Professional Documents
Culture Documents
File Notes
The main advantage to this aff is warming – since the warming file is being done
separately, the only warming cards included here are the ones we came across in the course
of permits research. In order to read this aff (at least in this iteration of the file), you need
to construct your own warming advantage using the warming file. It’s also advisable to
construct your own peak oil advantage using the oil files.
This file is designed mostly to let you have mechanism debates. You should write your plan
to establish an upstream, auctioned system of tradable carbon permits requiring a
substantial reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
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***Inherency
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Cap and trade is constantly rejected despite being the most cost-effective way of regulating
CO2 emissions
Yvonne Gross, J.D., Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Fall 2005, “Kyoto, Congress, or Bust: The Constitutional
Invalidity of State CO2 Cap and Trade Programs,” Thomas Jefferson Law Review, 28 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 205, p.
215
Cap-and-trade programs can be a useful tool for regulating CO2 emissions because they strike a balance
between preventive approaches to global warming and the economic challenges to emitters of CO2.
Accordingly, cap-and-trade programs are an economically efficient way to allocate the burdens of CO2
regulation if implemented across multiple sectors and on a national basis. However, they still represent
a mandatory approach to CO2 regulation that has been consistently rejected by both past and current
presidential administrations.47
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***Oil Dependence
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Cap and Trade Solves Wars from Warming and Peak Oil
( ) Runaway climate change will cause environmental destruction and armed conflict
across the globe, while peaking oil production will cause wars and collapse the economy –
implementing a cap and trade program now is critical to avert catastrophic climate change
John Podesta, President and CEO of the Center for American Progress, January 23, 2008, “Cap, Auction, and
Trade: Allowance Auctions and Revenue Recycling Under Carbon Cap-and-Trade,” online:
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/podesta_testimony.html, accessed June 23, 2008
Global warming is one of the greatest challenges our world faces, and as our understanding of its
implications increases, the case for dramatic, immediate action is only made stronger. Just last week, for
instance, we learned a new, startling fact: The western Antarctic ice sheet is melting at a faster rate than
anticipated by scientific models. This news was particularly disturbing because sea level rise may be
well above the “expected” A1B emission scenario projected in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s Fourth Assessment Report which had already foreseen a sea level rise during the next 30 years that
would have severe global consequences. Perhaps the best we can hope for and certainly the least we ought
to plan for is a climate that will cause severe damage to coastal cities, trading centers, and ecosystems
around the world. We have to come to grips with a climate that will force highly destabilizing human
migration in some of the most politically fragile regions of the world. This is a climate that will put Lagos
at risk by 2015 and will pose enormous challenges for Nigeria and the entire West African region, not to
mention the impact it would have on international oil supplies. We face a climate that will inflict severe
damage on the coastal wetlands of Bangladesh and its groundwater supplies, thus driving more people
inland and fomenting instability as the resettled population would have to compete for scarce resources
with the established residents. Others would migrate abroad, creating heightened political tension not
only in South Asia, but Europe and Southeast Asia as well. Increasing water scarcity due to climate change
will also contribute to instability throughout the world. Although we are not likely to see “water wars” per
se, countries will more aggressively pursue the kinds of technological and political solutions that
currently enable them to exist in regions that are stretched past their water limits. This is likely to be
the case in the Middle East where water shortages will coincide will a population boom. And this, as I
mentioned, was before we learned that the rate at which the western Antarctic ice sheet is melting means that
the sea level rise this century may be measured not in inches, not even in feet, but in meters. Clearly, global
warming presents the United States with multiple foreign policy and economic challenges, and not just from
our deepening dependence on oil. Worldwide, we are already beginning to feel some of the consequences
of climate change—ranging from more intense storms to droughts to sea level rise to food shortages.
And as economies continue to grow, countries will become more like the United States—meaning big-
time polluters—unless we change the trajectory we are currently on. Global warming greatly
complicates the challenge of restoring economic growth and shared prosperity. Here in the United
States, Americans are already burdened by near record oil prices and high gasoline and electricity bills.
This is one of the consequences of the Bush administration’s refusal to adopt a clean energy strategy
and solutions. And, last-ditch efforts, such as what we are seeing from the Bush administration with the
upcoming Major Economies Meeting, will get us no closer to solving global warming than a few meetings at
the end of the administration will bring about substantial gains toward peace in the Middle East. The
challenge we face now is nothing short of the conversion of an economy sustained by high-carbon
energy—putting both our national security and the health of our planet at serious risk—to one based
on low-carbon, sustainable sources of energy. The scale of this undertaking is immense and its potential
enormous. Our traditional understanding of energy security has been largely limited to assuring adequate
supplies of energy to fuel our economy. That will remain a necessary concern, of course, but not a sufficient
one. Going forward our leaders will have to act on an understanding of energy security that turns not just on
the supply but on the carbon content of the energy we use. Otherwise, we will consign ourselves long-term to
the mercy of international markets and an increasingly variable climate. We must act now and act boldly to
put ourselves on a sustainable footing, in the interest of our national, economic, environmental, and energy
security. Simply put, energy will rapidly transform the world for good or ill. The question for the United
States is whether we will participate as a leader in the global energy revolution. The scale of the change we
need is daunting but achievable. We must create a virtuous circle of rising economic fortunes for a growing
global middle class. This must include an energy strategy comprising
CONTINUED – NO TEXT REMOVED…
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Cap and Trade Solves Wars from Warming and Peak Oil
PODESTA CONTINUED – NO TEXT REMOVED…
complementary policies that reduce our nation’s carbon footprint, revolutionize energy production and
consumption, lower costs for consumers over time, create new green-collar jobs, and spur innovation and
leadership in the global low-carbon technology marketplace. The urgency of this issue demands a president
willing to make the low-carbon energy challenge a top priority in the White House—a centerpiece not only
of his or her energy policy but also of his or her economic program—to produce broad-based growth and
sustain American economic leadership in the 21st century. This task is so encompassing it will demand that
the incoming president in 2009 reorganize the mission and responsibility of all relevant government agencies
—economic, national security, and environmental. As part of this reorganization, the incoming president
should create a new National Energy Council in the White House led by a National Energy Advisor whose
missions will be the energy transformation of our economy and the promotion of these same steps abroad.
Thus, it is clear that energy policy is economic policy: In order to reverse the economic downturn we are
currently facing and to capture the opportunities provided by a low-carbon energy transformation, we must
put energy at the center of our nation’s economic growth. It is clear that energy policy is economic policy: in
order to reverse the economic downturn we are currently facing and to capture the opportunities provided by
a low-carbon energy transformation, we must put energy at the center of our nation’s economic
transformation and economic growth. The U.S. economy is currently dependent on a few high-carbon,
increasingly expensive energy sources like oil. Fundamentally changing how we produce and consume
energy, investing in low-carbon innovation, and transforming our economy to a low-carbon model are key to
promoting economic mobility, growth, job creation, and re-gaining technological leadership in the global
innovation marketplace. The U.S. Congress obviously realizes the importance of energy policy to the U.S.
economy—last year’s passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act is a demonstration of this—and I
congratulate you for your leadership on this achievement. But we must do more, both to reduce our national
greenhouse gas emissions and to jumpstart the technological innovation and investment needed to get us on
the right track, not only to stimulate and grow the economy but also to avoid the worst effects of global
warming. The longer we wait to act, the costs to our productivity growth, our national security, and our
environment will only continue to skyrocket. The Center for American Progress recently released a report,
entitled “Capturing the Energy Opportunity: Creating a Low-Carbon Economy,” which outlines our strategy
for transforming our economy from a high-carbon to a low-carbon model. In this report, we propose 10 steps
that the next administration can take to transform the economy from a high- to low-carbon model and capture
the opportunities provided by this transformation. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to discuss
the design of a national cap-and-trade program for global warming emissions which must be a
fundamental part of our energy and economic policy. CAP recommends an energy strategy that employs a
cap- and-trade system with a 100 percent auction of carbon permits and a suite of public investment policies
funded by the auction revenue. Any national cap-and-trade system should be designed to achieve a level
of reductions that will limit the temperature increase to 3.6°F (2°C) above pre-industrial levels, the
level at which scientists believe we have at least a strong likelihood of avoiding the worst impacts of
catastrophic climate change.
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***Climate Advantage
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Yes Warming
( ) Predictions and models of global climate change have been proven accurate – warming
is indisputable and its impact will only magnify
Albert N. Stavins, Professor of Business and Government at Harvard and Director of the Harvard Environmental
Economics Program, October 2007, “A U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” online:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climate_stavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf, accessed June
20, 2008
The basic story has been explained many times, but it merits repeating. Two trace constituents of the
atmosphere, carbon dioxide (CO2) and water vapor, create a thermal blanket for the planet much as glass on
a greenhouse traps the sun’s energy within. It is a good thing, too: without greenhouse warming, the earth
would be far too cold to be livable. But the balance between too much and too little greenhouse effect is
remarkably delicate. Massive quantities of CO2 are produced from the combustion of fossil fuels—coal,
petroleum, and natural gas—and deforestation. Meanwhile the direct warming effects of CO2 and other
greenhouse gases—methane, nitrous oxide, and halocarbons—are indirectly amplified because the
warming increases the evaporation of water, raising atmospheric water vapor concentrations
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007a).
Average global surface temperatures have risen by about 1.25 degrees Fahrenheit over the past 150
years, with most of the increase occurring since 1970. This fits the predictions of modern computer
models of climate change that also take account of increases in atmospheric dust (dust cools the earth by
reflecting sunlight) and variations in the sun’s energy output. Changes in temperatures in the middle of
continents and at high latitudes have been two to four times greater than the average global change—also as
predicted.
Warmer days and nights (which would surely be welcome in some places) are only part of the story. The
most important consequences of greenhouse gas concentrations are likely to be changes in patterns of
precipitation and runoff, the melting of glaciers and sea ice, increases in sea levels, and changes in
storm frequency and intensity (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007b). That is why it is
important to view the problem as global climate change rather than global warming alone. But moving
from predictions of average global temperature change to predictions of regional climate impacts is difficult.
The best computer models cannot yet produce reliable estimates of these impacts. What is obvious, however,
is that emissions in one country affect the climate in every other. Hence the fundamental logic of a global
pact on emissions, such as the one hammered out in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997.
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***Economy
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***Solvency
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***Mechanisms
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Albert N. Stavins, Professor of Business and Government at Harvard and Director of the Harvard Environmental
Economics Program, October 2007, “A U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” online:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climate_stavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf, accessed June
20, 2008
The need for a domestic U.S. policy that seriously addresses climate change is increasingly apparent. A cap-
and-trade system is the best approach in the short to medium term. Besides providing certainty about
emissions levels, cap-and-trade offers an easy means of compensating for the inevitably unequal burdens
imposed by climate policy; it is straightforward to harmonize with other countries’ climate policies; it avoids
the current political aversion in the United States to taxes; and it has a history of successful adoption in this
country. The paper proposes a specific cap-and-trade system with several key features including: an upstream
cap on CO2 emissions with gradual inclusion of other greenhouse gases; a gradual downward trajectory of
emissions ceilings over time to minimize disruption and allow firms and households time to adapt; and
mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. Initially, half of the program’s allowances would be allocated through
auctioning and half through free distribution, primarily to those entities most burdened by the policy. This
should help limit potential inequities while bolstering political support. The share distributed for free would
phase out over twenty-five years. The auctioned allowances would generate revenue that could be used for a
variety of worthwhile public purposes. The system would provide for linkage with international emissions
reduction credit arrangements, harmonization over time with effective cap-and-trade systems in other
countries, and appropriate linkage with other actions taken abroad that maintains a level playing field
between imports and import-competing domestic products.
Albert N. Stavins, Professor of Business and Government at Harvard and Director of the Harvard Environmental
Economics Program, October 2007, “A U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” online:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climate_stavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf, accessed June
20, 2008
The United States can launch a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically feasible approach
to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by adopting an upstream, economywide CO2 cap-and-trade system
that implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions over time. The approach proposed here also
includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty, such as multiyear compliance periods, provisions for
banking and borrowing, and possibly a cost containment mechanism to protect against extreme price
volatility. 15
Allowances under the system would be allocated through a combination of free distribution and open
auction. This is intended to balance, on the one hand, the legitimate concerns of those who will be
particularly burdened by this (or any) climate policy with, on the other hand, the opportunity to achieve
important public purposes with funds generated by the auctions. The share of free allowances would decrease
over time as the private sector adjusts to the carbon constraints, with all allowances being auctioned after
twenty-five years.
Offsets would be made available for both underground and biological carbon sequestration, to achieve short-
term cost-effectiveness and create long-term incentives for appropriate technological change. The cap-and-
trade system would be a federal program, with supremacy over all U.S. regional, state, and local systems, to
avoid duplication, double counting, and conflicting requirements. It would also provide for harmonization
over time with emissions reduction credit and cap-and-trade systems in other nations, as well as related
international systems.
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Tim Hargrave, Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Clean Air Policy, March 1998, “US Carbon Emissions
Trading: Description of an Upstream Approach,” online: http://www.ccap.org/pdf/upstpub.pdf, accessed June 20,
2008
The US could implement a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions cap-and-trade system either “upstream”, at the
level of primary fuel producers, or “downstream”, at the level of fuel users. An upstream system would
require fossil fuel producers to hold allowances for the potential greenhouse gas emissions embodied in their
fuels and would affect energy users by changing the prices of fossil fuels.
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Albert N. Stavins, Professor of Business and Government at Harvard and Director of the Harvard Environmental
Economics Program, October 2007, “A U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” online:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climate_stavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf, accessed June
20, 2008
Any cap-and-trade system for CO2 must define the set of emissions sources that are capped (the scope of
coverage) and the point in the fossil fuel supply chain at which that cap is enforced (the point of regulation).
To achieve economy-wide coverage, the point of regulation should be upstream, collecting allowances
according to the carbon content of fuels at the point of their extraction, import, processing, or distribution.21
The first sellers of extracted fossil fuels would be required to hold allowances: for coal, at the mine shipping
terminus; for petroleum, at the refinery gate; for natural gas, at the first distribution point; and for imports, at
the point of importation. Such a cap would effectively cover all sources of CO2 emissions throughout the
economy (Table 1).22 Any upstream program should include a credit mechanism, to address both the small
portion of fossil fuels that are not combusted and the use of postcombustion emissions reduction
technologies, such as carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). It should also include a credit-based
arrangement for fossil fuel exports so that exporters are not placed at a competitive disadvantage relative to
foreign suppliers that do not face allowance requirements. Emissions reductions from CCS technologies can
be readily measured. Also, unlike some creditbased programs, a program for CCS runs no risk of granting
credits for fictitious emissions reductions: because emissions sources have no incentive to install CCS
equipment in the absence of a climate policy, emissions reductions achieved by CCS are clearly additional.
CCS technologies are expected to play a significant role in achieving long-run emissions reduction goals;
therefore such a credit mechanism is an essential component of an upstream cap.
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Tim Hargrave, Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Clean Air Policy, March 1998, “US Carbon Emissions
Trading: Description of an Upstream Approach,” online: http://www.ccap.org/pdf/upstpub.pdf, accessed June 20,
2008
Effective implementation of an upstream system would depend on determining the proper point in the fuel
production cycle to require allowances. Criteria to use in identifying the proper point of regulation include
the following:
· The program should capture as high a percentage as possible of the total life-cycle emissions associated
with a fuel. The choice of the point of regulation will affect this level of coverage; and
· the program should be administratively feasible. This means that the number of regulated entities,
company reporting requirements and government administrative costs must be minimized. In addition,
regulation must take place at a point where the carbon content of fuel (and therefore potential carbon
emissions) may be accurately estimated. Finally, the system must accurately account for fuel imports and
exports as well as carbon that is used domestically but not emitted to the atmosphere (e.g., carbon that is
embodied in products such as asphalt and plastic).
Application of these criteria suggest that allowances be required at the following points in an upstream
system:
· Petroleum refineries, because coverage of petroleum-related emissions would be nearly total, the number
of regulated entities would be small (175), and the carbon in fuels could be reliably estimated.
· Oil importers, to ensure that refined petroleum products arriving from abroad are captured in the system.
· Natural gas pipelines, because of the high coverage of potential gas-related emissions and the fact that the
population of regulated entities would be kept to approximately 150, if all interstate and major intrastate
pipelines were included.
· Natural gas processing plants, to capture the carbon embodied in natural gas liquids (NGLs).
Approximately 725 gas processing plants are operating in the US.
· Coal mines and preparation plants. Prep plants, of which there are approximately 550, possess the data
needed to estimate potential carbon emissions. However, because not all coal passes through a prep plant, in
some cases regulation would have to take place at the mine. While all mines would be included in the
reporting system, only those producing coal that bypassed prep plants would need to hold allowances. It is
estimated that less than 100 coal mines, located primarily in the western US, would actually have to hold
allowances.
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*Auctioning
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Auctioning emissions credits is better for the US economy- and even helps businesses more
than if no carbon cap had been put in place.
Evans et al, June 2002
(Matt Evans, Beth Goldbert, Paige Brown and Bruce Kaplan, “Watching Our Assets: Climate Policy Should Not Be
Corporate Welfare,” Redefining Progress)
A permit giveaway would be a boon to the coal mining industry (1,005% increase) and the oil and gas
industry (29% increase), while the equity values in most other industries would decline. The profits these
companies generate from their free pollution permits would directly benefit only stockholders in these
companies. Most Americans would only receive higher prices in return. Electric utilities, which buy the
energy produced by fossil fuel extractions, would suffer the most (-5.7%). On the other hand, under a
system of permit auctions coupled with targeted tax cuts, the electric utility, construction, auto, service,
and housing industries would do better relative to the giveaway scenario. In some cases, they would do
better than if there were no climate policy at all. In this situation, prices would still increase by the market
price of permits, but the revenue raised from the permit auctions or fees could then be used for various
environmental or economic purposes. These might include rebates to citizens facing higher energy
prices; mitigating climate change’s impacts on the most vulnerable groups; or tax shifts that reduce
personal, payroll, or business investment taxes. Auctions would provide a benefit to society as a whole
in exchange for letting corporations use the atmosphere, while grandfathering would benefit only the
corporations who hold the permits.
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***AT: Disads
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AT: Elections
( ) Both candidates support cap and trade – there’s no way the plan could give one the
edge
IHT (International Herald Tribune), 6-18, 2008, “Europe’s carbon market holds lessons for the U.S.”
As the United States moves toward action on global warming, practical experience with carbon markets in
the European Union raises a critical question: Will such systems ever work?
Backers of carbon markets, including the presumptive U.S. presidential candidates Barack Obama and
John McCain, see them as one of the cheapest and most effective ways to control greenhouse gases in
advanced economies.
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***AT: Counterplans
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*AT: States
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***AT: Ks
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AT: Commodification K
( ) There’s no link or impact to the ‘right-to-pollute’ K
Albert N. Stavins, Professor of Business and Government at Harvard and Director of the Harvard Environmental
Economics Program, October 2007, “A U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” online:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climate_stavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf, accessed June
20, 2008
“Cap-and-Trade Is Unethical—It Allows Firms to Buy and Sell the Right to Pollute.” Over the twenty-five
years in which market-based instruments have become an accepted part of the environmental
regulatory portfolio, the claim that cap-and-trade systems are morally flawed because they allow firms
to buy and sell the right to pollute is heard with decreasing frequency. But the argument has been made
at least as recently as the late 1990s, and in the specific context of global climate change policy (Sandel
1997). However, few would agree that people are behaving immorally by cooking dinner, heating their
homes, turning on a light, or using a computer. Yet all of these activities result in CO2 emissions
(Gaines 1997).
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AT: Market/Neolib K
( ) General criticisms of the market don’t apply to our aff – market-based mechanisms are
critical to addressing the harm of climate change and avoiding the pitfalls of command-
and-control that link more to their K
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, the Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and the Director of the International Tax LLM Program
at the University of Michigan Law School, and David M. Uhlmann, the Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice
and the Director of the Environmental Law and Policy Program at the University of Michigan Law School, March
18, 2008, “Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than
Cap and Trade,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1109167, accessed June 23, 2008
The major driving force behind market-based approaches is the belief that harnessing market forces is
critical to developing the operational changes and alternative technologies needed to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions. Theoretically, reliance on market-based forces would allow development of the most
costeffective form of carbon dioxide reductions, which is less likely to occur if the government mandates
particular types of emissions controls under the Clean Air Act. Some may question whether it is wise to rely
on market forces to respond to a crisis that has been described as a market failure of epic proportions, since
free market forces have failed to account for the enormous economic and social costs that would accompany
global climate change.98 From an economic standpoint, however, carbon dioxide emissions are the classic
externality: emissions occur at no cost to the emitting facility, but at an enormous cost to society as a
whole.99 A central feature of the market-based approaches, therefore, is developing a price signal for
carbon that incorporates the costs of that externality and drives the market toward finding acceptable
alternatives.100 It may be a leap of faith to focus on market-based solutions for environmental problems that
have their origin in the dramatic increase in carbon dioxide emissions that have accompanied
industrialization and development around the world during the last 150 years. Yet, precisely because the
increase in carbon dioxide emissions is occurring throughout the world and across all sectors of the
global economy, a market-based approach may be the best way to address all sources of carbon dioxide
emissions. In contrast, the regulatory approaches described above necessarily target individual market
sectors, which may lead to uneven emissions controls. In addition to promoting the most cost-effective
solutions, market-based limits allow the significant costs of carbon dioxide emission reductions to be
distributed more evenly across the economy.101 Any carbon mitigation strategy will have economic
impacts, and no approach can eliminate all disproportionate effects, but a market-based strategy is
likely to allow costs to be shared most equally, because it affects the entire economy. Finally, a market-
based approach can be implemented more rapidly than the regulatory approaches described above,
particularly if a carbon tax is utilized.
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***Topicality
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Cpa and trade is the strongest incentives for invoations to meet targets
Albert N. Stavins, Professor of Business and Government at Harvard and Director of the Harvard Environmental
Economics Program, October 2007, “A U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” online:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climate_stavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf, accessed June
20, 2008
Compared with market-based policies, standards yield weaker incentives for the development of new
emissions reduction technologies. For example, unlike market-based policies, standards for energy
consumption by air conditioners would not provide clear or certain rewards for the development of air
conditioners that are more efficient than the standards require. This difference in incentives is
particularly acute for more advanced technologies that are still in the innovation phase and have not yet been
sufficiently deployed to have any associated standards. As new technologies emerge and increasingly
stringent emissions targets must be met, pursuit of a standards-based approach would require
continual adjustments to the standards, at a significant administrative cost, to ensure that
responsibilities for emissions reduction continue to be distributed across regulated sources in a
reasonably cost-effective manner. By contrast, under a cap-and-trade system, only the emissions cap
need be changed over time. Firms and households will respond to emerging technologies and increasing
carbon price signals by adopting those technologies, measures, and efficiency improvements that offer the
least costly emissions reductions.
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AT: Effects-T
( ) Game over – cap-and-trade directly incentivizes the use of alternate energy technology
Albert N. Stavins, Professor of Business and Government at Harvard and Director of the Harvard Environmental
Economics Program, October 2007, “A U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” online:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climate_stavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf, accessed June
20, 2008
The cost of achieving significant greenhouse gas emissions reductions in future years will depend
critically on the availability and cost of low- or nonemitting technologies. A cap-and-trade system that
establishes caps extending decades into the future generates price signals that provide incentives for firms
to invest in the development and deployment of such technologies, thereby lowering the future cost of
reducing emissions. To create these incentives, a cap-and-trade system must provide credible
commitments to meeting long-run emissions targets.9 If a lack of credibility makes the payoff from
investments in the new technologies highly uncertain, these investments will lag (Montgomery and Smith
2007). On the other hand, policymakers also need to maintain flexibility to adjust long-term targets as new
information is obtained regarding the benefits and costs of mitigating climate change. Managing this trade-
off between the credibility of long-run targets and flexibility is important for the success of any climate
policy.
AT: Extra-T
( ) It’s impossible for cap-and-trade to be extra-topical - it caps emissions by measuring
the carbon embodied in fuels, rather than emissions once they’re burned – that means only
switching to alternate fuels allows industries to sell their permits
Tim Hargrave, Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Clean Air Policy, March 1998, “US Carbon Emissions
Trading: Description of an Upstream Approach,” online: http://www.ccap.org/pdf/upstpub.pdf, accessed June 20,
2008
Another possible disadvantage of an upstream system is that it would provide no incentive to employ end
use emissions treatment technologies such as carbon dioxide scrubbers. This is because an upstream
system would account for potential emissions by estimating the carbon embodied in fuels rather than
by monitoring actual stack emissions, as would be the case in a downstream system, at least in the
electricity sector. CO2 scrubbing is not now cost-effective, but it might be in the future. If so, then this issue
would have to be addressed. One option would be to create an allowance set-aside to reward the use of
scrubbers. Another would be to allow fuel producers to purchase the emissions reductions from scrubbers as
“offsets” of their own emissions, in the same way that companies are now funding carbon sequestration
projects.