Gender and the Liberal Democrats: Representing women

1

Gender and the Liberal Democrats: national and international context

The under-representation of women in public life is a result not just of direct and indirect discrimination, but also of the enormous social, cultural and economic pressures on women.

Liberal Democrats, ‘Equal Citizens’ policy paper (1994)

The Liberal Democrats are the UK’s third party at Westminster: they currently have fifty-seven MPs, less than 10 percent of the House of Commons. Despite the fact that they are currently in coalition government with the Conservatives, their third party status is reflected in the relative lack of attention paid to the party, hence less is known about the party’s organisation, policies and personnel compared to the Labour and the Conservative parties. The representation of women by the Liberal Democrats is further marginalised in extant studies and commentary. Following the 2010 general election, men made up 87.7 percent of the Parliamentary party. Whilst previous research has noted that the vast majority of their MPs were male (Childs, 2008a; Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005) a detailed institutional analysis of why this should be the case is lacking. Of course, with so few MPs of either sex, a poor track record on women’s representation may appear to be a somewhat minor concern. However, the question of women’s representation matters for the Liberal Democrats, not least because of their status as coalition partners in government. The party itself recognises that women’s representation is a problem, although their attempts to redress the imbalance have been slow and hesitant, and their record sits uneasily alongside their claim to be a ‘pro-women party’ (Harrison, 2009b).

This introductory chapter establishes both the national and international context within which the themes of this book – the descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation of women by the Liberal Democrats – are examined. As such, it addresses five key areas: it provides a brief overview of the Liberal Democrats in respect of contemporary electoral politics in the UK; considers inter-party comparisons of women’s representation; situates this research within an international context by comparing the number and percentage of women Liberal Democrat MPs with other European Liberal parties; outlines the main contentions of the research; and finally explores the various approaches to the concept of representation that underpin this study.

The Liberal Democrats

The 2010 general election proved a decisive turning point for the party. Despite a reduction in the overall number of MPs returned, the party were in the position of helping determine the make-up of the next government. Following detailed negotiations, the party entered a coalition government with the Conservatives which saw Liberal Democrats take up five positions in the Cabinet, with Nick Clegg as Deputy Prime Minister. Notwithstanding their position as coalition partners and securing their highest national share of the vote (23 percent) in the 2010 general election, the Liberal Democrats are still struggling to make the electoral breakthrough that many have long anticipated (Dorey and Denham, 2007).

The televised leaders’ debates offered a new and important opportunity for the third party to compete on a level playing field during the 2010 general election. Nick Clegg’s success during the debates, which at its peak resulted in opinion polling of over 30 percent for the party, was not eventually translated into seats. Although the party managed to secure the support of the Observer and Guardian, the Conservative-supporting press, notably the Sun, launched a series of personal attacks on the party leader. Despite a modest increase in their share of the vote, the number of Liberal Democrat seats actually went down. Whilst the party won four seats each from Labour and the Conservatives, and won two of the newly created seats, they lost thirteen seats: eleven to the Conservatives and two to Labour.

Table 1.1 British general elections of 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010

In the run-up to the 2010 general election, and with a resurgent Conservative Party, Nick Clegg had switched the Liberal Democrat campaign to target the top fifty Labour marginal seats. It is clear that this strategy did not in the end prove successful. Likewise, during the 2005 election the Liberal Democrats had failed to make much headway against the Conservatives, in spite of the much-flaunted ‘decapitation’ strategy, which targeted senior Conservative politicians (Curtice, 2007; Russell, 2005). Post-2005 therefore, there was a perception, both internally and externally, that the party had missed an important opportunity to make a significant electoral breakthrough, despite popular flagship policies, such as their opposition to the war in Iraq and the pledge to scrap student tuition fees (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2005). This feeling was reinforced by the party’s performance at the 2010 election, despite their role in the coalition government.

The distribution of their electoral support in a majoritarian electoral system which produces a disparity between the percentage of votes won and the percentage of seats won disadvantages the Liberal Democrats (Denver, 2007); and as the third and smaller party they also have fewer material resources. These disadvantages have been compounded by organisational upheaval, internal disputes with regards policy, and wider challenges facing the successful marketing of the party to the electorate.

Support for the Liberal Democrats has traditionally been viewed in terms of geographical strongholds, with the party building clusters of seats in certain regions such as the South West and Scotland (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005, p. 143). These geographical trends have their historical roots in patterns of support for the Liberal party, which is partially a result of the entrenched north-south divide that has characterised Labour and Conservative support. The Liberal’s ability to appeal to rural areas which had rejected socialism became key for the party, and remains important to the Liberal Democrats today (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005, p. 148).

The Liberal Democrats have not substantially increased their number of seats outside of their heartlands; as shown in Table 1.2, indeed it is clear that the South West and Scotland remain particular strongholds. The increase in their share of the vote in the East Midlands relative to the number of seats won illustrates the inequity of the electoral system. The geographical unevenness of the Liberal Democrats’ seats also make it harder for the party to sell themselves as a ‘credible’ option to voters nationwide, something which Russell and Fieldhouse identify as being critical to any future breakthrough (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005). The party’s capacity to appeal to all British regions is hindered by the lasting purchase of the ‘wasted vote syndrome’, which kept them out of second place electorally despite being the second choice for many voters (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005).¹

Table 1.2 Share of the vote and seats won by region, 1997–2010

One way in which the Liberal Democrats have tried to be more electorally competitive is by making the party organisation run more efficiently, with more direction from party headquarters (Cowley Street). The noted professionalisation of the Liberal Democrats has been a key development within the party and has aided their attempts to present a credible image; investment in opinion research and the steadily increasing influence of the party leadership are two important ways in which the party has attempted to strengthen its position in British politics (Webb, 2000; Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005; Russell et al., 2007; Whiteley, Seyd and Billinghurst, 2006). This professionalisation has, in part, further exacerbated tensions between the core (national) and periphery (local) party, with local parties determined not to cede further power to Cowley Street (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005).

The holding of two leadership elections in quick succession generated a degree of instability within the Liberal Democrats. The rapid change of personnel at the top of the party, coupled with a raft of damaging headlines regarding the personal lives of senior politicians, made ‘selling’ the party a much harder task (Hurst, 2006). Whilst research has noted the increased cohesion amongst the parliamentary party (Cole, 2009), recent internal debates over the renewal of the Trident nuclear weapon and tuition fees have highlighted current divisions within the wider party. These divisions are partially a result of the party’s constitution, which allows grass-roots activists a degree of influence over the leadership and ideological positioning of the party (Evans, 2007). Furthermore, ideological differences based upon a social-classical Liberal divide also aggravate tensions. This is illustrated by the publication of two very different ideologically motivated books by parliamentarians and senior party activists: the economically liberal Orange Book (Marshall and Laws, 2004) and the socially liberal Reinventing the State (Brack, Grayson and Howarth, 2007).

Since becoming leader, Nick Clegg made it clear that Labour are the Liberal Democrats’ primary target, despite suggestions, both before and after the 2010 general election, that Labour and the Liberal Democrats have much to co-operate on (see for example New Statesman 29.1.2009; Observer 9.5.2010). In his recently published pamphlet The Liberal Moment (2009), Clegg argues that the time has come for progressives to ‘regroup under a new banner.’ Whilst some suggested prior to the 2010 general election that this perceived shift to the left would make it difficult for the party in the South of England, Clegg is clear that the Liberal Democrats alone constitute the progressive face of British politics and therefore have more to gain by targeting disillusioned Labour voters. During the 2010 election the party sought to emphasise, with varying degrees of success, the growing gap between the rich and poor, the environment and radical electoral and political reform, this was driven by a desire on the part of the Liberal Democrats to simultaneously appeal to Labour voters whilst defending seats against the Conservatives.

Of course the result of the 2010 general election provided a dilemma for the Liberal Democrats, but despite some reservations on the part of some senior Liberal Democrat activists (see for example Guardian 10.5.2010), Nick Clegg managed to secure a number of key concessions from the Conservatives during the coalition negotiations, including a referendum on electoral reform. Moreover, at a specially arranged conference for Liberal Democrat activists, the grassroots endorsed his decision to enter into coalition with the Conservatives.

Women’s representation and the Liberal Democrats

The under-representation of women in British politics means that the legislature does not accurately reflect the social make-up of society; women constitute fifty two percent of the population, but just over twenty percent of the House of Commons. This disparity is a continuing reminder of the gendered inequalities underpinning political institutions. Whilst the Liberal Democrats can boast the highest percentage of women councillors in the three major parties, at thirty two percent (IDeA, 2006), there are only seven women Liberal Democrat MPs out of a Parliamentary party of fifty-seven. Indeed, the low number of women MPs has been a persistent feature of the Parliamentary party. In order to contextualise these figures, a brief overview of the types of strategies parties adopt to increase the number of women is provided.

Gender and politics scholars are in broad agreement that it is the responsibility of political parties to ensure that a sufficient number of women candidates are selected and, more specifically, that women are selected to fight winnable seats (Childs et al., 2005; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). Furthermore, there is a consensus that there are enough women seeking selection on behalf of all major political parties. In short there is not a problem with the supply of women candidates, but rather there is a problem with the demand for women candidates (Childs, 2008a). One explanation as to why women remain descriptively under-represented in British politics is because of the ‘institutionally sexist’ culture evident within British political parties (Lovenduski, 2005, pp. 57–58). Sexism is identified in parties where an ingrained discrimination or bias against women or femininity exists. The discrimination is based upon a culture and code of practices that was, and continues to be, created, recreated and defined by men (Lovenduski, 2005, p. 58). Institutional sexism has implications for political recruitment: the selection processes are underpinned by formal rules and informal values, which serve to privilege men and masculine traits. Therefore, in order for political parties to overcome these inherent discriminatory biases, a strategic and interventionist approach to candidate selection must be adopted.

Lovenduski identified three strategic approaches which political parties could adopt to increase the number of women MPs: equality rhetoric, equality promotion and equality guarantees (Lovenduski, 2005, p. 90). Equality rhetoric is the public acknowledgment of the need to do something about increasing the numbers of women who come forward; this can be identified in campaign literature and speeches. Equality promotion offers a more tangible approach through the provision of targeted training or financial help, and it can also include the setting of internal party quotas. Lastly, equality guarantees recognise that a direct intervention in the selection mechanism is vital to ensure the selection and election of more women MPs; examples of these measures include: all women shortlists (AWS), where only women can apply for designated local seats; zipping, where men and women are placed alternately on a list of candidates; and twinning, where a male and female candidate are selected for a pair of twinned constituencies (Lovenduski, 2005).

In the run-up to the 2010 general election the three main parties adopted a variety of strategies to try and increase the number of women MPs. The 2002 Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act allowed political parties to use positive discrimination in the selection of their parliamentary candidates. However, not all parties took advantage of this change in legislation.

As Table 1.3 indicates, there are obvious inter-party differences with regards women’s representation. That women’s presence in the House of Commons continues to rely overwhelmingly on one political party is distinctly problematic (Mackay, 2001, p. 2). Despite the swing away from Labour at the 2010 election, the data in Table 1.3 highlight some interesting inter-party comparisons: although Labour lost seventeen women MPs, their percentage of women actually increased; both the number and percentage of Liberal Democrat women decreased; and both the number and percentage of Conservative women increased.

Table 1.3 Women MPs 1983–2010 by party

Labour has been the only party willing to use equality guarantees in the selection of women candidates for Westminster elections. In the run-up to the 2010 general election Labour opted once again to use AWS to ensure the selection of women in thirty seats, including twenty-four existing Labour seats. This was a successful strategy, with twenty-four of the thirty newly elected women selected on an AWS. Moreover, Labour also adopted equality promotion strategies. For example Emily’s List, established in 1993 to give financial help to Labour women seeking selection, gave a total of eighteen grants to women seeking selection and also gave a grant of £1,000 to the Labour Women’s Network to run a weekend residential course for women thinking of going into public life. Although the actual number of Labour women MPs decreased by seventeen (the swing in 2010 was against Labour) the party also fielded a higher percentage and number of women candidates in 2010 (up 4 percent to 30 percent; an increase of twenty-four candidates from 166 to 190).

With strong internal opposition to the use of positive discrimination, the Conservatives under the leadership of David Cameron introduced a number of different initiatives to try and increase their number of women MPs. The first of these reforms was the establishment of the ‘A’ or priority list of 100 candidates which was gender balanced. The second strategy was to hold open primaries, a selection process in which all constituents, regardless of party affiliation, have the opportunity to vote for the candidate. They also introduced sex-balanced quotas at each stage of the selection process. Finally, from January 2010 onwards, by-election rules were introduced in the selection process whereby a shortlist of three candidates would be drawn up for either the local association or the local electorate through an open primary to select from (Campbell and Childs, 2010). The party also fielded a higher percentage and number of women candidates in 2010 (up 6 percent to 25 percent; an increase of forty-three candidates to 161).

The Liberal Democrats also rejected the use of equality guarantees and specifically AWS (discussed in further detail in Chapters 2 and 3). For the 2010 general election the party made use of both rhetorical and promotional strategies that they had used in previous elections. In 2001 the party established a Gender Balance Taskforce (GBTF, now the Campaign for Gender Balance, or CGB) which aimed to raise the number of women on the approved list to 500 and to ensure, through training and promotion, that women were selected in at least 40 percent of seats requiring a swing to win of 7.5 percent or less (Evans, 2008). The internal women’s organisation Women Liberal Democrats (WLD) also sought to encourage women to stand at the election by contacting all women on the party’s list of approved candidates not yet selected and encouraging them to apply for seats. Additionally, the party also used quotas at the point of shortlisting, requiring that on a shortlist of three there is at least one candidate of each sex. The party fielded a slightly lower percentage and number of women candidates in 2010 (down 1 percent to 22 percent; a decrease of six candidates to 134).

The record number of MPs retiring at the 2010 general election, 149, provided an opportunity for the parties to increase their number of women MPs. Whilst the two largest parties used a variety of strategies to ensure women were selected for these newly vacant seats, as discussed above, the Liberal Democrats continued to use existing strategies: Labour selected women in 46 percent of their 102 seats; Conservatives selected women in 26 percent of their thirty-eight seats; and the Liberal Democrats selected women in 57 percent of their seven newly vacant seats. The Liberal Democrats selected the largest percentage of women in their vacant seats; however, it is important to note that this is on much smaller numbers, and, following the election, the party has the lowest percentage of women MPs.

The Liberal Democrats are lagging behind in terms of women’s representation, and are far short of anything close to parity. Despite sporadic attempts made on behalf of the Liberal Democrat leadership to offer direction in the candidate selection process, the autonomy of local parties to select their own candidate is jealously guarded; indeed, selecting prospective parliamentary candidates is frequently perceived to be one of the few areas of influence left for local activists of any party. However, the small size of the Parliamentary party, and specific institutional and ideological factors, have proved influential upon the party’s response to women’s representation.

The feminisation of political parties, that is the insertion and integration of women into all levels of the party, is a key idea that scholars can use to assess how responsive the parties are to the issue of women’s representation (Lovenduski, 2005). As Childs notes, the process of feminisation depends partly upon exogenous factors, including the anticipated benefit that may accompany the feminisation process, as parties seek to widen their electoral appeal (Childs, 2008a). Thus, the pressure on Labour and the Conservatives to ‘feminise’ their parties is in part driven by a