Michaella Placida J.

Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

GR. Nos. 177597, 177499, 178056; December, 21, 2009

FACTS:

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the

Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a

municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of municipalities

to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the

fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress.

Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. The House of Representatives

adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress

adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint

Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective

sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income

requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.These cityhood bills lapsed into law on

various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for

violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection

clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce

the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same

amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the

equal protection clause

HELD:

Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that “No province, city, municipality, or

barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except

in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria

established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local

Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code

all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a

city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted

into a component city if it has a locallygenerated average annual income, as certified by the

Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2)

consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:(i) a

contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land

Management Bureau; or(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)

inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the

land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than

the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and

bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is

composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or

more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of

special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city

from P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA

9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.
 The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the

following conditions:1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification

must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing

conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the

classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16

respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.

Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in

Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal

protection clause.
Michaella Placida J. Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3

Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections

242 SCRA 211; March 7, 1995

FACTS:

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Maguindanao has two legislative districts.

The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to

create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional

Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of

the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the

purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of

Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be

retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff

Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as

to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).

Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan

with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate

legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her

rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the

Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains

legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is

being deprived of a representative in the HOR.COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is

still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected

and so is its representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional and whether or not ARMM can create LGUs

validly.

HELD:

RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section

10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides that “No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in

accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.Thus, the creation of

any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with

three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the

Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the

Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.There is neither an

express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to

regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its

plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local

government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any

provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and

municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance

with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan

province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that

a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in

order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato

City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand,

ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative

district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested

solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Michaella Placida J. Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995

FACTS:

Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The

Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as

unconstitutional. Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative

district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general

reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census.

Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of

the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

HELD:

Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the

charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not

more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not

preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general

reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and

providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment

can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts

allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a

new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an

indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or

province a particle of their sovereignty.Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another

legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the

1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a

population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the

population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be

increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

Michaella Placida J. Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3
Tan v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986

FACTS:

This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a

New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective

Dec. 3, 1985.

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for

January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is

unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:(1) The

voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the

new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite; (2) The area which would

comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is

lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute

The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered.

Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite

sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under

Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution.

HELD:

Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution states that “ No province, city, municipality or barrio

may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in

accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval

by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is

created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the approval of a

majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be obtained.The creation of

the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration

of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.

 Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first

would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially

altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the

mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.

It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new

province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite shall be

conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval

of this Act." However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, there was an unexplained change

from "areas affected" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas affected." The Supreme

Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new province constitutes the area

affected.

Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous,

and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The

substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic

effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.

Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has

no legal effect for being a patent nullity. Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was declared unconstitutional.

The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the

officials thereof are also declared null and void.

Michaella Placida J. Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3

Abbas vs Comelec

179 SCRA 287

FACTS:

The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into

either of the following:(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that

certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in

Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region

which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. In support of

his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that “there is

hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and

cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article

X of the Constitution.” Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation

of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy,

an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable

votes were obtained.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the creation of the autonomous region and its composition is valid.

HELD:

Under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take

effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and

only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included

in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not

be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not

all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No.

6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No.

6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall

compromise it.

It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on

the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent

units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to

get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same

phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the autonomous

region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the

purpose.”

It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes

approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in

all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.More importantly,

because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the

plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they

ratified the Constitution.

Michaella Placida J. Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3

Ordillo vs Comelec

192 SCRA 100

FACTS:

On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,

Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to

Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera

Autonomous Region.”The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite

showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao

Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city

above-mentioned.Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259

stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the

votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.

The petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic

Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous

Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said

Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the

creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such

Region.

HELD:

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities,

municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one

constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is

supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for

administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To

become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,

economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements

are not present in this case.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous

Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government

and local government units. It further provides that:

“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for

the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay

or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .”

From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province

may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of

having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising

their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area
Michaella Placida J. Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3

CITY OF QUEZON vs. LEXBER INCORPORATED

G.R. No. 141616; March 15, 2001
FACTS :

LEXBER INC. owned a parcel of land of 26,010 sq.m. located in Antipolo. It was

offered and persuaded to have it used as a garbage dumping site by Quezon City and other Metro

Manila Cities or municipalities authorized by the latter for 5 years from Jan.1991 to Dec. 1995.

August 27, 1990 a Tri-Partite MOA was drawn among Quezon City, represented by Mayor

Brigido Simon, Jr., Lexber Inc. and Mun. of Antipolo. Part of the Agreement was that Lexber Inc.

shall be hired as the exclusive supplier of manpower, heavy equipment and engineering services for

the dumpsite and shall also have the right of furst refusal for con tracting such services.

On September 10, 1990, the first negotiated contract between Quezon City represented by

Mayor Simon and Lexber Inc. for Lexber to construct the necessary infrastructure at the dumpsite,

designated as the Q.C. Sanitary Landfill for a contract price of P4,381,069.00. Construction of said

infrastructure was completed on November 25, 1991 and contract price was paid by Q.C. November

8, 1990, second negotiated contract was entered into between Lexber and Q.C. where it was agreed

that Lexber shall provided maintenance services in the form of manpower, equipment and

engineering operations for the dumpsite for P1,536,796.00 monthly. It was also agreed that Q.C.

shall pay Lebster a reduced fee of 50% of the monthly contract price or P768,493 if Q,C. fails to

dump the agreed volume of 54,000 cu.m. of garbage fcor any given month.

On December 11, 1991, Lexber was notified to commence maintenance and dumping

operations at the site starting on Dec. 15, 1991 by Q.C. thru the City Engineer Alfredo Macapugay,

Proj. Manager Rene Lazaro, and Mayor Simon.Q.C. immediately commenced dumping garbage on

the landfill site continuously from December 1991 until May 1992. Thereafter, it ceased to dump

garbage on the site without notice to Lexber. Lexber claimed that even if the dumpsite remain

unused, it was entitled to payment for its services as stipulated in the second negotiated contract.

On December 12, 1992, Lexber’s counsel sent a demand letter to Q.C. demanding payment of

at least 50% of its services under the said contact amounting to P9,989,174.00. Because of the idle

state of the dumpsite for more than a year, Lexber also sought a clarification from Q.C. regarding its
intention on the dumpsite project, considering the waste of equipment and manpower in the

meantime, and its loss of opportunity for the property.

This time, Q.C. is acting thru Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. who succeeded Mayor Simon in the

interim, denied any liability under the contract on the ground that it was invalid and unenforceable.

Accordidng to Mayor Mathay, the contract was signed only by Mayor Simon and was not approved

nor ratified by the City Council and it lacked the required budget appropriation.Feb. 21, 1994,

Lexber filed a complaint for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance or Rescission of Contract and

Damages against Q.C. at the Q.C. RTC. On Jan. 26, 1998 RTC rendered judgment in favor of Lexber

ordering Q.C . to pay P768,493 per month starting Dec. 15, 1991 until Dec. 15, 1995 with legal

interest starting Dec. 16, 1992 until Q.C. finally pays the entire amount. and ordering defendant Q.C.

to pay costs of suit.Q.C. appealed to the C.A. but it affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Its Motion for

Reconsideration was also denied. On Jan. 26, 2000 –Q.C. petitioned the Supreme Court for review on

certiorari assailing the Oct. 18, 1999 decision of the C.A.

ISSUES :

1. Was the second negotiated contract null and void ab initio because its execution was done in

violation of existing laws, more particularly Sections 85, 86 and 87 of P.D. 1445 and Section

177(b) of B.P. 337?

2. Do subsequent acts of Q.C. petitioner constituted a ratification of the subject negotiated

contract notwithstanding the lack of appropriation?

HELD :

The very same P.D. 1445 which is the cornerstone of petitioner’s arguments does not provide

that the absence of an appropriation law ipso facto makes a contract entered into by a local

government unit null and void. Section 84 of the statute specifically provides: Revenue funds shall

not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or

other specific statutory authority.

Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an appropriation law, but

also in pursuance of other specific authority, i.e., section 84 of PD 1445. Thus, when a contract is

entered into by a city mayor pursuant to specific statutory authority, the law, i.e., PD 1445 allows

the disbursement of funds from any public treasury or depository therefor. It can thus be plainly
seen that the law invoked by petitioner QUEZON City itself provides that an appropriation law is

not the only authority upon which public funds shall be disbursed.

Furthermore, then Mayor Simon did not enter into the subject contract without legal

authority. He was so authorized under BP 337, the Local Government Code of 1993. We note that

while the subsequent Local government Code of 1991, which took effect after the execution of the

subject contract, provides that the mayuaor’s representation must be “upon authority of the

sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance,” there was no such qualification under

the old code. `

Therefore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court as affirmed by

the Court of Appeals in this regard. It is clear that the second negotiated contract was entered in to

Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. pursuant to law or specific statutory authority as required by P.D. No.

1445.There is also no merit in petitioner’s claim that there was no appropriation therefore, for it is

evident that even as early as April 4, 1991, funds which were certified to as available had been

allocated for use in the first few months operation of the sanitary landfill. The problem arose only

because the new administration unjustifiably refused to abide by the stipulations in the second

negotiated contract. hence, petitioner’s arguments on this issue fail to convince this Court that the

second negotiated contract was null and void ab initio for lack of prior appropriation or authority

on the part of Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr.

When appellant City government after the construction by the appellee of the dumpsite

structure in accordance with the contract plans and specifications started to dump garbage collected

in the City and consequently paid the appellee for the services rendered, such acts produce and

constitute a ratification and approval of the negotiated contract and necessarily should imply its

waiver of the right to assail the contract’s enforceability.

Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that there was constructive ratification on the part of

petitioner.The records also reveal that petitioner issued Disbursement Vouchers of various amounts

covering the period between March 1, 1992 to April 30, 1992 for the services rendered by the Mud

Regal Group Inc. to haul garbage to the sanitary landfill. The said disbursement vouchers were

passed in audit and duly approved and paid by petitioner. These are facts and circumstances on

record which led the trial court, the appellate court and this Court to affirm the conclusion that

petitioner had actually ratified the subject contract.

Michaella Placida J. Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3

EVY D. MACASIANO vs. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO

GR No. 97764 August 10, 1992

FACTS:

On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance authorizing the closure

of some streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market

thereon. By virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter into a contract to any

service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea market

and/or vending areas. Because of this purpose, respondent Palanyag entered into an agreement

with the municipality of Paranaque with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury. Consequently,

market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of Metropolitan Traffic

Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls. These stalls were later returned to

Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea

market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, respondents filed with the court a

joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to

which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary

injunction. The court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his

letter pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease and use

of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market is valid?

HELD:

Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain devoted to public

use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be

disposed or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of

due process, the closure of the road should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other
public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended

or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the

property becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that

respondent municipality can use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property

belonging to the local unit concerned might lawfully used or conveyed.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for

vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local

government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private

persons. Hence the ordinance is null and void.

Michaella Placida J. Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

G.R. No. 180050; February 10, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to

nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being

unconstitutional.Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province of

Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial

Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with

average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12

square kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance.

Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a province may be created

if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as

certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as

certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the

Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more

islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the

province. Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into law and a

plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative. With the

approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of

Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a separate and distinct province.

Respondents argued that exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the

purpose of the Local Government Code to develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions.

Thus, the rules and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the

objects and purposes of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the

Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.

HELD:

No. The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption

from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR went beyond the

criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized

portion “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of

one (1) or more islands. “

The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law as it

already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision. Thus,

there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations

implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.

Michaella Placida J. Tumaneng
Public Corporation- Set No.3

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG

328 SCRA 137

FACTS:

On October 13, 1994, the SangguniangPanglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution

authorizing Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceeding over the property of

Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario Streets in Mandaluyong City for the

expansion of Mandaluyong Medical Center. On January 20, 1995, Mayor Abalos wrote Alberto

Suguitan offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, the City of

Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan

filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the said motion and subsequently, it allowed the

expropriation of the subject property. Aggrieved by the said order, the heirs of Suguitan asserted

that the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means

of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160, and not by means of a mere

resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the city of Mandaluyong has validly exercised its power of expropriation.

Held: NO

The Court ruled that the basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local

government units is Section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that: "A local government unit may,

through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent

domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon

payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws;

Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and

definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided,

further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the

filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least

fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of

the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the

taking of the property. In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong sought to exercise the power of

eminent domain over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first

requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an

ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Therefore, while the

Court remains conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, it cannot grant

judicial sanction to a local government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in

contravention of the very law giving it such power.