YNOT v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

FACTS:
Petitioner transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these were confiscated
by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits
transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a
result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits
of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on
the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority
and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the
outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an
impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of
legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution
wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the
force of law.
ISSUE:
Is the E.O. constitutional?
HOLDING:
The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
RATIO:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the Supreme Court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, Courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential
decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the
grant of legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controversy. In the
due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This
was due to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down a stif command for
all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying
degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due process lest they be
confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.

There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.

There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection
between facts proved and fact presumed. An example is a passport of a person with
a criminal ofense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both
restrains and is restrained by due process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to
626 which prohibits slaughter of carabaos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, it cant be said
that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the
purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not
juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the ofense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of
justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method to
confiscate carabaos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owner was denied the right to be heard or his
defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separation of powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.

ERMITA MALATE V CITY OF MANILA 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

FACTS:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar
Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in
the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00
license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there
was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be
violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,

restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for
being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila violates of the due process clause?
HELD: No. Judgment reversed.
RATIO:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance
set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution.
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of
the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase
"the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from
legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to

meet the due process requirement.

Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power
and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in
fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg.
Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed
purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24
hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of
the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the
sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
afected with public interest.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS CITY OF MANILA JANUARY 20,2009

FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels
and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes
on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution.
The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor
of the City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD:

The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual
liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection
against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that
not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence,
the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a
limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely afected
only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare.

CITY OF MANILA VS JUDGE LAGUIO 455 SCRA 308

FACTS:
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically
prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in
the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill
seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places ofering amusement or
entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as
tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate
motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that
the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to
be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was
an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general
laws.

JMM PROMOTIONS VS CA 260 SCRA 319

FACTS:
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity)
filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which
establishes various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a
new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other
related issuance, principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional
right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual
artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance
of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the
constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction against the orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for
brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court
on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order
denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant.
An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however,
dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals upheld
the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise
of Police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.
RULING:
Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State.
The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as
a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their
conduct affects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to not
disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to
define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to
pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed afects at most the right of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing
or accreditation requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice,
under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades
or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical
exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these
requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process
clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards
no such deprivation exists.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

101 PHIL 155

FACTS:
RA 1180 An Act to Regulate The Retail Business prohibits foreigners and foreign owned
corporations to engage in the retail business/trade in the Philippines. Petitioner assails the
Act contending it violates the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines andChina and is
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 1180 a valid exercise of police power of the State.
HELD:
The court held that RA 1180 is a valid exercise of the police power of the State since such
sovereign power of the State could not be bargained through any Treaty or contract
especially when the intent of such legislation is to remedy a real and actual danger to the
national economy due to the increasing dominance and control of aliens in the retail trade
in the country.

US VS TORIBIO

15 PHIL 85

FACTS:
Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence
sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for
human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the
municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that
he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not given one because the carabao
was not found to be unfit for agricultural work which resulted to appellant to slaughter
said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the
validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for
agricultural work can be slaughtered.

HELD:
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally
conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to
justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be
regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order
the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers
by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased
cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden
buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of
interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the
compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with
contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the
suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling
houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public

require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in
thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere
with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously afected.

VELASCO VS VILLEGAS

FEBRUARY 13,1983

FACTS:
In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of
Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City
of Manila, which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They
contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without
due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police
power
HELD:

NO.

The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondentsappellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are:
(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of
massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely
diferent measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and,
(2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of
separate rooms for massage of customers.
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare
clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice
Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been
given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular

circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is
the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.

AGUSTIN VS EDU

88 SCRA 195

FACT :
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction
No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or
drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle
when it stalls or is disabled. Incompliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner
of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the
compliance thereof. This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent
administrative order are unlawful land unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due
process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order
issued is unconstitutional
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are
deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such
was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction
is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its
premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations that such letter was
issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked
vehicles on the streets and highways.

TAXICAB OPERATORS VS BOT

119 SCRA 597

FACTS:
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs
more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal
protection because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi
industry.
Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and
comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.
ISSUE:

Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is
a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the
safety and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal
protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to
heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from
taxicabs of other places.
Rationale behind exercise of police power
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers
posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

BAUTISTA VS JUINIO

127 SCRA 329

FACTS:
Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction LOI 869 issued in 1979
which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles
during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this
law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista
claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are
heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on
oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who
have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for
the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for
precisely those owned by them fall within such category.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.
HELD:
The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The
classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an afront to reason. The ideal
situation is for the laws benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the afairs of
men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the
idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot
approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into
account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted,
which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely afected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or
at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the
laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all

persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being diferent, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

GANCAYCO VS CITY GOVT OF QUEZON CITY & MMDA

2011

GR 177933 OCTOBER 11,

FACTS:
In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on
March 1956, Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of
arcades for commercial buildings to be constructed. At the outset, it bears emphasis that
at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building
code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of
buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular
ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the
wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line.
Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property
line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In efect, property owners
relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for
their own purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965,
Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his
property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from
constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and
issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject to the condition that upon notice by the City
Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at
his own expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along
EDSA, in consequence, they sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a
portion of his building violated the National Building Code.
Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon
City to prohibit the MMDA from demolishing his property. The RTC rendered its Decision on
30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held that the questioned ordinance was
unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancaycos
375 square meters of property were being taken without compensation for the publics
benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance
violated owners right to equal protection of laws.
MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it
demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila,
thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is
not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.

ISSUES:
1
WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
2

WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

3
WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A PUBLIC
NUISANCE. (4) WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF
JUSTICE GANCAYCO.
RULING:
(1)
To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two
grounds: (1) whether the ordinance takes private property without due process of law and
just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates the equal protection of rights
because it allowed exemptions from its application.
On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of
the ordinance to determine whether or not the ordinance constitutes a taking of private
property without due process of law and just compensation.
The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has
not been attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner
estopped from assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional
question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and
the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for
refusing to allow it to be raised later.
Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on
the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears
emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of
the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the
exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city
engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its diferent treatment
of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper
person to do so.
(2)
To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine
whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can determine whether the
City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits of the delegation.
It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council,
police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of
Quezon City, which states:
To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may
be necessary to carry into efect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience

thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe
under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
In Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, [27] we also held:
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of
earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the
absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City
when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the
health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the
improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These
arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and
pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the
contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business
zone along EDSA.
(3)
The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per se.
We disagree.
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from
constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not
nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely afect the safety
of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not
necessarily make that structure a nuisance.
(4)
MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered
to demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized
the MMDA and the local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys,
bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and
obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building
Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.
However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be
demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building
Official.
MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building
Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The power to
enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the law's
following provision, thus:

Sec.
201.
Responsibility for
Administration
and
Enforcement.
The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including
the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby
vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications,
hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary."
There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to
implement the Building Code.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

175 SCRA 343
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229
on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No.
229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation,
due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of
the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by
the President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied
to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of
Eminent Domain.
RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction
between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under
police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of
such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent

Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to
the owner of the property expropriated.

DECS VS SAN DIEGO

180 SCRA 533

FACTS
Ramon Guevara, a graduate of UE with BS in Zoology claims that he took and flunked the
NMAT thrice. When he applied again, DECS rejected his application based on the three
flunk rule
*three flunk rule: MECS Order No. 12 series of 1972
A student shall be allowed only three chances to take the NMAT. After three
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time
He filed a petition to the RTC invoking constitutional rights to academic freedom with
quality education. Additional grounds were due process and equal protection. RTC
granted the petition thus this case.

ISSUE
Whether or not a person who has thrice failed the NMAT is entitled to take it again.
DECISION
SC reversed the decision of RTC. It is the right and responsibility of the state to insure that
the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may entrust
their lives and health. The three flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. Academic
preparation of applicants may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and by the
three flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the
regulation of the medical profession.
* Proper exercise of police power requires concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method.

VILLANUEVA VS CASTAEDA

SEPTEMBER 21, 1987

FACTS:

There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado
Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of
vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a talipapa.

The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area
by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government.

The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal
constructions on public property.

November 7, 1961: municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218
authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the above-mentioned place.

November 10, 1961: The action was protested in Civil Case no. 2040, where the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the
defendants from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy.

January 18, 1964: while the case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando
adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place
and as the public plaza of the municipality, 4 thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No.
218, series of 1961

November 2, 1968: Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that
the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce
of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.

January 12, 1982: the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San
Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to
restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza.

June 14, 1982: Respondent Macalino, as officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor of
San Fernanda, issued a resolution requiring the municipal treasurer and the municipal
engineer to demolish the stalls beginning July 1, 1982

The reaction of the petitioners was to file a petition for prohibition with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga June 26, 1982 which was denied by the respondent judge
on July 19, 1982, and the motion for reconsideration was also denied on August 5,
1982, prompting the petitioners to come to this Court on certiorari to challenge his
decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the demolition is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
Since the occupation of the place by the vendors, it had deteriorated to the prejudice of the
community. Stalls, being made of flammable materials, became a potential fire trap; access
to and from the market was obstructed; there were aggravated health and sanitation
problems; flow of traffic was obstructed; stallholders in the public market were deprived of
a sizable volume of business; the people were deprived of the use of the place as a public
plaza.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the
police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This
authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into efect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this case through the
adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.

PRC VS DE GUZMAN, ET AL.

JUNE 21, 1987

FACTS:

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine.

They passed the Physician Licensire Examination that is conducted in February 1993 by
the Board of Medicine.
PRC released their names as successful examinees of the exam.
The Board observed that the seventy-nine successful examinees from the Fatima
College of Medicine in the two most difficult exam subjects specifically Biochemistry
(Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne) were unusually and
exceptionally high. And they found it unusual even after comparing their performance
with other schools.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as
physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or
irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an
expert mathematician and authority in statistics, conduct a statistical analysis of the
results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination and concluded that there
must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects.
NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the 1993
Physician Examination can lead to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained
early access to the test questions.
On July 5, 1993, the respondents filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other
respondents as intervenors.
On July 21, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, charging respondents with
immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit in connection with the Bio-Chem and
Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees
be nullified.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of denying the respondents to take the hippocratic oath is a valid
exercise of police power of the state pursuant to RA 2382.
RULING:
The act of denying the repondents to take the hippocratic oath is a valid exercise of police
power.

This case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements by De Guzman, et. al. Section 830 of RA 2382 prescribes, among others, that
a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily
passed" the corresponding Board Examination. Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath
may only be administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." According to
Board Resolution 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that De Guzman, et. al.
"satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations, thus the Board instead sought to nullify
the examination results obtained by the latter.

RATIONALE:
While it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements; like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their
exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons
who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge
may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the
public from the potentially deadly efects of incompetence and ignorance among those who
would practice medicine. It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the
exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its
agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the
exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up
ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the
legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public
agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public
officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business,
profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of
said officials in the exercise of their power. Herein, the guidelines are provided for in RA
2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of
medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and
conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians license,
or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the
conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt
taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue.
For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if
denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege
without thwarting the legislative will.

DIDIPIO VS GOZUN

485 SCRA 586

FACTS:
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies
when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995,
Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed
an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later
CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After
the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have
the law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking
of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as
unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section
107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private
property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and
the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent

DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its
own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation.
Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking
provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of
rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or
economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that to require
compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by
purchase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are;
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously afected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking
involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just
compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to
the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a
consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation
of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly
compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

CITY GOVT OF QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA

122 SCRA 759

FACTS:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides for the appropriation of 6% of memorial
parks for charity burial of the paupers. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc (HPI), did not appropriate the
6% requirement. Seven years after, the Quezon City council issued a resolution to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space.

HPI filed with the Court of First Instance Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul
Section 9 of the Ordinance. HPIs contended that the taking or confiscation of property by
the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot
be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of the
property. Also, HPI contended that the general welfare clause is not a source of power for
the taking of property because it refers to the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining or regulating the use of liberty and property.
On the other hand, the City Government and City Council argue that the taking of property
is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for public use,
further arguing that the City Council has authority under its charter to exercise local police
power.
The court rendered a decision declaring Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void:
The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery... that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon
City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his
private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the City Government and City Council was denied,
and so the instant petition was filed.
ISSUE:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court sustained the decision of the respondent court, holding that there
is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Police
power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty
or property for the promotion of general health, morals, safety of the people and more so,
the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order
to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the
general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as
opium and firearms.

DE LA CRUZ VS PARAS

123 SCRA 569

FACTS:
De La Cruz, et al. were club and cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of
Ordinance no. 84, series of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue,
Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said ordinance violates their right to engage in a
lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality
girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras

however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that
Ord. 84 is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 ( An Act Granting Municipal or City
Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishment , Maintenance and Operation
of Certain Places of Amusement within their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions). Paras rules
that the prohibiation is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la
cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses pursuant to Ord. 84 which is further in pursuant to RA938.
HELD:
The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited,
certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can
be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved
could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the
business of cabarets.