The Capabilities of the New Regime in North Korea

A neorealist perspective of the regime of Kim Jong-Un in North Korea

Preutescu Drago-Andrei
Dragos.preutescu@gmail.com International Relations and European Studies, Iai - Romania

Reorganization of the old traditions with a new leader The North Korea capabilities are well-known until the dictatorship of Kim Il-Sung started in 1972. Now, in the 21th century, in a world of nuclear proliferation and diplomatic turbulence I choose to take into attention a new framework to explain in a neorealist way the concepts of Kenneth N. Waltz of state behavior, human nature, international competition, anarchy, military power (Waltz 1959). My discussion is focused on the relations between the new regime in North Korea and USA, taking into consideration the capabilities of each countries, the concept of smart power (Wilson 2008) as a game between hard power and soft power embodying the security dilemma approach. The disappearance of balance of power is not materialized, instead is played in the field of interdependence between important actors. The game of nuclear weapons proliferation made by North Korea and the USA solutions for this problem let us to think that in a case without any resolution the ultimate step is war and military conflict. So, my purpose is to retest (Zigerell 2011: 630) the realism theory of Kenneth Waltz and to find new observations, arguments and explanations for the future outcomes of why is relevant to believe in the capacity to think in a realistic way. The real world (Walt 1998: 29) is not based on too many theories, but in my opinion in capability to find many explanations and arguments for a theory concerning the world policy making. If Stephen Walt says are many theories for one world, I have to say it is necessary to exist many arguments for a few good theories. The interpretative and intuitive role is a multibased value to understand the war meaning. A new world order started to appear (Walt 1998: 43). We can see the military and strategic security mechanism develop by USA in the world, as a key to maintain democratic values through a democratic realism action (Snyder 2004). Theory is a powerful check to see what is relevant, and what could be incorporated in the concept of realism. What is change in the international foreign policy with the capabilities of the new regime in North Korea? And how realism theories explained it? Concerning the new election coming in USA, Mitt Romney, one of the presidential candidates stressed the idea of a new leadership (Rogin 2011) for USA in South-East Asia to assure stability for the future. Exist a good potential to win democratic values in the case of North Korea were a tyrant is changed with another tyrant? Well, I think is not. In this kind of
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moments, the pragmatic and realist thinking must take the place of enthusiasm. Even if in North Korea is a new regime, the dictatorial power of this country is still large and dangerous. Authoritarian regimes engage in their actions different types of challenges; they try to prove a survival of their international role. It was exactly like this after the death of Kim Jong-Il. A subtle (Ackerman 2011) intention by the successor leader Kim Jong-Un when he launched missiles near the South Korea coasts, trying to transmit a classical message in the vision of each dictator who started to rule a country: We are still here! Nothing is change after our fathers death! I call this tyrant anarchy where anarchy of a new young tyrant starts to move on. It also happens because it is necessary to stabilize the power in his country. The Great successor (Bolton 2011) must ensure the continuity of the nuclear program launched in the past, and also to maintain a peaceful thinking about any act of disturbance from army generals. It is true that USA, Japan and South Korea wait for an opportune moment to intervene. In the case of the new regime of North Korea nothing is significant changed. The domestic politics are still hierarchically ordered (Waltz 1979: 81), and the function of the military power is a great observable phenomenon in states like North Korea. Being the only capability to make a way in the international politics game, they use this unit from the state structure to perform power. The use of force is the predictable phenomenon in the case of North Korea. The distribution of capabilities (Waltz 1979: 97) of both countries, USA and North Korea is based on the question: how can you impose a democratic peace on a tyrannical rule? Through war and open conflicts. It is not possible that a tyrant to accept democratic values and democracies like USA to accept tyrannical meanings. The conflict will exist anyway. Imposing a new social system (Waltz 1993: 49) is not valid. If anyone thinks that the change of the new leader in North Korea regime will change something in domestic politics of this country is wrong. After the death of Kim Jong-Il, the Great Successor has the job to reinforce the same system imposed by his father in 1994 (Jeon 2000: 764). Regime strategies are set in motion like a ruling circle (Jeon 2000: 762) to avoid possible conflicts between generations and eventually dissidents from the army. Every regime created in this manner has the purpose to reinforce or undermine the power capabilities that lead to their creation in the first place (Krasner 1982: 507). The capabilities of North Korea are not
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just the possessing of nuclear weapons, but also the image they have about war to generate influence in international relations strategies (Waltz 1993: 60). If the same system of political transition or transferred power is repeated by Kim Jong-Un, then we cannot hope for a new type of rearrangement in North Korea. The only solution is to think of a misleading of leadership, or to find a breakthrough if we think on the relationship with China. The new North Korean leader had some inadequate behavior with Chine even from the beginning (Fang 2012). The balance of power between China and USA is North Korea We have Chinas attempt to maintain a balance of power in the South-East Asia. As it is more realistic as the USA-China relations was not in a positive predisposition in recent months due to economic crisis. Taking into account tactical calculations that I like to apply especially after I read the book of Sun Tzu The art of warfare I recommend a well-know quote from this book: show strong when youre weak and weak when youre strong it fits well with the missile attack of North Korea after the death of Kim Jong-Il. They appear to be strong but in fact they are weak. Could China afford to lose an allied? I do not think so. USA wants a weak leadership in North Korea? I think so. China still sends food aid to the regime in Pyongyang. Thinking in terms of strategic and military can say that theories of realism find a fertile ground in terms of ability of states to retain or to win power among other countries. The balance of power from Kenneth Waltz is a good opportunity both for China and USA as an advantage under the North Korea instability in a moving regime change. The divergences now between these two countries are not so close. China needs to ensure potential allies, or to maintain them to combat Americas military and economic power. If North Korea in one the list of alliances, then USA have to change the political strategy in terms of war and security dilemma. If in the time of Cold War the existing balance of power was a very clear conflict between USA and URSS, today in a multi-polarity system of power the conflicts could be multiplied because more states gain military and economical power, or try to fight for their sovereignty and ideology. North Korea is one of these countries, and from this country could start a conflict-puzzle, or a conflict matrix (it is a concept used in IT) because states are linked (Walt 1998: 31), and everyone is use everyone, or try to do so, to win more power.

When writing this paper a rumor appears in the international press. Weibo, the Chinese model for micro blogging launched news about a possible assassination of Kim Jong-Un (Miks 2012). Another battle for the new regime will be between North Korean brothers, sons of Kim Jong-Il. Here are some important issues. Why Weibo launched this rumor? Because cannot be true. One of the explanations is the bad relations between Kim Jong-Un and the power from Beijing. Could China try to find another successor in North Korea to maintain a certain authority? It is possible because Kim Jong-Un want to establish or to renegotiate with USA an agreement about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The successor game is very important in these moments. A controversial relation between China and USA can influence in a certain part the political decisions in Pyongyang. The organized power (Waltz 1959: 5) could be anyone in this period of time. USA could set a smart power (Wilson 2008: 113) strategy combining hard power and soft power in this process. The reality is like this: hard power in the Iranian problem and soft power with the new North Korea regime. At least it will be like this because USA can afford to wear a war in the same time with both enemies, North Korea and Iran. If Kim Jong-Il was a reliable partner for Iran, now with the new leader the game is a little bit changed. Another explanation is to find out what tips Kim Jong-Il give to his son before death. A new bold initiative (Howard 2004: 806) may be tried by USA like in 1994 to emphasize diplomacy (Haas 2005: 73) with North Korea. Also it is possible that Kim Jong-Un to be a smart boy. Why? Maybe he had clear directives from his father, or maybe he understands that in some views China is weaker than USA (e.g. economical ties). Like in 1994 when his father signed an agreement with USA concerning the nuclear weapons I can argue why China try to have another successor in North Korea. The agreement from 2002 with USA again, and the testing bombs in 2006 put the relations of China and North Korea under question (Huntley 2007: 459). This is the first clue how Kim Jong-Il thanked about nuclear weapons and the power he could have. What can do a son who is named the successor a few years earlier? Just to follow the same strategic meaning like his father. And more important, USA is now focused on the Iran problem. The language game (Howard 2004) is the game of threats that arise in the new balance of power. Like I
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explained the balance of power between China and USA now is North Korea. Russia is weak in this moments and it is against missile shield program of USA. Syria, Iran, Iraq could play in the Chinese field as well. USA has on his part the other big economies and countries. But what power has North Korea in this game? With the support of USA we could have a calm Korea to ensure stability in Asia. The balance of power of Waltz did not change so much in his meaning, but in the way of finding arguments. Could be possible of North Korea to leave the axis of evil (Haas 2005: 66) for a time? The capabilities of army and weapons mass destruction (WMD) is a balancing force to choose to go to battle against North Korea (Howard 2004: 807808). The game of smart power paradoxically is a fight between hard power and soft power. Today the concept of distribution of capabilities is not necessary to take leadership on the world, but to get in the sphere of countries that matters Also I think the concept of soft power from Joseph Nye (1990) cover also the concept of security dilemma (Jervis 1978). Peace is the rest sleep of the war The capabilities of an authoritarian regime are limited but very dangerous. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea is a global problem because these types of weapons are sold or could be sold to other non-democratic countries like Iran, Iraq, and China etc. In a conversation with a lady which was a general in the army in my country she told me that weapons are produced to be used. It is more obvious to see today an important competition of weapons. From one side we have the bad countries that have the weapons to exercise an international anarchy (Waltz 1959: 14), and on the other side we have USA and others (e.g. the important TV emissions on Discovery Chanel about important technologies produced by the American army) exercising an imperial fashion (Snyder 2004) for establish peace. The instruments of force (Waltz 1979: 127) are an important game in conflicts explaining, or legitimizing the preemptive attack (Hass 2005: 72) use by Kim Jong-Un after his father death, and a preventive war which can be initiated by USA to prevent an increased of North Korea military power. We see how theories about realism are not obsolete (Waltz 2000: 6). The theory of Kenneth Waltz is not invalid, but is explain in a simplistic manner taking into consideration other periodic events from history to explain the meaning of human nature and the state of war. The
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new balance of power is between those who posses mass nuclear weapons for distribution in other parts of the world (Iran, Al-Qaeda etc.) and on the other side countries who possess nuclear weapons as a kind of rule of world governance being a synonymous with the perpetual peace (Waltz 1959: 15). The difference is the last ones have an agreement; the others like in the case of North Korea will use it in unconditional way if they want. The power of nuclear proliferation is a source to produce interdependence for North Korea, but if this interdependence is not produce, then the ultimate step is to use the weapons (Lovins et. all 1990: 1160). A domino effect (Huntley 2007: 464) for a conflict could explode if nothing will be negotiate right, and the Korean Peninsula with his military force like in no other part of the world (Waltz 2000: 33) will start a new big war. What could prevent a war (Wendt 1992: 395)? The institutions like UN or NATO are not able to be involved and to stop the rules make by the incorrect countries. And the theory of liberalism and the peace that could be provided by institutions seems to fail. How power is changed in the world (Nye 1990: 153) make the difference in the capabilities of each country to create a self-help system (Waltz 1979: 105) to have a role in international politics. The family dynasty (An 1977: 175) created in time of Cold War by Kim Il-Sung is still standing. Even if balance of power must accept some limitations in a world of interdependence (Nye 1990: 156) the continuous proliferations of weapons is increasing. Conclusions Trying to understand the consequences of the new regime in North Korea and the behavior of The Great Successor in a world that sits on a fertile ground for war is necessary to be explained by the theories of Waltz. North Korea is a state of war (Waltz 1979: 102) because family ruling is an important contribution to this and it is a reality. The game of nuclear weapons made by North Korea (because have the capability to do so) can change first of all the balance of power between USA and China. North Korea will not follow a way to reduce the nuclear weapons production because the ideology of this country to think about international politics is way long different from other states. If USA will not leave the games to be made by China to control the Asian Peninsula (Moisi 2012), then they have to find an agreement, a new agreement with North Korea who is more probably to happen in the future because USA is focused on the Iranian problem.
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A good approach to my assumptions of Waltz theory about realism is the offensive realism launched by John Mearsheimer (2001) where he explains the behavior model of states, not the impact of human nature. The regional hegemony for security and power it fits very well with what is happen now in South-East Asia, and how North Korea try to raise his power with the nuclear proliferation for weapons. When a state finds out how big is his power then he provokes others or tries to impose his rules in the international affairs (Kupchan 2003). But he also remembers about the capability of each state and how these capabilities are put in the game of foreign policies, so it is much close to Waltz theories, but difference is that Mearsheimer finds unit explanations of the state behavior.

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