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EMV stands for Europay, MasterCard and VISA, the global standard for inter-operation of integrated circuit cards (IC cards or "chip cards") and IC card capable point of sale (POS) terminals and automated teller machines (ATMs), for authenticating credit and debit card transactions. It is a joint effort between Europay, MasterCard and Visa to ensure security and global interoperability so that Visa and MasterCard cards can continue to be accepted everywhere. Europay International SA was absorbed into MasterCard in 2002. JCB (formerly Japan Credit Bureau) joined the organization in December 2004, and American Express joined in February 2009. IC card systems based on EMV are being phased in across the world, under names such as "IC Credit" and "Chip and PIN".
Credit card with EMV chip. The 3 by 5 mm chip embedded in the card is shown enlarged in the inset. The contact pads on the card enable electronic access to the chip
The EMV standards define the interaction at the physical, electrical, data and application levels between IC cards and IC card processing devices for financial transactions. There are standards based on ISO/IEC 7816 for contact cards, and standards based on ISO/IEC 14443 for contactless cards. The first standard for payment cards was the Carte Bancaire B0' standard deployed in France in 1989. Geldkarte in Germany also predates EMV. EMV was designed to allow cards and terminals to be backwardly compatible with these standards. France has since migrated all its card and terminal infrastructure to EMV. The most widely known chip card implementations of EMV standard are: • • • • VSDC - VISA MChip - MasterCard AEIPS - American Express J Smart - JCB
Visa and MasterCard have also developed standards for using EMV cards in devices to support card-not-present transactions over the telephone and Internet. MasterCard has the Chip Authentication Program (CAP) for secure e-commerce. Its implementation is known as EMV-CAP and supports a number of modes. Visa has the Dynamic Password Authentication (DPA) scheme, which is their implementation of CAP using different default values. In February 2010 computer scientists from Cambridge University demonstrated that an implementation of EMV PIN entry is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack; however, the way PINs are processed depends on the capabilities of the card and the terminal. This attack is not a general weakness, but it does show that attacks are possible depending on the implementation. In May 2010, a press release from Gemalto (a global EMV card producer) indicated that United Nations Federal Credit Union in New York would become the first EMV card issuer in the US, offering an EMV Visa credit card to its customers.
. while cryptographic operations take comparatively little time. and sending a response. The processing time is comparable to online transactions. the system being implemented in the UK) see Chip and PIN. The use of a PIN and cryptographic algorithms such as DES. the majority of implementations of EMV cards and terminals confirm the identity of the cardholder by requiring the entry of a PIN (Personal Identification Number) rather than signing a paper receipt. For more details of this (specifically. and did not inadvertently assist the transaction through PIN disclosure. Whether or not PIN authentication takes place depends upon the capabilities of the terminal and programming of the card. Using this protocol. EMV commands ISO/IEC 7816-3 defines the transmission protocol between chip cards and readers. Although not the only possible method. Triple-DES. in which communications delay accounts for the majority of the time. a credit and debit card application or an e-purse. data is exchanged in application protocol data units (APDUs). One of the original goals of EMV was to allow for multiple applications to be held on a card: for instance. the card processing it. The supposed increased protection from fraud has allowed banks and credit card issuers to push through a 'liability shift' such that merchants are now liable (as from 1 January 2005 in the EU region) for any fraud that results from transactions on systems that are not EMV capable. did not authorize the transaction. EMV uses the following commands: • • • • • • • • • • • • application block application unblock card block external authenticate (7816-4) generate application cryptogram get data (7816-4) get processing options internal authenticate (7816-4) PIN change / unblock read record (7816-4) select (7816-4) verify (7816-4) Commands followed by "7816-4" are defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 and are interindustry commands used for many chip card applications such as GSM SIM cards. RSA and SHA provide authentication of the card to the processing terminal and the card issuer's host system. There are two major benefits to moving to smart card based credit card payment systems: improved security (with associated fraud reduction). This comprises sending a command to a card. and the possibility for finer control of "offline" credit card transaction approvals. For transactions in which an EMV card is used. the cardholder is assumed to be liable unless they can unquestionably prove they were not present for the transaction. EMV chip card transactions improve security against fraud compared to magnetic stripe card transactions that rely on the holder's signature and visual inspection of the card to check for features such as hologram.EMV 2 Differences and benefits of EMV The purpose and goal of the EMV standard is to specify interoperability between EMV compliant IC cards and EMV compliant credit card payment terminals throughout the world.
The way application selection is prescribed in EMV is far more complicated than it need be and is a frequent source of interoperability problems between cards and terminals. which is issued by the ISO/IEC 7816-5 registration authority.) have to have their own application rather than there being an "EMV" application.g. MasterCard etc. Book 1  of the EMV standard devotes 15 pages to describing the application selection process. GSM and EMV. The AID is printed on all EMV cardholder receipts. This is followed by a proprietary application identifier extension (PIX) which enables the application provider to differentiate between the different applications offered. An AID consists of a registered application provider identifier (RID) of five bytes. which would have been much simpler. Card scheme Visa RID Product PIX 1010 2010 2020 8010 AID A0000000031010 A0000000032010 A0000000032020 A0000000038010 A0000000041010 A0000000043060 A0000000046000 A0000000050001 A0000000050002 A00000002501 A0000000291010 A000000003 Visa credit or debit Visa Electron V PAY Plus MasterCard A000000004 MasterCard credit or debit 1010 Maestro (debit card) 3060 Cirrus (interbank network) 6000 UK Domestic Maestro .EMV 3 EMV transaction flow An EMV transaction has the following steps: • • • • • • • • • • Application selection Initiate application processing Read application data Processing restrictions Offline data authentication (not carried out in ATMs) Cardholder verification Terminal risk management Terminal action analysis First card action analysis Online transaction authorisation (only carried out if required by the result of the previous steps.Switch (debit card) A000000005 Maestro UK  Solo American Express LINK (UK) ATM network ZKA Consorzio BANCOMAT A000000025 American Express A000000029 ATM card A000000359 Girocard A000000141 PagoBANCOMAT 0001 0002 01 1010 1010028001 A0000003591010028001 0001 A0000001410001 . The intent of application selection was to allow cards to contain completely different applications e. EMV however took application selection to be a way of identifying the type of product so that all product issuers (Visa. mandatory in ATMs) • Second card action analysis • Issuer script processing Application selection ISO/IEC 7816 defines a process for application selection. An application identifier (AID) is used to address an application in the card.
a list of files and records that the terminal needs to read from the card. The AFL contains the files that contain EMV data. Three data elements read in the previous step are checked. The card responds with the application interchange profile (AIP). Support of CDA in devices may be needed. Offline data authentication Offline data authentication is a cryptographic check to makes sure that the card is valid using Public-key cryptography. but for all transactions made with an expired card to be performed on-line. Data in these files is stored in BER TLV format. These all need to be read using the read record command. the components of which form the basis of an accept/decline decision later in the transaction flow. so all the files need to be read. There are three different processes that can be undertaken depending on the card: • Static data authentication (SDA) ensures data read from the card has been signed by the card issuer. The card also provides the application file locator (AFL). EMV defines tag values for all data used in card processing. • Dynamic data authentication (DDA) provides protection against modification of data and cloning. but does not prevent cloning. card issuers to permit their cardholders to continue to use expired cards after their expiry date.) • Application effective/expiration dates checking If any of these checks fail. The terminal sets the appropriate bit in the terminal verification results (TVR). This feature allows. for example. Offline data authentication is never carried out at ATMs. This process is not mandatory in terminals and can ony be carried out where both card and terminal support it. This prevents modification of data. The PDOL (a list of tags and lengths of data elements) is optionally provided by the card to the terminal during application selection. Read application data Smart cards store data in files. as this process has been implemented in specific markets. EMV does not specify which files data is stored in. a list of functions to be performed in processing the transaction. . Processing restrictions The purpose of the processing restrictions is to see if the card should be used. the card is not necessarily declined. • Combined DDA/generate application cryptogram (CDA) combines DDA with the generation of a card's application cryptogram to assure card validity. When issuing this command. the terminal supplies the card with any data elements requested by the card in the processing options data objects list (PDOL). • Application version number • Application usage control (This shows whether the card is only for domestic use etc.EMV 4 Initiate application processing The terminal sends the get processing options command to the card.
Terminal risk management checks the transaction amount against a floor limit (above which transactions should be processed on-line). sent online for authorization. It is also possible to have a 1 in n online counter. The CVM list establishes a priority of CVMs to be used relative to the capabilities of the terminal. Terminal risk management Terminal risk management is only performed in devices where there is a decision to be made whether a transaction should be authorised on-line or offline. An online only device such as an ATM always attempts to go on-line with the authorization request. They are: • • • • • • • • Signature Offline plaintext PIN Offline enciphered PIN Offline plaintext PIN and signature Offline enciphered PIN and signature Online PIN No CVM required Fail CVM processing The terminal uses a CVM list read from the card to determine the type of verification to be performed. Depending on the terminals decision (offline. online. ATMs generally support online PIN. Because the floor limit is set to zero. the only relevant Terminal verification results bit is “Service not allowed”. this step can be missed. ATMs) or always off-line. Different terminals support different CVMs.EMV 5 Cardholder verification Cardholder verification is used to evaluate whether the person presenting the card is the legitimate cardholder. If transactions are always carried out on-line (e. or declined offline. Online only devices do not need to perform IAC-default processing. unless declined off-line due to Issuer action codes—Denial settings. There are many cardholder verification methods (CVMs) supported in EMV. First card action analysis One of the data objects read from the card in the Read application data stage is CDOL1 (Card Data object List). the terminal sets the appropriate bit in the terminal verification results (TVR). Terminal action analysis The results of previous processing steps are used to determine whether a transaction should be approved offline. decline) the terminal requests one of the following cryptograms from the card: • Transaction certificate (TC)—Offline approval • Authorization Request Cryptogram (ARQC)—Online authorization • Application Authentication Cryptogram (AAC)—Offline decline . This is done using a combination of Terminal action codes (TACSs) which are held in the terminal and Issuer action codes (IACs) which are read from the card. POS terminals vary in their support of CVM depending on their type and in which country they are located. and a check against a hot card list (which is only necessary for off-line transaction). This object is a list of tags that the card want to be sent to it to make a decision on whether to approve or decline a transaction (including transaction amount. for an online only device. When an online only device performs IAC—Online and TAC—Online processing the only relevant TVR bit is “Transaction value exceeds the floor limit”. the transaction should always go online and all other values in TAC—Online or IAC—Online are irrelevant. During IAC—Denial and TAC—Denial processing.g. If the result of any of these test is positive. The terminal sends this data and requests a cryptogram using the generate application cryptogram command. but many other data objects too).
such as PCI-DSS. The card generates the ARQC. device certification) is issued by EMVCo following submission of results of testing performed by an accredited testing house. which covers physical. but can return an ARQC when a TC has been asked for.). which covers payment application selection and credit financial transaction processing. Control of the EMV standard The first version of EMV standard was published in 1995. This lets the card know the issuer's response. The ARQC is sent in the authorisation message. MasterCard MChip. and Visa.EMV This step gives the card the opportunity to accept the terminal's action analysis or to decline a transaction or force a transaction on-line.g. MasterCard Worldwide. The card application may then reset offline usage limits. American Express AEIPS. Even if for any reason the terminal could not go online (e. The issuer responds to an authorisation request with a response code (accepting or declining the transaction). Issuer script processing If a card issuer wants to update a card post issuance it can send commands to the card using issuer script processing. American Express. JCB JSmart. or change card parameters. Recognition of compliance with the EMV standard (i. EMV Compliance testing has two levels: EMV Level 1. The EMVCo standards have been integrated into the broader electronic payment security standards being developed by the Secure POS Vendor Alliance. with a specific effort to develop a common interpretation of EMVCo's place relative to. and EMV Level 2. Its format depends on the card application. Now the standard is defined and managed by the public corporation EMVCo LLC . other existing security standards. Inc. communication failure). or Interac in Canada. The ARQC created by the card application is a digital signature of the transaction details which can be checked in real time by the card issuer. Second card action analysis CDOL2 (Card data object list) contains a list of tags that the card wants to be sent following online transaction authorisation (response code ARPC etc. After passing common EMVCo tests. . The card cannot return a TC when an ARQC has been asked for. Each of these organizations owns one quarter of EMVCo and has representatives in the EMVCo organization and EMVCo working groups. so are meaningless to the terminal. Issuer scripts are encrypted between the card and the issuer. and interactions with. the software must be certified by payment brands to comply with proprietary EMV implementations such as VISA VSDC. EMV does not specify the contents of the ARQC. the terminal should send this data to the card again using the generate authorisation cryptogram command.The current members of EMVCo are JCB International. Issuer script can be used to block cards. or EMV-compliant implementations of non-EMVCo members such as LINK in the UK.e. This provides a strong cryptographic check that the card is genuine. an authorisation response cryptogram (ARPC) and optionally an issuer script (a string of commands to be sent to the card). 6 Online transaction authorisation Transactions go online when a ARQC has been requested. electrical and transport level interfaces.
0. 27 October 2004.Cardholder. "Fraudsters show how to beat chip and pin"  BBC News Online.0 in December 2000.Application Specification Book 4  . Poor print exposing Pin numbers  25 Aug 2005 The Guardian.0 in 1996 with later amendments to EMV3. that define all the components in an EMV payment system.1 in 1998 This was further amended to version 4. 16 October 2009  . Version 4. the official EMV standard documents. and Acquirer Interface Requirements Versions First EMV standard came into view in 1995 as EMV 2. Attendant. are published as four "books": • • • • Book 1  .0 became effective in June 2004.EMV 7 List of EMV documents and standards Since version 4.0. This was upgraded to EMV 3. version EMV 4.Security and Key Management Book 3  .2 is in effect since June 2008.1. "Safety in numbers? Not likely"  Chip and SPIN !  (critical website) The Inquirer: Does he take PINs with his chips?  (critical editorial) Attack methods against Chip & PIN (EMV)  (academic research site) New Law Journal: statistical and legal analysis of claimed card fraud.1 became effective in June 2007. 5 September 2005.Application Independent ICC to Terminal Interface Requirements Book 2  . Version. Vulnerabilities Examples • • • • • • • The Guardian. 4.
PINs obtained in this way are only of use if the card is then stolen. the card is stolen from the machine's slot and used with the PIN obtained by pinhole camera or binocular observation from a distance. and defective cards. Hidden pinhole camera on cash machines are sometimes used by criminals to harvest PINs. there have been instances where a customer is told by a "friendly bystander" that they have dropped £5 after they have inserted the card and entered the PIN. A card alone without PIN can be used in a merchant's terminal which allows authorisation by magnetic strip—such terminals are increasingly rare in countries using EMV—but not in an ATM until 2010. can be used. A card can be used in a PIN terminal without entering a valid PIN using malicious special hardware announced by researchers in February 2010.EMV 8 Decreased security for PINs A PIN alone obtained by an unauthorised person is not enough for fraudulent card use. in terminal devices which permit fallback to magstripe processing for foreign customers without chip cards. Again. EMV cards generally have identical data encoded on the chip which is read as part of the normal EMV transaction process. Indirect observation Security cameras at the cash register intended to deter shoplifters and thieves may compromise the security of Chip and PIN by recording customers entering PINs if recordings are not dealt with securely. A PIN can. clone the card and know the PIN for use in ATMs that allow magnetic stripe authorisation. allowing a fraudster to footage from security cameras (as above). it is not known if this vulnerability has been exploited by criminals. the environment is more open and public. Direct observation It is always possible to find a PIN by watching it being typed in ("shoulder surfing"). usually in conjunction with card theft. allowing construction of a magnetic stripe card which. be used in conjunction with a cloned magnetic strip or a card which is stolen or misused. for example. Consequently criminals attempt to obtain both card and PIN. For example. or anyone with access to in systems which swipe the magnetic stripe. This attack is possible only where (a) the offline PIN is presented in plaintext by the PIN entry device to the card.. The use of PINs by all merchants accepting cards has increased the opportunities to observe PINs. where (b) magstripe fallback is permitted by the card . Before Chip and PIN this could happen at an ATM in a bank or other relatively secure area. then the attacker may be able to recover both the track-two data and the PIN. when they bend down to pick it up. while not usable in a chip and PIN terminal. fraudulent use is possible only in conjunction with a stolen card or cloned magnetic stripe. staff.g. Opportunities to harvest PINs and clone magnetic stripes In addition to the track-two data on the magnetic stripe. however. If an EMV reader is compromised to the extent that the conversation between the card and the terminal is intercepted. This would not work in countries (including the UK) where all ATMs require authorisation by chip rather than magnetic stripe. or misused (e. by a family member). A Chip and PIN machine may be observed by Counterfeit PIN pads are sometimes used to log PINs and stripe details other shoppers. and more care is needed to shield the PIN when typing it in to a legitimate terminal.
although tests on cards in February 2008 indicated this may have been delayed. disagreed with the majority of the report. In October 2008 it was reported that hundreds of Chip and PIN readers for use in Britain.  The Cambridge University exploit allowed the experimenters to obtain both card data to create a magnetic stripe and the PIN. When magstripe fallback fraud levels grow. APACS (the UK payments association) stated that such measures would be in place from January 2008. However. a practice endorsed by electronic payment security standards like those being developed by the SPVA. Data were typically used a couple of months after the card transactions to make it harder for investigators to pin down the vulnerability. It was claimed that changes specified to the protocol (specifying different card verification values between the Chip and Magnetic Stripe – the iCVV) rendered this attack ineffective. Successful attacks Conversation-capturing is the form of attack which was reported to have taken place against Shell terminals in May 2006. The fraud reported in October 2008 to have operated for 9 months (see above) was probably in operation at the time. saying: "The types of attack on PIN entry devices detailed in this report are difficult to undertake and not currently economically viable for a fraudster to carry out. an EMV card-present transaction at a UK ATM. Tens of millions of pounds sterling are believed to have been stolen.EMV issuer and (c) where geographic and behavioural checking may not be carried out by the card issuer. It's scary". it is usually permitted when fraud levels are low. there was a very large scale and successful attack which went on for 9 months in 2008 (see below). Demonstration of PIN harvesting and stripe cloning Cambridge University researchers Steven Murdoch and Saar Drimer demonstrated in a February 2008 BBC Newsnight programme one example attack. Denmark. this processing option is disallowed. to illustrate that Chip and PIN is not secure enough to justify passing the liability to prove fraud from the banks onto customers. Within the UK and Ireland. This vulnerability spurred efforts to implement better control of electronic POS devices over their entire life cycle. in order to increase profits and avoid antagonising cardholders by allowing transactions which could not otherwise have taken place. After the fraud was discovered it was found that tampered-with terminals could be identified as the additional circuitry increased their weight by about 100 g. Geographic and behavioural fraud analysis tools are in use by many card issuers to track and decline transactions considered suspicious—for example. US National Counterintelligence Executive Joel Brenner said "Previously only a nation state's intelligence service would have been capable of pulling off this type of operation. but was not discovered for many months. when they were forced to disable all EMV authentication in their petrol stations after more than £1 million was stolen from customers. followed hours later by a magstripe fallback transaction in the Far East. the UK payments association. 9 . plaintext offline PIN is the standard mode of operation and cards which support encrypted offline PIN are rare. the Netherlands." They also said that changes to the protocol (specifying different card verification values between the Chip and Magnetic Stripe – the iCVV) would make this attack ineffective from January 2008. APACS. Permitting magstripe fallback transactions to take place is a risk known to card issuers. despite being common in other countries. and Belgium had been expertly tampered with in China during or shortly after manufacture so that details and PINs of credit and debit cards were sent during the 9 months before over mobile phone networks to criminals in Lahore. Ireland. Pakistan.
" It is not known if this vulnerability has been exploited. and were not picked up by banks' security systems.. with the customer given 13 months to make a claim. We dispute the assertion by the banking industry that criminals are not sophisticated enough. because they have already demonstrated a far higher level of skill than is necessary for this attack in their miniaturized PIN entry device skimmers. inserting a fake card and typing in "0000" as the PIN.. The amount of technical sophistication needed to carry out this attack is really quite low". but UK regulations in force from 1 November 2009 placed the onus firmly on the banks to prove that a customer has been negligent in any dispute. Any 4 digits are typed in and accepted as a valid PIN. it would be extremely difficult and expensive to carry out successfully. Originally bank customers had to prove that they had not been negligent with their PIN before getting redress. The transactions were registered as normal. chip and PIN has helped to bring down instances of card crime. such transactions will never succeed offline as a card will never generate an offline authorisation without a successful PIN entry. but many cases remain unexplained "What we do know is that we do have cases that are brought forward from individuals which seem quite persuasive". out of character or otherwise outside of the typical risk management parameters set by the issuer. and consider refunding these customers because it could be they are victim of this type of fraud". Murdoch said that "[the banks] should look back at previous transactions where the customer said their PIN had not been used and the bank record showed it has.  A stolen card is connected to an electronic circuit and to a fake card which is inserted into the terminal ("man-in-the-middle attack"). EMVCo disagreed and published a response saying that. this is the exact equivalent of a merchant performing a PIN bypass transaction. and referred the Newsnight team to the banking trade association for further comment. A team from the BBC's Newsnight programme visited a Cambridge University cafeteria (with permission) with the system. and that the possible financial gain from the attack is minimal while the risk of a declined transaction or exposure of the fraudster is significant. November/December 2009. The announcement of the vulnerability said "The expertise that is required is not high (undergraduate level electronics) . several banks each said that this was an industry-wide issue.EMV 10 2010: hidden hardware disables PIN checking on stolen card On 11 February 2010 Murdoch and Drimer's team at Cambridge University announced that they had found "a flaw in chip and PIN so serious they think it shows that the whole system needs a re-write" that was "so simple that it shocked them". Because the submission of the PIN is suppressed. A member of the research team said "Even small-scale criminal systems have better equipment than we have. Drimer and Murdoch published a paper with Ross Anderson on the closely related topic of "Failures of Tamper-Proofing in PIN Entry Devices" in IEEE Security and Privacy. while such an attack might be theoretically possible. When approached for comment. and were able to pay using their own cards (a thief would use stolen cards) connected to the circuit. that current compensating controls are likely to detect or limit the fraud. the transaction ARQC must be submitted online to the issuer who will know that the ARQC was generated without a successful PIN submission (since this information is included in the encrypted ARQC) and hence would be very likely to decline the transaction if it were for a high value. . According to Phil Jones of the Consumers' Association. As a result of this.
pdf). aspx?id=4  http:/ / www. com/ download_agreement. retrieved 2010-02-12  BBC: New flaws in chip and pin system revealed. uk/ finance/ personalfinance/ consumertips/ banking/ 6338659/ Bank-payments-13-months-to-dispute-suspicious-transactions. Issued Globally Compliant Payment Card (http:/ / www. uk/ ~sjm217/ papers/ ieeesp09tamper. BBC News. co.11). theregister. bbc. com/ download_agreement.Card fraud: banks now have to prove your guilt. cl. . uk/ blogs/ newsnight/ susanwatts/ 2010/ 02/ new_flaws_in_chip_and_pin_syst. Secure POS Vendor Alliance. html  http:/ / news. com/ download_agreement.1562682. newlawjournal. uk/ 1/ hi/ programmes/ newsnight/ 7265437. 10th October 2008. uk/ flow_chart. uk  http:/ / www. org/ technicalWorking. Computer Laboratory. co. com/ php/ pr_view. co. bbc. html  http:/ / www. The Register. aspx?id=11  http:/ / www. EMVCo. co. 6 May 2006 (http:/ / news. uk/  http:/ / www. cam.bbc. uk/ business/ card_payments/ means/ shift_liability. co. ppt#306. shtml  http:/ / www. org/ Files/ SPVA Press Conference and Customer Meeting CDO final version . telegraph. Gemalto NV.stm Petrol firm suspends chip-and-pin]. emvx. ac. Murdoch. co. ac. php?id=749).00.uk/1/hi/england/4980190. http:/ / www. co. cl. uk/ research/ security/ banking/ nopin/ ). cam. stm)  Organized crime tampers with European card swipe devices. ac. spva. spva. 26 February 2008. theinquirer.  http:/ / www. html)  Failures of Tamper-Proofing in PIN Entry Devices.13802. uk/ 1/ hi/ technology/ 4183330.EMV 11 See also • Supply chain attack References  United Nations Federal Credit Union Selects Gemalto for First U. com/ documents/ EMVCo_response_to_Cambridge_Report. org  SPVA Launch Presentation (http:/ / www. cl. IEEE Security and Privacy. uk/ 2008/ 10/ 10/ organized_crime_doctors_chip_and_pin_machines/  Technical Working Groups.  http:/ / www. http:/ / www. 12 February 2010 (http:/ / www. ac. 2009.1456. cl. retrieved 2010-03-26  Telegraph . and Anderson. com/ download_agreement. chipandspin. guardian. co. gemalto. html). emvco. . uk/ creditanddebt/ creditcards/ story/ 0. bbc. channelregister. pdf) . stm).February 2010) (http:/ / www. co. org/ chip-pin-camera  http:/ / www. chipandpin. aspx/  "Is Chip and Pin really secure?" (http:/ / news. uk/ research/ security/ banking/ ped/  *[http://news. co. uk/ nlj/ content/ chip-pin-fallacies  http:/ / boakes. The UK Cards Association. uk/ 2008/ 02/ 27/ credit_card_reader_security_pants/  EMV PIN verification "wedge" vulnerability (http:/ / www. Drimer. 11 February 2010 (http:/ / www. emvco. November/December 2009 (http:/ / www. Secure POS Vendor Alliance. aspx?id=5  http:/ / www. co. bbc. uk/ consumer/ tv_and_radio/ watchdog/ reports/ insurance_and_finance/ insurance_20070206. html)  Response from EMVCo to the Cambridge University Report on Chip and PIN vulnerabilities ('Chip and PIN is Broken' . co. net/ ?article=27304  http:/ / www. Retrieved 2 May 2010. bbc.co.00. BBC News.  http:/ / www. emvco. emvco.S. co. uk/ scamsandfraud/ story/ 0. co. maestrocard.1336619. co. aspx?id=7  http:/ / money. cam. uk/ 1/ hi/ england/ 4980190. emvco. aspx  http:/ / www. uk/ research/ security/ banking/  http:/ / www. emvco. University of Cambridge. stm  http:/ / money.  Chip and PIN liability Shift (http:/ / www. . cam. guardian. 2009.
co. TLV decoder. the organisation responsible for developing and maintaining the standard • Chip and PIN (http://www.EMV 12 External links • EMVCo (http://www. the UK's central coordinating authority for the implementation of EMV • Chip and SPIN (http://www.ru/docs/HowTo/TAG.aspx).chipandspin.com). site run by the Association For Payment Clearing Services (APACS).uk/).co. a technical guide to EMV transactions. discussion of some security aspects of EMV.info) Smartcard Type-length-value TAGs. samples.uk/). complete with a glossary of terms a flowchart showing the stages of a typical transaction • Selected list of EMV data TAGs (http://cheef.co.emvx.uk/emv_guide. from members of the University of Cambridge Security Group • What is EMV? (http://www. .emvco.chipandpin.
Socrates2008. BonsaiViking. The Thing That Should Not Be. Robindch. Peyna. Davidsteed. Corydon76. Pathoschild. Bliksim.php?oldid=393717488 Contributors: Aurorasophia. Nurg. Optimisteo. Hadseys. CesarB.wikipedia. org/ licenses/ by-sa/ 3. Quidnam.0 Unported http:/ / creativecommons. Ilgicioglu. MikeKn. Banej.png License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3. Web-Crawling Stickler. IMSoP. Bearcat. Stephan Leeds. Dgwbirch. Uncle G. Johnnaylor. Guy Harris. Herbythyme. Edward. Karl-Henner. Barefootguru. MrC. PeterC. Toutoune25. Tonyfaull. Zaian. ClementSeveillac. Qutezuce. The Anome. Woohookitty. ForthOK. Jfdwolff.org/w/index. OwenS. Pol098.jpg Source: http://en. Yintan. Damieng. CharlieMG.Monniaux. Olipro. Pawlov. Licenses and Contributors Image:Smartcard3. Hairy Dude. Mitch Ames. Nigel jewell.png Source: http://en. LindsayH. The wub. EMVSupporter.0 Contributors: User:Channel R Image:chip pin camera flaw. NathanBeach.Article Sources and Contributors 13 Article Sources and Contributors EMV Source: http://en.org/w/index. Yousou. Guffydrawers. Leeatcookerly. EMVCo Board of Managers. H3llbringer.jpg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Ear1grey License Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3. Rbrwr. 0/ . Hopkapi. Logi. Glatk. Frispar.php?title=File:Smartcard3. Kiv. Plop. VISIONTEKTELE. Mike Moreton.wikipedia. Rich Farmbrough. Cancun771. SmitherIsGod. David.php?title=File:Chip_pin_camera_flaw.org/w/index. Mauls. Melsaran.wikipedia. Bovineone. Lotu. 111 anonymous edits Image Sources. Halpernsiegel. Siddhant.
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