The Lotus Sutra and Japanese Culture

M ATSUMOTO Shir

the Lotus Sutra and Japanese culture is an extension of my argument that the doctrine of tathgata-garbha is not Buddhist.1 The question I put myself here is, What is the teaching of the Lotus Sutra, perhaps the most inuential Buddhist scripture in East Asia? I have organized my remarks in response to the views of Hirakawa Akira, one of the leading Japanese authorities on Buddhism, whose standpoint can be summarized in three points:
HE PRESENT ESSAY ON

1. The idea of the one vehicle (ekayna) in the Lotus Sutra indicates a principle that unies the three vehicles (triyna). 2. The idea of the attainment of Buddhahood by all beings in the Lotus Sutra is the same as the idea that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature in the Mahparinirva Sutra, resulting in a view of the Lotus Sutra colored by the doctrine of tathgata-garbha. 3. Stupa worship was the basis for the formation of the Lotus Sutra.
THE ONE VEHICLE: UNIFYING PRINCIPLE OR SPECIFIC OPTION?

What is the function of the idea of one vehicle in the Lotus Sutra? Hirakawa writes:
Although the followers of each of the three vehiclessravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvasall perform the different practices of their respective vehicle, they make equal progress on the path to Buddhahood. According to the chapter on Means, There is only one vehicle, not two or three (T 9.8a). In contrast, according to the Vimalakrti Sutra, the followers of the sravaka-vehicle are disparaged as having rotten or inferior seeds and are said to have no possibility of realizing Buddhahood. However, if sravakas and pratyekabuddhas cannot realize ultimate salvation, then the teaching of the Vimalakrti Sutra cannot be called a complete version of Mahayana, since some beings are not included within 388

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the scope of the Buddhas compassion. The One-Buddha-vehicle teaching of the Lotus Sutra probably arose out of the need to formulate a Mahayana teaching that would account for the salvation of Hinayana practitioners. In historical terms, after a period of emphasizing the opposition of and differences between the Hinayana and Mahayana traditions, Mahayana thinkers formulated new teachings such as those of the Lotus Sutra, which would encompass the two traditions. The appeal of such teachings was based on the popularity of stupa worship.2 The one vehicle of the Lotus Sutra includes and unies the sravaka vehicle and the pratyekabuddha vehicle. This does not mean that one enters into the bodhisattva vehicle after totally abandoning the vehicle of the sravaka, but that the practice of the sravaka vehicle itself becomes the practice of the bodhisattva vehicle.3

According to Hirakawa, the idea of the one vehicle in the Lotus Sutra provides a principle for unifying Hinayana and Mahayana. This obviates the need for abandoning the Hinayana and converting to Mahayana, because the way of the sravaka is seen as a practice for attaining Buddhahood. I disagree with this interpretation. The idea of one vehicle in the Lotus Sutra should be understood in light of verses 5355 in the second chapter on Means:4
Sravaka (Voice-hearers) of the Leader (nyaka) Who hear the Dharma I preach, If they hear or bear in mind even a single verse, They shall all undoubtedly attain Enlightenment. [53] There is only One Vehicle (yna), For in the world there is no second nor third, Except a differentiation between vehicles [Taught] by the Supreme Ones as skillful means. [54] The protector of the world is born into the world In order to clarify and teach the wisdom of the Buddha (buddha-jna). There is only one purpose, and no second. The Buddhas do not lead beings through the Hinayana. [55]

The teaching in these verses is illustrated in Diagram 1 (see p. 390). I maintain that the true intent of the Lotus Sutra is to teach that even though three vehicles are taught as a skillful means, only the Mahayana (i.e., the Buddha-yna) is real and true. The existence of three vehicles is presupposed in the Lotus Sutra teaching of one vehicle. We may assume
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DIAGRAM

1 one vehicle = real Buddha-yna (Mahayana)

three vehicles = means 3. rvaka-yna 2. Pratyekabuddha-yna 1. Bodhisattva-yna

that prior to the compilation of the Lotus Sutra there was a form of Mahayana (reected in the Prajpramit sutras)5 in which Hinayana and Mahayana either coexisted or were set in opposition to one another. With the appearance of the chapter on Means in the Lotus Sutra, however, the assertion was made that, of the three vehicles, only the Mahayana (the Buddha-yna) is the true one. Whereas previously the other two vehicles were granted some validity, they were declared invalid with the coming of the Lotus Sutra. The core teaching of the chapter on Means is that the two lower vehicles are not really vehicles leading to Buddhahood at all, because they are inadequate to the task. What, then, qualies a form of Buddhism as valid and adequate to be called a vehicle to Buddhahood? The answer is, the form that provides Buddha-wisdom (buddhajna) or allows beings to attain Buddhahood. This disqualies the ways of the sravaka and pratyekabuddha. Only the Mahayanathe vehicle of the bodhisattva and the Buddhais a vehicle for this attainment. From the ancient past it was taken as accepted wisdom that the idea of one vehicle in the Lotus Sutra could be summarized in the phrase the attainment of Buddhahood by the sravaka and pratyekabuddha (nij sabutsu 6[). Unlike Hirakawa, I maintain that this does not mean that sravakas and pratyekabuddhas can attain Buddhahood while remaining in their current way. If they want to attain Buddhahood they must abandon their current state and convert to Mahayana. In Chinese Buddhism this conversion was expressed in the phrase turning from the inferior and entering the great (esh nydai q), and this was set up as a necessary condition for those of the two vehicles to attain Buddhahood. More specically, this conversion involves hearing the teaching of the one vehicle through the preaching of the Lotus Sutra and believing in this message. All who believe in the Lotus Sutra will attain Buddhahood, but those who do not believe will never attain Buddhahood. This is the basic stance of the Lotus Sutra.
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The core teaching that runs through the chapter on Means is that the two vehicles are incapable of leading people to Buddhahood, and are thus useless vehicles. The verses cited above are the clearest expression of this idea, which is accurately transmitted in Kumrajvas translation (T 9.8a2022):
In order to preach Buddha-wisdom The Buddhas come into the world. Only this one cause is true, For the other two are unreal. To the very end he does not resort to the Lesser Vehicle To ferry the beings across.6

On the basis of these verses we can say that the Lotus Sutra makes the following identications:
The two vehicles = the other two = Hinayana = unreal The Buddha-vehicle = the one cause = Mahayana = real

In short, the one-vehicle teaching of the Lotus Sutra is neither a conciliatory nor a syncretistic teaching. It calls for a radical choice that involves rejecting what is wrong and accepting what is right. In a different time and place, Dgen (12001253) was to take the same standpoint. In the Shbgenz zuimonki he says:
If someone comes to ask about the teaching or the essentials of practice, a monk must always answer him truthfully. Even if the person seems to be someone of no talent or is a beginner with little knowledge and cannot understand, the monk must not reply with an expedient or untrue answer. The spirit of the bodhisattva precepts requires that he answer only with the Mahayana teachings, even if the questioner is a Hinayana person who asks of the Hinayana way. This is how the Tathagata taught during his lifetime. The provisional teachings of expediency are really of no value. The last True Teaching [of the Lotus Sutra] alone has real worth. Do not worry about whether or not the person understands; just answer with the truth.7

Here Dgen clearly states that the bodhisattva ideal requires that Mahayana teachings must be taught even to those who do not understand or who explicitly ask for the Hinayana teachings, and that this was also the way taken by the Buddha himself. Further, the expedient or provisional means are worthless, and the truth must be told regardless of the capacity of the listener to understand. This is the radical one-vehicle teaching of
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the Lotus Sutra: that Mahayana alone is right, and the other teachings are wrong and useless. The differences of this position from Hirakawas should be obvious. I have illustrated it in Diagrams 2 and 3. In short, Hirakawa understands the one vehicle to mean a unifying principle that incorporates the two vehicles of the sravaka and pratyekabuddha. I understand the one vehicle as a principle that involves rejecting the two vehicles and choosing Mahayana. Another way to look at the difference between the two theories is to note that Hirakawas view involves four vehicles, while mine involves only three. I am aware of Kariya Sadahikos opinion that the traditional controversy between the so-called four-vehicles theory and the three-vehicles theory is awed in the very way in which the problem is expressed,8 but here again I beg to differ. This controversy concerns the issue of whether or not the one vehicle is to be identied with Mahayana, and this issue cannot be ignored when discussing the teaching of the Lotus Sutra. Why, then, has the three-vehicle versus four-vehicle controversy remained unresolved all this time? The answer is really quite simple: the
DIAGRAM

One Vehicle as a Unifying Principle three vehicles = means 3. rvaka-yna 2. Pratyekabuddha-yna 1. Bodhisattva-yna 3 Buddha-yna one vehicle = real

DIAGRAM

One Vehicle as a Specic Option rvaka-yna Pratyekabuddha-yna Mahayana

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teaching of the three-vehicle theory in its pure sense has never been accepted in the history of Buddhism in East Asia. By pure sense I mean the teaching of the three-vehicle theory that does not depend on the idea of tathgata-garbha, or the structure that I call dhtu-vda. Among modern Japanese scholars Fuse Kgaku, whose monumental study of the formation of the Lotus Sutra was published more than half a century ago, seems to be the only one to interpret the idea of one vehicle in terms of the three-vehicles theory.9 He speaks of the transcendent one vehicle (or what I call the one vehicle as a unifying principle), and rejects the idea in favor of singling out the one vehicle from among the three.10 All other modern Japanese Buddhist scholars interpret the one vehicle of the Lotus Sutra in terms of merging, reconciling, or unifying the three vehicles, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly supporting the four-vehicles theory.11 In this sense, Hirakawa may be said to represent the standard view of Japanese Buddhologists. The problem is that the idea of one vehicle as a unifying principle cannot account for Dgens position that only Mahayana is true or Nichirens radical and intense decision that only the Lotus Sutra is correct. In general the new Buddhist movements of the Kamakura period elected for clear-cut choices of certain teachings or practices, in contrast to the prevalent ethos of reconciliation and unity represented by the Tendai and Shingon schools. This latter ethos is best represented by the Tendai tradition of original enlightenment (hongaku hmon ), which derived in turn from tathgata-garbha thought and its dhtu-vda structure. Let us now turn to the question of the relationship between the Lotus Sutra and the doctrine of tathgata-garbha.

THE LOTUS SUTRA AND THE DOCTRINE OF TATHGATA-GARBHA

As is well known, Hirakawa interprets the Lotus Sutra in terms of the doctrine of tathgata-garbha and Kariya criticizes him for it.12 We may begin with Hirakawas actual words:
The technical term Buddha-nature (buddha-dhtu) does not appear in the Lotus Sutra, but the same notion is nevertheless expressed in ideas like the prophecies or assurance of Buddhahood for the sravakas (shmon juki l4z) and the attainment of Buddhahood by those of the two vehicles (nij sabutsu). We may therefore say that the idea of one vehicle is not only a [particular] teaching but also the ground or basis of the 393

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teachings, and is in fact the ideal that every being has Buddha-nature. One cannot say that those of the two vehicles can attain Buddhahood without acknowledging that every being has Buddha-nature.13 The idea that all beings can attain Buddhahood (or, to put it negatively, that there is no one who cannot attain Buddhahood)14 is the same idea as all beings have Buddha-nature.15

In short, Hirakawa identied the idea in the Lotus Sutra that all beings can attain Buddhahood with the teaching of the Mahparinirva Sutra that all sentient beings without exception have Buddha-nature. I have argued elsewhere at length that these two positions are different, and that since the doctrine of tathgata-garbha is a form of dhtu-vda, it is a philosophy of discrimination that, in the end, will claim that there are people who can never attain Buddhahood.16 Diagrams 4 and 5 illustrate this point, and show the structure of the idea of one vehicle taught, respectively, in the rmldev Sutra17 and in the Mahyanastrlakra of the Yogacara school.18 I consider both of these structures to be dhtu-vda, but there is a theoretical development from structure 4 to structure 5. The crucial difference is that while there are movements of both production and dissolution in structure 4, only the unilateral movement of production remains in structure 5. This reects the gotra theory of the Yogacarins, which teaches that the gotra (lineage) of each type is xed and cannot be overcome. There is yet another difference between the two structures. The term Mahayana in Diagram 4 has changed to tathgata-dharma in Diagram 5. This reects an important feature of dhtu-vda texts, namely that they seem to support the three-vehicles theory while in fact logically maintaining the four-vehicles theory. In discussing the relation between the one vehicle and the three vehicles, the Yogacarins were interested only in the realm of the super-locus. As a result, they understood the three vehicles to coexist as xed and different entities, while at the same time asserting that Mahayana was superior. This pattern resembles the state of affairs prior to the introduction of the idea of the one-vehicle by the Lotus Sutra. Even more pernicious is the fact that the difference between the vehicles and their superior-inferior relationship is ontologically solidied on the basis of a single and real locus, which inevitably leads to an ideology of discrimination. I call this type of dhtu-vda the gotra theory, and I consider it to display the same discriminatory traits that we nd in the related ideas of kula (clan) and vaa (lineage) in Indian society.
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DIAGRAM

4 pratyekabuddha-yna

production
rvaka-yna

dissolution

Mahayana

= ynatraya

[super-locus]

ekayna-buddhayna
DIAGRAM

production
rvaka-dharma

5 pratyekabuddha-dharma

tathgata-dharma

= ynatraya

[super-locus]

[locus] (hetu)

dharmadhtu-ekayna

On a related point, we noted in commenting on a citation from Hirakawa earlier in this essay that he considers the Vimalakrti Sutra, which disparages the sravaka as rotten seed, to predate the Lotus Sutra, attributing its origins to a period when there was pronounced confrontation between Hinayana and Mahayana. I would argue, however, that the Vimalakrti Sutra clearly postdates the Lotus Sutra, both because it teaches an extremely discriminatory gotra theory19 and because its teaching is a form of dhtu-vda.20
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We may now turn to the question of why some dhtu-vda literature seems to teach the three-vehicle theory when in fact it is based on the logic of the four-vehicle theory. To begin with, the dhtu-vda tendencies of Vasubandhus Treatise on the Lotus Sutra (*Saddharmapu^arkopadea, T No. 1519) are clearly revealed in the following passages:
[The Lotus Sutra] clearly manifests [the idea that] all sentient beings are endowed with Buddha-nature (buddha-dhtu). [T 26.9a] The Dharma body (dharmakya) is the same for the sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and the Buddhas. [T 26.7a]

Here the terms buddha-dhtu and dharmakya refer to a single basic locus, of which individual sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and Buddhas are super-loci. Nevertheless, Vasubandhu clearly teaches the three-vehicle theory in the famous passage at the end of his treatise in which he supports rejecting the two and clarifying the one (&gs).21 I would note here that the intent of this phrase is quite different from the three-vehicle theory that I accept and have illustrated above in Diagram 3. Whereas in my understanding the one-vehicle idea of the Lotus Sutra involves a total negation or rejection of the two vehicles, Vasubandhu admits the validity of all three vehicles and then sets out to establish their superior-inferior relationship. His reasoning clearly is based on the gotra theory, as reected in the use of the common YogacaraVijnavda theory of the four kinds of sravaka. According to this theory, sravakas are classied into four groups: the xed (), the arrogant (E), the transformed (5), and those converted to bodhi (qT ). Vasubandhu claims that of these four types of sravaka, only the last two are included among the sravaka who are assured in the Lotus Sutra of eventual enlightenment. It is important to note that in this scheme these two types of sravaka, who can attain Buddhahood, originally possess the lineage (gotra) of a bodhisattva and only assume the provisional form of sravakas, while the real sravakas who are xed in the lineage of a sravaka can never attain Buddhahood. Herein lies the basis for the fundamental notion of the Yogacaras that bodhisattvas alone can attain Buddhahood but sravakas cannot, and that there is a denite difference between the three vehicles. What is even more astonishing is that this discriminatory notion of the superiority of Mahayana on the basis of the gotra theory has even crept into the Lotus Sutra itself. In his insistence that the sravaka practices
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themselves can become the practices of a bodhisattva, Hirakawa relies on two passages from Kumrajvas Chinese translation of the Lotus Sutra:
a. Inwardly concealing their bodhisattva-conduct and outwardly showing themselves to be voice-hearers,22 b. What you are now treading Is the bodhisattva path. By the gradual cultivation of learning, You shall all achieve Buddhahood.23

It is clear that these two passages are based on the gotra theory and support the position that bodhisattvas can attain Buddhahood but sravakas cannot. To further complicate matters, these passages are suspect on texthistorical grounds. For example, I agree with Kariya that the rst passage (a) is a later addition to the text.24 As for the second passage (b), the entire fth chapter on Medicinal Herbs is highly problematic, as indicated by the fact that Kumrajvas translation is missing the entire last section of the chapter. The quoted verse comes at the end of the chapter in Kumrajvas translation, and though Kariya goes so far as to reject most of the chapter as inauthentic,25 he retains this verse as part of the authentic Lotus Sutra. In any case, the problem still remains that this passage contains features characteristic of dhtu-vda. In fact, I have argued elsewhere that the dhtu-vda features are so prominent in this chapter that it is the earliest clear instance of dhtu-vda in Buddhist literature.26 Whatever the merits of this claim, the Sanskrit text reveals even more clearly the dhtu-vda-like logic of this passage:
rvakcaranti ete varabodhicrik (131.1112) These sravakasare practicing the excellent practices for enlightenment.

Evidently this statement teaches a gotra theory based on a dhtu-vda structure, in that it implies that these sravakas, who are listening to the Lotus Sutra at this time, are really bodhisattvas who possess the gotra of a bodhisattva. By relying on these passages, Hirakawa throws his entire interpretation of the Lotus Sutra into question. Not that he is not in good company. Chi-tsang (549623), one of the most important Chinese commentators on the Lotus Sutra, regarded passage (a) as crucial to the correct understanding of the sutra. According to Suemitsu Yasumasa, Chi-tsang divided the sravakas into ve groups, classifying riputra, the four great sravakas, and Pra among the concealed bodhisattvas who
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outwardly show themselves to be sravakas.27 According to Chi-tsangs view, all the sravakas who are assured of nal enlightenment or Buddhahood in the Lotus Sutra are really bodhisattvas who possess the bodhisattva gotra, and the real sravakas who have the sravaka gotra can never attain Buddhahood. In other words, Chi-tsang admits the existence of a group of people who are eternally incapable of attaining Buddhahood. This conclusion by Chi-tsang should not really surprise us, given his fundamental commitment to dhtuvda.28 Contrary to Chi-tsang and Hirakawa, I take the position that their interpretation of the Lotus Sutra is informed by the doctrine of tathgata-garbha and dhtu-vda, and that they have seriously misconstrued its real message.

STUPA VENERATION AND THE LOTUS SUTRA

I part company again with Hirakawa on the issue of stupa veneration and the Lotus Sutra. Hirakawa emphasizes the important role of stupa veneration in the Lotus Sutra and says:
As for the origin of the Lotus Sutra, it is most reasonable to say that it appeared from a context of stupa veneration.29

Hirakawas famous hypothesis is that Mahayana Buddhism itself arose from lay-centered Buddhist groups composed of believers who were neither strictly monks nor laity.30 He also notes the connection between stupa veneration and the doctrine of tathgata-garbha in that both share the use of the term buddha-dhtu, with the primary meaning being the relics or bones of the Buddha.31 In his words:
If the original nature of the mind is pure, the manifestation of that original nature is equivalent to the attainment of Buddhahood. The Mahayanists vow to attain Buddhahood was based on the belief that the mind is innately pure.32

According to Hirakawa, then, accepting the tathgata-garbha-type idea of an innately pure mind or Buddha-nature is prerequisite to arousing an aspiration for enlightenment (bodhicitta). This is tantamount to saying that there can be no Mahayana Buddhism without the doctrine of tathgata-garbha! I nd this unacceptable. It seems to me that his logic of seeing tathgata-garbha as a necessary element for the arising of Mahayana Buddhism is erroneously adopted to provide theoretical support for
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the stupa-veneration theory. Unlike Hirakawa, I maintain that stupa veneration was not endorsed in the original form of the Lotus Sutra. I admit that the diverse and frequently diametrically opposed theories concerning the formative history of the Lotus Sutra have give risen to a multitude of still unsolved problems. But at the same time, I support the theory of Fuse Kgaku, who argues that verses 78 to 96 of chapter two on Means (which expound on Buddhist stupas and statues) are a later addition.33 As further evidence of this theory, let us turn our attention to some religious and philosophical problems regarding the Buddhist stupas. To begin with, for Hirakawa the term stupa veneration means the veneration of an architectural structure wherein the Buddhas relics (bones) are deposited and guarded. In other words, it refers to relic worship. The salient question is: What are Buddha relics? What are the bones that remain after the Buddhas death? To answer the question properly, we need to clarify the meaning of the concepts of nirvana (nibbna) and death in the Mahparinibbna-sutta. In an earlier essay I undertook a critical etymological analysis of the commonly accepted interpretation of the term nibbna.34 In lieu of the usual way of reading nir+v+ana or nir v as the root for nirva, in the sense of blowing out the ame (of delements) or extinction, I proposed a derivation from the root nir v (to uncover), which would give the meaning of emancipation; liberation; getting rid of coverings. I therefore took nibbna to be synonymous with nirvti, which in turn is synonymous with vimukti or emancipation. It is important to note that these two terms, nibbna and vimukti (or moka), were in use prior to the advent of Buddhism, and that they referred originally to the emancipation or liberation of the spirit (atman) from its connement in the body (non-atman), like a snake casting off its skin. This idea of emancipation or liberation has two features: it is based on tma-vda, and it idealizes the nal abandonment of the body in death. This notion erroneously found its way into the Buddhist tradition by way of texts like the Mahparinibbna-sutta, whose author or authors interpreted the Buddhas death as the release of his spirit (atman) from its bodily connement (non-atman). Thus we nd the celebrated passage in this sutta that one should take refuge in atman (atta-dp viharatha),35 a clear indication of the idea of tma-vda. The passage teaches that one should take refuge in an atman that survives eternally after having been
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released from the body through physical death. This sutta not only teaches the idea of an eternal atman but also justies the veneration of relics by identifying the relics (bones) of the Buddha with an eternal atman. The crucial phrase is sarrn eva avasissisu, or only bones remained.36 This refers to the historical fact that after the cremation of the Buddhas body, only the bones (sarrni) remained. What, then, are these bones or relics? They symbolize something that survives the ames of cremation and continues to exist forever. In other words, they are identied with the atman that survives physical death. As a result, the relics are later called buddha-dhtu. It is only a short step for the Mahayana Mahparinirva Sutra to identify this term with the Buddha-nature and tathgata-garbha. In fact this is the next logical step, because all of these terms refer to an eternal and imperishable atman.37 To summarize, it is clear that stupa veneration is simply the worship of relics of the Buddha that symbolize and project the idea of an eternal atman. Such stupa veneration is a direct contradiction to the basic Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anatman) and dependent arising (prattyasamutpda), and cannot be accepted. In fact the practice was entrusted to lay people, concerning whom we lack the information to determine whether and to what extent we could even call them Buddhists. Not to be overlooked in this regard are the passages in the Lotus Sutra itself that explicitly reject stupa veneration and the worship of relics, such as statements in chapter 10 on the Preachers of Dharma and in chapter 17 on The Discrimination of Merits.38 The most important passage is the portrayal of the Buddha Prabhtaratna (Many Jewels) in chapter 11, The Apparition of the Jeweled Stupa. When kyamuni opens the door to Prabhtaratnas stupa, he nds not dead relics but a living, esh-and-blood Buddha seated in meditation. The superb research Kariya Sadahiko has done on this question is not to be overlooked. Nearly thirty years ago, on the basis of ancient Central Asian manuscripts, Kariya noted that the term pariuka-gtra (having a dried up body)39 should be emended to apariuka-gtro (having a body that is not dried up), so that the Buddha in the stupa is seen to have a beautiful body that lives forever.40 This reading is supported by Toda Hirofumi, one of the leading authorities on the philological study of the Lotus Sutra, who proposes his own emendation: paryaka baddhv pariukagtro saghaitakyo.41
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Kariya argues further that this Buddha appears as a sabhogakya (reward body) rather than as a dharmakya.42 Since the theory of the three types of Buddha-body was grounded on a dhtu-vda structure that takes tathat or dharmakya to be the locus (dhtu), the question of whether the eternal Buddha taught in the Lotus Sutra (in chapter 16 on The Life-span of the Thus Come One) is a dharmakya or a sabhogakya takes on great signicance. If the Lotus Sutra is understood in terms of dhtu-vda, it is natural to assume that the eternal Buddha of the Lotus Sutra is dharmakya. A typical example is the Tendai hongaku tradition of medieval Japan, which takes the idea of dharmakya a step further to teach the existence of an originally enlightened Buddha who is beyond all actions. In sharp contrast to these dhtu-vda-based interpretations, Chih-i (538597), the founder of the Tien-tai school and the most important Chinese Buddhist philosopher, sides with the sabhogakya position. In the Fa-hua wen-ch he writes that the chapter 16 of the Lotus Sutra claries in general [the teaching of] the three bodies [of the Buddha], but its specic intent is to clarify the sabhogakya.43 Nichiren inherits this standpoint from Chih-i.44 I agree fully with Kariyas position and would add that this image of the Buddha who lives forever, in chapter 17, is mirrored in the eternal and true Buddha whose image appears in the chapter on The Life-span of the Thus Come One. I differ slightly from Kariya only in arguing that the vision of the Lotus Sutra as presented in the chapter on The Apparition of the Jeweled Stupa is actually a denial of stupa veneration. I see its clear repudiation of the veneration of relics and its symbolic representation of death to be a rejection of the idea of nirvana as a representation of death in favor of an everlasting and living Buddha. The Mahparinirva Sutra, on the other handdespite the prior example of the Lotus Sutrareverts to attachment to the doctrine of tathgata-garbha and a philosophy of death based on ideas of relics (dhtu) and atman. In a word, it teaches dhtu-vda. Here again we see the danger of interpreting the Lotus Sutra in terms of the doctrine of tathgata-garbha. Such an approach can only lead to grave errors and fallacious conclusions.
PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON JAPANESE CULTURE

While I admit that I have no expertise in the general eld of Japanese culture, I nd myself unable to stand by idly and allow recent theories of
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Japanese culture based on the idea of tathgata-garbha to go unchallenged. There is a tendency in certain circles to present an overly optimistic view of the identity of Japanese culture as a culture exhibiting the following characteristics:
1. The elevation of naturalism (illustrated by the idea of the enlightenment of trees and plants) over humanism. 2. The elevation of experiential antirationalism (the mysticism of Zen or tantric Buddhism) over logic and intellect. 3. The elevation of totalitarianism over individualism, which in turn paves the way to corporate nationalism, in a forced application of wa or harmony.45 4. The elevation of animism and polytheism or pantheism, on the grounds of relativism, over absolute monotheism.46

I would argue that this way of presenting Japanese culture derives from the generative monism or dhtu-vda of the doctrine of tathgatagarbha. Not that this is anything terribly new. We nd it already, for example, in the Kokutai no hongi, a tract on national polity issued by the Ministry of Education in 1937, where the the idea of wa or harmony is traced to the Seventeen Article Constitution attributed to Prince Shtoku (574622), and is emphasized in a nationalistic or totalitarian context. These same views of Japanese identity are now being advocated by people like Umehara Takeshi, Director of the International Research Center for Japanese Culture.47 By his own admission he advocates and beauties the ideas of tathgata-garbha, the enlightenment of grass and trees, as an animistic polytheism. Umehara-like expositions on Japanese culture begin, to one degree or another, with assumptions (of the sort commonly found in decline-of-the-West theories) that Western rationalism, rugged individualism, and anthropocentric ways of thinking and acting are all deeply rooted in a Judeo-Christian tradition that has irrevocably declined and fallen, and has proved itself incapable of rescuing humanity from its current problems. Oriental thought, in particular Japanese traditions like wa and the nature-centered view of the world, is offered as an alternative to help us out of our predicament. I wish to state in the strongest possible terms that the particularity of the Japanese does not lie in a simple oneness with nature. The Japanese people are not perpetually in an ecstatic state induced by staring at owers and trees. We are not vegetable-like human beings. What makes us dis402

THE LOTUS SUTRA AND JAPANESE CULTURE

tinctively human is the same thing that makes Westerners human: we can think. If not thinking were the ideal for humanity, as proposed in the idea of tathgata-garbha propagated by a certain celebrated Chinese Chan master called Mo-ho-yen at the bSam yas debate in ninth-century Tibet,48 we should all suspend life and rush to becomes plants and stones and relics. If Japan has achieved a considerable degree of economic development, this success is also due in great part to the positive inuences of rationalism, individualism, and consciousness of human rights. (I hasten to add, however, that these ideals have yet to sink deep roots in Japan, at least not to the degree that they have in the West.) Why, then, should we abandon our dignity as human beings and return to nature, to plants and trees, and to the Orient? I am not blind to the current movements across the globe to protect nature and animals from the environmentally disastrous work of human hands. I, too, recognize the need to raise ecological consciousness, but with one obvious proviso: It is worse to kill human beings than to kill nature or animals. Let us not forget, either, that the ecological movements of today were not generated by Eastern naturalism. They were initiated by Westerners, and founded on the traditions of rationalism and respect for human rights. It is simply not logically possible to derive the environmental movement and environmental ethics from an Eastern naturalism expressed in such phrases as mountains, rivers, plants, and trees are all enlightened. Such naturalism leads nowhere but to the natural state of doing nothing. It does not direct us to think or actively to seek remedies to our problems. In order to acknowledge the wrongs brought about by destruction of the natural world and to right these wrongs by changing our way of living, we need to think and to act. But it is this very thinking and acting that is totally rejected in the no-thinking and no-action of Eastern naturalist philosophy. Personally speaking, it is my destiny to be a Japanese, but I am fervent in my desire to distance myself from those who naively advocate ideas of Japanese culture thick with antirationalistic praise for Japan, the East, nature, and harmony, ideas based on the doctrine of tathgata-garbha and dhtu-vda.49
[Translated by Paul L. Swanson]

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