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MANAGING THE RISK: OVERVIEW AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF

TWI’s RISK-BASED INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

M Pereira*, J B Speck*, H Iravani* and I J Freire**

The application of risk-based life management practices has generated considerable

interest in industry. The application of risk-based inspection (RBI) has become more
widely used particularly in the oil & gas refining and production industry, and the
petrochemical and fossil fuel power sectors. The practical interpretation of risk-based
management principles and the use of the most appropriate techniques are of great
practical significance to operators. This paper considers the RBI process and some of
the key issues, which must be addressed for its effective application and a brief
description of existing regulations in terms of American and European guidelines for
both RBI and assessment of inspection periodicity is given. This is followed by a
description of the approach to RBI and maintenance planning developed by TWI for the
integrity management of the oil & gas, pipeline and power industry sectors.

Keywords: Risk-based inspection (RBI), plant integrity, fitness-for-service (FFS),

software, RISKWISE, remaining life, process plant, pipelines.

* The Welding Institute (TWI), Cambridge, UK

phone:+44(0)1223891162 fax:+44(0)1223893303
marcos.pereira@twi.co.uk
** SGS do Brasil, RJ, Brazil,
phone: +55(0)2125808786 fax:+55(0)2125801375
ielson.freire@sgs.com
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1. INTRODUCTION

Risk-based inspection (RBI) is an integrated methodology that uses risk as a basis for
prioritising and managing in-service inspection. The potential benefits from using RBI
include: integrated cost-effective management of health, safety, and environmental and
business interruption risks; optimised inspection planning providing a higher level of
coverage for high-risk items; cost savings derived from extending inspection intervals
and increasing plant availability; and optimum repair and replacement scheduling.

This paper first considers the RBI process and identifies and describes some of the key
issues which must be addressed for its effective application including: user friendliness;
incorporation of damage mechanisms and failure scenarios; audit team approach;
systematic consideration of risk management measures; and linkage to inspection
frequency. It then provides a brief review the current status of RBI within the context of
existing regulatory framework and also in terms of American and European guidelines
for both RBI and assessment of inspection periodicity.

The paper goes on to present elements of the approach to risk-based inspection and
maintenance planning developed at TWI for integrity management in oil & gas
processing, pipeline and power industry sectors. The main features and implementation
procedures associated with TWI's RISKWISE TM and LIFEWISE TM software tools, and
PIPEWISE TM are given to illustrate semi-quantitative and quantitative methods. In
addition, Illustrative case studies are outlined.

2. THE RBI PROCESS

The process of RBI should form part of an integrated strategy for managing the integrity
of all assets and systems throughout the plant or facility. RBI is a logical and systematic
process of evaluation and planning. The major steps within the process are:

- establish requirements and clear statement of objectives,

- define systems, system boundaries and equipment to be addressed,
- specify the RBI management team and responsibilities,
- assemble plant database,
- evaluate failure scenarios, damage mechanisms and uncertainties,
- perform risk audit based on event probability or likelihood and event consequence
analyses,
- review risk management measures and develop risk-focused inspection plan,
- implement inspection plan and any associated operational or maintenance
measures,
- assess inspection findings in terms of remaining life and fitness for service,
- update and feedback to plant database, risk audit and inspection plan on a
continuous basis.

For control purposes and to ensure best practice the plant manager should exercise a
'performance audit' on each of the above steps in the RBI process.
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3. CRITICAL ISSUES FOR EFFECTIVE RBI IMPLEMENTATION

Some of the main requirements and critical success factors for the effective
implementation of RBI are summarised below.

3.1 User Friendliness of Software

Increasingly, RBI is becoming a plant-based decision aid which forms an integral part
of an asset or plant manager's tool-box. It is essential that the tool is fully understood
and accepted by the user and, additionally, can be used easily without undue
complexity. Simplicity ensures rapid implementation and a fully transparent (rather than
'black-box') approach, which facilitates transfer of know-how. The incorporation of
local plant experience is also important in order to obtain 'buy in' to the product as well
as the results by plant personnel. Software tools simply will tend to 'sit on the shelf'
unless these issues are accommodated.

3.2 Damage Mechanisms and Failure Scenarios

The RBI process must take account of all damage mechanisms and failure modes to a
level of state-of-the-art understanding. Failure databases derived from plant experience
together with available material models and associated databases are important input.
However, it should be recognised that comprehensive 'expert systems' or prescriptive
modules based on a knowledge of nominal service conditions, which purport to predict
all failure scenarios, do not currently exist. Expert judgement based on a combination of
operational process experience, design and material degradation issues is thus a key
element in identifying both existing and potential damage mechanisms and failure
modes.

3.3 Audit Team Approach

The risk audit, the evaluation of risk management options and inspection planning
require multi-disciplinary input covering a range of competences. Therefore, it is best
performed by a team including plant personnel and technical expertise covering the
following areas:

- risk analysis,
- process hazards and business consequences,
- local safety management,
- plant design and materials degradation,
- operations, inspection and maintenance functions,
- inspection and NDE techniques.

The complexity of the plant or facility should determine the size of the team. Safety
implications should be addressed by individuals in the team who can demonstrate
professional competence. The team leader should preferably be remote from pressures
associated with plant production. Consensus is required on all major decisions and a
complete record must be kept of all judgements and decisions made. Auditability is
essential through all stages from plant data capture to inspection planning rationale.

Further benefits of an interactive audit team approach are the on-the-job training and
transference of assessment know-how, which are implicit within the approach.
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3.4 Risk Management Measures

RBI tools, that only output a risk audit, no matter how comprehensive, do not
necessarily provide the solution that operators are looking for. A more holistic approach
is increasingly being required whereby the operator is systematically directed through a
series of risk-management options. These options should not be restricted to inspection
or maintenance actions but should also lead the operator to other measures such as,
design or engineering modifications, operational changes, etc. The impact of each risk
management action should be retained by the software so that cost/risk optimisation can
subsequently be undertaken.

3.5 Formal Link to Inspection Frequency

An RBI tool, which only outputs a risk audit, also leaves the user with the problem of
selecting appropriate and safe inspection intervals.

Health and Safety regulations, e.g. the PSSR (see Section 4.1) do not specifically
prescribe inspection intervals. Rather, they requires the ‘Competent Person’ to use
judgement and experience. As mentioned under Section 4.3, the Institute of Petroleum
[1] and SAFed [2] have issued guidelines on maximum service intervals between
inspections. These should be used where necessary although the extent of operating
experience is often a key factor in avoiding excessive conservatism.

Notwithstanding the above, to be effective the RBI tool should offer formal guidance on
the inspection frequency based on the risk audit undertaken. Where risk management
measures are incorporated, the software should accordingly be able to guide the user to
the target inspection frequency by selecting the appropriate measures.

In general, in order to determine a safe inspection interval of equipment by means of a

formal route it is necessary to know the remaining life of the equipment item under the
damage mechanism or mechanisms prevailing. In cases where the damage mechanism is
time dependent such that damage accumulates continuously, e.g. corrosion, creep and
fatigue, then the remaining life can be assessed providing an appropriate predictive
model together with relevant materials databases, future operating conditions and
current damage status are known.

Some damage mechanisms such as stress corrosion cracking often arise in an

unpredictable manner. In these cases experience in similar equipment in similar service
is important in assigning appropriate inspection periods.

Nevertheless, since general and localised corrosion are often the most prolific damage
mechanisms in industrial installations, in many cases a formal approach based on
assessment of remaining life is potentially very useful. Calculations should implicitly
make conservative assumptions and issues such as inspection accuracy and process
stability need to be factored in.

In summary a formal remaining life evaluation approach to establishing inspection

intervals is potentially viable in many instances. The quantitative means to this is
entirely possible and has been broadly outlined by means of reliability rule-based
methods in the ASME RBI Guidelines [3]. The requirement, however, is to incorporate
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the principles of such a formal approach in a user-oriented semi-quantitative RBI route.

TWI's RISKWISETM software has been developed with this need in mind and is
outlined in Section 5 below together with TWI's LIFEWISE TM software for fully
quantitative applications and PIPEWISE TM programme.

4. REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES

4.1 UK and European Health and Safety Legislations

The European Commission has introduced a series of European Health and Safety
Directives, which are law and are being implemented by every member state within the
European Union (EU). In the UK, implementation of these directives is within the
existing Health and Safety at Work etc Act, 1974 [4]. For pressure systems, the UK
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) provides the Pressure Systems Safety Regulations
(PSSR) [5] for steam raising plant together with an Approved Code of Practice (ACoP)
providing practical advice on compliance with the Regulations. The responsibility for
specifying the nature, extent and periodicity of inspection is placed with the 'Competent
Person' who must effectively perform a risk assessment before making
recommendations. The European Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) [6] considers all
pressurised fluid containment with the aim of conformity in design and manufacture.
The PED also has a requirement for supply of 'instructions for the user' giving all
necessary safety information for commissioning and during continued service. Risks are
considered in the form of hazards associated with release of stored energy. HSE
publications in the period 1998-2000 [7-9] have focused more on risk assessment yet
without being prescriptive in terms of methodology. The guidance given allows
flexibility, for example, it recognises that quantitative approaches are not always
necessary.

4.2 Guidelines on Risk Assessment and RBI

API and ASME have produced guidelines for establishing inspection focus based on
risk evaluation [10&3].

API 581 [10] was developed primarily for the oil refining and petrochemical industry. It
comprises qualitative and quantitative approaches. The qualitative approach is based on
determining a series of failure likelihood and failure consequence factors, which are
used to deliver, for every equipment item, a risk rating in the form of a position within a
five by five risk matrix. In the quantitative approach, the evaluation of likelihood (or
failure frequency) starts with a generic failure frequency for the type of equipment in
question. This value is then modified by two factors: FE (Equipment Modification
factor) takes account of items such as damage type, inspection effectiveness, condition,
design and fabrication and process control; and FM (Management System Evaluation
Factor) accommodates the potential impact on mechanical integrity of all process safety
management issues from API-RP 750. The factors FE and FM are obtained from an
exhaustive scoring system based on questionnaires or workbooks. The quantitative
assessment of failure consequence within API 581 is based on a systematic multi-stage
process to determine costs relating to instantaneous and continuous fluid release with
regard to flammable and toxic consequences, environmental clean-up, business
interruption etc.
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The ASME approach [3] has been developed for power (fossil and nuclear) and process
plant applications. Again it comprises a qualitative risk-ranking as well as a quantitative
assessment applied to individual components or equipment items. The quantitative
approach recommends that a full FMECA (Failure Modes Effects Criticality Analysis)
should be conducted. The use of operating experience databases and analytical damage
models together with their probabilistic applications is also recommended. The latter is
required for establishing inspection periods, although detailed examples of the
analytical process are not given.

The API and ASME approaches are similar in that they both advocate progression from
a relatively simple qualitative risk-ranking method to a far more complex quantitative
method requiring significant effort and expertise to execute. Although the ASME
approach considers the time dependence of failure probability, neither approaches offers
clear and formal methods to translate risks into inspection frequencies.

4.3 Guidelines on Assessment of Inspection Frequency

The Safety Assessment Federation (SAFed) produced, in 1997, a set of guidelines on

the periodicity of examinations [2]. The guidelines adopt a basic qualitative approach to
risk assessment and further state that they should only be adopted after proper
consideration of individual circumstances pertaining to each pressure system. The
European Confederation of Organisations for Testing, Inspection, Certification and
Prevention (CEOC) has developed advisory guidelines aimed at harmonisation within
the EU with respect to inspection frequency of boilers and pressure vessels [11]. A
semi-quantitative approach is proposed whereby scores of likelihood of failure are input
into a risk matrix. The maximum period between inspections is then related to the
assessed level of risk. The Institute of Petroleum (IP) has issued a code of practice for
inspection of pressure vessels in the petroleum industry [1]. It groups equipment into
different categories, e.g. process pressure vessels and heat exchangers, process storage
vessels, etc. and uses a grading system to assign inspection intervals. The allocation of
grade is set after the first examination. If the degradation rate is high or if operational
practices are uncertain, a low grade and inspection interval are ascribed representing a
high risk of failure. For cases where the degradation rate is more predictable and as
expected, a less severe grade can be allocated allowing an extended inspection interval.
If the grade is changed following further examinations, inspection intervals may be
increased (or reduced).

In summary it can be said that where predictability exists there is scope for formal
methods for determining inspection periods based on reliability and remaining life
considerations. These are considered in Section 5.

5. TWI's RISK-BASED INSPECTION AND RISK-BASED LIFE

MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS

This section presents TWI's RISKWISE TM and LIFEWISE TM software with emphasis
on estimation of inspection periodicity and replacement planning respectively, in
addition to PIPEWISE TM programme.

5.1 RISKWISE TM Software

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TWI's RISKWISE TM suite of software has been customised for several applications and
has been implemented worldwide in oil and gas process plants, power plant boilers,
pipelines, etc. The customised versions of RISKWISE TM have also been incorporated in
equipment-specific life management programmes, e.g. PIPEWISE TM and
TANKWISE TM for pipelines and above ground storage tanks respectively.

The key features of RISKWISE TM include:

- Interfaces with existing inspection or corrosion data management software

- Output screening on the basis of risk or inspection periodicity
- Decision support help text on damage mechanisms, NDE, likelihood and
consequence analysis
- Risk audit accommodates qualitative judgement and quantitative damage
projections
- Draws upon the strengths of API and ASME guidelines and applies them in user-
oriented manner
- Interactive, fully transparent audit team approach ensuring 'buy in' and transfer of
know-how
- Assessment of inspection frequency, includes a module based on formal reliability
rules
- Includes a 'focus/defocus' module directing the user to various risk management
options
- Outputs a Written Scheme of Examination or equivalent including risk management
actions
- Fully auditable throughout.

RISKWISE TM has been outlined in previous publications, e.g. [12]. Only those aspects
relevant to evaluation of inspection frequency will be detailed here.

The evaluation of failure likelihood within the software includes a Damage Mechanism
Factor (DMF) based on an assessment of whether failure is not credible (NC), unlikely
(UL) or likely (L) in each of three forward time frames, 1TA, 2TA and 3TA where TA
normally represents the current inspection or turnaround interval. This approach takes
account of uncertainties in plant inspection data as well as uncertainties in damage rules.

The time dimension on failure likelihood enables evaluation of a Remaining Life

Indicator (RLI). The RLI is essentially a measure of the remaining life for a given
equipment item undergoing a given damage mechanism(s).

The RLI is derived on the basis of equivalence between damage and overall failure
likelihood rating and hence also between damage rate and likelihood change rate (LCR).
The LCR is obtained from the evolution of failure likelihood over the periods: 1TA,
2TA and 3TA. For example if it remains NC (i.e. NC/NC/NC) over these time periods
then the LCR is low. On the other hand if the failure likelihood changes from NC to L
then the LCR is high. For a given damage mechanism, e.g. corrosion, the numerical
values of DMF relating to NC, UL and L are derived from the generic form of the
associated cumulative failure probability curve.

The RLI is computed automatically in the software based on assessment of the

appropriate failure likelihood evolution. The calculation also implicitly takes account of
all factors that contribute to the current failure likelihood score, L. The resultant RLI
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value is output to the user to provide a formal basis for assigning future inspection
periods.

The reliability of the calculated RLI as a conservative tool for establishing inspection
intervals has been calibrated against calculated remaining lives. A typical comparison is
presented in Fig.1, which shows that in all cases, the RLI is equal to or more
conservative than the corresponding calculated remaining lives.

30

Screening threshold (5yrs)

Estimated remaining life, yrs

RISKWISE RLI (years)

20
Calculated RL (years)

10

Fig.1. Comparison of RISKWISE™ Remaining Life Indicator (RLI)

and calculated remaining lives.

RLI values, tabulated on the RISKWISETM risk summary screen, enable improved
inspection or other risk mitigation actions to be evaluated in priority order. The
sensitivity of the RLI and hence, inspection period, to various risk mitigation or
inspection relaxation (focus/defocus) actions can subsequently be assessed thereby
enabling cost-risk optimisation.

As a semi-quantitative tool, RISKWISE TM with its in-built inspection interval

evaluation meets the requirements for a rapid, user-oriented tool for RBI studies
covering individual process or power plant units or in plant-wide or facility-wide
applications. It bridges the gap between qualitative and quantitative methods in a single
all-embracing, practical plant manager's tool.

5.2 LIFEWISE TM Software

TWI's LIFEWISETM is a quantitative risk-based life management software which is

used for optimising repair or replacement plans as well as inspection schedules for
critical equipment items (e.g. aging pipelines).

LFEWISETM is applied in cases where continuous degradation occurs with time, e.g.
internal corrosion of pipelines. The input information includes a life model and
uncertainty distributions in the model input parameters, notably: damage status, future
operating conditions and relevant material damage kinetics data. The associated
uncertainty distributions are subjected to a Monte Carlo probabilistic analysis to yield
the failure probability as a function of forward time. A cost analysis is also performed
using input on the cost of a planned repair or replacement in net present worth terms,
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and input on the consequence cost of a failure including business interruption,

remediation, property loss and litigation or liability costs.

LIFE = F(material, operating conditions, damage status)

Operating Parameters Damage/thinning

Material
data

Failure probability ‘vs’ time

X
Consequence Cost ($)
RISK Increasing
$ cost

With mitigation measures

Planned replacement cost e.g. - improve monitor/inspect
- protect/inhibit
- repair
- replace
life extended life TIME

Figure 2 Schematic illustration of LIFEWISE TM

The product of the failure probability and the consequence cost gives the risk evolution
as a monetary value as a function of time. The optimum repair or replacement time is
based on the time at which the risk equals the planned cost of repair or replacement.
Clearly risk mitigation measures whether by likelihood or consequence reduction can be
readily assessed in terms of extended lifetime gained. The process is illustrated
schematically in Figure 2.

In cases where cost information is not readily available a limiting failure probability
approach can be adopted to discern the safe remaining lifetime.

5.3 PIPEWISETM Programme

TWI's PIPEWISETM programme is an integrated three-level approach for optimising

inspection, repair and replacement planning of pipelines. The application approach
involves:

Level 1:

A broad criticality ranking of lines or line lengths normally based on production

criticality and severity of degradation.

Level 2:

A semi-quantitative assessment using RISKWISE TM software customised for pipelines,

RISKWISEpipelinesTM. The output includes: remaining life ranking, inspection plan,
requirement for Level 3 analysis and the fully populated RISKWISEpipelinesTM
software.
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Level 3:

A quantitative assessment including risk-cost optimisation applied to lines or line

lengths at high risk using LIFEWISEpipelinesTM , i.e. LIFEWISE TM software customised
for pipelines; the output includes remaining life estimates and a basis for detailed repair
or replacement scheduling.

The overall PIPEWISE TM programme is summarised in the flow diagram in Figure 3.

6. CASE STUDIES

6.1 RBI Study of a Naptha HDS Unit Using RISKWISE TM

The study comprised a pilot application of RISKWISE TM on selected equipment items

in a Naptha Hydrodesulphuriser unit within an oil refinery. The unit was commissioned
in the early 1980s. The current inspection period (IP) was generally 48 months. Piping,
however was on a 24 month inspection cycle and storage tanks were inspected every 84
months.

6.1.1 Objectives and scope

The objectives were:

- to demonstrate the key steps in the RBI process

- to suggest ways of optimising inspection plans
- to identify ways of reducing the risk of failure.

The scope of the study is shown in Table 1.

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TWI's Life Cycle Management Programme for Pipelines

PIPEWISETM
Design, O&M, Identify corrosion/ damage
Inspection Data Capture types & available models

DELIVERABLE
Level 1

Initial Criticality Ranking

• All lines/line lengths
Identification of
lines/line lengths
requiring Level 2
study

RISKWISETM
Risk/Life Audit - RISKWISEpipelinesTM
software
• Risk Audit
• Semi-quantitative likelihood (L), Summary
consequence (C) and likelihood change
Level 2

L
rate (LCR) analysis
• Remaining life indicator (RLI)
estimation
• Optimum risk mitigation/inspection
measures C
• Inspection,
maintenance
and replacement
schedules
• Statistically
optimised
inspection
Quantitative Analysis- LIFEWISEpipelinesTM
coverage plan
• High risk lines/line lengths
• Quantitative probabilistic assessment and • Refined
Level 3

cost analysis replacement

• Risk/cost - based decision support on schedules (high
replacement risk areas)
• Validation of Level 2 • LIFEWISETM
methodology
• Validated Level
2 life estimates

Figure 3 Flow diagram for PIPEWISE TM

Table 1: Scope of study

Hot/Cold
Tank Oxygen Reactor Separato
Item type Total farm Stripper & Heater r
Accumulator 1 1
Column 1 2
Drum 1 1
Reactor 1 1
Heater 1 1
Piping 10 2 5 3
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S&T 18 16 2
Exchanger
Tanks 2 2
Total 35 2 3 23 7
6.1.2 Results

The results are summarised in Figures 4-5. Figure 4 shows a summary of the results of
the risk audit on a risk matrix with likelihood categories 1-5 and consequence categories
A-E.
The severity of consequence was found to be greatest for the piping and shell and tube
heat exchangers

12 100%
90%
10
80%

8 70%
No. of Equipment

Cumulative %
60%
6 50%
40%
4
30%

2 20%
10%
0 0%
0 48 84 90 96 240 480
RLI, mths

No. of Equipment Cumulative %

Figure 4 Estimates of risk Figure 5 Distribution of RLI

Based on the time dimension of failure likelihood, implicit in the software, values of the
Remaining Life Indicator (RLI) were automatically output for each item and each
damage mechanism (DM). Where more than one DM exists then the minimum RLI
value is output. These are shown in the form of a distribution covering all the selected
items in Figure 5. It is seen that the computed RLI varies from zero to 480 months. In
view of the currently adopted inspection periods (IP) given above and subject to process
controlled shutdowns and statutory requirements there was clearly scope for
optimisation.

Details of some selected equipment items, damage mechanisms (DM) results and
recommendations are summarised in Table 2.

6.1.3 Summary and benefits

A summary of the major findings and benefits of the study is given as follows:

− scope for reduction in shutdown inspection for approximately 70% of equipment

considered;

− incremental run-length extension is feasible after selected equipment modifications.

− The study highlighted areas where imminent risk mitigation was needed (e.g.
replacement of vapour condenser bundles).
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Table 2: Summary of risk audit results for selected items

Risk

Risk
RLI,

RLI.,
IP,

Focus-defocus
temperature

mechanisms
Operating
Material;

proposal
Damage

Initial
Initial

Initial
Class

Class
mths

mths

mths
Item

New

New
Vapour Carbon Oxygen 0 48 5A replace 48 2A
Condense steel; pitting, bundle at
r 38C water side earliest
(Bundle) opportunit
y
(or install
air cooler)
Charge 9Cr 1Mo Sulphidati 480 48 1E relax to 480 1E
Heater steel; on, Creep, visual
Tubes 357C Vanadate inspection
attack only at
next
planned
shutdown
Feed Carbon General & 84 84 2B internally 168 1B
Tank steel; 25C pitting coat tank
corrosion floor with
epoxy
resin at
next
opportunit
y
Reactor P11 & Sulphidati 90 48 2E increase 90 2E
12Cr on, inspection
steel; Creep interval
380C cracking, for
Hydrogen cracking
attack, H+ (only) to
embrittle 96 mths
ment
Hot Carbon General 90 48 2E defer next 90 2E
Separator steel; pitting internal
101C corrosion, inspection
HIC, for further
Stress 48 mths;
corrosion external
cracking UT
(only) at
normal
inspection
interval
(48 mths)
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Feed Line Carbon General/pi 240 24 1D increase 240 1D

steel; tting external
24C corrosion UT
interval to
96 mths
Combined Carbon General/pi 48 48 2E replace 180 2E
Feed steel; tting bundle in,
Exchange 170C corrosion eg: Type
r (Bundle) 321 SS

6.2 Pipeline Remaining Life Study using TWI's PIPEWISE TM

The case study covers subsea pipelines used for oil production and water injection,
where the key problem was internal corrosion and limited inspection data. Both were
addressed in the study.

6.2.1 Objective and scope

The objective of the study was to assess the useable remaining life of in excess of 260
oil production and water injection lines with an age in the range 1 to 39 years. The
internal damage mechanisms to be addressed included: CO2 corrosion, H2S corrosion,
microbial corrosion, oxygen induced corrosion, HIC and stress corrosion cracking.

6.2.2 Technical approach and results

The PIPEWISE TM Level 1 assessment established priorities using qualitative likelihood

and consequence ratings. Likelihood was based on factors such as process fluid
corrosivity, while consequence was assessed on the basis of the production criticality of
the line.

The Level 2 assessment procedure is illustrated in Figure 8.

Calculate corrosion
rate using
Process Database Predict Consequence
Assessment

Diameter
Grade Determine cumulative
Nom WT corrosion rate
Age
from flow data

Assign a prevailing
corrosion rate
(future)

RISKWISEpipelinesTM

Figure 8: PIPEWISE TM Level 2 remaining life ranking procedure for oil production
lines
In view of the paucity of inspection data it was necessary to use corrosion modelling
tools such as PREDICT software. The RISKWISEpipelinesTM software was used to
establish failure likelihood factors which were centred on current line condition
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(cumulative corrosion), likelihood of failure within forward time frames (e.g. 5, 10 and
15 years) and inspection effectiveness.

RISKWISEpipelinesTM subsequently computed values of RLI (Remaining Life

Indicator). All lines with an RLI of less than 5 years were selected as high risk lines for
assessment in PIPEWISE TM Level 3.

Level 3 was aimed at the quantitative estimation of the useable remaining life of
selected lines using TWI's LIFEWISEpipelinesTM probabilistic approach. It involved:

- evaluation of extent of corrosion in the form of statistical distributions from a

combination of theoretical rate predictions (using PREDICT software) and the
spread in corrosion rates actually obtained from the limited inspection data.
- determination of the leakage or rupture thickness using a modified form of ASME
B31G taking due account of internal pressure, initial wall thickness, material
strength and corrosion length.

- calculation of the probability of corroded thickness being less than the minimum
required thickness.

This information provided a failure equation to be coded in the probabilistic analysis

module which utilises Monte Carlo simulation and other reliability methods. The output
consisted of failure probabilities as a function of time and estimates of useful remaining
life for all the lines assessed.

It was generally found that, where line-specific thickness data were available or could
be obtained, assessed lives could be extended by up to 16 years above estimates made in
the absence of such data. The useable remaining life was based upon the exceedence of
target reliability levels, which were selected from pipeline standards. A target reliability
value of 10-5 was used for the high safety-class oil production lines and a value of 10-2
was adopted for the low safety-class water injection lines.

6.2.3 Benefits and recommendations

The output enabled the operator to formalise a pipeline inspection and replacement plan
with associated savings resulting from reduced business interruption, deferred capital
spend and minimised liability uncertainties.

To this end it was recommended to consider inspection or replacement options based on

a run/inspect/repair/replace cost optimisation analysis.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The key issues for effective implementation of semi-quantitative RBI tools have been
addressed. These include: the need to retain application efficiency and user friendliness,
as levels of sophistication increase; expert judgement in identifying existing and
potential damage mechanisms (based on a combination of operational process
experience and design and material degradation issues); an audit team approach to RBI
implementation providing multi-disciplinary input and facilitating on-the-job training
and transfer of assessment know-how; consideration of risk management measures such
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as design or engineering modifications and operational changes; a formal consideration

of a time dimension of risk to provide a tool to select appropriate inspection intervals.

The status of RBI within existing regulatory framework has been reviewed in addition
to relevant guidelines for the application of RBI and assessment of inspection
periodicity. Both the API and ASME approaches advocate progression from a relatively
simple qualitative risk-ranking method to a far more complex quantitative method
requiring significant effort and expertise to execute. However, neither approaches offers
clear and formal methods to translate risks into inspection frequencies.

The scope for formal methods for determining inspection periods, based on reliability
and remaining life considerations, is dependant on whether degradation mechanisms are
predictable and can be incorporated in predictive models. It has been shown that the
semi-quantitative Remaining Life Indicator (RLI), as incorporated in RISKWISE TM
software, can be sufficient for plant-wide inspection planning as well as establishing
risk management measures. This approach has been illustrated for in a case study on a
Naphta HDS unit within an oil refinery. If a more refined analysis is required, e.g. for
critical equipment, fully quantitative assessment tools can be used. This has been
illustrated in a case study on sub-sea pipelines using the LIFEWISE TM software and
PIPEWISE TM programme.

8. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper is published with permission of TWI Ltd.

9. REFERENCES

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6 Pressure Equipment Directive (97/23/EC)

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8 The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998. Approved Code
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