The Revolutionary Socialists http://www.e-socialists.

net/node/8138 18 January 2012 Power and wealth to the people In an article1 written before the recent parliamentary elections we proposed that there are three forces vying with each other to decide the fate of the Egyptian Revolution. The first of these is the counter-revolution which wants to retain the old regime with all its powers beneath a layer of superficial changes. The ruling military council represents the counter-revolution, as do the remnants of the old regime within the institutions of the state, and behind them stand big business (the 1000 richest families in Egypt) and the US government, the Zionist entity and the Saudi regime. The second force is composed of the reformist political parties and movements which were opposed to the Mubarak regime and are rooted particularly in the middle class. At the head of these forces is the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party. They have an interest in sharing power and wealth with the old regime without making fundamental or radical changes to its social and economic policies, or disturbing its vested interests and international affiliations. Finally we have the forces for deepening and radicalising the revolution on the level of political democracy and at a socio-economic level. These forces have an interest in the complete eradication of the old regime, at the head of which stands the military council, and the complete cleansing of the state institutions and the redistribution of power and wealth in Egypt to the vast majority of the Egyptians: workers, peasants and the poor. What is the balance of power between these three forces after the parliamentary elections as we enter the second year of the Egyptian revolution? Firstly, as was expected, the reformist Islamist movement, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, won a sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections. A large section of the Egyptian masses cast their ballots in the elections as the revolution gave them the confidence that, for the first time in their lives, their votes would count and not be forged with that this means in terms of illusions in parliamentary democracy and its ability to achieve the revolutions demands of social justice, freedom and dignity.

Egypt on the Road of Revolution http://www.scribd.com/doc/76534261/Revolutionary-SocialistsEgypt-on-the-Road-of-Revolution

Secondly, the balance of forces between the reformist Islamists and the counterrevolution is currently delicately and dangerously poised between the desire of the Muslim Brotherhood to hold onto its parliamentary gains to reflect these in real power at the expense of the power and vested interests of the old regime, and its desire to maintain stability through deals with the military council and the remnants of the old regime. This is for two reasons: the first is out of fear of a coup by the military council to annul the election results (repeating the experience of Algeria) or a full military coup to restore the old regime. The second reason is the fear that broad sections of the masses have escaped from the control or hegemony of reformism and are threatening new revolutionary upsurges which risk upsetting the delicate balance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military council with all the dangers that this poses to the two sides. It is noticeable at this critical moment the Brotherhoods willingness to offer massive concessions and guarantees to the military council, in order to preserve their gains, even if these are as yet only superficial. So they have accepted the continuation of the Ganzoury government and have given guarantees of an amnesty for the senior army officers with no legal questions asked about the massacres of the past few months. In fact the guarantees offered by the leadership of the Brotherhood and its electionwinning party, are not limited to the military council, but include those made to the class of big businessmen to encourage investment and continue with the neo-liberal policies of the old regime, as well as guarantees to the Zionist entity and the American government not to endanger the Camp David Accord and to continue the strategic partnership with the United States. They even agreed to negotiations with the IMF on exactly the same humiliating conditions as under the old regime. Perhaps the image which best conveys this relationship is the picture of Lieutenant General Sami Anan with his hands stained with the blood of hundreds of martyrs and thousands of injured in a historic embrace with the Brotherhoods leaders Muhammad Morsi and Saad al-Katani, as it shows how both sides fear of the third force (the masses who have an interest in deepening the revolution on a political and social level) is much greater than their differences over the details of the division of the political spoils between them. But why are they so afraid? Is it not time to celebrate the marriage of democracy to the peaceful transfer of power as has happened in Tunisia? Here we have to say that Egypt is not Tunisia. This is for a number of reasons, and principally because of the economic crisis. None of the successive governments which have held power since the fall of Mubarak have been able to offer anything tangible to the masses, rather the situation has worsened day by day. Foreign exchange reserves are fast draining away (down from $36 billion to $15 billion during the first year of the revolution). Inflation is rising in the absence of any mechanism to control rising prices. Unemployment is continually rising and none of the successive governments have proposed to increase the budgets for housing, education, health, youth employment, or genuinely raise wages or improve public services for the majority of the masses. And all this is happening in the context of a severe crisis of global capitalism which in turn reduces income for Egyptian capitalism from sources such as tourism, the Suez Canal and foreign investment. The incoming Islamist-military governments will be austerity governments as a result of their commitment to neo-liberal polices, and will offer nothing to the masses but further poverty, job cuts, unemployment and the

disappearance of public services. They will possibly be even more brutal than those of the former regime. This means the honeymoon between the masses and the reformist Islamist parties they elected in the hope of serving their own interests and bettering their standard of living will be short. It will rapidly expose the inability of parliament in general, and of the Brotherhood in particular, to solve the masses problems and to offer a genuine alternative to the old regime and all its violence. We have an elected parliament which has been stripped of its powers and left helpless. The dominant political forces in the parliament are allied with the military council and the remnants of the old regime. Both internally and externally they are adopting the same political and economic policies as the old regime. The new parliament and the military council will only produce capitalist austerity governments which are hostile to the workers, the peasants and the poor. Like their predecessors, they will protect the interests of big business and the foreign companies, and above all they will remain faithful servants of the old regimes masters in Washington, Tel Aviv and Riyad. The next phase of the Egyptian revolution, which will begin on 25 January 2012, will not only mark the beginning of the defeat of the counter-revolution and its violent attempts to resurrect the past which the Egyptian people have trampled under their feet, but also the beginning of a battle with the reformist forces and parliamentary illusions. It will see the fight to link the deepening of the democratic revolution (transcending a formal parliamentary regime with limited powers) with the project of redistributing wealth (through the overthrow of the militarys economic monopoly and the 1000 richest families in Egypt) and the building of a new regime which represents and serves the interests of Egypts workers and peasants. This does not mean, of course, that the revolutionary forces can afford to ignore, or not take a clear position on issues such as the transfer of power from the hands of the military to civilians. However, the question remains to whom is power being transferred, even it is for a transitional period? Is it to a civilian presidential council, as some are suggesting? Or to the newly-elected parliament as others have argued? In fact both of these wrong perspectives are formalistic and short-sighted. The idea of a presidential council lacks any degree of democracy. Who will chose its members and by which mechanism? As for the second suggestion transfer of power to the elected parliament this appears to be more democratic, but loses its real meaning in the light of the composition of the current parliament and the nature and interests of the dominant forces within it. At this dangerous period we will focus on the demands which will serve the interests of the Egyptian revolution, which will not be achieved through the meaningless slogans about the phoney transfer of power but through a new wave of mass mobilisation. These demands can be summarized as follows Firstly: the resignation of the Ganzoury government as it is a government of Mubaraks old gang. Secondly: the trial of the military council, headed by Field Marshal Tantawi on charges of killing, wounding and dishonouring thousands of revolutionaries in

Egypts public squares, as there can be no talk of democracy without putting the military council in the dock. Thirdly: the complete cleansing of the remnants of the old regime and the network of interests it represents from the institutions of the Egyptian state, starting with the military. These demands or conditions are an inseparable part of exposing the reformists before the masses which voted for them in the elections. They also represent the gateway to the next wave of the Egyptian revolution, which will begin on 25 January 2012, under the slogan all power and wealth to the people. The task of the revolutionaries in this new wave will be to link the uprisings and sit-ins in the squares with the strikes and protests of workers and the poor. It will be to link those who want to complete the democratic revolution and take it beyond a restricted and incapacitated parliamentary democracy to forms of direct, mass democracy in the popular and workers and peasants committees and those who want to achieve the demands of social justice through strikes and sit-ins to recover Egypts wealth from the 1000 richest families and the military establishment and redistribute it for the benefit of the workers, peasants and the poor.