THE PATTON REPORT
rj Richard M. Patton 1969
No. 8 A Loss Control Publication December 1969
THE ERA OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLAGRATIONS
The world has changed, past is done. In 1967, 107 major industrial fires occurred in the
New years come one by one. United States and Canada with a combined
How nice to dream of what is gone, property damage loss of 320 million dollars.
Each man has his Babylon. Although these major loss fires represented only
about one out of every thousand fires that
But dreams of past serve no man well. occurred, they represented approximately 20% of
Nostalgia is a form of hell. the total fire damage in the United States and
Forget the dead, tomorrow's near, Canada. The development of the industrial
Step boldly forth and see what's there. conflagration problem is a key factor in the
continued rise in fire losses in this country.
America has moved into a new era of great fire The dollar value placed on a fire loss often reflects
loss. This movement toward disaster, and the the insurance reimbursement. Usually it does not
reasons, are generally unrecognized today. But in include the total replacement cost of the facility,
the last thirty years of this century fire losses such or the business interruption loss. It never includes
as the great General Motors fire of 1953 will the very real impact on a corporation sales
become common. program, relationship with customers, plans for
future expansion, lost manpower after shutdowns,
Going back fifty to one hundred years and more and loss of relative position in a competive business
there was a type of fire called the conflagration society.
that ravaged whole cities. Probably the most
famous of these were the Chicago fire of 1871 (17 The McCormick Place fire in Chicago in January
thousand buildings destroyed, 168 million 1967 caused a property damage to the building of
property damage) Boston fire of 1872 (776 more than 22 million and a content loss estimated
buildings, 75 million dollars) and the San Francisco at greater than 100 million dollars. The total
earthquake and fire of 1906 (28 thousand business interruption loss, including the loss of
buildings, 350 million). The causes of these fires revenue to the city of Chicago from convention
included extensive areas of close spaced cancellations, is unknown; but it must have been
combustible buildings, inadequate water supplies astronomical.
and fire fighting forces in relation to the problem,
and extensive use of wood shingle roofs that The Apollo Spacecraft cabin fire at Cape Kennedy
disintegrated and turned into countless flying on January 27, 1967 in which three astronauts
flaming brands during a fire. died is listed as a 75 million dollar loss by N.F.P.A.
But, who knows the total cost of all the changes,
The age of the urban conflagration has receded but delays, and uncertainties that developed? If Russia
there is a new menace, born of World War II and did not run into trouble with its space craft
thirty years old now. It is the industrial program as well it is possible that the ultimate
conflagration. result would have been to make an American the
second man to land on the moon.
An industrial conflagration is a fire involving a
multi-acre building, a major industrial complex or a The industrial disaster differs from the urban
very high value area. Today, fires in a single conflagration in some important ways. Perhaps the
building can equal and exceed the values lost in most significant difference is that the urban loss
most of the great fires that have occurred in this was spread among many but the industrial loss
country. For example, the fifty million dollar generally is concentrated on a single organization.
General Motors fire in Lovonia in 1953 represented
a greater dollar loss than did nineteen of the The urban conflagration involved many buildings
twenty-two great disasters that occurred between in a great area. The industrial fire can occur in a
1835 and 1911. single building; even in an area as small as a space
capsule.
interior of very large buildings to cope with
The utban fire had to be fought by public fire
an out of control fire.
departments using hose streams and other
conventional fire fighting means. The industrial c) The alarm was delayed.
conflagration must be prevented through proper d) The water supply was poorly maintained.
industrial process design, or must be controlled None of these findings are particularly new,
when small by privately owned protection systems startling, or unique.
and methods. Without proper private safeguards
the fire may be beyond control prior to response But perhaps the most significant question that
by the public fire department. could have been explored, but wasn't, is
this: "What basic faults exist in fire protection
Fire technology invariable lags far behind the fire technology that can lead engineers to , the
disaster. The technology to control the industrial conclusion that an occupancy of about 100,000
conflagration, by and large, has not yet been BTU'S per sq. ft. (consisting of booths constructed
developed. In fact the industrial conflagration as a of light wood frames supporting plywood on
unique and significant problem has not yet been pressed wood fiberboard paneling) is a non
recognized by most fire control authorities. hazardous occupancy not requiring sprinkler
Conventional control methods are still applied to protection".
the non-conventional industrial fire.
Note that this is very similar to questions that
Why do I say this? I say it because the fire
could be asked about the St. Regis fire. For
protection deficiencies "discovered" by specialists
example, "why was a standard four hour fire wall
following each modern disaster, and the fire
installed to separate the warehouse from the
protection solutions recommended by the
production unit when the fire loading (BTU'S per
authorities in relation to new construction and new
sq. ft.) was greatly in excess of a normal
processes are the same and identical faults and
occupancy?"
solutions that have been routinely advocated for
fifty to seventy years now. The conditions that
"Why was a standard sprinkler layout which
.cause the modern industrial loss have changed
obviously produced an inadequate density for fire
radically since World War II, but the solutions are
control installed?"
all pre-World War II. The authorities have not yet
recognized that there is a new ball game, and the
." Why was fire control not achieved with 21/2
old rules no longer provide adequate safeguards.
million gallons of water when the incipient fire
could have been controlled with a few hundred
Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is give some
gallons of water? Why provide a 21/2 million gallon `•*,
in on what I consider to be a perfect
water system and then install a fire control system
example of the modern major industrial loss. It is
that was unable to effectively use even a very small
the St. Regis Pensicola plant fire of 1962. The then
portion of the supply?"
modern industrial plant was designed as a
"HIGHLY PROTECTED 'RISK". Its "modern" In recent years there have been some large scale
protection features included: A total water supply fire tests of rolled paper storage, rubber tire
that consisted of two 100,000 gallon tanks, two storage, high piled stock and rack storage. Does
1500 GPM at 100 PSI fire pumps, and four water this signify that there is a change in the wind? Does
reservoirs totaling approximately 21/2 million it mean that fire technology is now moving in the
gallons of water; standard sprinkler protection, right direction? In my opinion it does not.
roof venting facilities, draft curtains at the roof,
and a standard fire wall with standard fire doors
First of all, of all of the post World War II fire
separating the rolled paper storage warehouse from
problems that have developed, I feel that storage is
the production unit. When the welders entered the
in the least complex, most solvable category.
warehouse they were accompied by the standard
Secondly, the solutions being developed usually
fire watch with the standard fire extinguisher.
fall under the classification of "the same old
When a spark ignited the paper the standard fire
recipe, triple strength". In short, I feel the research
watch with the standard extinguisher was right
has come to grips with only the surface problems,
there, but the extinguisher was inadequate for the and then inadequately. For example, the fire
modern rolled paper hazard. The sprinklers
research that has dealt with the high piled stock
operated but failed to suppress the fire. The fire
problem recommends automatic smoke vents for
reached an intensity beyond fire department
the roof and draft curtains below the roof as part
control prior to the arrival of the fire department. of the total solution to the problem. Yet, in truth,
To make the story complete the standard fire wall
these tests have not researched the behavior of
failed and the production unit was lost as well as curtains and vents under fire conditions. Therefore,
the warehouse. engineers who design fire protection for tomorrows
buildings know little more, if any, about heat
The McCormick Place fire also fits the pattern of containment and smoke venting then did the
St. Regis, even though it was not a sprinklered engineers who designed them for St. Regis.
property. Following the fire, investigators analysed
the causes of the loss, and basically they concluded
The (new) solutions for this storage problem
that; includes the same old sprinkler head that can be
a) Bare steel not protected by sprinklers loses demonstrated to be poorly suited to the new
its strength rapidly in a fire. storage arrangements.
Fire denartment often cannot reach the
The very signifient factor of ceiling height still has loss, and being unable to test possible new
not been adequately researched in relation to theories and new ideas with research, yet under
sprinkler operation and performance. pressure for solutions; the committee usually
comes up with the old time honored (but not
The fire loading (BTU'S per sq. ft.) is no more a always pertinent) protection concepts, and
part of fire protection design than it was prior to simple asks for "more of the same".
the St. Regis fire or the McCormick Place fire. 3. When the next disaster strikes the committee
is locked in on their previous solutions. The
Most of all, basic attitudes have not changed. need to justify past decisions often outweighs
Protection engineers are still trying to force the impetus for re-evaluations. Justifications are
industry to build its plants to fit fire protection, developed for previous decisions and the
rather than designing the fire protection to fit "tradition protection" ante is upped another
modern industrial needs. chip.
A good illustration of this attitude is the opening 4. Over the years elaborate justifications are
paragraph of the fire report written by a developed that "prove" previous theoties.
representative of a New England insurance rating Because technical support is shaky or
association and published in the November 1969 nonexistent for the theories they are
NEPA Fire Journal covering the recent "Stop & maintained "in force" by a vigorous defense of
Shop" fire in Boston. The report beings the "fortress" against outside and unacceptable
"BUILDINGS DESIGNED FOR MAXIMUM ideas.
EFFICIENCY OF OPERATION DO NOT 5. The net result is a technology that is
ALWAYS LEND THEMSELVES TO OPTIMUM nontechnical and rigidly opposed to the broad
FIRE PROTECTION. BUT IN A BUILDING revisions necessary to bring it in line with
WHERE FIRE PROTECTION HAS BEEN present industrial needs.
SACRIFICED, THE RESULTS OF A FIRE 6. Note that the fault lies with the system, not
CAN BE ZERO EFFICIENCY. SUCH WAS the individual men. The system first forces men
THE CASE DURING A FIRE THAT SWEPT to commit themselves without giving them the
A WAREHOUSE IN BOSTON, MASS., ON help they need in terms of financing, technical
AUGUST 5, 1969 CAUSING DAMAGE support and research. Then, when additional
ESTIMATED AT FIFTEEN MILLION". predictable disasters occur because the true
solutions have not been developed the men who
The implication here is that efficiency is at were forced out on a limb must justify their
variance with fire protection; that one is gained at past conclusions. Who can blame them for not
sacrifice of the other. But why must this be so? researching their own errors.
Why not ask ourselves two questions? First, "what 7. Today we have fire investigations and some
is there about efficiency that conflicts with fire limited fire research. But, the bulk of the
safety?" And then, the more important question, responsibility for the advancement of fire
"what changes are needed in protection to protection is in the hands of those who are least
compensate for those changes that came into being able to make the sweeping changes so necessary.
in recent years to improve efficiency, so that an I have seen too much research that is geared
adequate level of fire safety may be toward justifying the status quo.
re-established?" This, of course, implies that fire
protection must change as industry changes, and It is said that we only learn about fire through
there are many who are not prepared to accept this suffering disasters. The pity of the present
conclusion. situation is: WE ARE HAVING DISASTERS, BUT
ARE NOT LEARNING FROM THEM.
Why is this so? Why is it that when disasters occur
the investigators often close their eyes to The correction of the conditions that caused urban
conditions that clearly indicate changes are needed, conflagration of the 19th and early 20th centuries
and instead concentrate on finding "deficiencies" took a very long time, and much human suffering.
— They look thru innumerable requirements until It seems, we have an even rougher road to travel in
they find sonic that were not complied with. The regard to industrial conflagrations. So far, some
existence of "deficiencies", regardless of their really tremendous holocausts over a thirty year
pertinence, "proves" the wisdom of existing period have produced only minimum changes in
concepts. Why this policy? These are the reasons: basic fire concepts. But don't give up, the
I. Fire regulations often come into existence REALLY BIG FIRES ARE YET TO COME!
like a shot gun wedding, they develope under
In my next newsletter I will delve deeper into the
the pressure of an accident. Committees are
charged with a responsibility to develope changes that have come about in industry, the way
solutions. in which these changes effect protection, and some
2. Usually, funds for adequate investigations of the basic changes that are needed to bring fire
and research are not available. Being unable to protection closer to present day needs.
thoroughly investigate the circumstances of the
