DATE FILED: July 12, 2019 3:37 PM

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS FILING ID: 4D98C92DF953F

CASE NUMBER: 2019CA543
2 East 14th Avenue
Denver, CO 80203

PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Court of Appeals Case No.:
COLORADO UNION OF TAXPAYERS COURT USE ONLY
2019CA543
FOUNDATION; and TABOR COMMITTEE
District Court Case Number:
2017CV034617
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
County: Denver, Colorado
CITY OF DENVER COLORADO

Matthew R. Miller (17PHV5301)

Aditya Dynar (18PHV5350)
GOLDWATER INSTITUTE
500 E. Coronado Road
Phoenix, AZ 85004
(602) 462-5000
Fax: (602) 256-7045
litigation@goldwaterinstitute.org

James M. Manley (CO Bar No. 40327)

Pacific Legal Foundation
3217 E. Shea Blvd., #108
Phoenix, AZ 85028
(916) 419-7111
Fax: (916) 419-7747
jmanley@pacificlegal.org

APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEF

 Come now, Appellants Colorado Union of Taxpayers Foundation and

TABOR Committee, by and through their attorneys of record, and hereby submit

this Opening Brief.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of C.A.R. 28

and C.A.R. 32, including:

Word Limits: This brief has 7,464 words, which is not more than the 9,500 word

limit.

Included Sections: In the arguments section, before arguing each issue on appeal, I

have the following separately titled sub-sections:

The Standard of Review: I discuss which Standard of Review should be

used to evaluate that issue.

Preservation: I discuss if that issue was preserved for appeal. I cite to the

page in the Record on Appeal where I raised this issue before the District Court

and I cite to where the District Court decided that issue.

I understand that my brief may be rejected if I fail to comply with these

rules.

/s/ Matthew R. Miller

Matthew R. Miller

i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................ i

Table of Contents .................................................................................................... ii

Table of Authorities ............................................................................................... iv

I. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............................................................... 1

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................ 1

A. Course of Proceedings ........................................................................... 1

B. Disposition in the Trial Court ................................................................. 3

III. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ....... 3

A. Denver requires groups that speak about municipal ballot measures to

publicly report their donors’ personal information. .................................... 3

B. Denver asserts an “informational interest” in the donor information..... 6

C. Appellants are non-profit organizations that regularly speak about

Colorado laws and governance. ................................................................... 8

D. At trial, Appellants showed that both they and like-minded groups are
routinely subject to ideological harassment and intimidation. ................... 12

IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................... 15

V. STATEMENT OF APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW ................... 16

VI. CITATION TO PRECISE LOCATION IN RECORD WHERE ISSUES ON

APPEAL WERE PRESENTED AND RULED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT
............................................................................................................................... 16

VII. ARGUMENT ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 16

ii
 A. Only the injury-in-fact requirement of standing is in dispute here. ..... 17

B. Plaintiffs demonstrated an injury-in-fact and thus have standing. ....... 18

1. Plaintiffs did not need to show that they had already spoken about
a Denver ballot measure before they could show injury-in-fact. ....... 19

2. At trial, Appellants showed that they suffer an injury-in-fact due to

the Disclosure Ordinance. ................................................................... 22

a. Appellants showed that they have engaged in the type of

speech affected by the Disclosure Ordinance.. ............................ 22

b. Appellants showed a present desire, though no specific plans,

to engage in speech affected by the Disclosure Ordinance. ......... 25

c. Appellants presented a plausible claim that they presently have

no intention to speak in Denver because of a credible threat that
the Disclosure Ordinance will be enforced. ................................. 27

3. Independence Institute v. Coffman does not prevent a finding of

standing here. ..................................................................................... 30

a. Coffman involved highly unique facts that do not resemble the

facts of this case............................................................................ 30

b. To the extent that Coffman prevents a finding of standing, it

should be overruled. ..................................................................... 32

VIII. REMEDY SOUGHT .................................................................................. 34

IX. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 34

X. ATTORNEY’S FEES .................................................................................... 34

iii
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851 (Colo. 2004) ............................................... 16, 17

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 830 P.2d 1045
(Colo. 1992) ................................................................................................... 18, 19

Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d
1174 (10th Cir. 2000)............................................................................................33

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)................................................... 32, 33

City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) ...........................................................32

Cmty. Tele–Commc’ns, Inc. v. Heather Corp., 677 P.2d 330 (Colo.1984) ...... 18, 20

Conrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo.1983) ...............................20

Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2013) ....................................................20

Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) .................................33

Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) .................21

Independence Institute v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008) 30, 31, 32, 33

Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006) . 22, 25

Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2010) ....................................................20

O’Bryant v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 778 P.2d 648 (Colo.1989) ..................................19

People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo.
1985) .............................................................................................................. 18, 20

Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) ....................21

iv
State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges & Occupational Educ. v. Olson, 687 P.2d 429 (Colo.
1984) .....................................................................................................................29

Three Bells Ranch Assocs. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass’n, 758 P.2d 164
(Colo.1988) ...........................................................................................................20

Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir.1987) ....................................................21

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) .................................................................................................34

Regulations

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code, art. III, Chpt. 15 ..............................................5, 17

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-32(j) ...............................................................4

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-32(m) .............................................................4

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-35 ...................................................................4

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-35(c) ...............................................................5

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-35(d) ..............................................................4

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-35.5 ................................................................4

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-35.5(a) ........................................................4, 5

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-35.5(c) ............................................................4

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-36(c) ...........................................................5, 6

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code § 15-40.5(a) ............................................................5

Constitutional Provisions

Colorado Constitution, art. II § 10 Constitution ........................................................1

v
U.S. Constitution, amend. I ........................................................................................1

vi
I. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did Appellants demonstrate an injury-in-fact, for purposes of standing in a

free-speech case, by showing that they regularly engage in the kind of speech

prohibited by the challenged Denver ordinance; desire to engage in the kind of

speech that is regulated by the ordinance; and are credibly chilled from doing so

due to the existence of the challenged ordinance?

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Course of Proceedings

This case involves a challenge to a Denver ordinance that requires non-profit

groups to disclose the identities and personal information of their donors to the

City whenever those groups spend more than a minimal amount of money to

communicate with voters about a municipal ballot measure. On December 13,

2017, Appellants filed the case, which seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. In

the Complaint, Appellants allege that the disclosure requirements violate the First

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the free-speech clause, Article II Sec. 10,

of the Colorado Constitution because the government is forcing Appellants to

make an unconstitutional choice: speak to voters about local ballot measures and

expose their donors to potential harassment and intimidation, or remain silent on

the ballot measures and protect their donors.

1
 After the parties conducted discovery, they by agreement filed cross-motions

for summary judgment on the legal questions presented in this case. On January 7,

2019, the Trial Court denied the cross-motions for summary judgment and ordered

the parties to trial. In the order denying the cross-motions for summary judgment,

the trail court emphasized that “the threshold issue at trial shall be whether

Plaintiffs have standing to bring the present action. However, the parties shall also

be prepared to present evidence on the constitutionality claim, including whether

Plaintiffs have been subjected to threats, harassment, or reprisals.” CF, p 694.

A bench trial was conducted from February 4–5, 2019. During the trial, the

Trial Court heard from five witnesses. Mr. Daniel Volkosh, the Policy and

Compliance Administrator for the Denver clerk and Recorder’s Office, testified

about the operation of the ordinance and the City’s purported reasons for enacting

it. A representative for each Appellant testified about the effect the ordinance had

and would have on their organizations, as well as specific instances of ideological

harassment to which they had been exposed. Finally, two additional witnesses,

from organizations similar to Appellants, testified about ideological harassment

they had previously endured as a result of their political speech.

2
 B. Disposition in the Trial Court

At the conclusion of the two-day bench trial, the Trial Court entered

judgment for Appellee. The Trial Court ruled that Plaintiffs had not established

that they had standing to challenge Appellee’s donor-disclosure ordinance.

Specifically, the Trial Court’s written decision found that:

Plaintiffs have not shown any evidence that they are or will be required
to comply with Denver’s campaign finance reporting requirements.
Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not, and have never,
communicated with Denver voters on a Denver ballot measure.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have not produced any persuasive evidence that
they have or are likely to experience real, immediate, or future harm
because of the municipal code. Therefore, the Court finds that neither
Plaintiffs [sic] have standing to challenge [the law].

CF, p 770.
This appeal timely followed.

III. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A. Denver requires groups that speak about municipal ballot

measures to publicly report their donors’ personal information.
In September, 2017, Denver amended Chapter 15 of the Denver Revised

Municipal Code, which addresses municipal elections and campaign finances, by

adopting Council Bill No. CB17-0866. Among many other changes, the new law

requires groups that communicate with voters about proposed Denver ballot

measures to file periodic reports with the City. Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code §§

3
15-35 and 15-35.5 (together the “Disclosure Ordinance”). These reports include

personal information about the groups’ donors and are made available for public

inspection. Id. §§ 15-35(d)(3)–(4) and 15-35.5(c)(8).

The Disclosure Ordinance establishes two types of groups that must submit

reports to the City: groups engaging in “electioneering communications” and

groups that must register as “issue committees.” If a group communicates

information about a ballot measure, but does not take a position, that group has

engaged in “electioneering communications” under the Disclosure Ordinance. Id.

§ 15-32(j). A group that spends $1,000 or more engaging in electioneering

communications must file a report that includes the name and address of every

person who donated $25 or more for the purpose of making the communications.

Id. § 15-35.5(a), (c)(8).

On the other hand, if a group spends $500 or more and actively encourages

voters to support or reject a ballot measure, that group is considered an issue

committee. Id. § 15-32(m). Issue committees must file a report that includes the

name and address of every person who donates $50 or more to support the

communications. Id. § 15-35(d)(3). If an individual donates $200 or more, the

issue committee must also report to the City that person’s occupation and

employer. Id. § 15-35(d)(4).

4
 Hence, any group spending any reasonable amount of money to

communicate with Denver voters, about a ballot measure, will be required to file

reports with the City that detail its donors’ names, addresses, and in many cases

occupations and employers. The type of communication is ultimately relevant

only to which dollar threshold triggers the reporting requirement. Id., art. III, Chpt.

15. Groups engaged in electioneering communications are required to file a report

when they first spend $1,000 or more, plus an additional report for each subsequent

expenditure, “regardless of the amount.” Id.§ 15-35.5(a).

Electioneering communication reports are required to be filed within 48

hours of the expenditure being made. Id. Issue committee reports are due each

month after a group becomes an issue committee. For instance, if a group begins

communicating with voters in June, and the election is held in November, that

group would be required to submit reports for June, July, August, September,

October, and November, plus a “post-election report” and a “year-end report.” Id.

§ 15-35(c). These reports are made available for public review and inspection on

the City’s website, and the personal information of donors is not redacted. Id. §

15-36(c). Failure to file a report can subject a group to penalties of $50 per day, up

to $500 per violation. Id.§ 15-40.5(a).

5
 B. Denver asserts an “informational interest” in the donor
information.

After the disclosures are made, the reports are published to the internet. Id.

§ 15-36(c). Any interested party can search for this information since the reports

are formatted to be a PDF. Daniel Volkosh, a representative for the City at trial,

testified that no information on these internet PDFs gets redacted. Tr. (02/04/19) p

31:31:3–4. Volkosh also testified that that the information is made available in

perpetuity, and that he didn’t know if there is a policy in place to eventually take

this information off the Internet. Id. pp 29:6–20, 30:19–25.

Appellee asserts that it has an “interest in preserving the integrity of the

political system and its elections by maintaining an informed electorate, including

through public disclosure. This includes the public disclosure of the names and

addresses of each person who makes a contribution or a contribution in kind to an

issue committee that has an aggregate amount or value of $50.00 or more within a

calendar year and the occupation and employer of any natural person if the sum of

that person’s contribution and contributions in kind to an issue committee is

$200.00 or more in a calendar year.” CF, p 110 ¶ 42. The City further asserts that

“[d]isclosure of this information serves the purpose and interest of providing the

electorate with information about the source and amount of money contributed to

an issue committee in support or opposition of a municipal ballot issue or ballot

6
question. Disclosure of this information will aid the voters in evaluating the

arguments to which they are being subjected and in deciding whether to support or

oppose the issue or question. The information about the source and amount of

money contributed to issue committees aids the voters in making informed

decisions and giving proper weight to different speakers and messages.” Id. ¶ 39.

In short, the City wants its voters “to be making … informed decision[s],” and

“want[s] them to be correctly evaluating … the arguments that are being made to

them.” Id. ¶ 40.

The City offers no evidence that voters regularly access this information,

however. Id. ¶ 41. It does not know whether voters actually find this information

useful. Id. When asked what the City meant by “preserving the integrity of the

political system and its elections,” its representative testified that it means “making

sure that, if someone is telling our voters to vote a certain way …, it could be a

Denver resident, or it could be someone who’s outside of Denver, on a municipal

issue, we think our voters deserve to know who is speaking to them so that they

may make an informed decision about the value of that communication.” Id., ¶ 42.

The City identified no specific reason, nor any occurrence in a previous Denver

election, that led the City to be concerned about the integrity of its electoral

process. The City did not “talk about the wisdom of” the dollar amounts that

7
trigger disclosure before it adopted the Ordinance. CF, p 111 ¶ 44. According to

the City, the purpose of requiring disclosure of employers of donors is to

incentivize the public to “do their own investigation” into “specific employer[s] or

corporation[s].” Id. ¶ 45.

The City agrees that if certain groups chose to remain silent as a result of the

challenged disclosure Ordinance, “that would result in less information being

conveyed to voters.” Id. ¶ 46. Despite this, the City did not consider any

alternative system of voluntary disclosure. Mr. Volkosh testified that the

stakeholder meetings that were held to solicit public input before adoption of the

challenged ordinance were attended by government officials, representatives from

Colorado Ethics Watch, and Common Cause, but were not attended by any

nonprofit groups that opposed the compulsory disclosure of donor information. Id.

¶ 49.

C. Appellants are non-profit organizations that regularly speak

about Colorado laws and governance.
Appellant Colorado Union of Taxpayers Foundation (“CUT”) is a non-profit

group incorporated in 2009 under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code

and based in Lyons, Colorado. CF, p 699 ¶ 11. CUT has a sister organization, the

Colorado Union of Taxpayers. Id. ¶ 11. The Committee is incorporated as a

501(c)(4) group and rates the legislature every year. Id. The Foundation is a
8
501(c)(3) that works on educating the citizenry on tax issues. Id. ¶ 12. The CUT

Foundation is an Appellant in this lawsuit. The CUT Committee is not. Id. ¶ 14.

CUT advocates on behalf of Colorado taxpayers, including Denver

taxpayers. CUT’s mission is to “remind the Legislators, we, the taxpayers, are

well able to make our own decisions on how we spend our own money. The job of

the Colorado Assembly is to enforce our freedoms to establish contracts between

one-another and not to simply redistribute our earnings as they see fit.” Id. p 8 ¶

19.

CUT educates the public in various ways. One way it does so is through the

use of radio ads about pending ballot propositions. CF, p 106 ¶ 20. CUT has paid

for radio ads “on specific issues, giving the pros and cons of a tax issue.” Id. ¶ 21.

For instance, CUT has paid for radio ads “when Amendment 69 was on the ballot.”

Id. Amendment 69 was a citizen’s initiative to provide universal healthcare in

Colorado. The goal of CUT’s radio ads is to “explain to people the effect of the

law that’s being proposed.” Id. A 30 second ad run 25 times a week costs $4,500.

See Tr. (02/04/19) p 86:18-19. At trial, CUT’s representative, Marty Nielsen

testified that CUT would engage in purchasing radio ads that educated Denver

voters about proposed municipal ballot measures if one of those measures

9
impacted CUT’s mission to promote responsible governmental spending and low

tax burdens on Colorado citizens. Id. pp 125:10–126:3.

CUT’s representative, testified that disclosing donor information would lead

to a loss of donors, since most donors understand the donation to be private and

confidential. Id. pp 125:2–6, 123:7–15. She testified that disclosing such

information would be so detrimental to CUT that it would compel them to no

longer engage in Denver elections. Id. p 124:19–24. She testified that donors

would be “absolutely” less likely to contribute if they knew their names were listed

on a government website that is available to the public for fear of repercussions in

their business and personal lives. Id. p. 125:2–9.

Appellant TABOR Committee (“TABOR”) is a non-profit group

incorporated in 2009 under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code and

based in Lakewood, Colorado. CF, p 699 ¶ 15. TABOR also has a sister

organization, the TABOR Foundation. Id. ¶ 17. The Foundation is incorporated as

a 501(c)(3) group and works on education. Id. The TABOR Committee is a

501(c)(4) that works on advocacy. Id. ¶ 16. The TABOR Committee is an

Appellant in this lawsuit. The TABOR Foundation is not. Id. ¶ 18.

The goal of TABOR is to protect the Colorado Taxpayers Bill of Rights,

which the group describes as “the gold standard” for restraining government

10
growth and ensuring fiscal responsibility. CF, p 107 ¶ 28. As part of its mission,

TABOR undertakes activities designed to “address legislative and ballot measures

affecting [the Taxpayers Bill of Rights].” Id. ¶ 29. For example, TABOR

Committee informs voters about ballot questions going to Denver voters for

approval in a “Denver decides ballot issue forum.” Id. ¶ 30.

Testimony shows that TABOR would engage in communications that

encourage Denver voters to support or oppose proposed municipal ballot measures

if one of those measures affected its mission to promote responsible governmental

spending and low tax burdens on Colorado citizens. Tr. (02/04/19) pp 83:9–84:2,

84:20–85:4.

TABOR’s board of directors volunteer for the organization and the time they

spend is an in-kind contribution to TABOR Committee. CF, p 107 ¶ 31. For

example, Dana West, a web master and a member of the board, actively maintains

the website. Id. Although the value of West’s contributions is not exactly known,

it is estimated that the compensation would be worth “thousands, probably tens of

thousands a year.” Tr. (02/04/19) p 87:8-13.

The cash donations that are spent on communicating and educating the

public about ballot questions exceeds the thresholds of the challenged law. CF, p

108 ¶ 32.

11
 TABOR receives donations larger than $50 as well as $200. Id. p 81:12–15.

Penn Pfiffner, a representative of TABOR testified in court that all donations are

given with the expectation of privacy. Id. pp 81:23–82:2. Mr. Pfiffner also

testified that if TABOR is forced to disclose donor information, then it will not be

able to raise the necessary funds to educate the public on future ballot measures.

Id. pp 82:16–83:8. At least one donor of TABOR Committee explicitly wants to

remain anonymous and does not want to be identified. Mr. Pfiffner testimony Id.

pp 88:18–20. Mr. Pfiffner testified that the donor wishes to remain anonymous for

fear of losing clients who hold political beliefs that are different than his. Id. pp

88:22–89:7.

D. At trial, Appellants showed that both they and like-minded

groups are routinely subject to ideological harassment and
intimidation.
At trial, CUT and TABOR showed that both they and similar, right-of-center

non-profit groups, are routinely subjected to ideological harassment and

intimidation. CUT’s president, Marty Nielsen, testified that after placing a

political sign in the back of her car during a gubernatorial race, her car was

“immediately keyed”. Id. p 126:11–21. Nielsen also testified that during a

different election, she was the victim of two different road rage incidents because

of a political bumper sticker on her vehicle. The instigators made obscene gestures

12
towards Nielsen and her family, tried to force them into a different lane, and

honked their horn at them. Because of this, Nielsen decided the bumper sticker

had to be removed for their safety. Id. at Pg. 127:3–24.

Similarly, Penn Pfiffner, chairman of the TABOR Committee, has been

subjected to “intimidation and harassment for his political stances.” CF, p 108 ¶

35. Mr. Pfiffner testified that starting from the early-2000’s Mr. Pfiffner’s car and

house has been vandalized. In one instance, Mr. Pfiffner’s vehicle was egged. The

next instance, his house as well as his vehicle were vandalized. The worst

occurrence of harassment and intimidation occurred when an unknown person

threw a rock the size of a football into Mr. Pfiffner’s vehicle, destroying the rear

windshield and the dashboard, as well as damaging the front windshield. All

incidents occurred shortly after Mr. Pfiffner placed different yard signs expressing

a political voice. Tr. (02/04/19) pp 92:3–94:11. Because of the continued political

harassment, Mr. Pfiffner stopped placing yard signs outside of his house. Ever

since this decision, Mr. Pfiffner’s property has not been vandalized. Id.

Non-profit organizations with similar views as Appellants also face

intimidation and harassment. In 2013–2014, Dave Trabert, President of the Kansas

Policy Institute, a 501(c)(3) non-profit with a similar free-market mission, received

vulgar and threatening emails and Tweets based on the work his organization

13
performs. One email read, “Hey asshole, we know who signs your checks for the

propaganda you spew. We know where you live and we’re watching you. Go

crawl back into the hole from which you came!” Tr. (02/05/19) p 22:3–14; Tr. Ex.

9 p 6. A Tweet directed at Mr. Trabert read, “KOCH (just say the word) … makes

1 wish some crazy could get them a bullet between the eyes!” Id. p 27:4–9; Tr. Ex.

9, p 3. He received other emails with explicit threats of sexual violence. Tr. Ex. 9

p 4–5, 7. Mr. Trabert testified that after reading these types of communications, he

was scared, and it was his understanding that the intimidation and threats were

related to his work at the Kansas Policy Institute. Tr. (02/05/19) pp 20:25–21:12.

In 2013, F. Vincent Vernuccio, former Director of Labor Policy at the

Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a Michigan-based free-market non-profit group

that has a similar mission as the Appellants’, was spat upon by people who oppose

his work. Id. pp 7:5–8:21. He has been shouted down by ideological opponents to

the extent that the people shouting him down needed to be removed by police. Id.

During an appearance on a radio program, he received a threatening phone call

indicating something dangerous would be waiting for him when he returned home,

prompting his employer to perform a security check of his home before he

returned. Id. pp 10:8–11:2.

14
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellants are two longstanding Colorado-based 501(c) non-profit

organizations that have, as their express missions, advocating for limited

government and lower taxes. Appellants challenged a recent City of Denver

ordinance that requires groups that communicate with voters about municipal

ballot measures to disclose the names and personal information of their donors to

the government. This information is then made publicly available on the internet.

The Trial Court committed reversible error when it ruled that Appellants did

not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the law under the First

Amendment and free-speech clause of the Colorado Constitution. The Trial

Court’s decision hinged on whether Appellants showed an injury-in-fact at trial.

As explained below, they did because Appellants showed that they regularly

engage in the kind of speech the law regulates; that they both desire to speak about

Denver ballot measures in the future and have already refrained from doing so; and

that they have and will refrain from speaking because of Appellee’s requirement

that they disclose their donors as a condition of being allowed to speak. These

showings established an injury-in-fact under the free-speech jurisprudence of both

Colorado and U.S. courts. The Trial Court should be reversed.

15
V. STATEMENT OF APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Trial Court determined that Appellants lack standing to challenge the

disclosure ordinance. CF, p 770. Because standing is a pure question of law, this

Court reviews the Trial Court’s determination de novo. Ainscough v. Owens, 90

P.3d 851, 856 (Colo. 2004).

VI. CITATION TO PRECISE LOCATION IN RECORD WHERE ISSUES

ON APPEAL WERE PRESENTED AND RULED UPON BY THE
TRIAL COURT
This appeal revolves around standing, which was properly preserved at Trial

and heavily briefed by the Parties prior to Trial. CF, pp 251–54; CF, pp 435–39.

Standing was discussed during the trial at Tr. (02/05/19) pp 42:3–44:7,

47:13–52:1, 56:22–25, 57:6–58:21.

The Trial Court’s discussion of standing in its order dismissing for lack

of jurisdiction based on standing can be found at CF, pp 787–90.

VII. ARGUMENT ON APPEAL

In late-2017, Appellee City of Denver adopted the Disclosure Ordinance,

which requires groups that support, oppose, or merely speak about a Denver ballot

measure to file reports disclosing the names and personal information of their

donors. These reports are then made publicly available on the internet. Appellants

are non-profit organizations that have been operating throughout Colorado for

16
several decades, focusing on promoting a limited-government and low-tax agenda.

At trial, Appellants showed that—consistent with their history and organizational

missions—they desired to and were likely to speak about Denver ballot measures

in the foreseeable future. And both Appellant organizations showed that they

would refrain from speaking about Denver ballot measures because their donors

fear ideological harassment and intimidation if their names, addresses,

occupations, and employers are put on a government-maintained, publicly

accessible list, as the Disclosure Ordinance requires. As explained below, these

showings are sufficient to establish that Appellants suffer an injury-in-fact as a

result of the Disclosure Ordinance, and that they accordingly have standing. The

Trial Court erred in finding otherwise and should be reversed.

A. Only the injury-in-fact requirement of standing is in dispute here.

There are three elements of standing in Colorado. Plaintiffs must

demonstrate: (1) a legally protected right; (2) an injury in fact; and (3) properly

named defendants. Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 856 (Colo. 2004). Neither

Appellee nor the Trial Court questioned prongs one and three. That is because

they are easily satisfied. The right to speak about municipal ballot measures is a

legally protected free-speech right, and the Disclosure Ordinance unquestionably

impacts that right. Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code, art. III, Chpt. 15. To the third

17
prong, Appellee City of Denver is the properly named defendant because it passed

and enforces the challenged law. Thus, the Trial Court’s decision turned on its

analysis of the second prong—injury in fact—as does this appeal.

On appeal, this Court may examine “allegations of the complaint, along with

any other evidence submitted on the issue of standing.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, La

Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1053 (Colo. 1992);

Rangeview, LLC v. City of Aurora, 381 P.3d 445, 449 ¶ 11 (Colo. App. 2016) (“an

appellate court may consider testimony and other documentary evidence in the

appellate record to determine whether the parties have standing.”).

B. Plaintiffs demonstrated an injury-in-fact and thus have standing.

The question on appeal is whether Plaintiffs demonstrated an injury-in-fact

for purposes of First Amendment standing. As shown below, they did. The

inquiry into whether someone has shown an injury-in-fact is dependent on the kind

of claims being brought. For claims brought under the Colorado Uniform

Declaratory Judgment Act, plaintiffs are not required to violate the statute in order

to have standing. Cmty. Tele–Commc’ns, Inc. v. Heather Corp., 677 P.2d 330, 334

(Colo.1984). And for free-speech cases, the standing analysis is relaxed because

courts are concerned that speech may be unnecessarily chilled otherwise. People

ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 355 (Colo. 1985).

18
This is not to say that the injury-in-fact inquiry is toothless—it is not. But here,

Appellants introduced evidence at trial that they regularly engage in the type of

speech being regulated, that they credibly desire to engage in speech about Denver

ballot measures in the future, and that they both will refrain and have already

refrained from engaging in such speech due to the existence of the Disclosure

Ordinance. These showings are enough to demonstrate the requisite injury-in-fact

in this case.

1. Plaintiffs did not need to show that they had already spoken
about a Denver ballot measure before they could show
injury-in-fact.
In general, injury-in-fact is satisfied when an “injury [is] sufficiently direct

and palpable to allow a court to say with fair assurance that there is an actual

controversy proper for judicial resolution.” O’Bryant v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 778

P.2d 648, 653 (Colo.1989). This requirement is satisfied “when the allegations of

the complaint, along with any other evidence submitted on the issue of standing,

establish[] that [a] regulatory scheme threatens to cause injury to the plaintiff’s

present or imminent activities.” Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d at 1053. Taken

together, Appellants’ complaint, motion for summary judgment, and evidence

introduced at trial satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the standing test.

19
 Importantly, Appellants seek a declaratory judgment and permanent

injunction under the Colorado Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The UDJA “is

a remedial statute calculated to afford parties judicial relief from uncertainty and

insecurity with respect to their rights and legal relations.” Id. A plaintiff seeking a

declaratory judgment on the validity of a regulatory scheme is not required to

violate the regulation and thus become subject to punishment “in order to secure

the adjudication of uncertain legal rights.” Cmty. Tele-Commc’ns, 677 P.2d at 334.

A plaintiff need only demonstrate the existence of an existing legal controversy

that can be effectively resolved by a declaratory judgment. See Three Bells Ranch

Assocs. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass’n, 758 P.2d 164, 168 (Colo.1988);

Conrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo.1983).

The Trial Court’s decision fails to address standing in the context of

Appellants’ free-speech claims, and instead applies a traditional standing analysis.

But the “leniency of First Amendment standing manifests itself most commonly in

the doctrine’s first element: injury-in-fact.” Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 235

(4th Cir. 2013). And limitations on standing are “substantially relaxed in the

context of first amendment claims.” Tooley, 697 P.2d at 355; see also Lopez v.

Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 2010) (“First Amendment cases raise unique

20
standing considerations that tilt dramatically toward a finding of standing.”

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Standing is relaxed in free-speech cases because courts recognize that

chilling constitutionally protected speech is a significant constitutional injury.

“[W]hen there is a danger of chilling free speech,” plaintiffs may “challenge a

statute … because … the statute’s very existence may cause [litigants and others]

to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Sec’y of State of

Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956–57 (1984). This presumption is

particularly appropriate when the presence of a statute tends to cause self-

censorship. See Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 946 (10th Cir.1987); see also

Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“[W]hen a challenged statute risks chilling the exercise of First Amendment

rights, the Supreme Court has dispensed with rigid standing requirements.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Disclosure Ordinance does

just that, by forcing Appellants to decide—before speaking—whether to remain

silent, or violate the privacy rights of their donors by complying with the

government’s forced disclosure.

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 2. At trial, Appellants showed that they suffer an injury-in-
fact due to the Disclosure Ordinance.
Plaintiffs in free-speech cases do not need to violate a speech-restrictive law

before they can challenge it, but they must do more than simply allege that a law

violates their free-speech rights. The Tenth Circuit offered a useful guide for how

courts should navigate this inquiry in Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Walker,

450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006). There, the Court held that it is not necessary for a

plaintiff “to show they have specific plans or intentions to engage in the type of

speech affected by the challenged government action,” provided that three

elements are met:

(1) evidence that in the past [plaintiffs] have engaged in the type of
speech affected by the challenged government action; (2) affidavits or
testimony stating a present desire, though no specific plans, to engage
in such speech; and (3) a plausible claim that they presently have no
intention to do so because of a credible threat that the statute will be
enforced.

Id. at 1089. As shown below, Appellants satisfied all three of these elements at

trial.

a. Appellants showed that they have engaged in the type

of speech affected by the Disclosure Ordinance.
To the first element of Walker, representatives for Appellants testified at

trial about the activities they have engaged in during their decades of existence.

While it is true that Appellants are small organizations with small budgets, they

22
nevertheless demonstrated that they routinely engage in speech about

governmental action and legislation throughout Colorado. Penn Pfiffner, chairman

of the TABOR Committee, testified about a range TABOR’s activities. The

Committee is “an advocacy organization,” the mission of which is “to protect and

further the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights.” Tr. (02/04/19) pp 71:23–72:1. When

TABOR believes that there “has been a poor interpretation” of that provision,

“we’ve gotten active in reacting to … what we see as violations” of it. Id. p 72:1–

5.

Mr. Pfiffner gave examples of this. One such example occurred in Grand

Lake. There, the City had adopted “a charge [that] had been put on that was called

a municipal fee. Now, this charge was identical to anything you and I would call a

tax. … And yet they had the audacity to say this is just a fee” so as to bypass the

requirements of the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights. “So we got involved in that. … I

made an effort to let the town know about just how wrongheaded this was so we

solicited and got an interview with the local paper and [later got] an op ed.” Id. pp

72:8–73:3.

Another example of TABOR’s activities occurred in Loveland. There, the

TABOR Committee was concerned about “a debt issue [that] had been passed for

the Downtown Development Authority.” Id. p 73:6–8. The debt issue had only

23
been voted on by roughly 900 people who lived within the zone of the Authority.

Id. p 73:9–10. But because the entire city was responsible for the debt, TABOR

believed that the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights required it to be voted on by the entire

approximately 45,000-person population of Loveland. Id. p 73:12–16. This

prompted TABOR to send a letter to the City expressing its concern about the 900-

person vote. Id. pp 73:21–74:7.

CUT has also engaged in expressive activity involving municipal legislation

and ballot measures around the state. Marty Nielsen, president of CUT, testified

that CUT offers information about ballot measures “[t]o hopefully encourage the

voter to come to the right conclusion when they go to the ballot. … Generally

speaking it would be to have less government and lower taxes.” Id. pp 120:25–

121:5. For example, CUT opposed a statewide ballot measure called Amendment

69, which would provide universal healthcare in Colorado. The group ran “some

radio advertisements informing the public” about its concerns with Amendment 69.

Id. p 121:8–12. It did the same with a ballot measure called Measure C, which

permitted the state to exceed Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights spending limitations, on

certain areas, for five years. For its radio advertisements opposing these measures,

CUT spent “between $5,000 and $7,000.” Id. p 121:13–14.

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 Thus, Appellants introduced substantial testimony showing a history of

engaging with spending issues around the state, including issues that appeared as

ballot measures. This is exactly the kind of testimony that the Walker court was

interested in seeing as part of its analysis of injury-in-fact in free-speech cases,

where the court was looking for “evidence that in the past [plaintiffs] have engaged

in the type of speech affected by the challenged government action[.]” 450 F.3d at

1089. It is uncontroverted that Appellants have regularly engaged in the kind of

speech that Denver now seeks to regulate.

b. Appellants showed a present desire, though no

specific plans, to engage in speech affected by the
Disclosure Ordinance.
To the second element of Walker, representatives for Appellants were

directly examined at trial about their desire to communicate with Denver voters

about municipal ballot measures. Penn Pfiffner, chairman of TABOR, was asked

whether advocating for ballot measures is within the scope of the TABOR

Committee’s mission. He answered that “Absolutely those are within the purview

of … the TABOR Committee.” Tr. (02/04/19) p 77:18–20. When asked whether

there are “any geographic limitations on where the committee will operate,” he

answered, “[f]or ballot issues, [all of] Colorado.” Id. p 77:21–24. When asked

25
whether that would include every city in Colorado, he answered that “it would

include every city.” Id. pp 77:25–78:1. This would, obviously, include Denver.

Mr. Pfiffner was then asked about whether “raising money to oppose or

support a ballot measure [is] the kind of thing TABOR would do if it felt it was

important?” He answered, “It’s something we would love to do. We have not had

enough resources or the focus away from other things to be able to do these sort of

ballot measures besides [activities in Grand Lake]. … So we’d like to do a whole

lot more.” Id. p 79:12–22. When asked, “If you needed to raise $500 to do that

could you do so?” Mr. Pfiffner responded, “[o]h, yes.” Id p 79:23–25.

Marty Nielsen, president of Appellant CUT Foundation testified about a

similar desire to educate voters about Denver ballot measures in the future,

consistent with CUT’s mission. For instance, Ms. Nielsen testified that CUT

would like to speak about Denver issues ranging from “a Denver sales tax

increase,” to “a Denver property tax increase,” to an override of the Taxpayers’

Bill of Rights. Id. p 125:10–20. She also testified that CUT would have the ability

to raise money—to fund speech about Denver ballot measures—that would exceed

the monetary triggers in the Disclosure Ordinance. Id. pp 122:20–123:3.

Thus, Appellants showed that speaking about Denver ballot measures is well

within the long-standing scope of their respective organizational missions, and that

26
they are likely to speak about Denver ballot measures in the future. They showed

that it is not a matter of if this law will chill them, but when. Appellants showed

that they would speak about any Denver ballot measure that impacts their

organizational goals of promoting lower taxes and governmental fiscal

responsibility. This claim is perfectly credible because Appellants operate

statewide, and both have the mission of promoting limited government and lower

taxes. They showed that they have the ability to raise funds that exceed the dollar

threshold to trigger the reporting requirements; and that they are likely to spend

more than the threshold amounts when they speak about a Denver ballot measure.

And, as detailed in the following section, the Ordinance has already prevented

them from speaking about Denver ballot measures.

c. Appellants presented a plausible claim that they

presently have no intention to speak in Denver
because of a credible threat that the Disclosure
Ordinance will be enforced.
Finally, Appellants testified about how the law has prevented and will

prevent them from speaking about Denver ballot measures in the future. For

instance, Denver placed a number of tax measures on its ballot for citizen approval

in fall of 2018. Mr. Pfiffner testified that TABOR did not get involved with

informing citizens about those measures because “we were putting ourselves at

risk” because of the Disclosure Ordinance. Id. p 83:13–20. “We ha[ve] to self
27
censor as long as this statute’s in place,” he said. Id. He further testified that

shortly after the Disclosure Ordinance was adopted, he sent an email to TABOR’s

board members urging them to remain silent on any Denver ballot measures. “Be

silent,” he said, “on what you say in terms of taking a position on anything that’s

on the [Denver] ballot.” Id. p 83:9–12.

This edict to self-censor is consistent with the desires of TABOR’s donors.

Mr. Pfiffner testified that at least one donor has told him that he wishes to remain

anonymous, and that he will stop giving if there is a risk his name will be put on a

publicly available report. Id. pp 88:18–89:7.

CUT’s representative, Marty Nielsen, provided similar testimony. She was

asked “if it’s a condition of engaging in Denver election[s] that CUT has to

disclose its donors, would CUT engage in Denver elections?” Ms. Nielsen

responded, “No. … Not if we had to disclose our donors.” Id. pp 124:19–125:1.

She elaborated that “many of [our donors] would fear repercussions in their

business and maybe in their personal life” because of the Disclosure Ordinance.

Id. pp 125:8–9.

Denver does not dispute that the Disclosure Ordinance will apply to

Appellants the minute they exceed the spending thresholds and communicate with

voters about a Denver ballot measure. When Appellants do this, they will either

28
become an “issue committee” (if they take a position) or a group engaged in

“electioneering communications” if they merely provide information. Id. p 14:1–

11 In either case, they will be required to file reports disclosing the names and

personal information of their donors.

Appellants have provided testimony that they will refrain from speaking

about Denver ballot measures in the future, because of the Disclosure Ordinance.

Indeed, TABOR has already instructed its board members not to speak about

Denver ballot measures at all, for fear of triggering the disclosure requirements.

Id. p 83:9–12. This is precisely the kind of chilling effect that courts are concerned

about when conducting an injury-in-fact analysis in free-speech cases. State Bd.

for Cmty. Colleges & Occupational Educ. v. Olson, 687 P.2d 429, 436 (Colo.

1984). Such a chilling effect was shown through uncontroverted testimony at trial.

Thus, at trial, Appellants showed that they continue to suffer a cognizable

injury-in-fact under the Disclosure Ordinance. Uncontroverted testimony showed

that Appellants regularly engage in the kind of speech the Disclosure Ordinance

targets; that they would speak about Denver ballot measures but-for the existence

of the challenged law; and that are credibly—indeed, actually—chilled by the

law’s disclosure requirements. The Trial Court committed reversible error when it

found that Appellants lack standing.

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 3. Independence Institute v. Coffman does not prevent a finding
of standing here.
Because Appellee relied on it so heavily at trial, and is likely to do so again

on appeal, Appellants will address standing under this Court’s decision in

Independence Institute v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130, 1136 (Colo. App. 2008).

Coffman does not prevent a finding of standing in this case for at least two reasons.

First, Coffman involved a highly unique procedural posture that does not speak to

the facts of this case. Second, Coffman cannot prevent a finding of standing here

because it relied on predictions about what federal courts would do, based on U.S.

Supreme Court dicta, and those predictions have proven incorrect in subsequent

cases.

a. Coffman involved highly unique facts that do not

resemble the facts of this case.
The standing analysis in Coffman is not instructive in this case because

Coffman had an unusual procedural posture entirely different from the posture of

this case. Coffman involved a constitutional challenge to certain registration and

reporting requirements in the Colorado Fair Campaign Practices Act. Unlike this

case, that case was not brought as a pre-enforcement challenge, but was instead

filed while state administrative proceedings were pending against the plaintiff. 209

P.3d at 1134. On appeal, this Court determined that the Independence Institute had

30
standing, at the time the case was filed, because of those pending administrative

proceedings. However, that did not end the inquiry. The government argued that

the case was “barred by an order of the trial court.” Id. at 1140. That order had

been entered because the Independence Institute had “recast its claim” on appeal.

Id. at 1141. Whereas the Institute had previously argued that the requirements

were burdensome because they placed an undue burden on small organizations, it

was now arguing that the requirements were burdensome because they applied to

groups that only occasionally engaged in ballot measure advocacy. Id.

According to this Court, that changed the claim from a facial challenge to an

as-applied challenge. Id. That was improper because the Trial Court had entered

an order saying it would only entertain facial challenges, and that order had not

been appealed by the appellants. Id. Thus, this Court concluded “that (1) the

Independence Institute has modified this claim from a facial to an as-applied

challenge to the registration and reporting requirements, and (2) as an as-applied

argument, it may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” Id.

Putting aside the complex procedural posture, the holding in Coffman was

simply that appellants could not raise their as-applied argument for the first time on

appeal. This case does not involve such a question, and Coffman’s standing

analysis is therefore silent on whether Appellants had standing in the instant

31
matter. The question of Appellants’ standing can instead be resolved based on the

analysis proffered above in section VII of this brief.

b. To the extent that Coffman prevents a finding of

standing, it should be overruled.
If this Court finds that Coffman prevents a finding of standing, it should

overrule Coffman as inconsistent with later Supreme Court precedent. Appellee

relied heavily on Coffman’s facial/as-applied distinction during summary

judgment—despite the fact that Appellants made it clear from the start that they

were bringing both kinds of challenges. CF, p 437. But as the U.S. Supreme Court

explained two years after Coffman, labeling a challenge “facial” or “as-applied”

does not have “some automatic effect” on the “disposition in every case involving

a constitutional challenge.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010).

The distinction is helpful only because “it goes to the breadth of the remedy

employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint.” Id.; see also

City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2449 (2015) (“the Court has never held that

[facial] claims cannot be brought under any otherwise enforceable provision of the

Constitution”).

After this Court decided Coffman, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the

“facial validity” of the law challenged in Citizens United, even though the

plaintiffs presented “narrower arguments,” 558 U.S. at 333. The Tenth Circuit also
32
rejected similar nitpicking between facial and as-applied challenges in Doe v. City

of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1122–28 (10th Cir. 2012). On the other hand,

Coffman recited the pre-Citizens United understanding of facial and as-applied

challenges and is simply no longer on-point on that issue. Any dispute over

whether a free-speech challenge is “facial” or “as-applied” cannot be used as a

basis to defeat standing (the highly unique facts of Coffman notwithstanding).

As explained above, at trial, Appellants established that they will speak in

the future about Denver-specific issues. Injury to their legally protected interest is,

therefore, plain. Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v.

Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000), held that plaintiffs—like Appellants

here—have “subject-to” standing, and that the government’s “insist[ence] that

under the [government’s] construction of [the challenged provisions],

organizations like [Appellants] will not be prosecuted … are insufficient to

overcome the chilling effect of the statute’s plain language.” Id. at 1192 (emphasis

added). So long as there is some relief that will redress a plaintiff’s injuries, such a

plaintiff has standing. The form of relief here is declaratory and injunctive relief,

fees, costs, and other legal and equitable relief. CF, p 13 ¶¶ 1–6. This relief would

address Appellants’ injuries. Appellants, like the plaintiffs in Davidson, have

therefore established standing.

33
VIII. REMEDY SOUGHT

As shown above, the Trial Court erroneously found that Appellants lack

standing. Accordingly, Appellants request that the Trial Court’s entry of judgment

in favor of Appellee be reversed, and that this case be remanded to the Trial Court

for a ruling on the merits of Appellants’ constitutional claims.

IX. CONCLUSION

The trial court erred when it ignored the evidence introduced by Appellants

at trial and ruled that Appellants lacked standing. That decision should be reversed

and the case should be remanded for proceedings on the merits of Appellants’

constitutional claims.

X. ATTORNEY’S FEES

Appellants request an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in this

action and this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

Dated: July 12, 2019

/s/ Matthew R. Miller

Matthew R. Miller (17PHV5301)
Scharf-Norton Center for
Constitutional Litigation at the
GOLDWATER INSTITUTE

34
 /s/ James M. Manley
James M. Manley (CO Bar No. 40327)
Pacific Legal Foundation
3217 E. Shea Blvd. #108
Phoenix, AZ 85028
(916) 419-7111
Fax: (916) 419-7747
jmanley@pacificlegal.org

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 12th day of July, 2019 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was filed and served via Colorado Courts E-Filing to the following
parties:

KRISTIN M. BRONSON, Denver City Attorney

Joshua L. Roberts
Assistant City Attorney
Municipal Operations Section
201 W. Colfax Avenue, Dept. 1207
Denver, CO 80202-5332
joshua.roberts@denvergov.org

/s/ Kris Schlott

Kris Schlott, Paralegal

35