Criminal Procedure Cases

Module I
Barroso v. Judge Omelio

G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015

FACTS:

Barroso filed a complaint for collection of sum of money, damages, and attorney’s fees against Dennis
Li. The complaint includes a writ of attachment which was granted with the corresponding attachment bond.
Dennis Li, on the other hand, filed a counter-attachment bond issued by Travelers Insurance and Surety
Corporation (Travelers). Thereafter, Barroso filed a motion for approval of compromise agreement which was
granted by the Court and issued a writ of execution. Regardless of the agreement, Dennis Li still failed to pay
the sums of money and a writ of execution was returned by sheriff unsatisfied.

An alias writ of execution was later issued against Dennis Li and Travelers based on the counter bond
filed by Dennis Li. Travelers asked a period of 7 days to validate the counter-bond, however, they filed a
separate case for Declaration of Nullity, Prohibition, Injunction and Damages which was raffled to RTC 14.
Judge Omelio of RTC 14 issued a preliminary injunction wherein he assailed the Order dated July 29, 2009
which directs the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

The petitioner acknowledged that the CA had concurrent jurisdiction over this petition but he resorted to
the Supreme Court by pointing out that Judge Omelio’s conduct shows gross ignorance of the law and other
remedy under ordinary course of law would not be speedy and adequate.

ISSUE:

Did the Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and gross ignorance of the law by assuming jurisdiction over the action for prohibition and injunction against
the executive sheriff of a coequal court.

RULING:

Yes.

Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Rule on Non-Interference

Under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in regular courts or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice that “no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant relief sought by the
injunction.

The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment to the exclusion of all other coordinate
courts for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.

Thus, a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still pending in court, so that
all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.

Applying the foregoing rule, the issuance of the subject writ of preliminary injunction was improper and
thus correctible by certiorari. Judge Omelio does not have jurisdiction to hinder the enforcement of an order of

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
a co-equal court. He must be aware that said co-equal court had exclusive jurisdiction or authority to correct its
own issuances if ever there was indeed a mistake

Hierarchy of Courts

The Court emphasized that trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by
the Supreme Court. It is an important component of the orderly administration of justice and not imposed
merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons. This doctrine ensures that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.

Exceptions to this rule: (The rule is not absolute)

For exceptionally compelling reasons, the Court may exercise its discretion to act on special civil actions for
certiorari filed directly with it. Examples of cases that present compelling reasons are:

(1) those... involving genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;

(2) those where the issues are of transcendental importance, and the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
are so great as to outweigh the necessity for prudence;

(3) cases of... first impression, where no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on such
issues;

(4) where the constitutional issues raised are better decided after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body
and with the concurrence of the majority of those who... participated in its discussion;

(5) where time is of the essence;

(6) where the act being questioned was that of a constitutional body;

(7) where there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free
petitioner from the injurious... effects of respondents' acts in violation of their constitutional rights; and

(8) the issues involve public welfare, the advancement of public policy, the broader interest of justice, or where
the orders complained of are patent nullities, or where appeal can be considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy.

(Ha Datu Tawahig v. Hon Cebu City Prosecutor)

(9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and

(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
De Lima v. Guerrero

G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017

FACTS: 

A petition was filed by De Lima to assail the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her by Judge
Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa, Branch 204 in the criminal case for Illegal Drug
Trading filed by the government after the resolution of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Department of Justice. Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information, the Sandiganbayan
has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. Sandiganbayan has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the
case considering that the acts described in the Information were intimately related to her position as the
Secretary of Justice.

Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of RA
9165, including the acts described in the Information against the petitioner. They contended that
Sandiganbayan was specifically created as an anti-graft court, it was never conferred with the power to try
drug-related cases even those committed by public officials.

On Procedural Issues

De Lima claims that she did not violate the rules on the hierarchy of courts, exhaustion of judicial
remedies, and against forum-shopping in filing the petition. Direct recourse to the Supreme Court may be
allowed if the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the availing of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of the Supreme
Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.

According to De Lima, her petition is a matter of national interest and has serious implications. It
warrants a deviation from the rule on hierarchy of courts as it involves questions of first impression, the
answers to which will significantly impact the power of public institutions and the rights of citizens. The petition
also involves questions of law, the resolution of which will not only affect her but all citizens of the country. It
also warrants an exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction in the interest of speedy justice and to
avoid future litigation.

She also claims that her petition was properly notarized and fully complied with the substantial
requirements of notarization. According to De Lima, the Supreme Court has more substantive and relevant
issues to resolve than be bothered with such narrow, formalistic pettiness and legal nitpicking on the proper
accomplishment of her petition’s verification.

In the end, De Lima asked the Supreme Court to order her immediate release from detention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 9165 committed
by a public officer?

RULING:

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
NO. RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to “exclusively try and
hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165). This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous
drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660.  It is a canon of statutory
construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to
the general. 

Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660*, is the general law on jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their
office; Section 90 of RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction
violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon
the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA
9165 was committed in relation to the public officials’ office.

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless
of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Ha Datu Tawahig v. Hon. Cebu City Prosecutor, et. al.

G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019

FACTS:

Lorriane Fe P. Igot (Igot) filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Cebu City Prosecutor charging Roderick
Sumatra (Ha Datu Tawahig, Tribal Chieftain of Higaonon Tribe) with rape. Prosecutor I Lineth Lapinid found
probable cause to charge Sumatra with rape and recommended filing a corresponding information.

Judge Singco directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Sumatra, but he would not be
arrested until July 2, 2013. Following his arrest, Sumatra filed a Motion to Quash and Supplemental Motion to
Quash. These motions cited as bases Sections 15 and 65 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, predicated on
the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused and that the present controversy is
purely a dispute involving indigenous cultural communities over which customary laws must apply in
accordance with their tribal justice system and under the jurisdiction of the NCIP.

Singco denied the Motion to Quash and Supplemental Motion to Quash because The Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act does not apply to prosecution of a “dispute” such as this case as it does not involve claims
over ancestral domain nor it relates to their rights which would require the application of the customary law and
practices to resolve the dispute between the parties herein.

But a certain Vicente B. Gonzales, Jr. (Gonzales), identifying himself as Datu Bontito Leon Kilat and
representing himself to be a "customary lawyer," filed a "Motion to Release the Indigenous Person," which was
founded on grounds substantially the same as the Motion and Supplemental Motion to Quash.

Sumatra filed this Petition for Mandamus on November 11, 2015. He notes that Igot had already
brought her accusations against him before the concerned Council of Elders and that the Dadantulan Tribal
Court was subsequently formed. He adds that on January 3, 2007, the Dadantulan Tribal Court issued a
Resolution clearing him and declaring that he "should be spared from criminal, civil, and administrative
liability." Relying on the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and "other related laws concerning cases involving
indigenous peoples," petitioner maintains that a writ of mandamus must be issued to compel respondents to
"uphold and respect" the Dadantulan Tribal Court Resolution, and "thereby release Sumatra from jail to stop
his continued arbitrary detention."

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not this Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondents to desist from
proceeding with the rape case against petitioner Roderick D. Sumatra.
II. Whether or not the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act remove the courts of law jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving indigenous people.

RULING:

I. No. The petition was denied.

Hierarchy of Courts

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
1987 Constitution vests this Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. However, it is not only this Court that has the competence to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The Court of Appeals and regional trial courts are equally
capable of taking cognizance of petitions for such writs.

Nonetheless, the original jurisdiction this Court shares with the Court of Appeals and regional trial
courts is not a license to immediately seek relief from this Court. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus must be filed in keeping with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The doctrine of hierarchy of
courts is grounded on considerations of judicial economy.

This Court, however, takes cognizance of the Petition, in the interest of addressing the novel issue of
whether the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act works to remove from courts of law jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving indigenous peoples. It does not.

Petitioner asserts that, in light of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, it was respondents' duty to desist
from proceeding with the case against him. His plea for relief, therefore, falls under the first situation. For a writ
of mandamus to be issued in such a situation, there must be a concurrence between: (1) a clear, duly
established legal right pertaining to petitioner; and (2) a correlative, ministerial duty imposed by law upon
respondent, which that respondent unlawfully neglects. The first situation demands a concurrence between a
clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a correlative duty incumbent upon respondents to perform an act,
this duty being imposed upon them by law. Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established.
It cannot be a prospective entitlement that is yet to be settled

II. The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act DOES NOT compel courts of law to desist from
taking cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no
correlative rights and duties in support of petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus
cannot be issued.

To yield criminal prosecution would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as the objects of
criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may enable a measure of reparation for private injuries
engendered by criminal offenses, but it will never enable the consummate recompense owed to the State and
the Filipino people. Ultimately then, yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a miscarriage of justice.

It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to facilitate such miscarriage of justice. Its view
of self-governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances. Preservation is pursued in the
context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with the national legal system. Customary laws cannot
work to undermine penal statutes designed to address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.

Viewed through the lens of the requisites for issuing a writ of mandamus, there is no right or duty to
even speak of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does it state that courts of law are to
abandon jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of mechanisms applying customary laws. Petitioner
derives no right from the Dadantulan Tribal Court to be spared from criminal liability. The Regional Trial Court
is under no obligation to defer to the exculpatory pronouncements made by the Dadantulan Tribal Court.
Instead, it must proceed to rule on petitioner's alleged liability with all prudence and erudition.

Principles:

The Philippine legal system's framework for the protection of indigenous peoples was never intended and will
not operate to deprive courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Individuals belonging to indigenous cultural

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
communities who are charged with criminal offenses cannot invoke Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, to evade prosecution and liability under courts of law.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Edgar Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005

FACTS:

Crisostomo is a member of PNP and a jail guard at the Solano Municipal Jail. Together with Mario
Calingayan and other inmates, they were charged with the murder of Renato Suba, an inmate in the Solano
Municipal Jail.

Renato Suba, was brought to the police station on the night of February 13, 1989 for investigation for
allegedly hitting the head of a certain Diosdado Lacangan. After investigation, he was detained alone in the
third cell. On the following day at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, he was visited by his brother, Rizalino Suba,
whom he asked to bring him a blanket, toothbrush, clothes and foods. Rizalino left the municipal jail on
February 14, 1989, at almost 5:20 p.m., while his other brother, Rolando, brought the things to him in jail.
Rolando left their house at about 5:30 p.m. and came back at 6:00 oclock. At that time, Renato was in good
health and in good condition and that he was not complaining anything about his body. Another detained,
Mario Calingayan saw him still alive lying down after 6:00 p.m. when he was about to take a  bath. At around
9:00 o’clock of the same day, Mr. Baldovino, a barangay councilman, informed the Renato’s family that they
should go to the municipal building as per request of the policemen.

Rizalino Suba, together with his uncle David Suba and Manuel Rollo, a barangay councilman, arrived at

the municipal building at 9:10 p.m. There they saw that the he was already lying dead on the cement floor
outside the cell in the municipal building. Calingayan was detained with five (5) others at the second cell
among four (4) cells in the jail. The four (4) cells, although having their own separate doors, made of iron grills
and equipped each with a padlock, were always open. It was up to them whether to close the doors, and any
detention prisoner could go to any cell inside the prison. Petitioner Edgar Crisostomo was the only one on duty
at the time of the death of the victim.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that only Crisostomo and Calingayan stood the trial and that they are guilty.
They found sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the two of murder. The Sandiganbayan relied on the
autopsy and exhumation reports in disregarding the defense theory that Renato committed suicide by hanging
himself with a blanket.

Crisostomo argues that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try the case. He contends that the mere
allegation in the Information that the offense was committed in relation to his office is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a crime of murder committed by a public official.
RULING:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try the case. However, the prosecution failed to prove
Crisostomo and Calingayan’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the Court acquitted the accused.
Crisostomo’s theory would have been tenable if the murdered victim was not a prisoner under his
custody as a jail guard. Indeed, murder and homicide will never be the main function of any public office. But
when would murder or homicide, committed by a public officer, fall within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?
RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
WHEN AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO PUBLIC OFFICE
People v. Montejo provided an answer where the Court explained that a public officer commits an
offense in relation to his office if he perpetrates the offense while performing, though in an improper or
irregular manner, his official functions and he cannot commit the offense without holding his public
office. In such a case, there is an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused. If the
information alleges the close connection between the offense charged and the office of the accused, the case
falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The case of People v. Montejo is an exception the Sanchez
v. Demetriou recognized.
TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISIDCTION:
Does the Information allege a close or intimate connection between the offense charged and
Crisostomo’s public office? YES
Assuming that the Information failed to allege that Crisostomo committed the crime in relation to his
office, does the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction? YES. Because the Information was filed on October 19,
1993 and the case of Deloso v. Domingo was promulgated on 1990 where it did not require that the
information should allege that the accused public officer committed the offense in relation to his office before
the Sandiganbayan could assume jurisdiction over the case. This ruling relied solely on PD 1606.

In the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas promulgated on 1991, the Court clarified that offenses specified in
Sec. 4 (a)(2) of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, must be committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office and the information MUST allege this fact.

Based on the forgoing findings and Deloso v. Domingo, the Sandiganabyan had every reason to
assume jurisdiction over this case. Crisostomo is estopped from questioning the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction
because he waited until the very last moment of the case, the rendition of the verdict, before he questioned the
jurisdiction.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Ampongan v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 234670-71, August 14, 2019

FACTS:

On July 14, 2017, Omar Erasmo Gonowon Ampongan (Ampongan) was charged with violations of Sec.
3 (e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Art. 171 (2) of the RPC, in connection with the
appointment of Edsel Dimaiwat to the vacant position of Secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iriga City
in 2014. At the time of the commission of the alleged offenses, Ampongan was the Vice Mayor of Iriga City,
Camarines Sur, with Salary grade 26 as classified under RA 6758.

Ampongan filed a motion to quash the Information for lack of jurisdiction. He alleges that it must be
heard by the RTC as provided under Sec. 2 of RA 10660 which is the law at the time if the institution of the
action. And assuming that it is RA 8249 which is the law governing the jurisdiction, he should still be heard by
RTC because as Vice Mayor, his salary grade is below the prescribed grade which is 27. His is 26. And is not
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

During arraignment, the Court ordered a plea of not guilty be entered for Ampongan in the 2 criminal
cases. Aggrieved, Ampongan filed an instant petition for certiorari alleging that Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that it has jurisdiction to try
the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed by Ampongan
and over him.

What is the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan under RA 8249 as amended by RA 10660?

RULING:

Serana v. Sandiganbayan was used to discuss the history of the creation of Sandiganbayan.

PD 1486 – created Sandiganbayan promulgated by President Marcos on June 11, 1978.

PD 1606 – amended PD 1486 promulgated on December 10, 1978. This expanded the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan.

PD 1861 – amended PD 1606 on March 23, 1983 further altering its jurisdiction.

RA 7975 – made succeeding amendment to PD 1606; approved on March 30, 1995.

RA 8249 – amended PD 1606 on February 5, 1997. Section 4 further modified the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

RA 10660 – amended RA 8249 which took effect on May 5, 2015. Section amends the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

WHEN DO YOU DETERMINE WHETHER A COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY A CRIMINAL

CASE?

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Generally, the jurisdiction of the Court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of
the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.

In this case, the Informations were files in July 14, 2017 but it was allegedly committed on Novemeber
3, 2014 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto. While RA 10660 which took effect on May 5, 2015 is the law
in force at the time of the institution of the action, such law is not applicable to petitioner’s case. RA 10660
provides for the reckoning point to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of RA 3019 which is the time of the commission of the offense. Therefore, while the
Informations were filed on 2017, the alleged offenses were committed on 2014. Thus, the Sandiganbayan did
not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to quash the Informations since RA 10660 finds no
application to Ampongan’s case.

The applicable law is RA 8249 (Sec. 4). The Supreme Court used the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan
where the Sandiganbayan exercised its jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan
City with salary grade 26.

Under paragraph 1 of Sec. 4 (a) of PD 1606, as amended by Sec. 2 of RA 7975, Congress included
specific officials, without any reference as to their salary grades, in the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.

Thus, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Samson v. Cabanos

G.R. No. 161693, June 28, 2005

FACTS:

Manolo P. Samson was charged with unfair competition by using trademarks and symbols prejudicial to
CATERPILLAR Inc. on products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and other
paraphernalia. This is a violation of Sec. 168.3 (a) in relation to Secs. 123.1 (e), 131.3 and 170 of RA 83293
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.

Samson moved to quash the Information for the reason that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense. He argued that Sec. 170 of RA 8293 provides that the penalty for violation 168 thereof is
imprisonment from 2 years to 5 years and a fine ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 and RA 7691 amending BP
129 vested MTC exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment NOT exceeding
6 years imprisonment irrespective of the amount of fine.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of Intellectual
Property Rights

RULING:

Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court finds no merit in the claim of Samson
that RA 166 was expressly repealed by RA 8293. RA 8293 and RA 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction
over violations of Intellectual Property Rights to the Regional Trial Court. They must prevail over RA 7691,
which is a general law. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to RTC must prevail over that granted by a
general law to MTC.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
COMELEC v. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre and Ma. Leonisa Genovia

G.R. No. 171208, September 7, 2007

FACTS:

During the synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, respondent Ma.Leonisa Genovia willfully and
unlawfully, cast her vote in substitution of another person by misrepresenting herself to be Emely Genovia
and voted in substitution of said Emely Genovia, a registered voter in Precinct No. 779-A, Barangay 60,
Caloocan City.

Under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, violation of any election offense is punishable as
follows:

SECTION 264. Penalties. – Any person found guilty of any election offense under
this Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more
than six years.

The Caloocan RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, it citing Section 32 (2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) which reads as follows:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Case. –  Except in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment

not exceeding six (6) years

The COMELEC moved to reconsider the trial court’s dismissal order, inviting attention to Section 268 of
the Omnibus Election Code which reads:

SECTION 268. Jurisdiction of courts. – The regional trial court shall have the exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be
under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

The trial court denied the COMELEC’s motion for "lack of merit. The COMELEC argues that under the
above-quoted provision of Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, all criminal cases for violation of the
Code, except those relating to failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction
of inferior courts fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code

RULING:

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Yes. As correctly argued by the COMELEC, Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically
provides, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings
for violation of the Code "except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote." Following
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, any criminal action or proceeding which bears the same penalty,
with the exception of the therein mentioned two cases, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional
trial courts.

SECTION 268. Jurisdiction of courts. – The regional trial court shall have the exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be
under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp.

G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013

FACTS:

On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development
Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and -construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and
Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost isP38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for the design and
construction of passenger terminal, andP20,200,000 for the design and construction of the jetty port facility.In
the course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional works. The scope of work
under these change orders were agreed upon by petitioner and respondent.

On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the construction of
Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract price for
Phase II is P2,475,345.54.

On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for the total amount ofP22,419,112.96 covering unpaid
accomplishments on works undertaken, tax refunds, price escalation, labor costs, overhead costs, and interest.

On July 13, 2006, respondent sued petitioner in the Regional Trial Court to collect the aforesaid amounts. On
August 17, 2006, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment.

After trial, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of plaintiff Jody King Construction And Development
Corporation and against defendant Province of Aklan.

Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. On November 24, 2009, the trial court issued a writ of execution
ordering Sheriff IV Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the immediate payment
ofP67,027,378.34 and tender the same to the respondent. Consequently, Sheriff Gamboa served notices of
garnishment on Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the
Philippines at their branches in Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds deposited
under the account of petitioner. Said banks, however, refused to give due course to the court order, citing the
relevant provisions of statutes, circulars and jurisprudence on the determination of government monetary
liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction.

Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution dated November 24, 2009, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
111754.

On December 7, 2009, the trial court denied petitioners notice of appeal filed on December 1, 2009. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 2009 Order was likewise denied.On May 20, 2010, petitioner
filed another petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid orders denying due course to its notice of
appeal.

By Decision dated October 18, 2010, the CAs First Division dismissed the petition as it found no grave abuse
of discretion in the lower courts issuance of the writ of execution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was likewise denied by the CA. The CA stressed that even assuming as true the alleged errors
committed by the trial court, these were insufficient for a ruling that grave abuse of discretion had been
committed. On the matter of execution of the trial courts decision, the appellate court said that it was rendered
moot by respondents filing of a petition before the Commission on Audit (COA).
RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
On August 31, 2011, the CAs Sixteenth Division rendered its Decision dismissing the petition. The CA said that
petitioner failed to provide valid justification for its failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration; counsels
explanation that he believed in good faith that the August 14, 2009 Decision of the trial court was received on
September 25, 2009 because it was handed to him by his personnel only on that day is not a justifiable excuse
that would warrant the relaxation of the rule on reglementary period of appeal. The CA also held that petitioner
is estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COAs primary
jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.

Petitioner is not estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 273, Marikina City
over the subject matter of the case.

The petition for certiorari filed before the CA due to the RTCs denial of petitioners Notice of Appeal was in
accord with jurisprudence.

ISSUES:

I. Which Court has jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities
II. Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable to this case? If yes, what are the
exceptions?
III. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of execution was proper?
IV. What is the effect of a judgement rendered by a body or tribunal which has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter?

RULING:

I. COA has the primary jurisdiction over the respondent’s money claims. It is the COA and not
the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioner’s money claim against respondent
local government unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties’ failure to argue the issue
nor active participation in the proceedings. Respondent’s collection suit being directed against a
local government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the
RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA.
Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its
notice of appeal and before the CA.
II. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction posits that if a case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if
the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative agency. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to
guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in
the proceeding before the court.

Exceptions to the rule on primary jurisdiction:

(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;

(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;

(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;

(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice;

(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;

(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;

(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;

(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;

(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

(k) when strong public interest is involved; and,

(l) in quo warranto proceedings.

However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the present case. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered
thereby are null and void.

III. No. It is not proper. The writ of execution issued in violation of COA’s primary jurisdiction is
VOID.
IV. All the proceedings of the Court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered
thereby are null and void. Since a judgement rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case is no judgement at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the
creator of any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect
and the void judgement can never be final and any writ of execution bases on it is likewise void.
Clearly, the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it ordered
the execution of its judgement against petitioner and garnishment of the latter’s fund.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Union Bank of the Philippines v. People
G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012

FACTS:
Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) “by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving
the same issue in another tribunal or agency”. The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted
and used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay
City Court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati
City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the
MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on
the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in
the place where the false document was presented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court.
RULING:
The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper
court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Article 183
of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the
basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.” The
constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated
when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the
RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit
under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her
affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime
is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at
the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony
made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either
be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath
and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue
shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court where it was stated that criminal action shall be
instituted where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.
The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of perjury and provided that Tomas did all things in Makati,
thus making Makati the right venue for the case.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
People v. Taroy
G.R. No. 192466, September 7, 2011

FACTS:

The case pertains to resolve the question of proof of territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. The accused herein is Alejo
taroy who was charged with 2 counts of rape before the RTC of La Trinidad Benguet.
Mila is Taroy’s wife. Mila has an eldest daughter from her first marriage named Des. The couple lived with
Mila’s children in Benguet at the boundary of Baguio City. 
According to Des, when she was still 10 years old, Taroy raped her when she was alone cleaning their
house. She was told not to tell anyone otherwise Mila and her siblings would suffer harm. This incident was
followed by another sexual abuse on the next year. This time it occurred inside Des’ bedroom where Taroy
pointed a knife at her and ordered her to undress and submit to his sexual desires.

Des only confided the story to her mother and aunt four years later. They accompanied her to the NBI
to complain. She also underwent medical examination where it was revealed that there was indeed a history of
previous blunt force caused by an insertion of an erect penis. The public prosecutor charged Taroy with two
counts of rape before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. Correspondingly, the RTC convicted Taroy of the
offense and penalized him to suffer reclusion perpetua.

Taroy challenged the Benguet RTC’s jurisdiction over the crimes charged contending that their
residence where the alleged offenses took place was at the boundary of Baguio City.

The RTC held, however, that Taroy’s testimony that their residence was in Baguio City did not strip
the court of its jurisdiction since he waived the jurisdictional requirement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC. It held that the prosecution has sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet has jurisdiction to hear the rape cases against Taroy.

RULING:

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor subjected to stipulation. The right
venue must exist as a matter of law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be
instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality, city, or province where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place.

The information filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were committed in the victim and
the offender’s house in City Limit, Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation
conferred territorial jurisdiction over the subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies
of Mila and Des as well as the affidavit of arrest point to this fact. Clearly, Taroy’s uncorroborated assertion that
the subject offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief. Besides, he admitted during the pre-trial
in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad that had jurisdiction to hear the case. Taken altogether, that
RTC’s jurisdiction to hear the case is beyond dispute.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Miranda V. Tuliao
G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006

FACTS:
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1
Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where the
Supreme Court, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a
certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and
Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.          

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.      

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners
and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

RULING:

YES, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of
the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law.

Custody of the Law Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant
where the mere application therefor constitutes a
RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused
ACCOMPLISHED either by arrest or voluntary ACQUIRED upon his arrest or voluntary appearance
surrender
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet One can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of law, such as when an accused escapes custody
a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash after his trial has commenced. 
the warrant. 
Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on
the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will
and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the
will of the law.
Custody of the law is literally custody over the body
of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Paderanga v. CA

G.R. No. 115407, August 28, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple
murder in the Regional Trial Court for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog
City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time.

The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for petitioner’s
apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through counsel, a motion for admission to bail
with the trial court which set the same for hearing.

As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital, his counsel
manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered
being in the custody of the law.

The prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge.

Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further
presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the
amount of P200,000.00

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the grant of bail was tainted with grave abuse of discretion

RULING: 

No.

As a paramount requisite, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, or otherwise
deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail.

A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of
a warrant of arrest issued or by warrantless arrest or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.

In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for admission to
bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the
factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody.

Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person.

Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail
court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed
for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
custody of the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called “house
arrest” or, in case of military offenders, by being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military camp area.

The general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances where
the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for
admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after
a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,
Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the
part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court is required with the participation of both the defense and a
duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show
that the evidence meets the required quantum.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Treñas v. People

G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012

FACTS:

December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City... mortgaged with
Maybank... bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private...
complainant Elizabeth

Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following
expenses

Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and
prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.

Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for

P24,000.00.

BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake.

Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.

Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856

When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati

Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.

case of Estafa was filed against him.

On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), both of Makati City.

petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that P150,000 was
given to and received by petitioner in Makati City.

the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22

December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City

The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner
was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the
prosecution witness... failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati
City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when
such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

ISSUES:

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF
JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;

RULING:

the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense are
conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on
conclusions and conjectures.

In Fukuzume v. People,[19] this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed to
prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial court's jurisdiction.

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article
315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information... would have been sufficient to
vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not
contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed.

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove
that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such
dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the
ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the
court of proper venue.

This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced
age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction
over the case.

this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the
petitioner's conduct in handling the funds of his client.

In Cuizon v. Macalino,[35] this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
him, shows lack of personal... honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against petitioner.

the Petition is GRANTED

The Decision... issued by the Court of Appeals... are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Principles:

in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense committed outside its limited territory

In Isip v. People, this Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction.

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have
been committed... or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein
by... the accused

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information.

And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.

RCNUson
 Criminal Procedure Cases
Module I
Isip v. People

G.R. No. 170298; June 26, 2007

FACTS:
        Complainant Leonardo Jose came to know petitioner spouses when they were introduced by his father
Nemesio. Nemesio and the Isips were engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry
pawned by gambling habitués. Since there business is expanding, they needed a capitalist, wherein they
offered to complainant their plan. Complainant agreed, so he gave pieces of jewelries for the Isips to sell at a
commission basis. The said jewelries were given by complainant in Cavite.

After sometimes, the Isips issued checks which are not sufficiently funded. Complainant then filed a
case of estafa against the Isips.

The RTC of Cavite ruled against the Isips. The Isips contest the decision. The alleged that the
transaction was done in Manila and not in Cavite since respondent is a resident of Manila. The case should
then be filed in Manila. The CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC Cavite has jurisdiction over case.

How is jurisdiction of court over a criminal case determined?

RULING:
        Yes. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.  The place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.  It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.  Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused.  Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited   territory.  Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information.  And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance
of the case.  However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the venue was
properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City.  The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction took place
in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs. 
Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to prove otherwise, for it is his
claim that the transaction involved was entered into in Manila.  The age-old but familiar rule that he who
alleges must prove his allegations applies.

RCNUson