STATCON PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER 1
1) The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in
such way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation and
that in the course of such application or construction, it should
not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite
the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its
terms (p6, Lito Corpuz v PP)
2) Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation, or equivocation, there is room only
for application. (p8. Director of Lands v CA)
3) When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It
must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the
law may be harsh or erroneous. The Court’s first and
fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its
express terms, interpretation being call for only when such
literal application is impossible. (p.11. Director of Lands v CA)
4) The First and Fundamental Duty of the Courts is to apply the
law. (p13. Sec of Dep of Public Works v Spouses Tecson, Pp v
Mapa)
5) The duty of the Courts is to apply the law disregarding their
feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused. (p 14. PP v Amigo)
CHAPTER 2: Statutes
Judicial doctrine – the judicial interpretation of a statute which constitutes
part of the laws as of the date it was originally passed since the Court’s
construction, merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the interpreted law carried into effect. Such judicial doctrine does not
amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction
or interpretation of pre – existing.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption: If the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and approved, our courts will presume that the foreign law
is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. (p40)
Chapter 3:
1. The Legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of the statute (p44, Ramirez v CA)
2. Plain Meaning Rule or Verba Legis : The primary rule in addressing
any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is
to examine the law itself to see what it plainly says. This is the plain
meaning rule of statutory construction. (p48, Request of CA, 52,
Globe Mackay v NLRC)
3. When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its
natural meaning. (p52. Basbacio)
4. In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be
given effect. (p.56 JMM v NLRC)
5. Ut re magis valem quam pereat/ construction is to be sought which
gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word. (p59
Duncano v Sandiganbayan)
Spirit and Purpose of the Law – when the interpretation of a statute
according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd
or mischievous consequences, or would thwart or contravene the manifest
purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as may
be necessary, the strict letter of the law.
6. A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the
statute was enacted should be rejected. (p64, De Guia v Comelec)
7. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves
the purpose of the law should prevail (p67, Salenillas v CA)
8. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases (p.70,
Commendador v De Villa)
IMPLICATIONS – the implications and intendments arising from the
language of a statute are as much a part of it as if they had been
expressed.
9. Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute
is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. (p74, Lydia
Chua v CSC and Natl Irrigation Administration, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius)
Casus Omissus – when a statute makes specific provisions in regard to
several enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any provision for a
case or object analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon the
same reason, and is therefore within the general scope of the statute, and it
appears that such case or object was omitted by inadvertence or because it
was overlooked or unforeseen.
10. The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been
clearly established (p79, PP v Manantan)
Doctrine of Stare Decisis et non quieta movere – the ruling of the court,
once it has acquired finality, do not disturb it anymore, let that remain as it
is, otherwise if it is to be disturb then there will be no end to litigation
11. Stare Decisis: Follow the past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled. Matters already decided on the
merits cannot be relitigated again and again (p83, JM Tuason v
Mariano)
12. Stare Decisis Et Non Quieta Movere, which means to
adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things, which are
established (p 86, Arnado v Comelec)

CHAPTER 4
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos – Where the law
does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish
13. When the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the
principle that general words and phrases of a statute should
ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.
(p90 AFPFC v Yahon)
14. The rule is well recognized that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish (p93, Pilar v Comelec)
15. If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.
(p95, PP v Evangelista)
Exceptions in the Statute
 16. When the law does not make any exception, courts may
not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify
it. (p98, De Villa v CA)
17. General terms may be restricted by specific words, with the
result that the general language will be limited by specific
language which indicates the statute’s object and the purpose.
The rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one
general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall
under one specific class. (Colgate – Palmolive v Gimenez)
General terms following special terms (Ejusdem Generis) - it is a
general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to person or things of the
same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned
18. Applying the rule in statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis, that is where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to person
or things of the same kind or class as those specifically. (p104,
RP v Migrino)
19. Rule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory
construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.
(p107, PP v Echavez)
20. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, “where a general
word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific
words of the same class or where the latter follow the former,
the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to
be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. (p109,
Alta Vista Golf and Country Club v the City of Cebu, et. al)
Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius – express mention and implied
exclusion, Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded
therefrom (p. 113, Municipality of new era v Municipality of marcos, et. al)
Associated Words (Noscitur a Sociis) – associated words explain and
limit each other. When a word used in a statute is ambiguous or vague, its
meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in
which it is found and the meaning of the terms which are associated with it.
21. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by
considering the company of terms in which it is found or with
which it is associated. ( p 118 Dra Buenaseda v Flavier)
Use of Negative Words
22. Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while
those in the affirmative are mere directory (p121 Fule v CA)
The Use of the word may and shall in the statute
23. Use of word may in the statute generally connotes a
permissible thing while the word shall is imperative (p123
Bersabal v Salvador)- may, confer discretion; shall, impose a duty
which may be enforced
a. Shall may be read either as mandatory or directory
depending upon a consideration of the entire provision
where it is found, its object and the consequence that
would follow from construing it one way or another. (De
Mesa v Mencias)

24. The use of word may clearly shows it is directory in nature

and not mandatory (p125, Office of the Ombudsman v Sahaguin, et
al)
Use of the word “Must”
25. The word must in a statute like shall is not always
imperative and may be consistent with an exercise of discretion.
(p127, Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Assoc, In v CA)
The use of the term “and” and the word “or”
And – conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea
that the latter is to be added to or taken along with the first.
 Or – disjunctive particle used to express as alternative or to give a
choice of one among two or more things.
26. The word only means exclusive – p 132, Roos Industrial
Construction, Inc v NLRC
Computation of Time
27. A “week” means a period of seven consecutive days
without regards to the day of the week on which it begins –
(p137, PNB v CA)
Function of the Proviso – a clause or part of a clause in the statute, the
office of which is either to except something from the enacting clause or to
qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of
misinterpretation of its extent. (p139, Alu-tucp v NLRC and National Steel
Corporation)

CHAPTER 5 Presumptions in aid of Construction and Interpretation

(p143)
Presumptions: in construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the Courts
will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid,
sensible and just law, and one which should change the prior law no further
than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in
question. The construction should be in harmony with this assumption
whenever possible. But presumptions of this kind cannot prevail against the
clear and explicit terms of the law.

Presumption against unconstitutionality: Laws are presumed

constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.
1) Aris (PHIL.), INC. v NLRC, [Link] GR 90501, August 5, 1991, 200 Scra
246 (p144)
2) All laws are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless
otherwise ruled by the Court (Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v Hon. Felipe G.
Pacquino, Guingona and Cepeda v Reyes and Associated
Development Corporation, p 147-148)

3) The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who

challenge it. (Jovencio Lim v PP, RTC of Quezon City, branch 217,
[Link], p151)

Presumption against injustice: We test a law by its results and likewise,

we may add, by its purpose. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the
meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in
its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. The law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice. (p152)

4) In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is

presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. (Karen Salvacion v Central Bank of the PH, GR 94723, August
21, 1997, 278 Scra 27, p153)
5) A law should not be interpreted so as to cause an injustice. (Alonzo
v IAC and Tecla Padua, GR L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 Scra 259,
p155)

Presumption against implied repeals: Well-settled is the rule that repeals

of laws by implication is not favored and that courts must generally assume
their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,
and clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concondare legibus est optimus interpretendi i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundamental is that the legislature should be
presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting statutes. (p157)
6) In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and
old laws.
Repeal by implication is not favored by law and is only resorted
to in case of irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
between the new law and the old law. (Almadovar v Chairperson
Pulido-Tan, COA, GR 213330, Nov 16, 2015, p159)
Repeals of statute by implication not favored (p161)
Antonio Mecano v COA: Repeals by implication are not favored and will not
be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws
are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing
a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law
relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also a clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from
the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of
the earlier or unless the reason for the earlier acts is beyond peradventure
renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by
any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the latter act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier.”
Presumption against ineffectiveness: It is presumed that the legislature
intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render them
operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating
them. In case of any doubts or obscurity, the construction will be such as to
carry out those objects. (p164)
7) In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
statute. (Paras v Comelec, p164)
Presumptions against absurdity: Statutes must receive a sensible
construction such as will effect to the legislative intention so as to avoid
and unjust or absurd conclusion. (p166)
CIR v ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. and the Court of Tax Appeals
8) Presumption against undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure. (Cesario Ursua v CA, p168)
Presumption against violation of international law: is in conformity with
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in our Construction. It
states that the PH as a democratic and republican state adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adhere to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations. (p171)

CHAPTER 6: INTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION AND

INTERPRETATION (p173)
Intrinsic Aids: are those aids within the statute. It must be emphasized
that intrinsic aids are resorted to only if there is ambiguity in the statute. If
the language is clear and unequivocal there is no need to resort to intrinsic
aids.
Parts of the statute, title, preamble, context or body of the statute,
chapter and section headings, punctuation and interpretation clause. To
determine the intention of the legislature.
1) Subtitle of the statute as intrinsic aids in determining legislative
intent. (Miriam Santiago v Comelec, p175)
Preamble as Intrinsic Aid
2) The intent of the law is culled from its preamble and from the
situation, circumstance and conditions it sought to remedy, must
be enforced. (Eugenio v Executive Secretary, p176)
3) Preamble used as a guide in determining the intent of the
lawmaker (PP v Echaves, p180)
CHAPTER 7: EXTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION (p183)
Extrinsic Aids: aids from outside sources, meaning outside of the four
corners of the statute. If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the
statute, the interpreter must find that out within the statute.
Extrinsic aids resorted by the courts: 1) history of the enactment of the
statute 2) opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to
execute or implement administrative laws; 3) contemporaneous
construction of executive officers; 4) actual proceedings of the legislative
body; 5) individual statements by members of Congress; 6) author of the
law and 7) explanatory note of the bill. Other: reports and
recommendations of legislative committees, public policy, judicial
construction and construction by the bar.
1) It is a well-accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous,
courts may examine both the printed pages of the published act as
well as those extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the
meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the
reasons for the passage of the bill and purposes to be
accomplished by the measure (Commissioner of Customs v ESSO
Standard Eastern, Inc., p184)
2) Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to
execute or implements administrative laws command much
respect and weight. (Vera v Cuevas, p188)
3) Contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by
executive officers charged with implementing and enforcing the
provisions of the statutes should be given controlling weight,
unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous. (PAFLU v Bureau of
Labor Relations, p190)
4) Courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a
statute of doubtful meaning. (De Villa v CA, p192)
5) In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the
meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations
may be adopted. (NPC v De Guzman, p193)
6) Individual statements by members of Congress on the floor do not
necessarily reflect legislative intent. (Casco Phil Chemical Co., Inc. v
Gimenez, p198)
7) The dissenting opinion is very persuasive following the rule that
the best interpreter of the law or any of its provisions is the author
of the law.
8) Courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguous
and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute. (Garvida v
Pillos and CA, p207)
CHAPTER 8: STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (p211)
1) Penal Statues: construed strictly against the state and in favor of the
accused (p213)
a. Centeno v Villalon-Pernillos and pp (p214)
b. Penal statutes should be construed strictly against the
state and in favor of the accused(Ursua v CA, p217)
c. Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.
(PP v Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, p219)

2) Tax Laws: must be construed strictly against the state and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer. (p223)
a. Taxes must not be imposed beyond what the law expressly
and clearly declares as tax laws must be construed strictly
against the state and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. (CIR
v La Tondeña Distillers, Inc., p225)
b. In case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly
against the government and liberally in favor of the
taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed
beyond what the applicable statute expressly and clearly
declares. (RP v IAC and Pastor, p227-228)
c. As a rule, any claim for exemption from a tax statute is
strictly construed against the taxpayer. However, where the
law is clear and unambiguous, the law must be taken as it
is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. (Acting
Commissioner of Customs v Manila Electric Company and
Court of Tax Appeals, p230)
d. Tax exemption must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state. (Misamis Oriental
Assoc of Coco Traders, Inc. v Dept of Finance, p231-232)
e. Tax exemption strictly construed against the taxpayer
(Resins, Incorporated v Auditor Gen of the PH and the Central
Bank of the PH, p234)
 f. Statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed in
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the tax authority. In construing a statute, it is the duty of
the courts to seek the real intent of the legislature, even if,
by so doing, they may limit the literal meaning of the broad
language. A claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for
tax exemption, is construed strictly against the taxpayer.
(p235)

3) Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly

construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
(Ong Chia v RP, p238)

4) Insurance Law: Contracts of Insurance are to be construed liberally

in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. (Finman
General Assurance Corporation v CA, p241)

5) Labor and Social Legislations

a) The official agents charged by law to implement social justice
guaranteed by the Constitution should adopt a liberal attitude
in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability (p244, GSIS v Vicencio)
b) Doubts in interpretation of Workmen’s Compensation and
Labor Code should be resolved in favor of the worker. (p246,
Manahan v Employee’s compensation)
c) Basically, social legislation is liberally construed. (p.249, Lazo
v Employees’ Compensation)
d) The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its
beneficiaries and the law by its own terms, requires a
construction of utmost liberality in their favor. (p.251, Vicente
v Employees’ Compensation Commission)

6) Retirement Laws:
a) Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally
interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to
provide for the retiree’s sustenance and comfort, when he is
 no longer capable of earning his livelihood. (p253, Tantuico v
Domingo)

7) Election Laws
a) Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed
to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections
(p257, Engle v Comelec and Menzon)
b) Liberal Construction of the Rules of Court (p261, DSM v CA
and Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc.