Mongol Manpower and Persian Population

Mongol Manpower and Persian Population
Author(s): John Masson Smith, Jr.

Source: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Oct., 1975), pp.
271-299
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3632138
Accessed: 13-05-2015 00:26 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the Economic and Social History of
the Orient.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 194.214.29.29 on Wed, 13 May 2015 00:26:06 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Journalof the Economicand Social History of the Orient,Vol. XVIII, Part III
MONGOL MANPOWER
AND PERSIAN POPULATION
BY
JOHN MASSON SMITH, Jr.

(University of California, Berkeley)
During the space of twenty eight years, as I have mentioned, the Scyths continued lords of the whole of Upper Asia. They entered Asia in pursuit of the
Cimmerians,and overthrew the empire of the Medes, who till they came
possessed the sovereignty. On their return to their homes after the long absence
of twenty-eight years, a task awaited them little less troublesome than their
struggle with the Medes. They found an army of no small size prepared to
oppose their entrance.For the Scythian women, when they saw that time went
on, and their husbands did not come back, had intermarriedwith their slaves.
Herodotus, Persian Wars, IV: i
What armyin the whole world can equal the Mongol army?In time of action,
when attacking and assaulting, they are like trained wild beasts out after
game, and in the days of peace and security they are like sheep, yielding milk,
and wool, and many other useful things. In misfortune and adversity they are
free from dissention and opposition. It is an army afterthe fashion of a peasantry,
being liable to all mannerof contributions .... It is also a peasantryin the guise
of an army, all of them, great and small, noble and base, in time of battle becoming swordsmen, archers and lancers and advancing in whatever manner
the occasion requires.
Juwaini (Boyle trans.), I, p. 30
I
Modern scholars consider the Mongol conquests as triumphs of
quality ratherthan quantity.They attributethe Mongols' extraordinary
military achievements, the winning of an unequalled empire almost
without the loss of a battle, much less a war, to their remarkable
strategic and tactical skills, and to their good organization, great
discipline and matchless leadership.These interpretationsare correct,
as far as they go; the Mongols had these qualities, but some further
qualificationis needed. Most of the methods employed by the Mongols
in war were not new. The mounted archer,able to loose the "Parthian
shot" (and a variety of others), had been riding all across the Inner
272
J. M. SMITH
Asian steppe and in parts of the Middle East for almost two millenia
(since before the Parthians,in fact) and the styles of fighting and campaigning appropriateto him had long been worked out. The essential
methods of evasion and encirclement had been used strategicallyby
the Scythiansagainst Darius, and tacticallyby the Parthiansat Carrhae
and the Turks at Manzikert,to cite only a few examples.And nomads
before the Mongols had enjoyed the advantageover sedentarypeoples
of cheaper horses and socially common cavalrymen.Mongol warfare
was distinguishednot so much by its skill and aptitudesas by its scale
and persistence.
The size of the Mongol armieshas not been appreciated.The sources
of Mongol history know the quality of Mongol troops, but they
remarkas well the great size of their forces. Marco Polo claimed that
the Mongol army numberedbetween six hundredand six hundredand
fifty thousand men in Russia and the Middle East together 1) and
Rashiduddin2) and Haython3) reported six hundred thousands in
Russia alone. Modern scholars have disregardedthese figures. Some
make perfunctory efforts, without reaching agreement or attempting
precision, to estimatethe numbers of Mongol and non-Mongol troops
in the imperialarmy, but most agree implicitly with Barthold that the
sources give "fantastic figures" that "deserve no credence whatsoever" 4). They are too skeptical.The sources give us manpower data
that the Mongols themselves compiled and relied upon in conducting
their masterful warfare, and these data show that the Mongol armies
were very large indeed. The Mongol conquests were the product of
the irresistible combination of skill and numbers.
The story of the Mongol conquests may seem, and is often made,
one of Davids facing Goliaths, a handful of nomads taking on China
I) Marco Polo, The Travels(Penguin, 1958), PP. 310-311.
of GenghisKhan, J. A. Boyle trans. (N.Y. and
2) Rashiduddin, The Successors
London, I97I), p. I28.
3) Haython, Flos HistoriarumTerreOrientis,in RecueildesHistoriensdesCroisades,
DocumentsArminiens,II (Paris, I906), p. 215.
4) W. Barthold, TurkestanDown to the Mongol Invasion(London: 2nd revised
edition, 1958), p. 404.
MONGOL MANPOWER
273
and Russia, "a hundred thousand conquering a hundred million" 5).

There is some truth in this. The population of China may have been
one hundred millions in the twelfth century6), and the Mongols even
today are only some three millions7). But the Mongols had reinforcements who tend to be overlooked, and, as we shall see later, resources
that have not been correctly assessed. The Mongol empire expanded
rapidly, and by the I240's included the whole Inner Asian steppe and
all of its nomads and mounted archers. The "Mongols", owing to
the elasticity, comprehensiveness,and linguistic and ethnic unconcern
of tribalism,were not only Mongolians, but Turks and Tunguses and
Tibetans. To some extent they were even Georgians, Russians and
Chinese, to name only a few of the non-nomad peoples who participated in the Mongol conquests, although the differentiationbetween
nomad and non-nomad meant more to the Mongols. The Mongol
forces were thus larger and more heterogeneous than first impressions
and many studies might suggest 8).
The figures usually cited for the size of the Mongol forces derive
from the Secret History of the Mongols,or from sources, such as
Rashiduddin, indirectly dependent on it. The Secret History gives
several enumerations of units from which, owing to their decimal
organization,troops totals can be derived. In i 20o6,following Chingis'
unification of the Mongols, 95 or 96 Thousands are listed, plus a
timen (Ten Thousand) of guards,for an implied total of Io1 to Io6,ooo
men 9). To these are added, following Jdchi's conquest of various
5) N. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (N.Y., 1963), p. 75.
6) C. P. Fitzgerald, China: A Short CulturalHistory (N.Y.: 3rd edition, 1961),
P- 387.
7) D. Sinor, Inner Asia: A Syllabus(The Hague, 1969), pp. 37, 49.

8) Some historians have understood this, but they have not reached agreement
or precision in their estimates of this larger force. Barthold (loc.cit.) estimates
150-200,000
men. H. D. Martin (in The Rise of Chingis Khan [Baltimore, 1950],
p. 13) gives one million. B. Spuler (in Iran Mogollar:,C. K6priilti trans. [Ankara,
1957], p. 439) has 1.4 millions. Most historians concentrate on Rashiduddin's figure
of I29,000 men.
9) Section zoz. For the text of the SecretHistory of the Mongols,see P. Pelliot,
Histoire secretedes Mongols(Paris, 1949). For a translation, see E, Haenisch, Die
der Mongolen(Leipzig, 1948).
GeheimeGeschichte
J. M. SMITH
274
"forest peoples" in 1207, two tiimensof Oyirad and Kirghiz, and

other forces from other tribes 10). Subsequently, but before the beginning of the North China campaigns in i z i i, judging by the placement
of the report in the SecretHistory,there is an apportionmentof peoples

and troops among the leading members of Chingis' family. Some 16
of the commandersof Thousands named in the zo6 list, presumably
along with their troops, are assigned to membersof the Family, along
with 28,500 other tents (probably with the implication of one soldier
per tent), for a total of 44,500 men 11). This would have left about 80
of the regular Thousands enumeratedin the 1206 list, and the Guards
Tiimen.The Regular, Guard and Family forces together thus would
have totalled 134,500 men. Rashiduddin, using similar information,
says that Chingis commanded 129,000 men at the time of his death
in I22712).
But these figures apply only to Outer Mongolia, as we shall see,

and to the period before the beginning of imperial expansion. These
are the "original" Mongols 13), perhaps, but the Mongol enterprise
soon involved many other peoples who are not counted in the Secret
History. Enumerationsof these exist; figures from Polo, Rashiduddin
and Haython have been cited above, and Jiizjdni estimates a total
force of from six to seven hundred thousand men 14). But because of
their inconsistencies and especially because of the very large numbers
involved, they are not much used. Canthey be reconciledand credited?
One way of appraisingthe greater Mongol army is provided by data
from the Middle East. Hiilegii was assigned "two persons out of every
ten in the Eastern and Western armies" with whom to conquer the
io) Section 239.

i i) The apportionment is in Section 242. The relation of the North Chinacampaign of 211 begins with Section 247.
i2) Martin,op. cit., pp. 13-14 and p. 14, n. 6, citing Rashiduddinvia M.D'Ohsson,
Histoire des Mongols,II (Amsterdam, 1835), pp. 3-5.
13) These "Mongols" already include some Turks, as for instance the Kirghiz.
14) Cited by Barthold, loc.cit., from Jaizjini, Tabaqit-i Nisiri, partial edition by
W. N. Lees, et al. (Calcutta, 1864), pp. 273, 968,
MONGOL MANPOWER
275
Middle East 15). If we can establish the size of Hiilegii's army, we can
then also calculatethe numbers of the whole Mongol force, and of its
regional subdivisions as well, since Mdngke Qaan, who gave not only
Hiilegii but also Qubilai a fifth of the Mongol troops
16),
was effecting
a reorganization of the Mongol territories and a redistribution of

Mongol forces. He was revising the old, four-way division of the
empire that had followed Chingis' death, adjustingfor the elimination
of most of the descendantsof Ogedei by reassignmentof their assets;
and equalizing (by reducing) the assets (and power) of the houses of
J6chi and Chaghataithat had been disproportionatelyenlargedby the
western conquests after 1227; and creating new portions for his
brothers, Qubilai and Hiilegii. Mdngke, Qubilai, Hiilegii, the heirs of
Chaghatai,and the descendantsof Jdchi were each to hold an equally
valuablepart of the Mongol empire and an equal share of the Mongol
nomad forces.
The description of Hiilegti's forces in Juwaini17) shows that the
"Eastern and Western armies" providing these portions for Hiilegii
and Qubilai were the nomad, largely Mongolian and Turkish forces
that constituted the main armies of the empire, and that the nonnomad auxiliaryforces of Iranians,Georgians, Russians, Chinese (and
so on) were not also being reapportioned.Sedentarymanpower,when
presentin Hiilegii's army,was separatelyidentified,and therewere only
one thousandhouseholds of Chineseartillerists-far from a fifthshareof
the non-nomad manpower available to the Mongols by the I25 o's.
Several sources give figures for the size of the Mongol force in the
Middle East, and the figures are, again, large, round and perhaps
questionable, although they are consistent. Marco Polo claimed that
Hiilegii had three hundred thousand troops with which to withstand
the attack of the Golden Horde in I26i 18). Rashiduddinhas Ketbuqa,
15) Juwaini, The History of the World-Conqueror,
J. A. Boyle trans. (Cambridge
[Mass.], 1958), II, p. 607; Ta'rikh-iJahdn-Gushi,Mirzi Muhammad Qazwini ed.
(3 vols.: Leyden and London, 1912
i6) Ibid.
17) Ibid., trans., II, pp. 607-608;
i8) Polo, op. cit., p. 3Io.
6, 1937), III, p. 90.

text, III, pp. 91-93.
J. M. SMITH
276
after his defeat in I26o, taunt his Mamluk captors, saying (in effect),
'you've got me, but there are three hundredthousand more like me' 19).
Haython, later, also counted three hundredthousand men in the army
of Oljeitii 20).
The number of Mongol troops is also reflected in their "order of

battle". Occasionally,as in the GeorgianCbronicle's
account of Ghiz~n's
Syrian campaign of I299-1300, the number of tiimens will be given in
the sources--thirteen in this case 21). More commonly, the number of

units is omitted, but the principalcommandersare listed. I believe that
these named commanders,except as otherwise specifiedin the sources,
were commandersof tiimens.Rashiduddinlists thirteencommandersfor
the
1299-1300
campaign:
Ghazan,
Chiiban,
Sultan, Tagharilja,
Ilbasmish, Chichek, Qurumshi and Qurbagha in the Center; and

Mulay, Satilmish, Qutlughshah, Yemin and Murtad in the Right
Wing 22). In describing the Right Wing, Rashiduddin even specifies
that each commanderled a ti'men,and we would not expect the commandersof the Centerto be of lesser rank. The correspondenceof the
information from the two sources is exact.
To assess Hiilegii's forces in similarmanner,let us look at his order
of battle for the campaign of I257-58 against 'Irdq-i 'Arab, Baghdad
and the Caliph,as given by Rashiduddin.The extensive strategyof the
campaign itself suggests a very large force. The Center, marching
direct on Baghdad from Hamadin via Kermanshah and Hulwun,
included Hiilegii, Kuka Ilka, Arqatu and Arghun Aqa, as well as
Suntai, who came in from some detached operation en route. In the
Left Wing, advancing from Luristan via Khiizistdn, were Ketbuqa,
Qadsunand Nerk Ilka. In the Right Wing, proceedingfrom Azerbdyjdn
via Irbil, were the J6chid princes, Bulgha, Tutar and Quli, and the
generals Buqa Timur and Sunchaq. Chormaghun and Baiju led a
19) Rashiddudin, Histoire des Mongolsde la Perse, E. Quatrem"reed. and trans.
(Paris, I836), p. 352.
zo) Haython, loc.cit.

21) M. F. Brosset, Histoire de la Giorgie,I (St. Petersburg, 1849), pp. 63o-632.
22) Rashiddudin,History of GhdZLdn
Khan,K. Jahn ed., I (London, 1940), p. 127.
MONGOL MANPOWER
277
separate corps into Mesopotamia from Rim 23). Thus fifteen commandersare named, and since Chormaghunhad formerly led three or
four tlimens,his force may have included more than two. Thus Hiilegii
would seem to have commandedfrom fifteen to seventeen tiimens.
Other sources bear this out. The GeorgianChroniclehas four tfmens
in the force under Chormaghunthat originally occupied Azerbdyjin,
ca. 1230, and that was later made subordinate to Hiilegii (and moved by
him to Rilm, since he wanted Azerbdyjin for himself), and has six
tfimensin Hiilegii's personal forces, stationed in Azerbdyjan24). It goes
on to mention the seconding to Hiilegii's command of other troops
from the realms, and led by princes, of the Jachids and Chaghataids;
it lists, however, only threeof these princes25). The numberof seconded
princes-and with them, probably, tiimens-appears larger in other
sources. Juwaini gives six 26), and Bar Hebraeus, seven 27). If we take
for nearby Aaerbdyjdn,and those

the figures of the GeorgianChronicle
of Juwaini and Bar Hebraeusfor the princely forces (which may have
been stationed in regions remote from Georgia and its chronicler)we
have again, from different sources, the convergent reckoning of
sixteen to seventeen tllmensin Hiilegii's command.
How is this figure to be reconciled with the other total of three
hundred thousand men commonly given for Hiilegii's forces? This
largernumber can also be reachedby counting not only the "Mongol"
or Inner Asian nomad troops, but the "Tdjik"or local Iranian,

Georgian, Armenian,and perhapsMiddle Eastern Turkish forces
under Hiilegii's commandas well. These troops do not appearas
clearlyin the sources.The Mongolswereprobablydisdainfulof their
capacities,and Muslimslike Rashiduddinprobablyfound them a
23) Rashiduddin, Jamic al-tawarikh, B. Karimi ed., II (Tehran, 1957), p. 707.
24) Brosset, op. cit., pp. 5II, 539.
25) Ibid., p. 541.
26) Juwaini, op. cit., trans., II, pp. 607-60o8;text, III, pp. 91-92. Grigor of Akanc',
Historyof theNationof theArchers,R. P. Blakeand R. N. Frye ed. and trans.(Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies, i2 [i949], PP. 269-399), p. 327, also has six princes, although
Grigor is not an altogether reliable source: he has, for instance, the tiimenas a unit
of thirty thousand men.
27) Bar Hebraeus, Chronography,E. Budge trans. (London, I932), I, p. 419.
J. M. SMITH
278
distastefulsubject,since many-perhaps most-of them were Christians.

But they were there, if only noticed summarily, as by Rashiduddin
when describing Hiilegii's Baghdad campaign, under the command
of "the sul.tdns,mdliks and kdtibs of Iran" 28); these included, among
others, the Georgian king and the "great men" of Georgia 29).
These troops were also counted by the Mongols and organized in
decimal units. The GeorgianChronicletells us that Hiilegii sent Arghun
Aqa to conduct a census in Georgia, and that he established nine
Georgian tfimens30). Elsewhere in Iran, Mongol administrators had been
at work on similarcensuses from the time of the conquest of Khurdsdn

after the Khwdirezmiancampaigns, and the occupation of Azerbayjan
by Chormaghun.Their results are given in passing by Juwaini, who
speaks of tiimensof Nishipuir-Tiis(Khurdsin), of Qumm, Kdshin and
Isfahin ('Irdq-i'Ajem), and of Tabriz-Azerbiyjdn-offive tiimensin

arenot likelyto havebeenunitsof Mongols,since
all31). Thesetfimens
they are located by cities, which would not have been a convenient
way of specifying the mobile Mongol camps, and which would not
have applied in particularto Qumm, Kdshin and Isfahdn,which were
not in regions occupied by Mongols. Juwaini has in mind, surely,
troops raised by local, non-Mongol commanders, vassal rulers and
administrators
mdliksandkdtibs")in thesecitiesfromamong
("sul.tdns,
the local, non-Mongol (although perhaps nomadic) population. The
Georgians, of course, were neither Mongols nor nomads. Taken
together, these Georgiansand others give us fourteentfimens,or perhaps
only thirteen, since the Georgian chronicler and Juwaini may both
have been including the Azerbdyjin tiimenin their counts. Counted
theyhelpto make
togetherwith the fifteento seventeenMongoltiimens
up a force approximatingthe customary large total of three hundred

thousand men.
28) Rashiduddin/ Quatremere, p. 264.

29)
Brosset, op. cit., pp. 548-549.
30) Ibid., p. 55T1.
31) Juwaini, op. cit., trans., II, pp. SII, ~i8; text, II, 248, 255.
MONGOL MANPOWER
279
II
From the preceding discussion can be seen, I believe, the numbers
and kind of units the Mongol armies of Outer Mongolia, and later, of
the Middle East, contained. But it is not clear how reliably a count
of army units indicates actual manpower. The Mongol units were
decimally organized, and named as Tens, Hundred, Thousands and
Ten Thousands,but were these numbersrealistic,or only conventions?
Ordinarily and rightly, estimates of numbers of troops, or indeed
large quantitative statements of all sorts in pre-modern sources are
treated with suspicion. The artistic tendency to exaggerate numbers
of warriors so as to enhance the importance of the story, or of the
protagonists, is well-known, and is not absent from Mongol storytelling. The SecretHistory has the Ong Khan and Jamuqa lead forty
thousand men against the Merkits in retaliation for their raid on
Temtijin's camp and rape of Temiijin's wife, Bdrte 32). Implicitly, the
Merkits have forces of comparablesize, so that the episode as reported

involves almost as many men as Chingis was later to mobilize from the
whole of Outer Mongolia-an implausible suggestion, but one that
follows the same artistic impulses as the Homeric story of the Trojan
War.
There are other reasons for distortion of estimates even by careful
reporters.The pay and provisioning of armiesis very generallysubject
to peculation, and one of the commonest devices for the diversion of
funds is the padding of muster-rolls, which inflates the number of
troops reported, enlarges the payroll, and enables the commander to
pocket the surpluspay. As one of the Mongols' administratorsput it:
Whenthey draw their pay and allowancesthe soldiers'numbersincreaseby
hundredsandthousands,but on the day of combattheirranksareeverywhere
vagueand uncertain,and none presentshimselfon the battlefield.A shepherd
wasonce calledto renderan accountof his office.Saidthe accountant:'How
manysheep remain?''Where?'asked the shepherd.'In the register'.'That',
repliedthe shepherd,'is why I asked:thereare none in the flock.' This is a
parableto be appliedto their armies;whereineach commander,in orderto
32) Sections 106-107.
z80
J. M. SMITH
increase the appropriationfor his men's pay, declares, 'I have so and so many
men', and at the time of inspection they impersonate one another in order to
make up their full strength 33).
But Juwaini was not describing Mongol armies. He was citing these
common corrupt and ineffectual practices to contrast them with
Mongol honesty and efficiency.
There are reasons why we may trust the estimates of the size of
Mongol forces more than we do others, and ways in which the discrepancies in these estimates may be explained. The Mongols were
notably effective campaigners,and the extent of their conquests and
the regularityof their victoriesarguefor their efficiencyin military

managementas well. Moreover,their style of campaigningdemanded
efficiency.The Mongol field armieswere cavalryforces, and cavalry
with unusuallylargenumbersof horsesattached,since the condition
of the pasturedanimalscould only be kept up to the high standards
requiredby Mongol strategyand tacticsby alternatingthe burdenof
each warriorand his gear among a number of horses during the
campaign.EachMongoltrooperthus took a stringof horsesto war;
for Ghizdn's Syriancampaignof I299-13oo00,eachsoldierwas to report
with five mounts34). These horses were normally supported by
grazing35), so the Mongols had to be carefuland preciseabout the
numbersof men in their armiesand on their campaignsbecauseof
this high ratioof horsesto men, whichmadeit difficultto findenough
pasturefor a powerfularmy.Also, on some campaignsthe Mongol
troops brough along not only their horses, but their familiesand
subsistenceanimalsas well. The Mongolmilitaryunitswereconsidered
to includeboth soldiersand their supportingestablishment:timens,
are "myriads,with their women,
Chronicle,
accordingto the Georgian
baggage and animals"36). Overestimatingthe size of a force would
33) Juwaini, op. cit., trans., I, p. 32; text, I, pp. 23-24.
der
34) D'Ohsson, op. cit., IV, p. zz8; and J. von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte
Ilchane,II (Darmstadt, 1843), pp. 85-86. The inadequate citations in these works
make the source of this information uncertain; it is probably Wassif.
35) Polo, op. cit., p. 69.
36) Brosset, op. cit., p. 539.
MONGOL MANPOWER
28
cause it better to fit the pasture available,but might provide too few
troops for the task at hand; underestimating could put too many
horses and sheep on too little pasture. The fact that the Mongols so
seldom got themselves into militaryor logistical difficulties--not even
when campaigning in Russia in winter-suggests that they were
usually well informed about the logistic potential of target regions,
and able effectivelyto relatethis informationto the consumptiveneeds
of their forces. To managethis they must have had a good idea of the
size of these forces.
Furthermore,the Mongol practice of re-equipping their troops by
occasional (later, annual) qupchurlevies upon the animals and goods
of the adequately-stockedsoldiers for the benefit of those who had
sufferedlosses during campaigns or from other hazards, assured that
a close scrutiny of the numbers and equipment of the forces would
be maintained37). Some commandersmight hope to gain extrabenefits
from qupchurby over-counting their men, and some soldiers might
over-representtheir losses, but other commandersand other soldiers
-the ones who would have to pay-would do their best to ascertain
that this paymentwas justified.
Finally,the Mongolshad less causethan most to be troubledwith

paddingof muster-rollsto enableembezzlementof pay. The Mongol
soldiers were not paid38). All in all, the Mongols had important
reasonsfor trying to obtain accurateinformationabout the size of
their forces, and fewer causesthan most for attemptingto miscount
them.
The Mongol enumerationshave not only to be supportedagainst
general skepticism,but helped out of particulardifficulties.Many
scholars accept Rashiduddin's figure of i29,ooo men for the Mongol
armyof I227, but then have difficultyrelatingthis force to a credible

Mongol population.They have taken as the Mongols'generalconscriptionmethod their well-attestedpracticeof levying as tax "one37) Rashiduddin/Jahn,p. 300. For a discussion of qupchur,see my "Mongol and
Nomadic Taxation", HarvardJournalof Asiatic Studies(1970).
38) Juwaini, op. cit., trans., I, pp. 29-31; text, I, pp. 21-22.
18
282z
J. M. SMITH
tenth of everything",and have reconstructedfrom this a Mongol

of aboutone millionas thebasefor theforceof 129,000 39).
population
Thereare severalproblemswith this method.To begin with, when
the Mongols appliedthe tithe as a conscriptionrate, they appliedit
not to the generalpopulation,but to that segment of it that was
properlyliableto conscription--theadultmales40). Hadsucha method
been appliedin Mongolia,the male populationby itself would have
had to be over one million to provide 129,000 men, and the total
populationwould have had to be betweenfive and six millions.Such
a figureis out of the question:the modernMongolsonly amountto
some threemillionsat most41).
Secondly,althougha Mongolianpopulationof one million in the
early thirteenthcenturyis easily conceivable,a populationof one
millionis OuterMongoliaalone is not. And it was Outer Mongolia
that produced129,000 men, or even somewhatmore. The lists of
forcesin the SecretHistorydisplaya Mongolstrengthof some 134,500
men priorto 1211 and the beginningof the North Chinacampaigns.
Most of these troopscamefrom OuterMongolia,as is seen from the
fact that the list of Thousandsof 1206 includesonly five thousand
men of the Inner MongolianOnggiits, and no Tangqutsat all42).
No additionsto these were madein the 1207 list, althougha dynastic
marriagewith the Onggiits is mentioned43). Clearlythe population
and manpowerof Inner Mongolia,which probablyequalledor surpassed that of Outer Mongolia,then as now, was not accessibleto
ChingisKhanat the time of his mobilizationof 134,500 men.
This placesa largeburdenon OuterMongolia.In recenttimes the
populationof Outer (the PeoplesRepublicof) Mongolia-minus, to
be sure,the Buryats,TannuTuva and some otherregionsfromwhich
Chingisderivedhis earlyrecruits-has only just passedone million,
39) G. Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven and London, 1953),
pp. 126-I27, 2I5-z26. Martin, op. cit., p. 14.
40) Brosset, op. cit., p. 55 .
41) Sinor, loc. cit.
42) Section o202.
43) Section 239-
MONGOL MANPOWER
283
and almost a quarter of these live in Ulan Bator. This population is

probably double what it was in 1921 4"), and is surely rather larger
also than that of the disturbedperiod leading up to 1207. How, then,
did Chingis raise 134,500
men from perhaps half a million people?
The difficulty appears again in even more exaggeratedform when

such calculationsare appliedto the datafrom Mongol Georgia reported
in the GeorgianChronicle.Hiilegfi's census enumerated nine timens,
and the conscriptionapplied in Georgia took one man in ten 45).Nine
tiimens-90o,ooo men-levied at a rate of one in ten would require an
adult male population of 900,000, and a total population of perhaps
(multiplying by five) 4,500,000 persons. But, as the translator of the
GeorgianChroniclenoted, in the early nineteenth century the Georgian

population was probably only around 225,000 46). In 1897 it was only
some 1.3 millions 47). Just after the Mongol conquest it would scarcely
have been so large. Obviously, something is wrong, either with the

force figures (which I would like not to believe), or with the understanding of the conscription technique through which the troops are
related to the general population.
The troops counted in the sources can be fitted to plausible populations, however, on the assumption that the Mongols conscripted
all adult males into the army48). Working with this assumption,
134,500 troops, taken as one-fifth of the people of Outer Mongolia,
would imply a total population of some 650,000, only slightly more

than the estimated population of 1921, and thus a believable figure.
The results for Georgia would also be credible. The nine tiimensof
adult males (of whomone-tenth were taken for service) would require
a total population of about 450,000.
This interpretationof the Mongols' census and conscription prac44) C. R. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia (N.Y. and Washington, 1968),
pp. 404-405, 408.
45) Brosset, loc. cit.
46) Ibid., n. 2.
47) R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge [Mass.], 1954), p. 289.
48) For the Mongols, "adult males" were from 15 to 60 years of age: see Grigor of
Akanc', op. cit., p. 325.
284
J. M. SMITH
tices makes sense in other ways as well. Adult male labor is not heavily
involved in the subsistence routines of nomadism, as we can see from
the accounts of both medieval and modern observers. Vreeland's
analysis of the division of labor in an early twentieth century Mongol
community has the women generally assigned to milking, collecting
fuel, building fires, preparing and cooking food, and caring for the
small children and for the sheep at night. The men carry on trading
and caravanoperations, cope with shearing, slaughtering, butchering
and tanning, engage in carpentry, ropemaking, metal-working and
agriculture. Both sexes are involved in herding sheep; only men
normally tend horses and camels. Vreeland notes that women often
assist in loading animalsand in coping with the ger, that childrenbegin
acting as shepherdsfrom age six or seven, and that boys begin shearing
sheep as soon as they are strong enough to do so 49).
Things have not changed much in Mongol camps in the past seven
centuries.As William of Rubruck describedit:
It is the duty of the women to drive the carts, to load the houses on to them
and to unload them, to milk the cows, to make the butter and grut [dried curd],
to dress the skins and to sew them .... They also sew shoes and socks and other
garments.... The women also make the felt and cover the houses.
The men make bows and arrows, manufacture stirrups and bits and make
saddles; they build the houses and carts, they look after the horses and milk
the mares, churn the [kumis]that is the mares' milk, and make the skins in
which it is kept, and they also look after the camels and load them. Both sexes
look after the sheep and goats, and sometimes the men, sometimes the women,
milk them50).
And things do not differ much among the various pastoral peoples.
Among Barth's Persian Basseri, for instance, the women and girls
usually perform most of the domestic chores, though men repair
equipment and tents and make rope; all cooperate in making and
breaking camp; and herding is usually (though not invariably) done
by males, especially by unmarried men and boys down to age six,
while milking is done by both sexes, but mostly by women. Barth
49) H. H. Vreeland, MongolCommunityand KinshipStructure(New Haven: 3rd
edition, 1962), pp. 48-51.
William of Rubruck,Journey,in C. Dawson, TheMongolMission(London and
5o)
N.Y., I95 5), P. 103.
MONGOL MANPOWER
285
remarksthat the division of labor between the sexes is "highly elastic"

and mostly determinedby pragmaticconsideration51).
Thus women are usually responsible for the regular subsistence
labor of nomadism,while men generallyattend to the more specialized
and more occasional tasks, and even in these are often helped or
replaced by women. The regular chore of herding normally involves
male labor as well as female, but often in special forms and ways:
using male childrenas much as adults, and with the men concentrating
on the care of the great militaryand logistic animals.Consideringthis,
and rememberingthe pragmatic "elasticity" of this division of labor
by sexes, it is easy to understand and believe in the situation that
Marco Polo reports:
And I assure you that the womenfolk [in Mongol society] buy and sell
and do all that is needful for their husbands and households. For the men do
not bother themselves about anythingbut hunting and warfareand falconry ....
The wives aretrue and loyal to their husbandsand very good at their household
tasks52).
Marco Polo was observing the Mongols in peacetime. But the implication of his descriptionis that, if the protection of the camps and
herds could be provided for in some way not requiring the presence
of the men-by the Pax Mongolica, for instance-then all the adult
male Mongols could serve in the armies of Chingis Khan and his
house.
It would appear, furthermore, that the whole Mongol manpower
was not only availablefor, but was used in war:
What armyin the whole world can equal the Mongol army?In time of action,
when attackingand assaulting, they are like trained wild beasts out after game,
and in days of peace and security they are like sheep, yielding milk, and wool,
and many other useful things ... It is also a peasantryin the guise of an army,
all of them,great and small, noble and base, in time of battle becoming swordsmen, archers and lancers and advancing in whatever manner the occasion
requires....
The reviewing and musteringof the army has been so arrangedthat they have
abolished the registry of inspection and dismissed the officials and clerks. For
they have divided all thepeopleinto companies of ten, appointing one of the
F.
Nomadsof SouthPersia (London, 1961), pp.
51) Barth,
14-6.
Sz) Polo, op. cit., p. 67.
286
J. M. SMITH
ten to be the commander of the nine others; while from among each ten commanders one has been given the title of 'commander of the hundred', all the
hundredhaving been placed under his command.And so it is with eachthousand
men and so also with each ten thousand... 53)
[emphases added]
Here we see the Mongols as a people in arms, a regimented nomadic

society, with all of their men counted, organized and used for war.
Although the Mongols best exemplify this capacity of nomadic
society for total mobilization, there are illustrations of it available
from other periods as well, even going back'to the very beginnings
of Inner Asian history. Herodotus begins his description of the
Scythianswith an anecdote concerning a legendary Scythiancampaign
into the Middle East 54). The Scythianmen went away to war, leaving
their wives behind, and stayed away in their conquests for twentyeight years. Meanwhile their wives interbred with their slaves, which
made for trouble when the Scythian husbands finally returned. The
story is fabulous, but it had its roots in the real capacity of nomads
to send all of their men to war. The story would not have survived
the skepticism of either Herodotus or his audience except for this
essential truth. But it survived not only among the Greeks, with their
curiosity about, and knowledge of Scythian affairs, but remained
persistently in circulation in the region as a valid illustration of the
peculiaritiesof nomadic life: the same story appears in the fifteenth
century Ottoman Siltfiqndme, told about the Golden Horde 55).
The Mongols also counted and organized their sedentary subjects
in the same way as they did the nomads in their empire, and for the
same reason: they plannedto use all the adultmales in war, if necessary.
Ordinarily,because the sedentarypeoples produced fewer cavalrymen,
and thus a poorer sort of army,the Mongols only drew upon a fraction
of this manpower, normally a tenth, and even that perhapsonly when
a campaignwas undertaken.But on occasion, and in particularduring
the period of the conquests, the entire sedentarymanpowerwas used:
53) Juwaini, op. cit., trans., I, pp. 30-31; text, I, pp. 22-23.
54) Herodotus, Persian Wars, IV: 1-4.
55) Ms. in the Topkapi Library,Istanbul, Hazine No. 1612, fols. 133-IS 2.
MONGOL MANPOWER
287
The Mongols then advanced on Khojend. When they arrived before the
town, the citizens took refuge in the citadel .... When the Mongol armyarrived
they found it impossible to capture the place immediately since it could be
reachedneither by bowshot nor by mangonel. They therefore drove the young
men of Khojend thither in a forced levy (hashar)and also fetched reinforcements from Otrar, Bokhara, Samarqandand the other towns and villages, so
that fifty thousand levies and twenty thousand Mongols were assembledin that
place. These were all formed into detachments of tens and hundreds. Over
every ten detachmentsof ten of the Taziks there was set a Mongol officer.. .56)
And also:
When the town [of Bukhdri] and the citadel had been purged of rebels
and the walls and outworks levelled with the dust, all the inhabitants of the
town, men and women, ugly and beautiful, were driven out on to the field
of the musalla.Chingiz-Khan spared their lives; but the youths and full-grown
men thatwere fit for such service were pressed into a levy (hashar)for the attack
on Samarqandand Dabusiya .... 7)
The Mongol enumerationsof troops raisedfrom the sedentarypeoples

are thus also censuses of adult males, so that the lists of Mongol tiimens
of whatever sort, nomad or sedentary,are at once counts of soldiers,
estimates of manpower and military potential, and indicators of the
size of the general population.
III
The Mongol population of the Middle East around I26o would have
been about 85b,000 persons, if there were seventeen tlmens in Hiilegii's
command (a figure that I prefer for reasons that will appear below).
And since Hiilegti led one-fifth of the Mongol forces (and people),
then the nomadic population of Inner Asia, all of it included in the
Mongol empire by this time, would have been about 4,250,000. Two
fifths of these would have been locatedin Mdngke'sOuter and Qubilai's

Inner Mongolia, 850,000 people in each region, 1.7 million in Mongolia
as a whole. One fifth, 85o,ooo people, would have been found in the
Chaghataidrealm of Transoxiana,Semirechiyeand parts of Jungaria
and the Tarim Basin. One fifth was in the J6chids' domainsin northern
56) Juwaini, op. cit., trans., I, p. 92; text, I, p. 71.
57) Ibid., trans., I, p. io7; text, I, p. 83.
288
J. M. SMITH
CentralAsia and the North Caucasianand South Russian steppe, and

the remainingfifth was in the Middle East with Htilegii. These numbers
are within plausible population limits for these regions, and well
within their capacitiesfor the support of nomadism58).
The sedentary populations of the western regions of the Mongol
empire can also be estimated from data of this sort. For Russia, Vernadsky59) has reconstructeda list of forty-threetfimenslocated between
Nizhni-Novgorod in the east and Galicia in the west, and north of
the steppe zone occupied by the Mongols (Tatars) and the tiimensof
the "regular" Mongol-Turkish nomad forces. The Grand Duchy of
Vladimircomprisedfifteento seventeentlimens,according(respectively)
to the RogozhskyChronicleandthe Chronograph

of 15 I2. The Grand
Duchy of Nizhni-Novgorodcounted as five tlmens, and Tver, says
Vernadsky,could have been no smaller.The other tiimensare listed in
a Crimeanyarliq and a Polish letter. Although these documents are of
the sixteenth century, they refer (explicitly in the yarliq) to, and incorporate information from the early fifteenth century, and thus they
of the lateperiodof the Golden

probablystill recordthe arrangements
under
The
list
includes
Kiev, Vladimir-in-Volynia,
Horde,
Toqtamish.
Lutsk, Sokal,Podolia,Kamenets,Braslav,Chernigov,Kursk,"Egolday",Liubitsk,Smolensk,Polotsk,Riazan,and Pronsk-fifteen more
To these Vernadskywould add threemore in Galicia(Galich,
ftimens.
58) The Kazakhs in the Steppe Kray of Tsarist Russia's empire were some 1.8
to i . 9 millions in 1897, and most of them were nomads. This region, which was
the equivalent of only the easternmost part of the Jdchids' domain, could thus
have harbored the whole J6chid Mongol force of 850,000 people. See L. Krader,
Peoples of Central Asia (Bloomington and The Hague, 1963), pp. I8o, 199.
The Chaghataidrealm was the approximateequivalent of the Tsarist Turkestan

Kray, including Semirechiye, which had perhaps i.5 million nomads in 1897,
together with Chinese Turkestan, which had about half a million largely nomadic
Kazakhs and Kirghiz in the early 195o's (it contained some Mongols too, whom
I have not been able to count). See Krader,op. cit., p. 199; E. Allworth (ed.), Central
Asia: A Century of Russian Rule (N.Y. and London, 1967), p. Io4; G. Moseley, A
Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili KaZakh Autonomous Chou (Cambridge [Mass.],
1966), pp. 17, z i; and Chang Chih-i, The Party and the National Question in China,
G. Moseley trans. (Cambridge [Mass.], and London, 1966), p. i61.

59) Vernadsky, op. cit., pp. 217-219.
MONGOL MANPOWER
289
Lvov and Sanok), which had been held by the Mongols until 1349.
These forty-threeRussian timensenrolled the adult male population
of Russia: some430,000 men. Of them, the Mongols probablyordinarily
employed about one-tenth in the armed forces; they may well have
been those Russians in China who were consolidated into a taimenin
1330 60). Ten thousand Russians would have been close to one-fifth
of the Russian force normally maintained (hypothetically) by the
Mongols, 43,000 men; they were perhaps sent to Qubilai as part of
the fifth portion underM6ngke's redistribution,althoughas mentioned,

I have seen no mention of Russian contingents in the other regions of
the empire, nor of substantial Chinese forces outside of the East.
These forty-threeRussiantimenswould also imply a generalpopulation
in Mongol Russia of 2,1 5o,ooo persons.
There is a pleasing coincidence between this information and that

of certainother sources that deal with Russia under the Golden Horde.
For the Jdchids' realmas for the Ilkhans'there is a conventionallarge,
round figure for military strength: 6oo,ooo men. The figure is found
in Rashiduddin (although in an unconvincing story) 61), and in the
authoritative work of the Armenian Haython 62). Marco Polo has
another figure, or figures: three hundred to three hundred and fifty

thousands63); he was uncertain of the exact strength of the Golden
Horde, but wanted to indicate that it was about equal to that of the
Mongol in the Middle East. The figure of six hundred thousands
accords very well with Vernadsky'sforty-three Russian tiimenswhen
these are taken in conjunction with the Mongol forces implied in the
observations of the fourteenth centurytravellerIbn Bataita.Ibn Batpita
visited the royal camp of the Golden Horde during the reign of Ozbek,
ca. 1332, and was told that there were seventeen commanders of
timensthen present at the camp for the festival at the end of Ramadan,
and that the army of the Horde was even larger than the 170,000 men
60o) Ibid., pp. 87-88.
p. 128.
6I) Rashiduddin/Boyle,
62) Haython,op.cit., p. 215.
63) Polo, op. cit., pp. 310-31.
290
J. M.
SMITH
that they led 64). These seventeen commanders would be the seventeen
Muslim Mongol generals of the seventeen "regular"Mongol-Turkish
nomad tinens assigned to the Golden Horde in accordancewith the
reapportionmentof forces by Mdngke Qaan. This force, by the terms
of the reapportionment,would have matched that of the Ilkhans in
the Middle East (and those of the other three regions), so we may
believe that Htilegii's army numbered seventeen tifmens also. Marco
Polo was right, although imprecise, about the approximatelyequal
strength of the two powers-in Mongol "regulars".The other forces
alluded to in Ibn Batdita'saccount in addition to the seventeen tfimens
whose commanderswere present, would have been the Russian troops,
non-nomadicand probablyonly occasionallymustered,and commanded
by Christianprinces; one would not expect them to be on hand in
the steppe for an Islamic holiday. The 170,000 nomad troops and the
430,000 Russians make up ,the required six hundred thousand men.
The conventional count of the forces of ChaghataidCentral Asia

(which excluded most of Kazakhstan,but included parts of Jungaria
and the Tarim Basin) was four hundred thousand troops, implying
a total populationof two millions. This numberis given by Haython65).
men, or seventeen tiimens, as elsewhere, would have been
"Mongols", leaving 230,000 men and I, 50,000 persons in the non170,000
"Mongol", probably largely sedentarypopulation. We do not have a

detailedenumerationof the sedentaryunits such as we have for Russia
(and, as we shall see, for the Middle East), although Ibn 'Arabshdh,
in Timiir's time, mentions seven tiimensof Samarqandand environs,
and nine tfimensof Andekan/Feraghdnand its districts66).
The non-Mongol population of Iran in the Mongol period is more
clearlyand fully exhibited. In the time of Hiilegti, the Mongols directly
Ibn Batata, Travels,H. A. R. Gibb trans., II (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 492-493.
Haython, op. cit., p. 214.
Ibn cArabshah,Tamerlane,J. H. Sanders trans. (London, 1936), p. 17. Emel
in "Resimli bir Han Silsilenamesi", Islim Tetkikleri Enstittisi Dergisi, V
as saying that
(i973), p. 176, quotes the Tdrikh-iRashidiof Mirza Haydar Dughlat
the Chaghataid Tughluk Timur (1347-1363) converted to Islam along with his
Mongol armyof 6o,ooo men.
64)
65)
66)
Esin,
MONGOL MANPOWER
291
controlled Azerbdyjdn,'Irdq-i 'Ajem and Khurdsin in Iran. These

regions, or their modern equivalents, contained about half the population of Iran in 1956 67). If this proportion obtained in earliertimes,
the same regions might have been expected ordinarilyto hold at least
some two and a half to three million people; the population of Iran
ca. i8oo, after two decades of Zand and Qajdrcomings and going, is
estimatedat around five to six millions68). Hiilegti's agents, however,
could count only five tiimensin those regions: one in Azerblyjdn,three
in 'Irdq-i 'Ajem (Qumm, Kdshan and Isfahdn), and one in Khurisdn
(Nishipur-Tais). These five units, or 50,000 men, imply a population
of only 250,000 people where, even by the undemanding early nine-
teenth centurystandard,there should have been two and a half millions.

This is a very small figure-not ridiculously, but pitifully small.
It shows, not mistaken arithmetic nor an incompetent count, since
Persian eagerness to evade enumerationwas probably well balanced
by Mongol willingness to use drasticmethods and plenty of manpower
in taking the census, but rather the impact of the Mongols' total
conscription and total warfare upon a sedentary society. The consequences of the Mongol invasions, always known to have been catastrophic,areherequantified.ManyMiddleEasternchroniclersproduced
exaggeratedestimatesof the death-tollof the onslaught69); the Mongols
actually counted the survivors, potential tax-payersand soldiers, and
found only about one-tenth of what we might consider the normal
minimum population. The Mongols had dispersed or destroyed the
rest, some two millions and more.
These losses are immense, but not disproportionate. Convergent
evidence is supplied by a comparison of late Sassanian(early seventh
century A.D.) and Mongol revenues obtained from the regions held
by the Mongols. The Sassanianshad gathered the equivalent of 139
67) National and Province Statistics of the First Census of Iran: November 1956, I
(Tehran, 1961).
68) C. Issawi, The Economic History of Iran, 18oo-z914 (Chicago, 1971), p. 20, has
the population of Iran ca. 18oo as around five or six millions.
69) Summarized by I. P. Petrushevsky in the Cambridge History of Iran, V (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 484-488.
292
J. M. SMITH
million of the Mongols' silver "dinars",whereas the Mongols themselves, ca. I295, received only 17 millions, or only 12 %
/oof the Sassanians'income. Thus both revenue and population figures suggest a
decline from "normal" of about 90 % 70).
The recovery of the population, at least in Azerbdyjdnand 'Iraq-i

'Ajem, is as phenomenal as its earlier losses. Around 1335, Qazwini
enumeratedtwenty-five tiimensin Iran that were not part of the Mongol
regularforces. Qazwini made specialmention of districtsthat supported
Mongols with iqtd' (five Mongol tlimens in the Pishkin district of
Azerbayjdn)and did not include these tiimensin the twenty-five 71).
Nine of the twenty-five were in Azerbayjan,nine in 'Irdq-i'Ajem, and
seven in Mdzandarin72). Unfortunately,the military establishmentof
Khurdsan,which was administrativelyautonomous, was not counted
by Qazwini. But the manpower and population of 'Iraq-i 'Ajem,
which had been 30,000 men,and 150,000 people in ca. i26o, had tripled
in about two generations, to 90,000 men and 450,000 people. That of
Mustawfi Qazwini in TheGeographi70) The revenue dataare given by
ed.
and trans., I, text (Leyden and
cal Part of the Nuzhat al-Qulfb, G. Le
Strange
.Hamdullah
London, 1915), P. 27; and II, trans. (Leyden and London, 1919), pp. 33 and n. i.
The Sassaniansobtained 420 million mithqils of silver, and the Mongols, 17 million
dindr-i rd'ij, or silver dinars. The mithqil used to count the Sassanians'revenue by
Ibn KhurdHdbih,Qazwini's source, was 4-25 grams; see G. C. Miles, "On the
Vatieties and Accuracy of Eighth Century Arab Coin Weights", Eretz-Israel, VII
(1963). The Mongols' silver dinar weighed I2.96 grams; see J. M. Smith, Jr., "The
Silver Currency of Mongol Iran", Journalof the Economicand Social History of the
Orient,XII (I969). Thus the Sassaniansobtained 1,785 million grams of silver, and
the Mongols only 220 millions.
The population data are not as firm as those of the revenue. I have used the low
estimates of the Iranian population of ca. 800ooto guess at the population of Iran
in the period just before the Mongols' arrival. The estimate may be too low, since
the period was one of a certain efflorescencein Seljuq Rum, CaliphalMesopotamia,
KhwarezmianCentral Asia, and in Georgia and Armenia. For the late Sassanian
period the estimate may be much too low. R. M. Adams, in "Agricultureand Urban
Life in Early Southwestern Iran", Science,136 # 3511 (13 April 1962) and TheLand
BehindBaghdad(Chicago, 1965), p. I 15, argues that the population of 'Iraq-i 'Arab
(in part) and Khaizistdnin Sassaniantimes was a great as, or greater than it is now.
If the population of SassanianIran was similarly large, then its decline by Mongol
times would have been on the order, not of 90 %, but 99 %.
71) Qazwini, op. cit., text, pp. 82-83; trans., p. 85.
72) Ibid., text, pp. 47, 75, 159; trans., pp. 54, 78, 156.
MONGOL MANPOWER
293
Azerbdyjin, rising from Io,ooo men and 50,000 people to 90,000 and
450,000, had grown nine-fold! Population growth was paralleled, and
is to a degree confirmedby the growth in the revenues of the Persian

Mongol government. Qazwini recorded 17 million silver dinars in
the revenue of ca.
1295,
rising to
21
million in 1304
73).
By 1312 the
revenue had reached 30 million dinars, having nearly doubled in only

two decades 74).
Such a growth rate is hard to march in ordinaryexperience. Iran's

population perhaps doubled between 18oo and 1914, and perhaps
nearly doubled again by 195675). Egypt, with the most rapid growth
of population in the modern Middle East, approximatelytrebled its
numbers in the 73 years between 1883 and 195676). It may seem
difficult to believe that medieval 'Iraq-i 'Ajem could rival modern
Egypt, to say nothing of Azerbdyjdngrowing three times faster still.
Nevertheless, such growth can be explained. The Mongols under
Hiilegii established a huge nomadic presence in Azerbdyjdn,with six
tiimens or 300,000 persons, and 'Iraq-i 'Ajem was chronicallyexposed
to the adjacentKurd and Lur nomads. These may well have replenished
the populations of these districts. Barth'sstudy of the Basserisuggests
that a very high rateof populationgrowth can be found among nomads:
The figures on present fertility seem consistent with those of the previous
generation; and in the period 1908-38 in which that generation was born, none
of the effects of modern medicine could yet have been felt, even indirectly,
in the nomad camps of Fars. One is forced to assume that a consistently high
rate of growth has been a characteristic of the tribal population in previous
times as well as today. The evidence from the living generations in the Basseri
campstoday-4.25 childrenper tent, and 7.2 personsper adultsiblinggroupsuggesta net growthfactorof at least 3 per generation,i.e. a treblingof the
nomadpopulationevery 30-40 years. This generalpictureis, furthermore,
not unique for the Basseri;superficialacquaintancewith neighboringArab
and Qashqaisuggestcomparablenaturalgrowthrates"7).
73) Qazwini, op. cit., text, p. 27; trans., p. 33.
74) D'Ohsson, op. cit., IV, p. 54375) Issawi, op. cit., p. 20 and n. 2.
76) Ibid. and C. Issawi, The EconomicHistory of the Middle East, 1800oo-14 (Chicago
and London, 1966), p. 373.
77) Barth, op. cit., pp. ii-16.
294
J. M. SMITH
Other cases show similar results. Joseph Birdsell, investigating

Australianpopulation questions, has provided evidence from studies
of isolated Tristan da Cunha, Pitcairn and Bass Strait islander populations, showing that, afterimplantationin these uninhabitedterritories,
they have approximatelydoubled in each generation,despite their very
simple economic and social circumstances,until the limit of the local
resourceshas been reached. He presents also the case of an Australian
aborigine family of one man and two women, who multiplied to 28
in thirtyyears,almost triplingtheir numbersin each of two generations,
while "wandering from place to place in search of food, and living
principallyupon black scrub kangaroos, which they sneak upon and
spear", and obtaining water entirely from the roots of local plants 78).
By comparisonwith growth rates of this sort, the suggested increase
in the Mongol population looks rathermodest. In two generations of
35 years each, the original 30o,000 Mongols could easily have produced
a surplus of 400,000 persons that would make up the numbers in
Azerbayj~n from 5o,ooo to 450,000.
Since the Mongols had doubtless calculatedthe nomadic capacity of

Azerbdyjdnfairly closely before assigning the six timensto it, increases
in the nomadic population beyond the original 300,000 would have
begun to produce imbalancesin the pastoral ecology, and would have
had to be removed from the pastoral sector, probably by a process of
sedentarizationakin to that described for the Basseri so clearly by
Barth. We can probably see parts of it. The five tf#mensof Mongols
mentioned by Qazwini as being supported by iqta' might be some of
these over-numerousnomads, now maintainedby the sedentarysector.
Others were probablyunable to avoid sedentarization,and were heard
from when the government attempted to collect the taxes (qaldn)
levied upon the non-Mongol sedentarypopulation:
Repeatedly, he (i.e., Ghizin) reprimanded the amirs, the judges (yarghzchis),
and the
(saying) that every time people come with complaints against
wazirs
and the mutasarrifs, they accept their words with haste; he indicated
the hdkims,
78) J. B. Birdsell, "Some Population Problems Involving Pleistocene Man",
Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology,XXII, Population Studies: Animal
Ecology and Demography (1957), pp. 47-69.
MONGOL MANPOWER
295
that it was possible that those people had not given qaldnbefore then and had
placed their burden on others, that the hdkim brought them into the qaldn,
and that such people naturallycomplained79).
Because the Mongols had demolished the previous population of

Azerbdyjin,therewould have been few obstaclesto this sedentarization,
and even advantages in it. SedentarizingMongols would not have
found themselves in the straits common to most failed nomads, who
enter an establishedand often alien society and economy at the bottom,
as agriculturallaborers, without land or other assets, and who suffer
there an unusually high rate of attrition. The Mongols could avail
themselves of the lands emptied by their earlier campaigning, and
from the time of Ghdzin could do so with the encouragementof the
Mongol government, which was trying to redevelop agriculture. In
Azerbdyjin, moreover, they would have benefitted both from the
sponsorship of Nature, which enables much of the region to be dryfarmed, and from the clement climate of the nearby Mongol government, which, as seen from the taxpayers'complaints and the grants
of iqtd', tried to support its constituents. Conditions thus favored a
rapid replenishmentof the sedentarypopulation.
The bulk of this new, ex-nomad population would have been
Turkish. The Mongol regular forces in the Middle East and Russia
contained substantialnumbers of Turks, so that the linguafranca, and
soon the language itself in these forces was Turkish. The Mongol
court in Iran used Turkish by the time of Oljeitii. The evidence that
shows the ruin of an older population and its replacementfrom among
the conquerors thus also helps explain the transformationof Azerbayjdn'spopulation from Iranian to Turkish. This process is usually
representedas startingin the eleventh century,with the Seljukinvasion.
But the conditions that would have favored Turkification,almost ideal
in the Mongol period, do not seem so ripe in Seljuktimes. The numbers
of Turks coming into the Middle East with the Seljuks do not seem
very large, perhaps tens of thousands rather than hundreds of thou79) Rashiduddin/Jahn, p. I8o. Translation by F. Schurmann in "Mongolian
Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,

19 (1956), P. 333 and n. 61.
296
J. M. SMITH
sandsso) (as in the Mongol period), and not all of them went to Amerbiyjin. Those who did go there probably could not establish themselves as comfortably and productively as did the Mongols later, and
probably could not clear the way for advantageoussedentarizationin
the drastic Mongol manner. The sedentarysociety of Azerbdyjdnand
the adjacent regions of Eastern Anatolia and Transcaucasiasurvived
the arrival of the Turks, making arrangementswith the Seljuks81)
and paying taxes (and very substantialsums by Mongol standards!)82),
or fighting persistently for independence8s). Because of this the pastoral potential of the Mughin steppe and the Aras and Kura valley
lowlands, and the Qaribigh, Aldtdgh and Savildn highlands probably
could not be fully realized, and the Turkish nomads had to rely more
on predation in Ruim than on pastoralismin Iran. Their population
surplus was probably too small, and their sedentaryopportunities too
limited for them to effect much Turkificationin Azerbdyj5n.
Lambton
80) C. Cahen,Pre-OttomanTurkey(London, 1968), p. 33; and A. K. S.
znd
ed.
in "Iran", Encyclopaedia
Islam,
of
81) For details of the relations of the local dynasties of Azerbdyjin, Rawwidids of
Tabriz, Shaddddidsof Ganja, and Shirwdnshdhs,with the Seljuks, see C. Bosworth
in the Cambridge
History of Iran, V, pp. 44, 62, 94-95 and passim.
claims that the revenue of Azet82) Qazwini, op. cit., text, p. 75; trans., p. 78,
bayjdnin the Seljukperiod was the equivalent of nearly 20omillion of the Mongol
silver dinars. Since he calculated that one Seljuk gold dinar (which he doubtless
dinars
equated with the current mithq l of 4-32 gm.) was worth 2-1/3 Mongol silver
a
revenue
be
to
he
seems
text
figure
Seljuk
trans.,
reporting
27;
34),
p.
p.
(ibid.,
of about 8.5 million Seljuk gold dinars. Ca. 133 5 the Mongols derived some 10.9 mil-
lion silver dinars from Azerbdyjdn;of these, some 8.7 million came from the Tdbriz
and z.z millions from land taxes, etc.: ibid., section 3, passim.
tamghbd,
83) The Turkomans made headway into Armenia and Georgia only slowly
and only with Seljuk support before 1071. During the reign of Malikshah they
finally seem to have had full access to the pastures of these regions. Subsequently,
the Georgians made a graduate reconquest, which, by the late twelfth century, had
been extended beyond the frontiers of Georgia to Lake Van, Kars, and even Ardabil,
thus threatening and perhaps controlling the summer pastures of the Azerbayjin
the
region. See S. Vryonis, Jr., The Declineof MedievalHellenismin Asia Minorand
and
the
the
Eleventh
Processof IslamiZation
Through FifteenthCentury(Berkeley
from
Los Angeles, I971), pp. 283-285; and Bosworth, op. cit., p. 179.
C. Cahen, in "L'Iran du Nord-Ouest face a l'expansion Seldjukide", Milanges

Henri Massi (Tehran, 1963), pp. 68-69, gives information on resistance to the
Seljuks by the Muslims of Khoy.
MONGOL MANPOWER
297
IV
In conclusion, let us note some further implications of the results
arrived at above. We have been observing, first of all, the operation
of a very simple and effective Mongol administrativemethod in this
system of counting and organizing troops. The decimal organization
of the army enabled Mongol commandersto calculate their military
potentialand logistic requirementsclosely, since they knew the number
of their men and could assume that each soldier had a certainnumber
of mounts and a supportingfamily and herds of a certainaverage size.
The rules of thumb here were probably ten horses, a five-person
family, and ioo animals (in "sheep-equivalent"units) for each soldier.
ioo sheep was the basic herd establishingtax liability, and this, or its
equivalent in other animals, was probably required to maintain the
desired level of military effectiveness84). A tiimencommanderwould
thus know not only that he had ten thousand men to fight with, but
that he had to administerfifty thousand people and find pasture for
the equivalent of one million sheep. The system was also convenient
because the exhaustive enumerationsof adult males, and their organization into decimal units, taken together with these conventional
assumptionsabout their supporting families and herds, meant that the
Mongol rulersknew the numbers,not just of their armies,but of their
people, and could estimate their needs and assign them pastures and
other assets accordingly. Counting the troops in effect accounted for
everyone, and taking care of the troops resulted in caring for the
whole people.
And the calculations were simple. The Mongols clearly thought
very highly of their system of decimal organizationof the army, since
they impressed upon nearly every observer their sense of its importance, and caused it to be specially noted in most of our sources85).
At first glance it seems only a sensible, scarcely remarkableway of
organizing troops. But now we can see what else it accomplished,
84) J. M. Smith, Jr., "Taxation", pp. 68-69. SecretHistory, section 279.
85) Juwaini, op. cit., trans., I, p. 31 ; text, I, p. 23. Bar Hebraeus, op. cit., p. 354.
Polo, op. cit., p. 69. Plano Carpini, in Dawson, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
19
J. M. SMITH
298
how easily it worked, and why the Mongols were so pleased with it.
The whole manpower, and implicitly the whole population, human
and animal, was comprehendedin these tens (or at worst, fives) and
their multiples, and the Mongols could manage anything from a
squadronto a nation without needing accountantsto do their figuring
even needing to be literate 86).
-without
We see here also an index of the attachment of the Mongols to

Chingis Khan and his enterprise. The Mongols could all be counted
as soldiers because they could be counted upon to devote themselves
wholly to Chingis' wars. This dedication, which is seen also in the
Mongols' willingness to bear an exigent and incessant taxation, contrasts sharplywith the normalnomadic (not to say human)reservations
about conscription. Most governments have only been able to use
fractions of the nomads' manpower. The Japanese tried to recruit
one-sixth of the Inner Mongols' men during World War II, but the
Mongols held out for a mere one-tenth
87).
Even the Ottomans, with
an attractiveenterpriseof their own, seem only to have obtained onesixth to one-fifth of the men in their nomads' camps 88). Full, or even
heavy conscription, can only be applied appropriately in nomadic
societies under special conditions. Ordinarily, nomadic peoples live
in a state of greatinsecurity,of chronicinter-tribalrivalry,and, perhaps
more important, of suspicion and fear even between camps of the
same tribe and clan. Under such circumstances,most of the manpower
of the camps, clans and tribes is immobilized by the requirementsof
local defense. This manpower can only be drawn upon effectively
86) Mongolorganizationwas prefiguredby, andperhapsderivedby continuing
traditionfrom thatof the Hsiung-nu,describedby Ssu-maCh'ienin Records
of the
The
B.
Watson
GrandHistorianof China,
trans.,II (N.Y., 1961),pp.I 55-I192. Hsiungnu has 3oo00,000troopsarrayedin units of ten, a hundred,a thousand,andtenthousand(pp. 163-164). A Chineserenegade,Chung-hsingShuo,taughtthem"how to
makean itemizedaccountingof the numberof personsand domesticanimalsin
the country"(p. 170). And in peacetimetheirmen "had nothing to do" (p. 171)!
87) Personalcommunicationfrom SechinJagchidof NationalChengchiUniversity,Taipei,and BrighamYoung University.
88) H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Societyand the West I:1 (London,
1950), P.
5.
MONGOL MANPOWER
299
when unity of leadershipand purpose enables the suspension of these

doubts and defenses. When it does, it gives the united community a
great advantageover its disunitedneighbors. But unificationhas been
achieved only rarely,and on a large scale only once-by Chingis Khan.
Mongol successes were founded upon the military differentialthat
favored nomadic societies over sedentary,not only in the raising and
riding of horses, but in the capacity to bear conscription and pay
taxes. Chingis Khan had only to discern these capacities, learn how
to administer the hordes they provided-and interest the nomads,
all the nomads of Inner Asia, in exercising them. He had only to
transmuteconscription, like taxation, from liability to opportunity.

Mongol Manpower and Persian Population

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Mongol Manpower and Persian Population

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Mongol Manpower and Persian Population

Author(s): John Masson Smith, Jr.

JOHN MASSON SMITH, Jr.

and Russia, "a hundred thousand conquering a hundred million" 5).

7) D. Sinor, Inner Asia: A Syllabus(The Hague, 1969), pp. 37, 49.

men. H. D. Martin (in The Rise of Chingis Khan [Baltimore, 1950],

"forest peoples" in 1207, two tiimensof Oyirad and Kirghiz, and

of the report in the SecretHistory,there is an apportionmentof peoples

But these figures apply only to Outer Mongolia, as we shall see,

io) Section 239.

a reorganization of the Mongol territories and a redistribution of

(3 vols.: Leyden and London, 1912

6, 1937), III, p. 90.

The number of Mongol troops is also reflected in their "order of

the sources--thirteen in this case 21). More commonly, the number of

Ilbasmish, Chichek, Qurumshi and Qurbagha in the Center; and

zo) Haython, loc.cit.

for nearby Aaerbdyjdn,and those

or Inner Asian nomad troops, but the "Tdjik"or local Iranian,

distastefulsubject,since many-perhaps most-of them were Christians.

at work on similarcensuses from the time of the conquest of Khurdsdn

Isfahin ('Irdq-i'Ajem), and of Tabriz-Azerbiyjdn-offive tiimensin

up a force approximatingthe customary large total of three hundred

28) Rashiduddin/ Quatremere, p. 264.

Brosset, op. cit., pp. 548-549.

30) Ibid., p. 55T1.

Merkits have forces of comparablesize, so that the episode as reported

make up their full strength 33).

the regularityof their victoriesarguefor their efficiencyin military

Finally,the Mongolshad less causethan most to be troubledwith

armyof I227, but then have difficultyrelatingthis force to a credible

tenth of everything",and have reconstructedfrom this a Mongol

and almost a quarter of these live in Ulan Bator. This population is

men from perhaps half a million people?

The difficulty appears again in even more exaggeratedform when

GeorgianChroniclenoted, in the early nineteenth century the Georgian

have been so large. Obviously, something is wrong, either with the

would imply a total population of some 650,000, only slightly more

remarksthat the division of labor between the sexes is "highly elastic"

Here we see the Mongols as a people in arms, a regimented nomadic

The Mongol enumerationsof troops raisedfrom the sedentarypeoples

fifths of these would have been locatedin Mdngke'sOuter and Qubilai's

CentralAsia and the North Caucasianand South Russian steppe, and

to the RogozhskyChronicleandthe Chronograph

of the lateperiodof the Golden

The Chaghataidrealm was the approximateequivalent of the Tsarist Turkestan

G. Moseley trans. (Cambridge [Mass.], and London, 1966), p. i61.

the fifth portion underM6ngke's redistribution,althoughas mentioned,

There is a pleasing coincidence between this information and that

another figure, or figures: three hundred to three hundred and fifty

63) Polo, op. cit., pp. 310-31.

The conventional count of the forces of ChaghataidCentral Asia

"Mongol", probably largely sedentarypopulation. We do not have a

controlled Azerbdyjdn,'Irdq-i 'Ajem and Khurdsin in Iran. These

teenth centurystandard,there should have been two and a half millions.

The recovery of the population, at least in Azerbdyjdnand 'Iraq-i

is to a degree confirmedby the growth in the revenues of the Persian

revenue had reached 30 million dinars, having nearly doubled in only

Such a growth rate is hard to march in ordinaryexperience. Iran's

Other cases show similar results. Joseph Birdsell, investigating

Since the Mongols had doubtless calculatedthe nomadic capacity of

Because the Mongols had demolished the previous population of

Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,

C. Cahen, in "L'Iran du Nord-Ouest face a l'expansion Seldjukide", Milanges