Admin Law, Law on Pubic Officers and Election Law

Case Digest: CAMPAIGN

Submitted By: CARMELI APRIL CATTILING

 Admin Law, Law on Pubic Officers and Election Law

1-United Transport Koalisyon vs. Commision on Elections

G.R. NO. 206020 | April 14, 2015
Reyes, J.
Doctrine:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any democracy.
It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular candidate.
The right to express one’s preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free
speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries
with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.
Facts:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the
rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda,
pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether
motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks,
piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the
public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or
terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by
Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of REsolution No.
9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned
public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to
reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
Issue/s:
Whether Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are
constitutional.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for
being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free
speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power of the
COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and
opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative
of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. On a final note, it bears stressing
that the freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of
expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable
feature of the democratic way of life.
 Admin Law, Law on Pubic Officers and Election Law

The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. NO. 205728 | January 21, 2015
Leonen, J.
Doctrine:
All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the
fundamental and preferred right to expression of the electorate during political contests no matter how
seemingly benign will be tolerated.
Facts:
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six feet (6′) by ten
feet (10′) in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the
tarpaulins stated: “Conscience Vote” and lists of candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a
check mark or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay. When the
said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to Bishop Navarra ordering the immediate
removal of the tarpaulin because it was in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the lawful size for
election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be constrained to
file an election offense against the latter. Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, Bishop Navarra, et al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of
Comelec as unconstitutional, and permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice and
hearing.
Issue/s:
Whether the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec has the power
to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.
Ruling:
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted
“in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. Personal opinions,
unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution
No. 9615 defining “political advertisement” or “election propaganda.” The caricature, though not
agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of
death or of life on the basis of a single issue—and a complex piece of legislation at that—can easily be
interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the candidates and party- list organizations. Not all may agree to
the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow
the example of petitioners. But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our
fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be
guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of
others.
 Admin Law, Law on Pubic Officers and Election Law

Penera vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. NO. 181613 | November 25, 2009
Carpio, J.
Doctrine:
Sec.79 (a) of Omnibus Eection Code. A candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has files a certificate of candidacy.
Sec. 15 of RA 8346. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within the period for filling
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate
of candidacy. Unlawful acts or omissions as applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start
of the aforesaid campaign period.
Facts:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of
the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification
against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her
political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 – a day before the start
of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the
different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for
them on the day of the elections.
Penera alone filed an Answer denying the charges but admitted that a motorcade did take place
and that it was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the
filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the
completion of such filing. The COMELEC disqualified Penera but absolved the other candidates from
Penera’s party from violation of section 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue/s:
Whether Penera is liable for premature campaigning.
Ruling:
In the case of Lanot vs. COMELEC, a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign
period.
 The second element requires the existence of a “candidate.” Under Section 79(a), a candidate is
one who “has filed a certificate of candidacy” to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a “candidate.” The third element requires that the campaign period has
not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day,
which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period,
then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such
last day, there is no “particular candidate or candidates” to campaign for or against. On the day
immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since
Section 80 covers only acts done “outside” the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only
apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one
candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for elective
public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007.
Penera filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March
2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March
2007, the date when she became a “candidate,” even if constituting election campaigning or partisan
political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are
within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the
campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign
period.
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start
of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that
“any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can
this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.”
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts
done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that
may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts
before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the
law.
 Admin Law, Law on Pubic Officers and Election Law

Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. NO. 147571 | May 5, 2001
Mendoza, J.
Doctrine:
A Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other
hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: “Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.”
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it
intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections
Issue/s:
Whether the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on
the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that that in The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice
Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien the test should then be employed to determine the constitutional
validity:
Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
 First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression of
free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that
such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, §5.4
shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical
results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."11 The inhibition
of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few unprotected categories
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression
of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet
criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the
governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the
creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election
cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be
attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly
pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates
the danger of such evils.
We hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for
a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other
than suppression of freedom of expression.
 Admin Law, Law on Pubic Officers and Election Law

Chavez vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. NO. 162777 | August 31, 2004
Azcuna, J.
Doctrine:
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people.
To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the
public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power?
and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals?
Facts:
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments
to endorse their products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew So to use his name and
image for 96° North, a clothing company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka
International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation and another corporation involved in the amusement and
video games business, G-Box. These last two agreements were entered into on October 14, 2003 and
November 10, 2003, respectively. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the
Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the plastic
products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the other two showed petitioner
endorsing the clothes of 96° North. One more billboard was set up along Roxas Boulevard showing
petitioner promoting the game and amusement parlors of G-Box.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI, REPORMA,
and Aksyon Demokratiko.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained
Section 32, the provision assailed herein. On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the
said provision by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, on January 29, 2004, by requesting the
COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another
letter dated February 23, 2004, this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application
of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be
construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
Issue/s:
Whether Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the
situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the
other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of
their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power as held in
National Press Club v. COMELEC,2 wherein the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section
11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air time "for
campaigning or other political purposes," except to the COMELEC. The obvious intention of this
provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the
former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." This Court ruled
therein that this objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is
characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of
society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty line.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and
do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, "election
campaign" or "partisan political activity" is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of
a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products,
he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products.
However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and
image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy.
Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to
discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates
for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more
opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do
not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as
image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months,
could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the
public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period.