REPUBLIC vs. CA G.R. No.

146587 July 2, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner (PIA) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land
situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of
radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On
26 February 1979, or more than 9 years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this
order condemning the property and ordering the plaintiff to pay thedefendants the just compensation for the property.

It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents the just compensation pursuant to the
foregoing decision. The respondents then filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated
property. In response, the court issued a writ of execution for the implementation thereof.

Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated land to the Bulacan State
University.

Despite the courts order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid and no action was on their case until petitioner filed its
manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount P4,664,000 by way of just compensation.

The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6/sq.m. as previously fixed to its
current zonal value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the return of the expropriated property.

The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs declaring its 26 February 1979 Decision to be unenforceable on the
ground of prescription in accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry. RTC denied petitioners Motion
to Permit Deposit and ordered the return of the expropriated property to the heirs of Santos.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner may appropriate the property
2. WON the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in question

HELD:
1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it
requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence
and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent,
its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of
property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are
held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of
the property whenever the public interest so requires it.

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation
proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is
taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a
right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.

Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just
compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the
recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon
the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining public use,
two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or theactual use by the public, and the second is public
advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as
society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of
the individual may be devoted.
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof
being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine
carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the
utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally
contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a
public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well
within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which,
decidedly, it is.
2. NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the pronouncement
in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. deVillaroya where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative
remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that thecase involved the
municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power ofeminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of
limitedapplication. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governmentsunder Republic Act No. 7160 cannot
be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government.
For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national
legislature, but even then, this delegated power ofeminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only
of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of
the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled -
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the
subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for
public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the
judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they were
expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.
"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may be deemed just and equitable
under the premises'."
The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City where the recovery of possession of
property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation
proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his
property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment
of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over
which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes,
exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the
condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby
preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on
the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an
unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding,
condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and
independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial
process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument could likewise apply
against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years
after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against
herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own
concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed,
resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property.
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value
to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with
the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be
computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in September 1969.
This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed,
being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and
inflation of the value of the currency over time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary
inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for
the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. In
other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to
alter the value of the currency.
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979
has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private
respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet
unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per
square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19
September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid.

Pp. vs. JOEL JANSON and RICKY PINANTAO alias OGCO [G.R. No. 125938. April 4, 2003]

Facts:
In the evening of March 24, 1986, six (6) men came to the house of Cesario Alcantara threatening to strafe and burn it
should they not be let in. Once inside, the masked group of men turned off the lights, hogtied Cesario, pushed him
facedown and covered him with blankets. They asked for money and Teresa gave them P400.Teresa was then led to the
kitchen. During this time, her daughter Marites was raped by four men. Then Marites was led to the kitchen where the
culprits threatened to abduct her if her mother would not give them money. Teresa then gave them an
additional P1,000 while the group took three wristwatches, one can of coffee, and one chicken. Then they left the
house, all the while speaking in the Manobo dialect.

Marites testified in open court that she was raped by Ricky alias Ogco Pinantao, Joel Janson, and Abdul Jona. She said
that she came to know Ricky Pinantao because he is a neighbor and that he often goes to their house to buy
bananas. She also said that she came to know Joel Janson because he is always going to Mateo since he has a relative
there. Upon cross-examination, however, Marites admitted that she was not certain of the identity of her perpetrators
at the time of the incident or immediately thereafter. According to her, it was only after Joel Janson was apprehended
for another crime, and after he confessed to the police, that she was able to confirm her suspicion.

The investigating police officer, P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, also admitted in open court that the sworn statement of appellant
Joel Janson was taken without the presence of counsel and that this statement together with the waiver of his right to
counsel was already prepared when it was presented to Atty. Zerrudo for signing.
Issues:
1. Is the extrajudicial confession of Janson admissible as evidence for the prosecution?
2. May said confession be used against co-accused Pinantao?

Held:
1. No. Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson cannot be admitted in evidence. The manner
by which it was obtained violated accuseds constitutional right to counsel.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is
derived there from shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.

As provided for in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. x x x (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him.
Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes
inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. In People
v.Gomez ,citing People v. Rodrigueza, this Court held that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution requires the
assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel.

Under the Constitution and existing law as well as jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion no matter how slight, as would lead
the accused to admit something false.

DAVID GUTANG vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Rights of Suspects under Custodial Investigation

Giving Urine Samples

FACTS:
David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was arrested by policemen in
connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence at Greenhills, San Juan. Several drug
paraphernalia, which later tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride, were seized along with a
small quantity of marijuana fruiting tops.

The four were brought to Camp Crame and were subjected to a drug-dependency test and were asked to give a sample
of their urine to which they complied. Their urine samples all tested positive for shabu.

De Venecia, Jr. voluntarily submitted himself for treatment, rehabilitation and confinement. Gutang, Regala and
Jimenez pleaded not guilty. They were found guilty of possession and use of prohibited drugs.

Gutang argued that the urine sample is inadmissible in evidence because he had no counsel during the custodial
investigation when it was taken. In effect, it is an uncounselled extra-judicial confession and a violation of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the urine samples taken were admissible in evidence.

RULING:
The Court ruled that it was admissible. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and
placed under investigation for the commission of crime. Such right is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation and not to unearth undisclosed facts.
An accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced,
or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done without going against the proscription against testimonial
compulsion.

244 People vs. Quidato [GR 117401, 1 October 1998]

Third Division, Romero (J): 2 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being a widower, Bernardo lived
alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He owned 16 hectares of coconut land in the area.
On 16 September 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita,
went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the copra, Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor,
who thereafter left. Bernardo Sr. and Bernardo Jr. went back to Sitio Libod that same day. At around 6:00 p.m. of 17
September 1988, Bernardo Jr. asked Reynaldo Malita to come to the former's house to discuss an important matter.
Upon Reynaldo's arrival at Bernardo Jr.'s house, he saw that his brother Eddie was already there. They started drinking
beer. Bernardo Jr. thereafter proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's house only at 10:00
p.m., after the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon reaching the house, Bernardo Jr. knocked on the
door, asking his father to let them in. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man down.
Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Bernardo Jr. and Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador looking
for money but they found none; so, the 3 of them left. The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by Bernardo
Jr.'s son, who had gone there to call his Lolo for breakfast. On 27 September 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother
regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The
two were promptly arrested by the police. Aside from arresting the latter two, however, the police also arrested
Bernardo Jr. On 29 September 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian
Police Station. When Mara apprised them of their constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, they signified
their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given in the absence of
counsel, Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter to sign their affidavits.
Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a
CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie,
again advising the two of their constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan,
to the Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and
Eddie affix their signatures on the affidavits. On 17 January 1989, Bernardo Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide
before the Regional Trial Court of Davao. A murder case was likewise filed against his co-accused, Reynaldo Malita and
Eddie Malita. Bernardo Jr. and the Malita brothers pleaded not guilty. The two cases were tried jointly. The Malita
brothers withdrew their "not guilty" plea during trial and were accordingly sentences. Only Bernardo Jr.'s case was tried
on merits. After due trial and on 2 March 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 4, rendered judgment finding
Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the offense of Parricide which falls under
Article 246 (of the Revised Penal Code), for the death of his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and accordingly, was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify
the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs. Bernardo Jr. appealed.

Issue: Whether an initially uncounseled extrajudicial confession, signed in the presence of a counsel in a later day, is
admissible as evidence against the accused.

Held: The prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however,
not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extrajudicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives
these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness
stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being
inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence
against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.
Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same inadmissible in evidence even
if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of
the right to counsel that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed
that the Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the
same in the presence of counsel the next day. Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's (accuseds wife)
testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a
judgment unfavorable to Bernardo Jr. He was therefore acquitted.

Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division) [GR 109242, 26 January 1999] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 10 February 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief,
Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those
mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters
Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. Merete likewise described the modus operandi
of the group. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending the
group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office. On 17 February 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin
dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that
day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private
car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of Adelantado and Gamboa Streets,
while two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo Street, near the Esquerra Building. At 2:00 p.m., a postal
delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. The
passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai. Pasicolan
alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an
alley between Esguerra and Montepino Buildings going towards Amorsolo St. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan
gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred
the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two then secured the bag to the back of
their motorcycle.
Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and
started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero.
At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested Marcelo and Romero. Unaware of the arrest of Romero and
Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed
the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan. The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to
their headquarters. They also brought along with them the motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted
mail found in their possession. On their way to the NBI headquarters, they passed by the Makati Central Post Office,
intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they were not able to find him there. The unsorted
mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters. The names of the addressees were listed. They were
subsequently notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their letters. Many of them, after proper identification, were able
to claim their letters. Some letters contained money. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their
signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and
Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin, they
required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them. Arnold
Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Marcelo y Cruz were charged with infidelity in the custody of
documents. The case was later withdrawn and another information for qualified theft was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. On 8 March 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime of qualified theft. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Pasiclon the penalty ranging from 8 years, 8
months, and 1 day of Prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, 1 month, and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
Romero and Marcelo, the penalty ranging from 7 YEARS, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 11 years,
6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, each. Marcelo filed the petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the exclusion of the admission, made through the signatures on the envelopes, extend to the exclusion
from evidence of the letters themselves.
Held: The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to authenticate the envelopes as
the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. This purpose and their signatures on the envelope, when coupled with
the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from Marcelo were those given to him and Romero,
undoubtedly help establish the guilt of Marcelo. Since these signatures are actually evidence of admission obtained from
Marcelo and his co-accused under circumstances contemplated in Art. III. 12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they
should be excluded. For indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time
under custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Under the Constitution, among the
rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one. However, the
letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly seized from Marcelo and Romero as an
incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that Marcelo's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and
his companion on 17 February 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the
letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest.
That these letters were the ones found in the possession of Marcelo and his companion and seized from them was
shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the
basis of the signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other
prosecution witnesses.

People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001]

Second Division, Bellosillo (J): 4 concur

Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened Gerry Galgarin (@
Toto), uncle of Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on
the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to
stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby
Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As
Dennis staggered for safety, the 2 assailants fled in the direction of the airport. Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and
bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near
death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive
medical attention. On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward
Endino and Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the
trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement
upon their apprehension. On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the
Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into
temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo
Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan
and be tried accordingly. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where Galgarin was
interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing
to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas,
Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for
Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they
separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His
interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession
which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted
that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in
Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial court found Galgarin guilty of murder qualified by Treachery, sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages.

Issue: Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarins confession is admissible as evidence.
Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in
the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police
officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed
been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have
been sympathetic with him. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting
one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that
extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the
connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and place
them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be
detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. It is not suggested that
videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police
officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one
to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a
confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: "we
should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession
always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions
is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating
polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed
by the Constitution."