Theoretical Terms and Partial Definitions

Author(s): John A. Winnie

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 32, No. 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1965), pp. 324-328
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
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 THIEORETICALTERMS AND PARTIAL DEFINITIONS*

JOHN A. WINNIE
U-niversity of Mi-n-nesota

The problem of the interpretation of theoretical terms is outlined, and soome diffi-
culties connected with the distinction between partial definitions and empirical postu-
lates are discussed. A reconstruction is sketched which is intended to explicate the
'definitional' character of partial definitions. Finally, some implications for the metho-
dology of theory construction are indicated.

In this paper I shall try to clarifythe view that some statementscan partiallydefine
some of the terms which they contain. Some writers hold that the theoretical terms
of the special sciences can be so defined, and these defining statements are variously
called "conditional definitions," "reduction chains," or "A-true statements" ([1]
cf. p. 63, [2], pp. 56-62, [5], p. 170). I shall here refer to them as "partialdefinitions."
But, unfortunately,there has thus far been lacking a satisfactorycharacterizationof
these "partial definitions." The following is an attempt to explicate this concept,
and to indicate some results for the logic of theory construction.
Logicians and mathematicians distinguish several sorts of definitions, and the
simplest is the "explicit" [Link] a calculus,an explicit definitionmerely amounts
to introducing an abbreviation; if the calculus is a language (i.e., interpreted),the
definiendum is synonymous with the definiens, and hence can be replaced by the
definiens in any formula without changing that formula's meaning. Moreover,
explicit definitionsare 'noncreative,'i.e., the addition of a statement having the form
of an explicit definitioncreatesno new theorems formulatedin the originalvocabulary
alone. Roughly, these are the main logical characteristicsof explicit definitions.
Considernext the position of the philosopherwho holds that theoreticalterms play
a logicallynon-trivialrole in scientifictheories. Accordingto this view, the introduction
of theoreticalterms is not merely a useful device for making predictions. Theoretical
terms refer to properties of the physical world, and both theoretical statements and
observationstatements are said to be "true" (or "false") in exactly the same sense.,
From this it follows that the realist (as I shall call one who holds this view) denies that
theoreticalterms can be explicitlydefinedby observationterms alone.2But at the same
time, theoreticalterms have empiricalsignificance,and most realists would hold that
this significance derives from some sort of a connection with observation terms or
statements. But if explicit definitions cannot provide the required connection, then
some alternativemust be sought, and one approachis to hold that, althoughtheoretical
terms cannot be explicitlydefined, some statementscan constitute "partial"definitions
of theoreticalterms.
At this point, a serious difficulty arises. If the defined terms in partial definitions
* Received, September, 1964.
1 The general approach, as far as terminology is concerned, is Carnap's, (cf. [3]). An obser-
vation statement is a statement which contains only observation terms as its descriptive signs.
Theoretical statements are statements containing at least one theoretical term.
2 Usually the argument proceeds from the impossibility of explicit definitions to the realistic

position.
324

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 THEORETICAL TERMS AND PARTIAL DEFINITIONS 325

do not have the characteristicsof eliminability, synonymy with the definiens, etc.,
then why call such statements "definitions"at all? In particular,what distinguishes
a partial definition from an empirical postulate? This criticism can be clarified by
making a few distinctions.
Some statements in a scientific object language may have the form of explicit
definitions,3 an example is "(x)(T1x 01x * 02x)." But this statement might, in
a particular reconstruction, be an empirical postulate. The usual way of indicating
that the above statement functions as a definition is to add, in the metalanguage
"T1x -def. Ox1 * 02x." The same purpose could be served by "(..O, T..) is a defi-
nition," when it is understood that, in such contexts, '(..0, T..)' must have the form
of an explicit definition. But suitability of form does not necessitate choosing a
particular statement as a definition; to this extent, then, the choice of a theory's
explicit definitions is arbitrary. But there are, of course, limits; "(Ex)(Tlx * 01x)," for
example, cannot function as an explicit definition, and this is because it does not have
the required form. So when the critic points to arbitrariness in the selection of partial
definitions, I take it that he refers, not to that same kind of arbitrariness which equally
attaches to the selection of explicit definitions, but to the fact that the notion "having
the form of a partial definition" has never been made quite clear. Here I must agree
with the critic, and I now propose the following explication as a rejoinder.
First of all, a concept of "definition" must be constructed which will contain
explicit definitions and partial definitions as special cases. A clue to the direction which
should be taken lies in the logical "harmlessness," or "non-creativity," of definitions.
In the case of explicit definitions, this "harmlessness" is a result of the eliminability
of the definiendum, and its synonymy with the definiens. But perhaps eliminability
is just a special case of compliance with a broader requirement; how this might be
arranged will be shown after some convenient abbreviatiorns have been introduced.
In what follows, we shall consider a formalized language L with observational
vocabulary 0 and theoretical vocabulary T; 0 and T, then, are classes of predicates.4
Let "(..O..)" represent any formula containing only members of 0 as descriptive
terms, and "(..O, T..)" represent any formula containing only members of 0 and
exactly one member of T as descriptive terms. Where A and B are formulas, "A z'B"
is to mean "A logically implies B," and "=> A" is to mean "A is logically true."
It then follows that A =>-B if and only if => (A D B). I shall say that a formula is
logically true if, and only if, it comes out true in all (non-empty) domains for all
interpretations of its non-logical signs.
The problem now is to pin down the sense in which statements which have the
form of definitions are "harmless" additions to a language. Statements which have
this property will here be called "definitionals." I submit the following as conditions
of adequacy which any characterization of definitionals must meet. If a formula A is
a definitional of the term in T with respect to the terms in 0, then
(CAl) A is of the form (..O, T..), and '(..O, T..)' is the conjunction of all putative
definitionals of the term in T,
(CA2) Not => A and not = A, and
(CA3) For all (..O..)1, if A => (..O..),, then => (..O..),.

3 A statement has the form of an explicit definition if and only if it is of the form "(x1) ... (x")
(TxL, ...,x,n - Ox1, ..., xn)," where "Tx,, ..., x,," is an n-place predicate (the definiendum),
and "Ox1, ..., Xn" is a formula (the definiens) containing exactly n free variables.
4 For simplicity's sake, it is assumed that predicates are the only descriptive signs in L.

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326 JOHN A. WINNIE

CAl and CA2 are fairly obvious; the last clause of CAl is necessary since, while
each of (..O, T..)1, (..O, T..)2, ..., (..O, T..), may satisfy CA3, their conjunction may
not (for an example, see fn. 5); CA2 merely requires that definitionals be neither
logically true nor self-contradictory.CA3, however, goes to the heart of the matter.
It requires that definitionalsof T-terms with respect to 0-terms logically entail only
logically true observation statements. Hence, if the theoretical terms of a scientific
languageare definedby statementswhich satisfy CAl, 2, and 3, these statements,taken
alone, will have no contingentobservationalconsequences.5This is the sense in which
these conditions of adequacycapturethe harmlessnessof definitions.
All statements having the form of explicit definitions satisfy CAl, 2, and 3, and
thus are [Link] definitionals,however,are not statementshaving the form of
explicit [Link],any definitional,(..O, T..), when conjoinedwith any
observation statement, (..O..),, to yield an observation statement (.-.O.)21 occurs
evacuously'in the antecedent,since in all such cases, (..O..), alone will logically imply
(..O.')2 (this follows directlyfrom CA3).6Thus, againwe see the observationalbarren-
ness of definitionals,and it is this which constitutes their logical harmlessnesswith
respect to the definingvocabularyin general.
It now remains only to define "definitionals,"and to demonstratethe adequacyof
the proposed definition. Let me mention again, to avoid confusion, that when a
statement is characterizedas a definitional,it is only then a candidatefor a definition;
whether or not the statementis in fact adoptedas a definitionwill depend on the parti-
cular [Link] adequatedefinitionis:
Def. 1 A statementA in L is a definitionalif and only if A is of the form (..O, T..),
not =>A and not => A, and =>(ET)(..O, T..).7
-

Since requirementsCAl and CA2 are directly incorporatedinto Def. 1, it is only

necessaryto show that CA3 is satisfied;this is accomplishedby the followingtheorems.
Th. 1 If (..O, T..) => (..O..), and =>(ET)(..O, T..), then z> (..O..),, for all (..O..),.
Proof: If (..O, T..) > (..O..),, then =>(..O, T..) D (..O..),. Hence, =>(T)((..O, T..)
D (..O..)). Since the quantifiedterm occurs only in the antecedent, we have =>(ET)
(..O, T..) D (..O..),. This gives: (ET)(..O, T..) => (..O..),. If A =>B, and -> A, then
> B. Hence, if =>(ET)(..O, T..), then > (..O..),.
Th. 2 If not (=> (ET)(..O, T..)), then (..O, T..) logically implies some contingent
statement in the 0-vocabulary only.
Proof: Case 1: (ET)(..O, T..) is [Link] so is (..O, T..). Hence
(..O, T..) logically implies any statement, in particular, any contingent observation
statement.
Case 2: (ET)(..O, T..) is contingent. But (..O, T..) logically implies (ET)(..O, T..)
-a contingent statement having only 0-terms as descriptivesigns.
5 Consider the bilateral reduction sentence '(x)(Ox D 02x - Tlx)' for the theoretical term
"T1." Taken by itself, this statement entails only logically true statements of the form '(..O..).'
When conjoined with '(x) (03x D 04x - Tlx),' however, we can deduce the contingent obser-
vation sentence '(x)(01x * 03X D 02X - 04x).' Hence, the conjunction is not a definitional,
while either conjunct is. Def. 3 states the general requirements which any such conjunction
must fulfill to be usable as a definition ([4] cf. pp. 28-29).
6 This consequence amounts to the "Criterion of Non-Creativity," as formulated by P. Suppes,
([6] p. 154). This connection was pointed out to me by Professor Wesley Salmon.
7 "(ET)" here represents the existential quantification over the predicate contained in T.

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 THEORETICAL TERMS AND PARTIAL DEFINITIONS 327

Cor. 3 CA3 if, and only if, z> (ET)(..O, T..).

Proof: Result follows immediatelyfrom Ths. I and 2.
Cor. 3 shows that Def. 1 doesmeet the stated conditions of adequacy.
It would certainlybe unfortunateif a finite numberof definitionals,when conjoined,
might in some cases entail a contingent [Link] following theorem
settles this question.
Th. 4 If (..O, T..) * (..O, T2..) ... (..0, Tn..) =>(..O..),, and (..O, T..),
(..0, T2..), ... ,(..0, Tn..) are all definitionals, then =>(..O..),, for all (..O..),.
Proof: (I shall just take the case of any pair of definitionals;the extension to the
general case is obvious.)
Suppose (..O, TP..) *(..O, T2..). =>(..O..),, where each conjunctof the antecedentis
a definitional. It now follows that =>((..0, T1..)D .(..0, T2..) D (..O..)J). Hence,
=>(T')((..O, Ti..) D .(..0, T2..) D (..O..)J). Since "T"'' occurs only in the antecedent,
we have: =>(ET-)(..O, TI..)D .(..O, T..) D (..O..),. This gives: (ET')(..O, TP..)
=> .(..O, T2..) D (..O..)J. Since (..O, T..) is a definitional, > (ET-)(..O, TV..).Hence
=- (..O, T2..) D (..O..),. Thus, (..O, T2..) > (..O..)1. Since (..O, T2..) is a definitional,
it logically implies only logically true observationstatements. But (..O..), is an obser-
vation statement; hence it is logically true.
With Def. 1, and a proof of its adequacy,we now have a precise characterizationof
definitionals. Now, some definitionals will have the form of explicit definitions;
the remainingdefinitionalswill be said to have the form of partialdefinitions.
Def. 2 A statementA in L has theform of a partial definitionif, and only if, A is a
definitionalwhich does not have the form of an explicit definition.
Supposing now that the idea of "having the form of a partial definition" is fairly
precise, what are some implicationsfor the logic of theory construction?I shall now
outline one approach to the problem of interpreting theoretical terms. A physical
theory reconstructedin L will contain at least three kinds of postulates: 1) a set of
observation statements; 2) a set of statements of the form (..T..); and 3) a set of
statementsof the form (..O, T..), which are sometimescalled, with some qualifications,
"ecorrespondencerules." In connection with the correspondencerules, I make the
following proposal.A number of sub-classes of the correspondencerules will contain
only definitionals, in particular, statements having the form of partial definitions.
Let us call such sub-classes "definitionalclasses."8We shall say that a definitional
class interpretsa class T of theoreticalterms if, and only if, for every member of T,
there is a definitional which contains T in the definitional class. In any particular
reconstruction, then, some definitional class-a sub-class of the correspondence
rules-will function as partial definitions for some (hopefully, all) of the theoretical
terms. The remainderof the correspondencerules are then to be regardedas empirical
postulates.
There is, of course, nothing originalabout this approach(cf. [5]). But in the present
development,the conditionswhich any choice of correspondencerules must meet are
spelled out clearly, and along with this, the justificationfor attributinga definitional
8 For some purposes, it may be desirable to broaden the notion of a definitional class to allow

for "sequences" of definitionals where each new term is defined with respect to all of the 0-terms
plus those introduced by definitionals which occur earlier in the sequence.

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328 JOHN A. WINNIE

character to the chosen rules. It would be imprudent, however, to claim that all
theoretical terms can be so defined (I cannot now see, e.g., how metrical concepts
could be introduced by this method); the claim, rather, is that the method of partial
definitions, when applicable, provides an intelligible account of the way in which
theoreticalterms acquire empiricalsignificance.

REFERENCES

[1] CARNAP, R., Foundations of Logic and Mathematics.

[2] CARNAP, R., "Testability and Meaning," reprinted in part in Feigl & Brodbeck, Readings
in the Philosoplhy of Science.
[3] CARNAP, R., "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts" in Feigl & Scriven,
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I.
[4] HEMPEL, C., Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science.
[5] MAXWELL, G., "Meaning Postulates in Scientific Theories," in Feigl & Maxwell, Current
Issues in the Philosophy of Science.
[6] SUPPES,P., Introduction to Logic.

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