READING MATERIAL

Centeno vs. Villaon-Pornillos

Martin
Centeno
vs.
Hon.
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994
Regalado, J.:

religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it

would not have so stated expressly.
Victoria

Villaon-Pornillos

Facts: Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization
known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive
for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente
Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and
solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00.
An information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together
with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of
Malolos.
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to
solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes with the
submission, inter alia, that the term religious purpose is not expressly
included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it
excludes.
Issue: Whether the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its
broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.
Held: No. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This
rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in
a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes,
treat the words charitable and religious separately and independently of
each other. Thus, the word charitable is only one of three descriptive words
used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that
charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings,
and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out charitable and
religious in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely
stated charitable or public welfare purposes, only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for

1 | Page

REPUBLIC vs. LIM

GR no. 161656, June 29, 2005
FACTS: In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation
of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military
reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name
of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB
then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its
Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as
just compensation. The Denzons appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on
March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports
Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the
matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed
willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961,
the Denzons successors-in-interest, Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the
same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the
Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.
On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of
Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the
National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939
upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza
and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as
such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of
P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the
annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in
favor of the Republic.
They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939,
there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still
ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only
demand the payment of their fair market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to
pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title
was issued in his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the
RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot
with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession.

Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18,
2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ...This is contrary to the rules of
fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but
also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"...
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that
they remain as the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its
failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation
therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14,
1940.
HELD: One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no
person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and
in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must
be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. 7
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The
Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay
respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and
939.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is
contrary to the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry
to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has
been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party
may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to
pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as
"reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not
comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts
mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that
all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the
government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the
occasion demands, however from the taking of private property by the
government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied
promise to compensate the owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932
when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more
than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be
no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator.

2 | Page

SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two

stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The
second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the
completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the
process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the
failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a
period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case
entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the
Republic.
While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the
expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to
recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government,
whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate
the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount
to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a
reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just."
Unson v. Lacson
G.R. No. L-7909 January 18, 1957
Facts:
Petitioner, Cipriano E. Unson, is the owner of Lot No. 10, Block 2537,
of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila. It is bounded, on the East or
Northeast, by Lot No. 12, belonging to Genato, and, also, running eastward
known as Lot No. 1, which the City of Manila regards as its patrimonial
property; and on the South or Southeast, running from East to West, known as
Lot No. 9, which is also claimed by said City as its patrimonial property.
Immediately south of this Lot No. 9 is the Northern half of Callejon del Carmen,
which is separated from its Southern half by the Estro de San Sebastian.
Several structures exist on the lot of petitioner Unson. There is a sizeable
building on the Northern part, adjoining R. Hidalgo Street, and a small building
known as "Commerce Building" on the Southern portion, which adjoins
the Lot No. 9. On or about September 28, 1951, the Municipal Board of Manila
passed Ordinance No. 3470 withdrawing said Northern portion of Callejon del
Carmen from public use, declaring it patrimonial property of the City and
authorizing its lease to Genato. Upon approval of this ordinance by the City

Mayor, the lease contract therein mentioned was entered into and Genato
constructed a building on said portion of Callejon del Carmen of Lot No. 9.
Petitioner alleged that Ordinance No. 3470 and the aforementioned contract of
lease with Genato are illegal.
Issue:
W/N the City of Manila is granted with the power to close Callejon del Carmen
Ruling:
No. Respondents have been unable to cite any legal provision specifically
vesting in the City of Manila the power to close Callejon del Carmen. Indeed,
section 18 (x) of Republic Act No. 409 upon which appellees rely
authorizes the Municipal Board of Manila, "subject to the provisions of existing
laws, to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement . . . of streets,
avenues, alleys . . . and other public places," but it says nothing about the
closing of any such places. The significance of this silence becomes apparent
when contrasted with section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code,
explicitly vesting in municipal councils of regularly organized municipalities the
power to close any municipal road, street, alley, park or square, provided that
persons prejudiced thereby are duly indemnified, and that the previous
approval of the Department Head shall have been secured. The express grant
of such power to the municipalities and the absence of said grant to the City of
Manila lead to no other conclusion than that the power was intended to be
withheld from the latter.
Republic of the Philippines v. Provincial Governor
G.R. No. L-28055 October 30, 1967
Facts:
In 1964 the provincial board of Cavite passed Resolution 27 creating a
Department of Safety "to be manned by trained technicians and investigators
who shall be agents of a person in authority (the Provincial Governor)" and
authorizing the appropriation of funds for its operation. The resolution did not
define the powers and functions of the department.
The administrative order of the respondent Governor defined the
general purposes, powers and functions of the Cavite department which is to
insure the safety of residents of Cavite and the well-being of both public and
private interests therein.
Thereafter the respondent Governor appointed the other respondents
as public safety officers, making them his special agents. On September 20,
1967 the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Government, filed a petition for quo
warranto, assailing the legality of the Department of Public Safety on the
ground that the province of Cavite has no authority to create public officers with
police functions. It is alleged that despite the demand of the President of the
Philippines the respondent Governor and the members of the provincial board

3 | Page

of Cavite have refused to dissolve and disband the public safety department,
and that the exercise of police functions by the agency "affects the lives and
liberties" of the people.
Issue:
W/N provincial government has the power, by necessary implication from
certain express powers granted to it, to create a provincial police force, the
parties admitting that there is no express or explicit statutory grant of power
Ruling:
No. As a rule of interpretation, Section 12(1) (2) of the Local Autonomy Act
does not purport to supply power where none exists, not even by necessary
implication. Here the power to create a provincial police force appears to be
denied to provincial governments. Thus, whereas Section 2105(c) of the
Revised Administrative Code gives them the power to appropriate money "for
the organization, equipment and maintenance of a police force in any
municipality or municipal district of the province where local funds are
insufficient to bear such expenses," nothing is said of their power to provide for
the organization of their own police. Again, while cities and municipalities are
authorized to provide uniforms for their police forces no such authority is
conferred on provinces. Section 2081 cannot be invoked because that
provision authorizes the appointment of subordinate employees in existing
offices, not the creation of the offices themselves.
Indeed, municipal offices can be created only by legislative authority. In the
Philippines, national and local police bodies are directly created by express
statutory enactment. Thus the Philippine Constabulary was constituted as a
national police force by virtue of a statute. So is the organization of police
forces in cities and municipalities specifically provided for by an Act of
Congress. Even the formation of posses comitatus in towns to assist the police
in the apprehension of criminals is a matter of express statutory
enactment. The lack of statutory basis for the creation of provincial police
forces is because the Governors are already clothed with ample powers and
resources. They can temporarily transfer policemen from one municipality to
another when public interest so requires. It seems quite clear that the
legislature intended to reserve for itself the field of legislation on this matter and
thereby exclude from it like actions by local governments.
Neither can the existence of such bodies be implied from the fact that
in prescribing the qualifications of members of local police agencies, section 9
of the Police Act of 1966 mentions "provincial police agencies" and the like.
In fact, the term is used in other legislation before the enactment of the
Police Act of 1966 and it has always been understood to refer to provincial
guards assigned to provincial jails. Since a municipal office can be created only
by legislative authority exercised either directly or through a grant of the power
to Municipal Corporation, the power of provinces to create provincial police
forces cannot be inferred.

Upon all the foregoing, it follows ineluctably that the creation of the Cavite
Department of Public Safety is an unlawful exercise of power, and is without
basis in law.
ACCORDINGLY, Resolution 27, dated January 27, 1964, of the
Provincial Board of Cavite and Administrative Order 65-1 of the respondentGovernor dated March 1, 1965 are declared void, the Cavite Department of
Public Safety is ordered dissolved, and the respondent public safety officers
are ousted from their positions. No pronouncement as to costs.
Arsenio Lacson vs Mariano Roque
Facts: The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly
defamatory and libelous utterances against a certain judge (Judge Montesa).
Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson. A special prosecutor was
assigned to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension of
Lacson to the President. The President, through acting Executive Secretary
Mariano Roque, issued a suspension order against Lacson.
Issue:
Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his post.
Ruling:
No. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President
sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. It is true that the President
shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments, but
supervision does not contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers
are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
construction subject to constitutional limitations
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in
section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done conformably
to law; and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he may at any
time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the
Government of the Philippines. Again, this power of removal must be
exercised conformably to law, in this case, the allege libelous act of Lacson
cannot be considered as disloyalty.
Echavez v. Dozen Construction and Development Corp.
G.R. No. 192916, October 11, 2010
Facts:
Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City,
which includes Lot No. 1956-A and Lot No. 1959. On September 7, 1985,

4 | Page

Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel)

through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor
of Dozen Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In
October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same
properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.
On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Manuel filed a petition to approve
Vicentes donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the
contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation.
Issue:
Whether or not the rule on substantial compliance in the construction of a will
valid?
Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuels petition to approve the
donation and his action for annulment of the contracts of sale. The RTC found
that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after
Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the
donation. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held
that since the donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa,
compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been
observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an
attestation clause and was therefore void.
The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the
formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills,4 "otherwise, the donation
is void and would produce no effect." 5 Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code
should have been applied.
That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two
separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively)
indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different
purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring
before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other
hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses
themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to
the manner of its execution.81avvphi1
Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the
Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal
the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the execution of a
decedents will. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of
Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses
themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the
Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.