CASE DIGEST: CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS

ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) v. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN

REFORM

FACTS:

Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non
Agricultural Uses. The said AO embraced all private agricultural
lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non AgriculturalUses, it
covers the following: (1) those to be converted to residential,
commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural
purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural
activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of
which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to
non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and
(4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or
other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to
be converted to such uses. The 2 earlier AOs was further
amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive Rules
on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for conversion
from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use.The AO was amended again in 2007 to include
provisions particularly addressing land conversion in time of
exigencies and calamities. To address the conversion to lands to
non agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended processing and approval
of land conversion through DAR Memo 88. CREBA claims that
there is a slowdown of housing projects because of such
stoppage

ISSUES: Is DAR's AO unconstitutional?

HELD:
RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to
or suitable for the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm
activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction
with such farming operations done by a person whether natural
or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. However, he issued an
AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses
before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands reclassified from
agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be
agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or
otherwise. This is violation of RA 6657 because there is nothing
in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of
law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to
require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be
submitted to its conversion authority. It also violates Section 20
of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided therein
that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion
procedures or requirements, or that the DARs approval or
clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.The said
Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes
the constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25,
Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. There is deprivation of liberty and property without
due process of law because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly,
arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from
legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties.
More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid
administrative order is patently biased in favor of the peasantry
at the expense of all other sectors of society.

DISMISSED
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), petitioner, vs.THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, 3 entitled
"Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural
Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The
aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local
Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.

Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-
99,4 entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage
includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial,
industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type
of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the
land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted
to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to
residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02,
entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No.
07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR
AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to
another agricultural use.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which
temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects,
which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the
substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED
AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.

HELD: yes?

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have been included in the definition of agricultural
lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority
stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and
regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural
lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for
conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context
of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.

More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has been
recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve land conversion. 38
Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of agricultural
lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses
before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use conversion.

It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that
agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which
they are intended.

Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DARs conversion authority can only be
exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. 45 The said date served as the
cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require
any DAR conversion clearance or authority. 46 Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is
already subject to DARs conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the
agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified
agricultural lands. It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural
uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not
automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes.

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October

1919
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands
be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement
namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such
expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed
for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery,
which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with
sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted
into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of
the particular strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it
(petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that
the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value
of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land
can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any
questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere
appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the
value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a
judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity
of the expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is
a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not
follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166
Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo,
Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the
legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within
the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot
be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or
entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature . But whether or
not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for
the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not
judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in
authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the
question of the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston
Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the
case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St.
Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
THECITYOFMANILA,plaintiffappellant,
vs.
CHINESECOMMUNITYOFMANILA,ETAL.,defendantsappellees.
G.R.No.L14355,October31,1919
FACTS
Theimportantquestionpresentedbythisappealis:Inexpropriationproceedingsbythecityof
Manila,maythecourtsinquireinto,andhearproofupon,thenecessityoftheexpropriation?
TheCityofManilapresentedapetitionintheCourtofFirstInstanceofsaidcity,prayingthat
certainlands,thereinparticularlydescribed,beexpropriatedforthepurposeofconstructingapublic
improvement.ThepetitionerallegedthatforthepurposeofconstructinganextensionofRizalAvenue,
Manila,itisnecessaryfortheplaintifftoacquireownershipofcertainparcelsoflandsituatedinthedistrict
ofBinondo.ThedefendantstheChineseCommunityofManila,IldefonsoTambunting,andFeliza
ConcepciondeDelgadoallegedintheirAnswer(a)thatnonecessityexistedforsaidexpropriationand
(b)thatthelandinquestionwasacemetery,whichhadbeenusedassuchformanyyears,andwascovered
withsepulchresandmonuments,andthatthesameshouldnotbeconvertedintoastreetforpublic
purposes.Oneofthedefendants,IldefonsoTampbunting,offeredtograntarightofwayforthesaid
extensionoverotherland,withoutcosttotheplaintiff,inorderthatthesepulchers,chapelsandgravesof
hisancestorsmaynotbedisturbed.
 TheHonorableSimpliciodelRosario,decidedthattherewasnonecessityfortheexpropriationof
theparticularstripoflandinquestion,andabsolvedeachandallofthedefendantsfromallliabilityunder
thecomplaint,withoutanyfindingastocosts.Onappeal,theplaintiffcontendedthatthecityofManilahas
authoritytoexpropriateprivatelandsforpublicpurposes.Section2429ofActNo.2711(Charterofthe
cityofManila)providesthat"thecity(Manila)...maycondemnprivatepropertyforpublicuse."
ISSUE
WhetherornottheCityofManilacancondemnprivatepropertyforpublicuse
HELD
No.ItistruethatSection2429ofActNo.2711,ortheCharteroftheCityofManilastatesthat
"thecity(Manila)...maycondemnprivatepropertyforpublicuse."Butwhenthestatutedoesnot
designatethepropertytobetakennorhowitmaybetaken,thenecessityoftakingparticularpropertyisa
questionforthecourts.Whentheapplicationtocondemnorappropriatepropertyismadedirectlytothe
court,thequestionofnecessityshouldberaised(Wheeling,etc.R.R.Co.vs.Toledo,Ry,etc.,Co.[72Ohio
St.,368]).Thenecessityforconferringtheauthorityuponamunicipalcorporationtoexercisetherightof
eminentdomainisadmittedlywithinthepowerofthelegislature.Butwhetherornotthemunicipal
corporationorentityisexercisingtherightinaparticularcaseundertheconditionsimposedbythegeneral
authority,isaquestionwhichthecourtshavetherighttoinquireinto.
Theimpossibilityofmeasuringthedamageandinadequacyofaremedyatlawistooapparentto
admitofargument.Todisturbthemortalremainsofthoseendearedtousinlifesometimesbecomesthe
saddutyoftheliving;but,exceptincasesofnecessity,orforlaudablepurposes,thesanctityofthegrave,
thelastrestingplaceofourfriends,shouldbemaintained,andthepreventativeaidofthecourtsshouldbe
invokedforthatobject.(RailroadCompanyvs.CemeteryCo.,116Tenn.,400;EvergreenCemetery
Associationvs.TheCityofNewHaven,43Conn.,234;Andersonvs.Acheson,132Iowa,744;Beattyvs.
Kurtz,2Peters,566.)
Whetherornotthecemeteryispublicorprivateproperty,itsappropriationfortheusesofapublic
street,especiallyduringthelifetimeofthosespeciallyinterestedinitsmaintenanceasacemetery,should
beaquestionofgreatconcern,anditsappropriationshouldnotbemadeforsuchpurposesuntilitisfully
establishedthatthegreatestnecessityexiststherefor.Inthepresentcase,evengrantingthatanecessity
existsfortheopeningofthestreetinquestion,therecordcontainsnoproofofthenecessityofopeningthe
samethroughthecemetery.Therecordshowsthatadjoiningandadjacentlandshavebeenofferedby
Tambuntingtothecityfreeofcharge,whichwillanswereverypurposeoftheplaintiff.
Thejudgmentofthelowercourtwasaffirmed.
RATIO/DOCTRINE
[1]Thetakingofprivatepropertyforanyuse,whichisnotrequiredbythenecessitiesor
convenienceoftheinhabitantsofthestate,isanunreasonableexerciseoftherightofeminentdomain,and
beyondthepowerofthelegislaturetodelegate.(Bennettvs.Marion,106Iowa,628,633;Wilsonvs.
Pittsburg,etc.Co.,222Pa.St.,541,545;Greasy,etc.Co.vs.Ely,etc.Co.,132Ky.,692,697.)Tojustify
theexerciseofthisextremepower(eminentdomain)wherethelegislaturehasleftittodependuponthe
necessitythatmaybefoundtoexist,inordertoaccomplishthepurposeoftheincorporation,theparty
claimingtherighttotheexerciseofthepowershouldberequiredtoshowatleastareasonabledegreeof
necessityforitsexercise(NewCentralCoalCo.vs.George'setc.Co.[37Md.,537,564]).
[2]Thegeneralpowertoexercisetherightofeminentdomainmustnotbeconfusedwiththeright
toexerciseitinaparticularcase.Thepowerofthelegislaturetoconfer,uponmunicipalcorporationsand
otherentitieswithintheState,generalauthoritytoexercisetherightofeminentdomaincannotbe
questionedbythecourts,butthatgeneralauthorityofmunicipalitiesorentitiesmustnotbeconfusedwith
therighttoexerciseitinparticularinstances.Themomentthemunicipalcorporationorentityattemptsto
exercisetheauthorityconferred,itmustcomplywiththeconditionsaccompanyingtheauthority.
[3]Therightofexpropriationisnotaninherentpowerinamunicipalcorporation,andbeforeit
canexercisetherightsomelawmustexistconferringthepoweruponit.Whenthecourtscometo
determinethequestion,theymustonlyfind(a)thatalaworauthorityexistsfortheexerciseoftherightof
eminentdomain,but(b)alsothattherightorauthorityisbeingexercisedinaccordancewiththelaw.Inthe
presentcasetherearetwoconditionsimposedupontheauthorityconcededtotheCityofManila:First,the
landmustbeprivate;and,second,thepurposemustbepublic.Ifthecourt,upontrial,findsthatneitherof
theseconditionsexistsorthateitheroneofthemfails,certainlyitcannotbecontendedthattherightis
beingexercisedinaccordancewithlaw.
[4]Theexerciseoftherightofeminentdomain,whetherdirectlybytheState,orbyitsauthorized
agents,isnecessarilyinderogationofprivaterights,andtheruleinthatcaseisthattheauthoritymustbe
strictlyconstrued.Nospeciesofpropertyisheldbyindividualswithgreatertenacity,andnoneisguarded
bytheconstitutionandlawsmoresedulously,thantherighttothefreeholdofinhabitants.Whenthe
legislatureinterfereswiththatright,and,forgreaterpublicpurposes,appropriatesthelandofanindividual
withouthisconsent,theplainmeaningofthelawshouldnotbeenlargedbydoubtlyinterpretation.
(Benselyvs.MountainlakeWaterCo.,13Cal.,306andcasescited[73Am.Dec.,576].)

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December

22, 1988)
18AUG
FACTS:

The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of

several streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning
regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later
gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for
public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was
brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to
maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also
filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation

violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use.

HELD:

No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

RATIO:

Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation,

to build a [f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as
evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the
residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it
was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a
legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts
should hold otherwise other than for the supposed non-impairment guaranty of
the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general
welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or
unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

Short Facts:

GR 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts to enforce the deed
restrictions against specific residents of Jupiter Street and, with
respect to GR 78182, Reposo Street. The residents have allegedly
converted their residences into commercial establishments (a
restaurant in GR 74376, a bakery and coffee shop in GR 76394, an
advertising firm in GR 78182; and a construction company,
apparently, in GR 82281) in violation of the said restrictions. Their
mother case, GR 71169 is, on the other hand, a petition to hold the
vendor itself, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development
Corporation), liable for tearing down the perimeter wall along Jupiter
Street that had theretofore closed its commercial section from the
residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the
full commercialization of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very
restrictions it had authored. The Court of Appeals dismissed all 5
appeals on the basis primarily of its ruling in AC-GR 66649, Bel-Air
Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land Realty Development Corporation, et al., in
which the appellate court explicitly rejected claims under the same
deed restrictions as a result of Ordinance 81 enacted by the
Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter
Street both for residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise
held that these twin measures were valid as a legitimate exercise of
police power.

Issue: WON Makati Resolution No. 81 and MMC Ordinance 81-01 are
unconstitutional as violative of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution.
Decision: No. Both are constitutional. All contracts are subject to the
overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the
State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. The
Court guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the law
between the contracting parties, but while it is so, it cannot
contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed
precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common
good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Police
power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people. Invariably described as the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers and in a sense, the greatest and most powerful
attribute of government, the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation
of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Police power is elastic
and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined
within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past
conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of
life. Public welfare, when clashing with the individual right to property,
should be made to prevail through the states exercise of its police
power. Herein, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of
police power, as the ordinance is neither capricious or arbitrary or
unreasonable; but that it is based on compelling interests of general
welfare. The restrictive easements are similar to any other contract,
and should not deter the valid exercise of police power. The MMC has
reclassified Jupiter Street into a high density commercial zone,
pursuant to Ordinance 81-01. Sangalang, BAVA, et. al., thus have no
cause of action on the strength alone of said deed restrictions.