You are on page 1of 9

CRIM PRO

Title
BABALA vs. ABAÑO

RULE 127 - PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
G.R. No. L-4600
Date: February 28, 1952
Ponente: PARAS, C.J.

PEDRO BABALA - Petitioners
FACTS
a
1.

MAXIMINO ABAÑO, ET AL. - Respondent.

Consequent upon a dispute over a market stall, an information for grave coercion was filed on January 26, 1951, in the CFI-Camarines
Norte, against petitioner Pedro Babala, at the instance of private respondent Patricio Canela.

2.

On the same date, respondent Canela filed in said court a civil action against petitioner Babala, for damages based on the same facts
alleged in the information for grave coercion, in which action respondent Canela prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.

3.

In the civil case, the petitioner insisted that the criminal case should have precedence, the CFI-Camarines Norte, however, issued an
order dated February 6, 1951, providing that the trial of the civil case upon the merits was suspended until after the criminal case
shall have been decided and terminated, but that the hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction might be proceeded with.

4.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was instituted by the petitioner to set aside this order arguing that the
criminal case suspended the trial of the civil case, including the matter of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE
Whether or not the criminal case suspended the trial of the civil case, including the matter of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction
RATIO
Petitioner's contention is unfounded. In the case of Ramcar, Inc., vs. De Leon, we have already ruled that, although the civil action is
suspended until final judgment in the criminal case, the court is not thereby deprived of its authority to issue
preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as preliminary injunction, attachment, appointment of receiver, fixing amounts of
bonds, and other processes of similar nature which do not go into the merits of the case. It was reasoned out that "if
those ancillary processes cannot be resorted to during the suspension, there is no sense in the rule providing only for suspension, when its
effect is to kill the action."
RULING
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Notes
2-S 2016-17 (SUMANQUI)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1952/feb1952/gr_l-4600_1952.html

CRIMPRO
Title
Santos Jr. vs Flores
G.R. Nos. L-18251 and L-18252
IRINEO SANTOS, JR., ANTONIO PINEDA, BENITO PUZON, VIRGILIO
ELAYDA, GRACIANO ABAD, BERNARDINO TORRIJOS, VIRGILIO MICLAT
AND MARINO REYES, petitioners,
G.R. Nos. L-18256 and L-18260
LORENTINO B. MOLINYAWE, petitioner,

RULE 126
G.R. Nos. L-18251 and L-18252
G.R. Nos. L-18256 and L-18260
Date: August 31, 1962
CONCEPCION, J. :
HON. JOSE P. FLORES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union; ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, RUFINO MARASIGAN and PEDRO
OFIANA, respondents.

HON. JOSE P. FLORES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union; ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, RUFINO MARASIGAN and PEDRO
OFIANA, respondent.
These cases are interrelated. The petitioners in L-18251 and L-18252 are Irineo Santos, Jr., Antonio Pineda, Benito Puzon, Virgilio Elayda,
Graciano Abad, Bernardino Torrijos, Virgilio Miclat and Marino Reyes, whereas Florentino B. Molinyawe is the sole petitioner in G.R. Nos. L-18256
and L-18260. The respondents in these four (4) cases, are identical, namely, Hon. Jose P. Flores, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union and Alejandro Sebastian, Rufino Marasigan and Pedro Ofiana.
FACTS
On November 27, 1959, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 185, directing respondent Alejandro Sebastian, aside from
Isidro Vejunco and Meneleo Mesina, "to assist the provincial fiscal of La Union and other provincial and city fiscals and attorneys in the
investigation and prosecution of the alleged ACCFA's (Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration) and CCE (Central
Cooperative Exchange) fraudulent tobacco deals". Thereupon, respondents Rufino Marasigan and Pedro Ofiana, as provincial fiscal and assistant
provincial fiscal, respectively, of La Union, together with respondent Sebastian (prosecutors), seized ACCFA and CCE records of tobacco
purchases and redrying, sealed the ACCFA warehouses in the redrying plant in Agoo, La Union, where the tobacco purchased in 1959 were

stored, and conducted ex parte the investigation by taking down the testimony of witnesses, and examining, with the assistance of tobacco
experts, the confiscated tobacco, a considerable amount of which turned oat to be native tobacco, although purchased and based off, as well
as paid for, as Virginia tobacco, aside from a size-able quantity of low grade Virginia tobacco purchased as high grade tobacco and paid for at
the price fixed by law for said high grade tobacco. After ascertaining the names of the persons involved in said tobacco deals, hereinafter
referred to as defendants, the prosecutors prepared corresponding informations; against them. The prosecutors decided that all of the
defendants be given opportunity to give their side of the matter, after demand by the defendants to the. Hence, the prosecutors sent to said
defendants, including petitioners herein, a notice, dated March 23, 1960, informing them that the former would conduct a preliminary
investigation (PI), "on March 20 — April 2, 1960, at 8:30 a.m., in the office of the Provincial Fiscal, San Fernando, La Union." The notice was
received by Molinyawe.
When the PI began, the prosecutors announced that their purpose was merely to hear the side of the defense and to receive its evidence,
because that introduced at the previous inquiry had already been found to be sufficient to justify the filing of the corresponding informations.
Counsel for petitioners in these four (4) cases then asked that they be informed of the particulars of the charges against them and allowed to
examine the records of the ex parte investigation, and the evidence introduced therein, as well as to cross-examine that witnesses who had
testified on said occasion. Acting upon this request, the prosecutors caused the draft of the informations prepared by them — which are
substantially identical to those eventually filed in court — to be read to petitioners herein. The latter were not allowed to examine the records
of the ex parte investigation, particularly the affidavits made by said witnesses, but the documentary evidence, consisting of records of the
ACCFA and the CCE, were placed at their disposal for two (2) days. Moreover, the prosecutors refused to recall said witnesses for crossexamination by petitioners, who protested against the procedure being followed by said prosecutors and announced that they (petitioners)
would have nothing to do with the proceedings. The prosecutors then gave petitioners herein up to April 5, 1960 to take up the matter with
the Supreme Court, whereupon petitioners and other defendants walked out of the room in which the investigation was being held and did not
attend further hearings. This notwithstanding the investigation continued, with respect to other defendants, from March 29 to April 6, 1960,
during which period the testimony of around 80 defendants and their witnesses was taken.
Thereafter, or on May 16, 1960, two (2) informations, one for malversation of public funds with falsification of public and official documents,
and another for malversation of public funds, were filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union and docketed therein as Criminal Cases
Nos. 2996 and 2997, thereof, against 61 and 48 persons, respectively, including, in both cases, petitioners herein. The informations were
amended, dropping 31 and 6 defendants, respectively, not including petitioners
Meanwhile, on motion of respondents Sebastian and Marasigan, dated May 17, 1960, writs of preliminary attachment
of the properties of the defendants in said criminal cases were issued on May 27, 1960. Said defendants sought the
dissolution of said writs, which was denied by respondent Hon. Jose P. Flores, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, on June 28, 1960. The arraignment of the defendants having subsequently been set for
November 21, 1960, petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-18251 and L-18252 moved to quash the amended informations.
Prior thereto, or on November 5, 1960, the Government had instituted Civil Case No. 6279 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, against several defendants, including herein petitioner, Florentino Molinyawe, for forfeiture of
property allegedly acquired by him, during his incumbency, in an amount out of proportion to his lawful income, as a
public official, in violation of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law). Thereupon, or on November 16, 1960,
Molinyawe moved to quash the informations in the aforesaid Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997, relying not only
upon the grounds invoked by petitioners in said cases G.R. Nos. L-18251 and L-18252, but, also, upon said Republic
Act No. 1379.
The motions to quash these two (2) sets of defendants were denied by respondent Judge on March 13, 1961. Soon, thereafter, or on March
17, 1961, petitioners were notified that their arraignment would take place on April 4, 1961. Thereupon, Irineo Santos, Jr., Antonio Pineda,
Benito Puzon, Virgilio Elayda, Graciano Abad, Bernardino Torrijos, Virgilio Miclat and Marino Reyes, instituted Cases G.R. Nos. L-18251 and L18252 of this Court. The next day, Molinyawe commenced Cases G.R. Nos. L-18256 and L-18260.
These four (4) cases are for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus, with preliminary injunction to restrain the respondents, their associates,
representatives, delegates, subordinates, substitutes and all other persons acting by or under their direction or in cooperation with them, from
further proceeding in said Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997 and from enforcing the orders and writs of attachment issued therein, as well as
from doing any act tending directly or indirectly to render ineffectual whatever judgment may be rendered by this Court. Petitioners pray, also,
that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered, annulling the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutors and the proceedings
relative to the filing of the informations and to the issuance of the writs of preliminary attachment, declaring that respondent Judge has no
jurisdiction. Furthermore, petitioner Molinyawe prays that he be declared, pursuant to section 8 of Republic Act No. 1379, immune from further
prosecution in the aforementioned criminal cases, by reason of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6379 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against him, and that respondents herein be commanded to "forever desist from prosecuting" him "for any transaction, matter or thing he is
compelled to explain in said Civil Case No. 6379".
ISSUE/S
The main issues, common to these four (4) cases, are:
(1) Whether petitioner are entitled, as a matter of right, to examine the affidavits of the witnesses who appeared before the prosecutors in
the course of the investigation conducted by them prior to March 28, 1960, and to cross-examine said witnesses – NO (I don’t know if this is
related)
(2) Whether the writs of preliminary attachment, should be dissolved or annulled, owing to the alleged insufficiency of the affidavit submitted
by the prosecution in said cases in support of its motion for the issuance in said writs. -- NO
RATIO

1) The first issue hinges on the proper interpretation and construction of section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, the
pertinent part of which reads:
A provincial fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal and a special counsel appointed under section 1686 of this Code shall have authority
to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or
made against persons charged with the commission of the same. If the offense charged falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance, the defendant shall not be entitled as a matter of right to preliminary investigation in any case, where the
provincial fiscal himself, or an assistant provincial fiscal, or a special counsel, after due investigation of the facts made in the
presence of the accused if the latter so requested, shall have presented an information against him in proper form and certified
under oath by the said provincial fiscal or assistant provincial fiscal or special counsel that he conducted a proper preliminary
investigation. To this end, he may, with due notice to the accused, summon reputed witnesses and require them to appear before
him and testify and be cross-examined under oath by the accused upon the latter's request. The attendance or evidence of absent
or recalcitrant witnesses who may be summoned or whose testimony may be required by the provincial fiscal, or assistant provincial
fiscal, or special counsel under the authority herein conferred shall be enforced by proper process upon application to be made by
the provincial fiscal, or assistant provincial fiscal, or special counsel to any Judge of First Instance of the Judicial District. But no
witness summoned to testify under this section shall be compelled to give testimony to incriminate himself.
At the outset, it will be recalled that, prior to the preliminary investigation held on March 29, 1960 and subsequent dates, the prosecutors had
made an investigation of the facts pertinent to the malversation of public funds and falsification of public and official documents which, later
on, became the subject matter of Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997. Had the prosecutors filed the informations therein relying exclusively
upon the evidence obtained in said previous investigation, there would have been no possible doubt that petitioners herein would not be
entitled to examine the sworn statements aforementioned and to cross-examine the makers thereof, for the provision above quoted explicitly
declares that "the defendant shall not be entitled as a matter of right to preliminary investigation". His right, under said provision, to be
present to the investigation conducted by the prosecutor and to cross-examine the witnesses who may appear before the latter, is conditioned
upon the existence of a "request", which must, perforce, precede said investigation by the prosecutor. There had been no such request by
herein petitioners before March 29, 1960. The request made by them on that date did not impose upon the prosecutors the mandatory duty
to disclose the details of the evidence introduced, and to recall the witnesses who had testified, prior thereto. This was a matter entirely
within the sound discretion of the prosecutors, who, we find, had acted within the proper bounds thereof.
It should be noted, also, that the prosecutors considered the evidence and facts gathered by them prior to March 29, 1960 as sufficient to
warrant the filing of the corresponding informations, which were, accordingly, prepared by them, and that the institution of the corresponding
criminal actions was deferred at the behest merely of some of the prospective defendants, who had asked that their respective sides be
heard before the filing of said informations. For this reason, the notice sent to herein petitioners and other defendants advised them that the
evidence introduced in the previous inquiry "constitutes a prima facie case against you and unless overcome justifies your inclusion in the
information to be filed in court". This notice did not have the effect of revoking or annulling the investigation previously conducted by the
prosecutors. It gave petitioners herein no other right than that to give their side of the case, if they wanted to. It did not entitle them to
examine the sworn statements taken at said previous inquiry or to cross-examine the respective affiants. By giving to petitioners the gist of
the evidence secured at said previous investigation and placing at their disposal the documentary evidence then taken, consisting of records of
the ACCFA and the CCE, the prosecutors had complied with the letter and spirit of section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, and satisfied the demands of justice and due process.
2) Petitioners insist that the writs of preliminary attachment above mentioned were illegally issued and that the same should be, either
dissolved, or annulled, upon the following grounds, namely: (a) the motion for the issuance of said writs was filed by respondent Alejandro
Sebastian, who, petitioners aver, has no personality to filled said motion, the offended party being the ACCFA; (b) the motion was sworn to by
said respondent, who, it is urged, has no personal knowledge of the truth of the allegations of fact made in said motion.
We find no merit in this pretense. As one of the official prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997, respondent Sebastian has the
authority to apply for such remedies as may be necessary to protect the interest of the offended party in said cases, particularly considering
that the corresponding civil liability of the culprits is to be determined therein, no reservation having been made of the right to enforce it in a
separate civil action. Again, respondent Sebastian alleged specifically in the aforesaid motion that he "personally" knew the facts of these
cases. Although he explained this knowledge by adding that he had "conducted personally the preliminary investigation of the same", it does
not follow that his aforesaid knowledge is hearsay in nature. In this connection, we must not overlook the fact that the main issues in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997 were: (a) whether native tobacco had been purchased, passed off and paid for as Virginia Tobacco; (b) whether
low grade tobacco were purchased as high grade tobacco and paid for at the price, fixed by law for such high grade tobacco; and (c) whether
the public and official records of said purchases had been falsified, and, in the affirmative, by whom. The nature of these issues is such that
the determination thereof depends principally upon the contents of said records and the stock found in the warehouse in which the tobacco
purchased had been stored, of which respondent Sebastian could have, and seemingly had, personal knowledge.
As indicated above, petitioner Molinyawe maintains that Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997 should be dismissed, insofar as he is concerned,
and respondents should be re-strained from further prosecution in said cases, in view of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6379 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for forfeiture of property allegedly acquired by him in violation of Republic Act No. 1379, section 8 of which reads:
Neither the respondent nor any other person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda and other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of
him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from

prosecution and conviction for perjury or false testimony committed in so testifying or from administrative proceedings.
Pursuant to this provision, "no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of a transaction, matter or thing concerning which he
is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise ...". The
records before us do not show that he has already testified or produced evidence in Civil Case No. 6379. Much less do said records indicate
the nature of said testimony or evidence, and, consequently, its bearing, if any, on the criminal cases referred to above. Indeed, not even
copies of the pertinent pleadings in said Civil Case No. 6379 have been attached to said records. Hence, we are not in a position to determine
the applicability of said section 8 of Republic Act No. 1379 to the aforementioned criminal cases.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these four (4) cases are denied and said cases are hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered.
2S 2016-17 (TAN)

CRIMPRO

Rule 127 (Provisional Remedies in Criminal Cases)

Title
Orbetta vs. Sotto
JUAN L. ORBETA, petitioner

GR No. 39562
Date: September 27, 1933
Ponente: HULL, J.
FILEMON SOTTO, ET AL., respondents

Original petition for certiorari. The petitioner has been convicted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu of the crime of arson and in addition to a
sentence for the crime has been held to indemnify respondent Sotto in the sum of P40,000. From this sentence, Orbeta has appealed to this
court.
FACTS
1.
2.
3.
4.

The petitioner has been convicted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu of the crime of arson and in addition to a sentence for the
crime has been held to indemnify respondent Sotto in the sum of P40,000.
After appeal, Sotto brought a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the sum of P40,000 based on the same acts for
the value of the identical property, that forms the basis of the criminal prosecution.
At the time of bringing the civil action a writ of attachment was granted, and the motion to discharge attachment has been
denied.
In this proceeding, we are asked to pass upon the validity of the attachment, and if it is found to be improperly or irregularly
issued, to discharge the attachment.

ISSUE/S
W/N the writ of attachment is valid.
RATIO
Articles 112 and 114 of the Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure are applicable to this case. They read as follows:
ART. 112. When the criminal action is instituted, the civil action shall be deemed included therein, unless the party injured or prejudiced waives
it, or expressly reserves it to be brought after the criminal action has been decided, should it lie.
If only the civil action arising from one of those crimes which cannot be prosecuted save upon private complaint is instituted, the criminal action
shall forthwith be extinguished.
ART. 114. Upon the institution of criminal proceedings for a felony or misdemeanor, no civil suit on the same act shall be prosecuted; and should
it have been instituted, it shall be suspended, pending final judgment in the criminal case.
It shall not be necessary for the prosecution of the criminal action that the civil suit arising from the same felony or misdemeanor should have
been previously instituted.
The civil responsibility of Orbeta to Sotto will be decided in the criminal proceedings. If the conviction is upheld, an indemnity will be awarded.
If Orbeta is finally acquitted, no civil responsibility for his alleged crime exists. The Almeida case aforecited, like this, grew out of a case of arson
and holds that the civil liabilities of the accused were settled by the criminal prosecution. Therefore civil proceedings instituted contrary to the
provisions of the Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure above quoted, are without force and effect. An attachment issued in the course of such an
improper proceeding must be vacated, as one of the requirements before an order of attachment can issue under section 426 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is "that a sufficient cause of action exists".
RULING
Writ granted. Costs against respondent Sotto. So ordered.
Guys, eto na yung full text mismo. Inayos ko lang yung timeline. Sobrang ikli nung full text. FYI.
2S 2016-17 (ALFARO)

CRIM PRO
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
vs.
JUAN MORENO, defendant-appellant.

Rule 127
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

GR No. 41036
Date: September 27, 1934
Ponente: AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
JUAN MORENO, defendant-appellant.

In this instance, the widow of the deceased filed a petition for the attachment of the property of the appellant alleging
that he is about to dispose, if he has not already disposed of his property, with intent to defraud his creditors and,
particularly so, in case the appealed judgment is affirmed, the heirs of the deceased will be unable to collect any of the indemnity awarded
them.
FACTS
Case timeline for better appreciation:
1. August 17, 1933 - the defendant and Aurelio Lee came to Manila from San Pedro Makati in the defendant's automobile. On the way they
stopped at a Chinese store in Tejeron Street to drink some gin. From there they went to the San Lazaro Jockey Club, and then to the house of
the Pabalan brothers, where Fabian Pabalan joined them, and the three went to the Bureau of Labor to get Eulogio Pabalan. While they were
waiting for the latter, the defendant remained in the automobile and went to sleep. As the defendant was still asleep when they were ready to
start, Aurelio Lee drove the automobile until they reached Sañgandaan, Caloocan, when he was relieved by the defendant. Eulogio Pabalan was
seated on the left side of the automobile and Aurelio Lee between him and the defendant. Fabian Pabalan was in the rumble seat. As soon as
the defendant took the wheel, he began to drive very fast, and the course of the automobile was crooked. The companions of the accused
protested and told him to stop the automobile and let them go out, but he did not heed their request. The defendant continued to drive in a
reckless manner, and in going around a curve leading to a concrete bridge in Meycauayan he violently struck the railing of the bridge and crushed
the left side of the automobile. Eulogio Pabalan received injuries from which he died the same day. Fabian Pabalan and Aurelio Lee were also
injured. (Facts from G.R. No. L-41036-B, October 10, 1934)
2. The appellant was charged with the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. He was found
guilty and sentenced to one year and one day of prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not a petition for attachment of property of accused be a remedy under the criminal procedure – NO
RATIO
In the case of United States vs. Namit (38 Phil., 926), this court held that the
Spanish system of criminal procedure was abrogated upon the
perpetuated by the reservation contained in section 107 of this
was rendered in 1918 and had been adopted even prior thereto, from the time
reason to alter it.

remedy of attachment which was available under the
adoption of General Orders, No. 58 , and was no
law. This ruling has been followed from the time this decision
General Orders, No. 58 went into effect, and this court sees no

General Orders, No. 58 which is the law of criminal procedure in force, contains no provision relative to attachment of the property of an
accused in a criminal case.
We cannot resort to the law of civil procedure in force, simply because it is for civil cases. Furthermore, it would be impracticable in a criminal
action. Section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that before the order of attachment is made the party applying for it must execute
to the defendant an obligation in an amount to be fixed by the judge, or justice of the peace issuing it, with sufficient surety for an amount not
exceeding that claimed by the plaintiff. In the case there is no basis for fixing the bond inasmuch as the information neither contains nor states
the amount of the appellant's civil liability. It is true that under the circumstances in the which the petition for attachment has been filed,
judgment had already been entered against the appellant fixing his civil liability at P1,000. However, this does not solve the difficulty inasmuch
as under the terms by which the order of attachment is granted by the law of civil procedure, should such attachment lie in a criminal action,
the same might be issued at any stage of the proceedings and not only after judgment is rendered in the first instance.
Furthermore, the offended party in a criminal case may bring a civil action independently before the criminal action is
instituted, or after the latter has been instituted, he may reserve his right to bring a civil action independently
thereof if he desires to avail himself of the remedies afforded by the law of civil procedure. If he does not do so and
prefers to include his civil action in the criminal action brought by the Government, he should accept all the protection afforded by the criminal
procedure and nothing more. He cannot bring to the criminal action the means which might have been used in the civil action which he has
abandoned.
RULING
For these considerations, the petition is denied. So ordered.
2S 2016-17 (BALLUNGAY)

CRIM PRO

RULE 127

Title
Ramcar, Incorprated v. De Leon
RAMCAR, INCORPORATED, Petitioner

G.R. No. L-1329
May 15, 1947
PERFECTO, J.
DIONISIO DE LEON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, ET
AL., Respondents

DOCTRINE: When no civil action is expressly instituted, according to subsection (a) of section 1 of Rule 107, it shall be impliedly jointly
"instituted with the criminal action." That means as if two actions are joined in one as twins, each one complete with the same completeness as
any of the two normal persons composing a twin. It means that the civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes
provided by law.
FACTS
December 26, 1946: Ramcar initiated a civil action against Francisco, Tread Jr. and Lloret by filinf a complaint for damages with the CFI Manila
for his stolen taxicab. He alleges that it was stolen from his parking place on December 2, 1946, and after many days of fruitless search, he
made an offer of P500 through the newspapers to anyone who could point to its whereabouts. The said car, already in dismantled condition, was
found in and recovered from the possession of defendants, who confessed to the representative of Ramcar and the police authorities as being
the authors of the theft of said car and of dismantling it to pieces, making it completely unserviceable and a total loss. In support of the
petition for the issuance of a writ of attachment, Ramcar alleged that defendants were concealing their properties and were about to dispose of
them with intent of defrauding their creditors, including Ramcar. Two days later, an information for theft was filed against the defendants.
January 2, 1947: After Ramcar had filed a bond in the amount of P5,000, a writ of attachment was issued against the properties of defendants.
January 14: Defendant Francisco filed a petition praying for the dismissal of the complaint and for the setting aside of the writ of attachment.
January 27: Defendant Tread Jr. moved for the suspension of the time within which to file a responsive pleading to the complaint and to
dissolve the writ of attachment.
January 30: Judge De Leon issued an order denying the dismissal of the complaint prayed for by Francisco, but granted its petition to set aside
the writ of attachment against him.
February 3: Judge De Leon granted the petition of Tread Jr., dated January 27.
February 20: Judge De Leon denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Ramcar who, consequently, filed with the Supreme Court the petition
which is now under our consideration, praying that the orders of Judge De Leon of January 30 and February 3 and 20, be declared null and void
and that the writ of attachment of January 2, 1947, be declared valid and in force.
Judge De Leon set aside the writ of attachment of January 2, 1947, upon the theory that it was improperly issued because at the time of its
issuance the information in the criminal case had already been filed, the theory being based on the lower court's interpretation of Section 1 of
Rule 107.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the writ of attachment of January 2, 1947 shall be maintained. –YES
RATIO
SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. — Except as otherwise provided by law, the following rules shall be observed:
a.

When a criminal action is instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately;

b.

Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

c.

After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted; and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;

xxx
From the provisions of Rule 107 it is clear that, unless there is a waiver of civil action or reserve of the right to initiate it expressly, criminal
action always carries the civil action for recovery of liability arising from the offense charged; that when criminal action has been commenced
before the civil action, the latter cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the former; that when the civil action has been
commenced before the criminal action, the former shall be suspended upon the institution of the latter and until final judgment is rendered in
the same; that, generally, extinction of the criminal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil; and that final judgment rendered in a civil
action in absolving defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.

Under subsection (c) of Rule 107 enjoining that no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted after a criminal action has been
commenced, and if the civil action has been instituted before the criminal, it "shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered," the Court in which the civil action i8 pending is, after the filing of the information in the
criminal case not ipso facto deprived of the power to issue a preliminary writ of attachment, a process which does not go into the merits of the
case.
When no civil action is expressly instituted, according to subsection (a) of section 1 of Rule 107, it shall be impliedly jointly "instituted with the
criminal action." That means as if two actions are joined in one as twins, each one complete with the same completeness as any of the two
normal persons composing a twin. It means that the civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes provided by law.
Such was the idea of the Supreme Court in United States vs. Heery (25 Phil., 600). There, besides affirming the criminal judgment rendered
therein, it ordered the record returned to the lower court "for the further purpose of completing the civil branch of the case." Therefore, within
the criminal action, with which the civil action is "impliedly instituted," the offended party may obtain the preliminary writ of attachment.
The orders of the respondent judge dated January 30 and February 3, 1947, having been issued upon a wrong interpretation of subsection (c)
of section 1 of Rule 107, and no intimation to the contrary having been made, we should assume that, without said wrong interpretation, the
writ of attachment was issued because the plaintiff was, under the facts and the law, entitled to its issuance, and that there was the duty of
the lower court to issue it.
RULING
For all the foregoing, the orders of the respondent judge of January 30 and February 3, 1947, are set aside, and the writ of attachment of
January 2, 1947, is maintained, unless and until lifted through a proper counter-bond that the defendants may file or for any other reason
recognized by law. Costs shall be taxed against respondents.
2S 2016-2017 (BARAMBANGAN)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1947/may1947/gr_l-1329_1947.html
CRIMPRO

RULE 127

Title

GR No. 144740
Date: August 31, 2005
SECURITY PACIFIC ASSURANCE CORP v. TRIA – INFANTE
Ponente: CHICO - NAZARIO , J.
Security Pacific Assurance Corporation – Petitioner
Hon. Judge Amelia Tria-Infante, People of the Philippines respresented
by Spouses Reynaldo and Zenaida Anzures, and Reynaldo R. Buazon, in
his official capacity as Sheriff IV, RTC Branch 9, Manila – Respondents
Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA declaring that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge in issuing the assailed order dated 31 March 2000
FACTS
Reynaldo Azures filed a complaint in the RTC against Teresita Villaluz for violation of B.P. 22. Anzures then filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Preliminary Attachment praying the pending the hearing on the merits of the case, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment be issued ordering
the Sheriff to attach the properties of Villaluz in accordance with the Rules of Court. The RTC issued a WPA upon Anzures’ posting of a bail
bond in the amount of 2.1M pesos. The Sheriff them attached certain properties of Villaluz and were duly annotated on the corresponding
certificates of title. Villaluz was acquitted of the crime charged but the Court held her to be civilly liable. Vilalluz appealed but the decision was
affirmed.
The case was elevated to the SC and during its pendency, Villaluz posted a counter-bond of 2.5M pesos issued by Security Pacific Assurance
Corporation and also filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. Anzures then moved for
the execution of judgment.
Pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued, Sheriff Reynaldo Buazon tried to serve the Writ of Execution upon Villaluz, but the latter no longer
resided in her given address. Buazon then sent a Notice of Garnishment to Security Pacific Assurance Corporation’s office in Makati, by
virtue of the counter-bond posted by Villaluz with the said corporation but the latter refused to assume its obligation on the counter-bond it
posted on the ground that the bond was not approved by the SC and that the condition by which the bond was issued did not happen.
ISSUE/S
(1) w/n the CA committed an error in affirming the decision of the RTC to allow the execution on the counter-bond issued by Security
Pacific – N0
(2) w/n the CA was correct in ruling that the mere act of posting the counter-bond was sufficient to discharge the attachment on the
property, without the need of the court’s approval of the counter-bond – YES
RATIO
(1) When a judgment which has become executory is returned unsatisfied, the liability of the bond AUTOMATICALLY ATTACHES upon the failure of the
surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefore. A Writ of Execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation
of the bond. Security Pacific contends that although it has a surety agreement with Villaluz, it is one which merely waives its right of excussion. (waiver of
the right to have all properties of the debtor exhausted first before it can be compelled to pay) The counter-bond itself states that the parties JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY BIND THEMSELVES to secure the payment of any judgment that the plaintiff may recover against the defendant in the action. In a
contract of suretyship, the surety agrees to answer directly, primarily, and absolutely to the principal’s debt, default, or miscarriage of another. This means

that the surety is equally bound with the principal regardless of his interest in the obligation or receipt of benefits. Security Pacific therefore cannot deny
liability as a surety.

(2) There are two ways to secure the discharge of an attachment. (1) the party whose property has been attached or a
person appearing on his behalf may post a security as provided by Sec 12 Rule 27; (2) the party whose property is
attached may show that the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly issued. Under the first manner, which is
applicable in this case, THE MERE FILING OF A COUNTER-BOND AS SECURITY DISCHARGES THE ATTACHMENT. This can be gleaned
from the defendant’s bond for the dissolution of attachment which states that Security Pacific as surety, in consideration of the dissolution of the said
attachment, jointly and severally binds itself with petitioner Villaluz for any judgment that may be recovered by private respondent Anzures against petitioner
Villaluz.
RULING
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 June 2000 and 22 August 2000, respectively, are both
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Notes
Section 12, Rule 57:
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counter-bond. After a writ of attachment has been
enforced, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may move for the
discharge of the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The court shall, after due notice and hearing,
order the discharge of the attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the
attaching party with the clerk of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to that fixed by the
court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. But if the attachment is sought to be discharged with respect to
a particular property, the counter-bond shall be equal to the value of that property as determined by the court. In
either case, the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party
may recover in the action. A notice of the deposit shall forthwith be served on the attaching party. Upon the
discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section, the property attached, or the proceeds
of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or to the person
appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should
such counter-bond for any reason be found to be or become insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file
an additional counter-bond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of attachment.
2-S 2016-17 (BUSTAMANTE)
Anacleto Tolentino vs. Jose Carlos
G.R No. 46180
August 30, 1938
Facts:
The fiscal of the City of Baguio filed an information against the petitioner charging him with malversation of public funds in the City of Baguio.
The information alleged that the petitioner being then the postmaster in the post office of Baguio and an official of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and having under his custody public funds in the amount of P23,863.92 and postage stamps valued at P3,197.98, or a total of
P27,061.90, which funds and postage stamps belonged to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and being under the legal duty to keep custody
thereof, account therefor, and return the same in due time to the said Government, willfully, illegally and criminally misappropriated the said
property, failed to account therefor, and took the same for his own use and benefit. The criminal case thus filed against him was docketed under
No. 1602.
The said fiscal filed against the same petitioner civil case No. 643 of the Court of First Instance of Benguet, Mountain Province. The suit had for
its purpose the recovery from the petitioner of the same public funds and postage stamps in the amount of P27,061.90. The complaint alleged
that the petitioner had under his custody the said public funds and postage stamps in his capacity as postmaster of the Baguio post office, that
as such public official he was under a duty to account therefor and to return the same to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, that he was
required to return and deliver the said property but he could not do so because he took and misappropriated the same for his own use and
benefit to the prejudice of its owner. To secure a preliminary attachment of all the property of the petitioner the complaint likewise alleged that
the plaintiff Commonwealth had a good cause of action against the petitioner, that the obligation assumed by the latter was not sufficiently
secured, that the petitioner had misappropriated public property consisting of the money sought to be recovered, and that he had disposed of
his property or was trying to alienate the same to defraud the Commonwealth of the Philippines. At the end of the complaint Conrado Alcaraz,
auditor of the City of Baguio, made a verified statement stating that he had read the allegations of the complaint and that the same were true
according to his best knowledge and belief. In view of the verified petition and allegations of the complaint, the respondent judge issued the writ
of attachment and an officer of the court attached the petitioner's property. The latter moved to dissolve the attachment, but the motion was
denied.
Issue:
The petitioner contends that the writ of attachment thus issued is null and void because: (1) the affidavit in support thereof is insufficient and
fatally defective; (2) the Commonwealth of the Philippines did not file any bond before issuing the attachment, as required by section 427 of

the Code of Civil Procedure; (3) the complaint filed in civil case No. 643 does not state any valid or legal cause of action inasmuch as under its
allegations the action brought, if any, was ex delicto, arising from the crime of malversation of public funds alleged in the information filed in
criminal case No. 1602; and (4) the respondent judge did not acquire jurisdiction, or acted without it, or abused his discretion in issuing the writ
of attachment
Held:
(1) No. The petition for attachment was included in the complaint which was filed, and at the end of the latter appears the verified
statement of the auditor of the City of Baguio wherein he avers that all the allegations of the complaint are true and correct to his
knowledge and belief. No petition or verified statement was filed separately to obtain the attachment. The sworn statement of the
auditor necessarily covered the allegations of the complaint to the effect that the petitioner was a postmaster and public official, that
he had the property described under his custody, that it was his legal duty to account therefor and to return the same to the
Commonwealth, that he refused or he failed to return the same upon demand, that he misappropriated the said property to the
prejudice of its owner, that the value of the property was not sufficiently secured, and that the petitioner had disposed of his property
or was trying to alienate the same in fraud of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
(2) No. Section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that before the issuance of a writ of attachment, the applicant therefor or
any person in his name, should file a bond in favor of the defendant for an amount not less than P400 nor more than the amount of
the claim, answerable for damages in case it is shown that the attachment was obtained illegally or without sufficient cause; but in the
case at bar the one who applied for and obtained the attachment is the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as plaintiff, and under the
theory that the State is always solvent it was not bound to post the required bond and the respondent judge did not exceed his
jurisdiction in exempting it from such requirement.
(3) In the complaint filed in the civil case, it is alleged, as already stated, that the petitioner was a postmaster and public official who had
custody of the property sought to be recovered, charged with the legal duty to return and deliver the same upon demand to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, and that he refused to return and deliver said property when he was required to do so by the
auditor of the City of Baguio. These allegation alone constitute sufficient cause of action under section 633 of the Revised
Administrative Code providing that every officer of the Government of the Philippine Islands whose duties permit or require the
possession or custody of Government funds or property of shall be accountable and directly responsible therefor. It is true that the
complaint sets out allegations which are substantially a reproduction of those in the information for malversation of public funds filed in
the criminal case, but these allegations, in connection with the civil action, are unnecessary and may be overlooked. The complaint
could have been demurred to on the ground of ambiguity because it alleged two different and independent causes of action; but as no
demurrer was interposed and as the complaint was not ordered amended, the Commonwealth mat try to prove and confine itself to
the action ex lege by abandoning the action ex delicto.
(4) The respondent judge had full jurisdiction to issue the attachment applied for in the civil case (section 425 of the Code of Civil
Procedure) and he did not abuse the discretion conferred upon him by law in granting the writ because the plaintiff Commonwealth had
complied with the requirements of sections 424, in connection with 412 and 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
For the foregoing reasons, the writ prayed for is denied, with the costs to the petitioner. So ordered.