGovernmentincludingNOCfromtherespectiveState PollutionControlBoardshavebeenobtainedbefore27thJanuary,1994,aprojectproponentwillnotbe

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requiredtoseekenvironmentalclearancefromtheImpactAssessmentAuthority(IAA).Howeverthose unitswhohavenotasyetcommencedproductionwillinformtheIAA. Accordingly, the matter of environmental clearance of KKNPP and its applicability as per the 1994 notificationwasreferredtoMoEFbyNPCIL. The details of completion of the land acquisition for the project, the state government environmental committee clearance and the work carried out in the project site since 1991, was submittedtoMoEF. Basedonthesubmissions,MoEFrevalidatedtheenvironmentalclearanceissuedinMay1989vide theirletterdated6thSeptember2001toKKNPPandmentionedthatthereisnoneedtoconduct publichearingandseekfreshenvironmentalclearance.

Note:ThecomprehensiveEIAforUnits1&2wasmadethroughNEERIintheyear2003,andduringthe EnvironmentalclearanceforUnits3to6,acomprehensiveEIAincludingtheimpactsofUnit1&2was made,andsubmittedtoMoEFintheyear2006,forwhichMoEFaccordedenvironmentalclearance(the EIAdocumentsareavailableinNPCILwebsite). 9.3.2CRZclearanceofKKNPP1&2: As per the norms prevailing in vogue in the year 1989 when KKNPP 1&2 obtained environmental clearance, there was a ban for constructing structures within 500 metres of High Tide line (HTL). ApplicationforobtainingtheenvironmentalclearanceforKKNPP1&2wassubmittedgivingtheproject details and location and the details of condenser cooling system as sea water in December 1988. Consideringtheapplication,MoEFissuedenvironmentalclearanceinMay1989,withapermissionto locatestructureswithin500MtrsofHTL. Subsequently 1991 notification for CRZ was issued and as per clause 2(i) (b) of 1991 CRZ notification projectsofDepartmentofAtomicEnergy(DAE)arepermissibleactivities.Alsoasperclause3(2)(i)of the 1991 CRZ notification, the projects of DAE shall require to obtain environmental clearance from MoEF. While considering the applicability of all the notifications issued after 1989 on the environmental clearance issues, MoEF vide their letter 6th September 2001 has reconfirmed the environmental clearance issued to KKNPP 1&2 (in 1989) which provides exemption for constructing plant structures within500MtrofHTL. Evenasperclause3(i)(b)ofthelatest2011CRZnotification,projectsofDepartmentofAtomicEnergy are permissible activities in the CRZ area. The regulation of the permissible activities as per this notificationalsostipulatesthatthepermissibleactivitiesneedtoobtainenvironmentalclearancefrom MoEF.

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 9.3.3ConsentfromTNPCB ConsenttoestablishKKNPP1&2. Application for consent to establish KKNPP 1&2 under air and water act was applied to District EnvironmentalEngineer,Tirunelvelivideapplicationdated30.12.2001withrelevantdocuments.The documentswereverifiedbyDEEandthesamewasforwardedtoTNPCB,Chennai. TNPCB Board vide their board resolution number 202110 dtd 19022004 resolved to issue consent. The consent for establishing vide TNPCB letter no nil dated 25.02.2004 to KKNPP 1&2 under air and wateract. ConsenttooperateKKNPP1&2 Applicationenclosingallthedetailsincludingadditionalfacilitiesweresubmitted toDEEinyear2010. BasedonthediscussionwithTNPCBchairmanwithKKNPP1&2management,theplantwasinspected byDEEandthequeriesraisedbyDEEhavebeenresponded.Theapplicationisunderconsiderationof theTNPCB. 9.4OtherstatutoryclearancesobtainedbyKKNPP1&2 9.4.1Statutoryclearancesobtainedforstorageofdieseloilatsite Clearance for storage of High Speed Diesel fuel oil Storage from Petroleum and Explosives safety organization(PESO)Nagpur,(Formerlydepartmentofexplosives)hasbeenobtainedforstorageofHigh Speed Diesel fuel oil used in emergency diesel generators of KKNPP at each location under the PetroleumRules2002. PESOgrantedfollowinglicensestoKKNPPforstorageofHSD: License No. P/HQ/TN/15/4818/(P26894) dated 19/1/2010 for storage of 3800 KL of High Speed Diesel(HSD)atCentralDieselStorageFacility06UEJ. LicenseNo.P/HQ/TN/15/4855/(P251898)dated21/6/2010forstorageof100KLofHSDat05UEJ.( CommonDGsetsbuilding)(DieselstorageFacilityof05UKD) LicenseNo.P/HQ/TN/15/4856/(P251850)dated21/6/2010forstorageof100KLofHSDat01UEJ.( Unit111UKDDieselStorageBuilding) LicenseNo.P/HQ/TN/15/4859/(P251860)dated21/6/2010forstorageof100KLofHSDat02UEJ. (Unit112UKDDieselStorageBuilding) LicenseNo.P/HQ/TN/15/4820/(P244402)dated21/1/2010forstorageof100KLofHSDat03UEJ. (Unit113UKDDieselStorageBuilding) LicenseNo.P/HQ/TN/15/4857/(P251890)dated21/6/2010forstorageof100KLofHSDat04UEJ. (Unit113UKDDieselStorageBuilding). 9.4.2 Clearance for storage of compressed gas cylinders from Petroleum and Explosives safety organization(PESO) Nitrogen,oxygen,hydrogen,acetlyne,argonandcarbondioxidegasesareusedforvariousprocesses inKKNPPandneedtobestored.
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BasedonKKNPPapplication,DeputyChiefControllerofExplosives,PESO,Sivakasisubcircle,Sivakasi, TamilNadugrantedfollowinglicensestoKKNPPforstorageofcompressedgasesasperGasCylinders Rules2004: LicenseNo.G/SC/TN/06/1801/(G21512)dated11August2010forstorageof1400argonand1680 oxygencompressedgascylindersat0USK. License No. G/SC/TN/06/1802/(G21795) dated 11 August 2010 for storage of 320 carbon dioxide, 3680nitrogen,3360hydrogenand560acetylenecompressedgascylindersat0USK

9.4.3ApprovalsfromDirectorofBoilers,TamilNadu,Chennai Auxillary boiler is used for producing auxiliary steam during start up of plant. Applications were submittedtotheDirectorofBoiler(DOB),Chennaifordesignapproval,erectionapprovalandlicensefor operation.FollowingarethelicensesgrantedtoKKNPPw.r.tauxiliaryboilers: ProvisionalorderNo.TechI/4660M/2008dated18062008.Designdrawingsapproval. Provisional order No DB/7729/7982M/2009, DB/7730/7982M/2009, DB/7731/7982M/ 2009 dated 22022010.(Threeboilers)Pipelinedrawingsapproval,inspectionoftheboilers,provisionalorder toboilers,passordertopipelinesissued. Provisional order No 43/DB/0910, 44/DB/0910, 45/DB/0910 dated 20022010 granting permissionforoperationoftheboilers.Provisionalorderisrenewedeverysixmonths.

9.4.4ClearancefromCentralElectricityAuthority,ElectricalInspectorateDivision For energizing and operating any electrical installation in the installations, clearance from Central electricityauthority(CEA)hastobeobtained.ApplicationwassubmittedtoCEAandonsatisfactionof thedocumentsandsiteinspectionoftheinstallations,CEAgaveapproval. Energisationof6.6KVand220KVGIS:Videletterdated24102008. ApprovalforenergisationofHV/MVequipment:Videletterdated09.06.2010. ApprovalforenergizingGT,UAT,ICT,DG400KVGIS:Videletterdtd16.12.2010 ApprovalforenergisationofallelectricalequipmentofUNIT1:Videletterdated26082011. 10.OtherTopics Dr.A.E.Muthunayagam, Nurul Islam University, Nagercoil, Tamil Nadu & Dr.S.M.Lee, Raja Ramanna Fellow,
SafetyResearchInstitute,Kalpakkam)

10.1FuelSupply 10.1.1NuclearFuel Fuel for initial and reload of Unit1&2 of KKNPP is procured as per Fuel Contract signed between Russian Federation and DAE, GOI. The fuel is supplied in the form of finished fuel assemblies of designated enrichment to be loaded in to the core. The quality of fuel fabrication at the fuel fabrication plant in Russia is inspected by DAE/NPCIL fuel experts at different stages of fuel
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fabricationasperapprovedQualityAssurancePlan. The finished fuel assemblies are packed in specially designed casks and transported by special air craftfromRussiatoIndia.FromAirporttotheKKNPPfacility,thetransportationisdonebyroad.The entiretransportation,startingfromfabricationplantinRussiatoKKNPPfacility,strictlyadheresto the safety regulations of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and AERB of India. Security arrangementsarefollowedaspertheDAESecuritynorms. 10.1.2DummyFuel DummyFuelhasnoradioactivematerialandisusedtosimulatetheNuclearFuelAssembly,bothby geometricalandbyweightconsideration.DummyFuelismadeofleadencapsulatedinsteeltubes. These are required to be installed in the reactor during commissioning, to study hydraulic characteristicslikepressureandtemperaturevariations,flowpatternwithvariouscombinationsof Reactor Coolant Pumps, temperature etc., in the Primary Coolant System. The Dummy Fuel assemblieshavenoproblemsofdisposalastheyarenonradioactive,butinfactarepreservedand reusedinsubsequentnewreactorsduringcommissioningtest. 10.2IAEASafeguards Government of India has entered into an agreement with International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of Safeguards for the nuclear fuel to be supplied for KKNPP by the Russian Federation.Theagreemententeredintoforceon27thSeptember1988andfollowstheguideline availableinINFCIRC/360availableonIAEAwebsite.Wehavelongexperienceinimplementation ofsafeguardsonnuclearfuelinsomeofourNPPsandtheprocedurestobefollowedatKKNPPwill benodifferent.HencetherearenoproblemsinimplementationofIAEAsafeguardsforthenuclear fuelinKKNPP. 10.3FreshWaterSupplyandDesalinationPlants Desalinationplant,basedonMechanicalVapourCompressiontechnology,atKKNPPsitehas beendesignedtomeettheprocessrequirementsofUnit#1&2andthepotablewaterrequirements. The plant water requirement is 5664 m3/day and the potable water requirement is 1272 m3/day.Againstthis,theinstalleddesalinationplantcapacityis7680m3/day.Thisismetbythreeunits, eachofcapacity2560m3/day,withoneadditionalunitof2560m3/dayunit,asastandby.Theoutput waterfromthedesalinationplantisfurtherpurifiedbydemineralizingandusedforindustrialpurpose. Theproductwateristreatedfurtherformakingitpotablewater. Theprovisionofwaterstorageandinventoryavailableinvarioustanksareadequateforcooling requirementsofReactorPlantforatleasttendays,incaseofpowerfailurefromtheGrid(eventhough theregulatoryrequirementisonly7days). Thedesalinationplantshavebeendesignedforsufficientcapacityandhavebeenerected and commissioned.Hence,thequestionofwaterutilizationfromothersourcessuchasPechiparaidamand Tamirabharaniriverdoesnotarise.

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 Desalination Plant at KKNPP site is based on thermal desalination i.e Mechanical Vapour Compression(MVC)system.Thesystemdrawsseawaterfromthemaincoolingwaterintakechannel provided for the power plant. The brine reject from the desalination plant will be mixed with the condensed cooling water discharges, diluted and released into the sea through the existing outfall channel. Abaselineenvironmentalassessmentandmathematicalmodelingstudyonflow,dispersionof brine reject and extent of mixing in the sea has been done by Indomer Coastal Hydraulics Pvt Ltd, Chennai, who is a certified consultant by Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Animal Husbandry & Dairying,NewDelhiandalsoacertifiedAgradehydrographicsurveyorbyInlandWaterwaysAuthority ofIndia,Noida. Thebrinerejectvolumeis350m3/hourandit getsdilutedwithseawater discharge through the outlet canal which is 2,50,000 m3/hour during plant normal operation. This will give an initial dilution of the order 700. This predilution would reduce the brine concentration from 69 ppt to an ambientvalueof35.1ppt. Thebrinerejectwillnothaveanyimpactinthemarineenvironmentwhilejoiningthesea.

Thebrinerejectdoesnotcontainanytoxicororganicpollutant. 10.4ConstructionQA NuclearPowerCorporationofIndiaLimitedhasacorporatequalitymanagementprogramwhich givesassuranceofqualityinallactivitiesundertaken. Basedontheobservationsandperusalofdocumentsavailableatsiteitisconcludedthatadequate qualitystandardsareincorporatedinallstagesofworksintheproject.Theassuranceofqualityis accordedhighestattentioninallfieldsi.e.indesign,manufacturingandprocurement,construction, erection,commissioningandoperation. ThecomponentsmanufacturedinRussiaandsuppliedtoKKNPP1&2fromRussianFederationare subjectedtoundergothestringentchecksasdetailedinthequalityassuranceplansdeveloped jointlybyNPCILandRussianNuclearauthorities. TheconstructionworksarecarriedoutinaccordancewithQAmanualespeciallyinrespectofcivil construction,thematerialsusedaretestedforeverybatchattheconcretetestinglabatsite.The constructionQApersonnelinspecttheworksaspertheQAplanandtheworksarecarriedoutas perapprovalofQAstaff.Therecordsoftestingandinspectionswhichareextensivearewell documented.TheregularreviewsofthequalityarecarriedoutbyinternalauditswithinNPCILand auditsonspecificsystemsbyAERB. Thereactorbuildingcontainmenthaswithstoodastructuralintegrityandleakratetestatthetest pressure,whichismuchhigherthanthedesignpressure.Thehydrotests,nondestructivetests (radiography,ultrasonictest)etcwerecarriedoutandrecordsaremaintained.Hotrunhasbeen carriedouttovalidatethedesign.
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Alltherelevantdocumentspertainingtoqualityarekeptproperlyforreadyreference.

10.5EmergencyPreparedness NPPs are designed and operated following the principle of defenseindepth. This principle requiresthattherebesuccessivebarriersagainstreleaseofradioactivityandseverallayersofprotection beprovidedforeachofthesafetyfunctions. Thefirstlevelofdefenseindepthisachievedbyensuringthattheplant isdesignedinsucha waythatallsafetyparameterslikepressure,temperature,flowetc.aremaintainedwithinthespecified limits. Thesecondlevelcorrespondstoupsetoperatingconditionsthatcanbeexpectedduringplant operation, like, failure of grid power supply. The design ensures that safety is not jeopardized on accountofsuchupsetconditions. The third level relates to the situation where plant parameters exceed the prescribed safety limits.ThesafetydesignoftheNPPensuresthatthereactorispromptlyshutdownautomaticallyand cooling of fuel is adequately maintained to prevent it from overheating and cause any release of radioactivity. The fourth level corresponds to a situation where adequate cooling of the fuel cannot be maintainedforsomereasonwherebythereactorgetsintotheaccidentmode.Evenforsuchaccident conditions,theNPPdesignprovidesthemeanstobeabletocontroltheprogressionoftheaccidentand preventanymajorreleaseofradioactivitytotheenvironmentsuchthattherearenosignificantadverse radiologicalconsequencesinthepublicdomain. The fifth level of defenseindepth assumes, in a hypothetical manner that due to unforeseen reasonsorduetoanyfailuresindesignoroperatingproceduresorintheirimplementation,radioactivity releasetakesplace.Towardsthisanemergencypreparednessplanisinplacewhichcanbeexecuted,if required,tomitigatetheconsequencesofsucharelease. The emergency preparedness plans should therefore be viewed in the overall context of the safetyphilosophyofdefenseindepth.Needlesstomentionthatforanyplantobeeffective,itmustbe testedperiodically.Theemergencyexerciseincludingtheoffsiteemergencyexercisethatmayrequire evacuationofasectionofthepopulation,arecarriedoutaccordingly.Itmust,however,bereiterated that the possibility of an emergency situation arising is extremely remote and the exercises are done onlytobeinastateofpreparedness,shouldtheneedarise. InIndia,NPPshavebeeninoperationoverthelastmorethan40yearsandtherehasneverbeen any accident of the need for any emergency actions in the public domain. Even in the entire world whereover430NPPsareinoperation,theneedforemergencyactioninthepublicdomainhasarisen only twice; once in 1986 from the Chernobyl accident and the other in 2011 from the Fukushima accident.

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 ItmaybenotedthatinKKreactordesign,manyadvancedsafetyfeaturesaredeployed.These includethepassiveheatremovalsystem,whichensurescoolingofthefuelevenifpowerisnotavailable and other safety provisions like the double containment and core catcher that strengthen the plant safety such that any intervention in the public domain outside the plant exclusion zone will not be requiredevenincaseofanaccident.However,asamatterofabundantcautionfollowingthedefense indepthsafetyphilosophy,emergencyplanforactionstobetakeninpublicdomainduringanyoffsite emergencyplanswerepreparedandprovidedtoDistrictAuthoritiesforimplementations. These procedures are accordingly included in the Emergency Preparedness Plans Vol1 and Vol2dulyapprovedforKudankulamNuclearPowerProject.Volume1coversPlantEmergencyandSite EmergencyconditionswhichhavebeenpreparedbytheKKNPPSite,reviewedandapprovedbyAtomic EnergyRegulatoryBoard.Thedocumentno.isI01.KK.0.0.TM.MN.WD001.Volume2isfortheOffsite EmergencyPreparednesswhichhasbeenpreparedbyNPCILinconsultationwiththeStateauthorities, concurredbyAtomicEnergyRegulatoryBoardandapprovedbytheDistrictCollector,TirunelveliDistrict. DocumentNo.isI01.KK.0.0.TM.MN.WD002.Bothofthesedocumentsareinplace. Theseemergencypreparednessplansbringsouttheconditionsatwhichplant,siteandoffsite emergenciesmaybedeclaredbytherespectiveauthorities.Theyalsobringoutindetailtherolesand responsibilitiesofvariousagenciesinvolved.Theplantsaretestedperiodicallybyconductofemergency exercisessuchthatanydeficiencycanbeobservedandcorrectedandtokeeptheplantupdated.Plant emergencyexerciseisconductedoncein3months,siteemergencyisconductedonceinayear.Theoff siteemergencyisconductedonceistwoyears.Priortofirstcriticality,plant,siteandoffsiteemergency exerciseshavetobeconductedonce. Fortheplantandsiteemergency,alltheKKNPPemployeesandtheCISFpersonnelhavebeen trained. First plant emergency mock exercise has been conducted involving KKNPP personnel and contractpersonnel. ImplementationofoffsiteEmergencyplaninvolvesvariousStateGovernmentDepartmentslike District Revenue, Social Welfare, Fire, Health, Horticulture & Agriculture, Fisheries, Irrigation, Forest, AnimalHusbandry,ElectricityBoard,Transport,LocalAdministration&PoliceDepartments.Adetailed training programme was conducted as per the schedule provided by the District Collectorate for the officials from all the above departments in the month of August 2011 about the roles and responsibilitiesoftherespectivedepartments.Around600officialsfromthesedepartmentshavebeen trainedonoffsiteemergencypreparedness. 10.6Decommissioning The objective of decommissioning is to release the NPP site for reuse or for unrestricted use, dependingontherequirement,ensuringsafetyofmembersofthepublicandoccupationalworkersas well as protection of the environment. Provisions for facilitating decommissioning in KKNPP1&2 have beenmadeinthedesign.
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 Decommissioningstrategyconsistsofdefuellingofreactorandremovalofallradioactivefluids fromthesystems,attheendofitsoperatinglife.TheSSCsarethenkeptinasafestoragemodefora period of time to allow for natural decay of radioactivity for ease of dismantling of components and theirpackagingandtransportationfordisposal.Thenecessarymachinery,components,structuresand thebuildingareleftintactforsuchsafekeeping.SomeoftheconventionalSSCsmaybedismantledat thisstage. ThecostofdecommissioningofNPPsinIndiahasbeenworkedoutthroughadetailedexercise. Theestimatesindicatethatdecommissioningcostcanbemetbyadecommissioninglevyof2paiseper KWhtobechargedalongwithtarifftocreateacorpustobeusedatthetimeofdecommissioning.The levy will be reviewed periodically to ascertain its adequacy to meet the decommissioning fund requirementsandmayberevisedifnecessary. In this context, it may be noted that some of the Indian NPPs have undergone significant renovationandmodernizationactivities.Theseincludedreplacementofcomponentslikepressuretubes end fittings, feeder pipes etc. This experience has demonstrated that technology for such dismantlement activities, which are similar to decommissioning, is available in the country. The experiencealsoshowsthatcostsinvolvedarewithintheestimatedvalues.Theradioactivewastearising fromdecommissioningisnotsignificantlydifferentthanthewastegeneratedfromnormaloperationof the NPP, except that its volume will be comparatively large. In India we have good experience in handlinganddisposalofsuchwasteandthereforenodifficultyisforeseenforhandlinganddisposalof wastearisingfromdecommissioningwork. 11.CONCLUSIONS EGobservesthatKKNPPisdesignedandengineeredtothestateofartofnuclearreactorsinline with the current international safety requirements and principles. KK site related aspects such as seismic,tsunami,tropicalstormsaretakenintoconsiderationatdesignstage.Morethan20VVER1000 are operating in Russian Federation and in other countries. While finalizing the contract for KKNPP, additionalsafetyfeatureswerespecifiedwhichhavebeenincorporatedandtheirfunctionalityisbeing establishedduringcommissioning.Theradiologicalreleasesduringtheplantoperationareexpectedto bewellbelowprescribedlimits.ThisfactisborneoutbytheexperiencefromoperatingNPPsinIndia andabroad.Basedonthenationalandinternationalstudiesandexperience,suchradiologicalreleases have no adverse effects on public health, environment and plant personnel. Safety of KKNPP was examined in relation to the TMI, Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. It is seen that based on the advanceddesignsafetyfeatures,safegradelevelandhighelevationofsafetyrelatedequipmentandthe factthatallkeyoperatingpersonnelaregraduateengineerswhoalsoreceiveintensivetraining,itisnot conceivablethatanyaccidentofthesetypescantakeplaceatKKNPP. EGalsonotesthatclearancesforvariousstagesoftheprojectaregivenbytheAtomicEnergy Regulatory Board after an elaborate and exhaustive safety review at each stage. Similarly, other statutory bodies have also conducted detailed and indepth reviews before according clearances

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pertainingtoareasrelevanttotheirpurview.Thisclearlyindicatesthatallapplicablesafetyaspectsof theprojecthavebeensubjectedtocarefulscrutinybytheconcernedstatutorybodiesinthecountry. Inparticular,safetyofKKNPPhasbeenthoroughlyevaluatedagainstexternaleventsofnatural origin,viz.,earthquakesandpossiblefloodingofthesitefromcyclonicstormsandtsunamis.Itisseen thattheseismicdesignofitsSSCsandlocationofsafetyrelatedcomponentsprovidehighlevelofsafety againstsuchevents.Possibilityofvolcaniceruptionsinthevicinityofthesitehasalsobeenexamined and no active volcanism has been identified. The magnitude of any possible tsunami that can be generated from submarine landslides in the Gulf of Mannar has been found to be much smaller than tsunamis that may get generated from the submarine active seismic faults, which has already been takenintoconsideration. In view of the above, theEG would like to conclude that the fears of the local population are unfoundedanddesignofKKNPPmeetsthecurrentsafetystandards.

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 1. BRIEF PROFILE OF Dr. A. E. MUTHUNAYAGAM Mechanical Engineer who has contributed significantly over 35 years in Indian Space Research Programmes and Oceanography in various capacities. He was formerViceChairmanforIntergovernmentalOceanographicCommission,former SecretarytoGovernmentofIndia,DepartmentofOceanDevelopment,Chairman BoardofGovernorsofIITMandExecutiveVicePresidentofKeralaStateCouncil forScience, Technology &Environment. SinceApril2009heiswithNurulIslam UniversityasProChancellor/Advisor.

2. PROFILE OF DR. M.R.IYER Aseniorscientistassociatedwithworkonradiationsafetyformorethan50years. HewasaprofessionalwithInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)inVienna.A veteran in the area of radiation health risks, Dr.Iyer can be expected to clear any doubtonthesubject.

3. BRIEF PROFILE OF DR. M.N. MADHYASTHA Formerly Chairman, Dept. of Biosciences, Dean Faculty of Science & Technology, Mangalore University, Mangalore. Currently Visiting Professor, National Institute ofTechnology,KarnatakaofferingcourseforM.TechinEnvironmentalEngineering. 40 years experience on coastal marine biology, ecological issues and resource conservation.CoordinatorNationalBiodiversityStrategyandActionPlan[NBSAP] forWestcoastregion.PrincipleInvestigator&MonitoringCommitteeIntegrated Action Plan on River Kaveri. Principal Investigator Thermal ecology of benthic organisamsofKaigaAtomicPowerPlant.Handledmanyresearchprojects.Visited manycountriesforresearchactivities.WasvisitingProfessoratSalfordUniversity, UK, Fulbright Research Fellow. Visited USA for 1 year for Research. Training in Environmental Master Plan at Denmark. Expert member, Committee of EnvironmentalistsandSociologists,interlinkingofriversGOI.

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4. BRIEF PROFILE OF DR. SUKUMARAN Former Professor and Head Sri Paramakalyani centre for Environmental Sciences, ManonmaniamSundaranarUniversity,Alwarkurichi627412.HadaPh.DinBiology fromMaduraiKamarajUnivesity.35yearsofteachingandresearchexperiencein Fisheries, Biotechnology, Environmental Sciences and Thermal Ecology. Is a member in several committees at State and Central Government. More than 30 studentsgottheirPh.Dunderhisguidance.Hehasproduced.Hadmorethan300 research publications in National and International Journals. Had travelled many foreign countries for attending international conferences and workshops. He was honoured with TANSA Award for his research in Environmental Sciences by GovernmentofTamilNadu.

5. BRIEF PROFILE OF DR. A.K.PAL HeisPrincipalScientistandHeadDivisionofFishNutritionBiochemistryand Physiology, Central Institute of Fisheries Education Deemed University, ICAR. His principle area of specialization is Thermal Ecophysiology & And Radio Ecology.Hehasreceivedmanyawardsandhonorsinhisareaofspecialization andhasauthoredmanyresearchpapersinhisfield.

6. BRIEF PROFILE OF DR. V.SHANTA V. Shanta born to an illustrious family and raised in a world of books, ideas, andhighachievementexecutivechairofChennaisCancerInstitute(WIA).She studied medicine at Madras Medical College and came under the spell of Muthulakshmi Reddy, a social reformer and Indias first woman medical graduate. In 1954, under Dr. Reddys leadership, the Womens Indian AssociationCancerReliefFundfoundedtheCancerInstitute(WIA)inMadras, now Chennai. Drawn to Reddys vision, young Dr. Shanta spurned a more lucrativeposttojointheInstitute.Shantaconductedgroundbreakingresearch on oral, cervical, and breast cancer and pediatric leukemia, publishing the results in international journals and establishing the Institute as Indias first RegionalCancerResearchandTreatmentCenterin1975.In1984,theInstitute added a postgraduate college where Shanta proceeded to train cancer specialists, more than 150 of whom now practice throughout the subcontinent.EightyfouryearoldShantastillseespatients,andisstilloncall

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twentyfour hours a day. She was honoured in year 2005 byRamon MagsaysayAwardforPublicService 7. BRIEF PROFILE OF DR.C.S.PRAMESH

Dr.C.S.Pramesh is the head of thoracic surgery at the Tata Memorial Hospital, the largest cancer centre in the country. He is an expert in cancer diagnosis and treatment. He is an experienced researcher and has conducted several large research studies in cancer causation, diagnosis and treatment. He has over 100 peer-reviewed publications in several international journals and books.

8. BRIEF PROFILE OF DR. HARSH K GUPTA PANIKAR He is a noted seismologist and former Secretary to Government of India, Department of Ocean Development. After the tsunami, he led design and commissioning of Tsunami Warning System for India. He has published over 150 scientific papers in reputed journals, and has authored four books. His first book titled Dams and Earthquakes published in 1976. Recently (2011) he edited the encyclopaedia of Solid Earth Geophysics (Springer, 1600 + pages). He is President, InternationalUnionofGeodesyandGeophysics.

9. BRIEF PROFILE OF DR. KANNAN IYER Ph.D.PurduUniversityintheareaofnuclearreactorsafetyin1985.JoinedIITBin 1986 and has continued experiments and analysis in the area of nuclear reactor safety.Hespecialisesinreactorsafetyandhisassessmentoftheconstructionand functioning of the Koodankulam plant will convince the protestors regarding the safetyofthecentre.

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10.

BRIEF PROFILE OF PROF C.V.R. MURTY ASpecialistinearthquakestructuralengineering.Hisareasofresearcharenon linear behaviour of structures under strong earthquakes shaking and development of seismic design codes. He has been a member of Bureau of Indian Standards Committee on earthquake engineering. Currently he is a Professor in Department of Civil Engineering at Indian Institute of Technonogy, Madras.

11.

BRIEF PROFILE OF DR. S.K. MEHTA HeisaretiredDirector,ReactorGroupatBhabhaAtomicResearchCentre[BARC] withlongexperienceinnuclearreactordesignanddevelopment,safetyresearch andsafetyanalysis.NuclearReactordesignanalysisandreviewishisareaof specialisation.

12. PROFILE OF DR. S.K. SHARMA Chairman of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) from January 2005 to January2010.ViceChairmanofAERBforaboutoneandhalfyearbeforethis. Before joining AERB, he worked as Director of Reactor Group in the Bhabha AtomicResearchCentre.HeisamemberoftheprestigiousInternationalNuclear SafetyGroup(INSAG)ofIAEAsincethelastabout8years.

13.

BRIEF PROFILE OF DR K. BALU He is a retired Director of Nuclear Waste Management Group at Bhabha Atomic research Centre [BARC]. A specialist in spent fuel management, Dr.Balu has developedmethods&setupfacilitiesforsafetreatmentanddisposalofradioactive wastesinthevariousnuclearfacilitysitesinthecountry.

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14.

BRIEF PROFILE OF DR.S.M.LEE He is former Director, Safety Research, Health Physics, Information services, Instrumentation and Electronics Groups of Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research,KalpakkamandpresentlyRajaRamannaFellow,SafetyResearchInstitute, Kalpakkam.

15.

PROFILE OF DR. W. STEPHEN ARULDASS KANTHIAH Dr.W.StephenAruldassKanthiahisaformerDirectorofHeavyWaterBoard, Govt.ofIndia.HeisanotedspecialistinIndustrialsafety.Heiswellknown forhisextensiveexperienceinestablishinghigheststandardofindustrial safetyinchemicalindustries.AwinnerofNationalSafetyaward2006and 2009.Hehas36yearsofIndustrialexperienceinindustrialoperations.Heis anoutstandingScientist,DepartmentofAtomicEnergy,Govt.ofIndia.

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