Chinese White-Collar Identity Formation
Chinese White-Collar Identity Formation
in the plural to acknowledge the drastically different with other social categories, such as race, gender and
situations that fall within the middle strata of social classes. ethnicity (cf. Brodkin 2000, Ortner 1998). I use the term
Taking this one step further, I also use the term middle- social identity to reflect the way this status group is socially
class segment, to refer to what Maurice Zeitlin calls “class constructed and contested (both by “white collars” and
segments” with specific historical circumstances, interests outsiders) in relation to a range of social categories. I thus
and structural positions (1989:186). This further distinction consider social identity to be a faceted whole of socially
is necessary given China’s history and the changing meanings constructed categories, so that we may alternately examine
and structuring of social class. the nuances and variations in this identity through the prisms
Class was a central ideological principle in Mao of differentiating factors—gender, nationality, race, and
Zedong’s China. Under Mao, citizens were assigned political ethnicity. Moreover, the term identity conveys the relationship
class labels that impacted the family as a whole. If a person’s between an individual and the groups with which he or she
parents were labeled as capitalists, they too would be labeled engages (Gleason 1983). This is an important aspect of the
as capitalists. Individuals with proper class labels (i.e., worker, white collar identity, given that white-collar workers belong
peasant) were, at various stages, able to gain easier access to to various communities on local, national and global levels.
higher education or preferential employment (Shirk 1982). Ultimately, I aim to demonstrate that by viewing the
Employment at this time was based on the work unit situation of white-collar executives through multiple facets
(danwei), rather than occupation. An individual was assigned of their identity, these various scales of reference become
to a work unit and regardless of his or her educational inexorably intertwined in the meaning assigned to this group.
attainment, would develop an occupation only in accordance
to the needs and opportunities within that work unit (Bian Setting the Scene: From Red Guards to White Collars
1994:93–94). Changing from one work unit to another was Under Mao Zedong, China’s socialist revolution had
uncommon, and a difficult task requiring social connections largely followed a soviet-style development plan emphasizing
(guanxi). Work units also had control over assigning housing, heavy industry. These industrial projects focused on
regulating marriages, and permitting childbirth. Some work developing industry in the countryside, but inadvertently
units had better access to resources and provided better created numerous problems in urban areas including
working conditions. This, in combination with the de- unemployment and an underdeveloped service industry.
emphasis on occupation, made the work unit the most Urban unemployment, particularly among young people,
significant factor in status attainment in contrast to a market had been problematic for some time. During the Cultural
economy where occupational attainment is the primary Revolution many urban youth, called Red Guards, were
means of social-class mobility (Bian 1994:71). The market “sent down” (xia xiang) to the countryside to work as
economy has brought numerous changes to China’s social laborers. While there were many ideological reasons for this
stratification, and although there is still prestige assigned to movement, postponing young people’s employment in the
where one works, there is an overall greater emphasis on cities was an important practical reason for the rural labor
occupation and salary. programs (Gold 1990:159–160).
Related to this overall change in the meaning assigned The unemployment problem had not been solved by
to class, there are also different cohorts within the same the end of the Cultural Revolution and China’s cities then
class position, depending upon which political environment faced the dilemma of finding employment for returning
was most influential during an individual’s lifetime. Lisa Red Guards as well as more recent graduates—all without
Rofel discusses the various cohorts in China among women jobs. By 1978, urban unemployment had reached 5.6 million,
working in silk factories, noting that the cohorts of women with urban youth comprising 47 percent of that figure (Gold
workers “formed visibly divided political generations” with 1990:159–160). Aggravating this situation, the party-state
“differential responses to the post-Mao vision of modernity” leadership simultaneously sought to solve the issue of an
(Rofel 1994:21). In this case, despite having the same class underdeveloped service industry by creating a consumer
position, depending on cohort membership, factory workers economy (Goodman 1999:244). As this emerging consumer
understand their situation in very different ways. As the market made new commodities available to the populace,
following section demonstrates, white-collar workers are frustrated and bored young people had taken to theft and
overwhelmingly from the same cohort, born in the late other crimes, threatening social order (Gold 1990).
1960s to 1970s, but among their peers they are afforded Among the many policies developed to rectify the
relatively high status because of their educational attainment, nation’s social and economic problems was the allowance of
high salaries, and occupation. Thus, while white-collar the creation of private, small businesses with no more than
workers share many formative experiences and political seven employees (Gold 1991:91). Allowing small business
views with other members of the same cohort, these views to emerge was intended to provide opportunities for
are also informed by their class position. unemployed youth and other marginalized citizens. While
The complexity described above demonstrates that the state leaders expected private business to provide
class is not merely an objective category as Weberian work for returning Red Guards, recent graduates, and
definitions may lead one to believe. Indeed, class is ex-convicts, they did not foresee the extent to which
“discursively constructed”—meaning that class is culturally mainstream urban residents would be lured into the private
and historically constituted rather than objectively assigned sphere (Gold 1990:173). The option of starting one’s own
(Dirks, et al. 1994). Furthermore, not only is class constituted business was an appealing alternative to many people, even
historically and culturally, but it is also intimately linked those with stable employment in state-owned enterprises
and government bureaus. Since remuneration in state-owned access to the new market were linked to corruption on the
enterprises (SOEs) emphasized benefits such as housing and part of government officials, and this unfairness was further
food rations rather than wages paid in cash, urbanites who compounded by the growing economic gap between participants
had found success in private business possessed more cash in the market economy and individuals who continued to
and were thus more able to partake in the new individual limit their activities to the state sector.
consumption opportunities (Gold 1990:175; Zhang 2001:13). These inequalities and injustices contributed to increasing
Private business came to be an attractive alternative to state- social unrest and were among the reasons for discontent
owned enterprise for employees who had grown increasingly which culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy
dissatisfied with the lack of mobility and opportunity in the demonstrations (Baum 1991; 1994; Gold 1990; 1991; Ogden
state-owned sector (Davis 1990). 1989).1 While private business did not cause the dem-
Adding to the appeal of the burgeoning market onstrations per se, private business had “exacerbated
economy were other reforms designed to alleviate the problems contradictions latent in Chinese society and [served] as a
of low productivity in the state-owned sector. The SOE useful scapegoat for a regime frantic to consolidate power”
work environment began a gradual process of change (Gold 1990:178). Hence, the democracy demonstrations of
from Mao’s emphasis on class background and political 1989 were followed by a government crackdown on private
correctness to Deng Xiaoping’s “economic primacy” approach businesses, which sought to end corruption on the part of
to developing the nation (Zhang 2000:60-61). Whereas state officials, but also aimed to enforce greater control over
Mao-era employment emphasized political background and the private business activities of the general populace. To
class labels, Deng-era employment emphasized skills and address student participation in the demonstrations, political
productivity. This marked a large-scale move from “red to education was reinforced in high school and university
expert,” as SOEs faced heightened pressure to improve curricula, particularly in cities that had witnessed especially
productivity and necessarily began to emphasize education large demonstrations.2 For Chinese citizens, the state’s
and skills over political correctness and class labels (Ogden reaction to the 1989 protests clarified the role they were to
1989:307–312; Shirk 1982:186–197). SOEs also began utilizing take in the nation’s reform process as solely economic.
labor contracts of three to six years for incoming employees, The state’s violent squelching of the demonstrations
rather than life-long job assignments (Davis 1990:101; also resulted in a decline in foreign direct investment (FDI),
Zhang 2000:13–14). This meant there was no longer leading policymakers to attend to the global capitalist arena
guaranteed lifelong employment, but it also meant that both as they sought to win back foreign investors’ confidence. In
companies and employees were able to be more selective in the 1980s policies toward FDI were highly particularistic
their employment. These changes together meant that focusing on select cities, but the 1990s brought a more wide-
individuals possessing certain skills and performing to spread and liberal approach to attracting FDI (Luo
certain standards would ultimately fare better in the 2000:109). Additionally, policies targeted specific types of
workplace (Bian 1994:56–58). This placed certain cohorts at FDI (e.g. high technology, finance, etc.), marking a move
a disadvantage, since individuals born in the 50’s and early from earlier reforms’ emphasis on manufacturing, which
60’s had received a fragmented education with high school counted “more on hands and less on brains,” to FDI
and university scholarship interrupted by the Cultural requiring a more educated workforce (Zhang 2000:22–23).
Revolution. Throughout the 1980s, the former Red Guards The state also began a propaganda campaign emphasizing
increasingly turned to entrepreneurship as education became globalization as a central component to the nation’s
more important for employment in SOEs and government modernization goals (Yan 2002). These changes stand in
(Davis 1992:425–426). marked contrast to the Mao-era isolationism, whereby the
Although the private sector held great allure, it was West (writ-large) was not to be trusted and independent
not without problems. As Deng Xiaoping sought to appease economic development was primary. However, in reform-
communist party conservatives, the reforms were necessarily era China the motto became “China to the world and the
fragmented and halting; this made for particularly unequal world to China” (zhongguo dui shijie, shijie dui zhongguo),
opportunities in the market economy (Baum 1991:4–5). The thus marking a new engagement with the global market
state had instituted a dual-price system for private and state and even a celebration of participation in the global market
sectors, whereby the state sector businesses were able to that has continued up to the present day.
purchase materials and services at a discounted price. This The universities had followed suit, by incorporating
allowed for much corruption, since private businesses with intensive foreign language study in business-related majors,
links to government officials were able to obtain goods at and even accepting foreign sponsorship for certain programs
state-sector prices. Entrepreneurial children of officials of study that were in high demand.3 So in tandem with
benefited greatly from this dual system, as well as from intensified political education, students were being taught
their ability to bypass bureaucratic licensing procedures skills that were conducive to the market economy, creating a
which remained tedious at best for the general populace complex (if not slightly paradoxical) ideological environment
(Gold 1990). By the mid-1980s, many private business and a cohort of “patriotic professionals” (Hoffman 2000, 2001,
operators were making well above the average salary for 2003). Likewise, the path to the job market was changing as
a state sector worker and “with the 20–30% inflation of the state-assigned job system was gradually phased out and
1988–89, this disparity in cash holdings made a critical universities took on the responsibility of preparing students
difference to one’s standard of living and perceptions of to locate jobs independently (Hoffman 2001). In this era of
equity and fairness” (Gold 1990:169). Thus inequalities in globalization, choice employment for many students was
with MNCs. In 1996, I asked a group of more than 60 mortgages.6 Job-hopping became the quickest way to
university students what they hoped to do after graduation, improve one’s standard of living, and many executives
and all but two replied that they hoped to work for foreign- changed companies at almost an annual pace. “Job-hopping
invested companies. Although a seemingly paradoxical goal fever” was the topic of many newspaper and magazine
for adamant patriots, ideologically, it followed the state goal of articles, as well as a common point of conversation in
modernization through globalization. Materially, this goal corporations. By the early 2000s, job-hopping had slowed,
made even more sense given that employment with foreign- but by then there was already a dramatic increase in the
invested companies often meant a “higher salary and better salaries afforded white collar executives in MNCs compared
working conditions” (Guthrie 1999:79–82; Zhang 2000:87). to their SOE peers.7
Given the concurrent growth of the consumer market and
privatization of housing in 1997, this has increasingly come to
Taking the Stage: White Collars with Chinese Characteristics
mean a higher standard of living compared with peers
It is within this historical context that the white-collar
employed by SOEs or government bureaus.4
occupational segment came to have locally-specific social
Although employment with MNCs was increasingly
meanings. With high salaries, excellent education, ample
desirable, the white-collar positions were only open to
employment opportunities, and affluent lifestyles, this status
a select few. Compared to SOEs, MNCs placed greater
group now sets the aspirations for many in China. Given that
value on education, particularly higher education obtained
economic reform has increasingly meant China’s status
when market reforms were in full swing. Foreign investors
groups are defined by relationship to the market economy,
sought a “talented labor pool with language skills, technical
income, and occupation, it is not surprising that this success
knowledge, business acumen, and the ability to communicate
extends beyond the workplace and carries broader social
cross-culturally” (Hoffman 2003:15). Rather than hiring SOE
meaning, as the above People’s Daily definition suggests.
managers, many MNCs preferred to hire recent university
While many jobs in the state-owned sector, private sector,
graduates, who received an education more in line with the
and government sector may qualify as white collar, the
market economy. With no established work habits from an
social meaning of the term is most often associated with
SOE environment, these workers could be easily “trained
employment in the foreign-invested sector. Also, there is a
up” (McEllister 1998). While I was working as a recruitment
lifestyle and worldview that is indicative of this occupational
consultant for MNCs during the late 1990s, it was not
group and the social meaning it embodies. Embedded in the
uncommon for managerial job candidates to be rejected
social meanings and attitudes associated with white-collar
because they had more than three years of experience in an
workers are multiple levels of influence: local cultures, state
SOE or were deemed, at 35 to 40 years old, “too old” to
policies, and global capital investment have all contributed to
adapt to MNC business practices. The dearth of Chinese
the situation of white-collar workers. Thus, with the influence
executives in their mid-forties and fifties is noticeable in
of multiple scales, there are multiple constructions of gender,
virtually any MNC and foreign executives visiting China
nationality, race and ethnicity that are intertwined in the
often comment on this.5 In a survey of three recruitment
white-collar social identity. Through an examination of
firms in Shanghai (one locally owned and two foreign-
these different aspects of identity, various scalar influences
owned), I asked consultants the age range for candidates
converge and conflict.
they place and I was told that it is rare to have a candidate
beyond their early forties (43 was the average age given)
unless that candidate was a “returnee” (person who had Gender and White Collars
lived and worked abroad for an extended period of time, Perhaps most striking, the social identity of white
normally more than five years). One recruitment consultant collars in China is often gendered female, and indeed it is
commented, “I want to say forty-four is the ceiling, but I no exaggeration to say that “people love to call girls ‘white
know it would be the very exceptional candidate or a very collar ladies’” (Wang 2004). However, these “girls” are not
specific position requiring government connections.” just secretaries of the sort described by C. Wright Mills
Another consultant explained, “Well, to figure out the age (1951) in his account of the male-dominated white collar
limit, you need to look at the education system changes and group in America during the first half of the twentieth
the changes in government-assigned jobs; that would be the century. Contemporary Chinese women have done
late eighties.O.O.O.” She went on to explain that it was only particularly well in MNCs; they are managers, consultants,
employees who entered the SOE under labor contracts that and directors holding positions throughout the corporate
jumped over to the foreign-invested sector, and it was rare hierarchy (Yan 2002:23).
for those with more seniority in the SOE to have made a There are several possible reasons behind the success
move. Thus, the MNC white-collar segment of the new rate of women in white-collar employment in China. First,
middle class is largely composed of young business there is the gendered educational track through which many
professionals born in the late 1960s and 1970s. women have found success. Most MNC employment at the
As FDI grew in the mid-1990s, the demand for white- management level requires English, French, and/or Japanese;
collar workers with skills specific to international business in China, there is a common stereotype that women are better
grew beyond the available pool of talented labor (Tse at learning a foreign language. University programs of study
2000:105). MNCs began competing for young executives by emphasizing foreign languages are often business-focused
offering dramatic increases in salaries, as well as tuition for and populated with more women than men (e.g. Foreign
MBA programs, training abroad, and money for home Trade, International Economics, International Business).8
Second, there are gendered career paths for young employees regarding the number of white-collar women who remain
of MNCs. Whereas many young men entered the workforce unmarried well into their thirties. Many white-collar women
by joining an MNC as a sales representative, many women report difficulty in finding suitable partners for marriage,
entered the workforce as personal assistants to higher given the tradition of men marrying “down” in social
management, which gave them greater access to corporate standing and women marrying “up” (Yan 2002:23). While
decision makers. In an interesting twist, many SOEs and women have fulfilled their economic obligation to their
Chinese companies deem such assistant positions to be a families by providing “pocket money” for parents, financing
male-gendered position, and a very powerful one at that, in family vacations, and in some cases even buying a home for
the sense that the assistant is the “right-hand man.” However, their parents, the social obligation to marry and procreate
for MNCs in the early 1990s, management frequently remains problematic.
consisted of expatriates sent from home offices in North White-collar women have explained to me that they
America, Australia, and Europe. Western executives sent to see no need to compromise and get married just to be
China to work brought gendered notions of the position or at socially acceptable. According to many white-collar women,
least required the foreign language skills possessed by young their male counterparts see them as competition in the
female graduates, and Chinese executives saw the prestige workplace, and thus the men prefer to marry younger
associated with being an assistant.9 The access personal women just entering the workforce. A training manager for
assistants have to senior management stands in contrast a Fortune 500 company had dinner with her male MBA
to a sales representative, who is more likely to report into a classmates during a business trip and found they had
city/district supervisor, who in turn reports to a regional “turned against” her. Her male peers told her in no
manager, who finally reports to a national sales director. uncertain terms that she had best start looking for a
English and other foreign languages are less commonly used foreigner to marry, since she was too accomplished and too
in the lower ranks of the sales and marketing departments, old (at thirty-two) to find a Chinese husband. However,
further putting young men at a disadvantage for communicating many white-collar women consider marrying foreigners
with higher management. Although this varies somewhat by with reluctance, since the cultural differences are viewed as
industry, it is the corporate structure seen in most consumer complicating marriage, and there is a greater likelihood
goods industries. they would need to move abroad at some point. An
This proximity to the expatriate executives would unmarried marketing manager further explained to me that
prove critical in moving up the corporate ladder. While it was difficult to find men with similar worldviews outside
most companies had long-term plans to “localize” their of the white-collar segment. She explained that entrepreneurs
management and promote Chinese executives to replace generally have a less global worldview, and are not
expatriates, the localization process in China was not as appropriate companions for women who prefer holidays
orderly as anticipated. A former president of the American wandering through Italy to group tours of Las Vegas.
Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai explained to me that White-collar women have chosen various means of
when the Asian economic crisis hit in the mid-1990s, many negotiating this catch-22, from not marrying at all, to dating
companies began to tighten the budgets of their China foreigners, to marrying men in the traditional professions
operations. A quick way to lower costs was through (e.g., law, medicine, academics). As they negotiate these
localization, since Chinese employees earn much lower conflicting social values, they are navigating amongst the
salaries than foreign management, they do not generally patterns set through educational practices in China, global
receive housing allowances, nor do they require tuition fees capital’s history in the Asia Pacific region, and local cultural
for children attending international schools. This expedited values. The prestige of “white collar ladies” and their
localization meant young Chinese women were in an marital status are enmeshed in a multi-scalar social, economic,
advantageous position given their proximity to foreign and cultural context.
managers. When the time came for foreign managers to
choose their replacements, the women they had mentored Urbanity and White Collars
and worked alongside became an obvious choice. Media descriptions also emphasize the urban setting
The image of a white-collar lady promoted by media of white collars. The MNC white-collar segment is distinctly
in China likewise reflects their success and achievement, as urban and concentrated in those cities that have attracted
one reporter for the Beijing Review dramatically describes: FDI in the high-tech, service and financial industries. This is
significant for an understanding of social status in China.
In Chinese cities, there are young, female employees
Despite a general improvement in the standard of living for
known as ‘white-collar ladies’ working in foreign
rural residents, urban-rural inequalities are exceptionally
companies. They are enviable and mysterious women
great, even compared to countries like India (Zhang 2000).
regarded as being favored by fate. They have a good
Although socioeconomic mobility has become marked by a
educational background, speak a foreign language
“spatialized move to the city” for many rural residents
fluently and travel all around the world. They earn
(Schein 2001:228), the social and economic aspects of
high salaries, wear fashionable clothes and from
mobility do not always go hand in hand. The classed nature
time to time unintentionally show a bit of arrogance
of urbanity is not necessarily new in China, given that the
in their graceful bearing. [Dai 2001]
Red Guards were sent “down to the countryside” (xia xiang),
While the image of an educated, wealthy, independent but global capitalism in combination with state policies
woman is on the one hand laudable, there is equal debate have created new conditions for the classed nature of urbanity.
State-led household registration (hukou) policies limit During a lunch I had with a group of white-collar workers,
the ability to obtain employment with welfare benefits in one man raised the topic of patriotism. He explained that he
the cities, creating a geographic class closure and layering of often thinks about the meaning of this term in his own life
citizenship (Solinger 1999). Even when rural peasants find and has come to the conclusion that, “For our parents, ai guo
success through entrepreneurial activities in the cities, they was about self-sacrifice, but for us it is about self-
are seen as “not properly belonging to the wealthy class” development. We support our country by working within
and are often resented by city residents (Guang 2003). the new economy and making as much money as we can.”
White-collar workers, however, are categorized in different The others at the table readily agreed.
ways, even in Shanghai, a city notorious for looking down This is not to suggest, however, that white-collar
on outsiders (both urban and rural). Many of Shanghai’s workers view themselves as elites—indeed the vast majority
white-collar workers are not native to the city. While most hold neither political nor economic power. Generally, these
of these urban immigrants come from other first and white-collar workers have limited guanxi networks (social
second-tier cities, some of them come from smaller cities, connections) compared to their peers in SOEs and government
towns and rural counties. It is not uncommon to find an posts. Although a university degree is needed, additional
office comprised of executives from around the nation, with economic capital, guanxi networks, or political background
tremendously varied backgrounds. In one company in are not required for success in multinational companies.
which I did research, out of 18 executives, seven were from Connections are still very advantageous to those seeking
Shanghai, four were from other large cities (with populations employment with the government or SOEs, and capital is of
of over six million people), five were from small cities and course critical to those with entrepreneurial aspirations.
towns, and two were from rural counties. In a smaller office This plays into a view of global capitalism as a
I visited, of the seven employees working in Shanghai, two more “fair market” and is further supported by the corporate
were from Shanghai, three were from large cities, and two practices of MNCs (in contrast to SOEs). MNCs have
were from rural areas. There has been little public comparatively more policies and structure to their human
discussion of the outsider origins of these white-collar resources practices, and SOEs have less. For example, many
workers. Instead, they have been embraced by the city; SOEs do not use Western-style human resources practices
there has evolved a new social category of “New of performance evaluation such as employee reviews.
Shanghaiese” (Xin Shanghairen) to refer to Shanghai’s non- During my fieldwork at a British—SOE joint venture, the
native white collars. The term has been largely embraced by SOE management team was perplexed by the British-hired
the media, with even a whole magazine dedicated to the (Chinese) management team’s desire to conduct performance
subject.10 The distinct use of xin Shanghairen for white-collar appraisals. One SOE manager explained to me that it struck
workers stands in marked contrast to the host of vulgar terms him as unnecessary to formalize what he already knew
used for migrant workers and “rich peasant” entrepreneurs.11 from working with his staff every day.
Local culture is also a part of this process, as white- While there are drawbacks and benefits to each work
collar workers enjoy particular prestige in Shanghai, where environment and perception of each depends on personal
residents take great pride in the city’s global capitalist preference, both SOE and MNC white-collar workers agree
history prior to the Communist Revolution in 1949. Whereas that getting ahead in an SOE depends more on your
government work is esteemed in Beijing, and entrepreneurship relationship with higher management and ability to navigate
is lauded in Guangzhou, Shanghai is a corporate city with a office politics. As one consultant with experience in both
global focus. One executive described the prestige of white- MNCs and SOEs told me, “work in multinational companies
collar workers as “where you work is like a brand name—like is less political. What comes first is your performance; only
an expensive watch. It’s a part of Shanghai life.” The social after that do personal connections matter.” Most white-
capital of Shanghai’s white-collar workers is tightly collar workers have explained the key to their success as
intertwined with the local history and culture, but it is also merit-based: you work hard, perform well, and you are
legitimized through Beijing-led reform policies of the 1990s. almost certain to move up the ranks. When asked about
their peers in SOEs, government positions, or non-foreign-
Nationalism and White Collars invested private enterprises, many MNC white-collar workers
Much of the existing research concerning China’s new have described the difference according to “ambition” or
middle classes and young professionals has focused on “willingness to work hard,” or they have even written off
national alliances (cf. Hoffman 2000, Pearson 1997, Rosen their peers as “lazy.” As one white-collar worker put it,
2004). These broader studies that include white-collar “why would you work for a dinosaur?”
executives in MNCs have overwhelming found China’s The view that white-collar workers tend to hold
white-collar workers to be quite nationalistic. They are towards the SOE environment in comparison to their
solidly aligned with the nation-state and view themselves careers borrows much from the state campaign promoting
as adamantly Chinese. This is partially the result of their globalization as key to China’s modernization. White-collar
age, as they grew up in a time of increasing prosperity in workers, in linking their work at foreign companies to an
the context of strong nation-building projects. It is commonly act of patriotism, are doing so in the belief that they are
said that the cohort born in the 1970s “developed along with taking China to the next level as the leaders of a newly
the nation.” It is significant, however, that white-collar skilled and highly educated workforce. The issue of guanxi
professionals working in foreign-invested MNCs view their connections and politics as central in the SOE environment,
business careers as an expression of patriotism (ai guo). when placed in contrast to the perceived meritocracy of the
MNCs, even suggests a commentary on the fairness of the Given the patterns of development and global capitalism in
market economy. This is, however, a comment on economic Asia, senior management, when not expatriate from the
structures and ways of doing business within China, not a West, is often ethnic Chinese from outside the PRC
statement against China. As several executives commented mainland. Because there is a longer (recent) history of
to me, “We are Chinese citizens first, international business foreign investment and global markets in Hong Kong,
people second.” Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia, there are more overseas
Chinese executives in those regions who possess the
Race and White Collars extensive corporate experience and Western-style education
Contrary to a belief in a meritocracy when comparing that corporate headquarters seek, often accompanied by
themselves to their compatriots, white-collar workers are proficiency in Mandarin and familiarity with the culture.
deeply aware of hierarchies on a global scale. White-collar These expatriate Chinese executives most frequently earn
workers frequently discuss the global glass ceiling they face. salaries higher than PRC executives doing comparable
When asked what they view as the reason for the glass work. There are consequent tensions between PRC Chinese
ceiling, white-collar workers mention trust towards Chinese and overseas Chinese managers brought in from Hong
employees, speaking the same language (both in terms of Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia.12 The issue of trust
business terminology and language), and the way China is is again a common reason given for the glass ceiling. One
exoticized by the West as the main barriers. A Project executive working for a Singaporean company explained,
Manager with a French company explains: “Most [Singaporeans] know our culture quite well, but they
are different in thinking and doing things—more Westernized
I have heard in American companies there is less of than the Chinese people. Though the companies take efforts
a glass ceiling, and in Japanese companies there is to localize, they still don’t trust [us] completely.” The
more. My friend was working for a Japanese company tension and lack of trust are often attributed to the colonial
and he held the same position for 4 years—he was experience of non-PRC Chinese; of Taiwanese managers,
very good at his job, understood the company well, one executive said, “To the Japanese you are just a worker.
and his bosses all liked him. But above him everyone They can’t manage you and don’t know China. But the
was Japanese and he was told the company would Taiwanese, they know China and are influenced by the
never place a Chinese person at that level. Maybe Japanese—that’s worse! They know you and keep you
French companies are similar to the Japanese.O.O.O. down. Maybe this is from growing up with a feeling of
Because you work with a French boss for 4–5 years, insecurity.” Both these examples further suggest a tainting
he trusts you and will say things like “Chinese are of Chinese culture, through Westernization and/or colonialism,
always like this—except you of course.” But when which has led to distrust of PRC employees.
he gets promoted or retires, it will be his boss These tensions are centered around dominant Han
choosing a replacement. His boss doesn’t know you, Chinese ideologies of race.13 Whereas Western models of
and probably prefers a French person, since it’s the race are relatively more economic in their origins (colonialism,
same language and culture. trade, slavery, capitalism, immigrant labor, etc.), Chinese
Although within China, work in a foreign-invested enterprise race ideologies are rooted in a shared historical identity and
is considered a “fair market” where anyone with the education the geographic center from which that identity emerged
required can participate and succeed through merit, there is (Wu 1991:164–165). Chinese models of race have long been
a limit to that success based on global hierarchies. Local configured around the “birthplace” of Chinese civilization
training consultancies are frequently requested to conduct along the Yellow River and lineage associated with this
“cross-cultural” training sessions for Chinese employees, but place (Tu 1991b). Beyond these boundaries, as the ideology
rarely receive requests to provide “cross-cultural” training goes, there are “barbarians” (non-Han Chinese, and other
for foreign executives. Thus, the burden has fallen on white- races). Thus, purity of Chinese-ness has a strong geographical
collar workers to understand the culture of their companies, component and becomes dissolved with distance and
somewhat ironically, given the importance of local market outside influence from non-Chinese. Overseas Chinese are
understanding in client negotiations and relations. Stories thought to be less Chinese because of experiences with non-
of “cleaning up the mess made by a foreign boss interacting Chinese, and the problematic of retaining one’s Chinese-
with local clients” are abundant, particularly when the ness is central for many (Wang 1991). Given nation-building
client is a government bureau or SOE. Clearly imbedded in activities’ necessitation of appropriate subjects who are
this situation are racializing ideologies of the West, through “culturally homogenized,” PRC Chinese-ness is to some
which the Chinese employee is slotted into the corporate extent and for various purposes conflated with ethnic/racial
structure to serve as cultural translator with the know-how Chinese-ness (Ong 1997:173).
needed to get things done in China, as well as the linguistic Within the context of the MNC workplace in China,
skills to translate back to home office. They are placed in these contrasting ideologies of race and ethnicity are
locally specific roles, but not positions that involve corporate coming together. On the corporate side, overseas Chinese
leadership and strategizing. Yet to assume that there are are placed above PRC employees because of their longer
only Western racializing ideologies at work in the MNCs engagement with the West and western-style educations.
would be a mistake. From a Chinese perspective, those who have been lessened
More nuanced, and often locally more important, by contact with the West and locations further from the
is the issue of Chinese-ness within the global hierarchy. “core” are being rewarded within the corporate hierarchy.
Shanghai’s white-collar workers do not passively alignment nationally, but also internationally—as seen in the
accept their position within the hierarchy. Some have differing situations of PRC Chinese white-collar workers and
chosen to study abroad and stay on in Australia, Europe, or their colleagues from the West and Asia.
North America to work for several years, with the hope that
upon returning to China they will have more bargaining Conclusion
power and will be seen as candidates for upper management In this article, I have attempted to provide an
positions. However, many white-collar workers believe the understanding of “white collar” as a social identity, born
glass ceiling will only be broken with the next generation, out of global capitalism but deeply intertwined with
since “their history will be more similar” to their colleagues national and local contexts. The social meanings attached to
from other places. As the first-generation white-collar white-collar workers and the attitudes they embrace are
workers start families of their own, they are strategizing for simultaneously the result of a global capitalist history, a
their children’s place in the corporate world. Among my state-led market reform process, various local cultures, and
interviewees, most of the white-collar workers with school- the agency of white-collar workers themselves.
aged children plan to send their children to the United The Asian economic crisis contributed to the promotion
States for university educations (with Canada and Australia of women in MNCs, as did cultural beliefs that women
as backup locales), reasoning that the children will be better were better suited for foreign language study. Foreign
prepared for careers back in China. They cite analytical investment patterns led to concentrations of white-collar
skills and English language skills as their rationale, along workers in the urban areas, but the particularly high
with the value of understanding another country’s culture prestige assigned to Shanghai’s white-collar workers is a
by living there. The goal however, is not to have children matter of local history in a global capitalist landscape. The
who will stay overseas, but rather children who will return patriotism expressed through working for foreign companies
to China having skipped a few rungs on the corporate is clearly linked to China’s national history of reform and
ladder and broken through the glass ceiling. This is distinct the state’s various ideological projects. Even if only
from discussions of overseas Chinese being tainted by the peripherally related, these factors lend credibility to the
West, and represents the new version of Chinese identity in meritocracy white-collar workers see on a national level and
an era of globalization. Yunxiang Yan describes this as the manner in which they naturalize their social alignments.
“managed globalization”—a situation in which “the state Yet, the global glass ceiling is intimately connected to
plays a leading role, and the elites and the populace work geopolitical and economic hierarchies within global
together to actively claim ownership of the emerging global capitalism. Each facet of the white-collar identity discussed
culture” in China (2002:44). requires consideration of multiple influences. Likewise,
In terms of class position within China, this emphasis on white-collar workers are sure to impact social alignments
strategies to equip the next generation with the skills needed nationally and globally as they negotiate the contexts in
for white collar work in foreign-invested companies demon- which they operate: as women choose whom and whom not
strates the speed with which gate-keeping mechanisms are to marry, as parents prepare for their children to make the
being established as white- collar workers seek to give their next leap in global capitalism, and as actions in a global
children a competitive edge. The desire to educate children arena are taken in the name of patriotism.
abroad is certainly not limited to this class segment, but it Contrary to anthropological tradition, I have not chosen
does stand in contrast to how this generation speaks of their a social group at the bottom or the very top of the capitalist
own experience on a national level. While they consider their pyramid. Instead, I have taken a slice from the middle of the
own success to be the result of hard work and a bit of luck, it global hierarchy, in hopes of illuminating the highly nuanced
seems the next generation will require more economic capital ways in which the intersection of different modes of
to overcome the global inequalities in the workplace. production and the “interplay of forces” create quite distinct
Economic reform has seemingly meant the change and unique social identities (Wolf 1982). The example of
from a Maoist view of labor as “natural resource” to China’s white-collar workers demonstrates how global
a capitalist view of labor as commodity (see Davis 1990 for a capitalism creates both “wider unity” as well as “diversity”
detailed discussion of this). Yet, there is something in (Wolf 1982:383). There are concomitant spheres of influence
the patriotic sentiment of white-collar professionals’ work generating new and changing social alignments, and at
contributing to China’s development that blends these polemic the same time given the way these spheres overlap, they are
views of labor. By developing oneself as a commodity necessarily connected in how individuals impact the contexts
within the global labor market, one is providing a greater in which they operate. In negotiating a local situation, an
natural resource for China’s quest as a world economic individual is simultaneously reacting to relationships on both
power. Moreover, the nation’s emerging market economy a national and global scale. Agents not only hold multiple
has global business flocking to China, but it seems that the and overlapping identities in the social arenas they
next level of engagement with global capitalism entails participate in, but moreover they are able to simultaneously
China going to the world, and then returning home again to negotiate these multiple activities.
fulfill the next era of patriotic duty through work.
Throughout this understanding of the market economy Acknowledgments
is the complicated meshing of socialist and capitalist modes Research for this article was generously funded
of production. The unique history and current environment through grants from the University of California, the Urban
of China’s market reforms has impacted not just the social China Research Network and the Wenner-Gren Foundation.
This article derived much inspiration from my opportunity 8This was the case when I was Wuhan (1996–97). Out of
to present at the 2005 American Anthropological Association more than 120 students majoring in International Economics
conference, and I owe much gratitude to the audience and Foreign Trade, less than 20% were male. I have in the
members, my co-panelists and our discussant, Elizabeth course of fieldwork asked both academics and white collars
Dunn, who provide thoughtful insight and commentary on about this situation and have been told that indeed these
my research. The patience and detailed comments provided tracks of study are most often dominated by women.
by anonymous reviewers for the Eric R. Wolf Student Paper 9See Carla Freeman’s (2000) work on dataworkers in
Competition were of immeasurable assistance in the revision Barbados for a discussion of gender and women workers
process. I, of course, take responsibility for any failings. both in relation to both corporate and local gender ideologies.
Freeman points out the process of negotiation that occurs as
Notes both corporate and local ideologies are “reshap[ed] in
1I do not, in the space of this article, consider the relation to one another” (2000:104). It is this two-way process
earlier democracy demonstrations of 1978–1979. I emphasize of adaptation that most closely reflects the situation of white
Tiananmen demonstrations for the reason of the global collar women in China, particularly given the high demand
attention they received and the relative severity of the for white collar employees with foreign language skills.
10See Susan Brownell’s (2001) work for a discussion of
crackdown on private businesses.
2For example, in Wuhan (one of the cities with magazines targeted towards white collars and the notion of
exceptionally large demonstrations) university students urbanity.
11It is further significant that no one I have ever come
were required to attend political education classes for six
hours a week and this remained the case up until 1997 across refers to themselves as xin Shanghairen. The assumed
when I taught at a university there. supremacy of being new Shanghaiese as opposed to “old
3For example, Nokia has sponsored programs in other” is in and of itself insulting given the arrogance for
telecommunications in the Yangtze Delta Region, and the which Shanghai culture is renowned. However the rejection
French government sponsored French language training for of this term may also suggest that rural and “other” origins
students at universities in Wuhan, where Citroen and are significant in day-to-day interaction of white-collars.
12For the purposes of this article, PRC Chinese refers to
Renault have operations.
4Prior to 1997, many employees of state-owned enterprises those executives born and raised in the so-called “mainland”.
were provided housing as part of their compensation packages. I do not include Taiwan, Macau, or Hong Kong in the
Housing varied greatly in quality and comfort depending on category of PRC Chinese. See Gordon Mathews (2000) for a
the resources of the SOE in which one was employed, as well discussion of Hong Kong self-identifying practices through
as one’s position and personal connections (guanxi). With the which they differentiate themselves from PRC Chinese.
13 Chinese, as discussed in this section, refers to Han
housing reforms of 1997, SOE employees were able to buy
their homes at preferential mortgage rates. The extent to Chinese. I regret that there is not space to consider the role
which individuals and families were able to capitalize on this of Han Chinese rule in the development of Chinese race
reform was largely dependent on the location and quality of ideologies, but refer the reader to volumes edited by Tu
their state-assigned housing. Wei-ming (1991a) and Stevan Harrell (1995) for excellent
5Exceptions to this include corporations who were discussions of historical and contemporary development of
among the first to enter the China market and set up Chinese race ideologies.
operations in the early to mid- 1980s, as well as industries
that require strong connections in government. In other cases,
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