Professional Documents
Culture Documents
High oil prices are here to stay – Oil production will peak no later than 2015, current
energy initiatives are woefully inadequate.
Andrews, Co-founder of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil US affiliate, 08
(Steve, Energy Bulletin, "Rejecting the real snake oil," 6-27-7,
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/31362, 6-30-8)
8. Depletion of aging oil fields is relentless. The world's largest oil fields -- all of which once produced at
least one million barrels of oil/day -- are all in permanent decline. The smaller new fields brought into
production can't offset the declines in the old war horses. It's like being on a treadmill that is both speeding
and ramping up, where you work harder and harder just to stay in place. 9. New technology isn't saving the
day. In the US, where we've applied the best technology available, production has slowly declined since
the late 1970s. 10. Oil exports are riding for a fall. In exporting countries like Mexico, where production slips while domestic
consumption grows, exports will shrink at an accelerated rate. China, the UK and Indonesia, oil exporters during the 1990s, are now
importers. World oil exports will peak before world oil production peaks. Highly hyped liquid substitute fuels, such
as ethanol from corn and liquids from coal or oil shale, come with their own unique baggage. They can't be scaled up quickly, require
huge energy and water inputs, and pose a range of environmental problems. Given the above facts and trends, ASPO-USA and a
growing list of respected energy analysts anticipate a peaking in world oil production soon, most likely
between 2010 and 2015. Such a turning point in world energy consumption and production patterns
will undoubtedly have serious consequences on the world's economy. Those possible consequences
should be anticipated and acted upon by decision makers at every level. Those who deny this looming reality are
part of the problem, not part of the intelligent response.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 5
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
High Oil Prices Will Lead to Another Great Depression Within Three Months
Leatherdale 2008 (Linda, Finances Columnist for the Toronto Sun, “Next Great Depression?”,
TorontoSun.com, http://www.torontosun.com/Money/2008/06/22/5952466-sun.html, June 22, 2008)
But while our competition watchdog, finally, laid charges of price fixing in Quebec, and you and I struggle
with pump prices on their way to $1.50 a litre, NOCs subsidize fuel prices for their civilians. That's why
Venezuela enjoys the cheapest gas in the world at 12 cents US a gallon, followed by Nigeria at 38 cents,
Kuwait 78 cents and Saudi Arabia at 91 cents. Energy-guzzling China, the world's new superpower as the
United States self-destructs, also subsidizes prices. Which is why our big North American automakers,
devastated by slumping sales and high gas prices, are showcasing their luxurious gas guzzlers in China,
where an emerging middle class can afford them, and the gas. But even China realizes the damages of out-
of-control oil prices, and this past week hiked its subsidized fuel prices in hopes of softening demand and
bringing oil back down to earth. Which leads to this: While we debate nationalized energy vs free capital
forces, and whether I'm a Marxist or not -- dire warnings are hinting that if we don't stop this madness,
we're heading to the biggest meltdown since the Great Market Crash of 1929 and the next Great
Depression. "A very nasty period is soon to be upon us -- be prepared," Bob Janjuah, a credit strategist for
the Royal Bank of Scotland, wrote in a report that sent shockwaves through the global financial community.
Janjuah is warning that these skyrocketing energy prices are inflicting big damage by fuelling inflation
and paralysing major central banks, who may be forced to hike interest rates at a time economies are
slowing and the U.S. subprime crisis is sending a tidal wave around the world, sparking a global credit
crunch. Janjuah says the crash will hit within three months, with Wall Street's S&P 500 crashing by more
than 300 points as "all the chickens come home to roost" from the excesses of the global boom. Such a slide,
Janjuah warns, would amount to one of the worst bear markets of the past century. "Cash is the key safe
haven. This is about not losing your money and not losing your job," said Janjuah, who last year correctly
called the credit crisis. He added that "globalization was always going to risk putting G7 bankers into a
dangerous corner at some point. We have gotten to that point," thanks to this energy-price shocker. DIRE
WARNING Another dire warning comes from the Bank of International Settlements, which warns
we're headed for the next Great Depression, thanks to a lax monetary policy that gave birth to complex
credit instruments, a strong appetite for risk, record household debt levels and imbalances in the
world's currency system. I'm not alone in warning it may be our own capitalist greed that's killing the
golden goose. Paul Craig Roberts, former assistant secretary to the U.S. Treasury during the Reagan
administration and now associate editor at The Wall Street Journal, writes that "something is wrong here"
when GDP grows while household incomes fall, or "Karl Marx was right that capitalism works to concentrate
income in the hands of a few capitalists." Roberts points out that while people lose jobs and homes, life
savings go up in smoke and energy prices nail the coffin shut -- the top 20 earners among private equity and
hedge fund managers earned an average of $657 million US last year, with four earning more than $1 billion,
while the top 20 CEOs of publicly held companies took home an average $36.4 million. Energy brass are
among this high-paid elite, with a blatant example of greed when former Exxon CEO Lee Raymond, who
was paid $52 million a year, walked out the door with a retirement package worth $400 million. And if you
check out insider trading info, you'll find energy CEOs and executives are cashing out big time. In my
capitalist world, wealth is not hoarded by a greedy few, while hard-working, middle-class citizens get
slaughtered. End of conversation.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 7
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
Unchecked, Peak Oil will kill over 4 billion people through Famine
Goodchild, Award-winning television producer and the former head of Science and Features at
the BBC, 07
(Peter, Counter Currents, "Peak Oil and Famine: Four Billion Deaths," 10-29-7,
http://www.countercurrents.org/goodchild291007.htm, 7-2-8)
At some point in the early years of the 21st century, there will be a clash of two giant forces:
overpopulation and oil depletion. That much has been known for a long time. It is also well known that
population must eventually decline in order to match the decline in oil production. A further problem,
however, is that it will be impossible to get those two giant forces into equilibrium in any gentle
fashion, because of a matter that is rarely considered: that in every year that has gone by — and every year
that will arrive — the population of the earth is automatically adjusted so that it is almost exactly equal
to its carrying capacity. We are always barely surviving. Population growth is soaring, whereas oil
production is plunging. If, at the start of any year, the world’s population is greater than its carrying
capacity, only simple arithmetic is needed to see that the difference between the two numbers means that
mortality will be above the normal by the end of that year. In fact, over the course of the 21st century
there will be about 4 billion deaths (probably about 3.6, to be more precise) above normal. Let us refer to
those 4 billion above-normal deaths as "famine deaths," for lack of a better term, since "peak oil" in terms
of daily life is really "peak food." There will, of course, also be famines for other reasons. It is also true
that warfare and plague will take their toll to a large extent before famine claims those same humans
as its victims.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 11
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
US action now is key to avoid coming resource wars that will drive humanity to extinction
Richard Heinberg, New College of California Core Faculty, Power Down: Options and Actions For A Post-
Carbon World, 2004, p. 111
The US is also uniquely positioned to lead the global energy transition. While it is the world's foremost
energy user, the US also possesses advanced renewable-energy research facilities. And China, if it were to follow
the model of Kerala or Cuba, rather than attempting to shift its economy in the direction of greater energy-
resource dependency, could be a beacon to the less-industrialized nations of the world.
However, currently neither nation is on the path to lead a global Powerdown. Indeed, present trends suggest that
the US and China are on a collision course, as the energy appetites of both nations continue to grow in the
context of deepening energy- resource depletion.
For the sake of American readers, I will put the matter as bluntly as possible: A peaceful global Powerdown is
possible only if the US leads the way. If current American domestic and foreign polices continue,
Powerdown efforts on the part of other nations may result in improved survival options for the people of those
nations, but for the world as a whole by far the most likely outcome will be devastating resource wars
continuing until the resources themselves are exhausted, the human species is extinct, or the fabric of
modern societies has been shredded to the point that anarchy - in the worst sense of the word - prevails
nearly everywhere.
Addiction to oil risks nuclear war with China and Russia, culminating in extinction
Henderson, Besline Research CEO/President/consultant, 07 (Bill, CounterCurrents.org, February 24, “Climate
Change, Peak Oil, and Nuclear War”, http://www.countercurrents.org/cc-henderson240207.htm, 7/9/08)
Countercurrents.org By Bill Henderson
Damocles had one life threatening sword hanging by a thread over his head. We have three: The awakening public now know
that climate change is real and human caused but still grossly underestimate the seriousness of the
danger, the increasing probability of extinction, and how close and insidious this danger is - runaway
climate change, the threshold of which, with carbon cycle time lags, we are close to if not upon. A steep spike in the price of
oil, precipitated perhaps by an attack on Iran or Middle East instability spreading the insurgency to
Saudi Arabia, could lead to an economic dislocation paralyzing the global economy. Such a shock
coming at the end of cheap oil but before major development of alternative energy economies could
mean the end of civilization as we know it. And there is a building new cold war with still potent
nuclear power Russia and China reacting to a belligerent, unilateralist America on record that it will
use military power to secure vital resources and to not allow any other country to threaten it's world
dominance. The world is closer to a final, nuclear, world war than at any time since the Cuban missile
crisis in 1962 with a beginning arms race and tactical confrontation over weapons in space and even
serious talk of pre-emptive nuclear attack. These three immediate threats to humanity, to each of us
now but also to future generations, are inter-related, interact upon each other, and complicate any
possible approach to individual solution. The fossil fuel energy path has taken us to a way of life that is
killing us and may lead to extinction for humanity and much of what we now recognize as nature.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 13
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
***Hard/Soft Landing***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 14
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Development of renewable energy alternatives will promote stability and decrease the
likelihood of a hard landing
Andrews, Co-founder of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil US affiliate, 08
(Steve, Energy Bulletin, "Rejecting the real snake oil," 6-27-7,
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/31362, 6-30-8)
Participation in faster development and construction of non-oil, non-gas renewable energy alternatives
to fossil fuels, and especially substitutes for oil, will therefore reduce invasion risks for oil and gas
exporter countries. The same effort will also reduce ‘threats to economic security’ of the large oil
importer nations and groups of nations. As noted above, current and future oil and gas ‘supply gaps’,
causing undersupply to markets, will become structural. This will raise the risks from failed attempts at
obtaining oil reserves or production capacity through military invasion, as in Iraq. Logically, this should lead
to renouncement of the ‘military option’ for obtaining oil and gas production capacities. The non-option of
military invasion as a ‘respose’ to declining supply and rising prices should urgently be replaced by
international cooperation and action for energy transition, featuring concerted near-term multilateral action to
first limit growth, then reduce world total oil and gas utilisation, while rapidly developing larger-scale
renewable energy systems. The double-edged sword of oil and energy prices On the one hand higher oil
prices increase world oil demand until very high prices are attained, as is very simply verified by checking
world oil demand growth, and growth of oil prices through 1999-2004. On the other hand, much higher oil
and energy prices are obligatory for rationalizing and justifying replacement and substitute energy sources,
systems and strategies in the energy economy. Neither of these two propositions are accepted. The so-called
financial community, notably the presidents of the US, European and Japanese central banks, and the IMF’s
Chief economist have in 2004 repeatedly claimed, without presenting any coherent evidence, that high or
‘extreme’ oil prices can only depress economic growth. If this happened, it would lead to a fall in world
oil demand growth, or even to zero growth of world oil demand, with actual contraction of demand
being possible if the ‘hard landing’ continued. In fact the real world, real economy does not operate this
way. Increasing oil prices tend to reinforce and increase economic growth at the world level, leading to
further oil and energy demand growth. Through the period 1999-2004, as oil prices have increased, world
oil demand growth rates have consistently increased – not decreased. To accommodate this distressing
‘reality gap’ between official mythology, and measurable economic reality, so-called ‘experts’ now add that
‘extreme priced oil’ will not hurt economic growth until about 12 months have elapsed, enabling the ‘real but
delayed action’ negative impacts of high priced oil to work through the economy. This fantasy economics is
unlikely to translate to reality unless interest rates in OECD countries are hiked to double-digit rates. Higher
priced oil will almost certainly continue to drive world economic growth until oil prices attain at least 75
USD/bbl. In addition, the first slowing impacts on economic growth of much higher oil and energy prices
will occur not in low income oil-importing countries, as repeatedly claimed by official economic mythology,
but in the most oil-intensive economies and societies of the OECD group of countries. Oil saving is therefore
of basic interest, concern and utility to the most oil-intensive, oil-wasteful economies and societies.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 16
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
Oil producers are at record highs in production and prices are still likely to remain high.
Simpson, Staff Writer, 08
(Scott, The Vancouver Sun, “Oil shock looms as prices stay high,” 7/2,
http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=7325c853-fbef-49c2-b714-3fb72eac145f, date accessed:
7/6/08
Oil producers around the world are working flat out, but still can't get far enough ahead of demand to
cause prices to fall, the International Energy Agency said Tuesday in a study of oil price trends through
2013. That means consumers hoping for a drop in gasoline prices to dampen some of the impact of the
B.C. carbon tax that came into effect on Tuesday should stop holding their breath. The agency, which
analyses national and international energy supply trends for countries including Canada, says market
fundamentals are behind the doubling of oil prices over the past 12 months. "OPEC [the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries] production is at record highs and non-OPEC producers are working
at full throttle, but stocks show no unusual build [of supply]," the report said.
Oil prices will remain high at least for the next five years.
Simpson, Staff Writer, 08
(Scott, The Vancouver Sun, “Oil shock looms as prices stay high,” 7/2,
http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=7325c853-fbef-49c2-b714-3fb72eac145f, date accessed:
7/6/08
Speculation by commodity traders is dismissed as the main reason oil prices are up. "Fundamentals are
setting the level of oil prices. . . . Often it is a case of political expediency to find a scapegoat for higher
prices rather than undertake serious analysis or perhaps confront difficult decisions," the report says.
"History has generally shown that speculative bubbles occur when speculators cause or facilitate
speculative physical stockbuilding -- look at past bubbles in tulip bulbs, silver or even housing. A check on
oil stocks does not indicate this is happening." Instead, the report offers several reasons which acted in
combination to push prices up -- and will keep them above $110 a barrel for at least the next five years.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 21
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
Oil prices and supplies are expected to remain tight over the next five years.
Carlisle, Staff writer for New York Times, 08
(Tamsin, The National, “Oil prices will stay high for 5 years: IEA,” 7/1,
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080701/BUSINESS/665181424/1041/NEWS, date accessed: 7/6/08)
Oil markets would remain tight and prices high for the next five years, hurting global economic growth
as Opec’s cushion of spare production capacity diminished, the energy watchdog for the world’s
industrialised nations warned today. In its medium-term outlook, the International Energy Agency (IEA)
cut its forecast for both world oil supply and demand, while predicting that Opec’s spare production
capacity would contract almost 50 per cent in five years.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 22
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
There is deep pessimism over whether or not OPEC can actually control high oil prices
Chazan, International Energy Correspondent, 08
(Guy, Business, “IEA warns of five-year oil supply squeeze,” 7/3,
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23958878-36375,00.html, date accessed: 7/6/08
GLOBAL oil markets will remain tight over the next five years, the International Energy Agency has
warned, in a gloomy assessment that offers little respite for consumers battered by record high oil
prices. The view of the Paris-based energy watchdog, which is funded by the world's biggest oil consuming nations, helped push oil
prices to near record levels. Benchmark crude oil rose US97c a barrel, or 0.7 per cent, to settle at $US140.97 yesterday in New York, a
Nymex closing record. US oil futures set a new intraday high of $US143.67 a barrel on Tuesday. The IEA
predicted global oil supply capacity would rise to just 96.2 million barrels a day in 2013 from 90.4
million barrels a day this year, including crude production from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, OPEC natural gas liquids and non-OPEC production. Most of that growth would come early before sharply tapering off,
the IEA said. Between 2011 and 2013, capacity would grow by less than 1 million barrels a day annually, the IEA said. The IEA's
outlook resonated with the views of oil company executives at an industry conference in Madrid, who
said the red-hot oil market reflected deep-seated pessimism about the industry's ability to open the
spigot to satisfy rising demand.
The decline in US petroleum reserves are fueling a steep climb in crude oil prices
BBC ‘08
“Oil Prices Hit Yet Another Record” 7/3/08 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7486764.stm Accessed: 7/6/08
The price of oil has continued to climb with US light, sweet crude reaching a record closing price and
London Brent rising above $146 a barrel.
Oil prices have risen significantly since the US government announced on Wednesday that its crude
stockpiles had fallen by more than expected last week.
Brent peaked at $146.69 before falling back $146.08, while US crude added $1.72 to $145.29, having hit
$145.85. Motoring organisation the AA called the rate of increases "eye watering".
Oil prices are expected to remain tight to due western countries growth
JAHN, Associated Press Writer, 08
(GEORGE, Associated Press, “Oil supplies will remain tight, says IEA,” 7/1,
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5iD3FfO1RtoD7wE-Os7-j4SK8SKqAD91L8TIG2, date accessed; 7/6/08)
MADRID, Spain (AP) — Oil supplies will remain tight despite record prices that have reduced demand,
according to the International Energy Agency, and its executive director said Tuesday that the world is in the
grip of its third "oil shock." Downsizing its estimate of how much oil will reach the market, the IEA
predicted supply will exceed projected demand only by 2 million barrels a day — a thin cushion. The IEA is
the energy watchdog for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a grouping of the
world's most industrialized countries. In its annual Medium Term Report, it said the world's estimated daily
oil needs would rise from 86.87 million barrels this year to 94.14 million barrels in 2013 — less than it
anticipated last year, because of skyrocketing prices. The agency said there will be 1.4 percent less
demand this year and 3.43 percent less in 2012, the last year for which the report gave figures. As
Western nations cut back, China and other emerging economies will consume more crude, the IEA
said.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 27
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
A global economic downturn is the most likely result of the current oil shock
AFP, 08
(Associated Foreign Press/ The Phnom Penh Press, May 29, Surging oil prices could hurt world economy,
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/200805294748/-Special-Supplements/Surging-oil-prices-could-hurt-
world-economy.html, 7/6/08)
The feared super-spike in crude oil prices that appears to be underway could deal a crippling blow to
a global economy already reeling from the US housing slump and tight credit, analysts say. Yet some
argue that the surge may be a speculative bubble, and could end up self-correcting as demand softens from
weaker economic growth and energy efficiency measures. Crude futures in May soared past the level of
$130 a barrel for the first time, having more than doubled in the past year. The jump appeared to fulfill
predictions from some analysts of a super-spike that could take oil up as far as $200 a barrel. Goldman
Sachs analyst Arjun Murti added to the speculative fever earlier this month with a dire prediction of higher
prices, citing “a lack of adequate supply growth” and still-strong demand. “The possibility of $150 to
$200 per barrel seems increasingly likely over the next six to 24 months,” he said in a research note. The
reality of sky-high energy costs could mean a darker outlook for the US and global economy, by raising
the price of a variety of goods and services. The notion of a quick recovery in the struggling US
economy would likely be put in doubt, and the rest of the world would suffer as well. “A super-super
spike would most likely put a stake in the heart of global economic growth,” says Ed Yardeni, economist
at Yardeni Research. “A global economic downturn would be the most likely outcome, led by a longer
and deeper recession in the US.” The airline industry, already reeling from the surge in the past year,
is feeling even more pain. Several small US carriers have filed for bankruptcy and American for bankruptcy
and American Airlines, the nation’s largest, announced a capacity reduction of 11 to 12 percent and other
steps to deal with soaring energy costs.
↓ Continued ↓
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 31
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
↑ Continued ↑
The budget and current account deficits are not “twin”. The budget in fact moved from large deficit in the
early 1990s into surplus in 1999-2001, while the external imbalance soared anew. But increased fiscal
shortfalls, especially with the economy nearing full employment, will intensify the need for foreign capital.
The external deficit would almost certainly rise further as a result.
Robert Rubin, former secretary of the Treasury, also stresses the psychological importance for financial
markets of expectations concerning the American budget position. If that deficit is viewed as likely to rise
substantially, without any correction in sight, confidence in America's financial instruments and currency
could crack. The dollar could fall sharply as it did in 1971-73, 1978-79, 1985-87, and 1994-95. Market
interest rates would rise substantially, and the Federal Reserve would probably have to push them still
higher to limit the acceleration of inflation.
These risks could be intensified by the change in leadership that will presumably take place at the Federal
Reserve Board in less than two years, inevitably creating new uncertainties after 25 years of superb
stewardship by Mr. Volcker and Alan Greenspan. A very hard landing is not inevitable but neither is it
unlikely.
The third component of the “America problem” is trade protectionism. The leading indicator of
American protection is not the unemployment rate, but rather overvaluation of the dollar and its
attendant external deficits, which sharply alter the politics of trade policy. It was domestic political,
rather than international financial, pressure that forced previous administrations (Nixon in 1971,
Reagan in 1985) aggressively to seek dollar depreciation. The hubbub over outsourcing and the launching of
a spate of trade actions against China are the latest cases in point. The current account and related budget
imbalances may not be sustainable for much longer, even if foreign investors and central banks prove
willing to continue funding them for a while.
The fourth big risk centers on China, which has accounted for over 20 percent of world trade growth for the
past three years. Fuelled by runaway credit expansion and unsustainable levels of investment, which recently
approached half of GDP, Chinese growth must slow. The leadership that took office in early 2003 ignored
the problem for a year. It has finally adopted a peculiar mix of market-related policies, such as higher
reserve requirements for the banks, and traditional command-and-control directives, such as cessation
of lending to certain sectors. The ultimate success of these measures is highly uncertain.
Under the best of circumstances, China's expansion will decelerate gradually but substantially from its recent
9 to 10 percent pace. When the country cooled its last excessive boom after 1992, growth declined for seven
straight years. A truly hard landing could be much more abrupt and severe. Either outcome will, to a
degree, counter the inflationary and interest-rate consequences of the other global risks. But a
slowdown, and especially a hard landing, in China would sharply reinforce their dampening effects on
world growth.
The fifth threat is energy prices. In the short run, the rapid growth of world demand, low private
inventories, shortages of refining and other infrastructure (particularly in America), continued
American purchases for its strategic reserve and fears of supply disruptions have outstripped the
possibilities for increased production. Hence prices have recently hit record highs in nominal terms.
The impact is extremely significant since every sustained rise of $10 per barrel in the world price takes
$250 billion to $300 billion (equivalent to about half a percentage point) off annual global growth for
several years. Mr. Greenspan frequently notes that all three major postwar recessions have been triggered
by sharp increases in the price of oil.
My colleague Philip Verleger concludes that this lethal combination could push the price to $60 to $70 per
barrel over the next year or two, perhaps exceeding the record high of 1980 in real terms. Gasoline prices
per gallon in America would rise from under $2 now to $2.60 in 2006. Prices would climb even more if
political or terrorist events were further to unsettle production in the Middle East, the former Soviet
Union or elsewhere.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 32
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
***Oil Shocks***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 41
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
Oil price shocks cause a crash in the economy, and abnormally low fiscal spending only
worsens their effect
EIA, Energy Information Administration, 08 (Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, Annual Energy
Outlook Analyses/EIA, January 15, Economic Effects of High Oil Prices,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/otheranalysis/aeo_2006analysispapers/efhop.html, 7/1/08)
On the potential output side, sudden large price increases create widespread uncertainty about
appropriate production techniques, purchases of new equipment and consumer durable goods like
automobiles, and wage and price negotiations. As firms and households adjust to the new conditions, some
plant and equipment will remain idle, some workers will be temporarily unemployed, and the economy
may no longer operate along its long-run production-possibility frontier. Although it is easy to
differentiate gradual from rapid price increases on a conceptual basis, empirical differentiation is more
difficult.
In terms of the state of the economy, if the economy is already suffering from high inflation and
unemployment, as in the late 1970s, then the oil price increases have the potential to cause severe
damage by limiting economic policy options. Many analysts assert that it was the monetary policy
undertaken in the 1970s that really damaged the U.S. economy.
The economic policies that are followed in response to a combination of higher inflation, higher
unemployment, lower exchange rates, and lower real output also affect the overall economic impact of
higher oil prices over the longer term. Sound economic policies may not completely eliminate the adverse
impacts of high oil prices described above, but they can moderate them. Conversely, inappropriate
economic policies can exacerbate the adverse impacts. Overly contractionary monetary and fiscal
policies to contain inflationary pressures can worsen the recessionary effects on income and
unemployment; expansionary monetary and fiscal policies may simply delay the fall in real income
necessitated by the increase in oil prices, stoke inflationary pressures, and worsen the impact of higher prices
in the long run.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 50
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
***Peak Oil***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 52
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
Peak Oil has already come, we will not be able to produce at a higher rate
Elliott, economics editor, 2008
(Larry, The Guardian, “$135 and rising ... has cheap oil gone for ever?” May 24,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/may/24/oil.commodities, Accessed on 7/11/08)
Economic theory suggests that rising prices encourage rising supplies, but investment in the oil industry is
expensive and takes a long time to bear fruit. In the past, oil companies have had their fingers badly
burned when prices have crashed and they are wary of over-committing. The International Monetary
Fund said the boom has led to higher investment but much of it has been soaked up by shortages of
equipment and skilled personnel.
"Oil will increasingly come from unconventional sources, because output has declined from peak levels
at conventional fields in many countries, and the size of oilfields is getting smaller on average. This
does not mean that the world is about to run out of oil, but it suggests that higher oil prices are needed
to induce the additional investment required to balance the market over the medium term."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 54
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Oil Toolkit
Preparing for peak oil will require at least a decade in order to avoid complete devastation;
action must be taken now
Hirsch, Senior energy program adviser for Science Applications International Corporation and
Senior Energy Advisor at MISI, 05
(Robert L., Minnesotans for Sustainability, "Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts,
Mitigation, & Risk Management," 2-5,
http://www.mnforsustain.org/oil_peaking_of_world_oil_production_study_hirsch.htm, 7-2-8)
The peaking of world oil production presents the U.S. and the world with an unprecedented risk
management problem. As peaking is approached, liquid fuel prices and price volatility will increase
dramatically, and, without timely mitigation, the economic, social, and political costs will be
unprecedented. Viable mitigation options exist on both the supply and demand sides, but to have
substantial impact, they must be initiated more than a decade in advance of peaking. In 2003, the world
consumed just under 80 million barrels per day (MM bpd) of oil. U.S. consumption was almost 20 MM bpd,
two-thirds of which was in the transportation sector. The U.S. has a fleet of about 210 million automobiles
and light trucks (vans, pick-ups, and SUVs). The average age of U.S. automobiles is nine years. Under
normal conditions, replacement of only half the automobile fleet will require 10-15 years. The average
age of light trucks is seven years. Under normal conditions, replacement of one-half of the stock of light
trucks will require 9-14 years. While significant improvements in fuel efficiency are possible in
automobiles and light trucks, any affordable approach to upgrading will be inherently time-
consuming, requiring more than a decade to achieve significant overall fuel efficiency improvement.
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Our oil will be depleted within our lifetimes according to the most optimistic projections,
and problems will start far before then
Woodard, Executive Editor of AskQuestions.org, 05
(Cheryl, Ask Questions, "Facing the End of Oil," 2-16-5,
http://www.askquestions.org/articles/oil/oil.pdf, 7-2-8)
The world’s oil supplies could last 40 years or more, according to some projections. But serious trouble
starts when ready supplies begin to decline, long before we get to the last drop. And many experts
believe that we’re already there. Best Case Scenario: The 2004 British Petroleum Statistical Review of
World Energy gave the most optimistic projection we could find, predicting that global oil reserves will
be gone in 2045, based on known reserves and current rates of consumption, called the R/P ratio. By the
same measure, US reserves will be exhausted in 2015. Optimists sometimes extend the 41 years by
including 'unconventional' oil supplies, like the oil tar sands in Canada, even though getting at that oil
sometimes causes more trouble than it's worth. The US Department of Energy offers a fairly pessimistic
assessment of Canadian oil supplies for instance, noting the Canadian political will to protect the
environment, the inefficiency of extraction methods, and the hazards of extraction, "Oil sands projects
are large, use considerable amounts of energy, particularly natural gas, and release both gaseous and
particulate emissions into the atmosphere. Although the oil sands processes have become more efficient and
have reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per unit of production, an increase in output could lead to an
increase in total emissions. Other environmental challenges associated with oil sands processing are
disposing of tailings, wastewater management, and land reclamation." We dare not count on Canadian oil
sands to replace dwindling supplies in other parts of the world. Forty-one years doesn’t seem like a very
long time before the world’s oil completely runs out. And yet, outside of the oil industry, many believe the
end will come much sooner.
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Peak oil will devastate global economies; the oil crisis will be exacerbated by the ever-
diminishing supply
Lundberg, Former analyst for the petroleum industries and founder of the Alliance for a Paving Moratorium and
the Auto-Free Times magazine, 04
(Jan, Blue, "Here comes the nutcracker: Peak oil in a nutshell," 9-20-4, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/4404, 7-
3-8)
If peak oil means we are at a half-way point, does this mean we now have years to either plan energy
use or get used to recession, as claimed by many a writer on peak oil? Before the reader makes
assumptions on how society may utilize the remaining store of petroleum, let me repeat what I told The
Institute of Petroleum in London two years ago (on February 17, 2003): "What the world went through in
1979’s oil crisis, which my former company warned of in the U.S., based on our projection of a 9% shortfall
in gasoline deliveries, can happen again. The difference will be that global production of oil will be
falling instead of increasing." This means that the next tough oil shortage, even if it is not
acknowledged as a post-peak oil extraction phenomenon of diminishing supply, will cripple the
globalized economy. Understanding of both the economics and social dynamics of collapse is rare, and even
when it is present there is an absence of taking into account the "market factor" in ushering in collapse.
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↓ Morris Continued ↓
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A second aspect of the loss of oil might hurt the farmer's productivity even more. The American farmer presently uses large quantities of
synthetic fertilizers, insecticides, weed killers, and rodent poisons to increase and protect his crop. All of these things are presently produced
from the petrochemicals which come from oil. In some instances, these things can be made from coal, but this would place an even greater
strain on our coal reserves, which would then dwindle even more rapidly. They might be completely exhausted in 40 years or even less.
Today, in countries too poor to afford them, insecticides and rodent poisons are not used, and as a result these pests often claim over 50
percent of the food crop. Nor can these countries afford to purchase synthetic fertilizers. This inability further decreases their food
production from 10 to 50 percent.
With the help of gasoline and diesel powered farming machinery, synthetic fertilizers, chemical insecticides, weed killers, and rodent
poisons, one American farmer is presently capable of feeding 50 people. It wasn’t always like this, however. In the 1800s, before the advent
of diesel powered machinery and oil-based insecticides, weed killers, rodent poisons, and synthetic fertilizers, 9 out of 10 Americans were
farmers and were forced to work long hours to keep everyone fed.
Then, in more recent times, diesel powered machinery and the chemical products the farmer presently relies on came into common use. 'Me
American farmer's productivity increased spectacularly with the addition of each new chemical tool. As each individual farmer's
productivity increased, fewer and fewer people were needed as farmers, and tens of millions of people left the farm and headed for the city.
Most of these people became factory workers, but some became scientists, teachers, sanitation technicians, doctors, and nurses.
We Become a Nation of Farmers Again
When our oil is exhausted and the farmer's productivity has dropped, it will once again be necessary for most of us to become farmers.
Although each American farmer was able to feed 50 people in 1986, after the loss of our oil he'll be lucky to produce enough food to be able
to feed his immediate family. This was the way it was before oil-based chemical products and fuels came into use, and we have no reason to
believe that it'll be any different after we've lost them.
The only way to compensate for this loss of individual productivity would be to drastically increase the number of farmers. Otherwise, not
enough food will be produced to keep people fed. This would necessitate a massive relocation from city to farm for over 240 million
Americans.
As you might expect, the relocation of over 240 million people to areas having little or no housing surplus would be a tremendous problem,
and it would put a severe stress on the nations home building industry. With electrical production, sawmills, and roofing manufacturers
virtually out of business, it would be impossible to build even enough sheds to house this many people. And, with no diesel powered
equipment, it would be next to impossible to dig the millions of septic systems and wells needed. Nor would it be easy to supply this many
new "homes" with electricity. With our factories shut down and no fuel available to operate heavy mining equipment, where would the
thousands of miles of copper or aluminum wire come from? Plainly, most Americans would be forced to live in sheds having no heat,
electricity, running water, or bathrooms. But, at least they would be close enough to the land to plant the food they would need to survive.
As doctors, sanitation workers, plant and animal pathologists, teachers, and research scientists were forced to become farmers, we'd lose the
services of these highly specialized, valuable people. In only a short time, the age old diseases such as malaria, cholera, typhoid fever,
tuberculosis, bubonic plague, and hookworm would rise from the backwaters of civili zation where they have been lurking, to once again
threaten mankind with great epidemics. There simply wouldrA be enough sanitation workers and medical personnel to keep these diseases
in check. And, chances are that the thousands of medicines once manufactured from oil would no longer be available.
Within 35 or 40 years after we lose our oil, coal rationing will probably be necessary. By then, most people in the industrialized nations win
have made the painful relocation from urban to rural areas where there is land, and where they can again become farmers. There will be
severe shortages of everything, including housing, food, clothing, and medicine. People will have lived through one terrible hardship or
tragedy after another, and they'll believe that nothing worse can happen. But, they will be in for a shock, because now civilizatiori!s last and
greatest catastrophe will begin.
The Great Die-Off-. Two Billion People Must Perish
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the world's farmers fed 1.6 billion people without the use of diesel
powered farm machinery, oil based synthetic fertilizers, weed killers, insecticides, and rodent poisons.
And, except for China and India, where famine killed 23 million people between 1876 and 1899, there was
little famine. But, today, the world's population isn’t 1.6 billion. It had shot up to six billion by 1999 and
is expected to top nine billion by 2050.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the use of DDT and improved sanitation in the underdeveloped countries cut the death rate and led to rapid
growth of the world's population. Soon, many dire predictions were heard regarding the world's inability to feed itself in the face of what
many termed a "population explosion." But, the world's scientists went to work on the problem and succeeded in developing such high-
yielding food crops that their success became known as the "Green Revolution." Worldwide, famine decreased to all-time lows except in
war torn countries such as Ethiopia, where a communist dictator prevented the distribution of food to drought-stricken areas of his country
unfriendly to his regime.
The surprisingly high crop yields were due not only to the geneticists' development of exceptional new strains
of old crops such as wheat and rice, but also to the use of modem high-yield farming techniques which
called for lots of fertilizer and the abundant use of chemicals to protect the crop from insect pests, weeds,
and disease.
↓ Morris Continued ↓
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Unfortunately, many of these agricultural chemicals are made from coal, natural gas, or crude oil. Of
course, once we run out of oil, all of these raw materials, including coal, either will be gone or in
increasingly short supply. When the world's farmers are denied these valuable tools, their ability to
produce food will undoubtedly plummet. It win probably be a little better than that of the farmers of the early 1900s, but not
much. One scientist estimates that we'll have to farm three times as much land as we now do to produce the same amount of food without
the tools of high-yield agriculture.' If this is correct, we will have to increase the land under cultivation by 10 million square miles, an
acreage roughly equivalent to the entire land mass of North America.
But, will this be possible? By 1967, most of the best, most fertile land had already been cleared and placed in cultivation in Asia and
Europe. Table 6.4 shows the figures for the various continents. As much as 88 percent of the potentially farmable land was already being
cultivated in Europe as early as 1967. Much the same was true of Asia.
In the 1980s and 1990s, much of the South American rain forest was cut down so this land could be used to produce food. Of course, not all
land is suitable for growing food. Some land is too far north or south and has too short a growing season. Some land is too wet, or too dry. A
lot of land lacks the humus or necessary minerals needed by crops. Little grows in the desert, or on a mountaintop. Only 8 percent of the
land in Russia is considered farmable. In China, where one-fifth of the world's people live, only ten percent of the land is farmable.
Further, since it wont be possible to use coal or oil to produce synthetic fibers such as Orlon and Dacron, much of the arable land remaining
will have to be used to grow fibers such as cotton and flax for clothing. More land will have to be provided as pasture for draft animals--
unless we plan to pull the plows ourselves. And, of course, if we plan on eating meat, making shoes out of leather, or wearing wool,
pastureland must be pro vided for cattle, pigs, and sheep.
We'll also have to keep some land in trees if we want to be able to repair any wooden structures or build any new ones. And, presumably,
we'll need some paper, which means more land in trees. Of course, wood will probably be the most widely used fuel except for coal, and as
our coal runs out we'll have to rely more and more on wood.
Finally, without the insecticides and medicines now produced from fossil fuels, larger acreages will have to be used to grow crops such as
the flower from which the insecticide pyrethrum can be obtained. Plainly, we're going to have to use the land to produce a lot of things
besides food.
Let's make -the very optimistic assumption that each one of us will require an acre of land under cultivation to survive. Only about half of
this acre will be used to raise food; the other half acre will be used as previously described. Of course, insects, rodents, and plant and animal
diseases will take a significant toll on whatever is raised on this acre. How many countries have enough land to meet this one acre per
person minimum?
Even today most of the industrialized countries have far more people than they have farmable acres. Japan has 10 people per farmable acre,
South Korea, eight people per acre, and China, four people per acre. In Europe, the Netherlands has 5.5 people per acre, followed by
Belgium4.94, West Germany-3.3, and Britain7-3.1. (Fortunately, the U.S. has only 0.5 person per acre.)
The grim implication in these figures is that much of Asia and Europe are simply too densely populated and have too little farmable land to
support all of their people by bare subsistence farming.
With the loss of oil and worsening shortages of coal, the production of industrial goods would be virtually
halted. Yet, without these goods to sell, these nations would lack the cash needed to buy food elsewhere.
And, even if they had the cash, there probably would not be any food to buy. Because of the worldwide
drop in agricultural productivity, even the nations which formerly exported food would probably be hard
pressed to keep their own people well fed.
The terrible consequence of this would be a massive "die-off." Any country which exceeded one person
per farmable acre would have to watch large numbers of its people starve to death or die of disease until
its population was reduced to one person per farmable acre.
Combined, Japan and South Korea would have to bury 147 million people, and each survivor would have
to dig nine graves using only a shovel. China and India would have to dig over 1. 1 billion graves, and the
nations of Europe would have to bury over 150 million victims of famine and disease.
Japan would lose 90 percent of its people, and China 75 percent. In Europe, the population of West
Germany would decrease by almost 70 percent. Even Britain would lose 68 percent of her people.
The total death toll from this great catastrophe could easily exceed two or three billion people worldwide,
or from 40 percent to 60 percent of the earth’s population. Table 6.5 shows how some of the nations of the
world would be affected by this catastrophe.
Of course, not everyone who died would starve to death. As people weakened they would become more
susceptible to disease, and great epidemics of the age-old killers of people would sweep over the entire
world. And, these horrifying conditions would undoubtedly lead to a complete breakdown of civilization
and give birth to incredibly barbaric times, as people looted, stole, and killed in hopes of gaining enough
food to survive, rather than starving to death. Starvation would push even ordinary people to incredible
savagery.
↓ Morris Continued ↓
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↑ Morris Continued ↑
There Have Been Other Warnings
This is not the first warning of this great catastrophe. In 1954, in The Challenge of Man’s Future, Harrison
Brown wrote:
If our energy resources dwindle, our industrial technology will dwindle, and life expectancy and population will
slowly dwindle with it. Consumption of the earth’s store of fossil fuels has barely started; yet, already we can
see the end. The age of fossil fuels will be over, not to be repeated for perhaps another 100 million years.
Will its passing mark the end of civilization and perhaps the beginning of the downward path to man’s
extinction?
Later in the same book, Brown says "[The] collapse of machine civilization would be accompanied by
starvation, disease, and death on a scale difficult to comprehend."' Of Harrison Brown’s effort, Albert
Einstein said, "We may well be grateful to Harrison Brown," and, "This objective book has high value."9 In
1977, England's honored scientist Sir Fred Hoyle, writing in Energy or Extinction? added his voice to Brown’s:
There can be no disagreement with the statement that world reserves of coal, oil, and gas can provide an
adequate energy source for only a limited future...
Nor can it be contested that most of the world's population, presently 4,000 million, will die in a disastrous
catastrophe should an adequate energy source not have been developed by the time that reserves of coal,
oil, and gas become exhausted.
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***Resource Wars***
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Dependence to oil causes massive overreach, and solving for the oil crisis will prevent an
economic collapse and terrorism
Smith and Kelly, The Washington Post, 2006
(Frederick and P. X., “Are We Ready for the Next Oil Shock?”, August 11, pg A19)
The magnitude of our dependence on oil puts stress on our military, strengthens our strategic
adversaries and undermines our efforts to support democratic allies. Each year the United States
expends enormous military resources protecting the chronically vulnerable oil production and
distribution network while also preparing to guarantee international access to key oil-producing
regions. This allocation of forces and dollars diminishes the military's capability for dealing with the
war on terrorism and other defense priorities. Considering the potentially devastating impact of an oil
crisis, the time has come for new voices, especially those of business leaders and retired national security
officials, to join the call for meaningful government action to reduce projected U.S. oil consumption. Our
respective personal experiences -- running a global transportation and logistics company and spearheading
the establishment of an independent U.S. Central Command in the Middle East -- convince us that America's
extreme dependence on oil is an unacceptable threat to national security and prosperity. During the coming
months, we will be co-chairing the Energy Security Leadership Council, a new and intensive effort by
business executives and retired military officers to advance a national energy strategy for reducing
U.S. oil dependence. Although drawn from very different backgrounds, the members of the council are
united in the belief that a fundamental shift in energy policy can prevent an unprecedented economic
and national security calamity.
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↓ Continued ↓
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↑ Kurlantzick Continued ↑
deal with Iran in which it will spend as much as $100 billion on future supplies of Iranian petroleum,
and Iran has become one of China’s biggest arms clients. To keep strong links with Sudan, which sends
roughly half of all its oil to China, Beijing has provided weapons to the Khartoum regime, despite
international pressure in the wake of the Darfur genocide. Over the past decade, China has been building
other types of alliances as well — training other countries’ army officers, for instance, with the kind of
education programs once dominated by the Pentagon. In the Philippines, where the military historically had
deep ties to America and where China has inked a joint offshore oil exploration deal, one top defense official
says many of his leading officers now head to China for short courses. “This is now considered relatively
prestigious, to go to China,” agrees Philippine defense analyst Rommel Banlaoi. “That wouldn’t have been
true a few years ago.” In oil-rich Venezuela, China has been training defense satellite technicians, elite
forces, and other military personnel. China has also helped Hugo Chavez revamp his oil infrastructure,
and Venezuela’s president has vowed to roughly triple his shipments to Beijing in the coming years. In
Central Asia, Chinese oil companies, aided by large loan and aid packages from Chinese state-linked
banks, have helped leading petroleum producers in that region orient new pipelines toward China.
And with Central Asian nations that themselves possess aging, post-Soviet armed forces, China has
become a major military player.China is only one of the drivers in the new global arms race. Playing
off its role as both energy supplier and, in some cases, consumer, Russia has increased its arms sales to
border nations in the Caspian region in order to further its energy links. In Central Asia, the Kremlin
has stepped up training for local militaries, and in Indonesia, one of the world’s largest gas producers,
then-Russian President Vladimir Putin last summer signed a deal to sell some $6 billion in new
weapons. Under Putin, the Kremlin also vowed to rebuild its navy. “It’s clear that a new arms race is
unfolding in the world,” Putin declared just before leaving office. India has been building its arsenal,
too, launching a massive ballistic missile program. Singapore has vastly upgraded its forces, and in the
Middle East, Saudi Arabia recently bought billions of dollars’ worth of new fighter jets from Europe,
new spending nearly matched by some of the other Gulf states. In part to counter the efforts of Russia
and China, Washington and other leading industrialized powers are building their own military links
— and again, these have little to do with ideological agreement. With Australia, Singapore, Japan, and
India — three democracies and one essentially authoritarian state — Washington has started holding
joint military exercises, including a vast war game last summer at virtually the same time as Peace
Mission 2007. On a recent visit to India by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, another top defense official
told reporters that the Pentagon was building ties to India “as a hedge” against China. In the Caspian
region, the United States is building its own military-energy ties. Over the past decade, it has boosted
defense links to nations like Azerbaijan and Georgia critical to petroleum pipelines serving America,
while simultaneously offering public White House meetings to Caspian leaders — even to Azeri President
Ilham Aliyev, accused of massive fraud in the past election. Across oil-rich Central Asia, the Pentagon has
negotiated deals to allow US forces to operate out of bases in many Central Asian states, and is now
cultivating Turkmenistan — a major gas producer where, since the death of its long-ruling autocratic
leader, the nation has taken some tentative steps to re-engage with the West. In the Middle East, the United
States is also building a new alliance to contain Iran’s influence. Over the past year, the Bush
administration aggressively pressured Congress to allow Washington to sell some $20 billion worth of
arms to Saudi Arabia in order to build up a bulwark against Iran. In many ways, these new deals echo
the old “Great Game,” the competition among Western powers for influence in Central Asia. But today
the situation is far more complex: With so much money in the hands of resource-rich countries, the line
is now much fuzzier between major powers and the developing nations whose resources they are
sparring over. It is also risky. Although this new arms race might produce nothing more than bigger toys for
the Pentagon and the People’s Liberation Army, many defense and energy experts think this is unlikely. The
buildup could push opponents toward damaging standoffs, as in the Cold War, and even escalate into
real clashes. In some arenas, the new alliances already seem to be sparking conflict. With China’s more
sophisticated submarine fleet increasingly moving into seas claimed by Japan, and Japan’s own self-defense
forces becoming more aggressive, Japan publicly exposed Chinese sub incursions, leading to perhaps the
worst downturn in Beijing-Tokyo relations in recent memory.
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China’s aggressive energy policies are leading them into conflict with the US over Oil
Mellor and Lim, The International Herald Tribune, 2006
(William and Le-Min, “China Drills Where Others Dare Not Seek Oil”, October 2, pg. 16)
China's oil consumption has almost quadrupled to 7.4 million barrels a day, making China the No. 2
consumer, behind the United States and ahead of Japan. As demand soars, production at China's biggest
oil field, Daqing, is in decline. ''There's no gentle way of saying this,'' said Han Wenke, deputy director
of the Beijing-based Energy-Research Institute, which is linked to the government. ''We need to find
oil fast.'' In its search, China is scouring the backwaters of the world, from monsoon-lashed Myanmar to the
deserts of Iran, to the deep seas off Sudan and North Korea, cutting deals with governments that the United
States and many other countries consider pariahs. China's oil diplomacy is putting the country on a
collision course with the United States and Western Europe, which have imposed sanctions on some of
the countries where China is doing business. ''China is so desperate for energy resources that they will
take the heat from the international community,'' said Mike Green, an analyst at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Case in point: Iran. The United States and Europe are
pushing the United Nations to impose sanctions because of Tehran's refusal to suspend uranium enrichment
programs. Although China, a permanent member of the Security Council, supported the world body's demand
that Iran curtail the program, it has threatened to veto any measures imposing sanctions. ''This is the first test
of whether the world can influence China, or China influence the world,'' Green said. Around the globe,
from Angola to Venezuela, China is locked in competition for oil resources with Western countries and
another emerging-market giant, India. China's search for oil is driven by its growing economic might.
Over the past 28 years, the Chinese economy has grown at an average of 9.7 percent a year; in the
quarter ended in June, it grew at 11.3 percent. In the first half of 2006, China imported 522,000 barrels a day
from Angola, its largest supplier; 464,000 barrels from Saudi Arabia; and about 338,000 barrels each from
Iran and Russia. ''I see China and the U.S. coming into conflict over energy in the years ahead,'' said Jin
Riguang, a Chinese government oil and natural gas adviser and a member of the Standing Committee
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
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China and the Us will be in direct competition for oil, causing resource wars
Ross, Political grass-roots activist, 04
(David, ZNet Venezuela, " Plan War and the Hubbert Oil Curve, An Interview with Richard
Heinberg," 4-16-4, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/73, 7-3-8)
So that’s Plan A, and it doesn’t look like it’s going to have a very happy ending because one can foresee
more and more armed conflicts between heavily militarized consuming nations and poorer resource-
rich producer nations. And eventually, there will be conflicts between competing consuming nations.
China, for example, wants to industrialize. China is using more and more oil every year. If the Chinese
are going to raise their standard of living and industrialize, they’re going to need lots of oil. But if
global oil production peaks, that means the Chinese will be in direct competition for every barrel of oil
with the already developed countries like the U.S. So, how are we going to work that out? Using nuclear
bombs? I hope not, but right now I don’t see any other thinking going on.
The US is already taking military precautions to secure oil resources against China
Roberts, Author of "The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World," 04
(Paul, The Washington Post, "The Undeclared Oil War," 6-27-4,
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/842, 7-3-8)
In other words, we are on the cusp of a new kind of war -- between those who have enough energy and
those who do not but are increasingly willing to go out and get it. While nations have always competed
for oil, it seems more and more likely that the race for a piece of the last big reserves of oil and natural
gas will be the dominant geopolitical theme of the 21st century.
Already we can see the outlines. China and Japan are scrapping over Siberia. In the Caspian Sea region,
European, Russian, Chinese and American governments and oil companies are battling for a stake in
the big oil fields of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In Africa, the United States is building a network of
military bases and diplomatic missions whose main goal is to protect American access to oilfields in
volatile places such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and tiny Sao Tome -- and, as important, to deny that
access to China and other thirsty superpowers.
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Japan and China are currently waging a diplomatic war over oil resources
Roberts, Author of "The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World," 04
(Paul, The Washington Post, "The Undeclared Oil War," 6-27-4,
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/842, 7-3-8)
While some debate whether the war in Iraq was or was not "about oil," another war, this one involving
little but oil, has broken out between two of the world's most powerful nations.
For months China and Japan have been locked in a diplomatic battle over access to the big oil fields in
Siberia. Japan, which depends entirely on imported oil, is desperately lobbying Moscow for a 2,300-
mile pipeline from Siberia to coastal Japan. But fast-growing China, now the world's second-largest oil
user, after the United States, sees Russian oil as vital for its own "energy security" and is pushing for a
1,400-mile pipeline south to Daqing.
The petro-rivalry has become so intense that Japan has offered to finance the $5 billion pipeline, invest $7
billion in development of Siberian oil fields and throw in an additional $2 billion for Russian "social
projects" -- this despite the certainty that if Japan does win Russia's oil, relations between Tokyo and
Beijing may sink to their lowest, potentially most dangerous, levels since World War II.
Increased demand from China, India, and Brazil complicates the US's quest for energy
security
Roberts, Author of "The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World," 04
(Paul, The Washington Post, "The Undeclared Oil War," 6-27-4,
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/842, 7-3-8)
Asia's undeclared oil war is but the latest reminder that in a global economy dependent largely on a
single fuel -- oil -- "energy security" means far more than hardening refineries and pipelines against
terrorist attack. At its most basic level, energy security is the ability to keep the global machine humming --
that is, to produce enough fuels and electricity at affordable prices that every nation can keep its
economy running, its people fed and its borders defended. A failure of energy security means that the
momentum of industrialization and modernity grinds to a halt. And by that measure, we are failing.
In the United States and Europe, new demand for electricity is outpacing the new supply of power and
natural gas and raising the specter of more rolling blackouts. In the "emerging" economies, such as
Brazil, India and especially China, energy demand is rising so fast it may double by 2020. And this only
hints at the energy crisis facing the developing world, where nearly 2 billion people -- a third of the
world's population -- have almost no access to electricity or liquid fuels and are thus condemned to a
medieval existence that breeds despair, resentment and, ultimately, conflict.
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China needs to find another source to fill its oil needs other than the Spratly islands,
otherwise the US and China will end up in a war
Miller, Commander US Navy, 2002
(Mark, “Maintaining Peace in the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands: Are there Acceptable Alternatives to the
US Naval Forces Forwad Deployed in the Asia Pacific Region?)
One can make an argument that it is not in China's best interest to claim the potential oil and natural gas
resources of the Spratlys and their surrounding waters by military force. However, the U.S. must be
postured with the capability to dissuade deter and defeat if necessary any seizure by force. Upsetting
the regional balance of power by a seizure of the Spratlys does not now seem to be in China's interest
but her long term natural resource and energy needs are a growing concern. Additionally any disruption
of the shipping lanes in the South China Sea is clearly not in China's interest as it would severely effect her
economy which relies heavily on such shipping. However, China has long espoused her territorial claims
over the Spratlys which are somewhat similar to claims she makes on Taiwan. It can not be overlooked that
China has repeatedly made small scale military incursions into the area to reaffirm her sovereignty claims.
Failure of the U.S. to be able to dissuade or deter potential Chinese aggression would lead to a power
vacuum in the region with the Chinese being the nation most likely to fill the vacuum.
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There is a lack of ability for China to secure energy resources in the Middle East because of
the United States increasing dependence gives China no room to enter
Blanche, Writer for Global News Wire, 2002
(Ed, Global News Wire; Arabies Trends “China Turns to the Gulf” January 1st, Lexis)
Chinese concerns about energy security have been heightened by the likelihood of a US war against
Iraq. This has accelerated efforts to diversify its energy sources away from those in the Middle East.
But, as with the Americans who are seeking to do the same thing, the hard fact is that the Middle East,
which sits on 65 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, is going to be primary source of energy for
decades to come. Even as China seeks to diversify its oil and gas imports in Asia, after 2010 there will
be few countries in that region still able to export. Indonesia and Malaysia, long the region's largest
exporters, are expected to become net oil importers themselves between 2005 and 2010. For Beijing, the
Middle East's remoteness creates strategic vulnerabilities. The prospect of terrorist attacks on oil installations
and tanker traffic has only heightened security concerns and caused dilemmas for China. The United States,
the main military power in the region, guarantees the security of oil supplies, and Beijing is thus dependent
on Washington in this regard. Given the strained relations between them, this is not a position that gives
China's leadership much comfort. This rivalry is intensifying as China moves towards becoming East Asia's
dominant power, challenging the Americans while increasingly competing for energy supplies. "China's
increased dependence on Middle Eastern oil is bound to affect its attitude and behavior in the region,
as in East Asia," according to Wu Lei of the School of International Relations at Yunnan University.
"However, if the US continues to dominate the Middle East, there may be little room there for the
Chinese to gain a political and military foothold. Because its ambitions are more limited than those of
the US, Russia, and even Iraq, Iran and Turkey, China has the advantage of a lack of political baggage, which
has helped to broaden its involvement with a few oil producers in the Middle East," Wu wrote in a recent
paper. "Although concerns about oil security have brought China's interests closer to those of the oil-
dependent West and Japan and Korea, there are many reasons to believe that China will have to take a
different tack from them. Firstly, China is a new actor in Middle Eastern and international oil
markets. Secondly in the Middle East the influence wielded by Western powers led by the US is so
great that there is little room for China to secure a beachhead.
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A war over the Spratly islands would lead to a US-China Nuclear war
The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), 1995
(“Developing Asian nations should be allowed a grace period to allow their economies to grow before being
subjected to trade liberalization demands, says Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad”, July 3rd, pg. 15,
Lexis)
Mahathir sees Asia developing in three possible ways in future. In his worst-case scenario, Asian countries
would go to war against each other, possibly over disputes such as their conflicting claims on the
Spratly Islands. China might then declare war on the U.S., leading to full-scale, even nuclear, war.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 94
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Oil Dependence Bad - War with Russia in the Arctic Circle (1/2)
The US and Russia are preparing for an oil war in the arctic circle
Cook, Financial Post.com Writer, 2008
(Bradley, Financial Post “Russian Army Trains for Arctic Resource War”, June 24th,
http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=610362, Date Accessed: July 3, 2008)
Russia's military is training its forces for combat in the Arctic to protect its claims to resources on the
continental shelf. "After the heads of several countries disputed Russia's rights to the resource-rich Arctic Ocean shelf," the military
"immediately" began adapting its training plans for units "that might be called upon to fight in the Arctic," Lieutenant General Vladimir
Shamanov said in an interview published on Tuesday in Krasnaya Zvezda, or Red Star, the army's newspaper. The Arctic shelf
may hold 10 billion tons of oil equivalent, as well as gold, nickel and diamonds, according to the Russian
government, which sent a mini-submarine to plant a flag beneath the polar cap in August. Danish
Science Minister Helge Sander called the move "a joke," while Canada responded by saying it would move
troops to its north to assert Arctic sovereignty. General Shamanov, head of training for the military, said
special preparation for Russian troops is needed because "modern wars are won and lost long before
they start." The U.S. recently held a 12-day military exercise in Alaska called Northern Edge 2008 with
5,000 troops after contesting Russia's polar claim. Russian military trainers "can't ignore such facts,"
he said. The U.S., Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark, the countries bordering the Arctic Ocean, pledged
at a meeting in Greenland last month to honor international law and work to reduce tension as they all seek
ownership of natural resources in the area.
Conflict is expected to result from the arctic circle due to oil supplies
Rayment, Defense Correspondent, 08
(Sean, Telegraph, “Russia accused of annexing the Arctic for oil reserves by Canada,” 5/18,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1976314/Russia-accused-of-annexing-the-Arctic-for-oil-
reserves-by-Canada.html, date accessed: 7/3/08)
It has reinforced fears that Moscow intends to annex "unlawfully" a vast portion of the ice-covered
Arctic, beneath which scientists believe up to 10 billion tons of gas and oil could be buried. Russian
ambition for control of the Arctic has provoked Canada to double to $40 million (£20.5 million) funding for
work to map the Arctic seabed in support its claim over the territory. The Russian ice breakers patrol huge
areas of the frozen ocean for months on end, cutting through ice up to 8ft thick. There are thought to be eight
in the region, dwarfing the British and American fleets, neither of which includes nuclear-powered ships. Canada also plans to open an
army training centre for cold-weather fighting at Resolute Bay and a deep-water port on the northern tip of Baffin Island, both of which
are close to the disputed region. The country's defence ministry intends to build a special fleet of patrol boats to guard the North West
Passage. The crisis has raised the spectre of Russia and the West joining in a new cold war over the
Arctic unless the United Nations can resolve the dispute.
Russia claiming territory in the arctic could cause confrontation between the US and
Russia
Frolov, former director of the National Laboratory for Foreign Policy, 07
(Vladimir, Russia profile, ”The Coming Conflict in the Arctic,” 7/10,
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=International&articleid=a1184076124, date accessed: 7/3/08)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush spent most of their time at the
“lobster summit” at Kennebunkport, Maine, discussing how to prevent the growing tensions between
their two countries from getting out of hand. The media and international affairs experts have been
portraying missile defense in Europe and the final status of Kosovo as the two most contentious issues
between Russia and the United States, with mutual recriminations over “democracy standards” providing
the background for the much anticipated onset of a new Cold War. But while this may well be true for today,
the stage has been quietly set for a much more serious confrontation in the non-too-distant future
between Russia and the United States – along with Canada, Norway and Denmark. Russia has recently
laid claim to a vast 1,191,000 sq km (460,800 sq miles) chunk of the ice-covered Arctic seabed. The claim
is not really about territory, but rather about the huge hydrocarbon reserves that are hidden on the seabed
under the Arctic ice cap. These newly discovered energy reserves will play a crucial role in the global
energy balance as the existing reserves of oil and gas are depleted over the next 20 years.
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Oil Dependence Bad - War with Russia in the Arctic Circle (2/2)
The Arctic Circle will become ground zero for an oil war between US and Russia
Chossudovsky, Editor of Global Research: Center for research on globalization, author of “The globalization of
poverty” and Americas War on ‘Terrorism’ ‘07
Michel, Global Research, “North American Integration and Militarization of the Arctic” 8/20/07
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6586 Accessed: 7/3/08
The Battle for the Arctic is part of a global military agenda of conquest and territorial control. It has
been described as a New Cold War between Russia and America.
Washington's objective is to secure territorial control, on behalf of the Anglo-American oil giants, over
extensive Arctic oil and natural gas reserves. The Arctic region could hold up to 25% of the World's oil
and gas reserves, according to some estimates. (Moscow Times, 3 August 2007). These estimates are
corroborated by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): "The real possibility exists that you could have another
world class petroleum province like the North Sea." (quoted by CNNMoney.com, 25 October 2006)
From Washington's perspective, the battle for the Arctic is part of broader global military agenda.
It is intimately related to the process of North American integration under the Security and Prosperity
Partnership Agreement (SPP) and the proposed North American Union (NAU). The SPP envisages, under the
auspices of a proposed "multiservice [North American] Defense Command", the militarization of a vast
territory extending from the Caribbean basin to the Canadian Arctic.
It also bears a relationship to America's hegemonic objectives in different parts of the World including
the Middle East. The underlying economic objective of US military operations is the conquest,
privatization and appropriation of the World's reserves of fossil fuel. The Arctic is no exception. The
Arctic is an integral part of the "Battle for Oil". It is one of the remaining frontiers of untapped
energy reserves.
High demand for oil will leading to military confrontation with Russia over the arctic circle
Zabarenko Writer at Commondreams, ‘08
CommonDreams News center “Could Arctic Ice Melt Spawn A New Type of Cold War?”
March 9th 2008 http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/03/09/7571/ Accessed: 7/3/08
WASHINGTON - With oil above $100 a barrel and Arctic ice melting faster than ever, some of the world’s
most powerful countries — including the United States and Russia — are looking north to a possible
energy bonanza.
This prospective scramble for buried Arctic mineral wealth made more accessible by freshly melted
seas could bring on a completely different kind of cold war, a scholar and former Coast Guard officer
says.
While a U.S. government official questioned the risk of polar conflict, Washington still would like to join a
25-year-old international treaty meant to figure out who owns the rights to the oceans, including the Arctic
Ocean. So far, the Senate has not approved it.
Unlike the first Cold War, dominated by tensions between the two late-20th century superpowers, this
century’s model could pit countries that border the Arctic Ocean against each other to claim mineral
rights. The Arctic powers include the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway.
The irony is that the burning of fossil fuels is at least in part responsible for the Arctic melt — due to climate
change — and the Arctic melt could pave the way for a 21st century rush to exploit even more fossil fuels.
The stakes are enormous, according to Scott Borgerson of the Council on Foreign Relations, a former U.S.
Coast Guard lieutenant commander.
The Arctic could hold as much as one-quarter of the world’s remaining undiscovered oil and gas deposits,
Borgerson wrote in the current issue of the journal Foreign Affairs.
Russia has claimed 460,000 square miles (1.191 million sq km) of Arctic waters, with an eye-catching
effort that included planting its flag on the ocean floor at the North Pole last summer. Days later, Moscow
sent strategic bomber flights over the Arctic for the first time since the Cold War.
“I think you can say planting a flag on the sea bottom and renewing strategic bomber flights is provocative,”
Borgerson said in a telephone interview.
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Resources are the final straw, pushing many countries into conflicts
Victor, professor at Stanford Law School; director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development;
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 07 (David G., The National Interest/Columbia International
Affairs Online, Nov/Dec, What Resource Wars?, http://www.ciaonet.org/cgi-
bin/dkv/ciao/querystring.pl?rq=0&ht=0&qp=&col=ciao&qc=ciao&qt=india+resource+war&x=0&y=0, 7/3/08)
Other lethal terror networks, such as Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers and Ireland’s Republican Army, arose with
funding from diasporas rather than oil or other natural resources. Unlike modern state armies that require
huge infusions of capital, terror networks are usually organized to make the most of scant funds.
During the run-up in oil and gas prices, analysts have often claimed that these revenues will go to fund
terror networks; yet it is sobering to remember that Al-Qaeda came out in the late 1990s, when oil
earnings were at their lowest in recent history. Most of the tiny sums of money needed for the September
11 attacks came from that period. Al-Qaeda’s daring attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania occurred when oil-rich patrons were fretting about the inability to make ends meet at home
because revenues were so low. Ideology and organization trump money as driving forces for terrorism.
Most thinking about resource-lubed conflict has concentrated on the ways that windfalls from resources
cause violence by empowering belligerent states or sub-state actors. But the chains of cause and effect
are more varied. For states with weak governance and resources that are easy to grab, resources tend
to make weak states even weaker and raise the odds of hot conflict. This was true for Angola’s diamonds
and Nigeria’s oil, which in both cases have helped finance civil war. For states with stable authoritarian
governments—such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, most of the rest in the western Gulf, and perhaps also Russia
and Venezuela—the problem may be the opposite. A sharp decline in resource revenues can create
dangerous vacuums where expectations are high and paltry distributions discredit the established
authorities.
On balance, the windfall in oil revenues over recent years is probably breeding more conflict than
would a crash in prices. However, while a few conflicts partly trace themselves to resources, it is the
other pernicious effects of resource windfalls, such as the undermining of democratic transitions and
the failure of most resource-reliant societies to organize their economies around investment and
productivity, that matter much, much more. At best, resources have indirect and mixed effects on
conflict.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 104
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***Food Prices***
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The food crisis is spreading to the US, affecting everyone and hurting 10% of families so
far
Philpott, Food Editor of Grist, 08
(Tom, Grist, "Our Ruined Harvest," 6-13-8, http://grist.org/comments/food/2008/06/13/, 7-6-8)
When fertilizer magnate Doyle predicted famine if global agriculture didn't hit on all cylinders this year, he
probably wasn't talking about the industrial nations of North America and Western Europe. Despite our
increasingly enfeebled economy, most Americans still command enough wealth to procure sufficient
calories even if prices rise dramatically. Likely, Doyle meant the world's 850 million people who live in
conditions of persistent hunger, mostly in the southern hemisphere. For them -- many of whom have been
essentially evicted from productive farmland and pushed into cities over the past few decades -- spikes in
food prices spell devastation. But here in the United States, too, hard times seem imminent. No one can
envy the 10.9 percent of U.S. families who already lacked sufficient access to food as of 2006. That
number will surely grow as the economy weakens. Bad weather and big ag are tossing shoppers around.
And you don't have to be poor to feel the pinch of higher grocery bills. "You know those complaints
you've been hearing about high food prices? They've just begun," a commodity trader told The New
York Times Thursday.
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Global famine caused by high food prices kills 25,000 people a day
Jose, Staff Writer for Commodity Online, 8
(Rinu, Commodity Online, "Food for thought: what fuels hunger?" 7-3-8,
http://www.commodityonline.com/news/topstory/Food-for-thought-What-fuels-hunger-10169-3.html, 7-12-8)
Haiti has fallen. Food riots have occurred in 22 countries, including Egypt, Yemen, Burkina Faso,
Ethiopia, Cameroon, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Madagascar, Mozambique,
Philippines and Senegal. In North Korea, where food shortages and famine have been endemic for years, the
average adolescent is 18 cm shorter than his counterpart in South Korea. Hunger has created a lost generation
(Rana Foroohar). High food prices are a matter of daily struggle, sacrifice and survival for more than
two billion people today. World Bank estimates that the current food crisis could push 100 million
people deeper into poverty.
Everyday, 25,000 people die from hunger related causes. Today, as food prices spiral out of control, the
worry is that millions more of the world’s poorest will also be lost to its savages. Beyond the numbers, it
means stolen lives and stunted futures. Governments around the world have reacted with a variety of
different measures to quell and head off disturbances as prices continue to rise and the prospect of shortages
increases. The World Food Programme calls for a $755 million aid to meet emergency needs. Food is an
amplifier of many kinds of risk, particularly political risk and its effects are traveling more rapidly
because the world is a global village now. Fuel prices have risen farther and faster than agricultural
commodities over the past few years adding fuel to the fire.
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Food prices hit the poor hardest, putting hundreds of thousands in risk of starvation.
Michel Chossudovsky Global Famine Global Research, May 2, 2008
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8877
Famine is the result of a process of "free market" restructuring of the global economy which has its roots in
the debt crisis of the early 1980s. It is not a recent phenomenon as suggested by several Western media
reports. The latter narrowly focus on short-term supply and demand for agricultural staples, while
obfuscating the broader structural causes of global famine. Poverty and chronic undernourishment is a
pre-existing condition. The recent hikes in food prices have contributed to exacerbating and
aggravating the food crisis. The price hikes are hitting an impoverished population, which has barely
the means to survive. Food riots have erupted almost simultaneously in all major regions of the
World: "Food prices in Haiti had risen on average by 40 percent in less than a year, with the cost of
staples such as rice doubling.... In Bangladesh, [in late April 2008] some 20,000 textile workers took to the
streets to denounce soaring food prices and demand higher wages. The price of rice in the country has
doubled over the past year, threatening the workers, who earn a monthly salary of just $25, with
hunger. In Egypt, protests by workers over food prices rocked the textile center of Mahalla al-Kobra, north
of Cairo, for two days last week, with two people shot dead by security forces. Hundreds were arrested, and
the government sent plainclothes police into the factories to force workers to work. Food prices in Egypt
have risen by 40 percent in the past year... Earlier this month, in the Ivory Coast, thousands marched on the
home of President Laurent Gbagbo, chanting “we are hungry” and “life is too expensive, you are going to
kill us. Similar demonstrations, strikes and clashes have taken place in Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Yemen, Ethiopia, and throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa."
(Bill Van Auken, Amid mounting food crisis, governments fear revolution of the hungry, Global Research,
April 2008)
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Oil prices are the root cause for food prices (1/2)
The small increases in food prices from ethanol use stems from the fossil fuels used to
create them
DOE and DOA, US Department of Energy and US Department of Agriculture, 08 (Responses to Questions of
Senator Bingmann, June,
http://www.energy.gov/media/Secretaries_Bodman_and_Schafer_Ltr_to_Sen_Bingaman.pdf, 6/30/08)
In order to estimate the impact of the increased production of U.S. biofuels on global food prices, one needs
to estimate the direct and indirect effects of the increased use of com and soybeans on individual commodity
prices. Last month, CEA testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about com-based
ethanol's impact on global food prices using this strategy. The analysis below continues in this spirit, but
it considers a broader category of factors and costs and a slightly different time period. Here the analysis is
updated to the 12 months ending in April, and the analysis considers a broader mix of biofuels-
focusing on com-based and soybean oil-based biofuels. Table 2 (below) presents the estimated effects of
ethanol and biodiesel production in the United States on global prices for com (maize), soybeans,
soybean meal, and soybean oil as well as the impact on the IMF global food commodity price index. It is
important to point out that the price impacts reflect greater ethanol and biodiesel production and not
only ethanol. The majority of the price increases rely on the fossil fuels used in the creation of the
biodiesel.The estimated impacts on global food prices are consistent with the estimates in response to
Question 1. We estimate that the percentage increase in price ofcom from April 2007 to April 2008
would have been 23 percent lower in the absence of any growth in biofuel production in the United
States. Based on this analysis, we estimate that the price of com would have increased by
47.5 percent assuming no growth in biofuel production in the United States, down from the actual
increase of61.7 percent, from April 2007 to April 2008.
Biofuel production is a negligible contributor to rising food prices, energy costs are to
blame
DOE and DOA, US Department of Energy and US Department of Agriculture, 08 (Responses to Questions
of Senator Bingmann, June,
http://www.energy.gov/media/Secretaries_Bodman_and_Schafer_Ltr_to_Sen_Bingaman.pdf, 6/30/08)
The price of agricultural commodities is rising for several reasons. The most important, in the long
run, is rising demand. This is in fact a tremendous success story as major emerging economies such as
India and China are achieving rapid growth. We certainly applaud this development. Hundreds of
millions of people are joining the global middle class -- and as standards of living improve, so do diets. It
should be noted that some of the biggest price increases have been for commodities such as rice and
wheat, which are not biofuels feedstocks at all.
In addition to rising demand, other factors are at work as well. Rising energy costs directly increase food
prices. Several major wheat exporters have recently suffered poor harvests. A number of countries have also
imposed export restrictions on foodstuffs which have disrupted normal supply patterns in global
markets, which has driven up prices. Biofuels production also contributes to demand but, when one
considers the full range of factors involved, biofuels are clearly not the major factor driving food
prices.
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Oil prices are the root cause for food prices (2/2)
The increase in food prices has had very little to do with ethanol consumption, gas prices
are driving the increases
DOE and DOA, US Department of Energy and US Department of Agriculture, 08 (Responses to Questions of
Senator Bingmann, June,
http://www.energy.gov/media/Secretaries_Bodman_and_Schafer_Ltr_to_Sen_Bingaman.pdf, 6/30/08)
In 2007, the expansion in ethanol and biodiesel consumption is estimated to have increased the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) for all food by 0.10-0.15 percentage point. In other words, ethanol and biodiesel
consumption accounted for approximately 3-4 percent of the overall rise in retail food prices. During the
first 4 months of 2008, the all food CPI increased by
4.8 percent, with increased ethanol and biodiesel consumption accounting for only about 4-5 percent of
the total increase while other factors accounted for 95-96 percent of the Increase.
Increased demand for biofuel feedstocks has benefited com and soybean producers. Higher prices have
encouraged production increases and some switching of acreage from soybeans to com. More dried
distiller grains are available for feed, but higher grain prices are also prompting adjustments by livestock
producers. In future years, production adjustments by livestock and dairy producers in response to
higher feed costs resulting from the expansion in ethanol and biodiesel consumption could add a total
of 0.6-0.7 percentage point to the CPI for all food.
Commodities prices, both agricultural and nonagricultural, have risen sharply in recent years for a
number of reasons unrelated to biofuels development. For agricultural commodities, higher incomes,
population growth, and depreciation of the dollar are increasing the demand for food; drought and dry
weather have lowered production and reduced stocks; and some countries have imposed export
restrictions. All these factors contribute to higher commodity prices. In addition, record prices for
gasoline and diesel fuel are increasing the costs of producing, transporting, and processing food
products.
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***Random Stuff***
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Militarization will only fully occur in a world where energy resources are scarce
Moran and Russel, respectively Prof of national security affairs at CCC, Senior Lecturer; Co-Director, Center
for Contemporary Conflict; Managing Editor, Strategic Insights. ‘08
Daniel and James, Center for Contemporary Conflict “The Militarization of Energy Security” 4/4/08
http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=1671 Accessed: 7/3/08
In such circumstances the great difficulty, from the point of view of both analysis and action, is to account for
the enormous range of secondary effects that may follow once force is used on a significant scale. One must
assume, for instance, that war by a major power to protect or to interfere with energy supplies would coincide
with, or inaugurate, a period of sharply declining performance by the world economy, a development whose
effects would be felt by the states immediately concerned, and also by potential opponents, collaborators, and
by-standers. In general, the militarization of energy security needs to be envisioned as occurring within a
context of strategic anxiety and severe economic stress, in which economic productivity is far below
what people are used to, and in which the perennial peace-time trade-offs between guns and butter had
become correspondingly more contentious. Such conditions have arisen before, in the 1930s, when the
developed world’s demand for security increased rapidly, under conditions that made the relative social cost
of that security extremely expensive. It remains difficult to this day to see how war could have been avoided
under such circumstances.
Oil dependence undercuts the US ability to carry out foreign policy objectives
Biden, Senator, 06 (Joesph R., U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7,
http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/BidenStatement060607.pdf, 7/3/08)
Here in the Foreign Relations Committee, we deal every day with the foreign policy implications of our
dependence on imported fossil fuels. Most obviously, there are our complex relationships with what
Michael Mandelbaum and others have called the “Axis of Oil,” the oil-rich regimes around the world.
This dependence has a pernicious effect on our foreign policy. It literally helps to fuel the terrorism we
are fighting, because some of dollars we spend on crude oil wind up in the pockets of radicals.
It limits our options and limits our leverage in dealing with national security threats, because oil rich
countries can stand up to us, and oil dependent countries are afraid to stand with us.
And it undercuts our hopes for advancing democracy and freedom, because repressive regimes,
swimming in a sea of high-priced oil, can resist pressure to reform. 3
To cite just one example, Iran’s most recent threats to disrupt oil exports – as a direct response to our
attempts to deal with their nuclear ambitions – was immediately translated into an increase in oil
prices – a jump to $73 a barrel. Not just economic forces, but political conflicts, drive this market.
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Dependency on other countries for energy allows them to utilize power to obtain
political oppurtunities
Deutch and Schlesinger, Chairs of the Council on Foreign Relations, 06 (John and James R., Council on
Foreign Relations, National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependence: Independent Task Force Report 58,
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf, 7/3/08)
Second, oil dependence causes political realignments that constrain the ability of the United States to
form partnerships to achieve common objectives. Perhaps the most pervasive effect arises as countries
dependent on imports subtly modify their policies to be more congenial to suppliers. For example,
China is aligning its relationships in the Middle East (e.g., Iran and Saudi Arabia) and Africa (e.g.,
Nigeria and Sudan) because of its desire to secure oil supplies. France and Germany, and with them much
of the European Union, are more reluctant to confront difficult issues with Russia and Iran because of
their dependence on imported oil and gas as well as the desire to pursue business opportunities in those
countries.
These new realignments have further diminished U.S. leverage, particularly in the Middle East and
Central Asia. For example, Chinese interest in securing oil and gas supplies challenges U.S. influence in
central Asia, notably in Kazakhstan. And Russia’s influence is likely to grow as it exports oil and (within
perhaps a decade) large amounts of natural gas to Japan and China. All consuming countries, including the
United States, are more constrained in dealing with producing states when oil markets are tight. To cite
one current example, concern about losing Iran’s 2.5 million barrels per day of world oil exports will
cause importing states to be reluctant to take action against Iran’s nuclear program.
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A2: SPR CP
Perm: SPR and investing in renewable energy is the best way to solve for oil dependency in the
short and long term
Podesta, Former staff of President Clinton from 1998 to 2001 and is currently the
president and chief executive officer of the Center for American Progress, 08
(John, Washington Times, “Long and short of oil price spike,” 06-15-08,
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/15/long-and-short-of-oil-price-spike/, accessed
07-01-08)
The high price of oil and gasoline is like the weather - everyone talks about it but no one does anything to fix it. That's
certainly the case for the Bush administration. In 2006, President Bush said, "America is addicted to oil," yet his
administration did nothing to reduce oil use. Had he acted in 2001, there would be millions more fuel-efficient cars on
our roads today, cutting our oil use.
However, there are immediate steps that the Bush administration and Congress can take today to help stem the rising
price of oil and also help those Americans hit hardest by rising gasoline prices. Then there are bold, long-term
measures that the next president and Congress must embrace to drastically reduce long-term oil use by
providing affordable alternatives, which will also increase our energy security.
Record oil prices are due to growing worldwide demand, sluggish production, a weak dollar and speculators gone wild.
In the short term, oil demand is unlikely to abate much, which means oil-producing countries have little incentive to
pump more oil now when the price may be higher next year. But the United States could upset that calculation
by selling 500,000 barrels per day from our nation's brimming Strategic Petroleum Reserve. This is
about half of the production increase President Bush unsuccessfully sought from Saudi Arabia. Even if
we did this for 100 days, the SPR would still be nearly 90 percent full.
Putting this additional oil on the market would burst the speculative bubble. Investors and speculators
in oil contracts would see today's safe, one-way bet challenged. Speculators count on market forces to
back up their bets, but when institutional investors and oil traders sense that the supply and price of
oil might go in different directions, all bets are off. And with oil at $135 per barrel, this is a profitable
time to sell oil bought at a much lower price.
These steps would break market momentum driving oil prices, but gas prices will remain high in the
near term. So we need to help those suffering the most from record energy prices, which are ravaging the budgets of
low- and middle-income families. These families today spend about 50 percent more of their income on gasoline
compared to 2001 - even though wage gains have been stagnant since then. Many households cannot quickly reduce the
amount of gas use built into their daily lives due to the location of their home and work and the gas mileage of their cars.
Many families cannot afford to buy a more fuel-efficient car right now.
Significantly, Americans are reducing their gasoline use, down 4 percent from a year ago, yet gas prices are up 23 percent
since then. So here's a bold idea to help low- and middle-income families cope with rising energy prices - a "fuel price
oilbate" program for households based on income. This program would also assist low-income households without cars
because they still pay more for food and other goods due to high fuel prices. To pay for these "oilbates," Congress could
eliminate some egregious tax breaks for Big Oil and recover lost royalties from wells in U.S. waters. With record profits
and prices, oil companies don't need tax breaks.
Ultimately, though, we must invest in affordable transportation options to slash oil dependence and
high costs. The new Energy Security and Independence Act increases fuel economy standards to cut oil use by 1.1
million barrels daily in 2020. And its requirement for more "cellulosic ethanol" made from switch grass and
plant waste, combined with other biofuels, would reduce gasoline use by another 15 percent.
These measures, however, are inadequate to significantly reduce consumption. We need to invest heavily in transportation
options that use little oil. The "plug-in hybrid electric vehicle," such as the Chevy Volt, could help meet this goal. A plug-
in car has a rechargeable battery that powers the engine for up to 40 miles - approximately a typical driving day. Gasoline
fuels any additional driving. The battery recharges overnight by plugging the car into an electrical socket. Plug-ins could
get 100 miles per gallon or more.
Like with earlier new technologies such as nuclear power, government must also help commercialize plug-ins. That can
be done by investing in battery research and development, purchasing plug-ins for government fleets, altering vehicle
taxes to reward efficiency and granting an $8,000 tax credit to purchase a plug-in or other hyper-efficient automobiles.
Mass transit - rail and buses - is another viable option. Last year saw the highest transit ridership in 50 years, and it's up
another 3 percent in 2008. Yet the Highway Trust Fund provides only 16 cents of every dollar for transit, with the rest
going for highways. Congress should significantly increase the public transit share.
Record gas prices are exacting a real economic toll on American families. Bold new steps are required to shake up
oil markets, give some relief for families and provide affordable alternatives to reduce our dependence
on costly, foreign oil from hostile regimes. We must begin these efforts today to protect our economy
and security from the future ravages of high energy prices.
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A2: ANWR CP
Due to strict ANWR regulations, oil production is bottlenecked as we are already working
at maximum capacity.
Friend, Staff Writer, 08
(Chris, The Bulletin, “Pickens Misses The Point: We Need More Oil,” 7/10,
http://www.thebulletin.us/site/index.cfm?newsid=19842696&BRD=2737&PAG=461&dept_id=576361&rfi=8, date
accessed: 7/11/08)
It may come as a surprise, but the United States is the third-largest oil producer in the world. What
makes our situation so frustrating is that we are extracting a mere fraction of the petroleum resources
located right beneath our feet. The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska (ANWR) holds untold
billions of barrels, and yet even that figure is dwarfed by the oil and natural gas reserves off both continental
coasts and in the Gulf of Mexico. Add to that the mammoth amount of coal at our disposal (which can be
converted to energy using new clean-coal technology) and our huge shale deposits, and America could be
calling all the shots. Of course, Congress doesn't see it that way. They won't lift the moratorium on
offshore drilling, and they refuse to open up even small tracts in ANWR. But it really doesn't matter
how more oil can be captured if you can't refine it efficiently - and we haven't built a new refinery
since 1976. A major reason why petroleum prices continue to spike is because of the bottleneck created
by our refineries operating at maximum capacity - so much so that most can never be taken offline for
any extended period of time because of the constant backlog.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 127
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***NEG***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 129
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Soft landing most likely scenario, even if we can’t control oil prices
Irish Independent ‘07
“Working for A Soft Landing” 6/12/07 LexisNexis Accessed: 7/01/08
The Central Bank believes that the hoped-for "soft landing" now appears to be the most likely outcome. That
is a welcome analysis. However, not all the variables which can help deliver that soft landing are actually
within our control.
The "Known Unknowns", as Donald Rumsfeld might call them, are international oil prices, currently at an 11-
month high, and rising, and the decline of the dollar against the euro.
There is no chance of a soft landing; civilization will unravel without oil as a cheap energy
source to sustain the global population
Church, Independent Energy Analyst for Counter Currents, 06
(Norman, Powerswitch, "Major Problems of Surviving Peak Oil," 10-23-6,
http://www.powerswitch.org.uk/portal/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2026&It
emid=2, 7-2-8)
We are in fantasy land if we think that we can continue to support the number of people that we do
now without the full input of oil and related products. There are just way too many people who depend
on civilization for their every day survival for there to be a "soft landing" as some would hope. We
have become so dependent on those fuels, that there is no way we can sustain ourselves at this population
density and level of technology without them. Even something as basic as food becomes impossible to
produce, process and transport without fuel. It is difficult to think about 'how things will play out' when an
oil-based global economy loses its cheap energy source. It has never happened before. It will never happen
again. I think it quite probable that it will start very slowly, may be so slowly that we may not even see it
start. It will take time for civilization to come apart, and the process will be like rolling down a slope,
not like falling off a cliff. We will face a future of shortages, economic crises, disintegrating
infrastructure, and collapsing public health, probably stretched out over a period of decades.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 132
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Alternate Causality – It’s the housing market that is the real cause of economic slow down
Norris, chief financial correspondent of The New York Times and The International Herald Tribune, 06,
(Floyd, International Herald Tribune, “Have oil shocks become business as usual?” 7/21, Lexis, date accessed:
7/4/08)
Even the U.S. Federal Reserve may be growing worried. Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, told the Senate on
Wednesday that he thought a slowing economy might enable inflation to cool without more tightening.
That sent the stock market soaring, although a slowing economy is hardly what investors want. But want it or
not, we may get it. The housing slowdown is likely to have a greater impact than in the past because the
strange mortgages that financed the boom some without principal payments and some with negative
amortization, meaning the amount owed grew every month could now cause distress for some
borrowers. The economy itself became far more dependent on a strong housing market than ever
before. If people cannot take more money out of their homes, and must pay more for gas, they may
have no choice but to buy less of everything else.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 138
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Monetary policy and oil prices are no long correlated. There’s only the risk these high
prices can reduce inflation.
Segal, Research Fellow at Oxford in Economics and Energy Studies, 07
(Paul, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, “Why do oil prices no longer shock?,” October,
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM35.pdf, date accessed: 6/30/08)
Within this context, the third argument uses the first two arguments to answer the question in the title: why is
the impact of high oil prices so much smaller today than in the 1970s? Given the importance of monetary
policy in the causal chain, I argue that a key difference is that oil prices no longer feed through to core
inflation, so that monetary policy no longer has to tighten in response to high oil prices. Indeed, as I
discuss later, high oil prices can also have a deflationary impact, requiring monetary policy to loosen. In
turn, the decline in feed-through to inflation is probably due to more flexible wages, and to more
credible monetary policy.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 146
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Doomsday scenarios of peak oil are threat constructions and ignore research that disagrees.
Smil, Research Professor of environmental, energy, food, population, economic and public policy studies, 06
(Vaclav, University of Manitoba, “Peak Oil: A Catastrophist Cult and Complex Realities,” February,
http://home.cc.umanitoba.ca/~vsmil/pdf_pubs/WorldWatch.pdf, date accessed: 6/30/08)
Proponents of the imminent peak of global oil extraction—led by Colin Campbell, Jean Laher- rère, L.F.
Ivanhoe, Richard Duncan, and Ken- neth Deffeyes—resort to deliberately alarmist arguments as they mix
incontestable facts with caricatures of complex realities and as they ignore anything that does not fit
their preconceived conclusions in order to issue their obituaries of modern civilization. Ivanhoe sees an
early end of the oil era as “the inevitable doomsday” followed by “economic implosion” that will make
“many of the world’s developed societies look more like today’s Russia than the U.S.” Duncan’s future
brings massive unemployment, breadlines, homelessness, and a catastrophic end of industrial civilization.
These conclusions are based on interpretations that lack any nuanced understanding of the human quest for
energy, disregard the role of prices, ignore any historical perspectives, and presuppose the end of human
inventiveness and adapt- ability. I will raise just three key points aimed at dismantling the foundations of this
new catastrophist cult. First, these preachings are just the latest installments in a long history of failed
peak forecasts. Second, the peak-oil advocates argue that this time the circumstances are really
different and that their forecasts will not fail—but in order to believe that, one has to ignore a
multitude of facts and possibilities that readily counteract their claims. Third, and most importantly,
there is no reason why even an early peak of global oil production should trigger any catastrophic
events.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 151
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Oil is a renewable resource – its compressed methane that’s pumped up through the mantle
Bennet Staff writer at worldnetdaily.com ‘05
Chris, World Net Daily. “Sustainable Oil” 5/25/08
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=38645 Accessed: 7/2/08
An intriguing theory now permeating oil company research staffs suggests that crude oil may actually be a
natural inorganic product, not a stepchild of unfathomable time and organic degradation. The theory
suggests there may be huge, yet-to-be-discovered reserves of oil at depths that dwarf current world
estimates. The theory is simple: Crude oil forms as a natural inorganic process which occurs between
the mantle and the crust, somewhere between 5 and 20 miles deep. The proposed mechanism is as
follows: Methane (CH4) is a common molecule found in quantity throughout our solar system – huge
concentrations exist at great depth in the Earth. At the mantle-crust interface, roughly 20,000 feet beneath
the surface, rapidly rising streams of compressed methane-based gasses hit pockets of high
temperature causing the condensation of heavier hydrocarbons. The product of this condensation is
commonly known as crude oil. Some compressed methane-based gasses migrate into pockets and
reservoirs we extract as "natural gas." In the geologically "cooler," more tectonically stable regions
around the globe, the crude oil pools into reservoirs. In the "hotter," more volcanic and tectonically active
areas, the oil and natural gas continue to condense and eventually to oxidize, producing carbon dioxide and
steam, which exits from active volcanoes. Periodically, depending on variations of geology and Earth
movement, oil seeps to the surface in quantity, creating the vast oil-sand deposits of Canada and Venezuela,
or the continual seeps found beneath the Gulf of Mexico and Uzbekistan. Periodically, depending on
variations of geology, the vast, deep pools of oil break free and replenish existing known reserves of oil.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 155
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Oil reservoirs are refilling themselves, proving that oil is renewing itself
Bennet Staff writer at worldnetdaily.com ‘05
Chris, World Net Daily. “Sustainable Oil” 5/25/08
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=38645 Accessed: 7/2/08
Even more intriguing is evidence that several oil reservoirs around the globe are refilling themselves,
such as the Eugene Island reservoir – not from the sides, as would be expected from cocurrent organic
reservoirs, but from the bottom up.
Dr. Gold strongly believes that oil is a "renewable, primordial soup continually manufactured by the
Earth under ultrahot conditions and tremendous pressures. As this substance migrates toward the
surface, it is attached by bacteria, making it appear to have an organic origin dating back to the
dinosaurs."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 156
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↓ Continued ↓
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 161
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↑ Heinberg Continued ↑
food supply meant that we had to adjust to eating smaller game and cul- tivated plants. Agriculture gave us another energy boost, but one
agricultural civilization after another - from that of the Mesopotamians to that of the Mayans - built densely populated cities and high
cultures, and then collapsed after exhausting the soil and cutting too many trees.
The same pattern plays out with other species whenever they discover a significant temporary food subsidy. The behavior has been observed
so many times, in so many species and human soci- eties, that it really has to be considered a standard response. The Industrial Revolution
was our most recent and dramatic human experience with "free" energy (in the forms of coal, oil, and natu- ral gas), and these fuels have
proven to be a windfall of unbeliev- able proportions. In Texas in the 1930s, oil was literally cheaper than drinking water - and it still is, if
we're talking about the water in one-pint containers sold at convenience stores. What have we done with this windfall? We have increased
our population from 800 million to 6.4 billion in a little over three centuries and brought the planet to the verge of ecological ruin. This
should come as no surprise. Any other species would have done essential- ly the same.
So if some new free-energy device were to become available tomorrow, how would people respond? We
really don't need to speculate much. Absent a self-limiting, culturally reinforced Powerdown program, we can
be virtually 100 percent sure that the response would be to continue population growth, and to increase
the harvesting of other resources from the environment, until Liebig's Law got us in one way or another.
Liebig's Law, named after the 19th century German soil scientist Justus von Liebig, is sometimes called the Law of the Minimum. It tells us
that the carrying capacity for any given species is set by the necessity in least supply. Every species has a list of requirements for survival -
water, temperature range, degree of salinity of water, degree of acidity or alkalinity of soil, food of a certain nature, so many hours of
sunlight, and so on. Liebig's Law tells us that even if all other factors are optimal, the lack of one necessity can undermine an organism's
ability to survive.
This puts a tough burden on humans' attempts to completely manage a fully artificial environment. We might get nearly everything perfect
(plenty of fresh water, enough proteins and carbohydrates, enough oxygen), and yet fail to adequately manage just one factor, and the result
would be catastrophic. The failure of the Biosphere experiments - in which highly equipped and well-prepared scientists attempted to
establish an artificial, fully enclosed, self-sustaining environment - is a case in point.
In my own mind, an understanding of Liebig's Law inspires a profound respect for wild nature. Somehow, through endless mutual
accommodations over hundreds of millions of years, untold numbers of species have managed to adjust themselves to their environments,
and their environments to themselves, in such a way that they can mutually survive. Of course, none do so for- ever: a given species appears,
flourishes for a few tens or hundreds of thousands of years, and then dies out as conditions change. In the meantime, a wondrous and
delicate balance enables that species to cooperate with others in the maintenance of the web of existence.
Are we humans clever enough to replace that mutually woven and continually micro-adjusted network of interdependence with an artificial
system of our own design that is capable of satisfying all of our basic needs well into the future? Again, some people may think so, but not,
I'd guess, many people with much familiarity with how nature actually works. Yes, we need energy. And, ultimately, energy is everything -
in the sense that life and matter are themselves reducible to energy. But we humans are biological creatures that have evolved in the context
of complex ecosystems. We depend on the services of thousands of other species for our survival. If we seri- ously upset the
systems on which we depend, we will most likely merely reconfirm the universality of the Law of the
Minimum and the inevitability of the ecological dilemma.
Of course we wish to find a way to preserve our current way of life. No one wants to undertake basic change unless we have to, especially if
doing so means restrictions on reproduction and indi- vidual consumption. But, as I have said already, business as usual is not an option,
even if there is a solution to the energy problem in isolation. The oil-depletion crisis is merely the current mask for the timeless ecological
dilemma. The way out of that dilemma requires no technological breakthrough; indeed, purely technical "solu- tions" may only distract us
from addressing the underlying problem. The way out is to restrict per-capita resource usage and to reduce the human population. If we take
the Powerdown path, then alter- native energy sources could help. If we refuse to power down, then nothing will help.
In the end, self-limitation is the only answer that counts, but that is the answer that no one wants to hear. So we sit, and wait, and assume,
and deny. And as we wait, the signs of depletion worsen and global resource wars loom. If we refuse to take the hard Powerdown path, after
a while we will simply have no choice: we will compete for what is left (whether for oil, natural gas, water, or phosphates) or we will die.
Plan Snooze simply leads us back to Plan War.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 162
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Merely by propagating the myth of ‘peak oil’ allows for the ruling elite of the new world
order to justify war, mass starvation and global poverty
Watson and Jones, Watson-Author of “Order out of Chaos”, Jones directs ‘Martial Law, 9-11: Rise of the Police State’. ‘05
Paul Joseph & Alex. Prison Planet. “The Myth of Peak Oil” October 12 2005.
http://www.prisonplanet.com/archives/peak_oil/index.htm Accessed: 7/1/08
Even though many will see it as immoral, many will subconsciously attach it as a reason for the war. In
reality the war is purely for profit, power and control, oil can be a part of that, but only if the peak oil claim
is upheld.
If we continue to let the corrupt elite tell us we are wholly dependent on oil, we may reach a twisted
situation whereby they can justify starvation and mass global poverty, perhaps even depopulation,
even within the western world due to the fact that our energy supplies are finished.
Peak oil is just another weapon the globalists have in their arsenal to move towards a new world order
where the elite get richer and everyone else falls into line.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 163
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Rising prices for food supplies help out farmers, resulting in growth
CISA Catholic Information Service for Africa ‘08
“All Africa” “High Food Prices Could Benefit Farmers, Catholic Expert Says” 5/4/08
http://allafrica.com/stories/200805050070.html Accessed: 6/1/08
The rising food prices, he pointed out, can be an opportunity for farmers in the developing world if
they are included as part of the solution. "Make no mistake: The increased prices for wheat, maize,
soybean and other edible oils have been a boon for farmers who are exporting from the United States,
Europe and elsewhere. The question is, how can we help African farmers also benefit from the increase in
prices while contributing to increases in food supply?"
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 165
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Widespread riots are a result of poverty and famine due to the increasingly worsening
global food crisis
Chossudovsky, Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa, Director of the Centre for
Research on Globalization, Contributor to the Encyclopedia Britannica, 08
(Michel, Global Research, "Global Famine," 5-2-8,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8877, 7-6-8)
Famine is the result of a process of "free market" restructuring of the global economy which has its
roots in the debt crisis of the early 1980s. It is not a recent phenomenon as suggested by several
Western media reports. The latter narrowly focus on short-term supply and demand for agricultural
staples, while obfuscating the broader structural causes of global famine.
Poverty and chronic undernourishment is a pre-existing condition. The recent hikes in food prices have
contributed to exacerbating and aggravating the food crisis. The price hikes are hitting an
impoverished population, which has barely the means to survive.
Food riots have erupted, almost simultaneously in all major regions of the World:
"Food prices in Haiti had risen on average by 40 percent in less than a year, with the cost of staples such as
rice doubling.... In Bangladesh, [in late April 2008] some 20,000 textile workers took to the streets to
denounce soaring food prices and demand higher wages. The price of rice in the country has doubled over the
past year, threatening the workers, who earn a monthly salary of just $25, with hunger. In Egypt, protests by
workers over food prices rocked the textile center of Mahalla al-Kobra, north of Cairo, for two days last
week, with two people shot dead by security forces. Hundreds were arrested, and the government sent
plainclothes police into the factories to force workers to work. Food prices in Egypt have risen by 40 percent
in the past year... Earlier this month, in the Ivory Coast, thousands marched on the home of President Laurent
Gbagbo, chanting “we are hungry” and “life is too expensive, you are going to kill us.
Similar demonstrations, strikes and clashes have taken place in Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Yemen, Ethiopia, and throughout most of sub-Saharan
Africa."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 169
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"Free market" policies supported by the IMF and World Bank have destroyed local
markets and devastatingly undermined food security
Chossudovsky, Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa, Director of the Centre for
Research on Globalization, Contributor to the Encyclopedia Britannica, 08
(Michel, Global Research, "Global Famine," 5-2-8,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8877, 7-6-8)
Since the 1980s, grain markets have been deregulated under the supervision of the World Bank and
US/EU grain surpluses are used systematically to destroy the peasantry and destabilize national food
agriculture. In this regard, World Bank lending requires the lifting of trade barriers on imported
agricultural staples, leading to the dumping of US/EU grain surpluses onto local market. These and
other measures have spearheaded local agricultural producers into bankruptcy.
A "free market" in grain --imposed by the IMF and the World Bank-- destroys the peasant economy
and undermines "food security". Malawi and Zimbabwe were once prosperous grain surplus
countries, Rwanda was virtually self-sufficient in food until 1990 when the IMF ordered the dumping of
EU and US grain surpluses on the domestic market precipitating small farmers into bankruptcy. In
1991-92, famine had hit Kenya, East Africa's most successful bread-basket economy. The Nairobi
government had been previously placed on a black list for not having obeyed IMF prescriptions. The
deregulation of the grain market had been demanded as one of the conditions for the rescheduling of
Nairobi's external debt with the Paris Club of official creditors. (Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalization of
Poverty and the New World Order, Second Edition, Montreal 2003)
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 171
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Maintaining oil as a national security threat ensures defeat of a rising china and militant
islam
Watts Professor of Geography and Development Studies at Berkeley ‘06
Michael, Monthly Review “Empire of Oil: Capitalist Dispossession and the Scramble for Africa” September 2006
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=9&did=1123316561&SrchMode=2&sid=9&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType
=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1215107076&clientId=10553 Accessed: 7/3/08
Energy security is the name of the game. No surprise, then, that the Council on Foreign Relations's call
for a different U.S. approach to Africa in its new report, More than Humanitarianism (2005), turns on
Africa's "growing strategic importance" for U.S. policy. It is the West African Gulf of Guinea,
encompassing the rich on and offshore fields stretching from Nigeria to Angola, that represents a key
plank in Bush's alternative to the increasingly volatile and unpredictable oil-states of the Persian Gulf.
Nigeria and Angola alone account for nearly four million barrels per day (almost half of Africa's output) and U.S. oil companies alone
have invested more than $40 billion in the region over the last decade (with another $30 billion expected between 2005 and 2010). oil
investment now represents over 50 percent of all foreign direct investment (FDI) in the continent (and over 60 percent of all FDI in the
top four FDI recipient countries), and almost 90 percent of all cross-border mergers and acquisition activity since 2003 has been in the
mining and petroleum sector. The strategic interests of the United States certainly include not only access to
cheap and reliable low-sulphur oil imports, but also keeping the Chinese (for example in Sudan) and
South Koreans (for example in Nigeria)-aggressive new actors in the African oil business-and Islamic terror
at bay. Africa is, according to the intelligence community, the "new frontier" in the fight against
revolutionary Islam. Energy security, it turns out, is a terrifying hybrid of the old and the new:
primitive accumulation and American militarism coupled to the war on terror.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 180
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Russia will not enter into a conflict with the west, they want to be perceived as a global
mediator
Lilia Shevtsova, co-chairs the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Project (Lilia, U.S.-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS: IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE?, Summer 2007, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Russia-
Web%20(2).pdf)
Today the Kremlin has decided to forge a more significant and ambitious role for Russia on the global
scene. Hence, several ideas were introduced. First was the idea of Russia as an intermediary capable of
resolving crises around the world. For the first time since perestroika, the Kremlin has publicly declared,
through its foreign affairs minister Sergei Lavrov, that Russia cannot take sides in global conflicts, that
it must act as a mediator. In other words, Russia is not going to join the West.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 186
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Russia is keen on cooperation and will work through tough issues like missile defense
U.S. Today 2/9/2008 Gates: Russia seeks missile defense solution http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-
02-09-gatesrussia_N.htm
Without forecasting any breakthroughs, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Saturday he believes Russia
wants to resolve sensitive security disputes with the United States, including proposed missile defenses
in central Europe. Gates also predicted Moscow would "react cautiously" if, as expected, Kosovo
declares independence from Russian ally Serbia this month. Russia opposes Kosovo's independence,
claiming it would set a precedent worldwide. The United States and many European nations support
Kosovo's statehood. "My own view is, and it's just a personal opinion, that I think that the Russians — first of
all, they are not going to like it (independence for Kosovo) — but I think that they will react cautiously,"
Gates told reporters after a private meeting with Sergei Ivanov, the Russian first deputy prime minister.
Asked by a reporter if that meant he did not expect Moscow to make "too big of a fuss," Gates replied, "I
didn't say that. I just said that I thought they would react cautiously." Gates and Ivanov met during a break in
an international security conference. Both were scheduled to deliver speeches Sunday. Gates said his would
focus on the challenge of stabilizing Afghanistan and would emphasize that Islamic extremism in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region is a serious threat to Europe. Kosovo's ethnic Albanian leadership has said that
it will declare independence from Serbia "in a matter of days," but has never specified the exact date. Serbia
regards the province as the cradle of its statehood, and expressions of nationalist anger have increased as the
independence declaration approached. Gates said he and Ivanov did not discuss Kosovo, but did talk about
other contentious issues, including the U.S. plan for placing missile interceptors in Poland and a tracking
radar in the Czech Republic. This past week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov criticized the missile
defense proposal. He said in an interview published in a Polish newspaper that the United States was
expanding its missile defense system from U.S. territory to northeast Asia and now to European nations close
to Russia's borders. This, he said, amounted to an American attempt to encircle its former Cold War
adversary. "All of it is concentrating around our borders," Lavrov was quoted as saying. Nonetheless, Gates
told reporters he is convinced that U.S.-Russian talks on such issues are worthwhile. "I think that
regardless of what's said in public, I think there is still an interest (in Moscow) in pursuing the
dialogue, and we are doing that," he said. As Gates and Ivanov posed for cameras before the meeting, they
engaged in a bit of small talk that suggested room for humor despite their countries' disputes. Ivanov
chuckled as he recounted the upshot of the conference's afternoon debate while Gates was absent. "Everyone
pokes his finger at you and us — we are responsible for everything," Ivanov said. Gates laughed and replied,
"As usual. Some things never change." Ivanov responded, "Cold War, no Cold War." In a brief interview with
American reporters after his meeting with Gates, Ivanov gave no indication of acrimony. "We discussed a
lot of serious issues, keeping in mind that we still have a lot in common," particularly with regard to
limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and the missiles used to deliver them, Ivanov said. "Also, in the
future, arms reduction talks and of course missile defenses" will be discussed further, he said. The missile defense
issue is particularly difficult. Russia has harshly criticized the plan as threatening Russian security. Washington has portrayed the Polish
and Czech sites as key to defending Europe and the United States from a potential long-range missile attack by Iran, which currently has
no such missiles. The United States is negotiating with the Polish and Czech governments over stationing missile defense components
on their territory. At Saturday's conference, Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski said the matter ultimately would be a decision for
Poland, not Russia. But he also reiterated his country's position that more consultation with Russia was necessary. "More needs to be
done to reassure Russia that the missile defense project does not threaten her," Sikorski said.
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The western world can ensure a lack of war through highlighting dangerous practices and
increasing transparency
Victor, professor at Stanford Law School; director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development;
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 07 (David G., The National Interest/Columbia International
Affairs Online, Nov/Dec, What Resource Wars?, http://www.ciaonet.org/cgi-
bin/dkv/ciao/querystring.pl?rq=0&ht=0&qp=&col=ciao&qc=ciao&qt=india+resource+war&x=0&y=0, 7/3/08)
Beyond patience, the West can help by focusing the spotlight on dangerous practices—clearly branding
them the problem. There’s some evidence that the shaming already underway is having an effect—evident,
for example, in China’s recent decision to no longer use its veto in the UN Security Council to shield
Sudan’s government. At the same time, the West can work with its own companies to make payments to
governments (and officials) much more transparent and to close havens for money siphoned from
governments. Despite many initiatives in this area, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
and the now-stalled attempt by some oil companies to “Publish What You Pay”, little has been accomplished.
Actual support for such policies by the most influential governments is strikingly rare. America is
notably quiet on this front.
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***Random Neg***
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↓ Continued ↓
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↑ Birger Continued ↑
Pirrong points out that when the federal government decided to bolster cheese prices in the 1970s, it did so
by purchasing warehouses full of cheese and keeping it off the market. "Well, where's the cheese now?"
Pirrong asks. "Where's all the oil that the speculators have held off the market?"
Even if you believe there's no way that oil trading volumes could be soaring without influencing oil
prices, remember that influence then has to run two ways.
If an index fund is indirectly driving up spot oil prices every time it buys a future, then the converse
must be true, too - there must be an equal and opposite downward push on spot prices every time that
future is sold. In other words, futures market critics can't have it both ways.
There's something else politicians conveniently overlook: futures trading requires two to tango. For every
investor who is betting oil prices will go up, there also needs to be an investor willing to take the
opposite side of that bet.
In the past, there have been times when the overwhelming majority of speculators were "longs" betting
on higher prices, while their commercial-trader counterparts - i.e. traders working for oil refiners,
airlines, and other end-users of oil - were the "shorts" betting prices would fall.
But as New York Mercantile Exchange Chairman James Newsome explained to Stupak's Congressional
committee, today's speculators are evenly split between shorts and longs. Moreover, the percentage of
futures contracts held by speculators (as opposed to commercial traders) "actually decreased over the
last year," Newsome told the subcommittee, "even at the same time that [oil] prices were increasing."
It's time to find a new scapegoat. My own nominee: Congress. But that's another column.
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Gas Tax CP
CP: Huge oil tax combined with funds to prop up oil regimes during the transition
Victor, professor at Stanford Law School; director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development;
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 07 (David G., The National Interest/Columbia International
Affairs Online, Nov/Dec, What Resource Wars?, http://www.ciaonet.org/cgi-
bin/dkv/ciao/querystring.pl?rq=0&ht=0&qp=&col=ciao&qc=ciao&qt=india+resource+war&x=0&y=0, 7/3/08)
With regard to the flow of resources to terrorists—who in turn cause conflicts and are often seen as a
circuitous route to resource wars—policymakers must realize that this channel for oil money is good
for speeches but perhaps the least important reason to stem the outflow of money for buying imported
hydrocarbons. Much more consequential is that the U.S. call on world oil resources is not sustainable
because a host of factors—such as nationalization of oil resources and insecurity in many oil-producing
regions—make it hard for supply to keep pace with demand. This yields tight and jittery markets and
still-higher prices. These problems will just get worse unless the United States and other big consumers
temper their demand. The goal should not be “independence” from international markets but a
sustainable path of consumption. When the left-leaning wings in American politics and the industry-
centered National Petroleum Council both issue this same warning about energy supplies—as they
have over the last year—then there is an urgent need for the United States to change course. Yet
Congress and the administration have done little to alter the fundamental policy incentives for
efficiency. At this writing, the House and Senate are attempting to reconcile two versions of energy bills,
neither of which, strikingly, will cause much fundamental change to the situation.
Cutting the flow of revenues to resource-rich governments and societies can be a good policy goal, but
success will require American policymakers to pursue strategies that they will find politically toxic at
home. One is to get serious about taxation. The only durable way to rigorously cut the flow of
resources is to keep prices high (and thus encourage efficiency as well as changes in behavior that
reduce dependence on oil) while channeling the revenues into the U.S. government treasury rather
than overseas. In short, that means a tax on imported oil and a complementary tax on all fuels sold in
the United States so that a fuel import tax doesn’t simply hand a windfall to domestic producers. And
if the United States (and other resource consumers) made a serious effort to contain financial windfalls
to natural-resources exporters, it would need—at the same time—to confront a more politically
poisonous task: propping up regimes or easing the transition to new systems of governance in places
where vacuums are worse than incumbents.
Given all the practical troubles for the midwives of regime change, serious policy in this area would need
to deal with many voids.
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*Robert Bryce, the writer of the book in question is a fellow at the institute for energy research and the
managing editor of energy tribune magazine
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