The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period Author(s): Timothy May Reviewed work(s): Source:

The Journal of Military History, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 617-635 Published by: Society for Military History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4138118 . Accessed: 10/03/2012 11:58
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The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-ModernPeriod

Timothy May

Abstract Often the armies that emerged from the steppes of InnerAsia are viewed as throngs of horse-archers who overwhelmed their opponents throughsheer ferocityor superiornumbers.The typicalobservation about their military abilityis that as nomads they were natural warriorsinuredsince birthto ridingand archery in the harsh climate of the steppe. While this view has an element of truth,the armies were actually better trained than is generally assumed. This article examines the trainingof InnerAsian armies. Althoughit focuses on the Mongols, it also explores the antecedents and evolution of training techniques across InnerAsia.

ONE of the biligs, cerned the

or maxims, of Chinggis Khan (Genghis Khan) contraining of the army: Just as ortaqs [merchants] come with gold spun fabrics and are confident of making profits on those goods and textiles, military commanders should teach their sons archery, horsemanship, and wrestling well. They should test them in these arts and make them audacious and brave to the same degree that ortaqs are confident of their own skill.1

1. Rashid al-Din, Jami'u't-Tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles, vol. 2, trans. William Thackston (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1998), 297; Rashid al-Din Tabib,Jami' al-Tawarikh, Timothy May is an assistant professor of history at North Georgia College and State University in Dahlonega, Georgia, where he teaches Middle Eastern and Central Asian History. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin-Madison where he wrote his dissertation, The Mechanics of Governance and Conquest: The Rise and Expansion of the Mongol Empire, 1185-1265. He is also the author of The Mongol Art of War (South Yorkshire, U.K.: Pen and Sword Publishing, forthcoming).
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Considering the importance that Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) placed on military training, it is surprising that the training of the army is often overlooked in the study of the Mongol Empire or other Inner Asian powers. In many respects, this neglect of an integral component of a military establishment is odd, given that copious amounts of research have been devoted to the training of European knights, and to a lesser extent to the training of the Mamlfiks of Egypt and Syria.2 Of course, much of this is due to the relative availability of source material. For the Mongols, about whom we have more information than other Inner Asian groups, there is virtually nothing demonstrating in detail the training of the Mongol warrior. Nevertheless, historians of the Mongols, as well as those of other medieval military systems, would do well to observe the methodology of J. F. Verbruggen in his modern classic, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages From the Eighth Century to 1340, in which he closely examines the equipment and training of the medieval knight, including war games.3 The typical observation concerning the training of the Mongols is that, as they were nomads, they learned to ride and shoot arrows from an early age, thus giving them adequate competence as warriors. Addied. Bahman Karimi (Tehran: Iqbal, 1983), 437. For more information on the ortaqs, or merchants, see Thomas T. Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners, 1200-1260," Asia Major 2 (1989): 83-126; Elizabeth Endicott-West, "Merchant Associations in Yiian China: The Ortogh,"Asia Major 2 (1989): 127-54. 2. David Ayalon, Outsiders in the Lands of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols, and Eunuchs (London: Ashgate 1988); David Ayalon, "Mamlikiyyit: (A) A First Attempt to Evaluate the MamlfikMilitary System," Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2 (1980): 321-39, reprinted in Ayalon, Outsiders in the Lands of Islam; David Ayalon, "Discharges from Service, Banishments and Imprisonments in Mamluk Society," Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972): 25-50; David Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Medieval Society (London: Vallentine, Mitchell and Co., 1956); David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army-I," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15 (1953): 203-28; David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army-II," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15 (1953): 448-76; David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army-III," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 16 (1954): 57-90; David Ayalon, "Preliminary Remarks on the MamMilitaryInstitution in Islam," in War,Technology, and Society in the Middle East, likk ed. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); P. M. Holt, "The Position and Power of the Mamlfik Sultan," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 38 (1975): 237-49; John France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999); J. F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages from the Eighth Century to 1340, 2d ed., trans. Colonel Sumner Willard and R. W. Southern (Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell, 1997); Christopher Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992); R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press 1995). 3. Verbruggen,The Art of Warfare, 19-40.
618

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Eurasia, 13th Century tionally, their maneuvers were based on the practice of the nerge, which was essentially a mass hunt often referred to as the battue.4 In the practice of the nerge the Mongols would fan out over several miles forming a circle. Gradually this circle would close and contract until all of the animals were trapped within this ring of men and horses.
4. Ala al-Din Ata Malik Juvaini, Genghis Khan: The History of the World Conqueror, trans. John Andrew Boyle (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 27-28; Ala al-Din 'AtaMalik Juvaini, Ta'rikh-i-Jahatn-Gusha,ed. Mirza Muhammad Qazvini, 3 vols., E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series (Leiden: Brill, 1912, 1916, 1937), 1:19-20. The nerge is also referred to as the jerge or jdirge in the Mongolian and Muslim sources. See Gerhard Doerfer, Tiirkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen, Unter Besonderer Beriicksichtigung alterer Neupersischer Geschichtsquellen, vor Allem der Mongolen- und Timuridenzeit, 4 vols. (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1963-75), 1:291-93, for jerge. The primary meaning appears to mean rank, row, or perhaps even a military column.
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After the Khan, or ruler, killed a few animals, others would begin their hunt. Some animals were allowed to escape in a symbolic act of clemency. A hunt of this size naturally required excellent communication and discipline in order to maintain the circle in addition to preventing animals from escaping until the appropriate time. The nerge was then adapted to warfare and applied through several techniques. The most obvious was the encirclement of the enemy, or double envelopment, in which the wings of the Mongol army would wrap around the opposing army so that they overlapped. In addition to making it possible to attack the enemy from multiple angles, the surrounding of enemy forces allowed the Mongols to employ another tactic. By leaving a gap in their encirclement, the Mongols created a seemingly innocuous hole that appeared to be a means of escape for those enclosed by the Mongol ranks, much as animals were permitted to flee during the nerge. During war, however, the gap served as a trap. Realizing that when cornered, the enemy would resist stubbornly, the Mongols allowed a safety valve in order to let the enemy escape. However, the fleeing troops quickly discovered to their detriment that the Mongols simply pursued and hunted them. Often discarding their weapons in their haste, the enemy rarely could maintain any semblance of effective defense once they chose to escape.5 As in the nerge, the warriors gradually tightened their circle around the enemy, forming a dense mass from which none could escape. It is thought that large numbers were required to perform this maneuver and maintain the noose around the enemy; as in the nerge, however, although certainly beneficial, this was not required.6 Just as skilled hunters were able to hold their positions to herd or direct the route of animals, so skilled warriors could do the same while encircling the enemy. Because of their archery skills and great mobility, the Mongols did not require superior numbers of troops to encircle an enemy. Like the traditional nomadic tactic of the feigned retreat, the nerge was not an innovation on the part of the Mongols. Rather, it appears to
5. Muhammad ibn Ahmad Nasawi, Sirah al-Sultan Jaldl al-Din Mankubirti (Cairo: Dairal-Fikr al-Arabi, 1953), 100-101; Mohammed En-Nasawi,Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-din Mankobirti, trans. 0. Houdas (Paris: l'fcole des Langues Orientales vivantes, 1895), 74; John de Piano Carpini, "History of the Mongols," in The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, ed. C. Dawson (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 36-37. The Mongols carried out this practice at Bukhara in modern Uzbekistan and then again at the battle of Mohi along the Sajo River in Hungary. 6. John Masson Smith, Jr., "Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East: Antecedents and Adaptations," in Warand Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th and 15th Centuries, ed. Yaacov Lev (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 253. Smith maintains that "encirclement, however, could reliably be achieved with superior numbers."
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be a standard tactic used in steppe warfare as indicated in this depiction of Scythian drills by Byzantine Emperor Maurice (582-602) : The Scythian formationis one in which the [units] are all formed in the same manner, as in former times, not with some of them arrangedas assault troops and some as defenders. They should be drawn up in one line, divided into two moiras instead of the usual three. The two flanks of the meros move out as though beginning an encircling maneuver, advancing toward one another, and surrounding an open space. Continuingalong in a circle, the right wing on the outside, the left on the inside, they ride into the opposite section of one another'sline. This used to be part of the cavalrygames in winter quartersduringMarch.7 The use of the nerge on a larger scale, however, may have been a Mongol innovation. At times the Mongols used it as a tactic on a broader front in an invasion, as they did during the invasion of the Rus' lands. After the capture of the city of Vladimir in 1237, "they turned back from there and held a council, deciding that they would proceed tiimain by tiimin in jairgeformation and take and destroy every town, province and fortress they came to."s Indeed, as the circle contracted, populations fled toward the center, typically a key city. The impact of the nerge was great. First, it cut off the principal city from communicating with other strongholds that might be expected to give aid. Second, refugees from these smaller cities would flee to the last stronghold. Not only did the reports from these defeated cities and the streaming hordes of refugees reduce the morale of the inhabitants and garrison forces of the principal city, but in addition, the refugees strained its resources, taxing food and water reserves and thus undermining the defense of the city. The Mongols were not the only Inner Asian group that considered hunting a valuable technique in military training. The Khitan, during the Liao Dynasty (907-1125) of northern China, used hunting not only for the practical purpose of feeding their troops, but also as training for mil7. Maurikos, Maurice's Strategikon:

trans. GeorgeT. Dennis (Philadelphia: Press, 1984), 61. Universityof Pennsylvania

Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy,

The Scythians were an Iranian or proto-Turkic steppe nomadic group that inhabited the southern steppes of Russia during the ancient period. They were gradually replaced by other nomadic groups. The Byzantines, however, commonly referred to all nomads regardless of location as Scythians, even during the medieval period. Thus, depending on the era, the Scythians could be Huns, Avars, Bulghars, or Turks. One moira consisted of 2,000 to 3,000 men. Meros were 6,000 to 7,000 men. Typically three moira formed one meros.
8. Rashid al-Din, Jami'u't-Tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles, 2:327. The

Rus' city of Vladimir was located about 200 kilometers east of Moscow. One tiiman is 10,000 men.
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itary maneuvers, particularly during the winter hunt.9 Indeed, one Liao emperor once said, "Our hunting is not simply a pursuit of pleasure. It is a means of practicing warfare."10 Indeed, one of the classic tactics among horse-archers, the infamous "Parthian shot," may have originated as a hunting technique. The Parthian shot was performed by riding away from the intended target while twisting backwards to the target and firing. Although all horsearchers from the steppe employed this technique, the origin of the term seems to have come from its devastating use against the Roman armies of Crassus at Carrhae in 53 BCE by the horse-archers of the Parthian empire (250 BCE-225 CE). Robert Drews has concluded that the Parthian shot was perfected by hunting dangerous animals, such as bulls or lions, that would most likely charge their antagonists. When a hunter with a bow was charged by such a beast, his most obvious recourse was to put distance between himself and the animal. By being able to turn and shoot, the hunter not only fended off the animal, but also enhanced his hunting and military skills. Indeed, Drews believes that this hunting technique, like so many others, was then applied to military tactics. He demonstrates that it gave its user a significant advantage: "If both the Parthian and his pursuer were riding at a gallop, the Parthian would in effect be shooting a bow with a wind at his back, while the pursuer would be shooting into the wind.""11 Steppe nomads were not the only ones to consider hunting an excellent opportunity to train their soldiers. Indeed, based on his observation of nomadic armies, Byzantine Emperor Maurice advised his generals to use hunting to perfect tactics and strategies. They used lines of horsemen as the Mongols did in the nerge and eventually encircled the game. Maurice noted that it was very much like a Scythian battle formation.12

9. Karl A. Wittfogel and Fang Chia-Sheng, History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125) (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1949), 119; Liao Shih [History of the Liao], trans. KarlA. Wittfogel and Fang Chia-Shang, in Wittfogel and Fang, History of Chinese Society, 126-29. The Khitans were a proto-Mongolgroup. In 907 they conquered much of northern China from the Song dynasty. Their empire comprised much of what is now modern Mongolia, the Inner Mongolian autonomous region of the People's Republic of China (PRC), as well as the northern part of the PRC. 10. Liao Shih, 565. The importance of the hunt in military training was so great that the Chinese inhabitants of the empire were forbidden to hunt. See p. 568. 11. Robert Drews, Early Riders: The Beginnings of Mounted Warfare in Asia and Europe (New York: Routledge, 2004), 102. This work is essential for anyone interested in the development of mounted warfare. Drews examines, and in some cases, reexamines the use of horses in warfare in preclassical antiquity. 12. Maurikos, Maurice's Strategikon, 165-67. As previously mentioned, the Byzantines referred to basically any steppe nomadic group as Scythians. 622
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The complex coordination of units and exercises involved with the nerge enabled the Mongol warriors to function as a single unit on the battlefield. Apparently, although other Inner Asian forces used similar tactics, they did not operate with the same degree of precision as the Mongols. One source noted that: The Mongolsfrom among the Turkishpeople accustomed their people [to fight as] a single squadron of cavalry, so that they struggled together against the enemy. Retiring [from the battle] and returning [to it] was denied to each of them. They gained from this great experience which was not [duplicated] by others.13 The Mongols' ability to operate in disciplined units certainly gave them an advantage but is not enough to explain their amazing military feats. While some scholars would argue that the Mongols were inferior soldiers who achieved victory due to overwhelming numbers or less-able opponents, neither explanation is fully convincing.14 It is unlikely that the Mongols could have established the largest contiguous empire in history even with overwhelming numbers, if they were indeed truly inferior and Song soldiers, particularly as the Chinese Jin (1125-1234) Empires produced even larger armies. One must also con(960-1279) sider that at the beginning of their conquests, the Mongols certainly did not possess vastly superior numbers against the Jin Dynasty of northern China or against the Khwairazmian Empire (1194-1224) in Central Asia and Iran. Finally, the Mongols carried out operations on several fronts. Although this could be accomplished by large armies, the size of the army did not automatically result in victory. Indeed, on some fronts, Mongol armies were fairly small for their theater of operation. Certainly the nerge contributed to producing a well-disciplined force capable of complex maneuvers over a broad front. The fact that the Mongols also became competent horsemen and archers due to daily practice almost from birth is also undeniable. The seasonal migrations of the nomads also enhanced their discipline as did the practice of coordinated moves across great distances. However, we must ask what other factors were involved. How did the Mongols practice their archery? We know that the Armenians called the Mongols "the Nation of Archers." Because the Armenians had several encounters with Kipchak Turks and other nomadic horse archers, they were quite familiar with them and the composite bow they used. To single out the Mongols as "the Nation of
13. 'Umar Ibn Ibrahim al-Ansi al-An'ari, Tafrij al-Kuruibft Tadbir al-'urfib (Cairo: American University at Cairo Press, 1961), 103. Also see p. 77. 14. John Masson Smith, Jr., " 'AynJalfit: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?" Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 44 (1984): 345. Also see Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War: The Middle Ages from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century (New York:Burt Franklin, 1898), 316-17; France, Western Warfare, 202.
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Archers" indicates that the Mongols were more proficient with this weapon than other nomads."s The historian must search for other evidence to determine how and why the Mongols became so proficient that they could, in at least one chronicler's opinion, surpass other Inner Asian nomads. To determine the origins of the Mongols' success, it is not enough to use sources directly related to the Mongols of the thirteenth century, as these provide scant information directly related to the training of the Mongol army. In addition, it is necessary to examine sources on the training of the Mamlfiks of Egypt and Syria as well as of the Khitans of the Liao Dynasty, since both originated in a steppe element: the Khitans, in addition to ruling part of Mongolia during the Liao Dynasty, have often been linked to the Mongols by ethnic and linguistic ties as well, while most of the MamlGfksduring the thirteenth century originated from the Dasht-i Kipchak, or Kipchak Steppe, before being imported to Egypt and Syria.16 Second, these sources, in addition to scholarly works, provide data from which to derive a clear picture of their military, and thus perhaps to establish a paradigm to compare with data relating to the Mongols and steppe societies in general. Thus, from these societies we may derive additional information that clarifies the methods that the Mongols used in training their soldiers. The Mamlfiks of Egypt, particularly under the first few Sultans, or rulers, as well as under the Ayyubids in the thirteenth century, instituted a strict regimen of training for their new recruits. This has been documented in detail in numerous works." Only when the recruits had
15. R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, "The History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc," Harvard Journal of Asian Studies 12 (1949): 269-399. The Kipchak Turks occupied much of the southern portion of modern Russia. They were pastoral nomads who moved into the region during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, replacing the Pechenegs as the dominant steppe group in the region. 16. The Mamlfik Sultanate of Eygpt and Syria came into existence in 1250, in the aftermath of the disastrous Second Crusade. The Mamlfikswere typically Kipchak Turks, who had been purchased as slaves by the various members of the Ayyubid Dynasty, founded by Salith al-Din, or Saladin. They were taught the rudiments of Islam and trained as warriors. Eventually they received manumission and then joined a corps of warriors fiercely loyal to their former masters. These units were often the elite forces in various Muslim armies. After a rebellion in 1250, the Mamlfiksdeposed the Ayyubids in Egypt and established a sultanate that would go on to defeat the Mongols at Ayn Jalfit in 1260, thus allowing them to establish dominion over Syria and Palestine. The Mamlfiks would also drive the Crusaders out of the Middle East in 1291. Dasht-i Kipchak is Persian for the Kipchak Steppe, which was typically how the southern Russian steppes were known during the medieval period. 17. See the following: Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms; Ayalon, "Preliminary Remarks on the MamlfikMilitary Instititution in Islam";Ayalon, "Mamltikiyyidt: A (A) First Attempt to Evaluate the Mamltik Military System"; R. S. Humphreys, "The Emergence of the Mamluk Army," Studia Islamica 45 (1977): 67-100; R. S.
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reached their majority did they actually begin military training. Under the guidance of a mucallim, or instructor, they trained in these four areas: equestrian arts, lancing, archery, and fencing. For the purposes of this study, only the equestrian and archery training is relevant. Only after successfully completing all four branches of training was the recruit considered afdris, or cavalryman.s18 In the equestrian training, the Mamlfiks learned how to leap upon their horses, even in full armor. The Mamlfik recruit began with a model horse and then moved on to a real one. Once he graduated to a real horse, the recruit learned to canter, trot, and gallop while using a saddle, and then he practiced with stirrups. Finally, he also learned to treat sick and injured horses.19 The process of learning archery was exceedingly long and arduous. At first, the Mamlfik recruit was not even allowed to shoot. Instead he merely had to work on his grip and on the motion of drawing and releasing the bow string. Once he had perfected these movements, the recruit could then practice shooting, but without using arrows. The next step allowed the recruit to shoot arrows, for which the pull of the bow was increased. Thus the Mamlfik recruit gradually began to use more powerful bows. Finally, the recruit was taken out into the desert to shoot before being considered qualified.20 As one can surmise, the Mamlufks in their prime were possibly the best-trained warriors in the medieval world. Despite the refined techniques in which they were drilled, part of their training in archery originated from their homeland in the steppes. One element of their training was the drill of the al-qabaq, or gourd.21 Essentially, while riding, the Mamlfik shot at a gourd affixed to
Humphreys, "The Emergence of the Mamluk Army," Studia Islamica 46 (1977): 147-82; Hassanein Rabie, "The Training of the MamlGkFaris," in Parry and Yapp, War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East. 18. Rabie, "The Training of the Mamlik FAris,"154. 19. Ibid., 154-57. While learning to use the lance, the Mamlk was advised to saddle his own horse. From here he learned to mount and dismount while carrying a lance, how to tilt, and how to use it while holding the reins. After these steps were mastered, the recruit then learned how to use the lance as a weapon and how to hurl it. As with all of the fighting arts, the Mamliks had manuals written with detailed instructions. Knights in Christendom, at least in the Carolingian period, underwent similar training. They practiced mounting and dismounting on wooden horses and with weapons drawn. Also, they practiced using weapons from horseback. See R. H. C. Davis, The Medieval Warhorse: Origin, Development, and Redevelopment (London: Thames and Hudson, 1989), 14-15. 20. Rabie, "The Training of the MamlfikFdris," 158. 21. J. D. Latham, "Notes on Mamlfk Horse-Archers,"Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 32 (1969): 258. Al-qabaq is a Turkic word meaning gourd.
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a pole. Due to the height of the pole, the rider would shoot upwards and often from different angles, including the Parthian shot. A simple training drill like this very well may have originated from the steppe. One could easily substitute a bag or other item for the gourd. Indeed, J. D. Latham, who has contributed much to the study of archery in the Islamic world, states: AlthoughI have hitherto been unable to turn up any written account of its early history, there seems no reason to doubt the assertion that "shootingthe gourd"was introducedto the MiddleEast from Central
Asia where it was practiced by the Turkmens and Mongols . . . if

acceptable the hypothesis may be carried a stage further with the suggestionthat a pole surmountedby a suitable target as simple as a bundle of ragsand strawwouldbe erected by a nomadic encampment and used for the purposes of instruction,practice, and amusement.22 A simple extension of this practice was the Mamlfik drill of shooting the qipaj, or qighaj. This drill was similar to al-qabaq, but involved the rider's shooting downward at a target as he rode by.23To accomplish this, a rider often rose in his stirrups, thus giving him a better vantage point. In addition, the Mamlfiks practiced holding the reins of their horses while shooting. They tied knots to shorten the reins and to unify them into one strand. Then the reins could be slipped over the pommel of the saddle or held by the third finger of the drawing hand, attached by a thong. The reins could be held in this manner because the Mamlfiks used a thumb ring and the index finger to draw the bow string. This also may have been how the Mongols learned to use their bows to full advantage.24 Latham wrote his work on the Mamlfik horse-archers in the late 1960s. More recent information from the modern era bolsters Latham's argument concerning the steppe origins of many of the Mamlfik drills. In modern Mongolia, the revival of many archery contests that had been repressed during the Communist era may shed some light on earlier such competitions. One such contest is known as the bombog kharvaa, or ball shooting. In it, three leather balls are mounted on poles. The mounted archer attempts to hit the first one while advancing upon it, then the second as he rides by it, and the final ball after he has ridden past it, thus enabling him to use a Parthian shot. Other contests include the sarampai kharvaa, in which the archer shoots at a target while riding at a gallop. According to one Mongolian, the most difficult part is controlling the
22. Ibid., 258. 23. Ibid., 261. 24. Ibid., 263. The thumb ring, often made of polished stone, allowed the string

to slide off of the archer's thumbwith less friction.It also allowedthe archerto use a
higher pull weight, as the string did not cut into his fingers. 626
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horse, which is done entirely with the knees as both hands are occupied with the bow while the reins are tied to the saddle.25 Consideringthis, it is highly probablethat the al-qabaq drill used by the Mamlfikswas of steppe origin. While it is impossible to determine at this time if the Mongols made training such as the bombog kharvaa a standard exercise for their army, it is likely that contests such as these were commonplace for entertainment purposes if not for actual military training. Further supportingthe probable steppe origin of the al-qabaq drill is the analysis of Mongoltactics and MamlUfk training by John Masson Smith, Jr. In regardsto the Mamlfiks'training, Smith wrote: of tookplaceon fields,alreadydescribed, from131 to 284 Practice yardsin length,downwhicha singleriderand his horsewouldgallop in a straight line, letting off one shot at the target two-thirds of

for the dexterity with the bow, but providing no training in evolusays only that the rider should not let the horse run into the pole-

off the waydownthe fieldandthen slowingandturning the course. this exercise,making By InnerAsianstandards was a rudimentary

withthe shooting-[one source] tionswiththe horsein conjunction of in movement shooting groups and andno practice coordinated by The did horse-archers. Mamlfiks not practicethe repeated "chargeand-shoot" tacticsusedby the Mongols because,unlikethe Mongols, could not keep galloping they long enoughto make such tactics worthwhile.26 Smith contends that the Mongols essentially performed this drill in combat, shooting several arrows while charging, and then retreating while another wave of Mongoltroops performed the same action, in the manner of the sixteenth-century caracole, or "charge and shoot," used by pistol-wielding European cavalry. The main reason, according to Smith, why the Mamlfiksdid not do this, is that they did not possess enough horses to carry it off. Indeed, the constant charging and retreating could easily exhaust a horse through the course of battle, necessitating the strings of horses that the Mongolsused. The intention of Smith's study was to demonstrate that the Mongols were inferior and poorly trained soldiers, particularly compared to the Mamlfiksof Egyptwho defeated them at Ayn Jalfit in 1260. However,by indicating that the Mamlfiksdid not train in "chargeand shoot" tactics, Smith indirectly demonstrates that a great deal of practice would be needed in order to conduct this tactic, particularlyduring the stress of combat. A high degree of coordination and discipline would be required to maintain any semblance of coherence as wave after wave of cavalry performed this attack. Without appropriate training, the most likely
25. "Old Songs of Arrows,"Mongolia Today 7 (2002): http://www.mongoliatoday.comissue/7/archery.html . 26. Smith, "AynJalfit: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?" 322.
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result would be mass chaos with retreating riders impeding the advance of the next wave. Additional evidence that the Mongols did not lack training comes from the Liao Shi, the history of the Liao Dynasty. Much like the Mongols, the Khitans also attacked in caracole fashion: one wave advancing Consideringthe high firing,and then retiringwhile another came forth.27 degree of sophistication in Khitanadministrationand also the organization and support of their military, it is unlikely that the Khitans would have viewed hunting as the only means of military training. Indeed, the Khitansalso held periodic militaryreviews. Duringthese, not only did the ethnic Khitans conduct military drills, but the Chinese soldiers in their armies also practiced with catapults, crossbows, swords, and spears.28 While evidence that the caracole was used among the Kipchaks is demonstrated only in the drills used by Mamlfiks recruited from the Dasht-i Kipchak, there is evidence that a caracole-style tactic did exist in the western Eurasian steppes prior to the Mongols. Maurice, the Byzantine emperor and author of the Strategikon, the Byzantine manual of warfare referred to earlier, wrote that another steppe people called Alans performedsimilar tactics, and advised that his own military practice them. In the Alansystemthe troops,someas assault[troops] someas and are defenders, drawnup in a singlebattleline. This is dividedinto feet linedup abouttwoor fourhundred fromeachother.The moiras, assaulttroopsadvanceat a gallopas in pursuit,and then turnback into the intervalsor clear spacesin the main line. Then, filtering withthe defenders together they turnandcharge againstthe enemy. the In anothermaneuver assaulttroopsturnaroundin those intervalsandchargeout against bothflanksof the unit, the men keeping
their originalrelative positions.29

Further evidence that this method of attack required a high degree of training comes from sixteenth-century Western Europe. In the sixteenth century, training and practice were necessary in order to perform the caracole effectively in conjunction with other attacks. When the Reiters, or heavy cavalry, who used the caracole were used with nonReiter troops, their maneuvers could disruptthe actions of other cavalry troops who were not accustomed to them. Indeed, at the battle of Ivry in 1590 between King Henri IV (1589-1610) of France and the Catholic League, KingHenri
27. Wittfogel and Fang, History of Chinese Society, 533. 28. Liao Shih, 567. 29. Maurikos,Maurice's Strategikon, 62. The Alans occupied the steppe region north of the Caucasus Mountains. They were of non-Turkic origin and remained a distinct nation into the fourteenth century.
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ordered the 250 Reiters in his pay to dispense with the caracole tactic and charge home with the rest of his cavalry.This was significant, for when performingtheir customary maneuver the Reiters always wheeled to the left after discharging their pistols. But the danger here was that they often collided with other oncoming friendly cavalry, throwingthe latter'sattack into disorder and blunting its effect. Indeed, the due de Mayenne, the League leader, later attributedhis defeat at Ivry precisely to this cause in an effort to shift the blame for the debacle onto others. Even so, his claim was not without some foundation:after performingthe caracole, [the duc's] Reiters did collide with the long lines of chargingLeague lancers, destroying their momentum and renderingtheir weapons useless.30 Other relevant tactics and training methods also existed. Herbert Franke reveals another form of training in his study of Chinese texts, which indicate some habits of the Khitans that might also apply to the Mongols. The Khitans practiced archery while mounted by shooting at willow rods. He believes this was part of a religious ceremony after a sacrifice, conceding, however, that it may have been a form of military training or even a game for recreation. Franke believes that this was practiced by the Mongols as well as the Jurchen, a Manchurian seminomadic people who conquered northern China and established the Jin
Dynasty.31

As we have seen, Professor Smith has vigorously contended that in comparison to the Mamlfiks, the Mongols were poorly trained.32 In many ways, this comparison cannot be made as the Mamlfiks were an elite force specifically recruited and trained for no other purpose than to serve as soldiers. Although the Mongols performed admirably in battle, they, by no means, could be considered an elite unit. By contrast, the Mamlfiks, particularly under Baybars (1260-77), ranked among the most highly trained warriors in the Middle Ages. However, one cannot compare a with a random Mongol trooper who, when not serving on military MamlGfk duty, very well might have spent his time tending his flocks. Certain elements of Smith's argument collapse under closer examination. One such argument concerns a comparison of the Mongol military training with that of the Mamlfikfaris. While practicing with swords, the
30. Ronald S. Love, "'All the King's Horsemen': The Equestrian Army of Henri IV, 1585-1598," Sixteenth Century Journal 22, no. 3 (1991): 519. 31. Herbert Franke, "Chinese Texts on the Jurchen (1) A Translation of the Jurchen Monographin the San-Ch'ao Pei-Meng Hui-Pien,"Zentralasiatische Studien
9 (1975): 180, in Studies on the Jurchens or the Jin Dynasty, ed. Herbert Franke and

Hok-lam Chan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997). 32. John Masson Smith, Jr., has written two articles which deal with this issue as well as other issues concerning the Mongol military that will be discussed elsewhere at length. Smith, "'Ayn Jalfit: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?" 307-45; Smith, "MongolSociety."
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Mamlafkstruck one thousand times into a clay bar. In addition, the Mamfiks practiced launching their arrows in a shower, with a high are, rather than a flat trajectory. In defense of the Mongols, it is rather odd to compare the swordsmanship talents of the Mongols with Mamliks because the Mongols avoided hand-to-hand combat unless necessary. Instead, they preferred to shoot their enemies, often using an arrow shower, a typical steppe tactic. Considering that all opposing forces could also fire from a fairly stable platform, it is unlikely that, unless they were charging, the Mongols would have any interest in closing with the enemy except under favorable circumstances. Quite simply, the closer one came, the more those on the opposing side could use their bows to deadly effect.33 Military training among the Mongols began at an early age.34 The most common example cited for steppe nomads in general originates in Ssfi-ma Chien's (145-85 BCE) account of the Xiong-nu, or Huns, as they became known in the West. He wrote that little boys learned to ride on the backs of sheep and practiced archery by shooting at small game: "Thus all the young men are able to use a bow and act as armed cavalry in time of war."35 Quite simply, one would not survive in the steppe without being able to ride a horse. Indeed, for males, mastery of hunting (the handling of a bow) and riding were primary duties. Concerning the Mongols, John de Plano Carpini confirmed that by the thirteenth century, little had changed: The men do not make anything at all, with the exception of arrows, and they also sometimes tend the flocks, but they hunt and practise archery, for they are all, big and little, excellent archers, and their children begin as soon as they are two or three years old to ride and manage horses and to gallop them, and they are given bows to suit their stature and are taught to shoot; they are extremely agile and also intrepid.36
33. Smith, "MongolSociety," 256. 34. While most studies remark, almost in shock, that Mongol children learned

different fromthe knightlycaste the arts of warat an earlyage, this is not drastically
in Europe. Children began their apprenticeships as pages at a very young age and systematically learned to ride and fight until approximately the age of twenty, by which time they had acquired enough physical maturity to bear the weight of the knight's

armor. thattime, they usuallyreceivedknighthood. At HansDelbrtick, MedievalWarJ. Jr. Press, 1990), 228; fare, trans.Walter Renfroe, (Lincoln:Universityof Nebraska
Verbruggen,The Art of Warfare, 27-28; Davis, The Medieval Warhorse, 19. 35. Ssfi-ma Chien, Records of the Grand Historian, trans. Burton Watson, 2 vols. (New York:Columbia University Press, 1961), 2:153.

36. Iohannesde PianoCarpini,"Ystoria in Mongalorum," Sinica Franciscana:

Itinera et Relationes Fratrum Minorum Saeculi XIII et XIV ed. P. Anastasius Van Den Wyngaert, 27-130 (Florence: Apud Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1929), 49-50;

of 18. Carpini,"History the Mongols,"

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This account is corroborated by Chinese sources as well. The Song envoy and general Zhao Hung noted that Mongols were born and raised in the saddle. From spring until winter they spent their days riding and hunting. In addition, most of them learned how to fight, thus creating an army trained in mounted warfare.37 Furthermore, from The Secret History of the Mongols, one can learn that indeed, Temiijin, the boy who would become Chinggis Khan, could shoot arrows with deadly effect before he attained his majority, as demonstrated in the murder of his half-brother Bekhtar.38 Jochi Qasar, Temiijin's brother, demonstrated his prowess with the bow not only in that episode, but also during a Tayichi'ud attack. During the latter Temiijin also demonstrated that he rode well enough to avoid capture for several days.39 In addition to becoming an expert riders as well as horse-archers, Mongol males received constant exposure to shooting a composite bow from an early age, enabling them, and indeed all steppe nomads, to acquire the requisite strength to pull and hold the string at full-draw. Referring to Mamlfik and Turkic archers in the Muslim world, J. D. Latham and W. F. Paterson wrote that "Regular practice from boyhood culminated in the archer's ability as a man to handle bows requiring a pull of 60, 80, and even 100 lbs., to hold them at full draw." They also mentioned that some could draw a bow with a 160-pound draw, but this was rare.40 Although the Mamlfiks underwent extensive training, much of their ability originated from their previous life on the steppe. The observations of Latham and Paterson can be applied to nomads of Mongolia as well. Although training began at an early age, formal induction into the Mongol military occurred later. Grigor of Akane noted that Mongol censuses registered men between the ages of fifteen and sixty as being suitable for military duty.41 The Chinese source Yuan Shi confirms this but extends the upper age bracket to seventy years old. The basic idea was that men served until they were too old to ride or bend a bow in combat. The Yuan Shi also notes that the age of induction usually ranged
37. Zhao Hung, Meng-Da Bei-Lu: Polnoe Opisanie Mongolo-Tatar, trans. Nikolai Ts. Munkuev (Moscow: NAUKA,1975), 65-66. 38. The Secret History of the Mongols, trans. Francis W. Cleaves (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1982), 22-23. 39. Ibid., 25-26. The Tayichi'ud were a rival Mongol clan or tribe to the Borjigid from which Temiijin, or Chinggis Khan, originated. 40. J. D. Latham and W. F. Paterson, Saracen Archery: An English Version and Exposition of a Mameluke Work on Archery (London: Holland Press, 1970), xxv. 41. Grigor of Akane, "The History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc," trans. and ed. R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 12 (1949): 325.
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between fifteen to twenty years old, depending on the need and number of men required. Not all men entered the army; some were required to stay at home to tend the herds or oversee appanages of the Mongol princes.42 In contrast, Michal Biran notes that the armies of Qara Khitai began their recruitment around the age of eighteen.43 In addition to a mastery of archery and riding, another key element, and perhaps the most important one, was the instillation of discipline in the otherwise individualistic nomad warriors. As in most of the medieval world, warfare in the steppes of Mongolia often degenerated into a group of individuals battling other individuals rather than organized military units combating other organized forces. Indeed, victory often was snatched away as the apparent winners stopped to plunder and loot the camp or city of the enemy before assuring final victory. Even great military leaders such as Salih al-Din, or Saladin (1138-1193), suffered from this. At Mount Gisard, near Ramla, in 1177, he was defeated as his army became too preoccupied with looting. Then again, he lost at Jaffa as his army did not get an opportunity to plunder.44 Thus, the instillation of discipline into the tribes of Mongolia may have been Chinggis Khan's greatest achievement. Even before his rise to absolute master of the Mongolian steppe, Chinggis Khan expected his orders to be obeyed, even by his relatives. In 1202, while still a vassal of Toghril Ong-Qan, Qayan of the Kereit, Chinggis Khan, or Temiijin as he was known then, made a radical departure from the traditional method of waging war45:when the Mongols attacked the Tatars at Dalan Nemiirges in eastern Mongolia, he insisted that his men wait until after the enemy was defeated rather than plunder the enemy during the attack. Furthermore, he ordered his men to be prepared to regroup at a designated location rather than dispersing across the steppe if they suffered defeat; those who disobeyed would suffer the consequences: If we conquer the enemy, we shall not stop to plunder. If the victory is complete, that booty will be ours in any case and we will share it
42. Yuan Shi, trans. Ch'i-Qing Hsiao, Chapter 98 in The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty, 72-91 (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1978), 74. 43. Michal Biran, "'Like a Mighty Wall': The Armies of the Kara Khitai (1124-1218)," Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 25 (2001): 53-54. Qara Khitai was an empire formed in Central Asia, consisting of much of modern Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. Founded by refugees of the Liao royal family after the collapse of the Liao Dynasty in 1125, Qara Khitai was ruled by a predominantly Buddhist minority among Muslim townspeople and shamanistic steppe nomads from 1128 until its collapse in 1218 due to Mongol expansion into the region. 44. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 79. 45. The Kereit were a powerful Turko-Mongoltribal confederation that was centered on the Tula river in Mongolia. 632
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among ourselves. If we are forced by the enemy to retreat,let us turn back to the point where we began the attack. The men who do not turn back to the point where we began the attack will be cut down.46 Indeed, Chinggis Khan expected absolute obedience to his commands. He desired his followers to put loyalty to him above all other ties, whether familial, clan, or tribal. According to the Persian chronicler Jfizjani, Chinggis Khan declared upon his coronation as Qayan, or emperor, in 1206: "Ifyou are obedient to my mandates, it behooveth that, if I should command the sons to slay the father, you should all obey."47 Anecdotes about the discipline of the Mongols are numerous. The discipline instilled in the Mongol army permeated Mongolian society. Jfizjain recorded that one could leave a riding whip on the ground and only its owner would pick it up, no matter how long it had lain there.48 But how did they maintain this discipline? Certainly with the great Qayan present, few dared to risk offense, but as the Mongol armies ranged across a continent, they must have been tempted to abandon discipline and to plunder and destroy the paltry forces of a city-state in Rus' or a distant town in China. One of the most commonly held hypotheses is that draconian measures held the troops in check. A perfect example of curbing the temptations of the Chinggisid princes while distant from the ruler and using the threat of harsh punishment involves an expedi46. Igor de Rachewiltz, trans., "The Secret History of the Mongols,"Papers on Far Eastern History 13 (1976): 46-47. (Henceforth, SHM-Rfollowed by the year of publication in Papers on Far Eastern History.) The Tatars dominated the eastern part of Mongolia and were constant threats and rivals to the Mongols until Chinggis Khan finally defeated them in 1202. 47. Minhij Siraj Jfizjani, Tabakgat-i-NasiriA General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia, Including Hindustan; from A. H. 194 (810 A.D.) to A.H. 658 (1260 A.D.) and the Irruption of the Infidel Mughals Into Islam, ed. and trans. Henry G. Raverty (New Delhi: Oriental Book Reprint Corp., 1970), 952-53 (henceforth, Jfizjaini/Raverty,Tabakat-i-Nasiri); Minhij SiraijJfizjani, Tabaqdt-i-Nasiri, 2 vols. (Lahore: Markazi Urdu Bord, 1975), 2:117. Jfizjani, of course, did not witness this. Furthermore, considering that he wrote his chronicle from the safety of Delhi, one must question how accurate this statement is. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate that outsiders or non-Mongols recognized that the discipline of the Mongols and the expectations of their leaders were quite high. This anecdote is also similarly told about Motun, a Xiong-nu prince who directed his bodyguard to shoot whomever he singled out, without hesitation. He first pointed at his favorite horse and then at his wife. Those who failed to carry out the order were executed. After he felt confident of their obedience and discipline, he eventually pointed out his father, Tumen, the Shan-yti or ruler of the Xiong-nu. Without fail, Motun'sbodyguard fired, killing the old QaYanand thus effectively raising Motun to the throne. See E. H. Parker,A Thousand Yearsof the Tartars (New York:Dorset Press, 1987), 9; and Ying-Shih Yii, "The Xiongnu," 118-50, in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor (Cam-

bridge: University Press,1990), 120. Cambridge

48. Jfizjani, Tabaq&t-i-Nasiri,2:181; JfizjfLnt/Raverty, Tabakat-i-Nasiri, 1078-79.

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tion on which Chinggis Khan sent his general Stibedei against the Merkit and Naiman who had fled from Mongolia into what is now Kazakhstan.49 He instructed Siibedei to spare his remounts so that they would not be overworked and become too lean. In addition, he prohibited Siibedei from allowing his troops to hunt except in moderation and only in order to maintain their food supply. Even orders on daily routines were to be carried out in strict obedience. He further instructed Siibedei: do not allow the soldiers to fix the crupper to the saddle and put on the bridle, but let the horses go with their mouths free. If this order is issued the soldiers will not be able to gallop on the way. Once you have so ordered, then whoever transgresses this command shall be seized and beaten. Send to Us those who transgressOur command if it looks that they are personally known to Us; as for the many who are not known to Us, just cut them down on the spot.50 From this command we can determine a few things. The first is that clearly Chinggis Khan gave his general authority to deal with misconduct and that disobedience was considered a serious crime. Second, Chinggis Khan also realized that princes, other relatives, or others who might hold his favor could undermine the authority of the general in charge of the campaign by flaunting their own special rank.51Thus, if they did disobey the general, then they were either to return to Chinggis Khan's orda, or camp, on their own accord, or one could be sure that a messenger would bring the news of the violation to the Qayan's attention. Even after the great Chinggis Khan died, princes were unable to usurp the authority of the generals. Outsiders confirmed that the Mongols maintained discipline in the ranks and among officers with draconian measures. Carpini wrote: If anyone is found in the act of plunderingor stealing in the territory under their power, he is put to death without any mercy. Again, if
49. The Naiman and Merkits were primarily Turkic pastoral nomads who lived in Mongolia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Merkit-Mongolconflict began before the lifetime of Chinggis Khan, as Yesiigei, Chinggis Khan's father, kidnapped H6'elfin, Chinggis Khan'smother, from her Merkit husband. This would later result in the Merkit kidnapping B6rte, Chinggis Khan'swife during his youth. The Merkit lived in what would now be part of the Buryat Republic in Russia and northern Mongolia, between Lake Baikal and the confluence of the Selenge, Orkhon, and Tula rivers. The Naiman, which means "eight" in Mongolian, dominated western Mongolia until their defeat by Chinggis Khan in 1204. With their defeat, the Naiman led by Giichiiliig and remnants of the Merkit fled from Mongoliainto Central Asia to escape Chinggis Khan's control. 50. SHM-R(1980), 19. 51. H. D. Martin, Rise of Chinggis Khan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1950), 6-7. Martin believes that Chinggis Khan specifically had his son Jochi in mind when he uttered this command as Jochi was fond of hunting and did accompany Siibedei on this particular mission.
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theirplans,especially whentheyintendgoingto war, anyonereveals he is givena hundred stripeson his back,as heavyas a peasantcan givewitha bigstick.52 In addition, he noted that in battle, if a few men flee as part of an arban, or unit of ten, and the entire unit does not flee, then all are put to death. If an arban flees and the 100 do not flee, then also all are executed. Also, if a few members are captured, the rest of the unit must rescue them.53The key was that they must function as a unit. Valery Aleexev, however, questions the idea that only draconian punishment maintained discipline in the Mongolarmy:
Without doubt, harshness played a role. But in the conditions of

nomadiclife, harshmeasures, none otherswereused, couldwell if lead to the disintegration military of units..... It wouldbe farmore realisticto presumethat the discipline the armyrestedon some in
deeply held collective psychology.54

Several possible factors could be involved in Alexeev's idea of collective psychology and its role in the discipline of the Mongolarmy. One is simple loyalty. As Chinggis Khan elevated members from all levels of nomadic society to positions of importance, his followers may have remained devoted to him out of gratitude and loyalty. In return, they ensured that their own units remained disciplined. Another factor, which is often downplayed,could have been a sense of destiny, since the Mongolsthought they were destined to control the world. In the end, the trainingof the Mongolsoldiers (whether ethnic Monor Turk) produced soldiers whose quality surpassed those of other gol states. Decades after Carpiniand Zhao Hung wrote their accounts of the Mongols,MarcoPolo observed, "Ofall troops in the world those are they which endure the greatest hardship and fatigue, and which cost the least; and they are the best of all for making wide conquests of country."55 Thus, while it is true that the Mongols and other Inner Asian warriors were fine soldiers because of the harsh conditions of the steppe, in truth it was the military trainingthat evolved out of hunting in the steppe that made them perhaps the best warriorsof the premodern period.

52. Carpini, "History of the Mongols," 17; Carpini, "YstoriaMongalorum,"49. 53. Carpini, "YstoriaMongalorum,"77; Carpini, "History of the Mongols,"33. 54. Valery Alexeev, "Some Aspects of the Study of Productive Forces in the
Empire of Chenghiz Khan," 186-87, in The Rulers From the Steppe: State Formation

on the Eurasian Periphery, ed. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1991), 194. 55. Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. Henry Yule, ed. Henri Cordier, 2 vols. (New York:Dover Publications, 1993), 1:260-61.
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