TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS tenants in said apartment along the first passageway.

She also
BY: LAW 3-A (S.Y. 2018-2019) mentioned some other inconveniences of having at the front of her
house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk
1. CUSTODIO & SANTOS VS. CA, 253 SCRA 483 and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear
FACTS: Original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency were even lost. The trial court ordered the defendants to give
of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving plaintiff permanent egress and ingress to the public street and
spouse [and children. The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two- ordered plaintiff to pay defendants P8,000.00 as indemnity for the
door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., permanent uses of the streets. Not satisfied, plaintiff’s heirs, herein
Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. respondents, appealed and raised that the trial court erred in not
Said property may be described to be surrounded by other awarding damages in their favor. The CA affirmed the decision with
immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos modifications ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-
Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as
property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral
Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary
of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all
Morato and then a Septic Tank. As an access to P. Burgos Street respects.
from plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. The
first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages by the CA is in order.
meters distant from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such
path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of RULING: The CA erred in awarding damages in favor of private
houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis.
length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is The CA’s award of damages was based solely on the fact that the
about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in unrealized rentals. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
length, has to be traversed. Defendant Santoses constructed an damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
adobe fence along their property which is also along the first damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
passageway making it narrower. Defendant Morato constructed damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
the entire passageway was enclosed. Tenants of said apartment violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum
vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she absque injuria. In the case at bar, although there was damage,
constructed said fence because there was an incident when her there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the
principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of a. Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the
right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is case based on Article 2180 (in loco parentis)
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant b. Whether or not PSBA is exculpated from liability
should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
RULING:
customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3)
There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners
a. The SC did not agree with the premises of the CA’s ruling. Article
in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or
the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law
public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy
(Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational
established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
enclose and fence their property.
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does
not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants
2. PSBA ET AL VS. CA ET AL, GR NO. 84698, FEBRUARY 4, 1992
of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the school
DOCTRINE: School's responsibility in loco parentis over its own
students: the harm or negligent act must be committed by its could have been made liable.
students against another student, not by an outsider.
b. It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution
General rule on the application of quasi-delict: no pre-existing accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
contract between the parties between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties
are bound to comply with. Moreover, there is that “built-in”
FACTS: Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student of PSBA,
obligation to provide students with an atmosphere that promotes
was stabbed to death while on the second-floor premises of the
school. The assailants were not members of the schools’ academic or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
community but were elements from outside the school. The knowledge. The school must ensure that adequate steps are taken
parents of Carlitos filed a civil action against the school authorities, to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
alleging them negligent, reckless and with failure to take security prevent the breakdown thereof.
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the
attack on the victim. The appellate court found in their favor,
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
primarily anchoring its decision on the law of quasi-delicts. Hence,
the petition. relation between PSBA and Carlitos, the rules on quasi-delict do not
really govern. However, the mere fact that a person is bound to
ISSUES:  another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual
liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the
same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have parties.
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s
testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the said
contract existed between the parties. Art. 21 of the Civil Code
note was never presented in court.
comes to mind, so that should the act which breaches a contract be
done in bad faith and violative of Art. 21, then there is a cause to ISSUE: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what
view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. basis.

In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between RULING: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-
the school and Carlitos had been breached thru the former’s contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
negligence in providing proper security measures.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and
3. AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class
FACTS: In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France
were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee
Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right” berth “after he was already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist
than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
and was transferred to the plane’s tourist class. anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the resulting in moral damages.
Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that
he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance
others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply
went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane incredible.
purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the
following: Culpa Aquiliana
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage
court eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s
avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not
an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So remiss in its duty and obligation to treat private respondent's
it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of account with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for nature of their relationship. The bank is under obligation to treat
the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, whether such
damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso
account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. It must
is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action bear the blame for failing to discover the mistake of its employee
is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public despite the established procedure requiring bank papers to pass
duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are through bank personnel whose duty it is to check and
proper. countercheck them for possible errors.4 Responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is
4. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO VS. CA ET AL, 237 SCRA 761 demandable.5 While the bank's negligence may not have been
attended with malice and bad faith, nevertheless, it caused serious
(1994)
anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to private respondents for
FACTS: Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings bank which they are entitled to recover reasonable moral damages.6
and deposited 38 treasury warrants. All these warrants were As the records bear out, insult was added to injury by petitioner
indorsed by the cashier of Golden Savings, and deposited it to bank's issuance of debit memoranda representing service and
the savings account in a Metrobank branch. They were sent penalty charges for the returned checks, not to mention the
later on for clearing by the branch office to the principal office insulting remarks from its Assistant Cashier.
of Metrobank, which forwarded them to the Bureau of It was established that when Mrs. Katigbak learned that her checks
Treasury for special clearing. On persistent inquiries on were not being honored and Mr. Dungo repeatedly made the
whether the warrants have been cleared, the branch manager insulting phone calls, her wounded feelings and the mental anguish
allowed withdrawal of the warrants, only to find out later on suffered by her caused her blood pressure to rise beyond normal
that the treasury warrants have been dishonored. limits, necessitating medical attendance for two (2) days at a
hospital.
ISSUE: The threshold issue was whether or not whether or not The damage to private respondents' reputation and social standing
private respondents RBPG and Isabel Rodriguez are legally entitled entitles them to moral damages. Moral damages include physical
to moral damages and attorney's fees, and suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
RULING: YES. There is no merit in petitioner's argument that it similar injury.8 Temperate or moderate damages which are more
should not be considered negligent, much less be held liable for than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
damages on account of the inadvertence of its bank employee as recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
Article 1173 of the Civil Code only requires it to exercise the suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
diligence of a good  pater familias. proved with certainty.9 Temperate damages may be allowed in
As borne out by the records, the dishonoring of the respondent's cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of
checks committed through negligence by the petitioner bank on pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced
April 6, 1982 was rectified only on April 15, 1992 or nine (9) days that there has been such loss. The appellate court, however,
after receipt of the credit memo. Clearly, petitioner bank was
justified its deletion when MBTC reasoned out that the amount of The lower court granted motion to dismiss; hence the present
P50,000.00 is not part of the relief prayed for in the complaint, action.
aside from the fact that the amount allegedly suffered by Mrs.
Katigbak is susceptible of proof.  ISSUES:
Moral and temperate damages which are not susceptible of
pecuniary estimation are not awarded to penalize the petitioner a) Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
but to compensate the respondents for injuries suffered as a result acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action
of the former's fault and negligence, taking into account the for civil liability, was not reversed?
latter's credit and social standing in the banking community, b) May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code
particularly since this is the very first time such humiliation has he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
befallen private respondents. The amount of such losses need not undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence
be established with exactitude, precisely due to their nature. 11 complained of, Reginald, though a minor, living with and
The carelessness of petitioner bank, aggravated by the lack of getting subsistence from his father, was already legally
promptness in repairing the error and the arrogant attitude of the married?
bank officer handling the matter, justifies the grant of moral
damages, which are clearly not excessive and unconscionable. RULING: In Barredo vs. Garcia, it was held that the same given act
Moreover, considering the nature and extent of the services can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also
rendered by private respondent's counsel, both in the trial and under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
appellate courts, the Court deems it just and equitable that xxx in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-
delito  or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully
attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 be awarded.
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act
for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
5. ELCANO VS. HILL convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
FACTS: It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was arising from his crime.
prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not
Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault
kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis of culpa aquiliana  would have very little scope and
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin damage to property- through any degree of negligence -
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the even the slightest - would have to be idemnified only
motion to dismiss above-referred to. through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In
 such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi- extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
delito or culpa aquiliana? civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make from criminal negligence.
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances recovery."
of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, Garcia, that culpa aquiliana  includes voluntary and negligent acts
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by which may be punishable by law.4
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal
We believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be
that of a crime under the Penal Code. upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
defendant. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable
(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are
without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang,
sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries
mother or guardian." of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and
in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that other improvements to destruction.
Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with
behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the respondent corporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them inspections on the land.
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued Case. And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any still unresolved.The decision was based on Section 3 (a), Rule III of
act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions
pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
action. after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. criminal action."
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, Court.
subsidiary to that of his son. On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the
order of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by
6. ANDAMO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. 191 SCRA 195 petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court .
(1990)
ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed
held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual
proceed independently of the criminal case and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
RULING: YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-delicts, claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
"(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for
according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action negligence.
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not
prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
render meaningless the independent character of the civil action character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
result of the latter." guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or the two cases vary.
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of Code.
the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by omission of the defendant.
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a
which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a
a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and
rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of
the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant action against the private respondents is based on their liability
in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where under Article 2180 of the NCC.
the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for
arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103
liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. of the RPC as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.

7. DULAY ET AL VS. CA ET AL, GR NO. 108017, APRIL 3, 1995 ISSUES:

FACTS: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno 1. Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay
Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the “Big Bang Sa constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the NCC
Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno 2. Whether Article 33 of the NCC applies only to injuries
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and intentionally committed
killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. 3. Whether the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the RPC
Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon
Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an RULING:
action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and private 1. Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by
respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
defendant Torzuela. negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay was of this Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of private respondents,
beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the
shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-
liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such intentional.
as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability 2. No. The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been
under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v.
of the RPC. In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’ PepsiCola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965);
filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of
of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not
employer’s subsidiary liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]).
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the
crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged the heirs of Isidro Casino in the sum of P12,000 without any
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
ISSUE: Was Gan negligent?
No. It having been established that the instant action is not
exdelicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and
RULING: No. A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the
the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself
as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article
brought about by his own negligence."
2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
The course of action suggested by the appellate court (that Gan
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
should have stopped her vehicle) would seem reasonable were it
the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado,
not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the
176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good
was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation
employee.
confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of
action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to
8. HEDDY GAN YU VS. CA, L-44264, SEPT. 10, 1988
others. Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the
FACTS: Gan was driving her car one day, when, in order to avoid
petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We therefore
two incoming vehicle encroaching her side of the road, one trying
rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full
to overtake the other, she swerved her car to the right, pinning an
force to the case at bar and consequently absolve petitioner from
old man trying to cross the street, pinning his body to a jeep,
any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under
causing the jeep to move forward and causing damage to other
consideration. We further set aside the award of damages to the
vehicles. Gan was found guilty by the RTC of homicide thru reckless
heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of the claim due
imprudence. On appeal, the CA found her guilty with homicide thru
them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.
simple imprudence, and pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner
Revised Penal Code, she was sentenced to the indeterminate
HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor and to indemnify
She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by RULING: YES. Petitioner cites its good faith in checking, not just
the appellate court to the heirs of the victim. once but twice, the validity of the aforementioned card prior its
dishonor. It argued that since the computer flashed an information
9. MANDARIN VILLA INC. VS. CA, ET AL, GR NO. 119850, JUNE 20, that the credit card expired, petitioner could not be expected to
1996 honor the same much less be adjudged negligent for dishonoring it.
FACTS: (Negligence arising from non-following of POS Guidelines) The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular
Atty. Clodualdo de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
petitioner’s restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafiood Village. After alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an
dinner the waiter handed him the bill in the amount of P2,658.50. ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
Atty. De Jesus offered to pay through his BANKARD credit card. The not, then he is guilty of negligence. The Point of Sale Guidelines
card was accepted however after validation the waiter returned which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow must follow
and audibly informed Atty. De Jesus that his credit card had under the circumstances provides: CARD EXPIRED 1. check expiry
expired. Atty. De Jesus replied saying that the same is about to date on card, 2. if unexpired, refer to CB, 2.1 if valid, honor up to
expire on September 1990 as embossed on its face. Atty. De Jesus maximum of SPL only, 2.2 if in CB as Lost, do procedures 2a to 2e.
and his two guests went to cashier to verify again the card. The 2.3 if in CB as Suspended/Cancelled, do not honor the card, 3. if
computer said “CARD EXPIRED”. They then returned to their table. expired, do not honor the card. Cleary, it has not yet expired in
Prof. Lirag, another guest, uttered the following remarks: “ Clody, October 1989, when the same was wrongfully dishonored. Hence,
may problema ba? Baka kailangang maghugas na kame ng petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an
pinggan?”. He then left to get his BPI Express Credit card from his ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation and
car. The same was honored and accepted. After the incident, he as such petitioner is guilty of negligence. The humiliation and
instituted the civil suit for damages against BANKARD and embarrassment of the private respondent was brought about not
petitioner. The trial court ordered the defendants to pay Atty. De by such remark of Prof. Lirag but by the fact of dishonor by
Jesus jointly and severally for moral and exemplary damages, and petitioner of credit card. The remark of Prof. Lirag served only to
attorney’s fees. The CA modified the decision finding petitioner aggravate the embarrassment then felt by Atty. De Jesus albeit
solely liable for the damages, reduced the monetary award for silently within himself. The appeal is DISMISSED.
moral and exemplary damages, and deleting the award for
attorney’s fees. 10. VERGARA VS. CA, GR NO. 77679, SEPTEMBER 30, 1987
FACTS: This case in action for damages against petitioner - Vergara
ISSUE: Is petitioner negligent based on the facts and if so, is its by the private respondent - Azarcon. The action arose from a
negligent act is the proximate cause of the damage suffered by vehicular accident that occurred on August 5, 1979 in Gapan,
Atty. De Jesus? Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of
the private respondent, causing damages thereto which were unearned salaries and as moral damages. On appeal, the conviction
inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22. The petitioner alleged that was affirmed but the respondent court** reduced the moral
his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very damages by P84,000.00, thus lowering the total indemnity to
P61,131.04. Still not satisfied, the petitioner has come to the
diligent manner, that the steering wheel refused to respond to his
Supreme Court for a complete reversal of the judgment.
effort and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of
his brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of the This case arose from a collision between the car being driven by the
private respondent, and that the said accident was an act of God petitioner and the jeep of Robert Ha on December 30, 1981, at
for which he cannot be held liable. about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at MacArthur Highway, in
Moncada, Tarlac.  The petitioner had a companion, Leon Miguel
ISSUE: Whether or not Vergara is negligent, and guilty of culpa Heras, who was seated beside him.  Robert Ha was at the wheel of
his vehicle, which had seven other passengers.  It appears that the
aquiliana.
petitioner was south-bound, toward Manila, and the jeep was
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to coming from the opposite direction; that a Philippine Rabbit bus
adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of ahead of the jeep swerved into the petitioner's lane to overtake
negligence on his part in the selection and supervision of his driver. and bypass a tricycle; and that as a result of this sudden move, the
Also, it was established by competent evidence that the requisites petitioner, to avoid a head-on collision, immediately veered his car
of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: to the shoulder of the highway.  The car went out of control when
(1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of it hit the soft shoulder, moved back diagonally across the cemented
highway, then collided with Ha's jeep, damaging it and causing
which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond,
multiple injuries to its passengers.  The Philippine Rabbit bus sped
was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between away.
such negligence and the damages. RTC and CA held petitioner liable. Hence, appeal to SC.

Furthermore, according to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied ISSUE: WON petitioner is liable.
the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect,
contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by RULING: The trial court held, and the respondent court affirmed,
that "the jeep was still about 150 meters away from the Philippine
defective brakes cannot be consideration as fortuitous in character.
Rabbit bus when the accused drove his car toward the road
Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable. shoulder to avoid the collision with the oncoming bus.  In other
words, there was sufficient time for Antonio Ramon Ongsiako to
11. ONGSIAKO VS. IAC, 152 SCRA 627 avail of a feasible time to avert hitting the jeep." The judge should
FACTS: Petitioner was convicted by the trial court* of only simple have been more careful in reaching this conclusion for it is not
negligence resulting in serious physical injuries and damage to founded on the facts as established.  The evidence of record is that
property.  He was sentenced to two months of arresto mayor and the distance was not 150 metersbut 150 feet, which makes quite a
to pay a total indemnity of P143,131.04 for medical expenses, difference, indeed.  
The Court considers this discrepancy important because the finding The Court is also perplexed by the following portion of the
of negligence by the trial court is based on whether or not the appealed decision:
accused had enough opportunity to avoid the collision.  And that "If it was true that appellant lost control of his vehicle as early as
opportunity depended on the distance between the two when his car hit the shoulder of the road, it was extremely stupid of
vehicles.  If the trial judge had carefully considered the evidence him to move his car back to the highway while his car was still out
and discovered that the distance was 150 feet and not meters, it is of control.  This is especially true in the face of his own admission
doubtful that he would have concluded as he did that the accused that he saw the Rabbit bus for the first time when it was still about
was negligent.  The distance of 150 feet is less than one-third of 200 meters away overtaking a vehicle (jeep of Robert Ha) which
150 meters, which means that the sufficient time imagined by the was immediately behind a tricycle' (p. 2, ibid.).  Assuming that
trial judge would have been correspondingly - and significantly - appellant indeed lost control of his car as he hit the shoulder, he
reduced by two-thirds of the actual period.  The time as shortened should have applied full not a little pressure upon his brakes.  He
could not have, if we apply the trial judge's own calculations, should have stopped his vehicle instead of driving it back to the
prevented the petitioner from avoiding the collision. highway and risking collision with oncoming vehicles."
Another indication of carelessness, this time on the part of the As the car was "still out of control," why is it assumed that the
respondent court, is its observation, in rejecting the petitioner's petitioner would nonetheless be able, although this would be
version of the collision, that "the police sketch of the collision "extremely stupid," to move it back to the highway?  It is really
scene fails to reveal any skidmarks of the appellant's car, on the mystifying that the respondent court would still expect the
highway.  What is rather odd about this finding is that the trial petitioner to control the car which, as it says so itself, was then
court, and the respondent court later, never considered the fact "out of control." "Assuming the appellant indeed lost control of his
that the sketch was made fivedays after the collision, as clearly car as he hit the shoulder," the decision adds, "he should have
emphasized by the petitioner in his brief.  Apparently, it did not stopped his vehicle instead of driving it back to the highway and
occur to the courts below - and this is also somewhat puzzling - risking collision with oncoming vehicles." This is hardly logical.  The
that all skidmarks would have disappeared by that time on the busy court cannot assume that the petitioner lost control of his vehicle
highway. and on that assumption fault him for not correctly controlling
There was also apparent disregard of the record when the it.  That would be impossible, to say the least.  When one loses
respondent court observed that the petitioner had not presented control of his car, he cannot direct it the way he wants, or move it
his companion to testify on his behalf, concluding that "such failure in the direction he chooses, or accelerate or stop it, for the simple
to present Heras raises the presumption that his testimony, had it reason that it is precisely out of control.  A car out of control is
been presented, would have been adverse to the appellant's cause simply out of control, period.  As for the "little pressure" the
(Orfanel v. People, 30 SCRA 825)." [8] This is another careless petitioner says he applied on the brakes, the purpose, according
conclusion.  The premise is incorrect, and so the conclusion must to him, was to prevent his car from turning turtle as a result of a
also be rejected.  In fact, the petitioner did present Heras, and sudden stop that would have been caused by his jamming on the
Heras did testify in support of the petitioner, substantially brakes.
corroborating the petitioner's account of the collision.  A reading of The real culprit in this unfortunate incident, as the Court sees it,
the transcript of the stenographic notes in the hearing of the case could be the driver of the Philippine Rabbit bus whose recklessness
on July 27, 1983, will readily disclose this. was the cause of the collision between the petitioner's car and
Robert Ha's jeep.  We notice that the trial court made the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an
meaningful observation that "the Philippine Rabbit bus may be automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
faulted," but added rather helplessly, that "it is not here horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
charged."[11] We hope it did not mean by this that someone else had He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
to be made liable, to vindicate the victims' rights. two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
It seems to us that a simple investigation would have uncovered horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
the identity and whereabouts of the Rabbit bus driver, with a view The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning
to his prosecution for his involvement in the collision.  Why this was signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition
not done reflects on the sense of duty of the law-enforcement or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
officers who investigated this matter and on the resourcefulness of against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to
the petitioner and his counsel whose cause could have improved the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he
with the indictment of the said driver. did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the
At any rate, it is the finding of the Court, in view of the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left,
misappreciation of the evidence of record by the respondent court that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing
and the trial court, that the guilt of the petitioner has not been the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
proved beyond reasonable doubt.  Consequently, he should not other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
have been held guilty of even simple negligence and instead is defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
entitled to be completely absolved of criminal responsibility. away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
The civil liability is, however, a different question. horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near,
While the quantum of proof necessary for conviction has not been there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
established, there is, in our view, a preponderance of evidence to other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
hold the petitioner liable in damages for the injuries sustained by right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as
the victims of this accident.  Although it is really doubtful that he then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
was criminally negligent, we find there is enough evidence to proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
sustain the conclusion that a little more caution and discretion on body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing,
his part in reacting to the threat of a head-on collision with the it has struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car
oncoming bus, could have avoided the unfortunate accident.  For and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
this shortcoming, we hold him liable for the hospitalization with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The
expenses and unearned salaries of the victims as itemized by the plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
trial court and affirmed by the respondent court.  We absolve him, unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
however, from the payment of moral damages and so reduce his
total civil liability to P46,131.04. ISSUE: WON the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner
above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
12. PICART VS. SMITH 37 PHIL 813 obligation to repair the damage done
FACTS: The plaintiff was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge at
San Fernando, La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, the RULING: Yes.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in against the threatened harm.
doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible.
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
prudence and determines liability by that. contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the
the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
the particular case. Could a prudent man, in the case under chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually negligence of the other party.
pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to The Plaintiff was able to recover damages from the defendant.
guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always 13. GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER HARDWARE ET AL VS. IAC ET AL, GR
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these NO. 70493, MAY 18, 1989
terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of
FACTS: Engr. Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo
negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
Patos were on the jeep with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
City. At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags,
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
GI sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infante,
consequences.
coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present
Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. At about 59
case we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man,
yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep
placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have
collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. The
damaged while the left side of the jeep, including its fender and
control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant;
hood, was extensively damaged.
and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or,
The instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and
seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the
children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran
other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid
City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck. Accordingly,
the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran
the Court dismissed the complaint “for insufficiency of evidence”.
straight on until he was almost upon the horse. Under these
The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 was "zigzagging" and hence no way of telling in which direction
on the plaintiffs’ appeal, reversing the decision of the Trial Court. It it would go as it approached the truck.
found Zacarias to be negligent and his negligence “gave rise to the c. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation
presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, and their by the police, Calibo’s companions, Roranes and Patos, who
liability is both primary and solidary.” It therefore ordered “the suffered injuries on account of the collision, refused to be so
defendants jointly and solidarily to indemnify the plaintiffs investigated or give statements to the police officers is a “telling
The defendants have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray indication that they did not attribute the happening to
for a reversal of the judgment of the IAC which, it is claimed, defendant Zacarias’ negligence or fault.”
ignored or ran counter to the established facts 2. Yes. Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence
on the part of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence
ISSUES: on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane,
1. WON the decision of the IAC was erroneous. incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical facts would still
2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case. absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the accident
under the rule of the last clear chance.
RULING: Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of
1. Yes. The SC found Calibo negligent instead, because of the each other’s vehicle from a distance of 150 meters. The truck had
following: been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away.
a. it is alleged that at the time of the collision, the truck was From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of
occupying 25 cm of the jeep’s lane. However it was found out the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last
that the center stripe of the road is misaligned and with the clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of
correct calculation of the width of the road, the truck on still on thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his
its proper lane and it was actually the jeep who is intruding the jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to
truck’s lane. Also, the jeep had been “zigzagging,” which is to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In
say that it was travelling or being driven erratically at the time. those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of
The other investigator also testified that eyewitnesses to the avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck
accident had remarked on the jeep’s “zigzagging.” There was to swerve and leave him a clear path.
also testimony that Calibo was drunk while driving the jeep. The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete
b. Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Zacarias a defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and
had acted negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a
back inside his lane upon the coming of the approaching jeep. similar state of facts.
Being well within his own lane, as has already been explained, he Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and
had no duty to swerve out of the jeep’s way as said Court would his employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into
have had him do. And even supposing that he was in fact partly whether or not the evidence supports the latter’s additional
inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of said
30 meters away cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent driver is no longer necessary and will not be undertaken. The fact is
action, there also being uncontradicted evidence that the jeep
that there is such evidence in the record which has not been the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since
controverted. the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased
14. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINE VS. IAC ET AL, GR NOS. 66102-04,
passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding
AUGUST 30, 1990)
vehicles.
FACTS: A jeep was carrying passengers when its right rear wheel
In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court modified the
became detached, causing it to be unbalanced. The driver stepped
questioned decision by making all the defendants’ solidarity liable.
on the brake, which made the jeep turn around, encroaching on the
opposite lane. The passenger jeepney was bumped from behind by
15. GEORGE MCKEE AND ARACELI KOH MCKEE VS IAC, JAIME
a speeding truck with such violence that three of its passengers
TAYAG AND ROSALINDA MANALO, GR NO. L-68102, JULY 16,
died whereas two other passengers suffered injuries. The
1992
representatives of the dead and of the injured passengers filed
FACTS: The car driven by the relatives of the petitioner were
suits to recover damages against the driver and the owners of the
crossing a bridge, when some kids tried to dart to cross the road,
truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
unsure whether to cross or not. The car blew its horn, swerved to
The trial court rendered judgment absolving the driver and the
the left side of the road, switched on its head light to try to warn
owners of the jeepney but required the driver and the owners of
the driver of the truck and tried to return to its lane. But the truck
the truck to compensate the victims. The Plaintiffs appealed
did not slow down. As a result, before the car could return to its
insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also
side, it got hit by the truck, leading to the death of the driver, his
be made liable. The Intermediate appellate court (now Court of
daughter and the baby sitter [in the front passenger seat], and
Appeals), relying primarily on the doctrine of last clear chance,
injury to the rest of the passengers. Witnesses saw the truck
affirmed the trial court's decision. The plaintiffs then filed a petition
stopped only after colliding with the car. There were skid marks
for review on certiorari before the Court.
under the truck, but there were no skid marks behind the truck.)
ISSUE: WON the doctrine of “last clear chance” is applicable.
RTC found Galang liable. CA affirmed RTC. Galang went to the SC via
RULING: No. Citing the landmark case of Anuran, et al. v. Buño et.
Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45.
al., THE Supreme Court reiterated that "[t]he principle about "the
last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the
ISSUE: Was Galang negligent?
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to
RULING: Yes. Galang was negligent. If ever the car driver was guilty
enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
of some negligence, it was excused by “Emergency Rule” and the
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the
doctrine of the “Last clear chance”. Galang was driving at 40miles
ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." The
per hour (38 kilometers per hour) when the allowable speed limit
Intermediate Appellate Court committed an error of law in applying
when crossing a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Galang
alleged that there was mistake in interpretation, but regularity of negotiating a curve, and collided with it. David Ico, spouses Ceasar
performance of duty by the officers getting his testimony is Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and two of their children, died while the
presumed. Galang’s employer is also liable under Article 2180 in rest of the passengers sustained injuries. The jeepney is extensively
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer could have damaged. 3. The driver of the bus went into hiding, and has never
raised the defense of good father of the family in due selection and been seen since. Maricar Baesa through her guardian and Fe O. Ico
supervision of employees, but they did not offer this defense. For filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against
the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law PANTRANCO. The other victims settled with Bus Company. 4.
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in the selection PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged
of their driver or in the supervision over him. Appellees did not negligence as the proximate cause of the accident, invoked the
allege such defense of having exercised the duties of a good father defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees in driver, Ambrosio Ramirez.
their answers. They did not even adduce evidence that they did in
fact have methods of selection and programs of supervision. The ISSUE: Can PANTRANCO invoke the defense of Last Clear Chance?
inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the proximate cause
of the mishap. If Galang's attention was on the highway, he would RULING: No. Petitioner claims the driver of the jeepney had the last
have sighted the car earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 clear chance to avoid the collision and hence, was negligent in
meters. He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence the
collision was already inevitable, because at the time that he opportunity to avoid the harm. The doctrine of the last clear chance
entered the bridge his attention was not riveted to the road in simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude
front of him. recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the
latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
16. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. VS BAESA, 179 SCRA 384 avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
(1989) negligence. The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application
FACTS: On June 12, 1981, at approximately 7:00 o'clock in the in this case.
morning, spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their three For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the
children, along with spouses David Ico and Fe Ico, their son Erwin person who had the last opportunity to avert the accident was
Ico and seven other persons, were onboard a passenger jeepney on aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due
their way to Malalam River, Isabela, to have a picnic in celebration care, have been aware of it In this case, there is nothing to show
of spouses Baesa’s fifth wedding anniversary. David Ico was that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger.
driving. 2. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right at a When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was
speed of about 20 KPH. A speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney
on-route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's lane while to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that
the bus driver will return to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney accounts balances. Unfortunately, it had never been the practice of
approach from the opposite direction. Both the trial court and the Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account
Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank.
Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. At the time David Ico Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would
must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a
was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as
an accident. The Court held that the last clear chance doctrine "can depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy
never apply where the party charged is required to act was written the account number of her husband but the name of
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad,
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the
been discovered" duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy
There is no presumption that the usual recruitment procedures and despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second
safety standards were observed. The mere issuance of rules and copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After
regulations and the formulation of various company policies on validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space
safety, without showing that they are being complied with, are not left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number
sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear
negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show to be RMC's account number. She made her company believe that
that in recruiting and employing the erring driver, the recruitment all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its
procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were account when, in truth and in fact, they were being deposited by
followed. Petitioner failed to do this. her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas.
This went on in a span of more than one (1) year without private
17. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS CA, ET. AL., 269 SCRA 695 respondent's knowledge.
FACTS: From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from
claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling petitioner bank the return of its money. RTC ruled that PBC and
P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of Azucena Mabayad are jointly and severally liable. CA affirmed with
depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. It modifications.
turned out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were
not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to ISSUES:
Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who 1. Whether applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent
likewise maintains an account with the same bank. During this for failing to avoid the injury by not exercising the proper validation
period, petitioner bank had, however, been regularly furnishing procedure
private respondent with monthly statements showing its current 2. Whether there was contributory negligence by RMC
 Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
RULING: omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
1. YES. The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
PBC of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name of the account If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
holder) should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. In the case of banks, however,
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father
on the part of the bank itself in its lack in selection and supervision of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship
of Ms. Mabayad. Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts
Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the of their clients with the highest degree of care.
effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he 2. YES. It cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was
never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of
disregard of the bank's validation procedures until 7 years later. account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to
Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary.
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the
chargeable with the consequences thereof. damages that may be awarded to the private respondent
Antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
exercise of due diligence. cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
dishonest employee, yet it cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru its damages to be awarded.
teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by
its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation 18. ACHEVARA, ET. AL. VS RAMOS, ET. AL, GR NO. 175172,
procedure. SEPTEMBER 29, 2009
FACTS: On June 27, 1995, respondents Elvira Ramos and her two RULING: The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation
minor children, namely, John Arnel Ramos and Khristine Camille where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence,
Ramos, filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur a Complaint for damages but the defendant − who had the last fair chance to avoid the
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code against petitioners Cresencia impending harm and failed to do so − is made liable for all the
Achevara, Alfredo Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior
Arnulfo Ramos, husband of Elvira Ramos and father of her two negligence of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply
children, in a vehicular accident that happened on April 22, 1995 at where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the
the national highway along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
Crescencia Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger after the peril is or should have been discovered.
jeep with Plate No. DKK-995, which was involved in the vehicular The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case,
accident. Alfredo Achevara was impleaded as the husband of the because even if it can be said that it was Benigno Valdez who had
operator and as the administrator of the conjugal partnership the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep
properties of the Spouses Achevara. encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no
In their Complaint, respondents alleged that in the morning of April longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer of
22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading petitioners stated that when the owner-type jeep encroached on
north on the national highway in Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez maneuvered his
Sur in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He tried to vehicle towards the western shoulder of the road to avoid a
overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on collision, but the owner-type jeep driven by Ramos continued to
the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by move to the western lane and bumped the left side of the
Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his passenger jeep. Thus, petitioners assert in their Petition that
death, notwithstanding prompt medical assistance. Respondents considering that the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the
alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds,
the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Although
passenger jeep. the records are bereft of evidence showing the exact distance
In their Answer, petitioners denied respondents allegation that between the two vehicles when the owner-type jeep encroached
Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle and bumped the vehicle on the lane of the passenger jeep, it must have been near enough,
driven by Arnulfo Ramos. because the passenger jeep driven by Valdez was unable to avoid
the collision. Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance does not
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for apply to this case.
damages incurred as a result of the vehicular accident. Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: When the plaintiffs own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury Truck is liable to the heirs of the victims of the mishap. Orix cannot
being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason
exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the
man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused. It has
gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence already been explained: Were a registered owner allowed to evade
of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is,
accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to
2179 of the Civil Code. escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite
person, or to one who possesses no property with which to
19. ORIX METRO LEASING ND FINANCE CORP. VS MANGALINO, GR respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of
NO. 174089 recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to
FACTS: This a case of multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or
Expressway (NLEX) resulting in the death of all the passengers in damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the
one vehicle, including the Mangalinao spousesa and a sibling of the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who the
surviving orphaned minor heirs. An action for damages based on owner is. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would
quasi delict was filed by the minor children of the Mangalinao become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity
spouses through their legal guardian against the registered owners to escape liability by disproving his ownership.
and drivers of the two 10-wheeler trucks that collided with their
parents’ Nissan Pathfinder. 20. LI, ET. AL. VS MANGALINO, GR NO. 174266, JANUARY 25, 2012
The children imputed recklessness, negligence, and imprudence on
the truck drivers for the deaths of their sister and parents; while 21. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS CA, GR NO. L-47379, MAY
they hold Sonny and Orix equally liable for failing to exercise the 16, 1988
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and FACTS: Engineering Construction, Inc. (petitioner, ECI for brevity),
supervision of their respective drivers. being a successful bidder, executed a contract in Manila with the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), whereby
ISSUE:Whether or not the defendants are jointly and severally the former undertook: to furnish all tools, labor, equipment and
liable. materials, and to construct the proposed 2nd Ipo-Bicti Tunnel,
Intake and Outlet Structures, and Appurtenant Structures, and
RULING: The finding of negligence of petitioners as found by the Appurtenant Features at Norzagaray, Bulacan and to complete said
lower courts is binding. Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso works within 800 calendar days. (Angat Hydro-electric Project and
Dam) The project involves two (2) major phases: (1) tunnel work Although the typhoon was a force majeure, NPC cannot escape
covering a distance of 7 kilometres and (2) the outworks at both liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss
ends of the tunnel. and damage.
The ECI already had completed the first major phase of the work As we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals:
(Tunnel Excavation Work). All the equipment no longer needed “If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there
there were transferred to another site where some projects were concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
yet to be completed. Some portion of the Bicti site were still under contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation, which
construction for the second phase. results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
On November 4, 1967, Typhoon “Welming” hit Central Luzon, The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires
passing through corporations’ Angat Hydro-electric Project and that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of
Dam. Due to the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the nature and human agencies are to be excluded from creating or
Angat Dam was rising perilously at the rate of 60 cm per hour. To entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause
prevent an overflow of water from the dam, the National Power of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the
Corporation(NPC) caused the opening of the spillway gates. participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or
Extraordinary large volume of water rushed out of the gates, and neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby
hit the installations and construction works of ECI at Ipo site with HUMANIZED, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to
terrific impact, as a result of which the latter’s stockpile of the acts of God.
materials supplies, camp facilities, permanent structures, and 22. AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO, GR NO. 121438, SEPTEMBER 28,
accessories were either washed away, lost, or destroyed. 1966
FACTS: In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos
ISSUE: Whether or not the destruction and loss of ECI’s equipment were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued
and facilities were due to force majeure, which will exempt NPC a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in
Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to
from liability.
vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right”
than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and
RULING: No, NPC will not be exempted from liability. NPC was upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat
undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the and was transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon “Welming” when it knew After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the
very well that it was safer to have opened the same gradually and Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment
earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among
others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he
typhoon at least four days before it actually struck.
went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane
purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the
following: “First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply
class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene.” incredible.
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial
court eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was Culpa Aquiliana
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act
avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s
in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
parties. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So
testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the said it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
note was never presented in court. employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso
ISSUES: is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action
Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.  is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
which was not presented in court is admissible in evidence. proper.
2. Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res
RULING: gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
1. Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa- incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
contractual and on culpa aquiliana. proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
Culpa Contractual admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was
Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet
passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
berth “after he was already seated” and to take a seat in the tourist guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It
class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, forms part of the res gestae.
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, 23. AFRICA VS CALTEX (PHIL) INC., 16 SCRA 448, 454-456 (1966)
resulting in moral damages. FACTS: On March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila St.
the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance It all started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of article 1171 and 2201
where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and paragraph 2 shall apply. A fire occurred therein and spread to and
burned several neighboring houses including the petitioners’. The burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could
spouse Bernabe and heirs of Domingo Ong, herein petitioners, sued have known how the fire started, were Boquiren, Caltex and their
respondents Caltex (phils), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren on negligence employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is
on the part of both of them which attributed to the cause of the a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because
fire. Mateo Boquiren is the agent in-charge of the operation. The gasoline of want of care.
station with all its appliances, equipment and employees was under the control
of the appellees but they gave no explanation thereof. 24. REPUBLIC VS LUZON STEVEDORING CORP., 128 PHIL 313, 21
In the police and fire report, they stated that during the SCRA 279
transferring of gasoline to the tank truck an unknown Filipino
FACTS: A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero"
Citizen lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near
all owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden
the main valve of the of the paid underground tank. Due to
gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. The respondents contend piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of
that it is not their negligence why the fire broke. But there was no the Pasig after heavy rains on August 15 and 16, 1960. The Republic
evidence presented to prove this theory and no other explanation sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damages.
can be had as to the reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had exercised due diligence in the
the branch owner failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the
if in case one happens.
bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to
damages. navigation.

RULING: Caltex and Boquiren are liable. Though the one who ISSUE: Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the
accuses the other of negligence is the one with burden to prove, in supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by
this case the principle of res ipsa loquitor applies. Res ipsa loquitur fortuitous event or force majeure.
(the transaction speaks for itself) which states: “where the thing
which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under
the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in RULING: No. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an
the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertibly provided
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including
absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendant’s barges like of NSC’s, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the
want of care.” Article 1173 states that, the fault on negligence of barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge
the obligation consists in the omission of that diligence which is supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not
happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the RULING: Yes. In malpractice or negligence cases involving the
inference arises by what is known as the “res ipsa loquitur”rule. administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of expert testimony
Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff,
events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be have been applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.” It is, defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient under excessive
therefore, not enough that the event should not have been or improper anaesthesia.
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the
one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The more difficulty to recognized standards of the medical community in the particular
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. The kind of case, and a showing that the physician in question
very measures adopted by NSC prove that the possibility of danger negligently departed from this standard in his treatment. Evidently,
was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr.
fortuito. Reyes, a physician- patient relationship was created. In accepting
Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the swollen stream the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect represented that,
and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not surgeons practicing in the same field, they will employ such
shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted training, care and skill in the treatment of their patients. They have
turned out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages.  a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under
25. LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA VS PASCASIO, ET. AL., GR NO. 118141, the same circumstances. In the event that any injury results to the
SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 patient from want of due care or skill during the operation, the
FACTS: Florencio, husband of petitioner, Leonila Garcia-Rueda, surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence.
underwent a surgical operation at University of Sto. Tomas Hospital In order to successfully pursue a claim for medical malpractice, a
for the removal of a stone blocking his uterer. However, due to an patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to
unknown cause and complications, Florencio died. Leonila seek the do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider
help of NBI, then later on NBI concluded that his death was caused would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably
by lack of care by attending physician in administering anesthesia. prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action
NBI recommended that Dr. Antonio and Dr. Balatbat-Reyes be caused injury to the patient.
charged of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
26. ERLINDA RAMOS VS CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 124354, DECEMBER 29,
ISSUE: Whether or not an expert testimony is needed to prove the 1999
negligence of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Balatbat-Reyes? DOCTRINE: Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule
which means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself”.
 RULING: Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove solidarily liable for the damages.
stone from her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr.
Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means
Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself”. It is a maxim for
good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned. Dr. the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
anesthesiologist, “botched” the administration of the anesthesia presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie
causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an
botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law explanation, where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the
of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center. complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the
attending physician was negligent.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon
and the anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the
expert testimony showing that Erlinda’s condition was caused by operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her person to the
the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over
“intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically
saying, “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and
lumalaki ang tiyan.” brain damaged - res ipsa loquitur - the thing speaks for itself!

Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust Negligence – private respondents were not able to disprove the
and fit to undergo surgery. presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and
their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. One
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist omitted to exercise due care need not be ananesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the
in intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation intubation was a success. “res ipsa loquitur applies here: The
to provide a good anesthesiologist, and for arriving 3 hours late and Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw
the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for not Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which
cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of
The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly negligence and irresponsibility. The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was
and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the
decision of the Trial Court. “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist
observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he did
ISSUE: Whether the private respondents were negligent and not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the
thereby caused the comatose condition of Ramos. anesthesia delivery. The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was
negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of 95% chance of healing with and when asked regarding the side
their “consultants”. While these consultants are not employees, effects, petitioner mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and
hospitals still exert significant controls on the selection and weakness. Respondents thus claimed that they would not have
termination of doctors who work there which is one of the given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. Thus the hospital assured them of its side effects.
was allocated a share in the liability.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was
27. DR. RUBI LI VS SPS. SOLIMAN, GR NO. 165279, JUNE 7, 2011 not liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures
FACTS: On July 7, 1993, respondents' 11-year old daughter, and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration
Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said
lower extremity at the St. Luke's Medical Center (SLMC). Results patient died.
showed that Angelica was suffering from osteosarcoma,
osteoblastic type, a high-grade cancer of the bone which usually ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Rubi Li is negligent and is liable for
afflicts teenage children. Following this diagnosis and as primary damages.
intervention, Angelica's right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime
Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As adjuvant treatment to RULING: NO. There are four essential elements a plaintiff must
eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence minimize the prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed
chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading to consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2)
other parts of the patient's body (metastasis), chemotherapy was he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a
suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to another direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient
doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist. consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented
to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The
On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to
died on September 1, 1993, just eleven (11) days after the "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the
administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.

On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit against Examining the evidence on record, the Court held that there was
petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy
and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and procedure performed with the consent of Angelica's parents.
disregard of Angelica's safety, health and welfare by their careless Respondents could not have been unaware in the course of initial
administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe treatment and amputation of Angelica's lower extremity, that her
the essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal immune system was already weak on account of the malignant
blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, tumor in her knee.On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence
which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelica's to respondents' claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance of
untimely demise. Further, it was specifically averred that petitioner recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like
assured the respondents that Angelica would recover in view of petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer
to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapy's success rate. that they built the wall in order to protect their persons and their
Besides, informed consent laws in other countries generally require property from their intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court
only a reasonable explanation of potential harms, so specific nonetheless ordered that an easement be created.
disclosures such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary.
Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified
28. SPOUSES CRISTINO AND BRIGIDA CUSTODIO, ET. AL. VS CA, ET. the decision of the trial court by awarding actual damages
AL., GR NO.116100, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 (p65,000.00), moral damages (p30,000.00) and exemplary
DOCTRINE: damages (p10,000.00). Hence this petition. Damages were based
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized rentals on the property
a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, due to the adobe wall restricting access.
there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages.
Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. has no legal basis. The mere fact of loss does not give rise to a right
to recover damages. There must be both a right of action for a legal
Damnum absque injuria – There is a material distinction between wrong inflicted by defendant and a damage to the plaintiff
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal resulting therefrom.Damages are merely a part of the remedy
right;damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and
in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a harm resulting from the injury is damage. Damages are the
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. In
absque injuria. this case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe wall which
was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of their rights as the
Article 21 – Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse of
principle of abuse of rights. For there to be an abuse of rights, the right as provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where
following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The
should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff. plaintiff. None of these requisites was present in this case.

FACTS: Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty.
easement of right of way going into their property against Instances where the damage was not a result of an injury is
petitioners who built an adobe wall in their properties which calleddamnum absque injuria  and the plaintiff is not normally given
thereby restricted access to the Mabasa property. Petitioners claim an award for damages.
 to jump off the running bus. They argue that they should not be
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act made liable for damages arising from acts of third persons over
causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. whom they have no control or supervision. . In effect, the
There must be damnum et injuria.
petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault or
negligence under the law, states that the vehicular incident
29. BACHELOR EXPRESS VS CA, 193 SCRA 216
resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused
FACTS: A bus owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by
by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier
Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted in the
did not have any control.
death of passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
The bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City;
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable.
that while in Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger; that about
15 minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed
RULING: YES. The liability of the petitioners is anchored on culpa
a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the
contractual or breach of contract of carriage. Ornominio Beter and
passengers; that when the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio
Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to petitioner
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road, the
Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of the bus, suffered
former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also
injuries which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article
suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The
1756 of the Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. is
passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the
presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had
bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of
observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733
Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents filed a
and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc. its
alleged owner Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera. Petitioner
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of
alleged that the driver was able to transport his passengers safely
the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the
to their respective places of destination except Ornominio Beter
passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole
and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the bus without the
exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by
knowledge and consent. The trial court dismissed the complaint
passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The
which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals.
sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in
Petitioners asseverate that they were not negligent in the
the bus is within the context of force majeure.
performance of their duties and that the incident was completely
and absolutely attributable to a third person, the passenger who
A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1)
ran amuck, for without his criminal act, Beter and Rautraut could The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
not have been subjected to fear and shock which compelled them failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be
independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to
foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be 30. AUSTRIA VS CA, 39 SCRA 527
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must FACTS: Maria Abad received from Austria one pendant with
be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
diamonds valued at P4,500 to be sold on a commission basis or to
obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must
be returned on demand. However, while walking home to her
be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor. residence in Mandaluyong, Rizal, Abad was said to have been
accosted by two men, one of whom hit her on the face, while the
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary other snatched her purse containing jewelry (including the
circumstance independent of the will of the obligor or of his pendant) and cash, and ran away. The incident became the subject
employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. of a criminal case filed in CFI Rizal against certain persons. Austria,
upon Abad’s failure to return the jewelry or pay for its value
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from notwithstanding demands, filed an action against her and her
liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident husband for recovery of the pendant or of its value, and damages.
was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove CFI Manila ordered Abad, jointly and severally, to pay Austria
that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from P4,500.00, with legal interest thereon, plus P450.00 as reasonable
such accident. attorneys' fees, and the costs. It held that Abads failed to prove the
fact of robbery, or, if indeed it was committed, that Maria was
The bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the guilty of negligence when she went home without any companion,
commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell although it was already getting dark and she was carrying a large
from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus amount of cash and valuables, and such negligence did not free her
was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after from liability for damages for the loss of the jewelry. CA overruled.
people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly Hence, this appeal to SC.
equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the ISSUE: Whether in a contract of agency (consignment of goods for
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and sale) it is necessary that there be prior conviction for robbery
negligence found in the law governing common carriers. before the loss of the article shall exempt the consignee from
liability for such loss.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of RULING: NO. To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a
their passengers" deserves no merit in view of the failure of the person from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the event must be
petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were independent of the human will (or rather, of the debtor's or
exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the obligor's); (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the
petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner, and that (3) the
the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law. obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury
to the creditor. A fortuitous event, therefore, can be produced by Doctrine:
nature, e.g., earthquakes, storms, floods, etc., or by the act of man, Common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary diligence in
such as war, attack by bandits, robbery, etc., provided that the their vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers
event has all the characteristics enumerated above. transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
It is undeniable that in order to completely exonerate the debtor case
for reason of a fortutious event, such debtor must, in addition to
the cams itself, be free of any concurrent or contributory fault or The source of a common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of
negligence. This is apparent from Article 1170 of the Civil Code of
carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry
the Philippines, providing that:
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, provide. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of the
thereof, are liable for damages. case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.
It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing at present in the
City of Manila and its suburbs, with their high incidence of crimes In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would
against persons and property that renders travel after nightfall a
exempt a person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it
matter to be sedulously avoided without suitable precaution and
protection, the conduct of respondent Maria G. Abad, in returning is necessary that the following elements must concur:
alone to her house in the evening, carrying jewelry of considerable (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent
value would be negligent per se and would not exempt her from of the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor);
responsibility in the case of a robbery. We are not persuaded, (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
however, that the same rule should obtain ten years previously, in (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
1961, when the robbery in question did take place, for at that time to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
criminality had not by far reached the levels attained in the present
(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
day.
To avail of the exemption granted in the law, it is not necessary aggravation of the injury to the creditor
that the persons responsible for the occurrence should be found or
punished; it would only be sufficient to establish that the Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to
unforeseeable event, the robbery in this case, did take place transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the
without any concurrent fault on the debtor's part, and this can be skyjacking incident staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane,
done by preponderant evidence. all members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), without
any connection with private respondent, hence, independent of the
31. FRANKLIN GACAL VS PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., GR NO. L- will of either the PAL or of its passengers.
55300, MARCH 15, 1990 Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been
satisfied. Consequently the existence of force majeure has been
established exempting respondent PAL from the payment of finding that all the damages sustained in the premises were
damages to its passengers who suffered death or injuries in their attributed to force majeure. Hence, this petition.
persons and for loss of their baggage. PAL averred that in the performance of its obligation to safely
transport passengers as far as human care and foresight can
FACTS: provide, it has exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious
Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon, Bonifacio S. Anislag person with due regard to all circumstances, but the security
and his wife, Mansueta, and the late Elma de Guzman, boarded a checks and measures and surveillance precautions in all flights,
PAL flight to Manila from the Davao Airport. Commander Zapata, including the inspection of baggage and cargo and frisking of
and five other armed members of the Moro National Liberation passengers at the Davao Airport were performed and rendered
Front (MNLF), all passengers of the same flight, hijacked the solely by military personnel who under appropriate authority had
aircraft ten minutes after take-off. The hijackers directed the pilot
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all airports in the
to fly to Libya but upon the pilots explanation of the fuel
Philippines. Similarly, the negotiations with the hijackers were a
limitations, they relented and directed the aircraft to land at
Zamboanga Airport. purely government matter and a military operation, handled by and
At the runway of the Zamboanga Airport, the aircraft was met subject to the absolute and exclusive jurisdiction of the military
by two armored cars of the military with machine guns pointed at authorities.
the plane. The rebels demanded that a DC-aircraft take them to PAL concluded that the accident that befell RP C1161 was
Libya with the President of PAL as hostage and that they be given caused by fortuitous event, force majeure and other causes beyond
$375,000 and 6 armalites, otherwise they will blow up the plane.
the control of the respondent Airline.
The negotiations lasted for three days and it was only on the third
day that the passengers were served 1/4 slice of a sandwich and 1/10
cup of PAL water. On the same day, relatives of the hijackers were ISSUE: Whether or not hijacking or air piracy during martial law and
allowed to board the plane but immediately after they alighted under the circumstances obtaining herein, is a caso fortuito or
therefrom, a battle between the military and the hijackers ensued, force majeure which would exempt an aircraft from payment of
culminating in the liberation of the surviving crew and passengers, damages to its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy and
the death of 10 passengers and 3 hijackers, and the capture of the 3 whose personal belongings were lost during the incident.
others.
RULING: YES. Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt but his wife suffered injuries and
was hospitalized for 2 days. Bonifacio S. Anislag also escaped required to exercise extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over
unhurt but Mrs. Anislag suffered a fracture at the radial bone of her the goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them,
left elbow for which she was hospitalized and operated on. Elma de according so all the circumstances of each case. They are presumed
Guzman died because of that battle. at fault or to have acted negligently whenever a passenger dies or
The plaintiffs filed an action for damages demanding from PAL is injured or for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods in
actual damages for hospital and medical expenses and the value of cases other than those enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code.
lost personal belongings, moral damages, attorney’s fees and
exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaints
 The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract sidewalk, about 1 ½ feet away, put on her emergency lights,
of carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can was standing at the left side of the rear of her car when she was
provide. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert
suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi lancer driven by defendant
extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of the
Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander
case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown
presumption of negligence and it must be shown that the carrier against the windshield of the car of the defendant and then fell to
had observed the required extraordinary diligence of a very the ground. She was pulled out from under the defendant’s car.
cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide or She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she
that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event. Thus, as ruled was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal
by this Court, no person shall be responsible for those "events
thigh (above knee)”. She was confined in the hospital for twenty
which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were
inevitable." (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is synonymous with (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.
caso fortuito which is of the same sense as "force majeure". Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He said he was
Applying the above guidelines, the failure to transport the travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was
petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking affected, and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that
incident staged buy the MNLF without connection to the private he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora
respondent, hence, independent of will of PAL or its passengers.  Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was
The events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan,
obligation in a normal manner and it cannot be faulted for with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph,
negligence on the duty performed by the military. The existence of with “full bright lights.” Temporarily blinded, he swerved to the
force majeure has been established thus exempting PAL from right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped
payment of damages. plaintiff’s car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in
color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area
32. MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA VS CA, RICHARD LI AND was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear
ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., GR NO 115024, FEBRUARY 7, portion of plaintiff’s car was protruding as it was then “at a stand
1996 still diagonally” on the outer portion of the right lane towards
FACTS: Araneta Avenue. He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff’s witness
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right
Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants
restaurant at Marcos highway to her home. While traveling along counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or
Aurora Blvd., she noticed she had a flat tire and stopped at a negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
lighted place to solicit help if needed. She parked along the ISSUES:
 1. W/N LI WAS NEGLIGENT. allegations were made as to whether or not the company
2. W/N VALENZUELA WAS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENT. took steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
3. W/N ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., AS LI’S EMPLOYER IS proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
LIABLE. unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to
RULING: overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
1. YES. A witness testified that Li’s car was being given at a absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
“very fast” speed, racing towards the general direction of company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias,
Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurting ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for
her against the windshield of the defendant’s Mitsubishi the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
lancer, from where she observed Valenzuela’s car parked accident.
parallel and very near the sidewalk, contrary to Li’s Li was an assistant manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc.
allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the center of he admitted that his functions as assistant manager did not
the right lane. require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he
2. NO. The court held that Valenzuela was not negligent was required quite often to perform work outside the office,
applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, “an individual visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with
who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is company clients. These meetings, clearly, were not strictly
required to act without much time to consider the best
confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
employee tasked with the job of representing his company
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own well as work related functions. The service car assigned to Li
negligence. Valenzuela did not exercise the standard by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li as
reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be well as the corporation to put up the front of a highly
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate successful entity, increasing the latter’s goodwill before its
circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its
one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her clients by providing the former a convenient mode of travel.
to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of
her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all 33. FILIMENO URBANO VS IAC, GR NO. 72964, JANUARY 7, 1988
reasonable precautions. Obviously, the only negligence FACTS: A vehicular accident happened one morning resulting in
ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in
accident.
damage to property with physical injuries. Accused was acquitted
3. YES. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to
because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. A civil
the court’s satisfaction, that it exercised the care of a good
father of the family entrusting its company car to Li. No action for damages based on tort was filed but was dismissed for
lack of reservation by the complainant.
 conducted on March 7, 1969, during which among others, the
RULING: It is a well-settled doctrine that a person, while not parties agreed to refer the technical issues involved in the case to a
criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. The judgment of Commissioner. Mr. Andres O. Hizon, who was ultimately appointed
by the trial court.
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability The Commissioner eventually submitted his report on September
might arise did not exist. The ruling is based on Article 29 of the 25, 1970 with the findings that while the damage sustained by the
Civil Code which provides that when the accused in a criminal PBA building was caused directly by the August 2, 1968 earthquake
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt was not whose magnitude was estimated at 7.3 they were also caused by
proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the defects in the plans and specifications prepared by the third-
the same act or omission may still be instituted. Such action only party defendants' architects, deviations from said plans and
specifications by the defendant contractors and failure of the latter
requires preponderance of evidence.
to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction of the
building and of the contractors, architects and even the owners to
Additionally, the provisions of Rule 111, Sec 2 (c) of the Rules of exercise the requisite degree of supervision in the construction of
Court sate that “extinction” of the civil action unless there is a subject building. United Construction Co., Inc. and the Nakpils
pronouncement that there is no basis upon which the civil liability claimed that it was an act of God that caused the failure of the
may exist. building which should exempt them from responsibility and not the
defective construction, poor workmanship, deviations from plans
and specifications and other imperfections in the case of
A person who is acquitted beyond reasonable doubt may be held
UnitedConstruction Co., Inc. or the deficiencies in the design, plans
civilly liable in the same judgment of acquittal. and specifications prepared by petitioners in the case of the
Nakpils.
34. JUAN F. NAKPIL AND SONS VS CA, ET. AL., GR NO. L-47851,
OCTOBER 3, 1986 ISSUE: Whether or not an act of God-an unusually strong
FACTS: The plaintiff, Philippine Bar Association decided to construct earthquake-which caused the failure of the building, exempts from
an officebuilding on its lot located at Intramuros, Manila. The liability, parties who are otherwise liable because of their
construction was undertaken by the United Construction, Inc. and negligence.
the plans and specifications for the building were prepared by the
other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The building RULING: The applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of
was completed in June, 1966. In the early morning of August 2, the parties herein is Article 1723 of the New Civil Code, which
1968 an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and the front provides:
columns of the building buckled, causing the building to tilt forward
dangerously. The tenants vacated the building in view of its Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and
precarious condition. As a temporary remedial measure, the specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen
building was shored up by United Construction, Inc. A pre-trial was years from the completion of the structure the same should
collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or and in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United
due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise Construction Co., Inc. was found to have made substantial
responsible for the damage if the edifice fags within the same deviations from the plans and specifications. and to have failed to
period on account of defects in the construction or the use of observe the requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to
materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any exercise the requisite degree of supervision; while the third-party
violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect defendants were found to have inadequacies or defects in the
supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the plans and specifications prepared by them.
contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not As correctly assessed by both courts, the defects in the
imply waiver of any of the causes of action by reason of any defect construction and in the plans and specifications were the
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought proximate causes that rendered the PBA building unable to
within ten years following the collapse of the building. On the other withstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968. For this reason the
hand, the general rule is that no person shall be responsible for defendant and third-party defendants cannot claim exemption
events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, from liability.
were inevitable (Article 1174, New Civil Code). An act of God has
been defined as an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural 35. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET. AL. VS CA, GAUDENCIO
causes without human intervention, which by no amount of RAYO, ET. AL., GR NO. 103442-45, MAY 21, 1993
foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could
FACTS: This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate
have been prevented. There is no dispute that the earthquake of
complaints., filed against NPC and a particular Chavez. Plaintiffs
August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous event or an act of God. To exempt the
filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of lives and
obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a
destruction of properties due to the negligence of the latter in
breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must
releasing water from Angat dam during the typhoon “Kading”.
concur: The cause of the breach of the obligation must be
Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multi-
independent of the will of the debtor; The event must be either
purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop,
unforseeable or unavoidable; The event must be such as to render
Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring
it impossible for the debtor to fulfil his obligation in a normal
the water level at the dam.
manner; and the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Thus it has been held that
NPC’s allegations were as follows:
when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in
producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by
1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the
showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of
operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant;
God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God,
2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection
he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by
of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different
which that loss or damage may have been occasioned.
municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the
impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of
The negligence of the defendant and the third-party defendants
typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary
petitioners was established beyond dispute both in the lower court
precautions;
4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent similarly situated as the private respondents — was the negligence
the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning
property; notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same
5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.
exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that
resulted and; The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of
6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and
by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of
character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but
defense, the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued products of defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and
because it performs a purely governmental function. carelessness."

The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil
ground that the provision of its charter allowing it to sue and be Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the
sued does not contemplate actions based on tort. Its decision on 30 following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation
April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must
credible evidence." be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any
damages in favor of the private respondents. Based on the findings participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
that  From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion,
convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of
was caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic) the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith,
suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by 45 Phil. 657).
defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight of October 26,
1978 up to the morning hours of October 27, 1978. Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God
or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained
ISSUE: by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of
Whether or not respondent is negligent? negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an
Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient? act of God or force majeure; a human factor — negligence or
Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM ABSQUE imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force
INJURIA? majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly,
resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence
was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws
RULING: We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss applicable to acts of God.
and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein — who were
36. ESTERIA GARCIANO VS CA, GR NO. 96126, AUGUST 10, 1992 ignored the Board of Directors’ order for her to report for duty on
DOCTRINE: LIABILITY THEREFOR ARISES ONLY FROM UNLAWFUL, July 5, 1982.
WILLFUL OR NEGLIGENT ACTS THAT ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, OR
MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS OR PUBLIC POLICY; NOT PRESENT IN FACTS: On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the
CASE AT BAR. — Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 petitioner through her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still
of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts abroad), informing her of the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the
that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy. school’s founder, concurred in by the president of the Parent-
The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner’s Teachers Association and the school faculty, to terminate her
discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While the services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the
respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they absence of any written contract of employment between her and
actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her the school due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of
post, as ordered by the school’s Board of Directors. That the school getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would
principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board’s decision to accept the position without a written contract (Exhs. C and 1).
retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June, 1982, she
masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. received the letter informing her that her services at the
They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She made
to dissent from the Board’s decision. Their acts were not contrary injuries from the school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the
to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They did not members of the Board of Directors of the school, with the
"illegally dismiss" her for the Board’s decision to retain her exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that
prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as
she did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter
she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self- or notice of termination received by you before this date has no
inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria. sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution,
therefore it is declared null and void . . ." (Exhs. D and 2).
MORAL DAMAGES; TO RECOVER THEM, INJURED PERSON MUST
NOT BE AT FAULT; CASE AT BAR. — With respect to petitioner’s On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three
claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under Article 21 members of the Board of Directors, out of a membership of nine
is based on equity, and he who comes to court to demand equity, (9), resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that
must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be construed as the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board’s deliberations for
granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning
not themselves at fault. Moral damages are recoverable only if the the integrity of the Board’s decision" (Exh. E).
case falls under Article 2219 in relation to Article 21. In the case at
bar, petitioner is not without fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in
leave of absence and failed to report back in time for the regular the Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz,
opening of classes. Secondly, for reasons known to herself alone, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the school for
she refused to sign a written contract of employment. Lastly, she discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.
 of the Board of Directors repudiating their decision to terminate
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on August 30, 1985, plaintiff-appellee is not proof that defendants-appellants had
ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay her P200,000 effectively and physically prevented plaintiff-appellee from
as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, P32,400 as lost resuming her post. It was nothing more than a reaction to what
earnings for nine years, and P10,000 as litigation expenses and defendants-appellants perceived as an affront to their collective
attorney’s fees. prestige. It would appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee had
voluntarily desisted from her teaching job in the school and has no
Appealed to the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court’s right to recover damages from defendants-appellants."
decision. Hence, appeal to SC.
Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct. arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary
to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.
RULING: Yes. After a careful perusal of the petition and the
respondents’ comments, the Court resolved to deny the petition "Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
for lack of merit. performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute,
which alone possesses the authority to hire and fire teachers and "Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
other employees of the school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
fact directed her to report for work. While the private respondents
sent her a letter of termination through her husband, they "Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
admittedly had no authority to do so. As the Court of Appeals aptly a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph shall compensate the latter for the damage."cralaw virtua1aw
library
"We agree with defendants-appellants, however, that they should
not have been held liable to plaintiff-appellee for damages. The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner’s
Defendants-appellants had no authority to dismiss plaintiff-appellee discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While the
and the latter was aware of this. Hence, the letter of termination respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they
sent to her through her husband by defendants-appellants had no actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her
legal effect whatsoever. It did not effectively prevent her from post, as ordered by the school’s Board of Directors. That the school
reporting for work. What is more, it was subsequently repudiated principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board’s decision to
by the Board of Directors which directed her to report for work. retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en
There was, therefore, no reason why she did not continue with her masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages.
teaching in the school. No evidence had been presented to show They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right
that defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting for work. to dissent from the Board’s decision. Their acts were not contrary
The fact that defendants-appellants had ‘acidly’ received the action to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They did not
"illegally dismiss" her for the Board’s decision to retain her and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and
prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo (Rodel). A passenger of the sedan, one
she did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss Estela Maliwat (Estela) sustained injuries. She was immediately
she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self- rushed to the hospital for treatment.
inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
With respect to petitioner’s claim for moral damages, the right to Quezon City found probable cause to indict Rodel, the driver
recover them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. in Damage to Property. In the meantime, petitioner
Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to recover demanded from respondent reimbursement for the
damages to injured persons who are not themselves at fault expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the
(Mabutas v. Calapan Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG 5828, cited in Padilla, hospitalization of Estela. The demand fell on deaf ears
Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p. 87). Moral damages are prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages
recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation to based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Article 21 (Flordelis v. Mar, 114 SCRA 41). In the case at bar, Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City.
petitioner is not without fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite  
leave of absence and failed to report back in time for the regular As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for
opening of classes. Secondly, for reasons known to herself alone, damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino,
she refused to sign a written contract of employment. Lastly, she (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the proximate cause of
ignored the Board of Directors’ order for her to report for duty on the accident. (Ramos) maintained that the sedan car
July 5, 1982.cralawnad crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street
despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting
The trial court’s award of exemplary damages to her was not vehicles to pass through the intersection.
justified for she is not entitled to moral, temperate or  
compensatory damages (Art. 2234, Civil Code). (Ramos) further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when
the mishap occurred. He asserted that he exercised the
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the damages diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
awarded by the trial court to the petitioner for they did not have supervision of his driver, Rodel. Further, the MeTC rendered
any legal or factual basis. the Decision exculpating (Ramos) from liability.

37. LAMBERT RAMOS VS COL REALTY CORP., GR NO.184905, C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
AUGUST 28, 2009 the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing Katipunan
FACTS: In the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue), Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of
corner Rajah Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned by petitioner dated November 30, 2004, such act is specifically prohibited.
C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin (Aquilino), Thus, it certifies that, “the crossing of vehicles at Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, occurred.  And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
Quezon City has (sic) not allowed since January 2004 up to the that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
present in view of the ongoing road construction at the area.” setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
Katipunan Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street in order to immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue. the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
Nonetheless, Aquilino crossed Katipunan Avenue through person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
certain portions of the barricade which were broken, thus prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
violating the MMDA rule. at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time
of the collision, Ramos vehicle was moving at high speed in a  If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing
busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not
(the Katipunan Avenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass), then have happened.  This specific untoward event is exactly what the
smashed into the rear door and fender of the passengers side MMDA prohibition was intended for.  Thus, a prudent and
of Aquilinos car, sending it spinning in a 180-degree turn. It intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the
therefore found the driver Rodel guilty of contributory accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that
negligence for driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed
a busy intersection. The Court Appeals therefore, found Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on
respondent Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable with Rodel account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing
Ilustrisimo to pay petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, Thus this construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass.  It was
petition. manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the
principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the
ISSUE: Whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty who cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.  
suffered in a vehicular collision, as the negligence of petitioner’s
employee is the proximate cause of the accident. What is clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly ignored these
barricades and drove through it. Without doubt, his negligence is
RULING: No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the established by the fact that he violated a traffic regulation. This
MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident.  
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and presumed that a person driving a motor
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have the mishap, he was violating any traffic
 regulation. right side of the road and the bus turned turtle. Four passengers
  including Bataclan were trapped inside the bus and could not get
Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realtys) out. After an hour, ten men came carrying lighted torch made of
negligence which resulted in the vehicular mishap. Articles 2185 bamboo fueled with petroleum. These men approached the bus
likewise applies to this case. and a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers. By reason of the death of Bataclan,
Moreover, Article 2179 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five
apply in this case, viz: minor children filed a suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the in the total amount of P 87, 150.
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only The RTC of Cavite awarded P1000 to the plaintiffs plus 600 as
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the attorney’s fee, plus P100, value of the goods carried by Bataclan for
injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff sale in Pasay City. This is for the reason that the proximate cause of
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but
damages to be awarded. rather, the fire that burned the bus including the four passengers.
That Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries,
As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence, the Court finds perhaps serious, was still alive and so the damages were awarded
it unnecessary to delve into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat not for his death but for the physical inquiries suffered by him.
Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate
cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has
Plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to CA but the
relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from
latter endorsed the appeal to SC because of the value involved in
respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as
the claim of the complaint.
a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages
in his favor.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
38. BATACLAN VS MEDINA, 102 PHIL 181
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus.
(2) WON the carrier is liable
FACTS: After midnight on September 13, 1952, bus no.30 of Medina
Transportation operated by owner defendant Mariano Medina, left
RULING:
the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by
(1) No. Proximate cause as defined in American Jurisprudence is…
Conrado Saylon. There are about 18 passengers and Bataclan is one
‘'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
of the passengers of the said bus who was seated beside of the
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
driver. At 2 o’clock that same morning, while the bus was running
which the result would not have occurred.' And more
within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
and the vehicle began to zigzag until it feel into the canal on the
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large
each having a close causal connection with its immediate area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-
or default that an injury to some person might probably result reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
there from.
(2) Yes. The case involves breach of contract of a common carrier.
In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, There was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his
we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the
that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the
the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at
to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it
where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach turtle. Also when the bus has already overturned, driver should and
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from must have known that in the position of the bus, gasoline could and
them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even
help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the
were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions
driver should and must have known that in the position in which above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this
39. PILIPINAS BANK VS CA, GR NO. 97873, AUGUST 12, 1993
FACTS: Echaus filed a complaint against Pilipinas Bank and its By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act 2655,
president, Constantino Bautista, for collection of a sum of money. as amended, otherwise known as the "Usury Law" the Monetary
Echuas alleged that Greatland realty conveyed to Pilipinas Bank by Board in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed
virtue of a contract of Dacion en Pago parcels of land for a that the rate of interest for the loan, or forbearance of any money,
consideration of P7,776,335.69; that Greatland assigned goods, or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence
P2,300,000.00 out of the total consideration of the Dacion en Pago, of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve (12%)
in her favor; and that despite demand Pilipinas Bank refused to give per cent per annum.
her amount.
Note that Circular No. 416, fixing the rate of interest at 12% per
The RTC and the CA, when appealed, ruled in favor of Echaus and annum, deals with (1) loans; (2) forbearance of any money, goods
ordered Pilipinas Bank to pay her the P2, 300, 000.00 with legal or credit; and (3) judgments. Judgments spoken of and referred to
interest and other monetary awards amounting to P5,517.707.00. in Circular No. 416 are "judgments in litigation involving loans or
Echaus filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Any other kind of
granted by the court. Pilipinas Bank complied with the writ of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with nor involving
execution pending appeal by issuing two manger’s checks in the loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall
total amount of P5,517,707.00. However, CA later on decreased the within the coverage of the said law for it is not, within the ambit of
award of damages and ordered Pilipinas Bank to pay a total of the authority granted to the Central Bank."
P2,655,000.00 which became final and executory. Pilipinas Bank
filed a motion in the trial court praying for respondent to refund to The amount to be paid was a portion of the P7,776,335.69 which
her the excess payment of P1,898,623.67 with interest at 6%. petitioner was obligated to pay Greatland as consideration for the
sale of several parcels of land by Greatland to petitioner. The
Contention of the PILIPINAS BANK: The interest rate due on the amount of P2,300,000.00 was assigned by Greatland in favor of
amount of P2, 300, 000.00 should be 6% and the excess amount private respondent. The said obligation therefore arose from a
paid must be refunded to it with interest of 6% per annum. contract of purchase and sale and not from a contract of loan or
mutuum. Hence, what is applicable is the rate of 6% per annum as
Contention of the ECHAUS: The interest rate due on the amount of provided in Article 2209 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and not
P2,300.000.00 should be 12% per annum and the amount to be the rate of 12% per annum as provided in Circular No. 416.
refunded to Pilipinas bank at 6% per annum.
As to the amount to be refunded to Pilipinas Bank:
RULING: In favour of petitioner.
Private respondent was paid in advance the amount of
As to the amount to be paid to Echaus: P5,517,707.00 by petitioner to the order for the execution pending
appeal of the judgment of the trial court. On appeal, the Court of
P.D. No. 116, the Monetary Board of Central Bank issued Central Appeals reduced the total damages to P3,619,083.33, leaving a
Bank Circular No. 416, which provides: balance of P1,898,623.67 to be refunded by private respondent to
petitioner. In an execution pending appeal, funds are advanced by
the losing party to the prevailing party with the implied obligation the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
of the latter to repay former, in case the appellate court cancels or diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
reduces the monetary award. In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred
that Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by the
In the case before us, the excess amount ordered to refunded by
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
private respondent falls within the ruling in Viloria and Buiser that
Circular No. 416 applies to cases where money is transferred from exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage,
one person to another and the obligation to return the same or a or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school,
portion thereof is subsequently adjudged. where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the
right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the
40. MARIA TERESA CUADRA VS ALFONSO ONFORT 35 SCRA 161 teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was
FACTS: Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
classmates in Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special
their teacher assigned the class to weed the school premises. While
reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she
jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it at MT mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s character
Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadra’s eye got infected. She which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which
was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be the blame could be attributed to her parents.
surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. JUSTICE BARREDO Dissenting;
MT Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monfort’s dad) MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that jokingly saying “aloud that she had found an earthworm and,
Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization),
evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her,” it
moral damages and attorney’s fees.
was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact,
ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180. she was hurt. There is nothing in the record that would indicate
RULING: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his that Alfonso had properly advised his daughter to behave properly
incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for the damages and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates,
caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is
of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to
which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act even try to minimize the damage caused upon by his child.
or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may
therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that 41. CRESENSIO LIBI, RT. AL. VS IAC, ET. AL, GR NO. 70890,
may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states SEPTEMBER 18, 1992
“that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, both minors, are
sweethearts for more than two years until Julie (for brevity) broke
up her relationship with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic committed. Wendell could have not gotten hold of the gun if the
and irresponsible. Wendell wanted reconciliation but Julie persisted key was not left negligently lying around.
in her refusal. This prompted the former to resort to threats against
her. One day Julie Ann and Wendell died from a single gunshot 42. MACARIO TAMARGO, ET. AL. VS CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 85044,
wound each comingfrom the same Smith and Wesson revolver JUNE 3, 1992
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, Wendell’s father. FACTS: On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court by petitioner
trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner
for insufficiency of the evidence. CA set aside the decision of the spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
lower court. against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
ISSUE: Whether or not Wendell’s parents should be held liable for incident.
damages. Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had
filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc before the
RULING: The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption
children, is contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code. was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, as Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents,
the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed
treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action
father of a family to prevent damages." In other words, the since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from
parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary and liability the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
shall ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc
diligence of a good father to prevent damage. However, was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority
defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
good father of the family in preventing their minor son from granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed
committing this crime by means of the gun which was freely petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was
missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been
ISSUE: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit
authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered
make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of PhilAmerican
parents? Forwarders, Inc. Among the defenses interposed by the defendants
in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
RULING: No. The Court does not consider that retroactive effect Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the
may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting action against him.
parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the ISSUE: Whether the terms "employers", "owners and “managers”
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of an establishment or enterprise" used in Article 2180 of the Civil
of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the
instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them accident from which the damage arose.
with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen RULING: NO. Those terms do not include the manager of a
and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the corporation. Under Article 2180 the term "manager" is used in the
time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child sense of "employer" and does not embrace a "manager" who may
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, himself be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy employer.
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little Under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee of his
tort was committed. employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

43. PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES INC. VS PHILAM FORWARDERS, INC., 44. DUAVIT VS CA, GR NO. 82318, MAY 18, 1989
GR NO. L-25142, MARCH 25, 1975 FACTS: Private respondents were on board a jeep when they met an
FACTS: On November 24, 1962, Fernando Pineda drove recklessly a accident with another jeep driven by Sabiniano. This accident caused
freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the injuries to private respondents, thus they filed a case for damages against
national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the driver Salbiniano and owner of the jeep Duavit. Duavit admits ownership
of the jeep but contends that he should not be held liable since Salbiniano stating that the facts upon which the IAC declared that his liability
is not his employee and that the jeep was taken by Salbiniano without his is based on fault by allowing the men to work on a non-working
(Duavit) consent. holiday is without basis. Furthermore, he contends that by filing a
suit against him, Adarle is then filing a suit against the Republic,
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an which violates the non-suability of the State.
accident can be held liable as an employer when the said vehicle was
neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with his consent. ISSUE: Whether or not Genson should be held liable, personally or
officially?
RULING: No, an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident
involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or RULING: NO. With regard to the non-suability contention, Adarle
knowledge and by a person not employed by him. To hold the petitioner filed a suit against Genson personally, in his capacity as the
liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was Highway District Engineer, and not the State or his office. As for the
neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like main issue, there was no evidence to prove Genson’s presence
holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the when the accident occurred, nor was there any basis for the lower
person who stole such vehicle. courts to hold that Genson was at fault by authorizing Arbatin and
his men to work on a non-working day. It might even be proven
45. JOSE GENSON VS EDUARDO ADARLE, ET. AL., GR NO. 73928, that working on a Saturday for the specific purpose of hauling junk
AUGUST 31, 1987 would be the time when the most work can be done, as it has less
FACTS: Arbatin was the successful bidder in a public auction of junk traffic. The Master-Servant doctrine in tort law cannot apply either,
and other unserviceable government property in the Highway since despite the fact that Buensalido, Genson’s employee, was
District Engineer’s Office of Roxas City. Arbatin then employed “moonlighting” on a non-working holiday, Buensalido’s
Adarle to help him haul the junk. On a non-working day, when arrangement with Arbatin was purely private in nature, and had
Adarle and Buensalido, the driver of the payloader, were at the site nothing to do with his being employed under Genson. Thus, absent
continuing to gather the junk, a bucket from the payloader fell and the showing of malice, bad faith or gross negligence on the part of
injured Adarle to the point of paralyzing his lower extremities. Genson, he cannot be held liable for the acts committed by
Adarle instituted an action against Arbatin, Buensalido, Marcelino Buensalido and Arbatin.
(Civil Engineer), and Genson (Highway District Engineer). RTC ruled
in favor of Adarle. IAC modified the previous ruling, absolving 46. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE VS IAC, ET. AL., GR NO. 75112,
Marcelino from liability, and averring that the liability of Genson is AUGUST 17, 1992
based on fault, by allowing Arbatin and his men to work on the FACTS: Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor
premises on a non-working day, in contravention of his office’s and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the
policy. Petitioner Genson then appealed the decision to the SC,
school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school
premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. RULING: Yes. Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in
Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly
latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is significant to negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time
note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact
the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within
where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of
Filamer Christian Institute. the burden of rebutting the presumption  juris tantum that there
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or
down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed
the road was clear. According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a
truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound The petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and
as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking
stop to check. Actually, the jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting
Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing
against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the
followed his advise to swerve to the right. At the time of the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or
incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons
headlight. other than the driver.
Petitioner’s contention: Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan
guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case for
Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should be kept; damages. This is quite understandable considering that as far as the
maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it
working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably
employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive was one authorized by the school to drive. The plaintiff and his
labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is heirs should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous
concerned. recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury caused by
a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short
ISSUE: Whether or not FILAMER be held liable for the negligence while. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing
caused by its employee. circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private
respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of employer- diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a
employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer service vehicle.
and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an
49. NPC VS CA ET. AL, GR NO. 119121, AUGUST 14, 1998
independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business
FACTS: Trucks owned by NPC left Marawi city bound for Iligan
of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the
city. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks
petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated. figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident
47. MARIA BENITA DULAY VS CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 108017, APRIL 3, resulted in the death of 3 persons riding in the Toyota, as well as
1995 physical injuries to 17 other passengers.
The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC
48. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORTION VS VICENTE VASQUEZ, and PHESCO. PHESCO contended that it was not the owner of the
JR., ET. AL., GR NO. 132266, DECEMBER 21, 1999 dump truck which collided with the Toyota Tamaraw but
NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC
FACTS: Romeo Vasquez who was driving his motorcycle collided
with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the
with a company car owned by Castilex driven by Abad who is the
latter’s projects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and
manager of which. The parent of Romeo filed a case for damages
countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of
against Abad and Castilex Corporation. The rtc ruled in favor of the
PHESCO.
Vasquezes holding that Abad and Castilex are jointly and solidary
Trial court absolved NPC of any liability, ordering PHESCO and the
liable. On appeal the CA affirmed holding that the driving by a
truck driver to pay. PHESCO appealed to the CA, which reversed the
manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his
trial court’s judgment, stating that a labor-only contractor is
assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
considered merely as an agent of the employer. So, even if Phesco
hired the driver, as Phesco is admittedly a labor only contractor of
ISSUE: Whether or not an Castilex may be held vicariously liable for
NPC, the statute itself establishes an employer-employee
the death resulting from the negligent operation by their manager
relationship between the employer NPC and the employee driver of
of a company-issued vehicle
the labor only contractor (Phesco).
RULING: The SC Held that Castilex is not liable for the act
ISSUE: As between NPC and PHESCO, who is the employer of the
committed by Abad for Abad was carrying out a personal purpose
driver of the truck and which should, therefore, be liable for
not in line with his duties and it was beyond the normal working
damages to the victims?
hours when the accident happened. Abad was in a place which is a
haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts which
RULING: Job (independent) contracting is present if the following
had no connection to CASTILEX business; neither does it have any
conditions are met: (a) the contractor carries on an independent
relation to his duties as a manager. In the absence of some special
business and undertakes the contract work on his own account
benefit to the employer, the employee is not acting within the
under his own responsibility according to his own manner and
scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor
method, free from the control and direction of his employer or
vehicle. Furthermore, since Abad was not in the scope of his
principal in all matters connected with the performance of the
functions, CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the
work except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil
substantial capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, Code.
machineries, work premises and other materials which are Article 2180: x x x “Employers shall be liable for the damages
necessary in the conduct of his business. Absent these requisites, caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
what exists is a labor only contract under which the person acting scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of engaged in any business or industry.”
the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner In this regard, NPCs liability is direct, primary and solidary with
and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for
him. Taking into consideration the above distinction, the Sc held damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and
that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting. the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the
NPC’s control over PHESCO in matters concerning the performance action.
of the latters work is evident. It is enough that NPC has the right to
wield such power to be considered as the employer. 50. MERCURY DRUG, ET. AL. VS SPS. HUNG, ET. AL., GR NO. 172122,
There is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in labor-only JUNE 22, 2007
contracting vis-a-vis NPC and as such, it is considered merely an
FACTS: Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the
agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an employer-
registered owner of a 6-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck (truck). It
employee relationship between the principal employer and the
employees of the labor-only contractor is created. Accordingly, the has employed petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as a driver.
principal employer is responsible to the employees of the labor- Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of
only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla
by the principal employer. GLI Sedan (car).
However, NPC maintains that, its liability shall only be limited to
violations of the Labor Code and not quasi-delicts.
The two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996
It bears stressing that the action was premised on the recovery of
damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC and PHESCO, within then municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondent
hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code which is the Stephen Huang was driving the car, weighing 1,450 kg., while
applicable law in resolving this case. petitioner Del Rosario was driving the truck, weighing 14,058 kg.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions Both were traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from
of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was on
employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its
caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both
right, when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into
doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the
implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the
implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the car and
zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land ₱1,000,000.00. The appellate court also denied the motion for
Church. reconsideration filed by petitioners.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are negligent and liable for damages.
Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal RULING: YES. The evidence proves petitioner Del Rosario’s
cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, negligence as the direct and proximate cause of the injuries
respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest suffered by respondent Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario
down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation failed to do what a reasonable and prudent man would have done
treatment. under the circumstances.
As to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross Rosario. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:
negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and petitioner
Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver. there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
In contrast, petitioners alleged that the immediate and proximate contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
cause of the accident was respondent Stephen Huang’s is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, he was driving on
the left innermost lane when the car bumped the truck’s front right Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
tire. The truck then swerved to the left, smashed into an electric only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
post, crossed the center island, and stopped on the other side of for whom one is responsible.
the highway. The car likewise crossed over the center island and
landed on the same portion of C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is
Drug claims that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a direct or immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse
family in the selection and supervision of all its employees. against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of
such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee.
The trial court, in its Decision dated September 29, 2004, found
petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that
to pay respondents actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the
damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.  selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective
On February 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their
the trial court but reduced the award of moral damages to qualifications, experience, and service records.
 were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six
However, petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbias
exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its warehouses. Of the six trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan,
employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del however, only five reached the destination. One truck, loaded with
Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its
reckless driving.  cargo.

It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a Later on, the said truck was recovered but without the copper
back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B
Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount
without any alternate. of P1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and adjustment,
R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as
51. LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC. VS GLODEL insurance indemnity.
BROKERAGE CORP., ET. AL., GR NO. 179446, JANUARY 10, 2011  
FACTS: On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against
MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court,
bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, Branch 14, Manila where it sought reimbursement of the amount it
2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed
from Isabel, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on that it had been subrogated to the right of the consignee to
the same date. recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for
  the loss. On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo
withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and
delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the attorney’s fees against R&B Insurance. 
services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to
transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in Bulacan On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered a decision holding
and Valenzuela City. Loadmasters as an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the
  latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by appellee.
Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by
its employed truck helpers. Six truckloads of copper cathodes were ISSUE: Between Glodel and Loadmasters, who is liable to pay R&B
to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six truckloads Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid Columbia?
 employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the
RULING: The Court viewed that both Loadmasters and Glodel are damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of
jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the  
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi- Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to
delict is solidary. another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the
  employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as employees.
subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct
contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the 52. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. VS HARPER,
provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which ET. AL., GR NO. 189998, AUGUST 29, 2012
expressly provide: FACTS: Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip and
  checked in at the Shangri- La Hotel. In the early morning of
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, November 6, 1999 when he was due to check out, he was
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified malefactors. It
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing appears that at around 11:00 am of that day, a Caucasian male
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and entered the Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta and expressed interest
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. in purchasing a Cartier lady’s watch valued at P320,000 with the use
of two MasterCard credit cards and an American Express credit
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable card issued in the name of Harper. But the customer’s difficulty in
not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of answering the queries phoned in by a credit card representative
persons for whom one is responsible. sufficiently aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba
   who asked for the customer’s passport upon suggestion of the
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their credit card representative to put the credit cards on hold. Probably
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their sensing trouble for himself, the customer hurriedly left the store
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any and left the three credit cards and the passport behind. In the
business or industry. meanwhile Harper’s family in Norway must have called at his hotel
   room to inform him about the attempt to use his American Express
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the card. Not getting any response from the room, his family requested
custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel to
were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As check on Harper’s room. Alarcon and security personnel went to
Room 1428 at 11:27 am., and were shocked to discover Harper’s In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of
lifeless body on the bed. the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the
Respondent’s commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act,
damages from petitioner. RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
CA affirmed. Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove its person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is
negligence; that Harper’s own negligence in allowing the killers into guilty of negligence.
his hotel room was the proximate cause of his own death; and that Liability on the part of the defendant is based upon the fact that he
hotels were not insurers of the safety of their guests. was in a better situation than the injured person to foresee and
prevent the happening of the injurious occurrence. The ghastly
ISSUE: Whether defendant-appellant had committed negligence incident could have been prevented had there been adequate
and corollarily, whether its negligence was the immediate cause of security in each of the hotel floors. Clearly, defendant’s inaction
the death of Christian Harper constitutes negligence or want of the reasonable care demanded
of it in that particular situation. Makati Shangri-La Hotel, to stress,
RULING: Yes, defendant-appellant had committed negligence and is a five-star hotel. The "reasonable care" that it must exercise for
such negligence was the immediate cause of the death of Christian the safety and comfort of its guests should be commensurate with
Harper. the grade and quality of the accommodation it offers. If there is
As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is Article such a thing as "five-star hotel security", the guests at Makati
2176 of the Civil Code, which states that: "Whoever by act or Shangri-La surely deserves just that.
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or 53. CADIENTE VS MACAS, GR NO. 161946, NOVEMBER 14, 2008
negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation FACTS: While standing on the shoulder of the road, Bithuel Macas
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera driven by Cimafranca. The
provisions of this chapter." accident resulted to the amputation of both legs up to the groins of
Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a the victim. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily the name of Atty. Cadiente, who, however, claimed that when the
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of accident happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The since he already sold it to Engr. Jalipa on March 28, 1994. The
Supreme Court likewise ruled that negligence is want of care victim’s father filed a complaint for torts and damages against
required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC of Davao City. Cadiente
an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of later filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa. Jalipa, however,
the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the filed a fourth-party complaint against Abubakar, to whom Jalipa
circumstances reasonably require. allegedly sold the vehicle on June 20, 1994.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty. portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case,
Mercado Ag. Cadiente and Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally without so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented
liable for damages to the plaintiff for their own negligence. The part of the highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and
Court of Appeals denied their appeal and subsequent motion for recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was
reconsideration. just where he should be when the unfortunate event transpired.

ISSUES: 2) No. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already
1) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible to the public for
victim, hence not entitled to recover damages. whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause. In the case of
2) Whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are Villanueva vs. Domingo, the Court held that the policy behind
jointly and severally liable to the victim. vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can
be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by
RULING: 1) None. Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third
“When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and party injured by one whose identity cannot be secured. Therefore,
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner’s name at
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate the time when the misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the respondent,
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to face life
damages to be awarded.” with nary but two remaining limbs.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff 54. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION VS CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 118889,
who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled MARCH 23, 1998
to recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear the FACTS: Anco Enterprises Company (ANCO), a partnership between
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held Ang Gui and Co To, was engaged in the shipping business operating
liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence two common carriers: M/T ANCO that is a tugboat and D/B Lucio
barge - no engine of its own, it could not maneuver by itself and
had to be towed by a tugboat for it to move from one place to
Records show that when the accident happened, the victim was
another.September 23 1979: San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shipped
standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of from Mandaue City, Cebu, on board the D/B Lucio, for towage by
the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was intended M/T ANCO:25,000 cases Pale Pilsen and 350 cases Cerveza Negra -
for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those consignee SMC’s Beer Marketing Division (BMD)-Estancia Beer
loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running Sales Office, Estancia, Iloilo 15,000 cases Pale Pilsen and 200 cases
vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said uncemented Cerveza Negra - consignee SMC’s BMD-San Jose Beer Sales Office,
San Jose, Antique. September 30, 1979: D/B Lucio was towed by the have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. 
M/T ANCO arrived and M/T ANCO left the barge immediately. The However, the common carrier must exercise due diligence
clouds were dark and the waves were big so SMC’s District Sales to prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the
Supervisor, Fernando Macabuag, requested ANCO’s representative occurrence of flood, storm, or other natural disaster in order
to transfer the barge to a safer place but it refused so around the that the common carrier may be exempted from liability  for
midnight, the barge sunk along with 29,210 cases of Pale Pilsen and the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods . . . 
500 cases of Cerveza Negra totalling to P1,346,197. When SMC
claimed against ANCO it stated that they agreed that it would not Caso fortuito or force majeure: extraordinary events not
be liable for any losses or damages resulting to the cargoes by foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or
reason of fortuitous event and it was agreed to be insured with which though foreseen, were inevitable not enough that the event
FGU for 20,000 cases or P858,500. ANCO filed against FGU. FGU should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
alleged that ANCO and SMC failed to exercise ordinary diligence or believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid - not
the diligence of a good father of the family in the care and in this case. Other vessels in the port of San Jose, Antique,
supervision of the cargoes. RTC: ANCO liable to SMC and FGU liable managed to transfer to another place. To be exempted from
for 53% of the lost cargoes. CA affirmed. responsibility, the natural disaster should have been the proximate
and only cause of the loss. There must have been no contributory
ISSUE: W/N FGU should be exempted from liability to ANCO for the negligence on the part of the common carrier.  There was blatant
lost cargoes because of a fortuitous event and negligence of ANCO  negligence on the part of M/T ANCO’s crewmembers, first in
leaving the engine-less barge D/B Lucio at the mercy of the storm
RULING: YES. Art. 1733.  Common carriers, from the nature of their without the assistance of the tugboat, and again in failing to heed
business and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe the request of SMC’s representatives to have the barge transferred
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the to a safer place. When evidence show that the insured’s negligence
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the or recklessness is so gross as to be sufficient to constitute a willful
circumstances of each case. act, the insurer must be exonerated. ANCO’s employees is of such
Such extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods is further gross character that it amounts to a wrongful act which must
expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and 1745 Nos. 5, 6, and 7 . . . exonerate FGU from liability under the insurance contract. Both the
D/B Lucio and the M/T ANCO were blatantly negligent.
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same 55. JIMMY CO. ET. AL. VS CA, ET. AL., GR. NO. 124922, JUNE 22, 1998
is due to any of the following causes only: FACTS: Petitioner entrusted his Nissan pick-up car 1988 model to
private respondent - which is engaged in the sale, distribution and
(1)     Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster repair of motor vehicles - for the following job repair services and
or calamity; supply of parts: Bleed injection pump and all nozzles, Adjust valve
tappet, Change oil and filter, Open up and service four wheel
Art. 1739. In order that the common carrier may be brakes, clean and adjust, Lubricate accelerator linkages, Replace
exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster must aircon belt; and Replace battery.
Private respondent undertook to return the vehicle on July 21, 1990 lawfully placed in its possession was due to carnapping.
fully serviced and supplied in accordance with the job contract. Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The
After petitioner paid in full the repair bill in the amount fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from anothers
of P1,397.00, private respondent issued to him a gate pass for the rightful possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not
release of the vehicle on said date. But came July 21, 1990, the latter automatically give rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as
could not release the vehicle as its battery was weak and was not such, carnapping entails more than the mere forceful taking of
yet replaced. Left with no option, petitioner himself bought a new anothers property. It must be proved and established that the
battery nearby and delivered it to private respondent for event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties and
installation on the same day. However, the battery was not that neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent has
installed and the delivery of the car was rescheduled to July 24, any participation. In accordance with the Rules of evidence, the
1990 or three (3) days later. When petitioner sought to reclaim his burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests
car in the afternoon of July 24, 1990, he was told that it was on him who invokes it-which in this case is the private respondent.
carnapped earlier that morning while being road-tested by private However, other than the police report of the alleged carnapping
respondents employee along Pedro Gil and Perez Streets in Paco, incident, no other evidence was presented by private respondent
Manila. Having failed to recover his car and its accessories or the to the effect that the incident was not due to its fault. A police
value thereof, petitioner filed a suit for damages against private report of an alleged crime, to which only private respondent is
respondent anchoring his claim on the latters alleged negligence. privy, does not suffice to established the carnapping. Neither does
For its part, private respondent contended that it has no liability it prove that there was no fault on the part of private respondent
because the car was lost as a result of a fortuitous event - the notwithstanding the parties agreement at the pre-trial that the car
carnapping. was carnapped. Carnapping does not foreclose the possibility of
The court a quo found private respondent guilty of delay in the fault or negligence on the part of private respondent.
performance of its obligation and held it liable to petitioner for the Even assuming arguendo that carnapping was duly established as a
value of the lost vehicle and its accessories plus interest and fortuitous event, still private respondent cannot escape liability.
attorneys fees.  Article 1165 Of the New Civil Code makes an obligor who is guilty of
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ruling of the delay responsible even for a fortuitous event until he has effected
lower court and ordered the dismissal of petitioners damage suit. the delivery. In this case, private respondent was already in delay as
[7]
 The CA ruled that: (1) the trial court was limited to resolving the it was supposed to deliver petitioners car three (3) days before it
issue of negligence as agreed during pre-trial; hence it cannot pass was lost. Petitioners agreement to the rescheduled delivery does
on the issue of delay; and (2) the vehicle was lost due to a not defeat his claim as private respondent had already breached its
fortuitous event. obligation. Moreover, such accession cannot be construed as
ISSUE: Whether a repair shop can be held liable for the loss of a waiver of petitioners right to hold private respondent liable
customers vehicle while the same is in its custody for repair or because the car was unusable and thus, petitioner had no option
other job services? but to leave it.
RULING: YES. The Court resolves the query in favor of the Assuming further that there was no delay, still working against
customer. It is a not a defense for a repair shop of motor vehicles private respondent is the legal presumption under Article 1265 that
to escape liability simply because the damage or loss of a thing its possession of the thing at the time it was lost was due to its
fault. This presumption is reasonable since he who has the custody respondents repair business is duly registered, it presupposes that
and care of the thing can easily explain the circumstances of the its shop is covered by insurance from which it may recover the loss.
loss. The vehicle owner has no duty to show that the repair shop If private respondent can recover from its insurer, then it would be
was at fault. All that petitioner needs to prove, as claimant, is the unjustly enriched if it will not compensate petitioner to whom no
simple fact that private respondent was in possession of the fault can be attributed. Otherwise, if the shop is not registered,
vehicle at the time it was lost. In this case, private respondents then the presumption of negligence applies.
possession at the time of the loss is undisputed. Consequently, the
burden shifts to the possessor who needs to present controverting 56. EXCONDE VS CAPUNO, 101 PHIL 842
evidence sufficient enough to overcome that presumption. FACTS: Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil of
Moreover, the exempting circumstances - earthquake, flood, storm Balintawak Elementary School. In March 1949, he attended a boy
or other natural calamity - when the presumption of fault is not scout parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. While they were inside a jeep, he
applicable do not concur in this case. Accordingly, having failed to took control of the wheels which he later lost control of causing
rebut the presumption and since the case does not fall under the the jeep to go turtle thereby killing two other students, Isidoro
exceptions, private respondent is answerable for the loss. Caperina and one other. Isidoro’s mother, Sabina Exconde, sued
It must likewise be emphasized that pursuant to Articles 1174 and Dante Capuno for the death of her son. Pending the criminal action,
1262 of the New Civil Code, liability attaches even if the loss was the mother reserved her right to file a separate civil action which
due to a fortuitous event if the nature of the obligation requires the she subsequently filed against Dante and his dad, Delfin Capuno.
assumption of risk. Carnapping is a normal business risk for those
engaged in the repair of motor vehicles. For just as the owner is ISSUE: Whether Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for
exposed to that risk so is the repair shop since the car was damages.
entrusted to it.
That is why, repair shops are required to first register with the RULING: Yes. Under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code,
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and to secure an insurance paragraph 1 and 5 provides that: “The obligation imposed by the
policy for the shop covering the property entrusted by its customer next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts
for repair, service or maintenance as a pre-requisite for such and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
registration/accreditation. Violation of this statutory duty responsible. The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
constitutes negligence per se. Having taken custody of the vehicle, mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children
private respondent is obliged not only to repair the vehicle but who live with them. Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades
must also provide the customer with some form of security for his are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices
property over which he loses immediate control. An owner who while they are under their custody.
cannot exercise the seven (7) juses or attributes of ownership the
right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in
accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
the fruits  is a crippled owner. Failure of the repair shop to provide may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
security to a motor vehicle owner would leave the latter at the obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority
mercy of the former. Moreover, on the assumption that private they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the “duty
of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the
them and instructing them in proportion to their means”, while, on "pitogo". However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he
the other hand, gives them the “right to correct and punish them in aggresively pushed the latter. The fight started then. After Augusto
moderation”. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and the latter was clutching
this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto's anger, Augusto
good father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut him on the
to prove. right check with a piece of razor.
On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the
law, “teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any A complaint was filed, however the CFI dismissed the complaint.
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under The CA rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay P2,000 as
moral damages and P50 for medical expenses, for the physical
their custody”, but this provision only applies to an institution of
injury caused by the son of the petitioner.
arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.
ISSUE Whether the teacher or head of the school should be held
57. MERCADO VS CA, 108 PHIL 414 responsible instead of the father since the incident of the inflicting
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during
co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while recess time)
Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L.
Mercado. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were RULING: NO. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son
A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be was studying should be made liable, is as follows:
described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On ART. 2180. . . .
February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their
started the aggression. Undeniably, the "pitogo" belonged to custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and
Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these
"pitogo" belonged to Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and
it to him, Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball with which they actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the
could play. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
"pitogo" belonged to Augusto. He thought it was the "pitogo" of Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils
Benedicto P. Lim, so that when Augusto attempted to get the appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their
"pitogo" from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because homes with their parents after school is over. The situation
contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between
nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over
the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their
58. PALISOC VS BRILLANTES, 41 SCRA 548
students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or
FACTS: In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was
other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last
their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they
arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of
damage.” In the light of the factual findings of the lower court’s
Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered
decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from
blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued
liability. The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which
Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor
prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his
(Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis
teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school
of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article
may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.
2180 of the Civil Code.
The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable
59. AMADERA VS CA, ET. AL., GR NO. L-47745, APRIL 15, 1988
for damages and that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not
FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school,
liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable “so long as
was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the
they [the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means,
former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless
as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals , that teachers or heads of
imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil
establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students
action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its
if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other
rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher
officials of the school – which Daffon was not.
together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the
students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.
defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the
following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution
RULING: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the
of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students
Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde Case as they
were not in the custody of the school since the semester has
adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case.
already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun,
Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the
and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence
school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict
through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining
discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his
under school custody because he went to school to comply with a death. Petition denied.
requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).
60. PALAFOX VS PROVINCE OF ILOCO NORTE, ET. AL., GR NO.
ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable. 10659, JANUARY 1968
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
RULING: No. Article 2180 - Lastly, teachers or heads of quashing the case filed by appellants against defendants, except as
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages far as Sabas Torralba, was concerned. It
appears that Sabas Torralba was employed as driver of the
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte detailed to the office of the
remain in their custody. District Engineer. On September 30, 1948, while driving
At the time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the his freight truck in compliance with his duties, he ran over Proceto
authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally Palafox, father of appellants, and the victim died as a result.
ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in Prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence, Sabas
the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was Torralba pleaded guilty and was accordingly sentenced. Having
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the reserved their right to file a civil action, the heirs later began these
proceeding against the employer province, the District Engineer,
other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys
the Provincial Treasurer and Sabas Torralba. To attach liability to
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in- the State for the negligence of Sabas Torralba a declaration must
charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a be made that he was "a special agent,"—and not one upon whom
general authority over the students and not direct control and properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion.
influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular This is under Article 1903 of the Civil Code; but this ruling may not
classes. be made, because the driver was not a special agent of the
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should Government within the scope of said article. And the principle
applies only to the Insular, as distinguished from the provincial or
probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated
municipal governments. Appellants invoke the doctrine of
an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without respondent superior as illustrated in the case of Mendoza vs. De
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher Leon, concerning liability of municipal corporations for negligent
authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof acts of their employees. It will be seen from that decision that if the
was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident. negligent employee was engaged in the performance of
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the governmental duties, as distinguished from corporate or
provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts proprietary or business functions—the government is not liable.
The construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and
and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the
the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents governmental activities. Hence, the death of Palafox—tragic and
deplorable though it may be—imposed on the province no duty to
pay monetary compensation. Judgment affirmed, with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
61. MERITT VS GOVERNMENT, 34 PHIL 311 responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and
FACTS: The facts of the case took place in the 1910. E. Merritt was a in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by
constructor of wooden buildings who was excellent at his work. an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of
Faura, he was bumped by the General Hospital ambulance, a the Civil Code.
government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor
to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was was a government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can
hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so be no liability from the government. “The Government does not
much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn. agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government which would be subversive of the public interest.”
by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a
E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused
Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed
of damages and ordered the government to pay the same. order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration
act of the driver of the ambulance, as the negligence which caused and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which
the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
Government? regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance
of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
RULING: No. The State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is Government is not liable.
only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when Likewise, by consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
General Hospital was not such an agent. liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by
purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed
on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be
liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the
sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of
the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.