Parfit Paper Revised Ideas 1.

Argue that the incompleteness is bad because it doesn't adequately rule out the argument from disagreement, which Parfit tells Wolfe is his entire goal (Christian suggests this, as well) On 554 Parfit seems less concerned about disagreement about why actions are wrong, at least, at the level of philosophical theory. He still seems concerned about which acts are wrong, however. He also reiterates here that he claims to have shown that, properly understood, the theories coincide. Parfit does justice to the importance of actual consent by appeal to a reason; this may be a key example of how, at critical moments, Parfit relies on reasons or it's an example of a case in which rational disagreement may be maintained. Is Parfit's discussion of imprecision on 559 compatible with the TT? Perhaps they're OK because this discussion could be read as being about normativity broadly and not demarcating clearly wrong acts? Revised Ideas- entirely courtesy of Christian 2. Assuming that Parfit doesn't collapse into act consequentialism, how has he shown that his view is at all preferable to act consequentialism? The critical question, as Christian suggests it, is whether Parfit's theory or act better lines up ...the purposes and nature of the various senses of wrong. If I follow the claim, one point might be that, if the suggestion is which view has more intuitive appeal, the suggestion that we ought to forsake good acts because a principle based on them would, if always followed, lead to worse overall outcomes seems rather counter-intuitive; the traditional objection that rule collapses into act seems relevant here. If the senses of wrong make reference to the whole deserving of blame + the belief relative, fact relative, etc. stuff that Parfit laid out at the beginning then I ought to re-read this material. 1. Another attempt at vacuity: if we have a complete theory of the reasons then the Triple Theory is superfluous From Christian: o Along these lines, check this out, I like this: Does such and such theory of normative reasons say that you have a reason to resent x because of his act? If you do, then THIS mere subset of our normative reasons will give us our moral theory (its that simple!) one might argue. And if you dont have a non-deontic reason to so resent then maybe you shouldnt after allafter all, impartial reasons do not recommend your doing so (theyre non-deontic)someone could reasonably reject the principle of so resenting. So Parfit, it would seem, MUST accept the simple theory, regardless of whether TT is true or if it is not (you following me)? I think someone needs to write this paper. But maybe Ive forgotten something. I think I see how this would be true in the case of act: what is the point of saying we always have most reason to what is impartially best -and- that this is what everyone could rationally will? Once I have the first I have answered all relevant normative questions. Christian provides another account of this which is I am struggling to follow. The suggestion, laid out slowly, is this: A theory of reasons may maintain that we have reason to resent a person if they perform a certain action... ...but, because Parfit suggests that moral badness should be understood in terms of our having

reasons to resent someone if they do such an action, it seems we get a moral theory the moment we allow such a reason! Who needs the Triple Theory?! OK, that's clear but the second part of the suggestion seems a little more confusing. It begins thus: If we didn't have such a non-deontic reason to resent as part of our input to the TT why should we resent someone when the TT says the principle under question is not one everyone can rationally accept? Indeed, if there is no impartial reason to resent then someone could reasonably reject a principle which requires resentment for a particular action and so the TT would not require resentment for this action. (This may be bolstered by the thought that we have at least some impartial reasons not to resent: resent can be a painful emotion to experience and others subject to it might be harmedso it's non-optimific to resent, absent some adequate reason to resentlike that an action is immoral.) Does the last lineunless an action is immoralsave Parfit against the second line of the argument? He may be able to grant that we may not have a reason to resent as input to the theory but that the deliverances of the TT create reasons for resentment because failure to pass TT means an action is immoral. It's not like we apply the TT again to its own outputs to see if someone could reasonably reject a new principle of resentment. In response to the first partthat is in direct response to the simple theory--it seems that Parfit must claim that there can be no such reasons for resentment prior to the TT; all reasons for resentment exist because an act follows from a principle which fails TT. He must claim this in the same way that, as he points out, Scanlon must omit what we might think are fully fledged moral claims into his contractualism because, if Scanlon did not do this, his theory would be empty. Another possible response is to claim that there are different sorts of resentment. One sort of resentment may be a sort of non-moral resentment the reasons for which may be entered into the TT as considerations. Moral resentment is stronger and must, as I point out above, follow from the TT or the TT is vacuous. In Defense of This Tactic

1. What defense would Parfit have against it? Sure, he can claim that if our theory just posited reasons for resentment this would make TT pointless. But so what?! Parfit cant object that this theory of normative reasons would be bad because it would be bad for his theory. And it seems the most Parfit can say as to why we cant have such reasons is: 1.) that would make TT pointless 2.) we just dont have such reasons and we can intuit this 3.) such a theory would be pointless because it would assume what we have to prove. 2. Option 1 will not work for obvious reasons. This actually may be a big deal, as an objection. Why would what reasons we have be held hostage to whether a particular moral theory works or not? This would only be the case if we had considerably more reason to accept TT than the reason in question. But its not at all clear that TT would have more plausibility than any such reason. It may be legitimate to reject a theory of reasons if it + TT yielded a bad conclusion. But claiming we dont have certain kinds of reasons because theyre a problem for TT seems bad. A utilitarian cant argue against our deontic intuitions simply by saying But if those exist then my theory doesnt work! 3. Option 2 will not work because it seems that its admitting that Parfits theory is only contingently worthwhile; in the possible worlds where the simple theory reasons exist, TT is redundant. But we might think that TT is supposed to be a modal thesis (is it?) and so the existence of a possible world were TT is pointless defeats it.

4. Option 3 is in one sense correct, but ultimately it doesnt seem that direct reasons of resentment would be any more problematic than any of the other reasons Parfit thinks we have. That is, Parfit already claims we have objective, external, mind-independent reasons to care about everyone elseis it really much more of a stretch to just say oh, we also have reasons to resent people who do certain actions? I cant see how it is. 5. Another tack: in his reply to Wolfe, Parfit seems to think its OK that theres not a single ultimate moral principle. He is worried that it would be objectionable if it turned out that morality were empty and thinks that the apparent disagreement between the main moral theories is evidence that morality is empty. As such, he isnt even invested in the success of the TT as a moral principle. Why does he think we have any actual moral principles as such? The simple theory seems to lack principles (it simply posits that there are moral reasons not to do things) but on its own how can this be a mark against it? Morality would not be empty were the simple theory true. 6. Another tack: Parfit never really seems to directly motivate the idea that TT captures the truth about morality. He argues that the main moral theories, ultimately, ought to be understood in such a way that they agree and insofar as we think each of the main theories is somewhat independently plausible we might be inclined to think that this agreement lends credence to TT. Further support would be given by its capturing our intuitive moral judgmentsbut the same could be said about a theory which just posits that we have disparate moral reasons of varying weights that pull against one another. Indeed, the later theory may even be more likely to capture intuitive judgments if the methodology for discovering our reasons is some form of intuition, even if it is of the sort of sophisticated intellectual intuition that Parfit and Christian discuss and compare to intuition of mathematical and logical truths. 7. This actually might be reinstating the objection that there is no important difference between saying everyone has reason to do this and everyone can rationally will this. Parfit on the senses of wrong Note: it may be best to focus on one sense or other (the reactive-attitude sense in particular, given Christians thoughts and that it seems weird) 1.) Indefinable sense: the meaning of wrong in this sense is, like ought and has a reason to, basic in that it cannot be analyzed. Parfit says we can only get at it by describing what it is like when it holds to people. For example, Parfit says this sense obtains when some act must not be done or musnt-be-done. We might also define this sense of wrong by defining it in terms of undefined other basic normative concepts. For example we might say that an action is wrong when we ought not to act in this way. (165) Although Parfit says we should avoid senses of wrong which just mean we have decisive reason to/not to (166) 2.) Blameworthiness sense: in this, definable, sense wrong means blameworthy. 3.) Reactive-attitude sense: in this definable sense wrong means an act of a kind that gives its agent reasons to feel remorse or guilt, and gives others reasons for indignation and resentment A lot may hinge on how this sense is cached out. If these reasons can be prior to TT then it seems TT is superfluous, at least for this sense of wrong (this seems to be Christians point). Off of this: if Parfit claims that these reasons are created as the output of the TT, where do these reasons fit in his typology of reasons?! He tells us we have partial and impartial reasons at the beginning of On What Matters. I dont recall his having discussed some other kind of reason. Presumably, they are moral reasons and he doesnt want to flesh them out much more in relation to other kinds of reasons? Are they impartial reasons created by a moral failing? Partial reasons?

4.) Parfit also denies that it would be worthwhile to speak of moral reasons as a kind of reason 166-7what does the TT give us as its output? What are the reasons for resentment, then? They apparently cannot be moral reasons given as output of TT or prior to TT. But if theyre partial or impartial reasonswhy cant they be fed back into TT? It seems we would have to come up with special sub-classes of partial and/or impartial reasons which cannot be fed back into the TTthat seems rather ad-hoc. Alternately, perhaps we would worry that theres some circularity here? Output: Xing is wrong in the reactive-attitudes sense, therefore Xing gives others reasons to feel remorse and the perpetrator (so presumably this is a partial reason, as only they could have this?) reasons to feel guiltywe now have some new reasons and ask whether we could Y in virtue of these and other reasonshow does this work? 5.) Parfit does say we have reasons to be concerned with preventing others pain, and more reason to prevent it insofar as it is worse. This comes up in a discussion of the following case in which I can: 1.) prevent 10 hours of pain to you 2.) prevent 9 hours of pain to you and 8 hours of pain for someone else (Parfit 32). Parfit says that in this case I ought to go with option 2 and this is because the reasons to do option 2 outweigh the reasons to do option 1. 6.) But if I already have reasons to be concerned with preventing everyone's pain, and these reasons can weigh against one another, why don't these reasons on their own constitute moral claims? Perhaps they are supposed to be outputs of the TT (i.e. no one could rationally will that I prevent less instead of more pain), but then why isn't the example explained in terms of the TT and not how more aggregate pain outweighs less aggregate pain? Sure, in the passage in which this comes up Parfit has not yet presented the TT, but he doesn't even gesture at it in this section. 7.) Moreover, some philosophers (names?) claim that morality is simply the set of reasons we have to be concerned with others. This may be too limited (because of cases in which we think we have moral reasons to be concerned solely with how we affect ourselves, presumably), but such philosophers seem readily posed to just say the reasons we have to prevent the pain of others just are moral reasons. This seems especially tempting if the reasons we have to prevent the pain of others are not products of TT. The Profoundest Problem 1. The Profoundest Problem:
Q1: What do I have most reason to do? Do I have sufficient or decisive reasons to act in any of these ways? Q2: What ought I morally to do? Would any of these acts be wrong? These questions might, it seems, have conflicting answers, since we might sometimes have sufficient or decisive reasons to act wrongly. Our problem is to decide whether we do or could have such reasons, and, if that is true, what further conclusions we should draw. (Parfit 144)

Basically, what Parfit refers to as the profoundest problem is whether we always have most reason to do the morally right thing. He thinks stating the problem in terms of reasons and not rules is the proper way, because rules cannot be weighed against one another whereas reasons can be weighed against one another. Thus, for example, if we think of

normativity in terms of rules we cannot ask whether we ought to do the morally or legally right thing, where these two conflict, because there is no neutral comparison possible between alternating sets of rules (at least, I think this is what Parfit is getting at; strictly speaking he just says that it would be pointless to say that such and so action would be legally overriding or morally overriding because this would not decide the issue for us: we need a neutral standard and reasons provide this). If we have reasons, we may weigh them against one another. Thus, we may have less reason to do the legal thing because the reasons given by legality are outweighed by the reasons of morality (Parfit 146). Parfit gives the following statement: We can compare the strengths of

our reasons to follow these requirements. The men who fought duels had at most weak reasons to follow the code of honour, and they had strong moral reasons not to fight. And when we are legally required to act wrongly, we may have decisive moral reasons to break the law. Moral requirements may thus be more important in the reason-implying sense than the requirements of the code of honour, or the law. (Parfit 146) But consider the simple theoriest spin on the duel case: the moral reasons not to fight the duel are that it causes considerable pain, injury and possibly death and that we always have reasons to prevent such things (these are called moral reasons because they are other-regarding). In opposition to this we have the reasons of honor. It's unclear how resentment works in but intuitively reasons of resentment follow as well (consider: if I kill you in a duel, it seems right that your family has reasons to resent me for this action, I have reasons to feel guilty because I killed you over my honor, but honor is stupid, etc. That honor is stupid is doing important moral work: your family may be pissed off if I killed you in self-defense but, if we're running with intuitive reasons, it may plausibly may be maintained that they lack reasons to resent me and I lack reasons to feel guilty if I kill you in self-defense because I have strong reasons to protect myself and this is not stupid. In contrast, because honor is stupid, killing over it deserves resentment.

List of Arguments by type 1. The Simple Theory (ST) argument and reasons for resentment/guilt: Parfit can give no adequate response to why we couldnt have a simple theory according to which certain actions give reasons for resentment and remorse directly, making the TT unnecessary for at least the reactiveattitude sense of wrong. 2. Parfit provides no real motivation for the TT: Parfits motivation seems to be: 1.) morality follows when we are more impartial (this appears in the Golden Rule/KC chapter) and 2.) moral disagreement between the main theories is a reason for skepticism therefore showing they all really agree defeats one skeptical worry; we might also think (though Parfit doesnt seem to say this directly, that the TT can observe the intuitive appeal of each of the theories it attempts to incorporate. Motivation 1 is equally captured by ST because the direct moral reasons are plausibly impartial 2.) morality is not empty just because the three main theories Parfit discusses disagree; the argument from disagreement may be aimed more at first-order judgments and appropriate reflection/sophisticated intuition on first order judgments may provide the content of ST. Further, Parfits own discussion of moral disagreement in Volume 2 of On What Matters seems to lend itself more to there being certain intuitively correct moral truths, none of which are TT or even easily related to it. 3. Objective reasons are no different in relation to error-theoretical arguments like the argument from queerness: Parfits objective reasons, especially the impartial ones, already seem so close to moral reasons that they might as well be moral reasons, at least as regards metaphysical

arguments for error-theory like Mackies argument from queerness. 4. The content of the objective reasons Parfit thinks we have prior to TT already seem like moral reasons: before Parfit gives us the TT we already have reasons to: be concerned with our own well-being, to be concerned with the well-being of others, to minimize the pain of others, to minimize our own pain, etc. This exacerbates the sense in which Parfits theory of objective reasons is (or might as well already be) a moral theory and gives ammunition to developing the ST further. 5. Parfit explicitly denies that there are any moral reasons as such (Parfit 166-7). What does the TT give us as its outputs, then? Also, he does talk about moral reasons frequently, even though he denies that such reasons exist. Im not sure where this fits in an argument typology, but it does cause a headache. Is there any point in talking about morality and not just objective normativity and reasons of different weight? Could the ST just call a certain class of objective reasons moral reasons (say because they are concerned with what we owe others)? Who knows. These do, however, seem interesting questions to pose for Parfit. He also seems never to answer the question of whether we, all things considered, have most reason to act morallyIm not sure what to make of this. Given Parfits indecision about whether we have most reason to do what we morally ought to dowhy not just say this: Simple Theory: there are certain objective reasons which are classified as moral reasons (including concern for others and reasons for resentment + guilt); they weigh a lot but were not sure how much. TTnot needed. Commentaries Slow down; even though the summary is in many places excellent, in others it goes too quickly Act consequentialism, not act utilitarianism How serious is the charge of incompleteness? Act consequentialism is incomplete in just this sense without a theory of the good.