Salerno 1943: The Allied Invasion of Italy

Salerno 1943

Campaign Chronicles

Salerno 1943

The Allied Invasion of Italy

Angus Konstam

First published in Great Britain in 2007 by

Pen & Sword Military

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Copyright © Angus Konstam 2007

Maps copyright © Christopher Summerville 2006

ISBN 978-1-84415-517-0

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Contents

List of Illustrations

and Maps

Illustrations

US Army Trucks Being Offloaded Onto a Landing Craft

Allied Landing Craft

The Port of Salerno

Sir Harold Alexander

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring

General Heinrich von Vietinghoff

‘Uncle Green’ Beach

Town of Vietri

Unloading a British 6-Pounder

The River Picento

US Rangers

Hampshire Lane

Troops of the US 36th Infantry Division

‘Red’ Beach

Beach Personnel

The Medieval Torre di Paestum

Troops of the US 45th Infantry Division

A British Observation Team

Montecorvino Airfield

Ruined German Tanks

American Sailors

British Bren Carriers

Lieutenant General Sir Richard McCreery

A German Stug III

British Infantry of the 1/5th Queen’s Regiment

Major General Ernest J. Dawley

Persano

The Tobacco Factory

The River Sele

Bibio Cioffi

Soldiers of the 6th Royal Leicester Regiment

Lieutenant General Traugott Herr

Altavilla

The Tobacco Factory Today

Monte San Chirico

Dragonea Hill

German Prisoners Unloading Supplies

Santa Lucia

A British PIAT Team

A British 6-Pounder

A British Jeep

South of Bellizzi

Tobacco Storage Building

A US Ranger Handing Out Rations

Burial Parties of the US 36th Infantry Division

The Old Station Building at Paestum Today

The Viaduct at Vietri

Railway Sidings at Battipaglia

General Montgomery

General Clark Tours the Ruins of Battipaglia

Young German Prisoners of the Hermann Göring Panzer Division

The Salerno War Cemetery

General McCreery Briefing Officers of the Commando Brigade

A Bren carrier of the 6th Yorkshire and Lancashire Regiment

The Crew of a British 4.2-inch Mortar

Maps

The Italian Theatre of Operations 1943

Allied Invasion Plans and German Dispositions

The Allied Landings in Southern Italy – September 1943

Salerno and the Campania Region

British Sector

American Sector

The Strategic Situation – October 1943

Maps

Background

On 17 August 1943 the battle for Sicily was over, as the last of the island’s German garrison escaped across the 2-mile wide Straits of Messina. Following their gruelling five-week battle the Allied commanders gathered on the Sicilian shore and decided what to do next. For the best part of four years the British Eighth Army had fought the Italians, and then the Germans, in the sandy wastes of North Africa. For the past year they had been joined by an inexperienced but eager American army, whose strength and competence had grown steadily. Sicily had served as a necessary stepping stone between Africa and Europe. The same two armies now began preparing for the next stage of the war – the invasion of Hitler’s ‘Fortress Europe’.

In fact, the Allies had been developing plans for an invasion of Italy for some time, and an amphibious landing on the Italian peninsula seemed the next logical step. If Italy could be knocked out of the war the Germans might be forced to retreat north into the Alps, while their army fighting in Russia would be stripped of one of its most reliable allies. The capture of Italy would also provide the Allies with much-needed bases and resources, which could be used in the next stage of the war – the invasion of Northern Europe and the drive on Germany.

On 3 September 1943 the British Eighth Army crossed the narrow Straits of Messina and established a foothold on the ‘toe’ of Italy. General Montgomery’s troops then began a pursuit of the retreating Germans up the ‘toe’, their progress slowed by the enemy’s ‘scorched earth’ policy of destroying bridges and sowing mines as they fell back. Then, on 9 September, the British 1st Airborne Division seized the Italian port of Taranto without a shot being fired. The lack of Italian resistance was hardly surprising. On the same day as Montgomery’s troops landed on the Italian mainland the Allies entered into secret negotiations with the Italian government, which agreed to surrender to the Allies at midnight on 8/9 September.

While the Germans hurriedly disarmed Italian Army units stationed within reach of their troops, the Allies were preparing to launch their assault on the Italian mainland. On the morning of 9 September units of the Allied Fifth Army began landing near Salerno, south of Naples. If the Allies thought the Italian surrender meant they could simply walk ashore, their hopes were cruelly dashed. The Germans opposed the landing, and so began a gruelling ten days of hard fighting. At one stage it even seemed likely the Allies would be thrown back into the sea. Only the arrival of reinforcements, the deployment of naval and air forces, and the grim determination of the men in the front line saved the Fifth Army from disaster. This is the story of those ten days, and of the bloody battle fought on the Salerno plain.

US Army trucks being offloaded onto an LCT off Paestum on D-Day (Library of Congress).

Strategic Options

The decision to land an Anglo-American army on the beaches below Salerno was not an obvious one for the Allied planners. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt decided to invade Sicily after clearing the Germans from North Africa, rather than transfer the bulk of their armies to Britain in preparation for an assault against North West Europe. As Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, General Eisenhower had reservations about the invasion of Sicily, which was code-named Operation Husky. It seemed like an open-ended commitment to a war in Italy, which could divert resources from a landing in France. However, after Roosevelt and Eisenhower extracted an agreement to limit the Allied involvement in the Mediterranean theatre, the invasion went ahead as planned.

Operation Husky proved a resounding success. The Allies landed on the southern and south-eastern coasts of Sicily on 10 July 1943 and within a month the Germans and their lacklustre Italian allies had been driven back to Messina, in the north-eastern tip of the island. The Germans then evacuated the island, pulling over 80,000 troops to safety. Finally on 17 August Messina was captured, and the campaign brought to an end. However, the fighting didn’t stop there. In May Churchill had persuaded Roosevelt that Eisenhower should try to knock Italy out of the war, as a continuation of Husky. Inevitably this meant an invasion of the Italian mainland. While the fighting was raging in Sicily, Eisenhower’s staff was busy drawing up plans for this next stage of the conflict.

During the next few weeks several schemes were developed, all involving landings either around Naples and Rome, or else on the southern coast of Italy. The more northerly invasion sites offered the most substantial strategic rewards if the landings succeeded, but conversely they also involved the greatest risk. By contrast, a landing on the southern coast was virtually risk-free, but the strategic advantages were minor. While a landing around Rome was discounted early on because the beaches lay beyond the reach of Allied air cover, other invasion plans were developed that gave Eisenhower a range of options. Operations Barracuda, Gangway and Mustang all involved landings in the Bay of Naples. However, these were eventually considered to be too risky, as the Germans would be able to reinforce the battlefield far more rapidly than the Allies could, while the beaches lay too far from the airfields in Sicily to permit all but the most minimal air cover for the operation.

A far safer option was Operation Slapstick, which involved the landing of General Clark’s Fifth Army at Taranto, supported by a drop by the US 82nd Airborne Division. This too was discarded, as the whole operation was considered too cautious. For the same reason Operation Goblet, a landing by General Montgomery’s Eighth Army at Crotone in Calabria was also abandoned, as was Operation Buttress, the landing of Fifth Army’s X Corps in the same area. Next came the drafting of plans for an independent parachute drop by the 82nd, either around Naples (Operation Giant I), or around Rome (Operation Giant II). Both were designed to block the flow of German reinforcements to the main landing area to the south, but both operations were rightly considered too perilous. In the end these plans were adapted by the Airborne commander when General Clark asked the 82nd to carry out a drop in support of the Salerno landings.

By the end of August it was clear that although the Germans still held southern Italy, their troops were in poor shape, and the Wehrmacht needed time to replenish the men and equipment lost during the Sicilian campaign. The normally cautious Montgomery urged an immediate landing in Calabria to take advantage of this – to establish a foothold on the Italian ‘toe’ before the enemy could recover. His aggressiveness was encouraged by the favourable political situation in Italy. After a string of military disasters the Italian leadership was anxious to make peace with the Allies. On the night of 24/25 July the Fascist Grand Council voted Mussolini from office, and the following day King Victor Emmanuel III ordered the arrest of the Italian dictator. A new government was formed under the leadership of Marshal Badoglio, who promptly entered secret negotiations with the Allies.

Meanwhile Eisenhower and General Alexander, commanding the Fifth Army Group, decided to launch a two-pronged invasion. The first element involved the landing of Montgomery’s Eighth Army in Calabria and Apulia: the British commander would then push the Germans back as his men advanced northwards. Meanwhile Clark’s Fifth Army would land further up the western coast of Italy, in a bid to secure the vital port of Naples. By the time the two armies met, the Allies would have secured the whole of Southern Italy, and would be able to use Naples as a supply base and conduit for reinforcements.

On 3 September Montgomery launched Operation Baytown, which involved the landing of his British XIII Corps near Reggio in Calabria. The Germans offered little resistance, and it soon transpired they were retreating northwards. That same day Marshal Badaglio agreed to the capitulation of Italy, in return for leniency from the Allies. Obviously, with a German army stationed in the country, the Italians were reluctant to announce their deal with the Allies for fear of reprisals. However, their hand was forced by Eisenhower. Following orders from his political superiors the Allied commander publicly announced the Italians had capitulated on the evening of 8 September – just hours before Clark’s amphibious landing was due to begin. The Germans were quick to respond, and following a pre-arranged plan, the signal was given for all German units in Italy to disarm the troops of their former ally, and to take over their bases, fortifications and airfields. Thus Eisenhower’s announcement had two immediate effects on the amphibious invasion: first, the Allied troops thought the landing would be a mere formality, and that the Germans would be unable to offer much in the way of a defence; second, the Germans had a busy night, occupying the Italian-manned coastal defences and fortifications, which lay in the path of the Allied invasion force. When dawn came the Germans would be ready and waiting.

As for choosing the location of this amphibious attack, Eisenhower and his planners had only one sensible option left to them. After discounting beaches further to the north, as they lay beyond the reach of Allied air cover, the Gulf of Salerno was finally chosen as the ideal location. Naval advisors approved of the fact the gulf was relatively free of obstructions, that ships could operate close inshore, and that the beaches themselves were free of surf. The beaches were also narrow, which made it easier to construct exit routes through the dunes or coastal hinterland. Once ashore, the military planners noted there was plenty of space to establish supply dumps close to the landing beaches, while a reasonable road net allowed easy transport of men and supplies forward from the beachhead. The only drawback was that the coastal plain was ringed by mountains, and unless the Allies could secure the passes before the Germans reinforced the area, their troops would have great difficulty forcing a way through the mountains to Naples. Unfortunately, Eisenhower’s planners failed to emphasize the importance of speed on General Clark and the men who would lead the assault on the Italian mainland.

Allied landing craft heading towards the American beachhead, D-Day (Library of Congress).

Operation Avalanche

Code-named Operation Avalanche, the Salerno landing was scheduled for the morning of 9 September, just three weeks after the Sicily campaign ended on the waterfront of Messina. General Clark’s staff put the finishing touches to the plan during those few weeks – in fact, changes were still being made while the invasion force was being transported to the beaches. The plan called for two coordinated assaults on the Salerno beaches by one British and one American corps. After securing the beachhead these troops were to push inland to secure the mountains. Then they would swing round to the north and begin a drive on Naples, which Clark saw as the ultimate objective of the whole operation.

Lieutenant General Sir Richard McCreery and his British X Corps would land on the left, just below the port of Salerno, while on the far side of the River Sele Lieutenant General Ernest J. Dawley’s US VI Corps would land in front of the antique ruins of Paestum. On the British left flank a force of American Rangers and British Commandos would seize the passes over the Sorrento peninsula and thus prevent the Germans from reinforcing the battle using the principal routes leading south from Naples. Although the two beachheads would be several miles apart and separated by the River Sele, it was hoped the gap would be filled at some point during the first two days of the battle.

A floating reserve was provided by two American units, the 45th Infantry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division. Elements of both of these formations would be available within a day or two of the landing, while an additional British armoured division, two American infantry divisions and army assets would all be made available within a week of the initial landing. The US Navy and the Royal Navy would join forces to escort the invasion fleet, and warships would then provide gunfire support when needed. A small US Task Force would even make a feint towards the mouth of the River Volturno above Naples, in an attempt to deceive the Germans as to Allied intentions. Finally, a small carrier force was provided, which would give air support for the fleet and the troops on the beaches.

The Port of Salerno, looking northwards from ‘Uncle Red’ Beach (Author’s Collection).

It was a daring plan, which presupposed the Germans would be slow to react. It was also imagined that the German units that had escaped from Sicily would be in poor shape and wouldn’t put up much of a fight. The planners were proved spectacularly wrong on both counts.

Clark fully expected that Salerno would be seized on D-Day, and that by D+1 his army would be poised in the hills north of the town, ready to begin a triumphal advance on Naples. Although his knowledge of German dispositions and intentions was sketchy, he understood that the only immediate threat to the landing would come from one understrength German formation, the 16th Panzer Division, commanded by Major General Sieckenius. Once that threat was driven back, or at least contained, then the army would be free to march on Naples. While optimism is an admirable quality in a general, Clark’s rash confidence was not only misplaced, it also came close to causing a military disaster.

The Invasion Force

Assembling the invasion force proved a major undertaking. For a start, not all the units sailed from the same port. Of the two divisions that made up the British X Corps, the 46th Infantry Division sailed from Bizerte near Tunis, while the 56th Infantry Division sailed from Tripoli. The American VI Corps was equally divided: the 36th Infantry Division set sail from Oran, while the 45th Infantry Division embarked at Palermo in Sicily. The greatest limiting factor was the availability of landing craft. Montgomery had already been allocated landing ships for his invasion of Calabria and Apulia, and he refused to release these in time for the Salerno operation. Consequently, the decision was made that VI Corps