Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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> j aoo 1000100 I 100-1 None
(l2) (8) II (4) (0)
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(J 2) _
Height (m)
Evacuotion Req jirerncnts
(No, of persons) ".".. """.
I
Potential Downstlcam Da-I
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1
I
DAMSiTEGEOLOGY PLAN
NOTE: GEOLOGY SiMf"dflEO FRO)...! ,;,VPO PLATE
"DAM"- I 19S:> DESIGN F:[PCRT
Nt: SAHD b
Veilture
CP. .... liiTE
- I)
PLATE 48
LOA;) "'TfH HO
.LUlo'il.H..t - l,;A,H:
ROCK OiTCh,
(
PP.E G['TI'.QU8:, DRY SEASOI, SHOP,ELlI
(EL .... O t)
SHORE llHf. OF GEIHQUet. R[SilVO)R
(EL 56:+:)
ZONE Of DEEP WEATHE.":IHG
u:'\;c
FAULT SHf.A" ZOriE
(GENERU-lY R'::t::ONSOLIOATEO)
SY!!>BO'ce?
LEGEND
I T
CIPM Yangtze Joint
. MARCH 1988 J
UAOf'ikO
." ..."
N
1r
[---
I
'/
THREE GORGES
Appendix A.5
PR00ECT FEASIBILITY REPORT
HEJGHT OF WAVE (m)
100
80-
r
I
"
--
!2 16 20 2'4 27
60
B
\
0'
x
40-
\
c
C CL
<lJ
<lJ
::J
..c
..c
0
N
,-
0
U
::J
0
0'
0
c
.c
-
0
If) N
:;:;: If)
@-\
--------
24 20 16 12 8 4 Xintan 4 8
DISTANCE (km)
A - Calculated wove for 16 x 10
6
m
3
entering.reservolr
(Water Level = 150m) at lOOmis
8 - Physicol model test result for 16 x 10
6
rn
3
entering reservoir
(Water Level = 130m) at 67 mls
C - Observed wove from June 12,1985 slide with 1,6x 10
6
m
3
entering reservoir
(Waier Level = 66m) at 31 mls
JIANGJIAPO I_ANDSLIDE
RESERVOIR WAVE ATTENUATION
Volume 4
THREE GORGES PROJECT FEASIBILITY REPORT
TABLE 1.1 - THREE GORGES RESERVOIR STORAGE
Appendix A.6
-" - -------
-------------.- ---
LEVEL (m) (km
3
) LEV El_ (m) (km
3
) LEVEL (m) VOLUi,IE
(km
3
)
---_.. -_._-
110 4.60 140 14 .70 170 34.40
111 -
4.75 141 15 .16 171 35.32
112 4.91 142 15.62 172 36.27
113 5.09 143 16.09 173 37 .23
114 5.29 144 16.57 174 38.22
115 5.50 145 17 .06 175 39.22
116 5.7= 146 17 .56 176 40.25
117 5.98 147 18.07 177 41 .29
1U3 6.24 148 18.60 178 .36
119
6 ,- 1
149 19.14 179 43.46 ::J
120 6.80 150 19.69 180 4
1
1.57
121 7.11 151 20.27 181 45.71
122 7.43 152 20.87 182 46.87
123 7.76 153 21 .48 183 '13.06
12
1
1 8.10 154 22.10 184 /19.28
, ,) 1-
8.45 155 22 .74 185
')0.52
L:J
126 8.81 156 23.40 1136 51 .80
127 9.17 157 24.0(3 187 5:3 . 10
12Ll 9.55 15Ll 24.77 188
.43
129
9, 159 25 .118 189 55.80
'\ .--,,/"\
10,33 160 26.20 190
5;' .20
! j ')
131
10. :; 3 161 26.94 191 . b3
132 11 . 14 162 27 .70 192 60.10
, l. ')
11 .56 163 2Ll.47 193 61 . GO
1 J.J
13
/
+
11 .99 164 29.26 194 63.1
135 12 .42
1 C' C
30 . en 195 64.72 .0 :J
136 12.87 166 30.90 196 66.33
137 13.32 167 31 .75 197 67 .99
138 13.78 168 32.61 198 69.68
139 14.24 169 33.50 199 71 .41
..------------- -------_.----- ,---------"-----..-- ---------- - ------- -
4A - 1--- 2--
Table 1.1
THREE GORGES PROJECT FEASIBILITY REPORT
TABLE 1.2 - GEZHOUBA RESERVOIR STORAGE
A.6 can't
LEVEL VOLUME
(m) (krn
3
)
60 0.14
I
4A
62
64
66
68
70
-- 1--3 --
o. 1 9
o.25
o.31
o.37
0.43
Table 1.2
A.6 con't
The difficulty of achieving this schedule Is
discussed In Volume 2, Section 4.4.2 and Is
common to aJi altematlves. It Is CYJV's opinion
that wn:h adequate equipment, preparation and
training of key f)BrsDnneJ it is to construct
the RCC cofferdam within the time allotted. There
will bB no difference in the common construction
problems PDsBd fOf any alternative.
Proposals fOf different tyPBs of cofferdam are
mentioned In Section 8.1 of this volume. However,
thes("1 options would restrict navigation capacity
during construction and have not boon considered
for this feasibility study.
.2 Right Bank Intake Dam and Powerhouse
scheduled for competlon by the time the reservoir
Is raised to Its intermediate level of EI130 in JUly of
Year 12.
The excavations for the permanent shipi(s
(23 379 000 m
3
for the YVPO Base Scheme) are
the most difficult on the project. They have very
high rock cuts that call for careful coordination of
SUppDrt work. The open-cut work will have to be
carefully coordinated with the underground
excavation.
The major drfferences in the prrnanent shiplocks
for various NPLs arise from changes in the height
of the head works, the numb! of locks and the
height of the lock walls. These are summarized in
the following table:
Dilm Oest CDp<l to Invert
t-----__ W;'-IL;'-I'... Lo
4
"Pk ..
YVPO Base 50 175 50 32.5 4D I 40 I 40 --.
I Ait. 1 50 185 60 32.5 I 40 I 40 i 40! --!
I All. 2 60 1 I 60 38 I 36 I 36 f 36 \ I
I .. __ J ..
The Increased length for five locks instead of fOlif
means more work but not more difficult work. While
construction of the permanent shiplock is a rnajor
undertaking there Is a time available for
construction even with an additional lock.
Lock Walls
H<light
----_._---_.,--------_._--------------------_...:
Head Worb
DCL NPL Arrangement
Construction of the right bank
Intake dam In Stage III Is
possible within the time
scheduled by YVPO. However,
the rlgtit bank PDwerhouse civil
construction and Installation of
tudJlnes and generators Is
JUdged to require the same
overall duration as the lefl bank
powerhouse, 47 months from
tilE) start of powerhouse civil
construction to opmatlon of the
first unit. This means a six
month extension of the
schedule fOf first generation at
the right bank p0Wertiouse and.
IS to all schemes.
18.3.7 Navigation Facllitleg
_... ._--- ----
.95
.76
.98
.88
l'
18.3.8 Schedule Risk
The probability of completing any phase of
construction on time has been estimated (see VoL 2
Section 5) and is shown below:
,...,...,.-.-.-.--.-.-.-----,
tliii
'------'--'--'----
Preparatory Phase- .98-
Phase r .
Phase.I!.... .
Ph.a.w< fli to<
Pro{ec1 .96
CumulaUv8 .'
ProbabiHty .87
Construction of the permarH:lnt shlplocks Is
. 1 TemPDrary Shlpock
The construction equipment proPDsOO by YVPO Is
surtable to build the temPDrary shlpock In the
avaiiable time. The CYJV recommendation to
Increase the range of operating levels, would
require a gr8<lter volume of concrete to be paced.
This can be accommodated within the same
schedule and construction pan.
.2 Shlp/ft
Shlpift construction as scheduled by YVPO for its
Base Scheme Is Judged to bB practicable but not
economic. The CYJV alternatives do not Include
a shlpHft. ThIs Is dlscussBd In Sec1lons 8 and 12.
.3 Permanent Shlpocks
Volume 1 - 18-6 -
A review of the nood control analysis of the erDA Feasibility Study of the Three Gorges Project
Philip B. Williams Ph.D, P.E.
Although most of the economic benefits claimed for the proposed Three Gorges Project are
forelectricity generation, in the public arena the dam's advocate have claimed flood protection as the
pri mary need for the project. It is freq uen tl y stated that unless the dam is bui 1t, catas trophic flooding will
occur downstream on the middle reaches of the Yangtze floodplain, affecting millions of people.
The feasibility study's role, therefore, is to provide an objective and systematic analysis of the
changes in flood risk provided by the dam and to demonstrate that the project would be the most cost-
effective approach to providing additional flood protection. For a project of this magnitude - one of the
world's largest civil engineering projects, which can potentially affect hundreds of millions of people - it
is reasonable to expect that such an analysis would be accurate, use the best available techniques, and
havc a consistent methodology.
Unfortunately the study does not achieve these goals, for the following reasons:
I . EUIVir:&C2LtIJC:J2LQjl;;.i,;J jSj1Ji Srevu:se J 1 K ~ t
In the summary of the feasibility report (Yol 1 sections ].2 and 1.4.4) which is presumably
written for funders and key policy makers, it is stated that the project's main flood control function is to
protect 20,000 km2 of downstream floodplain inhabited by 10 million people. But throughout the study
there appears to be confusion over the main flood control goal; for example, in the volume summary (Yol
4 p 1) it states that the project "can provide flood protection to approximately 1 mil1ion km2"; but
elsewhere (Vo] 7 p 1-21) it states more precisely that the "primary flood control objective of the project
and its operation must be to guarantee the integrity of the major dykes protecting the Jingbei Plain and the
Jingnan Region" - an area of 6700 km2 (see Vol 7 table 9.2).
1
The computed flood benefits described in the detailed technical analysis do not substantiate even
the least grandiose of these statements. In the benefit analysis the average reduction of flood area is
claimed to be about 4000 km2 (Vol 7 fig 1.4) but this nurnber itself can be misleading. About three
quarters of the benefits claimed for the project are attributable to the reduction in the frequency, anclnot
the elimination, of flooding of just three areas - two overflow diversion areas and thefloodway area
adjacent to the river channel between the dykes (referred to as beach areas). Only about 10% of the f10exl
benefits are attributable to protecting the highly populated Jingbei Plain and Jingnan region (Vol 7 table
1.5) yet the flood control storage and operation is designed specifically for this 10% (Vol 7 P 1-10).
Only a detailed reading of the study reveals that the project goals and operational design of the
project are not as stated, but instead to upgrade protection for the Jingbei and Jingnan regions from the
current 250 year level to lOOO year f]oodlevel (Vol 7 p 9-10, table 9.2). This means that the flood control
operational design is not based on an objective benefit/cost analysis, but on a subjective judgment that
these areas require levels of protection higher than the 250 year flood (Vol 7 table 9.2).
2. 1.J n
The feasibility study has recommended an opel'ational plan for the dam that establishes the
,U110Ullt of flood flows released and stored based on dowilstrealll flood levels (Vol 7 section 8), 'ro
achieve the flood benerits cLlillled ror the project means that this operational schedule will have to bc
rigorously followed - particularly during large floods.
Actual operating experience or large multipurpose reservoirs during large floods indicates there
can be substantial deviations rrolll prescribed operating procedures, resuHing in greatly reduced flood
benefits, In common with these other projects, the Three Gorges design has flood control operational
cri teria that:
2
CQjlflicL}VitlL12Qwer j2Loduction _QQeration. Because power production provides cash
revenue there will be strong institutional pressure to operate the dam to maximize power
generation by delaying emptying of the reservoir for flood control or keeping the
reservoir higher than required to maximize power head. In fact the feasibility study
already acknowledges that the operating criteria may be modified once the project is
completed, to increase power generation at the expense of flood control (Vol I p 11 14).
Such changes are not reflected in the analysis of benefits.
CoUDicU'IiltLiJo\:VnstrC:_ilLlLQevelQprnenJ,.c Most of the flood benefits claimed for the
project result from growth of development in the river channel and overflow diversion
areas. During major floods dam operators frequently disregard operating rules and fail to
make required releases when faced with the certainty of flooding downstream property
versus the uncertainty of later catastrophic flooding. This can substantially reduce flood
con tro] effecti veness .
alj sti c: s Actu a1operati ng exper icnce sh0 ws
that when large floods occur there is a substantial risk that designated spillway release
capacity IS not achieved because of operator errors or malfunctions of the spillway (e.g.
the e/.pericncl' with Tarbela or Glen Canyon). 'rhis too can substantially reduce flood
control storage and flood benefits.
However, the most significant operational
problem not recognized in the study is that the Three Gorges project is unlike any other
flood control reservoir because about 500,000 people will be living in the designated
flood control storage space of the reservoir (Vol 7 appendix F tabl.c 5.1). Only people
living below the 162 meler power pool level will be relocated, and therefore everyone
between level 162 and 182 will be inundated by the storage of floodwater in the
3
reservoir, as well as additional hundreds of thousands affected by backwater upstream to
Chongqing. This means, for example, that in the event of say a 100 yearflood the dam
operators will have to choose between flooding out large numbers of people living in the
reservoir or large numbers of people living in the river channel and overflow diversion
areas downstream. In fact the analysis indicates that for such a flood more people may be
flooded in the reservoir than downstream (Vol 7 table 9-4). Whilst it is hard to predict
rational decision-making in these circumstances, it is likely that the operators will weigh
the certainty of reservoir flooding more heavily, meaning that larger flood releases will
be made, negating many of the claimed flood benefits.
3. ,walysis of flood le_'{<:JS-
The most important parameter that determines flood risk is the height of water against the lowest
point of the dyke, For large rivers like the Yangtze with a complex flow network, diversion areas,
floodplain lakes and large tributary flows, the water surface during a flood will not have a flat slope at a
particular flow rate but one that varies in time and space, As is recognized in the feasibility study (Vol 7 P
7-1), hydrodynamic models can be used to simulatc the water levels, but were rejected for this analysis
because "the accuracy of the input data is much beyond the scope of the present study". Presumably the
input claw referred to is detailcdmapping of downstream ch;mnel gcomctry, Instead of using a
hydrodynamic model an analytically crude flood routing model is used for project design, simulating
water levels at only 12 locations on thc more than SOO km reach of river downstream by modeling the
river as a series of reservoirs, This model therefore cannot be used to identify the times and locations
along the river where the progression of the flood flow would first overtop the dykes, Use of such a model
in a developed country would not be acceptable for flood benefit analysis.
The validation prescntcd for this flood routing model is not'convincing and shows a discrepancy
between observed and computed flows during the flood peak of about the same volume as the total flood
storage of Three Gorges (Vol 7 fig 7,3). The report acknowledges that the main reasons for this
discrepancy are hydrodynamic effects (Yol 7 p 7-8) but nevertheless concludes, "the model representS
reasonably well" the river flows (Yol 7 P 7-10). Even if this were true the direct translation of flows to
water levels throughout the river using this model would be subject to substantial error. The importance
of accurate water level predictions is emphasized in the study, which notes that even a 20 cm change in
water level against a dyke can mean 20% change in flood benefits (Yol 7 p 9-32).
The usc of a flood routing model instead of a hydrodynamic model means that there are likely to
be substantial errors in the project flood control operational design. In addition key hydraulic factors
affecting flood risk, such as backwater effects and channel characteristics, are underemphasized because
they cannot be siniulated in this model. This is likely to mean that flood benefits achieved by upstream
storage wi]] not be as large when all these other factors arc considered. It can also mean that it is possible
that the operational design could in some circumstances increase flood risks in some areas because the
model cannot predict where the flood peaks are likely to first overtop the dykes.
4. Flood benefits exaooeraled .. .. ____ __ .._ ..__. _
The inadequate flood analysis and unrealistic operating assumptions would both tend to
exaggerate flood benefits of the project. In addition, two other major assumptions have been made that
greatly exaggen\te the value of the flood benefits:
(Yol 7 p 1-16). Such an incrl:ase in real terms over the next 60 years for land that
wi]] continue to be for overflow diversion and "beach" areas downstream is highly
questionable, as it is highly unlikely that such an investment would be made in locations
that renrain flood-prone. In fact some flood agencies in the developed countries regard
the usc of any future growth in flood benefit analysis as conjectural and invalid.
Dse of the S,lrne economic grQwth rate;,s with and witho,ut the darn. One of the basic tenets
5
of flood management planning is that flood damage potential and the type and value of
land use are closely related. Obviously people prefer not to build in flood-prone areas and
if they do they are likely to flood-proof their property. These actions greatly reduce the
flood damage potential in the "without project" alternative, and hence the net benefits
claimed for the project. If, for example, the growth rate without the project was 40% of
that with the project, total flood benefits would be zero (tompare Vol 7 tables
9.3 and 9.5).
This calculation illustrates a fundamental planning error that permeates the flood control
analysis. By failing to clearly define the primary goal as flood damage reduction and
instead focusing on flood control (which is merely one tool for flood management) the
project designers have built in a methodological flaw. They have failed to analyse the
flood management of the Yangtze as a complete system that incorporates not only
"plumbing" but also hydrologic, geomorphic, social and economic factor's.
It is interesting to note that the study only recognizes people's rational response to flood
hazard when it calculates flood darnages to property within the reservoir (Vol 7
appendix F p 2-4).
S. PrQject CostUgU,Qxed
Even disregarding the necessity for relocating all the half-million population between the power
pool and flood control pool level, which in itself could increase project costs by at least 20%, if any
realistic flood control operation is to be carried out several other significant project costs have been
ignored:
BackwaterJlo_Q<:LQ11mages upstLean_L The analysis of flood damages due to flooding of the
city of Chongqing by backwater froni the reservoir docs not take into account the
(3
increase in river stage due to sedimentation. The feasibility report (Vol 1 p 11 10)
acknowledges the problem but claims a "critical" flood stage of 198 m whereas the flood
control analysis shows damaging flows to occur at elevation 186 m (Vol 7 appendix F p
2--1). With even the optirnistic assessment of upstream sedimentation contained in the
study, the 100 year flood level will rise at least 1-2 m within 30 years, affecting hundreds
of thousands of people in the city which has a total population of about 4 million. It
appears that the report recognizes this omission as it claims "future upstream reservoirs
and conservation measures" would reduce sediment deposition. Neither the cost of these
reservoirs or measures nor the cost of incremental flood damages in Chongqing are
included in project cost.
Cost downstream Although the deleterious effect of the clearwater
flows eroding the downstream dykes is acknowledged, the feasibility report claims these
problems will be managed by constructing river training works and dredging (Vol 1 p 11-
11). These costs, which can be ex tremcly large, are not included in the benefit/cost
analysis.
__(;QastaLC:IQ,'iiQJl-. Unfortunately the feasibility study has not
analysed the role of reduced flood flows, and the capture of sediment, on shoreline
erosion and flooding dcnvnstream. At least 500 km of low-lying shoreline south of the
Yangtze River mouth depends on the extensive rnudflats onshore for protection against
coastal flooding. These mudflats are supplied by the sediment discharged from the
Yangtze. The costs of additional shore protection are not included in the benefit/cost
analysis.
6.
Because the primary goal of the study has been defined as flood control rather than flood damage
7
reduction, the importance of other components of the flood management system have been neglected. For
example, it is clear that with or without the project the existing dyke and diversion system provides
substantially greater benefits than flood control storage upstream on the Yangtze. Flood storage in the
floodplain lakes and diversion areas downstream is aboLlt 200 km3 as compared to the project's 31 km3.
Unglamorous alternatives that combine upgrading of critical dykes, modifications to overflow
areas, provision or refuges and perimeter dykes, flood proofing, noocl warning and appropriate zoning
were not examined. The feasibility report states that a long-term program of flood control works
improvements is already under way (Vol 1 p 16-3), but does not present this as an alternative nor discuss
how this affects the benefit/cost ratio. In particular, the study appears to have a somewhat contradictory
aversion for assessing the benefits of even small improvements in the dykes. On the one hand it states
without substantiation that it "would be uneconomic and impracticable" (Vol 7 p 1-2); on the other it
states that a 20 cm increase in height of dykes can increase flood benefits by 20% (Vol 7 P 9-32).
One important alternative component of an improved flood management system that was
investigated was the provision of ring dykes and refuge centers. The analysis concludes that "protective
dykes could be justified if the ilJ1nual probability of flooding is more than 1.5%" (Vol 7 appendix G p I
2). This means thill such measures arc cost-effective alternatives for the three diversion and beach areas
which provide most of the project's claimed flood benefits (sc.c Vol 7 table 9.2). This important
alternative analysis is relegated to an appendix and is not even mentioned in the study's summary of
alternatives (Vol 7 table 4.1).
Non-structural measures such as development restrictions in flood hazard areas can greatly
reduce f10exJ damages. This is recognized but only considered in justifying flood benefits in the reservoir
(Vol 7 appendix F p 6-1), Development restrictions that limit growth in the .overflow diversion and beach
areas that would limit growth to less than 40% of protected areas would negate all flood benefits for the
project.
7. Faihlfe to consider costs of potential catastrophic failure
The study implicitly claims that the Three Gorges project will prevent major loss of life in an
extreme flood such as the 1000 year event. Thus there is repeated emphasis on the catastrophic
consequences of failure of the Jingjiang dyke, the major upstream dyke that protects about 2 1/2 million
people (Vol 7 p 2-3) and thefloocJ control operation of the reservoir is orientated towards managing water
levels to prevent its failure, even though the probability of flood damage is much larger in other areas.
A systematic impact analysis of the project would indicate that such benefits are likely to be
negated, and in fact the potential for loss of life could be greatly increased, for the following reasons:
Increased failure of clownstrearn dykes. There is likely to be an increased incidence of failure clue
to the downcutting of the ri ver-channel undermining the banks (Vol 1 p 11-1). The
inadequate level of analysis of this vitally important impact is illustrated by the statement
"channel morphology should not change significantly because the dykes that presently
border the river are in many cases protected by rip-rap" (Vol 1 p 16-3). The problem of
increased undercutting and erosion is likely to Ix compounded by the daily peaking
power flow fluctuation of between 3200 and 12000 cubic metres/sec. As important as the
physical impact, is the institutional impact of the project. 'J'he construction of the dam is
likely to take funds that might be allocated for upgrading and maintaining these levees. In
common with the history of other flood control dams the perception of improved flood
protection is likely to lead to reduced maintcnance and deterioration of downstream
levees and other flood management infrastructure.
Potential failure of the dafl} As is discussed in a later chapter, the risk of catastrophic
failure of the project as presently planned is probably of the same order of magnitude as
the 1CXX) year flood. Although no dam feli lurc inundation map has been prepared, the
potential loss of life would number in the mi1lions. Property damage would be so large
that even with a 1 in 10,000 year failure probability any flood benefits claimed for the
dam would be negated.
to settle in hazardous areas. Although the study recognizes
the presence of dykes can create a false sense of security leading to higher mortalities
when they fail (Vol 7 p 4-4), it has not applied this same relationship to the presence of
the clam itself. 'rhe analysis of benefits makes it clear that additional population is
anticipated to settle in flood-prone areas. What is not discussed is that these areas wi]]
inevitably become more hazardous over time as the reservoir silts up and the active flood
control space is reduced. Decommissioning costs have not been included in the analysis
so it is likely that as siltation occurs the operation would be modified to maximize
protection against smal1er floods. This leads to a scenario where cities and towns have
been built up in what were thought to be protected areas, ring dykes and refuge areas
have been long neglected and a lOOO year flood occurs, which the dam is no longer able
to control. Inevitably the loss of life in such circumstances is likely to be greater than if
the clam had never been built.
10
N
X
tD
:J:1
'D
'D
(D
:=>
n
';-.J.I
97;) .
531-
20
24
22
130
395
:,4i)
3 944
872
28
032
42> 140
68 323
17 649
I 16
r ri t I i) : i:) y Ud n x 1() G/ km} '-In(j
-5'4
.. 0
I. 16
3.31
0.33
0.06
0.1'::
0.0
C. i .5
9.0
0.. 0
os
I () . () /
9 j \/
1" 13
1.98
5.20
9.62
4,,39
4.28
0.52
0.43
0.07
0.2"
12" 17
10.0
98.00
in Reservoir
P j cd n
I .. Floo.1ing for l1ot-hor-1! Gench !\:O<:''::.
PLOOD ARr.-A S
,A,roa Flood Damages
J I n 9 bo i
Jlngnan ion
Honghu Dlvers!on
Dongtlng Diversion
XII longhu
Sanzhou I! 11n Beoch, ;\<811
Other Beach Areas
l
Dongting Protocted Area
Jlngjlanq
Jingjlong Diversion
Renm i nduyucn
Jlngjlong Extension
Huxishangong
Shangbo I ! i zhou t3'3ach Area
Other Beoch Areas
Sub to t a I
Reduction
Chonoiing]i Roolon
Tf-P EE (J".:R(XS PROJ ECT Fti\ S [8 [ LI TY REPCR T
TABLE 1.5 - FLOCO CDf{THOL llff.f'f'ITS DYAnE}, ["elf'!, LOW NiD HIGi GF'<OliTH SCEN.-\RIOS
Il_iTY OF HiG,J1 CROWTH
i D i SCOUrrr ED
FL000 DAY,AGE 0 I seOUNT ED ;: LOC)] D,'}1AGE DISCOUNT ED
w\T'>10JT 'r{\TH REJYI)CT\C)H POTEt,{TI,A.L FLOC{) P01ENT1AL r'LOCXJ
IvY"'" "f)'" (v"""'c" '06 106 Ir6 '06
IIl--r\tt. 0Jr\"..Jl.:J i:- yu,Jn >< l' yucn x I yuan x ,0 yuan x I
1 1 (,",) (S) (A,) x (8) C::::) (A,) x (C)
_.-
9.2eo lH,) 340 15304 I 467
4.37 j 79<1 233 8 470 412
o /) 6U 1 8 2 81 2 13
1. 0 7 84 5 10 i 4 6 5 ] 6
1.80 ) 17i 57 295 77
59.00 14.3 24.1 1422
0.. 07 j 10 :167 78 150 526 106
0.52 61 3i9 828&J 431
2 389
3.12 20 56" 641
0.53 32 977 191
3 685 9
1 .. '} 'j 1,02 J ({
1.0 17 17
O. I I iJ'j C)CJ.1 96
963 I 943
3357 t I 5887
, , " 63 II I 84 \
I : I i 'I II b
l
Expoctf.;d i j()()d Controi! I I) ---.---- 1 ----
, Ii>2' I - r c-
, Be ne fit s : , i' ) 4 0 I I) I L ::J
I I_L I ._ ,L ,,_ _ -L- _
NOTE:
---.J
<
o
c
:3
re
l--'-
j
N
In
LT1
-1
IlJ
0-
re
THREE GORGES PRO-JECT FEAS1BILITY REPORT
Appendix B.4
" ....
\
'"
08S ERVED FLOWS
. .... "\COMPUTED FLOWS
YANGTZE RIVER
AT LUOSHAN
., ....
2>0 .....
50
70 -
40
80 -.,.----.----------------------------------,
W
l5
a:
<i:
I
U
V1
a
. " ,.,
E
8
o
20
10
o -1-------,.--------,--------,-----
MAY JU,>,E JULY AUGUST SEPT
8 0 ..,.-- -----..---- -..--..--.- ----.----------..- ..-- -----..- ..---..--.. ----..-- -.----.-,
DONGTING LAKE OUTLET
70 AT QILISHAN
"
or,
E
o
o
o
60 -
50 -
OBSERVED FLOWS
'/ . /,
" I ....
,: \
:' \....... " .....-'
w 40
<.5
0::
g \.-
V1 <, 2>0
" , .......
a / . I '.'
f.) \ ..
" co MPUTE 0 FLOWS , "
MAY
o
---------r-------T----------J------
T JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPT
COMPARISON OF OBSERVED
AND COMPUTED FLOWS
YEAR 1954
-- 7... G
Volume 7
I
4 -- April 1992
Building a new
life
Appendix 8.3
Foe
4It
In
SKE'fCII ivlAP OF PLAN FOR lNtJNDATION,
RESErrLEMENT ,AND RELOCATION OF TOWNS
AND CITIES
l'r'}'.'Inci,ol
\.II)C l)f te,\Cnlcrncf1l
lnulld:llion line 0: o:ld,wJ.ler
20 year,
326 townsbips) 291 ow resettle their people
wilhin their townShips. Ooty 3S \owmhips
have to evacuale their people to nearby ones..
'Therefore, the adven.c impact brought aoout
by long-distance migration p,n largely be
avoided.
3, -D1C Three Gorges Project haJ a long (enn
o(cons(ruction, During the J8ye-.ars from the
preparation stage till complelion, therc will be
enough timc Lo arrange production and
livelihocxl [or the disp13ccd rc.siden15,
T1K most advantageous o[ all is lhal lhe
cenlral govefllrneflt has allached great im
portance to thc fescttlement issue, It has
revised the rcsCnkmefl{ polic.)' of a onetime
compcnslllion p<1c\.:age inlo a development
oriented rcs-cttlerncnt's.chemc. Sinc.e 198\ a
sp,ccial fund o[ 20million yu an (53,7 million)
a year tlas been cl1located 10 lhis end, It iJ a
never before enjoyed by thc Other
';.. rc..scrvoir arcas in thc country, Thc trial reset
tlemenl scheme Over the past .six years h.15
been succcs-,,{ul.
City. Togelher with ilS SUbordinate projec1.5,
it C-<ln create jobs (or more than 30)000
people. And marc peopk will be employed 3.., '
more projects will be set up if thc central and
1<X.al governmcn15 purpo.scfully do so during
the c.onstruction of the Three Gorges hydro-
pJWcr sUltion.
2. '1l1c displaced populaLion is relatively
dispcr.s-cd, with a big proyorlion being urban
populatIon. Th'e rcscltkment will be confined
to a narrcr"" strip of2,CXXJ blomelers along the
reservoir, For urban rc.sidenLs, it is only a
maIler Of'C\',ICU<1tion and emigriltion and rcs-
torallon o[ urb..:1Il funclions Y.ilhOtJlthe need
to cre-ate jobs. The 330,C(X) rural or
.15.S rx::rccl)t of the lotal displac-ceJ population,
ilccounl only for 2.92 rx-recfJt of the lOlal
f;,rming Ix)pulation i.-, tile 19 roufllic..\ and
their SUbmerged l.3nd is anI)' 2.56
perceot o{ the lotJI area, wilh 110,CXXJ,mu
being p,1dd)' or 2..3 o( {he tot,1!
paddy rlelds,
/'.\ctSlly perched On hillsides and mountain
.slopes, none o( tIle 32.6 and {ew
Yi!!;:ges will t>e cntirety under water. Of tlles-c
tial for devclopment. planllcd, part of thc
undeveloped land and low-yielding slopes will
tx: used through appropriille cultivation and
improvement to provide the 330,CXXl rural
people with onc mu e.aeh to grow cash crops
such as ornngc, le.(l, mulberry and medicinal
herbs, and half a mu each of high and slc.ady-
yielding farm field, This will ensure the
crnigrtlnl.s a stable means of livcliho::x:l and
wiJJ help them 10 prosper. -Bcsidc.:s, belween
the ebbing lines of 160 meters and 175 meters
there is an ebbing are.a of 160,C<Xl mu (10,666
he(1.3res) where {<lnncrs can grO\-'{ one crop in
; h-.: dry season '111cr( I:; :11..-.0 abund'H1l grazing
g:oui)(lln the rescrvoir :lreil!O develop stexK'
r;;.is:ng anel processing,
There will abo Ix: gcoJ fOf the
tXC1\lSC of the rietllourism resoureC$
the arca, ;llld the 0PIX)({Ullitics
bfouglll by the (orthcomlng development in-
dL:.>tncs of butlding m;l!erials, construclion,
and services to be promoted
,d0:1g with lhe construction of the super dilln
P(0)CCl
Resettling the rural areas
!ZC'_scllling (he 330,CX,X) farmen in tile r('--scr
voir Jrea mainly relics on lflC dc\'elopmenl O[
macro-agriculture, i.e., maling full ux o[ lhe
ri.eh <lgrieullural in the rc.:;.cr.... oir
.", .are<l to develop various bnds of fuming,
aquacu1lure <lnel animal breeding, proccs.sing
),':- o[ agriclJltufill <lnd stocK products, (lOU rural
a.nd t(N.11ship industries. In farming, it \\111
:r.nainly focus on the reclamation Ofw35tc !;wd
_grow. orange, lea, rnlllber0> mcJicinJl
t; r-' k . . b ., {d . } "2 . - IX .. -.. to' herbs and olhcr .:-'hlCh .are p,1r,
. . . fa erCJc{( e are [ 1(, .3}?OO <? . in/ing Eli B.adailg' '; titularly suiled to \he local conditions.
__ :-, L:
-- ..- --- ------- 1\1so, ullprexluctivc nclrls arc to ly,.:: 1m
proyed to allO'w f;lfmcrs to hJ\'c half 2 f)H! o(
stabJc and higl1')1c!ulng field per rXf5-0n [or
&f<1in produclion,
During Ihe fXlSl six years, ,:6 million yuan
million) been for the
development of terraced fklds and orange,
tea and mUltx:rf)', In 19 colllltie-s, 74,(D)
I11U (4,900 hcctarcs) of 1.1nd has been
reclaimed :1nd con,Qrueled, v,1th 47,700 mu
(3,ISD hcClarc.l) for grain, 38,100 rnu (1.,5\D
hecla res) for ortlngc..\ 930 mu (62 hectJrt.:i)
for !:0rnclo, 3,&XJ IDIJ (253 hcct:Ht.:i) [or teJ
and 5,7CX) nil] (380 hectJru) [or such fruits 2.S
' .. "){
..\N
Advant:lges
'nlt: Three (;ort;cs area is :Jbunc!i1flt ill tile .
reYiUrCC5 o{ 13n(( .1gricuitlJrc, animal
hus;l,lndry, pnxJuclion, min .
::'.,' :in<! in :lddirion 10 f,l(> ,
:I;\d prli'.'c,\.\!Ilt', ;lI\J
L" cnvjfonmen,a\ C-;'P;\cII:r' io
tic the lk.p\;lccd lXoP\c.
icrr;;.\ of 1;\1)(1 rc:;..')urcc, !>,w,'C)'S ;ltHJ ell
h:l\'l: tlla: there:He I)c:1rly 20
mu (lJ mlilioll hccl.'re.s) o( mount:lIf)
,\1;",:'<.'5111 I:,C 19 where arc
If) tx: rcsculcd, II) which lownsillps
:U-;<) 1111111Cn mu of
;,'''y ,W ix:r;:cnl o(
u:r<..'nt .: 26 mdll\,[) nlU (2S-J,fKX) hee
, j .,f ('\> it 1\;11 cd 1:1 nd ;\1 ( kr...... )'lc Id t ur;!Ccd
\l.l\::h rnCH)." thuc 1\;\ hlg p\lll'1l
by U
gcs ArCIl EcoloQlcIl.l Development Offlce
under1he Stale
The rc:>cll!cn1cnl of huge number!> of
peopk 10 be cll.\p!:Jccd by the construction of
the Three Gorge5 fcs.crvoir onc of
the cotic,! L,:>SUC5 In the project, and must be
wellconceived and pl,lnncd if the project is 10
b<: Cl(fICO oul
Under (he current.scheme of <I normal i'JS
meterdeep w,ller S[(Hage level, the reservoir
<lrfcc{ \9 and cIlle5 In Sichu<l11
;lnd JI \JL'>C I prO"'IIKC.\ o{ which twO II
(OUr,IIC':;, \.10 10>1,'0$, :n;; ((l\I,'nships and 1':'51
\\111 lx: entlrel)' or p,l[\l)' 1I1und:ltcd.
t\(;:,)((]I!)1', to;j \ 9HS survt:y, [he rx)PUI3110{) of
Ihe Mca W;lS "I?_'),500, W\(ll urban and
_1.12,60G rur;1[ residents_ An estimated
.1)(,,iXX) I1HJ (2J,I"JXJ hcct;lrcs) of clllllv;Hrd
1;lnd ',qll be submerged. If we laKe lOW ile
(ounlthe fX)pul:llioo grO\I,-1h rille over the la.st
20 .1'(,3rs, there WIll be ilS I1WO)';1S l,133,&X)
p..:op:e lO I'>\.' CV(lcUJlccl and rl'scltlcd
on .<.ueb ;\ rnas.. "-Ive -",(;lie
(lu:.;rncnl.<. thc of :hc regIon's cuI
11\':llCd tll)U scarcity, b;lC),:v.-ard e("Doomy ;l110
CdL.'c;ltion .- !;lrgely due to lhe abs-cncc of
StC1\C InvCSlmenl in the P;"L\l, Tne prolonged
in,:cCl-sion in implementing the project has
IJ further burden. Nevertheless, the
has ()\vn ;'\OV;\l1\'I);o not shilred by
reserVOirs In the countr)',
7 76'
) 0<)
1 2. 12 9. '6
I 1.6, 5.97
2. I' 7.20
1 1.96 7. ?8
I 1.91 J 22
I <.96 2. <0
I o. )0 ). 1.(
I 1.02 2.0)
1 ',- ,0 ? )7
I 6.0, 2.08
I 1).00 O ..{2
i
7. )0 0.5\
'.62 I '.27 '. )9
is 881
9 00
5''T\T
) .( 1 1
21;
507 HI< 1'821 ;721 201192'1 2) !198 <20 1110'9 15,,691'120, I' <9651 6'61111660 'I
, 79' 1 8') 0171 '" 102 1< f"O '67 61,2' 8) 99' I - - - .
T5TT : I '5'05 I TUT I ""9 ----rrs- I -Cf 16320T 16051
SOo j blj) I 019 I 1)0 'I )'1 <19 I ) 1 ,0 0" 22 210 01 098 I
, 1 I 7U I )9 I i 208 I 7) 7 '. 77 \ I ' I 25 n 2 I' 222 19 91 I
2892'--+-7-9-06-0-+-1-2-'-9-9-6-102199 I 1<) <) 1'27' 129 II :520951 212900 i
15 80.1. .() i.(,O 68 323 I I ,( I i I J., 295 ' 2-< 2.( 82 880
TT85' )9 710 10 252 I i 5)0 I 2 '90 i 1< I 09) I ", 87 526 '800 I 67 260 ,
5 610 I) 279 2' 266 1 6 296 I 2 99' 'I' 996 I ,22 I )2' i 9 I 67) i 91 )0 8)9 I 29 29' 'I 01 I I
o X) 5 9 7 10 , I) <) 6 I < 0 I' I I 90 2 , 600 I 0) 2 969 I 6 <) 0 'I 6 0< 00) I 5 60 I, 26 0 <2 I'
1 )) ,I
8>
TIT
,'>
16>
F i C.<_,.:j
HI;, to( i c
Hi GH
i' 528 II' 5<2 I i ': I 578 I 075 I
570 879, I "9 '22, 2'9 8 1 10 I 60 I 1 097 I 10<, 1<8 I' 8() 020 207 I
TIT TI3' "ITS'I' -m. TIS I 150 '5 I '6 I )I I 51 90 TI 188 T22
I <> I ) 25 )) 2 " 8 I 60 I 9< 0 : < 2) : ) 02 ) I ) 7 1 29 II 6 75
_,____ 16> I I 216 0561 10' I 6: ,7J 7J 15 i __0_'_7_J 00 19 I 7' '8
Hie ) 8> I 27811 0079 I ) '92 II )06 II b08' ,; II j{; I '10 <52 [ 199! 792 51)
I OJ i ..!..1X2. i I 8" I ) 002 I I I'7 I .g.:.2 ) I 22!l. -'.Q.'!. ' .:E
, TIl I 88) 1 TI5IO I Ti0 i )00 I 25': 1 lJ' I nl9 I)) I 1'6 6' I 250 162
[ 1'5 I 5,0 i 6) I 066 I 006 I 106 1 ; : D 00 8,9 L 82 I 90 I 09 ! 15) 99
: I )n I <15 675 I __ __ ' '_'1L __"'-=-. )2 I ,5 I 25 i 97 60
I For Jlo9Jlong end Dongtlng A'tles. /}rl; in Ktr'? end demo-go potBntlQ]S cre In
/. For InlOri1\.Ctlon only.
3. ExcludIng ,j6"""Dges In r1S'$orvolr <lore".
..I, Th<; prob.::bility of floodIng elthe, Jing.'1<'ln or Jlngbol or t-0tr, 1<, pM yec.r. "'If
I t does itot r!'p,esent the 3ctu1 river ccurefely ..J<jl rD il"Hl btlt ..... ec,'
I avol" "ra (edU<&<:l llnd rho other Drtl Is uSuDi iy
i i
I H...:lJor Olve;:slon Ara..:!,> 1 ) .....,:,1 j"r
--->1 Jlncr I L I""
__ t_' un 0
\
19'> ) \ 1.2.
\ '!):) l 8.7
\ 9)'2 (12.7
19 :).( 9.2
i 9 '):) 8. ?, ..
19fJ! i 0.1
\ 968 1 1.0'
i 9 7D 9. Q(
I'fH 7.1.
1980 } 8,
1982 I 8:"
198;' 1 :> .( .
S """'0 I, I; H -1 -'--
,Cre-lh ![}ls.countl
1 R",tQ '
, '--L;---t e
! 105
i TLT
[ I, > I
I 16> I
I
I
l.
----J
\.0
W
Jl
w
(1)
-
-
D
r.T
---i
r
To to I t &(j-F 100d OO"\'lo-gf}'S. (yu",nx 106)
:Lo.... t.. \01 Ols.co...;nt
) t 098
19 91 I
22 2 I)
iJ. 222
1 ) i 0'<' 9
)6 05)
Prol.,ct.....j Arto>o",
25 912
1..0 )i.';'
198 .0\ 20
. 6') 20 I
2>
"
), : 9
27)
AI .... I
1.(! 1 102
t.. 6 ')
2; 1 92.( 721
7)7
I S6i.
i I
.") 171
l i 9
ioa
8.( )
) J,a2
59 I
':;"':1
, ,
6 ;
1 f,.C))
I I
5 7
.( 791.
J ......, i ) ", . ; : v ... . ) )., ( "(; <,
:.< )
n>
15 19 i
8 685
.. l,,,nUll'
li2
i 2 J..J ')
) 7 798
\ 9 2:>2
)6 G91
20 56'
'12 :-fi6
761.,
HonQ h U
J-l..'Jor () I v.,( '> I on Ar ">.,s
t:'4
1..:1
21>
'-1 O.l.)
: > B8:
j i ":--'9
51
1 ?
"1
161
101
19"7,(
1930
1982
198.\
5f),",p i '" AV"lr r:r:; I'l
HiS:o,ic flo-Od
n--i{f (.;cA(;f.S PX-.:.lJECT rf.ASiSIL1Ti ST\..Crr
TJ..8(. 9.5 Cff TOIN. DJ$.CI:.X.>(TE.D FLCXX) wiTH TtREE - 12 R:PRfS..t)<TAi;VE flOJO
0"'0' !Rowvol,j I i
Ji:'lq- \ 111""9- jn- SDflZr>OU- Oor-gting JIl"'><jno"" 1)r-<:j !Por:",.,tc;!Jlr.gJiorx; Tot,,1 1
fDongllng ,v
2
d"yu".' 'Ic
n
Plcl.' !" VAI09 i JI I ""9' I
'ifjrC"Jr.:-:;!\ SM"o'('lS i I
.. , , I I i
1931 00 i.25 e.!31 7.:'>0 )2 \;.Ot) i6 C.C{) 0.00 0.59 '\ SO \ 1..58 II .( 556 1 501...0\ I
\9;') I.).() 8.Q7 7. I.. i \ 5.00 :i. 0.00 0.00 0.62 I )/ I 591 I.. 769 1 5 )97 II
',952 '2. 0.') 7.)0 S7 ;2 O.CJ 0.00 0.20 'I 207 I 861 I ) 5./,) \ .( 615
19>' 0,91 1>,00 0,00 69 1>,00 Il 0,00 0,00 0,19 ( )8 I 991 I "0) I 5 <)) \'
19' i.I": 0.B6 ).')0 C. iP, O. is )1 .3.)0 6 0,00 0.00 O.C{) ( 306 I 091 950 7)1..
I ,
\962 0.1..9 I.G! D.7) '.).7' 'J.OO j) 7.;0 ;; 0.00 0.00 O.OC i \0) I ::)7)! 991 1667 I
\965 0.79 Y. G.7') O. 0.00)6 15.00 ! I 0.00 0.00 0.0-'> 1 i.0 577 I 1 6.(0 2 258 .
1970 0,00 0,06 7, l\ 0,00 0, 0,00 lO J. >0 j 0,00 0,00 0,02 I >2 5 i 082 I 670 I
0.9 1 0.')7 i.OO 0.00 0.97 )} 7.Yj ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 Jj7 6)0 9)7 705 I
0.09 2.20 \.)6 7.')0 0.09 i5.00 e 0.00 0.00 a.Db \ 90 218 J 891 2201 I
o 3.50 0.)2 ).')Q 0.1i. ?7 7.){) 0.02 0.02 0.00 j I.l,! 1.,91 1.>08 19,(1
')1) 0,62 I,)D ",JO 0, 0,)) 7,>0 u 0,00 0,00 0,0' I 1'0 8)9 I 205 [ 222) I
C,)' ",Do 0, )'1 10, 'I O,(y) 0,(0() 0, I) I '12 I 60) I 2272 I 2 991
f--- .--- -! .L .L- .. __'_ - ., , __ .__, " .. _'___,_ __' __' . --' ....., If--- Li----'-I '-- -j
Cu','" I'((NOI y"O" ,IOU, '0 .ld-loH7 I Tot,t Exooctod Flood 0",,"9"' I
:,c"'ntJ 10 ;::Ill r... ! 01'1 HIgh GrC"ofth I
1>0 \ I 00 I I 02 I I '020 I 0 691 I
JO ..( 80
---.<
---.<
<.0
<
o
c
:3
ro
Hi C""" 81
105
Ii!
1'1
161
1:\ 6\)<
'R)
'; ;, I 0
.( 3 1:..0
25 oJ))
I> 279
)2 \ 99
68
:'9 )10 10 ?BJ
2.< ?bCj 6 :9c:
Toto!
1) 51.?
'I I
I 9C2
DI SCOJIi
IS)
oS:
'";
6) .)
s,
6
(, ')
L'.2
;,u"r. x i 0
6
50S) i 1.:>
.( 19:' i ?
') i \ J.
1 ')14
969
7::>03 to
) )97
i 87?
09
b7)
d I sco...Jr. t (><j" ro
7'
"
1
27
, e) 826
8)9
d I
e2 880
.( B 04 j
29 29./,
12 9))
6 I 260
Chor.g-
I 109 JI
Rcog for.
ITO to i 'I
OO'llog.50
3
roc JI;'"\qjl'''{)9 "nd DonqlinG ;:;:,,,")101"' t3 ..
7 ;.
204 22 2
)0 i 26
te:
lJl
:::;
n
o
"
5 0'
CTii79 .1'..:::* **
I JJ) I
089
708 I
10 "21
) 228
I 976 I
I 209
) 985
2 2J 2
I )67
858
558 100
060
607
)67
2}1
I 851 8 260
>99 2 629
)68 I 608
2)6 ] 02 <\
26
)<
'0
76
1\0
87
202
--
'))
o
o
-'-
;Q6/ k,..,/.
I.. 6 i .(0
1}C' ) 87
il!!. I 1)1
7.5 ! 65
:"71 i 276
2! 0 i 279
;;:"(J
.3 j
.'..::)
i'
210
s
1) 7
'I
; I.. 'I De',
s 979
'),&,
10 962
] 6
16
2a
?5
52?! ] q
I 2\8 " )
7') 7 2.(9
.( /6 i ') 7
:> i 0 i 02
2 607 8E
I 5 \ S .(-58
926 799
2 70S 722
.( no \ I, 529
177
J..17
I I
91)
'98
289
2)8
" )
90
58
XJ
18
11
: 9
12
9)
5)
.3 i
8!
1
12)
1'1
161
-'-2L
12)
1"1
6i
... :iT f
---1
w
0-
ro
<.0
Ul
r or' In! a r- .... " r ! on on I y.
3. ,.,:: ,-;c>",.,ce$ i"
AFpendix B.6
THREE GORGES PROJECT FEASIBILITY REPORT
TABLE 2.2 - IMPACT OF JULY 1981 FLOOD AT CHONGQING
Peak Discharge: 82 600 mJ/s
Peak Stage: El 193.38
Peak StaSJe exceeded EI 1:30 fo(' i) days
POPULATION AFFECTED
Households
People
AGRICULTURAL LOSSES
Gr a i n I, ancl
I es
ot e [' Cr 0 pS
Urban
26 952
08 132
61 2
I) p'
I, J
1
]
99 'In l
il
., ,r-
270 ):Ll
u ra 1
528
915
Total
33 480
137 (jil/
Proelu c t ion
\.1000 kg)
628
rota 1
Total Loss
,IJ, 'I C [' (1 9 (: 1_ 0 S s
:3 U1L[) l ii (;
} .. -- ,.,.. . --, --, .._---" .. - , .. -...,- - ..,
/9 if 5 322
/ ]:-:8 000 yuan in 19i31
1 377 yuan/ha In 1981
Tot a 1:
!I vc (' aCJ e
190 x 10
6
yuan (IlC) cictJ) 1 s)
190 000 00O;ill d n :: lW6 y L1 an/ pe[' son
137 Oi)l in 1981
SOUf\CE: on "July 1981 Extra-orcJina Big F'lood in Cilongqing" by
ChonCJqing Floocl ConUo] Office, i'1aJch 19136.
7F
_ J ....
I
4
I
Appendix C.l
THREE GORGES PROJECT FEASIBILITY REPORT
TABLE 9.1
SUKKARY OF CYJV RESETTLEKENT COST ESTIKATES
(mi It i on yuan)
i
i
I
i I
I I
10
I I
I I
I I
3/, I
i I
I I
I I
NPL 180 II
II
II
3 867 II
I!
3 765 I I
II
1 3% II
II
1 630 I I
II
695 II
II
171 II
! I
5{, I I
II
',6 I I
23
NPL 170 I
25
NPL 160 I
23
1 2 112 2
1 951l 2 1,18 3 31,1l
605 797 1 067
71,2 790 1 201,
283 IIl3 506
91
11 "
15"
19
)() 1.6
20 26
1,2
5 29
I
3\
NPL 150 I
FACTORIES RELOCATION
RURAL RESETTLEMENT
ROADS AND BRIDGES
RELOCATION Of TWNS
RELOCATION OF CruNTY SEATS
7. TRANSKISSION LINES & SUBSTATIONS
6. PO',!ER PLANTS
i' , I
II
II""" . .
II
II 1.
I
I 2.
I
I 3
I
I I,.
I
I 5.
I I 5. RURAL ENTERPRISES
II
Ii q Lj,H:S
II
II 10. RAILWAYS
II
1111. CULTURAl.
Ii
Ii 12. I: f)UBLl!: HEALTHI 75 ql, ! 1')2 i 19B II
Ii I II
I i). liE,U,S 119/11
I II
I 11,. KAfiAGEKENT 525 7:\6 922 II
I II
I 1'). TOTAL I,ESLRVOIR COSTS 621.1 8030 1121.6 11,095 II
II I!
II 16. DAHSITE RESETTLEHENT 63 63 63 ()3 Ii
II II
! I 17. TarAL COST Of RESETTLEKENT 6 8 093 11 :108 157 II
II II
II 18. TOUI! / affected person (YUiln)I 116B6 11263 11609 11959 II
II II
II 19. Totill / affected pel'son ($) 3 158 3 3 137 3 232 II
II I I I I II
I1====================================================================================1 I
Volume 9
9-3 .- Table 9.1
Appendix C.2
THREE GORGES PROJECT FEASIBILITY REPORT
100000
jJ CZ1,coo
o
u}
}-
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1980 1990 1992 1994 1998 1990 2000 2002 2004
\ 200
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<
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Q C
>- '" :J
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,100
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1988 1990 1992 1994 1998 1998 2000 2002 2004
YEAR
RESETTLEMENT SCHEDULE AND CASHFLOW
NPL160, FCL 140 SCHEME
Volume 3
FIGURE 4.4
3.
\=j e[IS eignen: c:" \::; SJ:J i':':S e:l
I"
ve rt u d0 (
Lal sur I'acces i:J
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
tJi.:J
If
;-
J
I
'1
i
'I
SA
On the 'basis of the review and evaluation, CYJV is convinced that the
non-equilibrium approach used in the TGP model (i,e" the diffusion
equation) is the proper way to model suspended sediment deposition in
reservoirs ;Hld the suspended sediment loads of most rivers, For the
Yangtze, the suspended sediment load of generally fine sediments cornprises
99,95% of the total sediment load of the river, so the gravel bed load does
not need to be modeled for the feasibility level of study,
The theoretic31 basis for the TGP model is sound The
rnodel is fairly well formulated, Some approximations used in the m'odel are
not theoretically correct, but are reasonable and are treated as parameters
that can be calibrated in the model The hydraulics are
handled adequately, The seclimerlt function is almost identical to
Bagnold's equation for suspended load, has as much theoretical basis as
any sediment transport furlCtion, has been used in Russia, China and
Eastern European countries for over 40 years, and is easy to calibrate and
use It is well suited for the problem' at hand,
The TGP model has been calibrated and verified over a very broad rarlge
of conditions It has been used extensively and with good
results for over 15 years It was first applied to Gezhouba project in the
early 1970s and was subsequently verified after the project W;JS
constructed, Finally, and most important, the individuals who are doing
the modeling are the ones who developed the model, they have worked in
the data collection programs, they have intimate knowledge of the river,
the data, the theory, and the rnodel, They have worked on the Yangtze
and other Chinese rivers for over 30 years, CYJV agrees with Dawdy and
VarlO ni (193() ) t h 3 tat the presen t s tat e oft hescienee 0 f mat hem atic aI
rnocJeling of rivers I the modeler is more important than the model. The
Chirlese have very competent arld experienced personnel in their modeling
efforts
In c:orlclusion, CY JV believes that the results of the TGM model are as
reliable as any modeling efforts that could be undertaken at this time,
given the inherent uncertC1inties of these kinds of calculations, arld that
the results of the TGM model computations are a suitable basis for the
feasibility study and preliminary design of the Yangtze River Three Gorges
Project.
-- 3'-1 --
Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario
Office of the Registrar
February 8, 1993
CONFIDENTIAL
Ms. Patricia Adams
Executive Director
Probe International
225 Brunswick Avenue
Toronto, Ontario
M5S 2M6
Dear Ms. Adams:
The Complaints Committee, at its meeting of January 21, 1993, considered your complaint against
Acres International.
The Committee's Decision and Reasons is attached in accordance with Section 25(4) of the
Professional Engineers Act 1984.
Please note that the complainant in a matter regarding the conduct or actions of a member of the
Association or a holder of a Certificate of Authorization has the right to apply to the Complaints Review
Councillor under Section 27 of the Act, copy attached.
Yours very truly,
EWSjGWPjjd
Enclosures
1155 Yonge Street, Toronto, Onta.rio M4T 2Y5
George W. Piper, P.Eng.
Registrar
Telephone (416) 961-1100
DUll' 10
fu"';ish
information
Hearing
NOI
IYquiIYd
a member' of a commlltee uF -the
Association; or
(c)
ENGINEERS ACT
r
1984
(9) In conducting an examination or Reaipl
review in resn<'ct of the ASSOCiation. the of
r'- information
Complaints Review Councillor may hear or
obtain information from any person and
may make such inquiries as he thinks fit.
(10) TIle Complaints Review Councillor is
not required to hold or to afford to any per-
son an opportunity for a hearing in relation
to an examination. review or report in
respect of the Association.
(1 I) Every person who is.
(a) a member of the Council;
(b) an officer of the Association;
PROFESSIONAL
27.-( 1) The Complaints Review Council-
lor may examine from time to time the pro-
cedures for the treatment of complaints by
the Association.
(2) Where a complaint respecting a mem-
ber of the Association or a holder of a cer-
tificate of authori71ltion. a temporary licence
or a limited licence has not been disposed of
by the Complaints Committee within ninety
days after the complaint is filed with the
Registrar. upon application by the complain-
ant or on his own initiative the Complaints
Review Councillor may review the treatment
of the complaint by the Complaints Commit-
tee.
EXdminalion
hI'
(omplainlJ
Rel'irk'
Council/or
Rn'j('1A'
hy ComplainlJ
R<,,,icH'
Councillor
ApplicatioN
to Complaints
R<view
Councillor
Ccmplaints
R<vkw
Ccuncil/or
flOI to inquiu
info m<nr
of complaint
Discretionary
power of
Ccmplaints
R<view
Ccuncillor
Notie<
Offia
accommodation
Privacy
(3) A complainant who is not S<ltisfied
with the handling by the Complaints Com-
mittee of his complaint to the Committee
may apply to the Complaints Review Coun-
cillor for a review of the treatment of the
complaint after the Committee has disposed
of the complaint.
(4) In an examination or review in respec:
of the Association, the Complaints Review
Councillor shall not inquire into the merits
of any particular complaint made to the
Association.
(5) The Complaints Review Councillor in
his discretion may decide in a particular case
not to make a review or not to continue a
review in respect of the Association where,
(a) the review is or would be in respect
of the treatment of a complaint that
was disposed of by the Association
more than twelve months before the
matter came to the attention of the
Complaints Review Councillor; or
(b) in the opinion of the Complaints
Review Councillor,
(i) the application to the Com-
plaints Review Councillor is
frivolous or vexatious or is not
made in good faith, or
(ii) the person who has made
application to the Complaints
Review Councillor has not a
sufficient personal interest in
the subject-matter of the par-
ticular complaint.
(6) Before commencing an examination
or review in respect of the Association, the
Complaints Review Councillor shall inform
the Association of his intention to com-
mence the examination or review.
(7) The Council shall provide to the Com-
plaints Review Councillor such accommO<la-
tion and support staff in the offices of the
Association as are necessary to the perfor-
mance of the powers and duties of the C-Om-
plaints Review Councillor.
(8) Every examination or review by the
Complaints Review Councillor in respect of
the Association shall be conducted in pri-
vate.
(d) an employee of the Association,
shall furnish to the Complaints Review
Councillor such information regarding any
proceedings or procedures of the Associa-
tion in respect of the treatment of com-
plaints made to the Association as the Com-
plaints Review Councillor from time to time
requires. and shall give the Complaints
Review Councillor access to all records.
reports, files and other papers and things
belonging to or under the control of the
Association or any of such persons and that
relate to the treatment by the Association of
complaints or any particular complaint.
(12) The Complaints Review Councillor
shall make a repon following upon each
examination or review by him in respect of
the Association.
(13) Where the report follows upon an
examination of the procedure for the treat-
ment of complaints by the Association, the
Complaints Review Councillor shall transmit
the report to the Council.
(14) Where the repon follows upon a
review of the treatment of a complaint by
the Association. the Complaints Review
Councillor shall transmit the report to the
Council, to the complainant and to the per-
son complained against.
(15) TIle Complaints Review Councillor
may transmit a repon following upon an
examination or review to the Minister
where, in the opinion of the Complaints
Review Councillor. the repon should be
brought to the attention of the Minister.
(16) The Complaints Review Councillor
may include in a report following upon an
examination or review his recommendations
in respect of the procedures of the Associa-
tion. either generally or with respect to the
treatment of a particular complaint.
(17) The Council shall consider each
report. and any recommendations included
in the report. transmitted to it by the Com-
plaints Review CounCillor and sh:.lil notify
the Complaints Review Councillor of any
action it has taken in consequence,
Repon by
Complaints
Review
Councillor
Report
following
upon
examilUJlin{1
Repan
following
upon
revieH'
Repon to
Min/slu
R(("omrru'n-
dalions
Considatio{J
by Council
DECISION AND REASONS
OF THE COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS OF ONTARIO
IN THE MATTER OF ACRES INTERNATIONAL
In accordance with the provisions of Section 24 of the Professional Engineers Act R.S.O. 1990, a
meeting of the Complaints Committee was held in the offices of the Association, 1155 Yonge Street,
Toronto, on Thursday, January 21, 1993 to consider a complaint from Ms. Patricia Adams of Probe
International which was filed with the Registrar on October 19, 1990.
Introduction
The Canadian International Development Agency ("CIDA") financed a Feasibility Report for the Three
Gorges Water Control Project ("Project") on the Yangtze River in China. A Canadian consortium known
as CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture ("CYJV") completed the study for CIDA. Acres International is one of
five members of CYJV.
The Complaint and Responses
This complaint was brought to the attention of the Association by means of a September 17, 1990 letter
from Probe International ("Probe") enclosing a copy of a book entitled :'Damrnl.o..g3he Three Gorges:
What Dam Builders Don't Want You To Know" (the "Book"). The formal complaint, which was based on
this letter and the Book and dated October 18, 1990, was received on October 19, 1990.' Probe
International is a Toronto-based environmental advocacy group interested in the effects of Canadian aid
and trade policies on the people and environment of the Third World.
A copy of the complaint and the book were forwarded to Acres International Limited ("Acres") by the
Association in October 1990, and Acres, by letter dated December 27, 1990, provided an initial
response. By letter dated September 3, 1991, Probe afforded to the Association a rebuttal to the Acres
response, prompting Acres to forward to the Association a further response dated May 8, 1992
enclosing a number of documents replying to the Probe position. Included in that material was the
Three Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study ("Feasibility Study") in the form in which it was
provided to Acres by CIDA. On October 19, 1992, Probe forwarded. to the Association a further
rejoinder to the Acres response, and Acres in turn on November 16, 1992 provided the Association with
a rebuttal of the Probe October 19, 1992 rejoinder.
Jurisdiction
By way of preliminary objection, Acres submitted that the Association and its Complaints Committee
("Committee") do not have jurisdiction to consider and deal with the Probe complaint because the
conduct in question took place outside Ontario and, in particular, in the Province of Quebec and in
China. In response, Probe took the position that the Association has inherent jurisdiction over the
conduct of its members no matter where that conduct takes place. The Committee concluded that the
Association's jurisdiction is such that it is entitled to impose discipline upon its members with respect
to professional conduct inside or outside Ontario or Canada: Re: Legault and the Law Society of Upper
Canada (1975), 8 O.R. (2d)585, (Ontario Court of Appeal).
Probe Position
As to the merits of the complaint, Probe's position may generally be summarized as follows:
2
(a) A member of the Association involved in a project outside of Ontario must ensure that the
project meets all standards applicable in Ontario.
(b) The conduct of the CYJV engineers with respect to the Project included errors, omissions,
Imprudent assumptions, biases, analytical irregularities, inconsistencies, oversights and
substandard methodologies, demonstrating inadequacy of the review process with respect to
which the engineers were retained. In particular:
(i) With respect to dam design and safety, CYJV engineers failed to employ the
recommendations of certain ICOLD (International Committee On Large Dams) Bulletins
relating to dam safety precautions and the selection of seismicity parameters, neglected
to apply these recommendations in the dam design and the economic cost-benefit
analysis, underestimated earthquake ground accelerations and risks caused by
landslides, underestimated the risk of spillway failure, accepted dangerously high risks
of cofferdam failure, did not perform adequate analyses of reservoir-induced seismicity,
structural stability and flood control and failed to demonstrate the technical feasibility
of the spillways.
(ii) The flood control analysis carried out by CYJV engineers was inadequate and flawed,
the purpose of the Project was misrepresented, the Project's flood control benefits were
exaggerated and misrepresented, and unrealistic operating criteria were recommended
and assumed.
(iii) CYJV engineers failed to take into account uncertainty in their risk assessments;
(Iv) CYJV engineers failed to review existing data on sedimentation as reqUired by the
Project's Terms of Reference, thereby rendering their flood control, navigation and
electricity benefits, and project life-expectancy calculations unreliable and without
scientific basis;
(v) CYJV and its clients claimed they had "reviewed and analyzed, on an integrated basis,
the cost, benefits and other effects of the overall" Project, and concluded the Project
was "feasible and financially viable", without first demonstrating the feasibility of
resettling almost one million people, as the Project's Steering Committee and Terms of
References required;
(vi) CYJV concluded that the Project was "environmentally feasible" without data and
analysis to prove this.
Acres' Position
As to the merits of the complaint, Acres' position may generally be summarized as follows:
(a) The Book, which is a critique of the Feasibility Study and the performance of the CYJV, contains
eleven chapters of which only two appear to have been written by a professional engineer.
(b) The work involved in the Feasibility Study reqUired contributions from many individuals in a wide
variety of professions and specialties, including economists, environmental scientists and other
specialists in fields other than engineering.
(c) A feasibility study necessarily involves preliminary design studies which, while sufficient to
establish the scale of development and probable project costs within acceptable levels of
confidence, do not deal in detail with all design matters and related issues, many of which will
be resolved in subsequent stages of the project cycle.
(d) To ensure that the objectives of the Feasibility Study were met and that the standard of practice
was consistent with international practice, several levels of quality assurance and review were
3
utilized, including internationally-recognized specialists who supplemented the main Project
team, a regular review of the Study by a "Project Review Board" of the most experienced
professionals from CYJV's participating organizations, a review of all technical work by
independent specialists retained by CIDA, and extensive participation, including ongoing input,
review of all interim and final reports and formal review meetings in Canada and in China, by
a panel of international experts established by the World Bank.
(e) It is normal practice with respect to major feasibility studies to bring together a broad range of
high-level professional expertise and judgment to consider the often complex issues to be dealt
with. In the case of the Feasibility Study, the CYJV team possessed a very high level of
professional expertise, the external consultants and specialists engaged in evaluation and
review of the work were of world-class calibre, and the Feasibility Study was subjected to review
of very substantial scope and depth.
(f) The Feasibility Study was carried out in compliance with high professional standards in all
disciplines, of which engineering was only one, and was subjected to expert review throughout
the course of the Project. Acres does not debase those standards for any purpose.
(g) With respect to the technical criticisms of the Feasibility Study:
(i) The spill capacity is adequate in accordance with international practice, and the dam
and other structures are not endangered by the Probable Maximum Flood event. The
design of the dam was consistent with the ICOLD Bulletins to which Probe made
reference and was based upon analyses considering, to a degree appropriate for
feasibility assessment, all foreseeable load scenarios with respect to reservoir-induced
seismicity, structural stability, reservoir landslide, spillway failure and cofferdam failure.
(ii) The Feasibility Study set out the Project's flood control benefits and costs; explained
the purpose of the project and the operating criteria; and concluded that the flood
routing type flow model used was appropriate for feasibility level investigation, about
90% of the flood control storage will be reserved indefinitely, the risk of loss of life to
the additional population is small and there will be little flood damage below '198m at
the critical flood stage.
(iii) CYJV Engineers recognized possible down cutting of the river bed with a potential
localized increase in the cost of dike maintenance and determined that the on-going
programs of dike maintenance will ensure that repairs will be made as required.
(iv) CYJV made detailed resettlement estimates for four schemes covering a range of water
levels, defined fOllrteen principles to guide the planning and implementation of the
resettlement program and recommended that additional studies be carried out.
(v) CYJV concluded that the Project was "environmentally feasible" on the basis of the data
already available, provided that gaps in the available database were filled and an
ongoing environmental monitoring and mitigation program was implemented.
The Complaint Committee's Review
In addition to reviewing carefully the Book and the submissions of Probe and Acres, the Committee was
assisted by the following input:
(a) Reports prepared by the International Panel of Experts retained by the World Bank on
behalf of the Government of China to review and comment upon the CYJV Feasibility
Study;
(b) Statements by the World Bank and CIDA regarding their review of the Feasibility Study;
4
(c) Reports with respect to international engineering projects, prepared by two Ontario
professional engineers with extensive international experience;
(d) Reports by an Advisory Panel of three experienced Ontario professional engineers who
were asked by the Committee to provide an independent opinion of the complaint;
(e) Information obtained from several senior geologists from Hubei and Jiangxi provinces
in China;
(f) A review of the Book by Ted L. Napier of Ohio State University; and
(g) A report by Philip B. Williams P.E.
In light of the complexity of the issues and the volume of the material and information relevant to this
complaint, the Committee appointed five of its members to constitute a Sub-committee to review fully
the information and material provided by Probe and Acres and to report back to the full Committee.
The Sub-committee met on ten occasions to consider this complaint, while the full Committee
considered the complaint at sixteen of its meetings.
Decision
In considering the information and material submitted to it and in arriving at a decision, the Committee
recognized that:
(a) Experts may fairly and honestly disagree about the required standards of practice of their
profession. However, if a professional's conduct is deemed appropriate by reputable members
of the profession, he or she cannot be properly found to be guilty of professional misconduct.
(b) A feasibility study cannot reasonably be expected to reflect the degree of certainty, finality and
precision required of a project's final design and working drawings; and
(c) While Canadian engineers are required, no matter where they are practising, to meet a standard
of care, competence and diligence expected in Ontario, they are not expected to impose
Canadian social and cultural values upon foreign entities whose cultures and values may, and
often do, differ significantly from those accepted in Canada. Also, Ontario professional
engineers practising outside Canada may base their work on generally accepted international
engineering standards.
Applying these principles to the voluminous and complex material and information relevant to this
complaint, the Committee has come to the conclusion that there are in this case varying opinions among
competent, experienced and reputable experts as to whether the Feasibility Study reflects an acceptable
standard of engineering practice on the part of the CYJV in general, and Acres in particular.
Given the scope, complexity and location of the CYJV Project, varying opinions as to some aspects of
the Project, including assumptions, analyses and conclusions, are inevitable. In the particular
circumstances of this case, even such superficially straightforward matters as physical dimensions of
the dam can be subject to valid and honest disagreement. This is all the more true in the many areas
where technical decisions are inevitably influenced by social, cultural and other non-technical
considerations.
In the final analysis, the Committee has concluded that this is not a case in w ~ l i c h one side or opinion
is "right" and the other is necessarily "wrong". As in many cases involving the exercise of professional
judgement and expertise, there can be varying opinions as to the correctness or desirability of a
proposed course of action and the work performed in determining the advisability of that course of
action.
After a thorough and careful review of the information and material, and considering the extent of
support for the Feasibility Study from reputable sources, the Committee has concluded that work of the
CYJV in developing the Feasibility Study reflected a level of care, competence and diligence that met
a standard reasonably to be expected of Professional Engineers in Ontario.
The Committee is, therefore, of the opinion that the evidence before it does not indicate professional
misconduct or incompetence on the part of Acres. Accordingly, the Committee directs that the
Complaint not be referred to the Discipline Committee.
Dated this _..42,--,/"I7,--t/ __day of 1993
..... ,'---;::-
J.B. W' es, P.Eng. (Chairman)
MARK O. MATTSON
BARRISTER AND SOLICIlDR
P.O. BOX 552, S1N. "P"
TORONlD, ONTARIO
M5S2Tl
(416) 463-7085
(416) 469-3039 (FAX)
July 26, 1993
Complaints Review Councillor
Association of Professional Engineers of ontario
1155 Yonge Street
Toronto ontario
M4T 2Y5
Re: Probe International Complaint Regarding Acres International's
Role in the Three Gorges Water Control project Feasibility study
I am writing on behalf of Probe International ("Probe") to request
that you undertake a review of the treatment of my client' s
complaint against Acres International for its role in the Three
Gorges Water Control Project Feasibility Study, pursuant to section
27 (3) of the Professional Engineers Act, 1984. The Complaints
Committee issued its decision and reasons in this matter on
February 2nd, 1993.
The reason for the request for review is that the Complaints
Committee failed to comply with the minimal procedural protections
found in the common law duty of fairness. Although the Complaints
Committee exercises a highly discretionary administrative function,
it is not excused from the duty to exercise its powers in good
fai-th and to act fairly.
The law in Ontario clearly recognizes that an "investigating" body
such as the APEO Complaint's Committee, which does not make final
determinatiops, is nonetheless required to act fairly. The
compliance!with the procedural pre-conditions to the exercise of
the statutory power of such bodies is carefully scrutinized.
(Re Emerson and Law Society of Upper Canada (1984), 44 O.R. (2d)
729 (H.C'LJ.))
Probe requests that the Complaints Review Councillor undertake to
review the following aspects of the Complaints Committee's
decision:
The Decision to Not Refer the Matter to the Discipline Committee -
Because the Evidence Before It Did Not Indicate Professional
Misconduct or Incompetence on the P a ~ t of Acres International
2
Probe suggests that the Complaints Committee's decision, to not
refer the matter to a disciplinary hearing on the grounds that the
evidence before it did not indicate professional misconduct or
incompetence, is improper.
At page 4 of the Committee's decision it reads:
Given the scope, complexity and location of the CYJV
Project, varying opinions as to some aspects of the Project,
including assumptions, analysis and conclusions, are
inevitable .... In the final analysis, the Committee has
concluded that this is not a case in which one side or
opinion is "right" and the other is necessarily "wrong."
Also at page 4 of the decision it reads:
... the Committee has come to the conclusion that there are in
this case varying opinions among competent, experienced and
reputable experts as to whether the Feasibility Study reflects
an acceptable standard of engineering practice on the part of
the CYJV in general, and Acres in particular.
Contrary to the Committee's ruling, Probe suggests the above
finding is ground to justify a. hearing in order to assess
credibility, examine witnesses, and interpret the standards that
should be uniformly applied.
The jurisdiction of the Complaints Committee is not to determine
the resolution of the complaint but to determine whether or not the
allegation warrants further review. In order to carry out this
role, a recognized test has been adopted by both the courts and
administrative tribunals.
Are there reasonable grounds to believe the claim could be
established?
If there are reasonable grounds then a hearing should be granted.
It is appropriate for the Complaints Committee to ascertain if the
complaint has merit. The Complaints Committee did this and found
that the Probe complaint had meri"t. However, the Complaints
Committee then went much further.
The Complaints Committee received unsworn, untested and undisclosed
evidence. It assessed the credibility of this evidence, and on that
basis concluded that the evidence before it did not indicate
professional misconduct or incompetence on the part of Acres.
In Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985) 22 D.L.R.
(4d) 119 (F.C.A.), the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with an
appeal from a decision of the Immigration Appeal Board not to grant
a hearing to a person claiming refugee status. The test set out in
3
the Immigration Act which must be met in order for a person to
receive a hearing, was that a hearing would only be ordered if the
Board was "of the opinion there are reasonable grounds to believe
a claim could be established" at a hearing. The court found that
while oral hearings were not always required, where serious issues
of credibility were involved, however, an oral hearing must be
held.
The Complaints Committee made decisions about the merits of the
Probe complaint based on submissions of persons who were judged by
the Committee to be "reputable" members of the profession. These
members were professional engineers unilaterally chosen by the
Committee to assist in its investigation, or members of an
International Panel of Experts chosen by the proponent of the
project - the Chinese Government - and the World Bank to review the
Feasibility Report. Probe had no opportunity to address the
"apprehension of bias" of the reputable members. The issues of
credibility, apprehension of bias and conflict of interest require
a hearing with cross-examination and argument.
The submission of my client then, is that the decision of the
Complaints Committee to reject the need for a hearing was flawed
for two reasons. First the Complaints Committee exceeded its
jurisdiction by not limiting its role to determining whether there
are reasonable grounds to believe a claim could be established.
Secondly, it is a breach of the principles of fairness to reject
the need for a hearing when serious credibility issues are in
dispute.
A further reason the decision is flawed is that it can be
interpreted as a violation of section 7 of the Charter of Rights.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Singh v. MEl, concluded that at a
minimum, the concept of fundamental justice included the principles
of procedural fairness to act fairly, in good faith, without bias,
and in a judicial temper, and must give the opportunity to persons
to state their case.
The Decision to Not Refer the Matter to the Discipline Committee -
Because Acres followed Generally Accepted International Engineering
Standards
Probe suggests that the Complaints Committee failed to act fairly
and in good faith when it concluded that Acres followed "generally
accepted international engineering standards" . Neither the
respondent to the complaint nor the Complaints Committee delineated
what generally accepted international engineering standards consist
of or how they are determined.
Only the complainant, Probe, identified and applied well known and
accepted standards to the - Feasibility Study. These standards
4
included the Ontario standards set by the PEAO's Code of
Professional Conduct and Code of Ethics, the u.s. Standards applied
to similar circumstances in the U.S., the standards of the
In'ternational Commission on Large Dams, and the standards of the
U. S. Commission on Large Dams. In the complaint, Probe applied
these standards to the work of Acres and clearly showed where the
respondent's work did not meet the standards.
The standards used by Probe in its complaint are well known and are
recognized by the international engineering community and the
general public.
The rejection by the Complaints Committee of the standards used by
Probe was never justified. The conclusion then of the Committee
that Acres followed generally accepted international engineering
standards was unsupported. At the very least, the investigating
body must delineate or define a standard before ruling on
compliance.
The principle of fairness demands that the standards or regulations
to be applied by the investigating body be identifiable.
The Decision to Not Refer the Matter to the Discipline Committee -
Because of the Opinions of Reputable Members of the Profession
The Complaints Committee failed to provide Probe with a fair,
impartial and public hearing of its complaint.
'rhe Complaints Committee in its Decision and Reason took the
position that:
Experts may fairly and honestly disagree about the required
standards of practice of their profession. However, if a
professional's conduct lS deemed appropriate by repu'table
members of the profession, he or she cannot be properly found
to be guilty of professional misconduct.
The Complaints Commi'ttee was assisted In its review by many
external parties. The Committee was assis,ted by reports prepared by
an International Panel of Experts chosen by the World Bank and the
Government of China to review and comment on the CYJV Feasibility
Study; by reports prepared by two Ontario professional engineers
with international experience; by reports prepared by an Advisory
Panel of three experienced Ontario professional engineers who were
asked by the Commi,ttee to provide an independent opinion of the
complaint; and by information obtained from several senior
geologists from Hubei and Jiangxi provinces in China.
The Complaints Cormnittee accepted these various bodies' reports and
concluded that the reports were f:com "repu'table members of the
5
profession" without giving Probe an opportunity to comment on the
credibility, bias, conflict or vested interests of the members. The
error in accepting these untested reports is compounded by an
obvious apprehension of bias concerning the reports.
The names of these "reputable members of the profession" on which
the Committee bases its decision were never disclosed in the
decision. Probe did not have any input into the selection of the
members of this body that deemed Acres to have carried out its
Three Gorges project with care, competence and diligence. A basic
doctrine of fairness is that the evidence that the decision maker
relies on for its decision be disclosed to the parties unless it
falls under an exception to the rule. In this case, no reason was
given by the Complaints Committee for not disclosing the sources
and nature of its information.
Finally, the Complaints Committee accepted the International Panel
of Experts' support for the Feasibility study without addressing
the irregularity in that Panel's process, which Probe brought to
the attention of the Committee. There was no effort made to respect
the right of the complainant to have an opportunity to test the
impartialioty and reliability of this evidence before the Committee
deemed it to be worthy of basing its decision upon.
It is well established that "justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." The
Complaints Committee's decision to unequivocally accept the
evidence of certain members it deemed reputable over the evidence
of Probe's experts is unacceptable. The unilateral selection of the
members to assist the Committee is fraught with procedural
irregularities and causes an apprehension of bias.
The Decision to Not Refer the Matter to the Discipline Committee -
Because Acres Conduct Was Deemed Appropriate by Other Members of
the Profession
The Complaints Committee, In its decision and reasons, stated:
"if a professional's conduct lS deemed appropriate by
reputable members of the profession, he or she cannot be
properly found to be guilty of professional misconduct."
This statement is inconsistent with the statutory responsibility of
the Complaints Committee to maintain and protect minimum testable
standards of the profession. lot is suggested that the Complaints
Committee failed to base its decision on the merits of the
complaint but chose rather to base its decision on the opinions of
a select group of reputable members iot chose to consult.
6
This failure is compounded by the fact that the evidence of other
professional members, who were deemed reputable by the Complaints
Committee, were ignored. The Committee chose to ignore the opinion
of members who condemned the Acres study while it accepted the
opinions of members who condoned the study. The basis for accepting
one reputable member over another was not given by the Committee.
The fact that there exists a fundamental disagreement over the
standards that should be applied to the Three Gorges Study between
reputable members should have provided a basis for the Complaints
Committee to conclude that an oral hearing is warranted.
Probe International suggests that the Complaints Committee's
reliance on the opinion of a select group of reputable members of
the profession for its decision, is the most serious error in the
decision.
The function of the Complaints Committee to ascertain the merits of
a complaint against a member of the Association cannot be abdicated
or delegated to some select group of members. Otherwise the lawful
regulatory function of the Complaints Committee is delegated to the
members it is meant to regulate. Such a situation calls into
question the integrity of the self-governing body for the
engineering profession. It also impairs the ability of the
Complaints Committee to regulate fairly and impartially. Most
importantly it undermines the conclusion of the Committee in the
Probe Complaint to not order a hearing before the Disciplinary
Hearing Panel.
As I am sure you are aware, there has been a great deal of media
coverage, nationally and internationally, concerning the complaint
brought forward by Probe. As the findings of the Complaints
Committee are public, it is of the upmost importance that Probe
receive a response to the concerns contained in this letter at the
earliest date. It will certainly influence the manner in which my
client proceeds with these very important issues.
Thank you for your attention to this matter and I look forward to
hearing from you in the near future.
Yours truly,
Mark Mattson
FRJ\SER&BEAllY
and Solicitors
Nancy L. Backhouse
Certified by the Law Society of Upper
Canada as a Specialist in Family Law
39th Floor, 1 First Canadian Placc
Dircct Linc (416) 863-4378
September 14, 1993
Council of the Association of
Professional Engineers of Ontario
1155 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
Nl4T 2Y5
Probe International
c/o Mr.Mark O. Mattson
Barrister and Solicitor
P.O. Box 552 Station "P"
Toronto, Ontario
M5S 21'1
Mr. J. M. Gardiner
President
Acres International Limited
480 University Avenue
Toronto, Ontario
M5G 1V2
Dear Sirs:
As the Complain t5 Review Councillor for the /\ssociation of
Professional Engineers of Ontario, 1 have been asked by the
complainant, Probe International, to review the decision by the
Complaints Committee of the above-noted matter. "My role is to
determine whether th i s complai at was properly anel fairly processed.
Pursuant to 26 of the Profess';on.ol Engineers Act,my role
does not extend to inquiring into the merits of the complaint.
P.O. Box 100. 1First Canadian Place, Toron!o, Canada M5X ':':(XI'ISJ!, Fax 1'11'.>:
Toronto )\ul'l11 York OUI\W;1 VanuI I.! \ (;1'
In Monlrcal-.\fiWatcd with \lc\laslcr
2.
I have read the decision of the Complaints Committee dated
January 21, 1993. I have read the letter elated July 26, 1993, from
Mark O. Mattson, solicitor for the cornp1ainant requesting that a
review be undertaken. I have further reviewed this extensive file. I
have concluded that there is no basis to interfere with the decision of
the Complaints Committee.
Yours truly,
Nancy L. Backhouse
NLB:kb
225 Brunswick Avenue
Toronto, Ontario
Canada tv'i5S 21'/16
Phone: (416) 964-9223
Fax: (416) 964-82:39
email: web:eprobe
,john Hollh>-.:'cll
Leonald
January 10, 1995
J\lfs. Deborah Dileo
Association of Professional
Engineers of Ontario
1155 Yonge Street
Toronto, ON
MAT 2Y5
Dear Ms. Dileo:
In 1990 Probe International filed a complaint against Acres International with the
Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario regarding the Three Gorges dam
project in China. That complaint was ruled on in February 1993.
We have received a number of requests for Probe International's October 19, 1992
argument to the Complaints Committee in response to Acres International's May
8, 1992 submission to the same committee.
As explained in our letter of February 10, 1992 to Mr. EricW. Smythe, Manager
Complaints and Discipline, we understand that the complaint and response
process was a public process, and that Probe International's argument is a public
document. However, because the Association of Professional Engineers of
Ontario did not respond to that correspondence, we feel compelled to notify you
bei:Cnewe release our October 1992 argument. The argument will be released with
the decision of the Complaints Committee.
If you have any concerns regarding the release of Probe International's argument
to the Complaints Committee please notify us within three business days
Yours sincerely,
.. __.. , _'') '}
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......
Patricia Adams
Executive Director
iliO!)"" 111temCliionai is a Project of [:ilerqy Prol;c F:e:;earci;
CharitalJlr,1 Taxation f\Jurrtxlr 0599050-59
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